















THE  
WAR OF THE REBELLION:

A COMPILATION OF THE  
OFFICIAL RECORDS

OF THE  
UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES.

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PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF WAR, BY BVT. LIEUT.  
COL. ROBERT N. SCOTT, THIRD U. S. ARTILLERY,

AND

PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO ACT OF CONGRESS APPROVED JUNE 16, 1880.




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## PREFACE.



By an act approved June 23, 1874, Congress made an appropriation "to enable the Secretary of War to begin the publication of the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, both of the Union and Confederate Armies," and directed him "to have copied for the Public Printer all reports, letters, telegrams, and general orders not heretofore copied or printed, and properly arranged in chronological order."

Appropriations for continuing such preparation have been made from time to time, and the act approved June 16, 1880, has provided "for the printing and binding, under direction of the Secretary of War, of 10,000 copies of a compilation of the Official Records (Union and Confederate) of the War of the Rebellion, so far as the same may be ready for publication, during the fiscal year"; and that "of said number, 7,000 copies shall be for the use of the House of Representatives, 2,000 copies for the use of the Senate, and 1,000 copies for the use of the Executive Departments."\*

This compilation will be the first general publication of the military records of the war, and will embrace all official documents that can be obtained by the compiler, and that appear to be of any historical value.

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\*Volume I to V distributed under act approved June 16, 1880. The act approved August 7, 1882, provides that—

"The volumes of the official records of the war of the rebellion shall be distributed as follows: One thousand copies to the executive departments, as now provided by law. One thousand copies for distribution by the Secretary of War among officers of the Army and contributors to the work. Eight thousand three hundred copies shall be sent by the Secretary of War to such libraries, organizations, and individuals as may be designated by the Senators, Representatives, and Delegates of the Forty-seventh Congress. Each Senator shall designate not exceeding twenty-six, and each Representative and Delegate not exceeding twenty-one of such addresses, and the volumes shall be sent thereto from time to time as they are published, until the publication is completed. Senators, Representatives, and Delegates shall inform the Secretary of War in each case how many volumes of those heretofore published they have forwarded to such addresses. The remaining copies of the eleven thousand to be published, and all sets that may not be ordered to be distributed as provided herein, shall be sold by the Secretary of War for cost of publication with ten per cent. added thereto, and the proceeds of such sale shall be covered into the Treasury. If two or more sets of said volumes are ordered to the same address the Secretary of War shall inform the Senators, Representatives or Delegates, who have designated the same, who thereupon may designate other libraries, organizations, or individuals. The Secretary of War shall report to the first session of the Forty-eighth Congress what volumes of the series heretofore published have not been furnished to such libraries, organizations, and individuals. He shall also inform distributees at whose instance the volumes are sent."

The publication will present the records in the following order of arrangement:

The **1st Series** will embrace the formal reports, both Union and Confederate, of the first seizures of United States property in the Southern States, and of all military operations in the field, with the correspondence, orders, and returns relating specially thereto, and, as proposed, is to be accompanied by an Atlas.

In this series the reports will be arranged according to the campaigns and several theaters of operations (in the chronological order of the events), and the Union reports of any event will, as a rule, be immediately followed by the Confederate accounts. The correspondence, &c., not embraced in the "reports" proper will follow (first Union and next Confederate) in chronological order.

The **2d Series** will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns, Union and Confederate, relating to prisoners of war, and (so far as the military authorities were concerned) to State or political prisoners.

The **3d Series** will contain the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns of the Union authorities (embracing their correspondence with the Confederate officials) not relating specially to the subjects of the *first* and *second* series. It will set forth the annual and special reports of the Secretary of War, of the General-in-Chief, and of the chiefs of the several staff corps and departments; the calls for troops, and the correspondence between the National and the several State authorities.

The **4th Series** will exhibit the correspondence, orders, reports, and returns of the Confederate authorities, similar to that indicated for the Union officials, as of the *third* series, but excluding the correspondence between the Union and confederate authorities given in that series.

ROBERT N. SCOTT,

*Major, Third Art., and Bvt. Lieut. Col.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, August 23, 1880.

Approved:

ALEX. RAMSEY,  
*Secretary of War.*



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ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS

TO

**SERIES I—VOLUME VII.**

(To be inserted in the volume. For explanation see General  
Index volume, Serial No. 130, page XXVIII.)

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PUBLISHED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF

**The Hon. ELIHU ROOT, Secretary of War,**

BY

BRIG. GEN. FRED C. AINSWORTH,

CHIEF OF THE RECORD AND PENSION OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT,

AND

MR. JOSEPH W. KIRKLEY.

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**Mr. JOHN S. MOODEY, Indexer.**

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1902.



## TEXT.

- Page 1. Summary, for Dec. 25, 1861, read Dec. 28, 1861.
- Page 5. Tenth and eleventh lines, bottom, for *G. A. Huwald's* read *Huey's*.  
Fifteenth line, bottom, for *Fruitt* [*Trewhitt?*] read *Truitt*.
- Page 47. Twenty-sixth line, bottom, for *Holliday's* read *Holladay's*.
- Page 55. Eighteenth and nineteenth lines, top, for *Shawhaus' and Camcron's* read *Shawhans' and Camron's*.
- Page 66. Twenty-fourth line, top, for *Truett's* [?] read *Truitt's*.
- Page 79. Thomas' report, fourteenth and twenty-third lines, for *Roberts post* read *Robertsport*.
- Page 116. Thirteenth line, bottom, for *Columbus* read *Columbia*.
- Page 135. Polk's report, third and fourth lines, bottom, for *Deshler's Arkansas battery (Chalmers' regiment)* read *Desha's Arkansas battalion, Chalmers' regiment*.
- Page 155. Nineteenth line, top, for *Drew's* read *Crews'*.
- Page 168. Third Brigade, Second Division, for *14th Iowa* read *12th Iowa*.
- Page 215. Erase foot-note and insert *For Brig. Gen. C. F. Smith's report, see Series I, Vol. 52, Part 1, p. 7*.
- Page 219. Report No. 24, caption, for *Seventeenth* read *Seventh*.
- Pages 233, 236. Insert [*7th Texas?*] after *First Regiment Texas Infantry*, wherever it occurs.
- Page 251. Shackelford's report, third and fourth lines, for *13th instant* read *15th instant*.
- Page 313. Pillow to Randolph, sixth line, insert † after *instant* and add foot-note, † *See Pillow to Randolph, p. 314, the date of which should be September 11, 1862, instead of September 18, 1862*.
- Page 314. Pillow to Randolph, date line, for *September 18* read *September 11*.
- Page 416. Sixth line, bottom, for *Pagett's* read *Padgett's*.
- Page 422. Twentieth line, top, for *Hammond* read *Hamburg*.
- Page 433. Morgan's report, third line, for *Trabine's* read *Trabue's*.
- Page 437. Polk's report, first line, for *Columbus* read *Column*.
- Page 483. Foot-note, for *November 7* read *December 7*.
- Page 519. Last line, insert [*McNairy's battalion?*] after *McRea's regiment*.
- Page 529. Buell to Halleck, eighth line from end, for *resisting* read *uniting*.
- Page 550. Thomas to Buell, third line, for *our* read *one*.
- Page 587. Last line, for *preparative* read *preparation*.
- Page 644. Second line, top, for *blankets* read *blanks*.
- Page 737. Add note to Abstract from report of the First Division, Central Army of Kentucky, as follows: *Shoup's artillery battalion consisted of Swett's Mississippi and Hubbard's and Trigg's Arkansas batteries*.
- Page 749. Erase foot-note *Not found* and insert *See Series I, Vol. 52, Part 2, p. 229*.
- Page 750. Insert after *Freeman*, tenth line, bottom, *second junior lieutenant, [C.] Freeman*. Last line, for *D. C. Gormus* read *D. C. Ghormley*.
- Page 751. First line, top, for *F. Eldridge* read *S. W. Eldredge*.
- Page 758. Buckner to Hardee, second line, extract, for *though* read *through*.
- Page 780. Crittenden to Cooper, sixth line, for *Gormus'* read *Gorman's*.
- Page 816. First line, top, for *Cardell's* read *Caudill's*.
- Page 824. Zollicoffer's weekly return, for *S. A. Battle* read *J. A. Battle*; for *T. C. Sanders'* read *Q. C. Sanders'*.
- Page 832. Weekly report, Central Army of Kentucky, for *Lewis' brigade* read *Davis' brigade*.
- Page 835. Signature, for *J. M. Head* read *J. W. Head*.

- Page 852. Hindman's Brigade, for *1st Arkansas* read *3d Confederate, Colonel Marmaduke*. Not Brigaded, for *1st Mississippi Cavalry* read *Wirt Adams' Cavalry*. Insert \* after *Arkansas battalion artillery* and add foot-note, \* *Hubbard's and Trigg's batteries*.
- Page 855. Erase foot-note and insert *Omitted*.
- Page 894. Floyd to Johnston, date line, for *Murfreesborough* read *Nashville*.
- Page 904. Hindman's Brigade, for *Bennett's cavalry* read *W. D. Barnett's cavalry*. Cleburne's Brigade, for *1st Arkansas* read *1st [15th] Arkansas*. Insert \* after *Shoup's artillery battalion* and add foot-note, \* *Hubbard's and Trigg's batteries*. Bowen's Brigade, for *Merrick's battery* read *Hudson's battery*.
- Page 905. Breckinridge's Brigade, erase *Nelson's cavalry*.
- Page 935. Nineteenth line, bottom, for *Claiborne* read *Cleburne*.
- Page 984. Erase foot-note \* *Company B, Fourth Infantry*.
- Page 993. Under *Mississippi Troops*, insert after *Artillery—Batteries*: the following, *Issaquena* \* ( *Graves* ), 329, 333, 336, 340, 341, 343, 345, 348, 349, 367, 369, 779, and add foot-note, \* *Company B, Fourth Kentucky Infantry, attached*.

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## CHAPTER XVII.

# OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE, NORTH ALABAMA, AND SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA.

November 19, 1861—March 4, 1862.



### SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPAL EVENTS.\*

- Nov. 20, 1861.—Skirmish at Brownsville, Ky.  
21, 1861.—Ten thousand volunteers called out in Mississippi for the defense of Columbus, Ky., &c.  
Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, C. S. Army, assigned to command of Forts Henry and Donelson, Tenn.
- 24-Dec. 5, 1861.—Forrest's Expedition to Caseyville, Eddyville, &c., Ky.
- Dec. 1, 1861.—Skirmish at Whippoorwill Creek, Ky.  
Gunboat demonstration on Fort Holt, Ky.
- 1- 2, 1861.—Skirmishes near Camp Goggin, Ky.  
1-13, 1861.—Operations about Mill Springs and Somerset, Ky.  
4- 7, 1861.—Expedition to and destruction of Bacon Creek Bridge, Ky.  
5, 1861.—Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee, C. S. Army, assumes command of the Central Army of Kentucky.
- 5- 8, 1861.—Scout in vicinity of Russellville, Ky.  
8, 1861.—Skirmish at Fishing Creek, near Somerset, Ky.  
12, 1861.—Skirmish at Gradyville, Ky.  
17, 1861.—Action at Rowlett's Station (Woodsonville), Green River, Ky.  
18, 1861.—Reconnaissance from Somerset to Mill Springs, Ky.  
23, 1861-Jan. 30, 1862.—Gartfield's and Marshall's operations in Eastern Kentucky.  
25, 1861.—Skirmish at Grider's Ferry, Cumberland River, Ky.  
28, 1861.—Action at Sacramento, Ky.
- 28-31, 1861.—Expedition to Camp Beauregard and Viola, Ky.
- Jan. 7, 1862.—Skirmish at Jennie's Creek, Ky.  
8, 1862.—Skirmish at Fishing Creek, Ky.  
10, 1862.—Engagement at Middle Creek, near Prestonburg, Ky.  
10-21, 1862.—Expedition into Kentucky from Cairo, Ill.  
14, 1862.—Gunboat reconnaissance to Columbus, Ky.  
15-25, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Paducah, Ky., to Fort Henry, Tenn.  
19, 1862.—Engagement at Logan's Cross-Roads, on Fishing Creek, near Mill Springs, Ky.  
17-22, 1862.—Gunboat demonstrations on Fort Henry, Tenn.  
24-30, 1862.—Expedition to the Little Sandy and Piketon, Ky.

\* Of some of the minor conflicts noted in this "Summary" no circumstantial reports are on file, the only record of such events being references to them on muster rolls and returns.



- Jan. 28-Feb. 2, 1862.—Operations near Greensburg and Lebanon, Ky.
- Feb. 2, 1862.—Skirmish in Morgan County, Tenn.
- 4, 1862.—Gunboat reconnaissance to Fort Henry, Tenn.
- 6, 1862.—Capture of Fort Henry, Tenn.
- 6-10, 1862.—Expedition to Florence, Ala.
- 7, 1862.—Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, C. S. Army, assumes command at Fort Donelson, Tenn.
- 9, 1862.—Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, C. S. Army, assumes command at Fort Donelson, Tenn.
- ✓ 12-16, 1862.—Siege of Fort Donelson, Tenn.
- ✓ 13, 1862.—Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, C. S. Army, assumes command at Fort Donelson, Tenn.
- Skirmish near Fort Heiman, Ky.
- 14, 1862.—Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army, assigned to command of the District of West Tennessee.
- Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman, U. S. Army, assigned to command of the District of Cairo.
- Skirmish near Cumberland Gap, Tenn.
- 14-15, 1862.—Bowling Green, Ky., evacuated by the Confederates and occupied by the Union forces.
- 15-22, 1862.—Expedition from Cairo, Ill., to Eastport, Miss.
- 19, 1862.—Clarksville, Tenn., occupied by Union forces.
- 23, 1862.—General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, assumes immediate command of the Central Army.
- 23-25, 1862.—Nashville, Tenn., evacuated by the Confederates and occupied by the Union forces.
- 25, 1862.—Maj. Gen. E. Kirby Smith, C. S. Army, assigned to command in East Tennessee.
- 26, 1862.—Scout to Nashville, Tenn.
- March 1, 1862.—Engagement at Pittsburg, Tenn.
- 2-3, 1862.—Columbus, Ky., evacuated by the Confederates and occupied by the Union forces.
- 4, 1862.—Maj. Gen. Braxton Bragg, C. S. Army, announces his resumption of the command of Department of Alabama and West Florida.\*

### NOVEMBER 20, 1861.—Skirmish at Brownsville, Ky.

*Report of Brig. Gen. T. C. Hindman, C. S. Army.*

HDQRS. 1ST BRIG., 1ST DIV., CENTRAL ARMY KENTUCKY,  
Oakland, Ky., November 21, 1861.

SIR: As required by dispatch of last night from division headquarters, I submit a detailed report of my expedition to Brownsville on yesterday:

In a dispatch of recent date I informed you of the skirmish between a detachment of Major Phifer's cavalry battalion, under Captain Chrisman, and a party of Yankees, at Brownsville, and stated my wish to conduct an expedition in that direction. No official response reached me on the subject, and the intention was consequently abandoned. But on yesterday morning Lieutenant Colonel Marmaduke, First Arkansas Battalion, reported that Lieutenant Murphy, of his command, with six men of Major Phifer's battalion, who had been sent out two days previously by my order to procure spirits for hospital use, had not

\* It does not appear, however, that effect was ever given to his order resuming command.

returned and had probably been cut off by the enemy. Upon this information I determined to proceed at once to Brownsville, and break up the Yankee camp on the river bank opposite that place. Accordingly I left this post at 8 a. m. yesterday, taking with me Captains Chrisman and McNeill, and 50 men of Plifer's battalion, and First Lieutenant Orlin, with one gun of Swett's battery. The pickets upon the roads leading towards Brownsville were instructed to detain all citizens passing until the return of the expedition, and the advance guard had orders to arrest all male citizens found on the road or in view of it. These precautions enabled me to get within half a mile of the town unobserved. There Captain McNeill was detached, with 25 men, to proceed to the right around the knob south of and overhanging the place, so as to cut off retreat up the river. With the remainder of the force, after delaying long enough to enable Captain McNeill to get equally near the town, I moved along the direct road, which passes between the knob just referred to and another on its left 300 yards distant. It was impossible to get in rear of this last-named knob so as to cut off retreat down the river without being seen from the town. I ascended the right-hand knob on foot and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General Newton the one on the left to reconnoiter. There was no enemy visible on the Brownsville side of the river, but on the opposite side I perceived a body of cavalry, apparently about 50 strong, formed in a narrow road leading across the range of hills that runs parallel to the stream. One hundred yards farther down, near a small log cabin situated in a field, there was a squad of 11 to 15 men on foot, with horses hitched around. Still farther down on the Litchfield road, partly concealed in the timber, there was a mounted party of about 50. It was evident that they had notice of our approach and intended to dispute the passage of the river.

Lieutenant Newton found the river obstructed from the position he had taken. He ascertained from a woman who was passing that a party of between 15 and 20 had been in Brownsville during the day, but had just recrossed the river. Entering the town with the main body as rapidly as possible, I directed Lieutenant Orlin to open fire upon the enemy from the public square. The first discharge scattered the cavalry in the wood; the next dispersed the squad near the cabin and drove 10 or 15 more out of it; the third and fourth took effect upon the cabin, a spherical case shot exploding within it and a round shot piercing the building. At the first Captain McNeill entered the town, having taken one of their pickets; another was subsequently captured by a man of his detachment.

The piece was then moved around to a position nearer the river and commanding the Litchfield road, and fire was opened on the cavalry posted in that road, which was instantly dispersed. The dismounted men of the enemy now commenced firing from behind logs, trees, fences, &c., situated on the opposite bank, which is much lower than the south bank. Their weapons were Minie muskets and the common hunting rifle. The number of those firing were not less than 50.

My men were ordered to dismount, take position as near the river as practicable behind such cover as might be found, and reply to the fire of the enemy. The firing was thus continued for from ten to fifteen minutes, when that of the enemy ceased, except now and then scattering shots, their men running away singly and in squads of two and three through the corn fields and into the woods, and our men firing at them as long as they were visible. I at one time gave the order to Captain Chrisman to cross the river if practicable, but finding it not fordable, the order was countermanded. When dislodged from their position along

and under the river bank, the enemy collected in small squads at distances from 400 to 800 yards from the stream, and were again scattered by spherical case shot thrown by the 6-pounder, after which they entirely disappeared.

In addition to the two pickets captured, as before stated, a Federal flag hoisted in the town and the United States mail, found at the post-office, were taken. The pickets are citizens, who were compelled to perform that service. [They] were unarmed and I have released them.

The only casualty on our side was the wounding of Private Dugan, of Captain Chrisman's company, by a Minie ball fired near the close of the engagement. The wound is severe, but not mortal. Upon the side of the enemy I observed 6 men to fall, who remained in view and were doubtless killed.

The information reached me this morning by a man who left Brownsville at daylight that two Union men from the north side of the river were there last night about 2 o'clock in search of lint and medicines, who stated to him that 7 men were found dead on the field, 1 badly wounded and expected to die during the night, and that 4 wounded men were taken off by the cavalry; also that 5 horses were killed by the spherical case shot that exploded in the cabin; 2 other horses were killed by a similar shot at a different place.

The Federal force we engaged was of Colonel Jackson's regiment, posted at Litchfield.

The firing by Lieutenant Orlin was admirable, approaching almost to the accuracy of rifle practice.

Both officers and men, without exception, deported themselves well. Carelessness of their own safety, by which Private Dugan received his wound, was the only part of their conduct not to be approved.

I ordered sundry articles belonging to P. H. Solman, merchant, who conducted the Yankees into Brownsville yesterday morning, and is known to be in constant communication with the enemy, to be taken for hospital use. They are turned over to the brigade quartermaster and will be regularly invoiced.

Very respectfully,

T. C. HINDMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Lieut. D. G. WHITE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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NOVEMBER 24—DECEMBER 5, 1861.—Forrest's Expedition to Caseyville, Eddyville, &c., Ky.

#### REPORTS.

No. 1.—Col. N. B. Forrest, Tennessee Cavalry (Confederate).

No. 2.—Lieut. Col. James Peckham, Eighth Missouri Infantry.

#### No. 1.

*Report of Col. N. B. Forrest, Tennessee Cavalry (Confederate).*

REGIMENTAL HEADQUARTERS,  
*Hopkinsville, Ky., December 5, 1861.*

Leaving Hopkinsville November 24 with 300 men and their officers, under orders from brigade headquarters, we went to Greenville, where we found some arms and equipments belonging to the enemy, as will



be seen by a list herewith returned; also a soldier in full uniform, whom we made prisoner and returned to the commander of the post; from thence to Madisonville, where I sent Captain Overton, with 30 men, in the direction of Ashbysburg and Calhoun, who reported that all the troops had left the former place and gone to the latter (Calhoun). I then sent a scout to Henderson, dressed as a citizen, who reported that all the Federal forces had been sent from that town to Calhoun and their sick to Evansville.

I then visited Providence and Claysville and Morganfield, at all of which places the people met us with smiles and cheers, and fed and greeted us kindly.

I then went to Caseyville, on the Ohio River; then up the Tradewater 12 miles, where I crossed and went to Marion, in Crittenden County. When near that place a lady came from her door and begged in the name of her children for help, and representing that her husband (who was a citizen of standing and unconnected with the war) had been captured by Federal soldiers, led on and assisted by citizens of the neighborhood, whose names being given, I deemed it proper to arrest. William Akers was arrested, and when I approached the house of Jonathan Bells he shot the surgeon of my regiment from the door and escaped by a back opening in the house. A noble and brave man, and skillful surgeon, and high-toned gentleman was Dr. Van Wyck, and his loss was deeply felt by the whole regiment. Dispatching the body in care of Major Kelly, with 100 men, to Hopkinsville, I remained in the vicinity of Marion another day, and my scouts arrested one Federal soldier and brought him as prisoner, and killed one Scott, the leader of the band, who had sworn to shoot Southern men from their houses and behind trees, he (Scott) attempting it by wounding three horses with a shot-gun. The scouts found with him three guns and a pistol, which are returned to the Ordnance Department; also two horses of the enemy.

From Marion I went to Dycusburg and Eddyville, where I learned that no boats or soldiers had been on the Cumberland for twelve days at those points. The people at the latter places treated us with the utmost liberality and kindness.

It is believed that the expedition has done great good in giving confidence to the Southern-rights men, destroying the distorted ideas of Union men, who expected every species of abuse at the hands of the Confederate soldiers, many of them expressing their agreeable disappointment and change of views in regard to our army, and not a few assured us that they would no longer use any influence against the cause of the South. Universal kindness was the policy of the officers in command. With me were Captains Overton, May, Fruitt [Trewlitt?], and Hambrick, in command of detachments of their own companies, and Lieutenant Sims, in command of a detachment of Captain Gould's company, and Lieutenant Gentry, in command of a detachment of Captain Logan's company, and as guide Lieutenant Wallace, of Captain G. A. Huwald's company.

A number of hogs and cattle were started from the counties between this and the river and along the river under the auspices of the expedition.

There are no Federal forces remaining on this side the Ohio from the mouth of Green to the mouth of Cumberland, and with the exception of a few scouts none have been there for twelve days.

After I left Madisonville, Jackson's cavalry visited the place, about 400 in number, but he attempted no pursuit; he might have easily overtaken us. After we were at Caseyville 200 Federal troops came there

and captured about eighty hogs, became intoxicated on stolen whisky, and left in a row.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

N. B. FORREST,

*Colonel, Commanding Forrest Regiment Cavalry.*

Brig. Gen. CHARLES CLARK,

*Commanding at Hopkinsville, Ky.*

No. 2.

*Report of Lieut. Col. James Peckham, Eighth Missouri Infantry.*

CAMP GENERAL SMITH, Paducah, Ky., December 2, 1861.

SIR: In compliance with your order of the 30th ultimo, I proceeded, on board the transports Golden State and Lake Erie No. 3, with three companies of the Eighth Missouri Volunteers and one piece of artillery, commanded by Lieutenant Tobey, of the Chicago Light Artillery, to Cave in Rock, where I awaited the arrival of the gunboat Conestoga. In company with the latter I reached Caseyville, Ky., at daylight on the morning of the 1st instant. The enemy had left Caseyville the day before my arrival there, and from many reports was at least 20 miles distant and pushing southwards. From all I could learn I submit the following:

It was apparently with no intention of blockading the Ohio that the enemy ventured upon its banks. A very large crop of hogs is now ready for the market, and it is to secure this crop that they are found in the region of the Ohio. They have driven off many already, but a large number still remain. They had in an inclosure, some 3 miles from Caseyville, a lot of 60, which I secured, and turned over to Colonel Cavanaugh, of the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, now stationed at Shawneetown. I am led to believe that a large business in salt is being done by the rebels via Caseyville and Cave in Rock. It is known that vast quantities of goods find their way to Nashville through that section of country, of which Caseyville is the leading point. Upon my arrival at the latter place I consulted with Captain Phelps, of the Conestoga, and Colonel Williams, of this place, and concluded to send to Shawneetown for reinforcements. They arrived, but too late to do any good. I returned here this morning at 5 o'clock, under the conviction that my longer stay at Caseyville could be productive of no good.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Your obedient servant,

JAMES PECKHAM,

*Lieutenant Colonel Eighth Mo. Vols., Comdg. Detachment.*

General C. F. SMITH,

*Commanding U. S. Forces, Paducah, Ky.*

DECEMBER 1, 1861.—Gunboat demonstration on Fort Holt, Ky.

*Report of Col. John Cook, Seventh Illinois Infantry.*

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH BRIGADE,  
*Fort Holt, Ky., Sunday, December 1, 1861.*

At 3.15. p. m. Lieutenant Mathie, commanding Company F, Seventh Illinois, officer of the day, reported to these headquarters the approach

of three rebel gunboats (names unknown), which were allowed to reach a distance of  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Fort Holt, when, deeming it imprudent to allow them to progress farther, the batteries were ordered to open upon them, the first shot being fired from Fort Holt, on the extreme right of the fortifications, for the purpose of drawing a fire from the enemy, in order to test the power of his artillery, which having been done, the 64-pounder, "Lady Grant," in battery on the extreme left, returned his fire, dropping the first shot within 200 yards in advance of the boat. The second boat returning our fire plainly showed the inadequacy of both guns and artillerists to cope with us at any shorter distance. The 64-pounders, commanded by Lieutenant Wood (McAllister's artillery), was managed with marked ability, although laboring under great disadvantages, the piece being only provided with ammunition for 32-pounds.

I am confident that had we been supplied with the ammunition adapted to the caliber of the gun we could have done much damage to the enemy before he could have retreated. To elevate to such an extent as would enable us to reach him with a shot (there being no known rule to establish the angle), caused us in two instances to overshoot him, the shot from the gunboats always falling greatly short of us.

On the approach of these rebel craft a detachment from Captain Delano's cavalry, together with one company from the Twenty-eighth Illinois, were ordered to proceed, the former as far as Fort Jefferson, as a reconnoitering party, with instructions to report by messenger anything that would reveal the intentions of the enemy, and the latter beyond the picket line, deployed as skirmishers, to guard against an unexpected attack in the rear of the fort, both of which have returned, assuring me of the entire absence of any armed force about or around the camp.

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

JOHN COOK,  
*Colonel, Commanding Fourth Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding District Southeast Missouri, Cairo, Ill.*

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## DECEMBER 1-13, 1861.—Operations about Mill Springs and Somerset, Ky.

### REPORTS.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Albin Schoepf, U. S. Army.

No. 2.—Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer, Thirty-fifth Ohio Infantry.

No. 3.—Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer, C. S. Army.

#### No. 1.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Albin Schoepf, U. S. Army.*

CAMP GOGGIN, December 2, 1861.

GENERAL: I arrived here yesterday, reconnoitered same day and to-day. This morning the enemy opened fire from three pieces, one rifled, and infantry on Colonel Hoskins' camp subsequent to my order for the removal of the camp some distance back.

The strength of the enemy is estimated, by the best accounts we can get, of the following numbers: At Mill Springs, 2,000 infantry and 1,000



cavalry; at Captain West's farm, distant from Mill Springs 2 miles, 1,000 infantry; at Steubenville, 2 miles distant from West's, 2,000 infantry; and at Monticello, 5 miles from Steubenville, 3,000 infantry. Mill Springs is distant from this point 12 miles, at which place they can cross the Cumberland with facility, and 2 miles below that point they can also cross.

Apprehending the probability of their crossing at Mill Springs, I detailed two companies of cavalry to that place. I deem the position east of me safe, but west of me they may cross.

The river is high and not fordable, but by means of flats they can cross anywhere; the troops under my command are not sufficient to keep the river guarded as far as Mill Springs. Should they cross in the vicinity of my camp I can defend my position. The Thirty-eighth Ohio will be with me to day. The Seventeenth will occupy a position on Fishing Creek, to defend against a flank movement should the enemy cross.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPP,  
*Brigadier-General.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Eastern Division.*

P. S.—The enemy have moved their artillery and opened fire again. I have hardly time to write.

CAMP GOGGIN, *December 3, 1861.*

GENERAL: The enemy, after keeping up a brisk fire until 1 p. m., retired and took up march towards Mill Springs. I ordered Colonel Connell's Seventeenth Ohio Regiment from Somerset to that point; also three pieces of artillery and one company of cavalry. Should the enemy make an attempt to cross, we could be able to keep them in check.

Twenty reliable Union men crossed the river yesterday evening, and gave me information that Zollicoffer commands in person, and is at Mill Springs, with eight regiments of infantry, three of cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery.

My troops can be provided with beef and fresh pork; therefore I would suggest that only small stores and bread should be sent.

Captain Prime arrived here to-day. We will go to work as soon as the tools arrive.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPP,  
*Brigadier-General.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Eastern Division.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST KENTUCKY BRIGADE,  
*Somerset, December 8, 1861.*

GENERAL: We met the enemy's scouts this evening about 3 miles to the west of the village; the collision took place between the Thirty-fifth Ohio and the enemy's cavalry. Our loss was 1 killed and 1 wounded; the enemy's, 1 officer killed and 3 men wounded. We captured 1 horse and killed 5. The cavalry under my command, as usual, behaved badly. They are a nuisance, and the sooner they are disbanded the better. They are scouring the country on their own account, lounging about

the villages and drinking establishments, a nuisance and disturbance to the quiet citizens of the country. Captain Everett has just joined me, and reports a series of irregularities by stragglers of this regiment as having passed under his notice in the several villages through which he passed.

Is there no such thing as obtaining a regiment of *reliable* cavalry? Such a regiment is indispensable with this brigade at this time. The absence of such troops has kept me in the saddle until I am nearly worn down with fatigue.

I very much need a brigade commissary of subsistence, who could have the means to purchase such articles as it may become necessary to purchase. The system of making purchases by regimental commissaries and giving promise to pay is open to abuse, and has become a great annoyance.

The two Tennessee regiments will be here to-morrow. I shall, no doubt, need them by the time they arrive.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPP,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS.

P. S.—I regret to add that Major Helveti, of the Kentucky Cavalry, and Captain Prime, Engineers, are both missing, and have been, I now learn, captured by the enemy. These officers left camp with me on Wednesday on a reconnaissance, but, taking a different road, fell into the hands of the enemy. An earlier report would have been made of this, but I had looked for their return until after the departure of the Saturday's mail, my last reliable means of communicating with you. I deem it useless now to send a dispatch by a cavalry express.

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No. 2.

*Report of Col. Ferdinand Van Derveer, Thirty-fifth Ohio Infantry.*

CAMP NEAR SOMERSET, KY., *December 8, 1861.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that at 2 o'clock this afternoon rapid firing was heard from our advance picket, 30 strong, stationed on the Fishing Creek road, about 2 miles from our camp.

The battalion was immediately formed, and two companies went quickly to the relief of the picket. The enemy had been checked and were scattered through the woods.

The picket was first alarmed by several of Captain Dillion's cavalry, who had been posted a few miles in advance, rushing past. They could not be stopped, and in a few moments the whole company came rushing along, refusing to halt to assist our men, and so ran on to camp. Had they rendered any assistance the enemy would have been routed with considerable loss.

Our picket, under the direction of Lieut. W. C. Dine, of Company D, being in an open field, formed and delivered three volleys, retreating while loading to the woods, which they reached, and then came on to camp in small parties.

We killed 1 of their officers in command of the advance, 1 of their horses, and captured 1 horse. Our own loss was 1 killed, 1 wounded, and 15 missing.

The force of the enemy appears to have been 150 cavalry, chiefly armed with sabers and pistols.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

FERDINAND VAN DERVEER,

*Colonel Commanding Thirty-fifth Regiment Ohio Volunteers.*

Brig. Gen. ALBIN SCHOEPF,

*Commanding First Brigade Kentucky Volunteers.*

No. 3.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer, C. S. Army.*

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

*Mill Springs, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

SIR: Yesterday, with a small detachment of infantry and cavalry, I proceeded to reconnoiter from the left bank a camp of the enemy, 9 miles above, on the right bank of the river. Many of their tents were in full view, and they came out and fired on us with small-arms and one 12-pounder howitzer. We returned the fire, but the distance was too great for our guns to be of material service. To-day I took up four pieces of artillery and soon shelled them out of their encampment, causing them to strike tents precipitately and retire out of sight. I doubt whether they have more than one regiment there.

Captain Sheliha, with a scouting party, has examined Creelsborough and Burkesville, lower down the river, and reports three regiments of the enemy at the former and a small force at the latter, both on the right bank.

One of our picket parties reports a small force also at Rowena, on the same side of the river.

The river is now very high. I am now building transports to enable me to cross, but I fear there will be several days' delay.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.*

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

*Mill Springs, Ky., December 9, 1861.*

SIR: Having been disappointed in having ferry-boats captured by the force sent on in advance with that object, I have had to have boats built, and have been much delayed in crossing the Cumberland River. Five regiments, seven cavalry companies, and four pieces of artillery are now across. The position on both sides of the ferry is naturally strong, and I am rapidly strengthening the defenses on the right bank. The whole force with me is seven and one-half regiments, eighteen cavalry companies, and one 6-pounder battery of eight guns.

There is a force of the enemy at Columbia, the strength of which I am not able to ascertain. Three regiments of it were at Creelsborough, 18 miles above Burkesville, ten days ago. It is certain that there are now not less than five regiments at Somerset, possibly more.

On the 1st I reconnoitered from the left bank a camp of the enemy, a



part of which was in view on the right bank of the river at Waitsborough. On the 2d I took up four pieces of artillery and shelled them out, compelling them to move their encampment hurriedly. They had but two pieces of artillery. On the 4th I threw over the first small cavalry picket at this place. They met a cavalry picket of the enemy a mile from the ferry and drove them back, capturing some trifling equipments. The Seventeenth Ohio Regiment, with orders to prevent our crossing, had advanced to within  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles of the ferry. It fled precipitately to the neighborhood of Somerset.

On the 5th our cavalry pickets captured Major Helveti (supposed to be of General Buell's staff), Captain Prime, engineer officer, under orders from General Buell, and a corporal of Colonel Hoskins' regiment, after a chase of several miles, severely wounding the 2 officers.

Fishing Creek runs south into the Cumberland, 5 miles above here, and lies between our position and Somerset. It is more than 30 miles long, runs in a deep ravine 200 to 300 feet deep, and its summit-level on the east ranges from a half mile to one and a half miles distant from that on the west. There are two crossings from here to Somerset, 7 and 11 miles from here. The more distant, the enemy fortified on the eastern bank, and they had a force near the latter crossing. On the 7th our cavalry detachments crossed at both places, and found the enemy had fallen back to a camp 3 miles north of Somerset. They rode through their fortifications and returned. Yesterday our cavalry crossed at the upper ford and reconnoitered the enemy's camp and the town of Somerset. In the fortifications at the creek they found an infantry picket and a cavalry picket in advance. They were also fired on from the bushes this side of the creek. They charged upon all they met, pursued the enemy 5 or 6 miles, killed 10, and captured 16, one of whom is badly wounded. All are of the Thirty-fifth Ohio Regiment, except one of Wolford's regiment. There were 2 of our horses killed and 1 more wounded. The prisoners say their regiment reached Somerset only the evening before, and they know but little of what regiments are there, except that four of them are from Ohio, the Thirty-fifth, Thirty-eighth, Seventeenth, and Thirty-first. Hoskins' Kentucky regiment is certainly there, perhaps others. Our cavalry are to-day picketing both towards Harrison and Somerset.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,

*Brigadier-General.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,

*Bowling Green, Ky.*

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS, BEECH GROVE, KY.,  
*North of the River opposite Mill Springs, December 14, 1861.*

SIR: On the 2d instant I informed you that I had, from the south bank of the river, shelled the enemy out of their camp on the north bank, and was rapidly constructing boats at Mill Springs with which to cross the river. On the 3d I threw over a few cavalry pickets, who drove back the enemy's pickets, found a mile from the ferry, capturing a pistol, a saddle, and some other trappings. The Seventeenth Ohio Regiment,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles distant, fled 12 miles. On the 4th, our cavalry pickets captured, 6 miles north of the river, after a chase of more than a mile, Major Helveti, of the First Kentucky Cavalry, Captain Prime, of New York, engineer officer, of General Buell's staff, and a corporal of Colonel Hoskins' Kentucky regiment. The major and captain were



both severely wounded. On the 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th we were employed crossing, by aid of a few boats we had constructed (finding a strong position in the bend of the river on the north side), leaving two regiments, some cavalry, and two pieces of artillery on the south bank. On the 5th we found that the enemy were intrenching a strong position on the east bank of Fishing Creek, 11 miles north of us. The bed of the creek is a deep ravine, 200 to 300 feet deep, the summit-level on one side being distant from that on the other side from three quarters of a mile to one and a half miles. They also had a force at a lower crossing, 7 miles from us. Both crossings were on roads leading to Somerset. On the 7th we found that they had fallen back from both positions, and learned that they were intrenching 2 miles beyond Somerset. On the 8th our cavalry pushed across the creek at the upper crossing, met a cavalry and infantry picket at the fortifications, drove them to the enemy's camp near Somerset, killing 10 or 12 and capturing 17 prisoners, all of the Thirty-fifth Ohio Regiment, except 1 of the First Kentucky Cavalry. Our loss, 1 man wounded and 2 horses killed. Our party captured a number of muskets, pistols, accouterments, articles of wearing apparel, &c.

On the south side of the river I have had the ferries patrolled with cavalry from the forks of the Cumberland down to Burkesville. On the — our picket at Creelsborough was fired at across the river and by some men in a boat. They killed 2 in the boat, and lost a horse. On the 9th and 10th the enemy on the north bank fired across the river at our cavalry patrolling Rowena, 30 miles below here. I determined to punish them, and sent down an expedition on the north bank on the 11th, which dispersed the enemy, killing 3 and capturing 11. Our only loss was 1 man drowned in attempting to cross the river. Last night a party of our cavalry, who had crossed the South Fork of the Cumberland, were fired on, losing 1 man killed and 1 wounded. It being difficult to keep them here safely, I to-day sent 33 prisoners of war to Nashville, retaining 1 too badly wounded to move at present. General Johnston has ordered a steamboat to Gainesborough on the 18th, loaded with supplies for this brigade, on which the prisoners will take passage. This country is abundant in flour, pork, beef, and many other supplies. There are from eight to ten regiments of the enemy at Somerset, five at Columbia. I have four and a half regiments on this side intrenched—flanks and rear protected by the river—and two regiments on the south bank. Major-General Crittenden has assumed command of this district, and is at Knoxville.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.*

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**DECEMBER 4-7, 1861.—Expedition to and destruction of Bacon Creek Bridge, Ky.**

*Report of Capt. John H. Morgan, Kentucky Cavalry (Confederate).*

**CAMP BURNAM, December 7, 1861.**

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, I left camp on Wednesday last, at 4 p. m. with 105 men, and reached Green

River at 6 o'clock Thursday night, December 5. Crossed 6 men, 4 of whom were to dash through Munfordville and take a position upon the turnpike leading to Bacon Creek, 4 miles from town, to prevent any information being carried to the enemy's pickets, the other 2 to take position in the town and remain until the command had crossed the river. When they got into the town saw several men armed, 2 whose names were Berry Eaton and Luther Shackelford, who it seems had just returned from [the] Federal camp, where they had been to take a Southern-rights man, whom they had captured. My advance guard discovered them and ordered them to give up their guns. They dismounted, one immediately firing both barrels of his gun at my men, who returned the fire without doing any execution. The 2 men who were left in town caught one of the horses, which is now in my camp.

Reached Bacon Creek bridge at 9 o'clock. Found it in perfect order, with the exception of one rail, which was lying ready to be laid. There were five columns of uprights. All were completely burned, with the exception of the one which was in the creek. The bridge is a complete ruin.

The command left Bacon Creek at 1.05 o'clock. The rear guard of 4 men remained until within a few minutes of 3 o'clock.

General McCook's advance is at Upton's, his main body a short distance this side of Nolin. Was informed by Union men that the bridge on Rolling Fork has been washed away, entirely interrupting rail communication with Louisville.

On my way to Green River met a wagon loaded with goods purchased in Louisville. Had it guarded until my return. The wagon was claimed by Mrs. Ritter, who had purchased the goods with which it was loaded. Mrs. Ritter is believed by the people of that neighborhood to be an employé of the enemy. Upon my return, finding that a portion of the goods were to be delivered in Bowling Green, I released the wagon. One of my horses becoming exhausted, left it at Ritter's, and mounted the man upon one of his.

Upon the morning of the 7th one of my men was disabled from the accidental discharge of his gun. Reached camp at 11 a. m. December 7.

Respectfully, &c.,

JOHN H. MORGAN,  
*Commanding Squadron.*

General S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Commanding Division.*

DECEMBER 5-8, 1861.—Scout in vicinity of Russellville, Ky.

*Report of Capt. I. F. Harrison, Mississippi Cavalry.*

WIRT ADAMS' CAVALRY,  
*Camp Hardee, December 8, 1861.*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to report to Major-General Hardee, commanding, the result of my scout in the vicinity of Russellville:

Pursuant to instructions I left Bowling Green at midnight on the 5th instant, with a command of 45 men of this regiment, and reached Russellville at 2.30 a. m. on the 6th. Here I was detained three hours, procuring horses for my men. Upon procuring a mount I started to join Captain Pope, who had engaged the enemy the day before. I came



up with him about 16 miles from Russellville, assumed command, and started in pursuit of the enemy. I found his trail, and learned he was two hours ahead of me. A short distance from here, the advance guard having reported the presence of the enemy in front, I ordered a charge. Upon advancing I could discover but 3 men, 2 of whom were armed, making their escape and concealing themselves in the mountains. The third, who was engaged in cutting wood, I regret to say, was shot and badly wounded by one of the citizens who had joined me. The shooting was done after I had passed some distance beyond the point where the man was standing. Other firing occurred here on the part of the citizens. I was delayed one hour in attending to the wounded man.

Shortly after resuming the march I met the citizen who had been forced to guide the enemy across the country. He reported them as pressing forward rapidly, having heard the firing. I continued the pursuit, and when night prevented any further pursuit the trail not being visible, we were within fifteen minutes of them. I made a circuit and encamped with a view of cutting them off in the morning, but they escaped during the night across the mountains in the direction of Green River, having no doubt received accurate information as to our movements.

Upon the march back to Russellville I recovered the 8 muskets that the enemy had taken at the bridge and also 1 Colt's rifle belonging to them.

The 4 wounded of the enemy are concealed in the neighborhood, and I have no doubt that Captain Pope will be able to find them.

I regret very much to report [that] of the 35 or 40 citizens who accompanied my command, with the exception of Captain Pope and some 5 or 6 others, deserted me when their services were the most required.

I reached Bowling Green on my return at 2 o'clock this morning, with my command in good order.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. F. HARRISON,

*Captain Wirt Adams' Cavalry.*

Lieut. Col. R. C. WOOD, Jr.,

*Commanding Wirt Adams' Cavalry, Camp Hardee, Ky.*

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**DECEMBER 17, 1861.—Action at Rowlett's Station (Woodsonville), Green River, Ky.**

#### REPORTS, ETC.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Army, with congratulatory orders.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. Army.

No. 3.—Col. August Willich, Thirty-second Indiana Infantry.

No. 4.—Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman, C. S. Army, with congratulatory orders from Major-General Hardee.

#### No. 1.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Army, with congratulatory orders.*

LOUISVILLE, KY., December 17, 1861—12 p. m.

McCook's division is at Munfordville. General Mitchel at Bacon Creek. We are doing pretty well. Zollicoffer is either retiring across

the Cumberland River or is prepared to do so at the approach of any superior force. Any more formidable demonstration against him would only harass my troops and derange my plans. I am letting him alone for the present.

McCook reports the rebels attacked my pickets in front of the railroad bridge at 2 p. m. to-day. The picket consisted of four companies of the Thirty-second Indiana, Colonel Willich, under Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra. Their forces consisted of one regiment Texas Rangers, two regiments infantry, one battery, six guns. Our loss, Lieutenant Sachs and 8 enlisted men killed and 16 wounded. The rebel loss, 33 killed, including Colonel Terry, of Texas, and about 50 wounded. The rebels ingloriously retreated.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, February 8, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to inclose herewith the official report of a skirmish at Rowlett's Station, south of Green River, Kentucky, on the 17th of December, 1861, between a portion of Colonel Willich's Thirty-second Regiment of Indiana Volunteers (German), and a brigade of the enemy under General Hindman. The gallantry displayed by the Thirty-second Indiana on the occasion has been noticed in general orders from these headquarters, a copy of which is inclosed for file with this letter and the report. Colonel Willich was at the time on other duty, and the troops engaged were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra, whose skill and gallantry on the field merit the distinction of the brevet rank of colonel.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding Department.*

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
No. 23. } *Louisville, Ky., December 27, 1861.*

The general commanding takes pleasure in bringing to notice the gallant conduct of a portion of Colonel Willich's regiment, Thirty-second Indiana, at Rowlett's Station, in front of Munfordville, on the 17th instant.

Four companies of the regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra, on outpost duty, were attacked by a column of the enemy, consisting of one regiment of cavalry, a battery of artillery, and two regiments of infantry. They defended themselves until re-enforced by other companies of the regiment, and the fight was continued with such effect that the enemy at length retreated precipitately.

The attack of the enemy was mainly with his cavalry and artillery. Our troops fought as skirmishers, rallying rapidly into squares when charged by the cavalry, sometimes even defending themselves singly and killing their assailants with the bayonet.



The general tenders his thanks to the officers and soldiers of the regiment for their gallant and efficient conduct on this occasion. He commends it as a study and example to all other troops under his command, and enjoins them to emulate the discipline and instruction which insure such results.

The name of "Rowlett's Station" will be inscribed on the regimental colors of the Thirty-second Indiana Regiment.

By command of Brigadier-General Buell:

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

## No. 2.

*Report of Brig. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook, U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, CAMP WOOD,  
*December 25, 1861.*

CAPTAIN: Please find inclosed the official report of Col. August Willich, Thirty-second Indiana, of the affair in front of the railroad bridge over Green River. I would respectfully call the attention of the general commanding to the gallantry and good judgment of Lieutenant Colonel Von Trebra, of said regiment, during the action. The regiment behaved well; all present distinguished themselves.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. McD. MCCOOK,  
*Brigadier-General Volunteers, Commanding Second Division.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

## No. 3.

*Report of Col. August Willich, Thirty-second Indiana Infantry.*

CAMP GEORGE WOOD, *December 18, 1861.*

My regiment had, as usual, two companies on the south of Green River for the protection of the repairing of the railroad bridge across the Green River. The bridge built by our pontoniers being finished on the evening of the 15th instant, the former order to defend our work in case of an attack principally from the north side of the river was changed in such a manner that four companies, deployed as skirmishers, should form on the north side of Green River, while the remaining four should advance over the bridge to the south side as support of our pickets.

At 12 o'clock on the 17th of December the right wing of our picket chain (Company B, Captain Glass) was annoyed by skirmishers of the enemy. Captain Glass sent out a patrol that drove them back and followed them up with the balance of his company. About a mile from the picket chain he met a company of the enemy's infantry, whom he saluted with a volley, upon which they retreated in haste. Owing to the arrival of large forces of infantry, who had by this time made their appearance, he was obliged to retreat, executing the same in good order, until re-

enforcements arrived. During this maneuver Company C advanced on the left of the pike from Woodsonville in a southward direction. There they were attacked by a company of Texas Rangers, whom they drove back. At the same time the signal of alarm was given to the remainder of the regiment and was answered with astonishing alacrity. In their anxiety to hasten to the relief of the companies that were in danger the company commanders failed to obey the instructions given by me, and all of them rushed over the bridge and up the hill, there forming in our usual position at alarm—in close column. The undersigned being at the time of the general alarm at the headquarters of the division, Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra ordered Companies K, G, and F to the support of Company B on the right wing, and Companies A and I to the support of Company C on the left wing, and Companies E and H and a few men of Company D as reserve to follow along the pike, under command of Major Schnackenberg, in the usual distance. The infantry of the enemy on both wings were thrown by the mere advance of our lines of skirmishers. But now ensued the most earnest and bloody part of the struggle.

With lightning speed, under infernal yelling, great numbers of Texas Rangers rushed upon our whole force. They advanced as near as 15 or 20 yards to our lines, some of them even between them, and then opened fire with rifles and revolvers. Our skirmishers took the thing very coolly and permitted them to approach very close, when they opened a destructive fire on them. They were repulsed under severe loss, but only after Lieutenant Sachs, who left his covered position with one platoon, was surrounded by about 50 Rangers, several of them demanding of him three times to give up his sword and let his men lay down their arms. He firmly refused, and defended himself till he fell, with 3 of his men, before the attack was repulsed.

Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra now led on another advance of the center and left flank, when he drew down on his forces a second charge of the Rangers in larger numbers, charging into the very ranks, some dashing through to the rear, which might have proved disastrous to Companies C and I had not Company H, commanded by Lieutenants Cappell and Levy, and ordered forward by Adjutant Schmitt from the reserve on the pike, advanced with a hurrah towards the Rangers and repulsed them. At this moment the artillery of the enemy with six guns commenced its well-directed but not damaging fire. Their balls and shrapnels were thrown with great precision towards the reserve companies and skirmishers near the pike, but only a few men were hurt, and those by splinters from trees and fences. Among others, our undaunted and ever-attentive Assistant Surgeon Jeancon was struck by the branch of a tree and stupefied for a short time.

While this happened, the struggle on the right flank was not less severe. Companies F, K, and B were thrown out as skirmishers, Company G in column as support. The Rangers advanced within 15 yards, and then fired with shot-guns and revolvers. Our skirmishers made great havoc among them, but finally retreated behind the square formed by Company G, Captain Welschbillig. Now a fight ensued such as seldom occurs. The Rangers, about 150 to 200, thinking they could ride over that small squad of 50 men, attacked them in front and left flank. Captain Welschbillig suffered them to approach within 20 yards, and then fired a deadly volley at them. They retreated, but only after having discharged their guns and rifles at our men. They charged a second time, and engaged in front and both flanks. Several of them came close to our bayonets. A well-aimed volley sent them back again. They made a third but weak charge, which resulted more disastrously to them than



the former. They now disappeared in wild disorder from the battle-ground. In their place a regiment of infantry, the band playing, advanced against the small squad. Captain Welschbillig fell back before them with his men in good order, to form with Companies I and B, Company K holding the rear. At this moment the undersigned arrived and took command of the right wing. Seeing the danger that threatened the regiment in case the enemy's infantry (two regiments) would throw our right wing and advance on the line of retreat on the left wing, I ordered the signal "fall back slowly" to be given and formed the companies. Companies B and G fell in quickest. Company K guarded the rear. The forming of Companies B and G very likely gave rise to the enemy's belief of a re-enforcement on our right. At the same time Company A, till then delayed by their flanking movement, appeared on the enemy's right wing, on our left, when their artillery retreated in haste. The cavalry had disappeared from the battle-ground, and the infantry followed in double-quick time. Company A took an advanced position, holding it until the undersigned, Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra, a company (B) of the Forty-ninth Ohio, and Adjutant Schmitt, with a squad of men from my regiment, arrived to collect the dead and wounded, which were carried home under the protection of said forces. I cannot pass this without expressing my heartfelt thanks to Colonels Gibson and Harrison and their regiments, who volunteered to assist us in searching for our dead and wounded, and who took position against the enemy, giving our men help and protection.

In the fight participated 3 field, 1 staff, and 16 officers of the line, 23 sergeants, and 375 men. The force of the enemy consisted of one regiment Texas Rangers, two regiments infantry, and one battery, consisting of six guns. Our loss is, 1 officer and 10 men dead, 22 wounded, and 5 missing. The latter I hope to be able to report as wounded, and after whom I have to-day sent Lieutenant Mank, Company A, with a flag of truce.

According to the reports of our surgeons several of the wounded are beyond the hope of recovery. Yesterday the enemy reported his loss 40 killed and ours 200 killed. I venture to say that he lost in same proportion more than 40 as we lost less than 200.

It would be difficult for me to distinguish special names for their brave conduct, as this might be interpreted that others did not deserve the same praise. Every officer actually engaged distinguished himself by his coolness, courage, and judgment. Lieutenant Sachs gave way too much to his courage and advanced too hastily and too soon, which caused our mourning over his loss and that of several brave soldiers of his platoon.

As stated above, our assistant surgeon, Jeancon, was on the battle-ground, while our first surgeon, F. Krauth, discharged his duties faithfully at the hospital. Captains Giegoldt and Kodalle, Lieutenants Schutz, Trenck, and Kimmel were on the sick list. Lieutenant Knorr was on guard duty, and Lieutenant Pietzuch guarding the bridge with his pontoniers.

The noble conduct of some surgeons of the rebels I cannot pass with silence, although I am unable to give their names. They dressed the wounds of 3 of our men and sent them back to us in a farmer's wagon. On our part, Lieutenant Mank, of Company A, permitted 4 men of the rebel force to carry off the corpse of Colonel Terry, of the Texas Rangers, and several wounded men.

If I take into consideration that my regiment engaged successfully a force at least seven times as strong as our own, consisting of the selected

troops of the enemy, I think I have reason to say that everybody has done his duty faithfully.

A. WILLICH,  
*Colonel Thirty-second Indiana Volunteers.*

P. S.—Although I did not intend to mention any one individually, I feel myself induced to state that Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra has gained and confirmed, not only the admiration, but the love and confidence of every man in the regiment by the skill and gallantry with which he led them to the attack.

I have to mention also Lieutenant Pietzuch and his pontoniers, who by their unceasing efforts succeeded in constructing a bridge across Green River with the poor tools and scanty material furnished them in incredibly short time. Without this bridge it would have been impossible for me to cross the river with the regiment to support our pickets and frustrate the designs of the enemy by defeating them.

In conclusion, I most respectfully call the attention of the general commanding to the report which I laid before you in regard to strength and number of my regiment, and would ask you to take it in favorable consideration.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

A. W.

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Wood, Ky., December 18, 1861.*

Respectfully forwarded. By direction of the general commanding the division I threw two regiments across the river to the assistance of the Thirty-second, though they did not reach the ground until after the enemy had been put to flight. All praise is due to Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra and the men under him for the gallant manner in which they repulsed the picked troops of the enemy. As only a portion of the Thirty-second was engaged I forward the report of its colonel as a full and complete report of the affair.

R. W. JOHNSON,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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No. 4.

*Report of Brig. Gen. Thomas C. Hindman, C. S. Army, with congratulatory orders from Major-General Hardee.*

HEADQUARTERS ADVANCE GUARD,  
*Cave City, Ky., December 19, 1861.*

SIR: At 8 a. m. on the 17th instant I moved towards Woodsonville, for the purpose of breaking up the railroad from the vicinity of that place southward. My force consisted of 1,100 infantry, 250 cavalry, and four pieces of artillery. When within  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Woodsonville, concealed from the enemy's view, I halted the column and ordered forward Colonel Terry's Rangers to occupy the heights to my right, left, and front, and Major Phifer's cavalry to watch the crossings of Green River, still farther to my left. These orders having been executed and no force of the enemy or pickets seen, I advanced the column until the right reached the railroad. This brought me within three-quarters of a mile of the river and the enemy, but still concealed, except a small body of cavalry



upon the extreme right. Here a company of Rangers was detached to observe the enemy from Rowlett's Knob, which was to my right, across the railroad. A strip of timber bordered the river parallel to the line held by my cavalry. Fields were between. A body of the enemy's infantry, as skirmishers, moved through the timber by their right on my left. They were fired upon by a small body of my cavalry and retired.

The firing ceased for about half an hour, and I went in person to select a suitable place for camp, leaving Colonel Terry in command, with instructions to decoy the enemy up the hill, where I could use my infantry and artillery with effect and be out of range of the enemy's batteries. Before returning to the column the fire from the skirmishers recommenced. The enemy appeared in force upon my right and center. Colonel Terry, at the head of 75 Rangers, charged about 300, routed and drove them back, but fell mortally wounded. A body of the enemy of about the same size attacked the Rangers, under Captain Ferrill, upon the right of the turnpike, and were repulsed with heavy loss. The enemy began crossing by regiments and moving around on my right and left flanks. Three companies of Colonel Marmaduke's (First Arkansas) battalion were thrown out as skirmishers on my left, engaged the enemy's right, and drove them to the river. I now ordered forward Captain Swett's battery and the Second Arkansas Regiment to support it, holding the Sixth Arkansas Regiment in reserve. The artillery opened fire upon the enemy in the field adjacent to the railroad and drove them to the banks of the river. Firing now ceased on both sides. The enemy made no further attempt to advance, but knowing that he had already crossed in force, more than double my own, and had the means of crossing additional forces, I withdrew my command by way of the turnpike two miles and a half, and took position to meet the enemy if disposed to advance. There being no indications of any such intention, I returned to my camp here, reaching this place at 8 p. m.

My loss in this affair was as follows: Killed—Colonel Terry and 3 men of his regiment; dangerously wounded—Lieutenant Morris and 3 men of Texas Rangers; slightly wounded—Captain Walker and 3 men of Texas Rangers and 2 men of First Arkansas Battalion.

I estimate the enemy's loss at 75 killed and left on the ground; wounded unknown. I have 7 prisoners; other prisoners were too badly wounded to be moved, and were left at citizens' houses.

The troops under my command who were engaged displayed courage in excess. The others were as steady as veterans.

Very respectfully,

T. C. HINDMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Lieut. D. G. WHITE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division, &c.*

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SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. CENTRAL ARMY OF KENTUCKY,  
No. 46. } *December 21, 1861.*

On the 17th instant our forces, under Brigadier-General Hindman, partially engaged a superior force of the enemy at Woodsonville.

In the action we sustained a loss of 4 killed and 9 wounded.

The enemy was driven back and lost about 50 killed and 9 prisoners.

The conduct of our troops was marked by impetuous valor. In charging the enemy Colonel Terry, of the Texas Rangers, was killed in the moment of victory. His regiment deplores the loss of a brave and beloved commander; the Army one of its ablest officers.

The general commanding returns his thanks to Brigadier-General Hindman and his command for their conduct in the initiative of the campaign in Kentucky, and he hails the brilliant courage shown in the affair as a bright augury of their valor when the actual hour comes for striking a decisive blow.

By order of Major-General Hardee:

D. G. WHITE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

**DECEMBER 23, 1861—JANUARY 30, 1862.—Garfield's and Marshall's operations in Eastern Kentucky.**

**EVENTS.**

- Dec. 23, 1861.—Union forces advance from Louisa.  
Jan. 7, 1862.—Skirmish at Jennie's Creek.  
10, 1862.—Engagement at Middle Creek, near Prestonburg.  
24–30, 1862.—Expeditions to the Little Sandy and Piketon.

**REPORTS, ETC.**

- No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Ohio, with instructions to Colonel Garfield, and congratulatory orders.  
No. 2.—Col. James A. Garfield, Forty-second Ohio Infantry, commanding brigade, with instructions to subordinates.  
No. 3.—Brig. Gen. Humphrey Marshall, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, with instructions from War Department.  
No. 4.—Col. A. C. Moore, Twenty-ninth Virginia Infantry.

**No. 1.**

*Report of Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Ohio, with instructions to Colonel Garfield, and congratulatory orders.*

**HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
Louisville, January 14, 1862.**

Colonel Garfield, commanding Eighteenth Brigade, reports that on the 7th instant he attacked and drove the enemy from his intrenchments at Paintsville, killing 3 and wounding several; our loss 2 killed and 1 wounded. On the 10th he attacked the main body of the enemy, under Humphrey Marshall, posted on the hills at the Forks of Middle Creek. Skirmishing commenced at 8 a. m.; engaged from 1 p. m. until dark. The enemy was driven from all his positions, and in the night burned most of his stores and fled precipitately. Our force was 1,800 infantry and 300 cavalry. The enemy had 2,500 infantry, three pieces of artillery, and six companies of cavalry. Our loss at Prestonburg, 2 killed, 25 wounded. The enemy's loss at Prestonburg, 27 found dead on the field. He carried off his wounded and many of his killed.

We took 25 prisoners, 10 horses, and a quantity of stores.

Colonel Garfield had crossed the Big Sandy to Prestonburg on the 11th.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

General LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General, Washington.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 17, 1861.*

Colonel GARFIELD,

*Forty-second Ohio Regiment, Commanding Brigade:*

SIR: The brigade organized under your command is intended to operate against the rebel force threatening, and indeed actually committing, depredations in Kentucky, through the valley of the Big Sandy. The actual force of the enemy, from the best information I can gather, does not probably exceed 2,000 or 2,500, though rumor places it as high as 7,000. You can better ascertain the true state of the case when you get on the ground. You are apprised of the position of the troops placed under your command. Go first to Lexington and Paris, and place the Fortieth Ohio Regiment in such position as will best give a moral support to the people in the counties on the route to Prestonburg and Piketon, and oppose any further advance of the enemy on that route. Then proceed with the least possible delay to the mouth of the Sandy, and move with the force in that vicinity up the river, and drive the enemy back or cut him off. Having done that, Piketon will probably be the best position for you to occupy to guard against further incursion. Artillery will be of but little if any service to you in that country. If the enemy have any, it will encumber and weaken rather than strengthen them.

Your supplies must necessarily be taken up the river, and it ought to be done as soon as possible, while the navigation is open. Purchase what you can in the country through which you operate. Send your requisitions to these headquarters for funds and ordnance stores, and to the quartermaster and commissary at Cincinnati for other supplies. The conversations I have had with you will suggest more details than can be given here. Report frequently and fully upon all matters concerning your command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 28, 1861.*

Colonel GARFIELD,

*Commanding Eighteenth Brigade, Louisa, Ky.:*

The following dispatch was sent this day to Lieut. M. L. Benham, Forty-second Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Catlettsburg, via Portsmouth:

The arms for Lindsey's regiment were forwarded by Adams Express on the 19th to Greensburg. Ascertain whether they have gone through Cincinnati. Tell Colonel Garfield I have been unable to get the howitzers for him or I would send them, but I think he will find his infantry more efficient than the enemy's artillery. Tell him to report frequently.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 3, 1862.*

Colonel GARFIELD:

Yours of the 2d instant\* has been received. The general would send you two mountain howitzers, but he is under the impression that from

\* Not found.



the nature of the country and the season of the year you would find them more of an incumbrance than an advantage, and he hopes and expects that you will be able to accomplish important results without them. You can, however, give more in detail your views on the subject.

I presume you have received my letter of the 31st\* giving you information in relation to the enemy near you and my telegram requiring secrecy in regard to same.

Efforts are being made to start Colonel Lindsey, in compliance with your orders, and it is presumed he will [soon] be with you. Report frequently.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 20, 1862.*

Colonel GARFIELD,  
*Commanding Eighteenth Brigade, Prestonburg, Ky.:*

COLONEL: Your dispatches of your attack upon the enemy at Paintsville and Prestonburg on the 7th and 10th instant have been received, and the general commanding directs me to express his gratification at the perseverance, fortitude, and gallantry displayed by yourself and your command in the campaign in which you are engaged. Your original instructions were to proceed as far as Piketon (or Pikeville), and it is inferred from the activity and energy displayed up to the date of your dispatches that you have not permitted the enemy to rest this side of that point. As it is not known here what direction Marshall has taken, it is not practicable to give you any definite instructions. He may have gone into Western Virginia or taken the road from Prestonburg or Piketon to Hazard in Perry County or Whitesburg in Letcher, and may even attempt to make his way to Cumberland Gap. You are directed in any case to drive him from the soil of Kentucky and, having done this, to act as circumstances may require, keeping this office informed of your movements and your whereabouts, that instructions may reach you. Colonel Marshall's Kentucky regiment, from Maysville, Ky., was this day ordered to report to you, and if you should find it necessary to move to the south beyond Piketon, a force must be left at that point. It is a place which must be held, and Marshall's regiment might receive orders from you for that purpose. It would be well for you to put yourself in communication with him as soon as practicable.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. D. GREENE,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, January 24, 1862.*

Col. JAMES A. GARFIELD, *Paintsville, Ky.:*

SIR: Your official report of the battle of Middle Creek has been received and your success will be duly noticed in orders.

The general is expecting to receive from you more detailed information in reference to the retreat of the enemy, the direction taken by

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\* Not found.



him, his probable whereabouts and condition ; of his intentions, probable and future objects and movements. These points were not touched in your report.

You have probably ere this received my letter of the 20th instant, repeating the general's wish for you to establish your force at Piketon and be sure that the enemy does not again get a foothold on Kentucky soil.

Your difficulties in reference to supplies are appreciated, but the general trusts you will overcome them. The commissary of subsistence in Cincinnati has been directed to forward two months' supply of provisions as soon as practicable, the intention being to get a supply to you while the Big Sandy is up and before navigation ceases. The general desires you to take advantage of the high water to get your supplies of all kinds (ammunition and forage, if necessary) up the river while opportunity is favorable.

If Eastern Kentucky is entirely freed from the enemy and out of danger of annoyance, it is possible that yourself and part of your command may be called to other duties.

Capt. Ralph Plumb, quartermaster, was ordered to join you, on your application, from Lexington. Is he on duty with you?

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }	HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
No. 4a. }	<i>Louisville, Ky., January 20, 1862.</i>

The general commanding takes occasion to thank Colonel Garfield and his troops for their successful campaign against the rebel force under General Marshall on the Big Sandy and their gallant conduct in battle. They have overcome formidable difficulties in the character of the country, the condition of the roads, and the inclemency of the season, and without artillery have, in several engagements, terminating with the battle on Middle Creek on the 10th instant, driven the enemy from his intrenched position and forced him back into the mountains with the loss of a large amount of baggage and stores and many of his men killed or captured. These services have called into action the highest qualities of a soldier—perseverance and courage.

By command of General Buell :

JAMES B. FRY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff.*

HDQRS. OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, January 21, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, U. S. A.,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky. :*

SIR: Your dispatch of the 14th instant, reporting the success of Colonel Garfield against the enemy's forces under Humphrey Marshall at Paintsville and Prestonburg, on the 7th and 10th instant, has been received. Major-General McClellan, commanding the Army, congratulates Colonel Garfield and his brigade upon this handsome achievement

against forces superior in number and having the advantage of three pieces of artillery.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General.*

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No. 2.

*Reports of Col. James A. Garfield, Forty-second Ohio Infantry, commanding brigade, with instructions to subordinates.*

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*George's Creek, December 26, 1861.*

I arrived here last night with 900 men. Twenty-five hundred rebels are at Paintsville, 18 miles distant, with four guns. They are fortifying. The Fourteenth Kentucky can furnish only 500 effective men. They will be here soon. Colonel Lindsey has no equipments and but 600 effective men. I have ordered him to join me as soon as possible. Send me four small howitzers, with shell and shrapnel, if possible. I can get them here by boat and haul them with our mule teams. Lieut. M. L. Benham, Forty-second Regiment, awaits answer at Cincinnati.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL.

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*George's Creek, December 26, 1861.*

SIR: I advanced from Louisa on the 23d instant, with nine companies of the Forty-second Ohio, three companies of the Fourteenth Kentucky, and Major McLaughlin's squadron of cavalry, and reached this place, 18 miles from Paintsville, on the evening of the 24th, bringing our tents and subsistence by a flat-boat, as our train, in charge of one company of the Forty-second Ohio, had not yet arrived from Catlettsburg.

Nine companies of the Fourteenth Kentucky were allowed to remain at Louisa to await the arrival of their equipments. I expect them here to-morrow.

Colonel Lindsey has informed me that his command cannot be ready for service for an indefinite time. I herewith inclose you a copy of his communication.\* I have not yet heard from Colonel Wolford's cavalry. The roads along this valley are almost impassable; they were never more than tolerable, and in the distracted condition of the country no repairs have been made. It required four days' hard labor to bring our train of 25 wagons, nearly empty, a distance of 28 miles. I am therefore bringing our stores to this point by the river. When we leave here we shall go back from the river up George's Creek, and shall take our train with us. It will reach us to-morrow. I think I am now able to give you a reliable statement of the strength of the enemy in the vicinity of Paintsville at least.

I have collected and compared statements from citizens, scouts, and prisoners, and find that Colonel Williams returned about three weeks

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\* Not found.

ago with the force that retreated before General Nelson; and about ten days ago a regiment of troops from some neighboring State, probably Virginia, passed to Prestonburg, via Piketon, with a train of 55 wagons and four iron guns; one of large caliber, the others probably 6-pounders.

These two forces, amounting to from 2,000 to 2,500 men, increased by irregular bands of local rebels, mostly mounted, are now in Paintsville, and are throwing up works for defense, and sending out marauding parties in various directions, who are committing frequent murders, driving off cattle, and destroying the property of Union men. I inclose a map of the route from my camp to Paintsville.\* I send a request by telegraph for at least four small howitzers.

Without a strong re-enforcement my command can hardly dislodge the enemy without the means of shelling their camp. I can furnish teams for hauling the guns, which can be sent here by the river. I earnestly hope you will be able to furnish them. I shall hope to strike a blow at an early day. I have not yet been able to send you consolidated morning reports in consequence of the separation of the parts of my command and the want of proper blanks. Requisitions have been made, but a supply has not yet been received.

I have not yet heard from the Fortieth Ohio Regiment, but have no doubt it has reached and is occupying McCormick's Gap.

Respectfully submitted.

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Pardee, January 4, 1862.*

DEAR SIR: Shortly after the date of my last report to you, of December 26, I received intelligence that the enemy had retreated to a hill 3 miles from Paintsville, on the road to Prestonburg, where he is throwing up earthworks. About the same time 300 or 400 cavalry came in from West Liberty and encamped at the mouth of Jennie's Creek, where they still remain and are actively engaged in marauding and foraging expeditions. Judging from the position of the enemy that he intended to make a stand, I dispatched a messenger to Colonel Cranor, ordering him to proceed to Prestonburg via Hazel Green and Burning Spring, sending a strong party of cavalry via West Liberty and Licking Station to drive in the rebel forces on that route and protect Colonel Cranor's flank, and join him again before he reached Prestonburg. He was then to move down the river and hold himself in readiness to attack the enemy's position or cut off his retreat. I herewith inclose a copy of my instructions to him.\*

The messenger was expected to return on Monday evening, December 30, but did not reach me till Wednesday. On Tuesday, December 31, I moved up George's Creek 8 miles, with the Forty-second Ohio, five companies of the Fourteenth Kentucky, and McLaughlin's squadron of cavalry, and encamped at the foot of Brown's Hill. I there waited one day the arrival of Colonel Moor's [Cranor's?] train, part of which reached me January 1. Six of his wagons have not yet arrived. On the evening of

\* See p. 35.



January 1 my messenger from Colonel Cranor arrived, informing [me] that his regiment arrived at McCormick's Gap on Sunday, December 29, and would leave there in conformity with my orders on the following morning. It consumed the whole of January 2 and 3 and required a working party of 100 men to get our train over Brown's Hill to this point, on the headwaters of Tom's Creek, a distance of but little more than 3 miles from our former place of encampment. To-day our scouts encountered and drove back a hundred of the enemy's cavalry from Tom's Hill,  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles on the route to Paintsville. Our advance guard is holding the position to-night.

In view of the exceedingly bad condition of the roads, made worse by the heavy rains of the last two days, I have dispatched a second messenger to Colonel Cranor, appointing Monday next as the time when I hope to drive in the enemy's cavalry and occupy the mouth of Jennie's Creek. I am exceedingly perplexed by the non-arrival of Lindsey's regiment. When I first arrived at Catlettsburg I ordered him to join me as soon as he could obtain the requisite outfit. On Saturday last he broke up his camp and moved to Ashland, as I supposed, on his way up the valley. On Wednesday I heard that he had not yet left Ashland. I then sent him a peremptory order to move forward, but up to this time I have not heard from him. The two companies of Colonel Wolford's cavalry, which were ordered to join me, I have never heard from.

I stated in my last report that Major McLaughlin's [cavalry] had no carbines. I turned over to them the rifles belonging to such of the Forty-second Ohios as were sick and on detached duty, and they still use them. The major received a full supply of pistol cartridges a few days ago, but no caps came with them.

The squadron has but very little drill and cannot be relied on for much service, except scout and messenger duty. But, notwithstanding these drawbacks, I shall advance, and shall hope we may at least narrow down the limits of the enemy's depredations. Since my last report we have had 4 men from Major McLaughlin's cavalry captured by the enemy's scouts. We have taken 1 of his men, and Colonel Cranor has taken several more.

I was much in hopes I could have had a howitzer battery. Still, if I had an infantry force in this column equal to the enemy's I should have no doubt of being able to capture him. I shall try his strength as soon as I can draw him down from his position. I have not yet received any blanks, and hence have forwarded no morning reports. I inclose maps.\*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Eighteenth Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Paintsville, Ky., January 8, 1862.*

DEAR SIR: On Sunday, January 5, I drove in several small scouting parties of the enemy, killing 1 of them. On Monday, January 6, I moved on to the mouth of Muddy Branch. The enemy came down the

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\* Not found.



same evening from his intrenched hill, with one 12-pounder and two regiments of infantry, and occupied the southern bank of Paint Creek. When his scouts were drawn in they reported the advance of my whole column, and immediately Marshall broke up his camp, burned many of his wagons, and a large amount of corn, oats, meal, sugar, rice, and other provisions, and during the night of January 5 and all the following day he was hurrying his trains and infantry away on retreat. His cavalry remained behind, kept up a show of resistance, and thus kept their retreat a secret. Colonel Bolles, of the Second Virginia Cavalry, had been ordered by General Cox, commanding Department of the Kanawha, to co-operate with me, in view of the fact that bands of rebels were coming in from the Virginia side of the Sandy, and joined me on Monday at noon. We then moved forward, with the Forty-second Ohio, Fourteenth Kentucky, and 300 of Colonel Bolles' cavalry, and occupied this place. The rebel pickets were still on the opposite side of Paint Creek and retreated as we advanced. I immediately sent Colonel Bolles, with his 300 cavalry, to attack and drive back the rebels at Jennie's Creek, while I advanced with 1,000 men to attack General Marshall's position. I was obliged to construct a pontoon bridge across Paint Creek, and did not get my column in motion until sunset. We then advanced along an unfrequented road, and at 8 o'clock occupied the rebel fortifications 4 miles above here. We found his camp-fires still burning, and his whole camp showed signs of panic and most disorderly retreat. I then marched down Jennie's Creek to aid Colonel Bolles. Before we reached him his advance of 60 men had attacked 200 rebel cavalry, killed 6, wounded several, and scattered them among the hills. Colonel Bolles had 2 killed and 1 wounded.

To-day we have occupied all their works and sent out cavalry scouts to learn the direction of their retreat. Colonel Bolles has given me very efficient aid, but his orders will not permit him to remain with me longer. To-morrow morning I start in pursuit with 1,000 infantry and 400 cavalry.

Colonel Cranor, Fortieth Ohio, and six companies (300 men) of Wolford's cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, have joined me to-day. They had construed the enemy's retreat into an intended attack, and not being able to resist the whole rebel force, which has been increased by late re-enforcements to over 4,000 men, came down Paint Creek instead of going on to Prestonburg.

We have taken 15 prisoners, which I have this day sent to Newport Barracks. The vicinity of the rebel camps presents a scene of utter desolation. They have appropriated and destroyed an immense amount of property.

The transportation for our stores has been a work of extreme difficulty. But now that we have reached the river, we will hurry them up by boats. I shall hope to occupy Prestonburg to-morrow evening. I fear we shall not be able to catch the enemy in a "stern chase," but we shall try. Since he has left his stronghold I think I shall not need any artillery.

The health of my command is very good, considering the hard service they have been engaged in. I send you a sketch of Marshall's defenses.\* The extent and character of the works indicate a larger force than I had supposed they had. I regret to say I have not received any blanks and have not made out any brigade morning reports. I have the materials for them, and will forward them as soon as the blanks arrive.

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\* Not found. \*

Your telegram of the 2d instant, instructing me to keep secret the facts in your letter of the 31st ultimo, was duly received, but the letter referred to has not yet reached me.

From all the indications I am led to believe the enemy is retreating in a southwest direction from Prestonburg toward the Cumberland Gaps. How far in that direction shall I be permitted to follow him?

Very truly, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Prestonburg, Ky., January 11, 1862.*

I left Paintsville on Thursday noon with 1,100 men, and drove in the enemy's pickets 2 miles beyond Prestonburg. The men slept on their arms. At 4 o'clock yesterday morning we moved toward the main body of the enemy at the Forks of Middle Creek, under command of Marshall. Skirmishing with his outposts began at 8 o'clock, and at 1 o'clock p. m. we engaged his force of 2,500 men and three cannon posted on the hill. Fought them until dark. Having been re-enforced by 700 men from Paintsville, drove the enemy from all their positions. He carried off the majority of his dead and all his wounded. This morning we found 27 of his dead on the field. His killed cannot be less than 60. We have taken 25 prisoners, 10 horses, and a quantity of stores. The enemy burned most of his stores and fled precipitately.

To-day I have crossed the river, and am now occupying Prestonburg. Our loss 2 killed and 25 wounded.

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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PAINTSVILLE, *January 8, 1862.*  
(Via Portsmouth, Ohio, 14th.)

I entered this place yesterday with the Forty-second Ohio and Fourteenth Kentucky and 300 Second Virginia Cavalry. On hearing of my approach the main rebel force left their strongly-intrenched camp and fled. I sent my cavalry to the mouth of Jennie's, where they attacked and drove the rebel cavalry, which had been left as a vanguard, 5 miles, killing 3 and wounding a considerable number. Marshall's whole army is now flying in utter confusion. He has abandoned and burned a large amount of his stores. We have taken 15 prisoners. Our loss was 2 killed and 1 wounded. I start in pursuit to-morrow morning.

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*



HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Buell, Paintsville, January 14, 1862.*

DEAR SIR: At the date of my last report (January 8) I was preparing to pursue the enemy. The transportation of my stores from George's Creek had been a work of so great difficulty that I had not enough provisions here to give my whole command three days' rations before starting. One small boat had come up from below, but I found it had only enough provisions here for three days' rations of hard bread for 1,500 men. Having issued that amount, I sent 450 of Colonel Wolford's and Major McLaughlin's cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, to advance up Jennie's Creek, and harass the enemy's rear if still retreating. At the same time I took 1,100 of the best men from the Fortieth and Forty-second Ohio and the Fourteenth and Twenty-second Kentucky (three companies of Colonel Lindsey's regiment, the Twenty-second Kentucky, had arrived the evening before), and at noon started up the Big Sandy towards Prestonburg. After advancing 10 miles the enemy's pickets fired on our advance and retreated.

At 8 o'clock we reached the mouth of Abbott's Creek, 1 mile below Prestonburg. I then found that the enemy was encamped on the creek 3 miles above, and had been supplying himself with meal at a steam-mill in the vicinity. I sent back an order to Paintsville to move forward all our available force, having learned that another boat load of stores had arrived. I then encamped on the crest of a wooded hill, where we slept on our arms in the rain till 4 o'clock in the morning, when I moved up Abbott's Creek 1 mile and crossed over to the mouth of Middle Creek, which empties into the Big Sandy opposite Prestonburg. Supposing the enemy to be encamped on Abbott's Creek, it was my intention to advance up Middle Creek and cut off his retreat, while the cavalry should attack his rear. I advanced slowly, throwing out flankers and feeling my way cautiously among the hills. At 8 o'clock in the morning we reached the mouth of Middle Creek, where my advance began a brisk skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry, which continued till we had advanced  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles up the stream to within 1,000 yards of the forks of the creek, which I had learned the enemy were then occupying.

I drew up my force on the sloping point of a semicircular hill, and at 12 o'clock sent forward 20 mounted men to make a dash across the plain. This drew the enemy's fire, and in part disclosed his position. The Fifty-fourth Virginia Regiment (Colonel Trigg) was posted behind the farther point of the same ridge which I occupied. I immediately sent forward two Kentucky companies to pass along this crest of the ridge, and one company Forty-second Ohio, under command of Capt. F. A. Williams, together with one under Captain Jones, Fortieth Ohio, to cross the creek, which was nearly waist-deep, and occupy a spur of the high rocky ridge in front and to the left of my position.

In a few minutes the enemy opened a fire from one 6 and one 12 pounder. A shell from the battery fell in the midst of my skirmishers on the right, but did not explode. Soon after the detachment on the left engaged the enemy, who was concealed in large force behind the ridge. I sent forward a re-enforcement of two companies to the right, under Major Burke, of the Fourteenth Kentucky, and 90 men, under Major Pardee, of the Forty-second Ohio, to support Captain Williams. The enemy withdrew his Fifty-fourth Virginia across the creek, and sent strong re-enforcements to the hills on the left. About 2 o'clock I ordered Colonel Cranor, with 150 men from the Fortieth and Forty-second Ohio and Twenty-second Kentucky, to re-enforce Major Pardee.

Meantime the enemy had occupied the main ridge to a point nearly opposite the right of my position, and opened a heavy fire on my reserve, which was returned with good effect. In order more effectually to prevent his attempt to outflank me I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Monroe, of the Twenty-second Kentucky, with 120 of his own and the Fourteenth Regiment, to cross the creek a short distance below the point I occupied, and drive back the enemy from his position. This he did in gallant style, killing 15 or 20. Inch by inch the enemy, with more than three times our number, were driven up the steep ridge nearest the creek by Colonel Cranor and Major Pardee.

At 4 o'clock the re-enforcement under Lieutenant Colonel Sheldon, of the Forty-second Ohio, came in sight, which enabled me to send forward the remainder of my reserve, under Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, to pass around to the right and endeavor to capture the enemy's guns, which he had been using against us for three hours, but without effect. During the fight he had fired 30 rounds from his guns, but they were badly served, as only one of his shells exploded, and none of his shot, not even his canister, took effect. At 4.30 he ordered a retreat. My men drove him down the slopes of the hills, and at 5 o'clock he had been driven from every point. Many of my men had fired 30 rounds. It was growing dark, and I deemed it unsafe to pursue him, lest my men on the different hills should fire on each other in the darkness. The firing had scarcely ceased when a brilliant light streamed up from the valley to which the enemy had retreated. He was burning his stores and fleeing in great disorder. Twenty-five of his dead were left on the field, and 60 more were found next day thrown into a gorge in the hills. He has acknowledged 125 killed and a still larger number wounded. A field officer and 2 captains were found among the dead. Our loss was 1 killed and 20 wounded, 2 of whom have since died. We took 25 prisoners, among whom was a rebel captain. Not more than 900 of my force were actually engaged, and the enemy had not less than 3,500 men.

Special mention would be invidious when almost every officer and man did his duty. A majority of them fought for five hours without cessation. The cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel Letcher, did not reach me until the next morning, when I started them in pursuit. They followed 6 miles and took a few prisoners, but, their provisions being exhausted, they returned. A few howitzers would have added greatly to our success.

On the 11th I crossed the river and occupied Prestonburg. The place was almost deserted. I took several horses, 18 boxes quartermaster's stores, and 25 flint-lock muskets. I found the whole community in the vicinity of Prestonburg had been stripped of everything like supplies for an army. I could not find enough forage for my horses for over one day, and so sent them back to Paintsville. I had ordered the first boat that arrived at Paintsville to push on up to Prestonburg, but I found it would be impossible to bring up our tents and supplies until more provisions could be brought up the river. I therefore moved down to this place on the 12th and 13th, bringing my sick and foot-sore men on boats. I am hurrying our supplies up to this point. The marches over these exceedingly bad roads and the night exposures have been borne with great cheerfulness by my men, but they are greatly in need of rest and good care.

I cannot close this communication without making honorable mention of Lieut. J. D. Stubbs, quartermaster of the Forty-second Ohio, and senior quartermaster of the brigade. He has pushed forward the trans-



portation of our stores with an energy and determination which have enabled him to overcome very many and great obstacles, and his efforts have contributed greatly to the success of the expedition and the health and comfort of my command.

In a subsequent report I will communicate some facts relative to my command and also in regard to the situation of the country through which the enemy has been operating.

Very truly, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. Fry,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Buell, Paintsville, Ky., January 17, 1862.*

DEAR SIR: In my last report to you reasons were given why I did not move forward to Prestonburg with my whole force.

In this I desire to submit some further facts relative to the condition of my command and the situation of the country in which the enemy has been operating. The Fortieth and Forty-second Ohio Regiments are in good condition, considering the hard service they have rendered. The Fourteenth Kentucky is composed of excellent material, but is in a wretched state of discipline. Very few of its members have been drilled in the school of the soldier, much less that of the company and battalion. It can be considered but little better than a well-disposed, Union-loving mob, which, if its scattered fragments can be gathered up, may be converted into a very serviceable regiment.

The Twenty-second Kentucky I have not yet had the pleasure of seeing together. Three companies (200 men) joined me just in time to aid in the fight at Middle Creek. The remnant, about the same number, I have left at Louisa to guard our stores. I shall hope to get them here soon. From what I have seen I am encouraged to hope they are in a tolerably good state of discipline.

The six companies (300) of the First Kentucky Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, have been very hard-worked, and have a sick list of 207 men, as reported to me by their surgeon. A large number referred to refused to come into the mountains, and many that started deserted by the road.

Colonel Letcher is an admirable gentleman, but a more demoralized, discouraged body of men I have never seen. Major McLaughlin's squadron of cavalry are in a better state of discipline, and a few weeks of drill will make them quite serviceable. I shall do what I can to better the condition of the brigade as opportunity offers. I venture to suggest that the removal of Colonel Letcher's detachment of cavalry and the supplying of its place by another in better condition would be very serviceable both to Colonel Wolford's command and to this brigade.

From the best information I can obtain the upper part of the Sandy Valley is almost deserted. The expedition of General Nelson, followed by Marshall's, has swept away almost everything on which an army could subsist. Indeed, the late re-enforcements which joined Marshall's army came from the Gap by way of the Kentucky River, because they could find neither food nor forage between Piketon and Prestonburg. On the day following the fight I sent my cavalry back to this place, because I could not find forage for even a single day.

The enemy retreated after the battle to the Forks of Beaver Creek, 20 miles southwest of Prestonburg, and seems to be making his way towards the valley of the Kentucky River. Our prisoners say he intends to winter at Whitesburg or join the rebel forces towards the Cumberland Gap. The uncertainty of transportation by the river and the impossibility of finding subsistence for my force at Prestonburg or Piketon seem to me to indicate this as the most eligible place for winter quarters.

For the last five days no boats have been able to come up the river in consequence of the exceeding high waters, while they have been kept from coming up a much longer time since I arrived in the valley in consequence of low water.

I respectfully solicit instructions in regard to my future movements.

Very truly, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Paintsville, Ky., January 16, 1862.*

*Citizens of the Sandy Valley:*

I have come among you to restore the honor of the Union, and to bring back the old banner which you all once loved, but which by the machinations of evil men and by mutual misunderstandings has been dishonored among you. To those who are in arms against the Federal Government I offer only the alternative of battle or unconditional surrender. But to those who have taken no part in this war, who are in no way aiding or abetting the enemies of the Union—even to those who hold sentiments averse to the Union, but yet give no aid and comfort to its enemies—I offer the full protection of the Government, both in their persons and property.

Let those who have been seduced away from the love of their country to follow after and aid the destroyers of our peace lay down their arms return to their homes, bear true allegiance to the Federal Government, and they shall also enjoy like protection. The Army of the Union wages no war of plunder, but comes to bring back the prosperity of peace. Let all peace-loving citizens who have fled from their homes return and resume again the pursuits of peace and industry. If citizens have suffered from any outrages by the soldiers under my command I invite them to make known their complaints to me, and their wrongs shall be redressed and the offenders punished. I expect the friends of the Union in this valley to banish from among them all private feuds, and let a liberal-minded love of country direct their conduct towards those who have been so sadly estranged and misguided. Hoping that these days of turbulence may soon be ended and the better days of the Republic soon return, I am, very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Buell, Paintsville, Ky., January 30, 1862.*

SIR: On the 24th instant I sent out two detachments, one of 150 infantry, which has just returned from the headwaters of Little Sandy.



where it dispersed two companies of rebels, who were engaged in plundering; the other (110 cavalry) proceeded to the head of John's Creek and thence to Piketon. Both expeditions have terminated successfully. Ten prisoners were taken and a number of horses. There is now no enemy nearer than Whitesburg, where Marshall is encamped with the remnant of his brigade. His two Virginia regiments went home soon after the battle, and over 40 deserters have voluntarily given themselves up to me. I shall immediately move forward.

Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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CAMP BUELL, *Paintsville, January 30, 1862.*

DEAR SIR: Since the date of my last report (January 17) we have had the heaviest and longest-continued rains that have been known in this valley for many years. The roads, which were very bad before, have been ruined, and it will require a great amount of labor to render them again passable for wagons.

For nearly ten days the river was so high that boats could not run up, in consequence of the overhanging trees almost meeting in the middle of the stream. It is now at a good stage, and we are getting our supplies in abundance.

I have obtained reliable information of the late operations of the enemy. Immediately after the battle of Middle Creek he retreated 20 miles, to Beaver Creek, at which place his brigade organization seemed almost to have dissolved. A re-enforcement of one infantry regiment and a battery of artillery from Virginia, which was within two days' march, hearing of Marshall's flight, turned back and retired through the Pound Gap. The two Virginia regiments, under Colonels Trigg and Moore, left him at Beaver Creek, and went back to Virginia by the same route. I had prepared an expedition to move up the river by boats and get above his camp on Beaver, when I learned the remnant of his brigade had gone to Whitesburg, though his Kentucky regiments were decimated by desertions. One squad of 42 threw down their guns and deserted in a body. I am every day discharging on parole numbers of deserters, who voluntarily give themselves up.

A few days since I sent a detachment of 110 mounted men to Pike-ton, who dispersed a marauding band and captured several leading and active rebels, whom I have sent to Newport Barracks. In the pursuit Judge Cecil, of Piketon, was killed, and a Dr. Emmet severely wounded.

About one week since I learned that a predatory band of 150 men had gone out from Marshall's brigade a short time before his flight, and were encamped among the cliffs of Little Sandy, where they were raising recruits and committing depredations upon the property of citizens. I sent a party of 150 men, who dispersed them, taking a number of prisoners and horses. I believe there now is no enemy in Eastern Kentucky nearer to me than Whitesburg.

In my last report I asked for instructions in regard to my future movements. I have not yet received them. I have, however, ventured to order one regiment to move forward to Piketon, to watch the enemy and protect the border until I receive further instructions.



Hoping that I may be permitted to pass the gates of the mountains and strike at the great rebel railroad, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*George's Creek, December 28, 1861.*

Col. JONATHAN CRANOR,  
*Commanding Fortieth Ohio Volunteers:*

DEAR SIR: We now have reached a point from which we can begin to act in concert. I have advanced to within 18 miles of the enemy, who has just retired to a point 2 or 3 miles back of Paintsville, where he seems to be fortifying. He has two full regiments, under Humphrey Marshall, a brigadier-general in the rebel army, and an irregular force of local rebels, which makes their force about 2,500 men. They have four small guns, probably 6-pounders, and a considerable part of their force is cavalry. They seemed to be somewhat surprised, and about 300 came in from West Liberty a day or two since in some confusion, which leads me to suspect that they have heard from your scouts. My information is of such a character as to induce me to believe it is reliable.

The plan of our joint operations will be understood from the accompanying map.\* My messenger will reach you on Sunday morning. You will at once take up your line of march toward Prestonburg, by the way of Hazel Green and Burning Spring. Send a sufficiently strong force by way of West Liberty and Licking Station to protect your flank, and hold itself in readiness either to join you from the latter place or to proceed directly to Paintsville, according to the necessities of the case. You will advance with the greatest dispatch to Prestonburg, and if the enemy continues to hold his present position, 9 miles north of Prestonburg, as indicated on the inclosed map, you will advance toward him along the road from Prestonburg, to attack him in the rear or cut off his retreat, while my force attacks him from the Paintsville road. I shall hope you will be able to reach Prestonburg by Wednesday or Thursday. I shall leave this point on Monday; shall advance by easy marches; shall endeavor to keep his attention directed this way, and shall hope to offer him battle on Thursday or Friday. Our hope of success depends upon the celerity, promptness, and unity of our movements. Not having heard from you, I am left in some doubt of your being able to carry out the part of the programme assigned to you. There may also be enemies on your route that I do not know of. Make a full report of your situation to me by the express rider who delivers this, and he will return your answer to me in time to make any change in the plan which may be necessary. The opportunity is now before us, and I shall expect every effort will be made to improve it. The messenger will report to you verbally our strength and condition.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

P. S. We shall be able to communicate with each other at several points on your route.

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\*Not found.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Tom's Creek, January 3, 1862.*

Col. JONATHAN CRANOR,  
*Commanding Fortieth Ohio Volunteers :*

DEAR SIR: My messenger, who was sent to you, did not reach me till Wednesday evening. Fearing he had been captured, I halted at the end of one day's march, and dispatched another, who met the first one 18 miles on the way, and returned with him. I then moved on to this place, and have this evening succeeded in getting my trains here, over almost impassable roads. From what I have learned of the country through which you are to pass I am quite sure you cannot have made more than half or two-thirds the distance to Prestonburg. I send a messenger to apprise you of the present posture of the enemy and of my force.

The main body of his force is encamped on Hagar's farm, about 3 miles from Paintsville, on the road leading to Prestonburg. He has a force of from 300 to 400 cavalry encamped at the mouth of Jennie's Creek, 2 miles above Paintsville, on Paint Creek.

It is rumored that he has re-enforcements coming in from Virginia by way of Piketon. This is only a rumor, to which I do not give much credit, but which you will need to inquire into.

The tardiness with which my Kentucky forces are coming up, together with the ascertained character of the roads over which you are to pass, leads me to delay the time of our attack. You will advance as rapidly as possible, but with great caution as you approach the vicinity of the enemy. I shall probably be at the mouth of Jennie's Creek on Monday night.

We must immediately open and maintain a line of safe communication between our two columns. Let me hear from you very often.

Very truly, yours.

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Pardee, January 5, 1862.*

Capt. P. BUNKER,  
*Commanding Post, Louisa, Ky. :*

DEAR SIR: Your report of yesterday, containing an intercepted letter of Dr. Shelton, is just received.\* I am very much gratified with the intelligence that you have killed or disabled Smith and captured some of his associates. Send away all such men as fast as possible. You are doing good service in your present position, as the enemy is evidently anxious to outflank me and, if possible, cut off my supplies. Make frequent reports of your operations and give me any information you may obtain which will forward the success of our expedition. I sent you full orders a few days since, which I hope have reached you before this.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

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\*Not found.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Pardee, January 5, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. J. D. COX,  
*Commanding Division of Kanawha:*

DEAR SIR: I am now within 5 miles of Paintsville. The main force of the enemy is entrenched on two hills, 3 miles back of the town, on the road to Prestonburg. Five hundred of his cavalry are encamped at the mouth of Jennie's Creek, 2 miles west of Paintsville. We are skirmishing with his scouts daily. He has lately been re-enforced by 400 of Jenkins' cavalry and a few hundred men who were driven in from West Liberty by the Fortieth Ohio, which is advancing toward Prestonburg. My Kentucky forces are very slow in coming up, and I have but 1,300 men here, though I expect 500 of the Twenty-second Kentucky to reach me in a few days. I am also exceedingly glad to hear that Colonel Bolles, of your department, is coming with 500 cavalry to join me. For this I am under great obligations to you.

By examining the position of our own and the enemy's forces, I believe if the force which you have sent to Logan County could be sent westward, and act in concert with our forces here, the enemy's retreat could be completely cut off, and his whole army, which now amounts to from 4,000 to 5,000, could be captured. I have learned that there is a feasible route from Logan County to the Big Sandy down the valley of John's Creek, or, in case the enemy should retreat, your column could head him off on his route from Prestonburg to Piketon.

If it is consistent with the interests of your command, I hope you will allow that column to act in concert with me.

Very truly, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Pardee, January 5, 1862.*

Capt. JACOB HEATON,  
*Acting Assistant Commissary Subsistence:*

DEAR SIR: My messenger has just returned, bringing your dispatches.\* I am exceedingly grateful for the very prompt and energetic manner in which you have pushed our interests in regard to re-enforcements. It took nearly two days for us to get our own train over the mountains to this place, 3 miles from our former camp. Here I have waited two days to hear from our re-enforcements. We are now within 5 miles of Paintsville and 6½ miles from the mouth of Jennie's Creek, where the rebel cavalry are encamped. We have had two slight skirmishes with their pickets within the last twenty-four hours. They have been re-enforced within the last few days, and I have some reason to believe that Jenkins has joined them with 400 of his men.

I am exceedingly anxious to reach the river, where we can get stores by boat, and also I desire to occupy the mouth of Jennie's Creek. I expect to move to-morrow, and if Colonel Bolles' cavalry reaches me I shall be able to accomplish both these purposes soon.

From a messenger just arrived I learn that part of Colonel Lindsey's force has reached Louisa, and part of the rest will be there this evening. Now the river has so raised that I think his regiment can be taken up

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\* Not found.



the river to the mouth of Muddy Branch, a little below the mouth of Paint Creek; at any rate, they can be taken to the mouth of George's Creek. I hope you have succeeded in getting Colonel Lightburn's regiment to come up and co-operate with us. The enemy is rallying for a desperate effort, and the expedition is growing up to proportions that I did not at first expect, but if our friends come up to the work our prospect is very good. I have sent by the messenger who bears this a dispatch to General Cox, asking him to move his expedition to Logan Court-House, westward, and help cut off the enemy's retreat. Please send forward the dispatch.\*

\* \* \* \* \*

Very truly, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
Camp Pardee, January 5, 1862.

Maj. J. J. HOFFMAN,

*Commanding Squadron Second Virginia Cavalry:*

DEAR SIR: Your messenger has just arrived (11 o'clock p. m.) with your letter, inclosing a letter from Colonel Bolles.† I can answer your inquiries in no better way than to state my own and the enemy's positions, which you will understand from the inclosed maps.†

The main body of the rebel force is occupying a fortified hill 3 miles back of Paintsville, on the road leading to Prestonburg. At the mouth of Jennie's Creek, 4 or 5 miles from the main camp, there are from 400 to 500 rebel cavalry encamped. They are actively engaged in arresting Union men and plundering Union property. Our scouts have had two or three skirmishes with them within the last two days. I have only two companies (175) of cavalry, and they have not yet obtained their full outfit, and have had but little drill. I cannot rely upon them for much more than scout duty.

I am exceedingly glad to hear that Colonel Bolles' command is on the way to assist me; and it is my purpose to move on toward Paintsville, via the mouth of Muddy Branch, to-morrow, and send Colonel Bolles, in connection with my squadron of cavalry, to attack the rebel cavalry, and cut them off or drive them back as soon as his force arrives. I was greatly in hopes that he would reach here to-morrow, and advance upon the enemy at the same time that my column moves down another route to occupy Paintsville. I hope you will find it consistent with your orders from superior officers in your department to join me at once, and I hope Colonel Bolles will come on as soon as possible. I am informed that he can pass around by the headwaters of the Blaine and reach this point as soon as he could by the way of Louisa. He can take that route with safety.

By the united efforts of all our forces I have strong hopes that we may capture the whole army under General Marshall.

Hoping to see you soon, I am, dear sir, very respectfully, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
Colonel, Commanding Brigade.

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\* Some matter of detail omitted.

† Not found.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Mouth of Muddy Branch, January 6, 1862.*

Major McLAUGHLIN,  
*Commanding Squadron Cavalry:*

DEAR SIR: Information has just been received that the enemy has broken up his camp and retreated precipitately. It is of the utmost importance that we know the truth of this report, and, if true, that we know the direction he has taken. You will therefore send forthwith a part of your command, under a discreet officer, who shall proceed to Jennie's Creek and learn whether the enemy is still there, and, if so, whether he has been re-enforced. If he has left, try to discover the route he has taken. I leave the number subject to your discretion, but would suggest 40 or 50. I shall expect a report from you at an early hour in the morning. A messenger from George's Creek tells me that Colonel Bolles will not reach you till to-morrow noon.

Very truly, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Buell, January 24, 1862.*

Lieut. Col. J. R. BROWN,  
*Fourteenth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers:*

SIR: You are ordered to take command of a detachment of 130 men, with a complement of company officers, and start to-morrow morning, at as early an hour as practicable, to the cliffs of Little Sandy. The object of your expedition is to capture or disperse a body of the enemy who are occupying that vicinity and are committing depredations upon the property of citizens. If in your judgment the success of your enterprise demands it, you are authorized to detach a commissioned officer and a squad of men to guard such passes as the enemy would be likely to escape through.

You are hereby empowered to arrest and bring to these headquarters all persons who are aiding or abetting the rebellion, and who in your judgment are dangerous to the Union cause. I have ordered the quartermaster of the Fourteenth Kentucky to send with you a commissary sergeant, who will provide by purchase such provisions as the forces under your command are entitled to by law, but are unable to take with them. Your command will take three days' cooked rations in their haversacks, and will carry nothing in their knapsacks but their blankets. Each man must have 30 rounds of ammunition.

I shall expect you to return at the end of five days. If the success of your expedition requires it, you are authorized to extend the time to six days, but no longer, without orders from me.

Very truly, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

## No. 3.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Humphrey Marshall, C. S. Army, commanding brigade, with instructions from War Department.*

CAMP AT PAINTSVILLE, JOHNSON COUNTY, KY.,  
December 22, 1861.

GENERAL: I had the pleasure to receive your favor of the 10th instant\* on last evening. In reply permit me to express my gratification that the misapprehension by my friend Major-General Crittenden of the extent of his jurisdiction and your prompt rectification of what seemed to circumscribe vastly my sphere of proposed usefulness have left me nothing to complain of in regard to the matter and nothing to regret, except the hope it seems to have inspired Colonel Stuart's regiment with, that the field of its operations would be one more agreeable than the mountains.

I have been compelled to arrest Colonel Moore, of the regiment from Virginia, to be called the Twenty-eighth when organized, and I have directed him to remain at Abingdon (his home) until you order a court to try his case. I shall hereafter forward the charges and specifications, if I shall consider it absolutely essential to press the matter to a hearing. For the present I merely remark that I have been trying to move his command forward to Prestonburg since the 6th day of November. I telegraphed to him from Wytheville at that time, directing him to move. I saw him there on the 9th of November, and explained to him the apprehensions I entertained for Colonel Williams' safety; urged him to move his regiment. I then gave him written orders to move immediately on receiving arms and ammunition. I left Wytheville in person and went forward to the Richlands, in Tazewell (62 miles), crossed over to a point only 20 miles back of Abingdon, and thence to this place. From Pound Gap I urged Colonel Moore to come forward with his command. I wrote to him, demanding some explanation of his conduct. He rendered it and set a day to start, but he did not start at the time appointed; and when he did start, he only moved 3 or 4 or 5 miles per day, and finally halted between Abingdon and Clinch River, on the ground that he had promised his men not to move them across Clinch River until their wages were paid. Officers of this command came and went by his column; some of them made speeches to Colonel Moore's men. I bore all this in silence, but disapprovingly. The command was finally brought forward to the other side of Cumberland Mountain last Saturday (eight days ago), and there it halted again, and the colonel sent me a message that he was doing all he could to get forward, but his men would not come, and he had to go back after some he had permitted to go home to prepare wood for the winter for their families, &c., and expected to be detained for some seven or eight days, but would do his best; and I heard that the command was in a terrible condition, so far as discipline is concerned; and this last news and message seemed to leave me no alternative but to try to bring the command forward under the charge of the lieutenant-colonel or the major. Therefore I ordered Colonel Moore in arrest, and directed him to return to his home until you could order an investigation of his case. My sole object is to get his men into the field; I don't believe he ever will. I can't say that he does not desire to do so, but it is plain that if he keeps his own illegal promises to his soldiers at the expense of peremptory orders from his superior officer,

\* See "Correspondence, etc.—Confederate," *post*.



and at the risk of others whose safety might be dependent on his movements, he is a very unsafe depository of military trust; and if he wants to do right, yet can't command his men to march after more than thirty days of experiment, he should yield place to somebody who can.

I make this explanation to you because I am aware I ought to send forward charge and specification now, but I have no desire to push Colonel Moore into any place from which he cannot recover, and I want to leave myself a little room to observe whether the arrest alone will not answer without a trial.

I am here, 33 miles above Louisa and about 60 miles from the Ohio River. Below me are several large towns: Louisa, 900 population; Catlettsburg, 1,000, at the mouth of the Sandy. Four miles below Catlettsburg is Ashland, 1,200 population; 20 miles below is Greenupsburg; at 7 miles below, on the Ohio side, is Fronton, with 4,500 population, and this is the terminus of a railroad running to the interior of Ohio. At 25 miles from Catlettsburg and directly back of Ashland is Grayson, the county site of Carter County, Kentucky, with a few hundred population. The whole range is supported mainly by working coal and iron, and the capital employed is mainly belonging to Ohio men. The population is generally against the South. I have taken position here, and have arrested one man within 10 miles of Louisa, the only arrest I have sanctioned. I sent him to the post at Pound Gap, to be detained there until further orders. He ought to have been shot; he is a native of Tennessee, and I found him with an Enfield rifle in hand, a Lincoln uniform on his back, orders in his pockets, and the proof was positive that he was in company when two Southern-rights men were killed by Lincoln bands, and when a store was robbed, and that he was here with Nelson's command, vaporing through these streets, conducting himself towards old, respectable, and defenseless females in the most brutal and insolent manner; in one instance making an old lady named Preston (the wife of a very respectable old man whom they bailed at \$25,000) cook for a mess of Irish and Dutch soldiers for a whole week in her own house. I felt like having him shot, but thought imprisonment was probably the best course to take with him.

The President has released, unfortunately, at least three very bad men, whom Colonel Williams sent to Richmond before my arrival on this frontier. I have a battalion of those special-service men in Pound Gap, and I will send my prisoners there until they have been reported at Richmond. My policy is conciliatory to the people, and I think is having a good effect, but when I arrest a man against whom the proof is plain and whose guilt is startling, I shall secure him so certainly that nothing but superior authority to mine can relieve him. I have with me here Trigg's and part of Williams' regiment, and Jeffress' battery of four pieces, and 30 mounted men; in all about 1,100 men. The mounted battalion, about 400 men, is at Licking Station, 16 miles from this place, covering the roads which lead in from the direction from Lexington and Paris. My scouts report about 1,200 men at Catlettsburg and 400 of Rosecrans' cavalry at Louisa. They have made no demonstration in this direction as yet. Zeigler's regiment is at Ceredo, 3 miles above Catlettsburg.

Knowing that Colonel Stuart has not left Abingdon, and that Moore has not crossed the Cumberland, I am somewhat embarrassed about putting anything into motion which is not strictly defensive. However, I sent forward a detachment of mounted men as far as West Liberty, in Morgan County, and covered the march of about 50 unarmed recruits to

my camp, collecting at the same time a drove of about 130 hogs, and making contracts for about 30,000 weight of bacon for my command.

The Union men stampeded in every direction, for it was reported that I had an army pouring from the hills and numbering at least 10,000. Some of my men were thrown out in advance of West Liberty, and actually went down to Mount Sterling, within 20 miles of Paris. The Union men were absconding even from Mount Sterling. I formed a military plan thereupon, which I should have about 1,500 cavalry to execute, and it is to sweep down on the railroad from Lexington to Cincinnati and destroy it. I could have done it before this time if I had 1,000 cavalry. I can do it before a month passes if I have the number mentioned, and my opinion is that your column would find your adversary in retreat directly or so detaching force to assail me that you could march directly on Louisville. I think I shall be able, as it is, to employ some 6,000 or 8,000 of them, and can occasionally whip them when circumstances favor me.

Very respectfully, &c.,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, &c.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON.

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CAMP THREE MILES FROM PAINTSVILLE, KY.

*December 30, 1861.*

GENERAL: I wrote you a few days ago when I supposed I should be engaged with the enemy during the day. Word was sent to my headquarters, just before day on Christmas morning, that the enemy was firing on Colonel Williams' pickets, but this proved a false alarm. I have seen no enemy as yet, though I hear daily reports of the manner in which he is surrounding me. I suppose it is true that there is to be an effort to circumvent and to destroy this column, but I take great pleasure in declaring to you that I am cheered by the hope that it will grow so strong with the people as to foil our enemies. Since my last, Colonel Moore has actually arrived at my camp with a battalion of about 450 men. He passed the courier who conveyed my order of arrest, and as he had come I determined not to press it upon him; better to make out fair with what I have than to commence with a court-martial.

I take pleasure in informing the Department that the business of recruiting is now going on elegantly. I have received for the last three days new recruits from the interior of Kentucky at the rate of 10 per day, and my information is that a great number will join me. May I beg the Department to send me without delay arms to place in their hands. It is now for the Department to settle the question of raising an army in Kentucky by its answer to this request. I have informed you that the people have been disarmed by the Unionists, and therefore they cannot bring arms out here. I have adopted this plan: I arm about 20 and send in after the recruits, and this armed party gathers the boys and places arms in their hands, and then the whole march to me. None have been attacked as yet. I have placed all who have yet come in Colonel Williams' regiment, so as to fill it. That regiment now has full 1,000 men in the field. I have commenced the formation of the second regiment of infantry, and I think from present appearances that I shall have a second regiment formed in a short time, and as the matter progresses and the volume increases it will accelerate in movement, unless it shall appear that there are no arms and ammunition to distribute. I am aware

of the existing law. I have so far placed in the hands of the men the arms I received from Governor Letcher. I transferred the Belgian rifles to the men who were the best drilled, and have old flint-lock muskets to place in other hands, but these will soon be exhausted. You ought to have other arms furnished, and let me issue them to the men who will enlist for the year. No man comes for an enlistment for a longer period, but I believe nearly all will serve again after this term is out should the war continue.

I send you inclosed a slip from one of my friends at Paris.\* It is not signed, lest it might expose him if it fell into the hands of the enemy, but it is from a gentleman named Richard Lindsay, of Bourbon, and who is well posted. It will give you an idea of the feeling of the people who are under the rod of the oppressors, but who are powerless because disarmed. I must have arms, and it is useless to go in until I have them. My men here are anxious to march for the interior as we are, but I know that would be madness. I must have a mounted force raised in some way; must then dash forward with it, break up the railroad from Cincinnati to Lexington, deploy it as foragers through the country, and then follow with my infantry and artillery, and organize my force as I go. This is my plan in brief. When I do go, I must have arms to give to those who flock to my standard, otherwise they can but encumber me. My idea has always been to have an army effective when I reached my own section, and there its operations could be combined with the operations of other corps, under the general control of General A. S. Johnston, and to be directed by him, I hope, upon Cincinnati and the enemy's country.

I learn from a well-informed person that three regiments from Ohio were seen to pass Maysville a few days ago *en voyage* for the mouth of the Sandy, and that it was said three others were coming down from Wheeling or Pittsburgh. I shall not be surprised to be pressed upon by columns of from 6,000 to 10,000 men in the aggregate.

I estimate my own force this morning as equal to 3,000. Say, Williams, 1,000; Trigg, 550; Moore, 450; mounted battalion, 400; battery of four pieces, equal 600 men—total, 3,000.

I regret that Colonel Stuart has not moved from Abingdon yet. I learn that both officers and soldiers of that regiment are very averse to this service, and I suggest that in such mood they will be of very little service. I have no inclination to command men who pick soft places, and I would prefer regiments that are willing to sacrifice comfort to the cause they serve. It is not with me the best sign to know that a regiment loiters on the way-side when its absence endangers the safety and efficiency of a whole command. I would be willing, so far as I am concerned, to exchange Colonel Stuart's regiment for any other the Department may think proper to send me, but I hope some one will be sent without delay. Really, I think that if affairs in East Tennessee will admit of it, this column would be rendered very potent by the deployment of the force now there upon this line as a base. To strengthen me disturbs Cincinnati awfully; they call on General Buell at once for help, and draw away from Nashville and Bowling Green. It is the application of a counter-irritant to their tender spot instead of to ours. It has the advantage of enabling me to move forward where they are exposed, and they will be compelled to let me bring the population to our side and arm it in their rear, or detach enough from their main body to maneuver with me.

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\* Not found.



My present purpose is to remain here until I hear from you in response to these views. If I retreat, I shall retreat directly upon the interior of Kentucky, so as to draw the enemy away from his facilities of water transportation and to fall myself into the midst of friendly populations. I regard West Liberty, in Morgan County, as the great center of Eastern Kentucky, and shall make it my main depot hereafter when I do move. It is 75 miles from Maysville, 76 miles from the mouth of the Sandy, 65 miles from Irvine, and 78 miles from Pound Gap, and 70 miles from Paris. If you will put the center at West Liberty and describe the circle, you will see it passes nearly through all the points mentioned. The distances I give are by the roads.

I hear that changes of popular opinion very favorable to us are going on between this and the mouth of the Sandy. Indeed, prominent men have made overtures to me indirectly, which I shall try and improve into a well cemented friendship. Nor am I without some hope that the Kentucky regiments below me in the enemy's lines will become disaffected to their cause; but these matters, general, have not taken such shape as yet as to authorize me to speak of them more definitely now.

I have directed civic administration to be instituted in the counties along this frontier upon the basis of allegiance to the Confederate States. This must force an issue at once or will transfer the people, for it is impossible that when magistrates, constables, sheriffs, clerks, recorders, and judges are sworn in under the provisional government and revenues are collected by our officers another system can occupy the same space at the same time.

I sent to Pound Gap as a prisoner one Dr. Chilton, and have him there in custody. He ought to have been shot, for he is one of the very worst men in this country and has been a scourge to our friends. I propose to send my prisoners to Pound Gap, where the battalion stationed there can easily guard them, and the winds of the Cumberland Heights can ventilate them properly. I have a log house erected there for their especial accommodation. Mr. Chilton is the only tenant as yet. Mr. Diltz would have been better there, I fear, than at large. One Mr. Filson (a deputy United States marshal) ventured to Paintsville yesterday, and I had him arrested last night, but have not seen him yet. He is represented as bold and sagacious, and is probably here as a spy from the interior. I shall look to his case after daybreak. I am gratified to inform you that my topography of this country promises to be so minute as to be very valuable to the Department, as it has been already to me.

The line of couriers established by me works very well, arriving regularly Wednesdays and Saturdays from Abingdon and departing next day. It runs along my line of transportation, and serves to warn me of any interruption between this and my point of supply. In an emergency, by telegraphing to Abingdon, you can express to me from Richmond in thirty hours.

I shall have to determine for myself the question of subsistence referred to you from Jeffersonville, Va., in November, unless I shall be favored with a speedy reply.

I am, your obedient servant,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector-General.*

CAMP HAGAR,  
*Three Miles from Paintsville, Johnson Co., Ky., Jan. 3, 1862.*

GENERAL: I am yet in camp at the same point from which my last was dated, but in much closer proximity to the enemy. I suppose that I shall certainly be engaged to-day or to-morrow, for if he does not, I will. The force in front of me numbers some 4,000 as nearly as I can ascertain it, and I have had their encampments inspected. They have Garfield's Ohio regiment, from Mansfield, Ohio, which is 1,000 strong; it passed Catlettsburg 1,020 strong; a regiment from Parkersburg, Va., Laban T. Moore's Kentucky regiment, and Lindsey's Kentucky regiment, as nearly as I can learn the commanders, McLaughlin's Ohio cavalry, 200 strong, and what artillery I cannot learn. They have intrenched at Peach Orchard, 17 miles below this place, but Garfield and Moore and their cavalry have advanced to Sycamore Creek, which is 7 miles from Paintsville. Their reserve was expected to come up last night and I suppose they will advance to-day on Paintsville. If they do not, I will make a close reconnaissance in force of them to-morrow myself. I would await them in position (for I, too, have intrenched), but there is a heavy force advanced from Mount Sterling, which approaches me on the other side, consisting of Cranor's Ohio regiment, 750 strong (as it passed Paris), and another regiment, supposed to be Mundy's Kentucky regiment, with 500 cavalry and a battery; say, in all, 2,500 men. I must retreat or fight them before they combine, and I prefer the latter.

Since my last, Colonel Moore has arrived with about 330 men. He did not receive my order of arrest, and as he had actually come up I determined to try him again, and so premitted the arrest altogether. Colonel Stuart's [regiment] is still at Abingdon—himself sick at Richmond—the regiment having only about 200 fit for duty, and these trilling with the question of transportation. I have sent the most positive orders for them to march with such transportation as they can get, but to march at once, and they have received the like order direct from the Department of War, "to march what they have, if it is but ten."

I have no forms upon which to make up the monthly brigade report and have just called on my adjutant-general for it. I hope to forward it by the next courier, and shall then be able, I hope, to report my condition after a fight, as I now do, in abstract, before it:

Trigg's regiment, Fifty-fourth Virginia .....	669
Moore's regiment, Twenty-ninth Virginia .....	320
Williams' regiment, Sixth Kentucky (nine companies) .....	756
Simms' mounted battalion .....	375
Worsham's company (Williams' regiment) .....	50
Jeffress' battery (four pieces) .....	60
Total .....	2,240

But these are not all fit for duty; measles and mumps have played sad work among the men. The field report of yesterday shows non-commissioned officers and men present and fit for duty:

Trigg's regiment .....	578
Williams' regiment .....	594
Mounted battalion .....	360
Jeffress' battery .....	58
Moore's regiment .....	327
	1,917
Add Worsham's company (at Petersburg) .....	50
Total .....	1,967



Thus you see the force I command, which I supposed when I came here would be 5,000 to commence on. This return is accurate as exhibiting the actual strength, but many of Colonel Williams' men are undrilled; some of the companies have not been in camp more than a week. I flatter myself the enemy is as green as my force. They have blocked up the roads and stopped my chance of recruits again. If I can I will open them, and if I retreat I shall retreat upon Paris and rouse the country as I go or fall in the effort, for I know that if I am driven over the mountains again our cause in Kentucky is lost.

Since my last, our pickets and those of the enemy have come into contact. We took 5 horses and a sergeant and 3 men; they belong to McLaughlin's squadron. They were well mounted and finely armed — sabers and navy revolvers in sword belt, and Sharp's breech loading carbine, rifled. I put the arms and horses in my mounted battalion, as some of the men were dismounted, and I wished to stimulate them to catch more of the adverse party. They caught the horse of the guide, but not the guide. The picket consisted of about 30, and my party was about 25, under Captain Thomas. He cut off the vedettes of the picket and returned to camp for force to take the whole party, but when he returned they had gone, leaving one or two dragoon hats behind and the horse of their guide, indicating on their part a speedy movement. I have the prisoners, and will send them on to Pound Gap by the first opportunity.

The people hereabouts are perfectly terrified or apparently apathetic. I imagine most of them are Unionists, but so ignorant they do not understand the question at issue. I suggest through you to Governor Johnson to send me blank commissions for magistrates, sheriffs, and constables, clerks, and county judges, so that civic order may be reconstituted; also to send a commission of circuit judge to Harvey Burns, that courts may be holden at proper times. The people should learn that they belong to the Southern Confederacy, and the State provisional government by its operations should be seen and not merely heard of.

I am, truly, &c.,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, C. S. A.

—  
CAMP AT MARTIN'S MILL, ON BEAVER CREEK,  
*Floyd County, Kentucky, January 14, 1862.*

GENERAL: When I reported last the enemy was gathering in considerable force to my front and upon my left flank, near Paintsville, in Johnson County. The force in my front advanced to the mouth of Sycamore Creek, 5 miles from my position at Paintsville, and remained in camp there several days. This force was about 4,000 strong. It was stated in the Cincinnati Enquirer of December 28 to consist of five full regiments of infantry, 200 cavalry, and two batteries of field artillery, the whole under Colonel Garfield, of Ohio, acting as chief of brigade.

It was my purpose to wait the attack of this force at Hagar's farm, near Paintsville, but I intercepted a letter from Colonel Garfield, addressed to Colonel Cranor, commanding the Fortieth Ohio Volunteers, by which I learn that the latter, with a cavalry force of 400 to 500, was advancing from West Liberty upon Prestonburg. My scouts having reported their count of this force at 1,300 at Salyersville, 16 miles upon



my left, I presumed that the object of the enemy was to mass large forces in my rear while he attacked with superior force in my front.

My determination was at once formed to mask my front with my cavalry battalion, so as to prevent communication between the country people and the enemy, and by a lateral movement to the Prestonburg road, leading to Salyersville, to intercept and fight Colonel Cranor before his arrival at the post he was expected to occupy. I found the roads nearly impassable. With great labor my battery was moved 6 miles, but some of my wagons could not move 4 miles. It was the second day before I passed from the State road leading from Salyersville to Prestonburg.

On January 9 I had sent a detachment to the mill, 1 mile below Prestonburg, near to which I was compelled to draw (to make bread for my men), and the enemy drove them away during the night.

On the morning of the 10th I learned from my pickets that the enemy was passing in force from Abbott's Creek to Middle Creek, and were apparently pursuing me, the Fortieth Ohio having effected a junction with the rest by passing down Paint Creek. I was on my way to this place, because it is the nearest point to my camp of January 8 at which I could get meal to make bread. I permitted my transportation train to move along the road I was traveling, and I halted and formed my command for battle.

The enemy came in sight about 10 a. m. and we engaged about 12 m. He was very slow in making his advance and general dispositions. I send inclosed a sketch of the ground upon which the battle took place,\* from which you will see that my battery was at first placed in the gorge of the mouth of the Left Fork of Middle Creek. Williams' regiment, Moore's regiment, and part of the mounted battalion, fighting on foot, occupied the spurs and heights upon my right; Trigg's regiment occupied the height covering the battery; Witcher's and Holliday's companies in reserve in rear of the battery; Thomas' and Clay's companies, dismounted and armed with Belgian rifles, thrown forward on the opposite side of Middle Creek to the heights commanding the plain of main Middle Creek, and resisted any advance of skirmishers from the opposite heights.

The enemy, having come through a defile to the left of main Middle Creek, first deployed a large force on the heights to his right, then advanced a regiment to the middle of the plain, covered by cavalry, and rested his left and his reserves at the base of the hills, which were manned by my right. Our lines thus rested at an acute angle to each other. He first advanced his cavalry and center, but three discharges of artillery put the cavalry to flight, and if they did anything more during the day it was done on foot. We plainly heard the command to "Force the cavalry forward," but the cavalry did not make its appearance again. The enemy charged up the points above the mouth of Spurlock's Branch three times, but were repulsed with great loss.

In the evening I shifted our smooth-bore 6-pounder, so as to bring it to the summit of the dip in the hill occupied by Trigg's regiment, and obtained a fair flank fire at the enemy, while occupying a piney point in front of Moore's regiment. This soon attracted a hot fire upon the gun, but no further damage than the shooting of one of the artillery horses through the head.

After an action which lasted about four hours the enemy withdrew his force, it then being night, and retired down Middle Creek, on the route to Prestonburg, whence, the next day, he retraced his steps to Paintsville.

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\* See p. 51.

I submit herewith Colonel Moore's report, and will send others as soon as the officers make them out. They have been called for, but are not yet prepared. I send Dr. Duke's report of casualties. I think our loss will amount to 11 killed and 15 wounded; not more.\* The loss of the enemy was very severe. I understand he will report 1 killed and 10 or 12 wounded; his usual practice. We suppose his loss to be over 250 killed and about 300 wounded. These are the estimates of the neighbors. We saw his dead borne in numbers from the field, and the embarkation of his wounded was attested by several, who place these estimates upon the number. The field itself bears unerring testimony to his severe loss.

I can only say to you, general, that my troops acted firmly and enthusiastically during the whole fight; and, though the enemy numbered some 5,000 to our 1,500, they were certainly well whipped. If I had had bread for my men (some of whom had had nothing to eat for thirty hours) I should have renewed the action after night; but an enemy greater than the Lincolnites (starvation) summoned me to reach a point where we might obtain food for man and horse.

I pursued next day my march to this place, distant from the scene of action some 16 miles, which I accomplished in three days. My scouts informed me the enemy was at the same time returning to the points on the Sandy whence he came to disperse the "rebel force" I have the honor to command.

This is the first mill where I could get bread. I halted here and pitched my camp, perfectly satisfied that unless the enemy shall be strongly re-enforced he will not seek to renew our acquaintance.

In closing this account of my condition here I must let you know that this service cannot be advantageous to the Confederacy as it is now established. My force should be much greater or it should be withdrawn from this frontier altogether. Referring to the map, you will perceive that the Sandy River traverses from Piketon to its mouth about 100 miles, all of which is navigable by small steamers at high stages of water, and is navigable to Louisa at nearly all stages of water, and nearly at all seasons of the year. Emptying into the Ohio directly in front of the rich valley of the Scioto, and with a direct connection with the Ohio River navigation, the line of the Sandy as a military line demands a *corps d'armée*, simply because you must have a force sufficient to hold the point of its confluence with the Ohio, or your adversary can use the water transportation for his troops and land them in a few miles of your position fresh and ready for action. So he can in a night re-enforce them until he has a number sufficient to assure his success. I have found this objection to the line, and it has therefore been one of my purposes to draw away from the Sandy River and to compel him to use transportation by land and to march his troops over the same kind of roads I travel. This has a tendency to bring us upon a platform of equality.

But, sir, this country will not furnish subsistence for even the troops I now have; therefore we must advance or we must retire. The snow is now upon the ground and the roads nearly impassable. Indeed, the roads are made through very narrow valleys—the water-courses—and frequently these water-courses are so swollen as not to be fordable, yet they cannot be avoided without traversing high and steep mountains, now covered with ice and inaccessible for horses.

My troops now subsist by going to the fields, shucking the corn,

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\* The nominal list shows 9 killed and 14 wounded.



shelling it, taking it to the mill, grinding the meal, and then taking it to camp. This has been the only way they could be fed. The people of the country will do nothing. They will not assist to gather the corn nor to shell it, nor will they let us have the use of their horses, or anything that is theirs—nothing, either for love or money. They will not enter the army on either side, and seem to be actually terror-stricken. I have tried to shame them into a sense of what was due to themselves and their families, but it is of no use.

The one regiment now commanded by Colonel Williams has been raised in the mountain country, but the limit seems to have been reached, and the fact is those who have not yet taken part, who are poor, will not leave their families to starve in order to fight anybody's battles on any side.

I am told by the commissaries that this country will be exhausted of all supplies in two or three weeks at furthest. What am I then to do? If I had a force sufficient to probe the country and press to the foot of the hills in spite of opposition, the problem would be at once solved. I think that if such force cannot be supplied it would be better to retire this force from the line of the Sandy, and either place the command in winter quarters in some part of the Confederacy where they can be supplied with sufficient food or transfer it to some other theater of the war. I cannot war against nature. She demands food for men, and if it can only be had by subjecting the men to great exposure and toil, the service cannot be profitable to the Government. There would be some compensation for the wastage of our own force if the enemy were subjected to the same exposure, but men on foot cannot walk as fast as steamers can shift their position.

I regret to say that these facts are apparent to everybody here, and they have produced a decided effect upon the Virginia troops in this column, as you will see by a memorial to me I inclose for your consideration. I have merely replied to this memorial that I did not feel authorized by my orders to go into winter quarters in Virginia, nor did I deem it politic to retire from this section of Kentucky so long as there is a hope of obtaining a force sufficient to advance into the country.

I would add the suggestion, that if the Fifty-fourth Virginia, which is a capital regiment, is to be indulged in the wish expressed through its officers,\* the First Kentucky, commanded by Colonel Taylor, might be sent to its own State, to supply the place of that which retires.

I was inspired with hope that the business of recruiting would go on rapidly from the manifestations made for a few days; but the activity of the enemy seems to have established a surveillance over the interior more strict than ever. I have recruiting parties out in the adjoining counties, but I now receive no new levies from the interior. Unless I can force my way in, they will not be able or willing to come out. I made some suggestions on this head to the President. If they can be indulged, I am of the opinion most important consequences will flow from their immediate adoption, and I shall be enabled by that means to accomplish great good; but if they are not adopted, then I must observe that the wastage of energy and life in this column will not be compensated by any result the force at present under my charge can effect.

I write freely because I feel sincerely. I am willing to expose my own life to any hazard or to undergo any hardship for the cause. My observations you must regard as the views of one who calculates the

\* See p. 52.



general good which will probably flow from the application of a given force. I am most anxious to redeem Kentucky from the thralldom which now paralyzes her energy and seems to have chilled her courage. I think her own sons should perform the task; but, as she is now one of the Confederate States, her interests become matters of general concern and her laches must be supplied by vigilance from other quarters.

I desire to be informed of the views of the Government as speedily as possible, for I am in a country where I am compelled to subsist upon means which the people in the neighborhood will certainly require for their own support.

I do not think it sound policy to abandon the State or to break up this column if you can possibly re-enforce it, but you are aware, as well as I am, that 1,500 men cannot penetrate far before they must be overpowered and compelled to retreat. I came here to commence with 5,000 men. I have never had 1,800 present and fit for duty. My men are now diseased with measles and mumps, and yet have no hospital accommodations; exposed to snow and wet weather, yet have no overcoats and but few blankets. They do not murmur, but I know they feel the sacrifices they make, and I feel for them.

I hope that at the Department of War, amid engagements that press, my wants will not be forgotten, and that you, general, will have a determination formed at once, which shall result either in giving me an effective force for winter operations, according to the plan submitted by me to President Davis, or that you will settle the minds of my Virginia friends who are with me, by letting them go into winter quarters and giving me Kentuckians in their place, or let them know it cannot be done. Please telegraph me to Abingdon on receipt of this.

Respectfully,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*



CAMP ON MIDDLE CREEK, KY., *January 9, 1862.*

As officers of your brigade, who have willingly rendered the promptest obedience to your orders, in no manner desiring to dictate to you as our superior officer, but feeling, with you, the deepest interest in the success of your command, we nevertheless feel constrained to make known to you, in the most respectful manner, our views and wishes, and solicit your earnest attention to them. We started from Virginia with but part of our men, leaving more than 200 sick, and since the first day's march we have left all along the way our sick and disabled soldiers. The men now doing duty—and doing it without a murmur—have been necessarily subjected to hardships, exposure, and the deprivation of regular and adequate supplies of food, which are every day exhausting their energies and breaking down their health. Besides the ordinary inflammatory diseases incident to a winter campaign, fully one-half our men have been for more than a week suffering from dysentery and diarrhea. These men are first-rate soldiers, whose term of enlistment does not expire until next fall, and whose strength and energies should be preserved for the more active and efficient duties of the coming summer and fall; but we feel much more interested in the preservation of their health as our neighbors and friends who have at our solicitation entered into the service, and whose friends and families look to us for their safety and preservation. While we would be willing to make any sacrifice to advance our cause, we feel satisfied that we can accomplish no good result this winter. The people among whom we have come have not appreciated our cause to the extent of quitting their homes to unite with us, and we are now in midwinter, in a country poorly provided with the means of subsistence, exposed to an enemy more than double or treble our number, with roads which, if not now entirely impassable, must shortly become blocked up with snow and ice. This condition of things must necessarily increase the exposure of our men and render their supplies of food more uncertain, and thus every day aggravate the causes which are now wasting their energies and strength.

We do therefore most earnestly and respectfully solicit you to order our regiment to such point that we can go into winter quarters without the apprehension of being harassed by our enemies; where supplies can be procured and conveyed without the chance of failure, and the health and lives of our men can be preserved and protected.

With due deference to your judgment, we suggest some point in Virginia or Tennessee, contiguous to a line of railroad, where we can, during the winter, be subject to your orders, and from which we can move out in the spring strong, healthy, and able to do efficient service in the cause we all have so much at heart.

Most respectfully submitted.

BURWELL AKERS,  
*Captain Company I.*  
 GEORGE H. TURMAN,  
*Captain Company G.*  
 JACKSON GODBEY,  
*Captain Company B.*  
 JNO. J. WADE,  
*Captain Company E.*  
 JNO. S. DEYERLE,  
*Captain Company K.*

W. J. JORDAN,  
*Captain Company F.*  
 A. DICKERSON,  
*Captain Company A.*  
 H. SLUSHER,  
*Captain Company D.*  
 JAS. C. TAYLOR,  
*Captain Company C.*  
 S. H. GRIFFITH,  
*Captain Company H.*

Brig. Gen. HUMPHREY MARSHALL,  
*Commanding First Brigade, Army of Eastern Kentucky.*



## MARTIN'S MILL, FLOYD COUNTY, KY.,

*January 20, 1862.*

GENERAL: It seems the enemy and I have parted company for the present, he having fallen back to Paintsville and Louisa, I having come to this place for food, which is to be obtained in very limited supply.

I have commenced and will execute a movement with the view of subsisting my command and of offering another front and line to the enemy, on which we shall both have marching to do, and on which he will be compelled to draw off from his water transportation. It is the occupation of the line of the Kentucky River above the three forks of that stream. With this view, I have sent Colonel Trigg, with the Fifty-fourth Virginia and Jeffress' battery, to the head of Rock House Creek, to descend that stream to the Kentucky at Brashearsville; Moore and a part of Williams' regiment to Carr's Fork of the Kentucky, to descend that fork; Colonel Williams, with the other battalion of his regiment and 200 mounted men, up Jones' Fork to Beaver Creek, with orders to descend Troublesome Creek, pass through Breathitt County, and to ascend the Kentucky and join me at Hazard, in the county of Perry, where I propose to concentrate my whole force, and to be ready to receive any re-enforcements it may be in your power to send or to receive such instructions as the Department may choose to give.

The force under my command is in bad condition. The Virginians, instructed, I incline to think, by the success of Colonel Stuart and others in getting away from this mountain service, are hopeful and really impatient to go into winter quarters and beyond the mountains. Their argument has great force in it. He who undergoes the task of gathering the corn from the fields and preparing it himself for bread finds little time for military maneuver, and I can attest that the wastage of energy and health is enormous. But my Kentucky troops, though suffering under measles, mumps, and fever, and nearly reduced a half by the diseases incident to their severe exposure through the fall and winter, are as impatient, whenever a transfer to any point out of the State is mentioned. Here in Kentucky they want to serve, and here they want to keep the field. From this quarter they want to be led forward "to the blue-grass" before they are anxious for any repose at all.

I suggested in my letter two or three days since that in the event the Department should decide to withdraw the Fifty-fourth Virginia from the mountain service, I thought the First Kentucky Infantry, under Colonel Taylor, might supply its place, and so let me increase the Kentucky force in the column. I think it now proper to add that personally my feelings coincide with those of my Kentucky comrades; but I have thought it a duty to lay before the Department the wishes and views of the Virginia troops under my command, as also the difficulty of this service, and leave the Department to judge. I hope and wish and ask that I may have the re-enforcements to carry out views I have heretofore submitted to the President, and which, I am informed by Major Hawes, you have been put in possession of. I feel a thorough conviction that it will exercise more influence upon grand results in Kentucky than any other movement that can be made with 2,000 cavalry anywhere, and that the result will be a general rising of our friends in the State. If this is not the result, I shall despair of rousing them at all. I hear that the enemy expects to post about 6,000 men at the base of the mountains, to keep me out and the young men of the State in. This is their programme, and they perfectly know my effective strength. I have felt it due to myself to tell you that I cannot move down with a force of 1,500 or 1,600 men; if I do, I shall but march in to be marched out again, and

so do our cause more harm in this State than good. If I can get the force in any way, I want to move forward; if it is stated that the force cannot be supplied, then I will remain here, to divert their force and peril my own reputation for the sake of our cause so long as the Government may think it advantageous to demand the duty at my hands. The move I am now making will throw me farther into the interior than I have yet been, and I hope, as I keep up my connections with Pound Gap and keep eastward of Cumberland Gap, it will not be considered beyond my orders "to protect and defend this frontier." There is no enemy on this frontier this side of Paintsville; there is scarcely a friend between that and the mouth of Sandy River near the line of the river.

If you can give me the regiments I have asked for, to increase this column to 5,000 infantry, and give me 1,500 cavalry and a good artillery company (I have the guns at Pound Gap), I confidently advance the opinion that I can go to Lexington. But it must be done quickly and silently. It is the service I want. I further advance the opinion that it will result in great good to the general cause, even if I have to retreat from the country afterwards.

Major Hawes has explained to me the reason why Charles E. Marshall (being my brother) could not be appointed a disbursing officer to my command. I consider the rule a sound and good rule, and yield a ready submission to it. I commend him, however, in the strongest terms to the position in some other command, and request that the President will select for this command some man of equal capacity as my brigade quartermaster. My brother is a man of high business capacity, but not in very good health. If he will accept the position in any other command, devoted to the cause as I know he is and has been, I think he will prove a fine acquisition to the service wherever he may go. The only reason I wanted him was my knowledge of his energy, capacity, and integrity. I would name Ed. S. Crutchfield as a man who would make a good quartermaster, but really I don't know whether he would accept the place. He is at present at Bowling Green, I believe. I can commend his sound judgment and energy, but I don't know much of his facility as an accountant, which is so very needful in the position.

To turn from these to some minor points of detail: Yesterday Captain Stratton offered himself, a first and third lieutenant, 4 corporals, and 15 privates, being, as he said, part of a mounted company raised in Virginia for my command; that his other lieutenant, sergeants, and some 25 men were on the way; that his company was completely formed, but he did not know when his men could get out, as those he had were fired upon in Logan County, Virginia, in coming out. They propose to enlist for three years or during the war. I accepted the men and administered the oath, after subjecting them to the usual medical examination. I told the officers I would accept them also, but could not promise them commissions or pay unless the company should be filled in a reasonable time to the legal standard. I have another squad of about 40, and still another, about 35, mustered by General Zollicoffer, and transferred to this column—incipient companies, which are in the same situation. After a reasonable time I think these had best be consolidated; but I did not think it prudent to turn off 20 recruits *for the war* merely because a full company was not presented. I hope the approbation of the Department will cover the course I have taken.

Major Thompson, at Pound Gap, informs me that he believes he can raise two full companies out of the five companies of special-service men at that place who will mount and enlist *for the war*, if I will permit transfers so as to put the right men together. Some in one com-

pany will go, others will not. I have told him to make the transfers and present the two companies, and I will muster them in for the war, under his command. I propose then to attach the remaining three companies to Colonel Moore's regiment, so as to complete the Twenty-ninth Virginia according to your order, and I will assign the command of the post at Pound Gap to Major Giles (who is willing to accept it), and take Thompson into the field as an active officer. He is from the Mounted Rifle Corps, late of United States Army, and seems to be a competent officer for active service. I hope this arrangement, securing as it does two permanent companies to the service, will meet your approbation, if it can be effected.

Lieutenant-Colonel Simms, having been appointed senator, will not accept the place offered to him, I presume. I will cause the battalion to be reorganized and a new and judicious selection to be made. I think I can probably make a full battalion of mounted rifles, and yet have a full squadron of light cavalry, armed with the shot-gun or carbine and saber. I received and valued all the double-barreled shot guns in the command belonging to individuals and placed them in Shawhauser and Cameron's companies, promising the owners that they should be paid for or returned to them. Thus I made the arms of separate companies homogeneous. Will you authorize me to have these guns paid for? I do not think them efficient except for cavalry proper, nor the best arms for these; but the case must be disposed of.

In conclusion, let me say that I write into details because I want to keep in accordance with the wishes of the Department, and to have no difficulty springing out of my administration. If there are irregularities you will be kind enough to overlook them, for you cannot appreciate the difficulties I encounter in such a country and with raw levies such as I control and must bring into military shape.

I am, your obedient servant,

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General.*

II. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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CAMP IN LETCHER COUNTY, KY., *January 23, 1862.*

GENERAL: Since I last wrote the enemy assailed me in largely superior force, and was effectually and gallantly repulsed by the troops under my command.

My loss in the action of January 10 is accurately stated at 10 killed and 14 wounded.

The loss of the enemy was severe, estimated by the officers of my command, who had an opportunity to see their dead, at over 200 killed and more than that wounded.

The firing was kept up, with some intervals, for about four hours, and was occasionally very sharp and spirited.

My troops behaved remarkably well, had decided advantage in the situation, and maintained it throughout the day.

The enemy came into the valley of main Middle Creek below the mouth of the Left Fork of Middle Creek. I occupied the mouth of the Left Fork, my artillery in the gorge, my right wing below, and my left wing above the mouth. The enemy did not move me from any one position I assumed, and at nightfall withdrew from the field, leaving me just where I was in the morning. After he had withdrawn I called my troops down from the hills and pursued the march which I was executing when the enemy came in sight.



I see by the telegraphic dispatches that the enemy represents his achievement of a victory over me upon the occasion to which I am referring, and says that my troops fled in confusion, &c. I state that this is not only false, but it is an afterthought, for it can be proved by many that the enemy's troops represented themselves as having retired from the field because they were whipped; but the reporting officer, finding next day that I also had withdrawn from the battle-field, for the first time thought of establishing a claim to victory. Let a few facts decide that question. He came to attack and did attack, and he was in force far superior to mine. He did not move me from a single position I chose to occupy. At the close of the day each man of mine was just where he had been posted in the morning. He came to attack, yet came so cautiously that my left wing never fired a shot, and he never came up sufficiently to engage my center or my left wing. His force was fired upon by the 12-pounder howitzer and at once cleared my front, but, concealed by a point of the hills from my artillery, confined his further efforts to assaults upon my right wing, by which he was repulsed three times. Finally I found that he was re-enforcing heavily, and I ordered Trigg's regiment to pass over the creek and to make the work short and decisive, with the bayonet, if necessary; but before the Fifty-fourth Virginia could climb one side of the hill the enemy had entirely withdrawn from the scene of action, leaving my force in full and quiet possession. He withdrew from sight, and did not then dispute the ground on which we had fought. Not only I personally, but every officer and soldier in my entire command, without one exception, then understood that the enemy had been signally and unmistakably whipped, and that the repulse was final. It proved final, for he has never since that day sought in any manner or form to re-engage.

The enemy had some 4,500 or 5,000 men on the field and at least 500 cavalry, for that number was counted. I had some 1,600 men fit for duty and present on the field. He engaged 2,500 or 3,000 of his men; I about 900 to 1,000 of mine. A natural inquiry will be why he did not pursue, if my force fled before him. I moved from the battle-field up the Left Fork of Middle Creek, and at 7 miles from the field of battle came to the foot of a very lofty mountain, which it was necessary for me to cross, and the road from the field of battle to that point was a valley road all the way. I did not cross that mountain until the night of January 12, and the enemy did not come to see what had become of me. On the contrary, by that time he had fallen back to Paintsville, whence he came in mass to drive me out of the State. He returned without accomplishing his mission.

Why did I not pursue if I thought I had the victory? My reasons are simple and straightforward:

First. I could not renew the engagement that night because it was too dark, had I been so inclined. I did not know how far the enemy had gone, and would not have followed under any circumstances with the inferior force.

Second. I did not follow because my men were exhausted from hunger, having had nothing to eat all that day, and they were weak, and would not have been capable of service another day without food.

Third. I did not follow because I did not know the strength of the enemy in reserve, and had no idea of risking by rashness what my troops had gained by gallantry. I had fought superior numbers with the advantage of position on my side; I had no intent to renew the engagement, giving superior numbers the advantage of choice of the ground.

But, general, the controlling, present, and moving reason was that my

men had nothing to eat, and I could not tell that they could obtain it by returning with a fight against heavy odds between us and our chance of food. By sending horses forward to Martin's mill, on Beaver [Creek], I procured meal and brought it back to my troops, who were engaged in crossing my train over the mountain dividing Middle Creek from Beaver Creek. The fact is I could not pursue the enemy, and the enemy, being already repulsed, never had any idea of pursuing me.

The enemy represents that he took several prisoners. I assure you he never took one upon the field of battle. He did take Captain Conner a prisoner afterwards at Prestonburg, and that achievement should not be permitted to pass without its history. Captain Conner was ill with fever. He had been sick for some time and left Paintsville in a wagon. He had become delirious, and was in that situation two or three days. The physicians, after consultation, determined that it must cost his life to carry him farther in a wagon, and he was therefore carried by them to Prestonburg and committed to the care of an estimable lady, who promised to nurse him, and whose husband is our friend. Sick almost unto death and probably out of his mind with the disease, Captain Conner was in his sick bed made a prisoner and was taken off in a steamboat to Paintsville. The other prisoners taken were people not in the Army and who had never been in the Army, but who have been running ever since the war began like frightened hares, afraid to take arms, afraid to offer a single effort of resistance, and who, if pressed to it, would submit to having their ears cropped to show they have a master. Were I to make such conquests I might fill a gazette with them every week. The impression such representations make on my mind is as unfavorable to the chivalry of the officer who can make them as it is to his departure from truth. I hope I have your confidence sufficiently for you to know that I give no hue to the transactions of my command that is not properly belonging to them.

I think one of two things must occur—I must be re-enforced or I must retire from this part of the State, for my command cannot procure subsistence in the mountains. Forward it becomes plenty and cheap; but to go forward I must have 5,000 men. I have not 2,000 fit for duty. I want 2,000 cavalry in addition to the 5,000 infantry, and, in my judgment, I can with that force accomplish a work which will have a most material bearing on the fortunes and destiny of Kentucky and of the grand result of the war. I have heretofore delineated that idea to the proper authority. I ask the service if the force can be given.

I believe, sir, this comprises nearly all I have to communicate. My command is now in very bad health. Measles and mumps are passing through Williams' regiment. I think some 400 of that corps are now on the sick list. I shall have to be as quiet as possible until the diseases have run their course.

I am, general, your obedient servant,

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Bowling Green, Ky.*

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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RICHMOND, *January 24, 1862.*

General HUMPHREY MARSHALL:

Fall back to Pound Gap and report dispositions there made. Letter will go by Captain Wade.

S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General.*



RICHMOND, *January 24, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. HUMPHREY MARSHALL,  
*Commanding, &c. :*

GENERAL: I am directed by the Secretary of War to advise you that, in view of the inability of this Department to re-enforce you at present, it is deemed best that you should fall back to Pound Gap, there making such dispositions as may be deemed most expedient, and reporting your movements promptly to this office.

Captain Wade reports the route by the Louisa Fork to be impracticable for an advance of the enemy in force, and, further, that there is a possibility of his cutting you off, should you take that route, by means of his greater facilities through steamboat navigation to Piketon.

I am, very respectfully, &c.,

R. H. CHILTON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

CRAFT'S, SIX MILES FROM POUND GAP,  
*Letcher County, Ky., February 2, 1862.*

GENERAL: Your telegraphic dispatch of the 24th ultimo reached me by courier on the 26th, by which I was ordered to "fall back to Pound Gap, and to report dispositions there made."

Yesterday Captain Wade delivered me your letter of the 24th, which repeats the direction of the telegram, "in view of the inability of the Department to re-enforce you (me) at present," and requiring me at Pound Gap to make "such dispositions as may be deemed most expedient," which are to be "reported promptly to the Department."

I am extremely embarrassed by this order, for that it indicates a point for me to rest and dispose of the force under my command where it is simply impossible to feed men or animals for two days. The subsistence of the country about Pound Gap for 20 miles is literally exhausted. The supplies for the rifle battalion now at Pound Gap are drawn with great difficulty over that distance (55 miles) and much complaint is made of the precariousness of the supply. Nor can I halt within 20 miles of Pound Gap on this side of the mountains with any chance of obtaining food for man or horse. You can have no conception of the state of affairs here, general; starvation stares these people in the face. They are most averse to parting with a peck of corn or a pound of meat, and daily the women beg for the retention of the means of sustaining themselves and their children. It is no sham or affected apprehension they feel; I much fear they only see what spring-time will startlingly reveal as a stern reality. It cannot advance our cause or make converts to it to starve the best friends we have in this population, and in this county we have many, indeed a considerable majority of the people.

I have reflected upon my duty under your order, especially in view of the reason given for its issuance; and the disposition I shall make of the force will be to pass the mountains and to arrange the regiments as near as they can be to Pound Gap, so as to obtain supplies.

I hear from Captain Wade that the Secretary of War feels solicitous about the invasion of Virginia by the way of Pound Gap and by the way of Piketon. I feel morally sure the enemy is equally solicitous to prevent an invasion of Kentucky by the two routes named. This opinion is based upon his declarations as well as his operations. The presence of a force here, under my command or under the command of any Kentuckian whom the people of the "blue-grass region" know, operates as a



constant warning to them that they must be ready to resist an invasion, and their fears make constant and heavy drafts upon the Government for troops for this purpose. The exaggerations of rumors are greater than in the inverse ratio of the square of the distance; therefore my force was rarely estimated at Louisville or Lexington as less than 10,000 to 15,000, calling for an opposing force of not less than from six to ten regiments, which at one point or another have been employed to keep me out. I have seen elaborate articles in the Kentucky leading opposing journals on the subject of my invasion, from which I learned that the enemy, when he left the Sandy Valley with General Nelson's command, supposed it to be impossible for an army to subsist on what he had left behind, and that the leaders of the Lincoln party in Kentucky had resorted to the wholesale spoliation which intamized Nelson's expedition, upon the idea of preventing our occupation of the valley by troops whose aim might be to assert the rights of Kentucky and to vindicate her true opinion.

The enemy has not attempted now to leave the immediate valley of the Sandy nor to ascend the river in any force beyond the scene of his conflict with me on the 10th of January. On the contrary, he has left only a part of his force at Paintsville, and has only paid a hurried and trembling visit to Piketon with 120 cavalry, which came up John's Creek, arrived Sunday evening, and left on Monday morning. I hear that the object of the visit was to block up the road leading by the Lewis branch of the Sandy into Piketon, and that this was accomplished by Captain Childress, near the Kentucky line, to prevent an invasion again by that route or my use of that route to obtain supplies.

You will see from this that the probability is strong that the solicitude on the subject of an invasion is mutual. Should it prove that the object is only to mask preparation, so as to permit an invading force to gather supplies near Piketon, I shall keep myself advised, and will to the extent of my ability prevent its successful accomplishment. I do not think it probable the enemy will ever attempt an entry into Virginia in large force by the way of Piketon while you have a considerable force at Pound Gap, for the reason that the latter position would lie upon the flank of the advancing column and its command might in a day cut the line of transportation used on either side of the Cumberland Mountain range. In rear of Piketon (Virginia side) the county of Buchanan is mountainous and sterile, bare of supplies, and easily defended; in fact, one passes, as here, along a ridge or the water-courses flanked by mountain ranges. The danger and only danger is from a heavy cavalry force pressing in and destroying as it goes, and then retreating by a different road. This can be prevented by guarding near to the valued points and by having timely notice given at Pound Gap to the force which should be constantly kept there to cover the road which crosses the Cumberland Range at that place. It is a strong place into whosoever hands it falls and the defenses on both side are equal.

POUND GAP, *February 2*—evening.

I resume my letter after riding here from my camp of last night. I have ordered the Fifty-fourth Virginia Regiment to fall back to Gladesville, and if supplies cannot be had in that vicinity to cross Clinch River, if requisite to obtain them. Colonel Moore's regiment is on the march from Whitesburg for the same destination. Simms' mounted battalion will be here to-morrow, and I shall send it to Clinch River without hesitation. Colonel Williams has not yet moved from the mouth of Rock House Creek, which is 16 miles below Whitesburg, but has been

ordered to do so, and will be ordered to join the rest of the command at whatever point I can find supplies convenient or indeed possible. I shall not be surprised to have great trouble with this regiment on account of its removal into Virginia, for the men are nearly all from the mountain counties of Kentucky, and they would prefer, I believe, even to be retreating through the mountains of their own State to any rest which could be offered to them in any other part of the country. I regret to say that this spirit of discontent is not quieted or even allayed by the bearing and conversations of those who have them in immediate charge. In my own judgment the future efficiency of the regiment depends upon its opportunity to be drilled, for it is now entirely undrilled, and has been, since the first enlistment of its soldiers, so constantly on the move that the officers of companies, who all are from the walks of civic life, have had no opportunity to drill in the schools of the company or battalion. You will therefore recognize my solicitude before they are put into the plains, where the exercise might be close and severe, to have a chance to instruct them. It occurs to me that this season is the most propitious I shall have for this purpose, and that the existing status of the enemy and myself affords me more opportunity than I shall have again before the Department will be enabled to give me the re-enforcements I had expected to receive in order to accomplish the purposes I have had so much at heart.

I would not advise another entry into Kentucky from this point until about the 1st of May. The grass will by that time be up and the roads, now nearly impassable, will be good. The policy of the Government will be defensive, I presume, until that time, and that then it will in Kentucky become offensive. Sixty or seventy days to organize the trains, to recruit the horses, to rest and reinvigorate the men, many of whom have coughs, resulting from measles and exposure during the attack of disease, to drill the battalions, to establish proper correspondence with the men of interior Kentucky, to arrange supplies for a march, will not leave me idle or in unprofitable employment.

I will not here dwell on these views, but I request leave, when the regiment shall be posted, to visit Richmond for a few days, in order to have these views laid before the proper authority and to understand what I am to look for in the service for the future.

I inclose a written proposition from Mr. Brashers, the owner of the salt-works near Whitesburg, which I regard as very advantageous to the Government, and which I was at some trouble to secure. May I request an early answer to this communication?

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General.*

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Inclosure.]

I propose and agree to lease to the Government of the Confederate States of America my tract of land in Perry County, Kentucky, embracing some 4,000 acres, with privilege of using the machinery thereon situated and of making salt there and of cultivating the land, and with the privilege of cutting the timber and mining the coal, for the term of three years, from the 1st day of May next, for the sum of \$2,000 for the whole term, payable in equal installments annually, and with power to said Government to assign this lease and to locate troops on the land and otherwise to exercise all acts of ownership for the term through its agents, servants, officers, or assigns.

The acceptance of this proposition by the President or Secretary of War is to be considered as making this contract complete, on my being notified thereof by General Marshall, or any other agent of the Government, and a copy hereof furnished to me, signed by the President or Secretary, at any time prior to the 1st of May, 1862; possession to be given at that time or as much sooner as the other party chooses to take it.

Witness my hand and seal at Whitesburg, Letcher County, Kentucky, this 1st February, 1862.

R. S. BRASHERS.

Witnesses :

H. MARSHALL.

J. S. C. TAYLOR, M. D.

[Indorsement.]

It is not recommended to decide on this question at present, as it remains open until the 1st of May. Moreover, this department has made preparations for furnishing salt in less precarious localities and sufficient quantities.

L. B. NORTHROP,

*Commissary-General Subsistence.*

FEBRUARY 17, 1862.

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No. 4.

*Report of Col. A. C. Moore, Twenty-ninth Virginia Infantry.*

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-NINTH VIRGINIA REGIMENT,

*January 13, 1862.*

SIR : The present being the first opportunity which has presented itself since our engagement with the enemy at the Fork of Middle Creek, in Floyd County, Kentucky, on the evening of the 10th instant, I will now give you briefly a hasty report of the part taken and the consequences resulting therefrom to the force under my command. The Twenty-ninth Virginia Regiment was the greater part of the time—that is, during the battle, which lasted some three hours—in the head and front of the fire, and all, without a single exception, so far as my information extends, conducted themselves in the bravest and most gallant manner. The loss to my regiment was 5 killed and 7 wounded.

In this my brief and imperfect report I ought not, perhaps, to make any invidious distinctions by mentioning the names of any of my men or officers, who conducted themselves most gallantly in the battle; but I think my whole command will bear me out in giving to Lieut. Col. William Leigh, Maj. James Giles, and to Lieut. William J. March, of Captain Bryant's company, great credit for the gallant and daring part acted throughout the entire engagement.

In conclusion, I will say that all acted nobly and achieved for themselves a reputation and a name which old Virginia may and will be ever proud to honor.

A. C. MOORE,

*Colonel, Commanding Twenty-ninth Virginia Volunteers.*

Brig. Gen. HUMPHREY MARSHALL,

*Commanding First Brigade, Army of Eastern Kentucky.*



## DECEMBER 28, 1861.—Action at Sacramento, Ky.

## REPORTS.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, U. S. Army.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. Charles Clark, C. S. Army.

No. 3.—Col. Nathan B. Forrest, Forrest's Regiment, C. S. Army.

## No. 1.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden, U. S. Army.*HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*Calhoun, Ky., December 29, 1861.*

CAPTAIN: I regret to inform you that on yesterday, as a command of 168 men, under Major Murray, of Jackson's regiment, were returning from a reconnaissance, they were pursued and surprised by some rebel cavalry at Sacramento. The men made but little resistance, and I am afraid that the gallantry of the officers has cost us the services of several of them. I have not learned that any officer was killed, but when the men fled they fought themselves. Captains Bacon and Davis and Lieutenant Jouett are missing. Major Murray has just reported that 40 men are missing. From the accounts of the fight very few have been killed, and I suspect most of the missing will come in.

I sent Colonel Jackson out with about 500 men, 260 of them infantry, with instructions to gather up stragglers and the wounded, if there were any. I also instructed him that if the enemy were still in the vicinity to beat them up, but not to venture far in pursuit.

Jackson left about 10 o'clock last night. It is now about 10 a. m., and I have not heard from him. The rebels have no doubt rapidly retired, and Jackson is probably hunting his men. I shall ride out in a few minutes with an escort, and will write particulars as I can get them in an official report.

I have written this that you may not be deceived by any exaggerated report, which will doubtless reach you.

Very respectfully,

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*Calhoun, Ky., December 30, 1861.*

GENERAL: In the fight just beyond Sacramento we lost 8 killed and 8, perhaps 13, captured.

Over 400 rebel cavalry surprised 168 of Jackson's cavalry the day before yesterday, as they were returning from a scout to South Carrollton. The rebels attacked and drove in the vanguard, following them rapidly.

Major Murray behaved with great gallantry, and, with the aid of other officers, who will be mentioned when I get an official report, repelled the charge, being seconded handsomely by about 45 men. These men resisted the whole body of the enemy for ten minutes, and, from the accounts I have from many reliable witnesses, would have repulsed them, but at this critical moment some dastard unknown

shouted "Retreat to Sacramento!" Most of the men fled, of course, without stopping at Sacramento. In this retreat we sustained some loss. Capt. Albert G. Bacon was killed and 7 privates, whose names I will get to-day. Captain Davis, of Jackson's regiment, was captured. He was conspicuous in the fight for bravery. We do not know the extent of the enemy's loss. Meriwether (either a major or a lieutenant-colonel) was killed and certainly 4 men. The rebels took away three wagon loads of dead and wounded.

Although outnumbered and partially surprised, I think my men had the best of the fight. I rode out to Sacramento yesterday and found Jackson burying the dead—6 of our men. We have 5 or 6 men so badly wounded that we could not bring them in. They are in good quarters and will be well cared for. The enemy here have every advantage of us. The Union men are generally inactive, while the secessionists are full of activity.

The rebel cavalry reached Greenville Friday morning, and Friday night the scouting party under Major Murray rode to South Carrollton. The rebels were beyond a doubt apprised of Murray's expedition, and the first intimation I had of their presence was from the fight at Sacramento. Heretofore I have always been promptly notified of their arrival at Greenville. If I had received the information this time I might have captured the entire command. The rebels are thoroughly and well armed, and Jackson's men are badly armed, and, what is worse, have no confidence in their pistols. I know that you will remedy this as soon as possible.

Most respectfully,

General BUELL.

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*Calhoun, Ky., January 3, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: I now inclose you the report of Major Murray of the affair at Sacramento.\* You will see from Major Murray's report that the entire command behaved handsomely. Although attacked suddenly, and almost surprised, our men charged and drove back the rebels, and that, when the rebels rallied and were re-enforced, still fought and maintained themselves in a hand-to-hand conflict, until some one unknown called out "Retreat to Sacramento!" As it was, the casualties of the enemy were equal to ours. We have, however, to mourn the loss of 8 gallant soldiers, and 3 officers of uncommon bravery and soldierly qualities, Capt. A. G. Bacon killed, Capt. A. N. Davis captured, and Lieut. John L. Walters missing.

It is very gratifying to call your attention, general, to Major Murray's report of the conduct of all the officers under his command, every one of them perhaps under fire for the first time, and yet every one behaving handsomely.

I will close this letter, and only add that, by the testimony of all, Major Murray's conduct in the field deserves the highest praise.

I am, general, with great respect, your obedient servant,

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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\* Not found.

## No. 2.

*Report of Brig. Gen. Charles Clark, C. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS HOPKINSVILLE, KY.,

January 8, 1862.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the major-general, the official report of Col. N. B. Forrest of his brilliant and dashing affair at Sacramento on the 28th ultimo:

The report of Colonel Forrest is a modest recital of one of the most brilliant and successful cavalry engagements which the present war has witnessed, and gives a favorable omen of what that arm of our service will do in future on a more extended scale.

The loss of the enemy, it will be seen, is estimated by Colonel Forrest at 65 killed and 35 wounded and prisoners, and from private and unofficial sources I learn that the number is not overestimated.

Our own loss was but 2 killed, but in the death of Capt. C. E. Meriwether, who fell while gallantly leading his command into action, the country and the service have sustained a loss which I most deeply deplore. A brave and chivalrous gentleman, I esteemed him as one of the very best officers of his rank in the service. Colonel Forrest pays what I doubt not is a well-merited tribute to the gallantry and good conduct of his officers and men generally and specially. For the skill, courage, and energy displayed by Colonel Forrest he is entitled to the highest praise, and I take great pleasure in calling the attention of the general commanding and of the Government to his services. I am assured by officers and men that throughout the entire engagement he was conspicuous for the most daring courage; always in advance of his command. He was at one time engaged in a hand-to-hand conflict with 4 of the enemy, 3 of whom he killed, dismounting and making a prisoner of the fourth.

The other field officers, Lieutenant-Colonel Starnes and Major Kelly, by their coolness, courage, and promptitude, contributed largely to the success of the day.

I have the honor to be, lieutenant, respectfully, &c.,

CHARLES CLARK,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

Lieut. D. G. WHITE,

*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.*


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 No. 3.
*Report of Col. Nathan B. Forrest, Forrest's Regiment, C. S. Army.*

HOPKINSVILLE, KY., December 30, 1861.

Under orders to reconnoiter to the front, especially in the direction of Rochester and Greenville, and if deemed best to continue our observations towards Rumsey, my command left camp Thursday, 26th instant, myself with detachments from Companies A, C, and D, First Lieutenant Crutcher, Captains May and Gould; with a detachment of 25 men of Captain Meriwether's company, under his command, Major Kelly, with detachments from Companies E, F. and G, under Lieutenants Hampton, Nance, and Cowan, having been ordered to Greenville to await orders.



Leaving the Greenville road 4 miles from Hopkinsville I moved in the direction of Rochester, until fully satisfied that there were no movements of the enemy in that direction.

The next day, on reaching the Russellville and Greenville road, I turned towards Greenville, and on Saturday morning formed a junction with a detachment of 40 cavalry from Russellville, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Starnes and Captain McLemore, who, with Major Kelly, were awaiting my arrival at Greenville. Colonel Starnes had the day before been at South Carrollton, where he had engaged a party of the enemy, killing 3.

Hearing nothing still from the enemy, it was determined to extend our march to the vicinity of Rumsey. The command, about 300 strong, were moved forward in one column, with advance guard under Captain Meriwether and rear under Captain McLemore; the head of the column under my command; the center under Major Kelly, and the rear under Lieutenant-Colonel Starnes. We had moved 8 miles down the Rumsey road when information reached me that the enemy 500 strong had that morning crossed from Calhoun to Rumsey. My men were ordered to a rapid pace, and as the news of the proximity of the enemy ran down the column it was impossible to repress jubilant and defiant shouts, which reached the height of enthusiasm as the women from the houses waved us forward. A beautiful young lady, smiling, with untied tresses floating in the breeze, on horseback, met the column just before our advance guard came up with the rear of the enemy, infusing nerve into my arm and kindling knightly chivalry within my heart.

One mile this side the village of Sacramento our advance guard came up with their rear guard, who halted, seemingly in doubt whether we were friends or foes. Taking a Maynard rifle, I fired at them, when they rode off rapidly to their column. The column moved up the hill and formed just over its brow. I ordered up the head of my column, telling my men to hold their fire until within good range. The enemy commenced firing from the time we were within 200 yards of them. When we had moved 120 yards farther I ordered my men to fire. After three rounds I found that my men were not up in sufficient numbers to pursue them with success, and as they showed signs of fight, I ordered the advance to fall back. The enemy at once attempted to flank our left, and moved towards us and appeared greatly animated, supposing we were in retreat. They had moved down over 100 yards and seemed to be forming for a charge, when, the remainder of my men coming up, I dismounted a number of men with Sharp's carbines and Maynard rifles to act as sharpshooters; ordered a flank movement upon the part of Major Kelly and Colonel Starnes upon the right and left, and the detachments from the companies under my command, still mounted, were ordered to charge the enemy's center.

The men sprang to the charge with a shout, while the undergrowth so impeded the flankers that the enemy, broken by the charge and perceiving the movement on their flanks, broke in utter confusion, and, in spite of the efforts of a few officers, commenced a disorderly flight at full speed, in which the officers soon joined. We pressed closely on their rear, only getting an occasional shot, until we reached the village of Sacramento, when, the best mounted men of my companies coming up, there commenced a promiscuous saber slaughter of their rear, which was continued at almost full speed for 2 miles beyond the village, leaving their bleeding and wounded strewn along the whole route. At this point Captain Bacon, and but a little before Captain Burges, were run through with saber thrusts, and Captain Davis thrown from his horse and sur-

rendered as my prisoner, his shoulder being dislocated by the fall. The enemy, without officers, threw down their arms and depended alone upon the speed of their horses. Those of my men whose horses were able to keep up found no difficulty in piercing through every one they came up with, but as my horses were almost run down while theirs were much fresher, I deemed it best to call off the chase, for such it had become, leaving many wounded men hanging to their saddles to prevent their falling from their horses. Returning, we found their dead and wounded in every direction. Those who were able to be moved we placed in wagons. Captains Bacon and Burges were made as comfortable as we could, and applied to the nearest farm house to take care of them.

There were killed on the field and mortally wounded, who have since died, about 65; wounded and taken prisoners, about 35, making their loss about 100. Among their killed were two captains and three lieutenants and several non-commissioned officers.

The fight occurred in the woods; the run was principally along lanes.

I have the pleasure of stating that Colonel Starnes and Major Kelly acted in the most noble and chivalrous manner, and, indeed, I can say that Captain Gould, Captain May, Captain Meriwether (who unfortunately fell in front of the engagement), Lieutenant Crutcher, in command of Captain Overton's company; Lieutenant Nance, left in command of Captain Hambrick's company; Lieutenant Cowan, in command of Captain Logan's company (he acting as surgeon at the time), and Lieutenant Hampton, in command of Captain Truett's [?] company, with the men under their respective commands are deserving praise for their conduct.

Our loss was Captain Meriwether and Private Terry, of Captain Mc-Lemore's company, killed, and 3 privates slightly wounded; 2 from Captain May's and the other from Captain Hambrick's.

We returned to Greenville the night of the fight (Saturday), and from thence started to camp, and arrived last night.

Before closing this report I most respectfully call your attention to the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Bailey, of Captain Gould's company; Private J. W. Ripley, of Captain May's company, and Private J. M. Luxton, also of Captain May's; and Private D. W. Johnson, of Captain Logan's company, and, indeed, many others, whose horses being not quite so fast, did not come immediately under my own observation. Capt. M. D. Logan (who was acting as surgeon on that occasion) deserves praise for his noble conduct throughout the engagement.

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

Respectfully,

N. B. FORREST,

*Colonel, Commanding Forrest Regiment.*

General CHARLES CLARK, C. S. A.

DECEMBER 28-31, 1861.—Expedition to Camp Beauregard and Viola, Ky.

*Report of Brigadier-General Lewis Wallace, U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE U. S. FORCES,

*Paducah, Ky., January 1, 1862.*

SIR: Under the sanction of General Smith, given on the night of the 28th of December, 1861, with a detachment consisting of 130 men from



the Second Illinois Cavalry, Companies I and C, Regular Cavalry, and 70 men from Thielemann's dragoons, I left Paducah on the same night, to proceed in the direction of Camp Beauregard, for the purpose of reconnoitering that camp, gaining information as to the strength of the enemy and their whereabouts, and ascertaining whether or not re-enforcements had left Camp Beauregard for Bowling Green. I also understood that I had permission, if opportunity afforded, to attack and cut up a certain corps of marauders commanded by one King.

The night of my departure I halted at Camp Creek and rested until 8 o'clock next morning, and, proceeding then, stopped a couple of hours at Mayfield. Not getting the desired information there I went on towards Camp Beauregard until within 6 or 6½ miles of that camp, where the enemy appeared to have an outpost, guarded by about 75 men, who fled helter-skelter on my approach. At that point I found a farmer of undoubted loyalty, named Gee, from whom I obtained forage for my horses, and the information that all the troops who have been occupying Camp Beauregard for some months past, except a battery of artillery and King's marauders, had been taken to Bowling Green, but that their places had been supplied by three or four regiments of what is called "Sixty-days' men," green troops, mostly unarmed, and the whole without special organization. Satisfied on this point, I thought it prudent to return, and as there was no water for my cattle (without going off the road) nearer than Viola, I was compelled to come that far back the same night. Accordingly I bivouacked there.

About daybreak in the morning (Monday) one of my pickets galloped in and reported a heavy force of infantry and cavalry upon us and about to attack. I crossed Mayfield Creek immediately and in good order and drew up on the opposite bank to receive the attack, but, the enemy hanging fire, I drew off about a mile and a half on the Paducah road and fed the men and horses, sent Captain Lyman to report to the general, and, with his permission, bring me five companies of infantry, intending to hold the Confederates until I heard from headquarters. I then returned to Viola to engage them in a skirmish, but they had retreated. I remained there for orders, which did not reach me until 3 o'clock on Tuesday morning. Expecting the return of the enemy on Monday night, I recrossed the creek and made preparations to receive them. Quite a party of rebel cavalry appeared early in the morning, but waited only to get a sight of my men, a portion of whom I had dismounted to attack them.

Knowing the general's disinclination to hazard any of his command I was exceedingly cautious, and would not have engaged the enemy in a serious fight until I was certain of their numbers. I also took every possible care to have my way of retreat open, for which purpose I kept parties in continual motion to and from Plumley's Station, at which point I ordered all re-enforcements dispatched to me to remain for orders. In obedience to his orders, I returned without loss of time to Paducah on Tuesday.

Three guides whom I had mounted on Government horses were foolish enough, without my knowledge or consent, to sleep outside of my lines on Sunday night, and, while barely escaping themselves, lost their horses to the enemy. On Monday morning some of the cavalry whom I had armed with rifles—borrowed, a portion from the Twenty-third Indiana and a portion from the Eleventh Indiana—carelessly lost or threw away some of those arms and their accouterments. Circumstances very shameful.

It gives me pleasure to say that my command behaved excellently.



Excepting one piece of bacon, not an article of property belonging to a citizen was touched. The country from Viola to Mayfield, and particularly from Mayfield to Camp Beauregard, is of such a character as to render fighting with cavalry almost impossible. It is one long stretch of scrub-oak and dense chaparral, broken now and then by a farm or clearing. On account of the scarcity of water it would be difficult also to march a heavy column through.

Very respectfully,

LEW. WALLACE,  
*General, Second Brigade.*

Capt. THOMAS J. NEWSHAM,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, U. S. Forces, Paducah.*

# **JANUARY 10-21, 1862.—Expedition into Kentucky from Cairo, Ill.**

*Report of Brig. Gen. John A. McClelland, U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, Ill., January 24, 1862.*

SIR: Being in temporary command of this district, it becomes my duty to submit the following report of the expedition which left Cairo under orders to penetrate into the interior of Kentucky in the neighborhood of Columbus and towards Mayfield and Camp Beauregard:

The expedition consisted of the Tenth, Eighteenth, part of the Twenty-seventh, the Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-first, and Forty-eighth Regiments of Infantry, Schwartz's and Dresser's batteries of light artillery, under command of Captain Schwartz, chief of artillery; Carmichael's, O'Harnett's, and Dollins' companies of cavalry, attached to regiments; Stewart's cavalry company, attached to my brigade, and five companies of Col. T. Lyle Dickey's Fourth Cavalry Regiment, numbering 3,992, of cavalry 1,061, and of artillery 139, rank and file, all under my command, and all Illinois volunteers except Schwartz's battery of light artillery.

The cavalry, which had crossed the river and encamped at Fort Holt on the evening of the 9th, marched on the morning of the 10th to Fort Jefferson, Captain Stewart, with his company, being in the advance. On arriving he detained in custody all persons found at that place, and immediately sent forward pickets to guard the pass at Elliott's Mill and other approaches from Columbus. The remainder of the forces, conveyed by transports, arrived at Fort Jefferson on the same day (10th) and encamped, awaiting further orders. On the 11th I ordered a reconnaissance east to Blandville, by the Hill road, 8 miles; thence south, on the road to Columbus, to Weston's, 5 miles, and returning by Elliott's Mill to Fort Jefferson, 9 miles. This reconnaissance was made by Captain Stewart, in command of his own company, and Company B (Captain Collins), of the Fourth Cavalry. No armed enemy was encountered, but captures of L. T. Polk and Daniel Frazer, supposed to be couriers from Columbus, were made. No United States forces having previously approached so near Columbus, the inhabitants uniformly mistook our cavalry for rebel troops.

On the 12th I ordered a demonstration to be made in the direction of Columbus by six companies of cavalry, commanded by Captain Stewart, supported by the Tenth and Eighteenth Regiments of Infantry, commanded respectively by Colonels Morgan and Lawler. The infantry,

crossing Mayfield Creek at Elliott's Mill, took position there, while the cavalry advanced until they came within a mile and a half of the enemy's defenses, driving his pickets into camp and bringing away several prisoners and their horses. It was discovered that an abatis of fallen timber a half mile in width surrounded the enemy's intrenchments. The rigor of the weather and the non-appearance of any considerable rebel force led to the belief that they were closely collected around camp fires within their intrenchments, and indisposed to take the field. It is believed that with suitable preparation on our part a favorable time was thus afforded for successful attack and the capture of Columbus. From this near approach the cavalry returned by Puntney's Bend and Elliott's Mill to Fort Jefferson, communicating with and being joined by the infantry who formed their support. On the 13th, Lieut. H. C. Freeman, engineer, with an escort of cavalry, explored the different roads leading from Fort Jefferson to Blandville, and selected a strong position for an encampment a half mile south of Blandville, on the road to Columbus. On the 14th the whole force, preceded, flanked, and followed by strong guards, moved in two columns by different roads towards Blandville, and encamped in such a manner as to command the approaches from Columbus by both bridges across Mayfield Creek in that vicinity. One of these is known as O'Neal's Bridge and the other as Blandville Bridge.

The distance of this day's march was  $8\frac{1}{2}$  miles, over difficult roads, covered with sleet. To prevent surprise, strong mounted pickets were thrown forward toward Columbus and to the bridge across Mayfield Creek at Hayworth's Mill, 3 miles above Blandville. On the 15th we advanced to Weston's, the Fourth Illinois Cavalry and Dollins' company, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel McCullough, making an early movement southwest in the direction of Columbus, and repeating a near approach to that place, while Captain Stewart, with his company, pushed a reconnaissance 8 miles, quite to Milburn, taking the town by surprise and picking up a man just from Columbus, from whom he derived much valuable information respecting the condition of the rebel force at that place. He learned from this source that our demonstrations towards Columbus had excited much alarm, and induced the enemy to call in his forces at Jackson, Beauregard, New Madrid, and other places; two Mississippi regiments, according to report, having burned up their tents before their flight. (Milburn is reproached as a Union town by the rebels.) Joined at Weston's by the Seventh Illinois, Colonel Cook, our whole force encamped for the night in line of battle 10 miles from Columbus, taking a strong position, commanding the approaches from that place by two roads which here intersect the roads leading from Puntney's Bend and Elliott's Mill to Milburn; General Paine's column, following and encamping at the same place, during the next day, covered our rear, and kept open communication with the base of operations at Fort Jefferson.

Brigadier-General Grant, commanding the various forces in the field, came up with us at this point, and expressed his approval of the manner in which the disposition of the forces had been made. To prevent surprise, strong guards were again thrown forward. At 7 o'clock a. m. on the 16th the entire column, except the Seventh Illinois Volunteers, moved forward over icy roads towards Milburn, a small town southeast from Weston's and 8 miles distant, reaching Milburn about 12 m. The head of the column passed through the town on the road to Mayfield about 2 miles and halted, a portion of the column resting in the town.

Looking to the object of the expedition, so far as it had previously



been explained to me, I here maneuvered my forces so as to leave the enemy in doubt whether my purpose was to attack Columbus, march upon Camp Beauregard, or to destroy the railroad leading from Columbus to Union City, and to awaken apprehension for the safety of each. While the rear of the column was still resting in Milburn I countermarched the portion of it advanced beyond that place, taking the road beyond Milburn leading north to Lovelaceville, and followed in proper order by the rear of the column, pushed on some 4 miles on that road, and encamped. Giving out that the object of the countermarch was to encamp for the night on favorable ground near water in the vicinity of Milburn, the latent purpose of my change of the direction of my march was completely concealed. In the mean time, to increase the deception, in pursuance of my order, Lieutenant-Colonel McCullough, with the Fourth Cavalry, made a demonstration some 5 miles in a westerly direction on the road from Milburn to Columbus, and there again heard that Camp Beauregard was broken up, and that the enemy had retired within his intrenchments at Columbus, and soon after I heard that he had destroyed the railroad bridge across the Obion, which, if true, must be attributed to fear that it was my intention to seize and control the railroad in the rear of Columbus. Sending forward Captain Wemple, with his company of the Fourth Cavalry, to Mayfield, I communicated with General Smith, commanding the column that marched from Paducah, placing him in possession of a dispatch from Brigadier-General Grant, and giving him information of the report that Camp Beauregard had been abandoned. Captain Wemple and his command joined me the next day.

On the 17th our whole force advanced north 8 miles to Lovelaceville, throwing forward strong pickets to guard the approach from Columbus by Hayworth's Bridge. On the 18th my command was marched in two columns by different roads in a westerly direction, and encamped for the night about a mile from Blandville, except the Twenty-ninth Regiment and part of the baggage train, which, in consequence of the heavy rains of the previous night and the miry roads, were unable to come up. Riding back, I disposed of the regiment and train so as to secure them against danger. On the 19th the Twenty-ninth and the remainder of the train came up, the march of the former continuing as far as O'Neal's Mill, before mentioned, where, with a section of Schwartz's battery, they encamped for the night, disposing the force so as to command the approach from Columbus by the bridge at that place. During the same day I also sent forward the Tenth Regiment and another section of Schwartz's battery to occupy another approach from Columbus by the Blandville Bridge. These dispositions were made anticipatory of an advance by the enemy, of which I had heard a report, and still further to insure our safety I placed strong pickets above, at Hayworth's Bridge, instructing the officer in command to remove some of its plank so as to render it temporarily impassable.

Admonished by the reported advance of the enemy and the exposure of my left flank for its whole length during the march of the next day, I dispatched a courier during the night of the 19th to communicate with our forces at Fort Jefferson, and to suggest that the pass at Elliott's Mill should be occupied by an adequate force to prevent my return to Fort Jefferson from being cut off. The courier returned with a message from Colonel Marsh, commanding the Twentieth Illinois, informing me that all our forces except mine and his own had embarked for Cairo, but that he would remain and hold the pass until I came up, unless otherwise ordered.

At 7 o'clock on the morning of the 20th the main body of my forces



moved forward on the direct road to Fort Jefferson. The Twenty-ninth, with a section of Schwartz's battery, and the Tenth, with another section of the same battery, after having rendered the bridges near their encampments impassable, falling in the rear of the column, moved on with it to Fort Jefferson. During the exposure of this day's march, which was considered eminently critical, the column was guarded against surprise by strong guards of cavalry and infantry moving in front, rear, and on the left flank. The Eighteenth and Thirty-first Regiments, together with three pieces of Dresser's artillery, having arrived at Fort Jefferson by 1 o'clock p. m., were immediately embarked for Cairo, the remainder of the column following the next day to the same place.

The unavoidable deficiency of transportation with which my command set out, aggravated by the bad condition of the roads, prevented me from taking, on leaving Cairo, the five days' supply of rations and forage directed by the commanding officer of this district; hence the necessity of an early resort to other sources of supply. None other presented but to quarter upon the enemy or to purchase from loyal citizens. I accordingly resorted to both expedients as I had opportunity. In some cases finding live stock, provisions, forage, &c., the owners of which had abandoned it and gone into the rebel army, I took and appropriated it to the uses of the United States without hesitation. In other cases I purchased from loyal citizens such supplies as were indispensable, and caused certificates to be issued, charging the Government for the fair value of the articles thus obtained. By these means of supply, resorted to from necessities of the case, substantial economy was practiced in saving to the Government in supplies and transportation more than their full value for the five days named.

The reconnoissance thus made completed a march of 140 miles by the cavalry and 75 miles by the infantry over icy or miry roads during a most inclement season, and has led to the discovery of several important roads which did not appear upon our maps. It has also disclosed the fact that, with proper crossings of Mayfield Creek at Elliott's and O'Neal's Mills, also immediately south of Blandville, and still above at Hayworth's Mill, no serious obstacle will intervene to prevent an army marching in several divisions by different routes upon Columbus; and, while this is true, it is also worthy of mention that Mayfield Creek affords a strong natural barrier against any advance of the enemy upon a force taking position behind it. Besides the immediate object of so formidable a demonstration, other beneficial results, perhaps of little less importance, have flowed from it. Without doubt it has exploded many false reports studiously and sedulously circulated by the enemy to our detriment. It has forcibly and deeply impressed the inhabitants of the district through which we passed with the superiority of our military preparations and of our ultimate ability to conquer the rebellion. It inspired hope among many loyal citizens, who hailed us as deliverers, whom I regret our unexpected withdrawal will probably leave victims of rebel persecution and proscription. This consideration, with others having great weight with me, prompts me in conclusion to presume upon your indulgence so far as to urgently recommend a renewed advance of our forces, if not immediately upon Columbus, at least so far as to regain the ground we recently occupied. Landing a floating depot at Puntney's Bend, under protection of our gunboats, from which to draw supplies, and reoccupying Milburn and the crossings at Weston's, with adequate forces threatening the railroad back of Columbus, and co-operating with our gunboats and such other force as had seized New Madrid, it would be placed within our power in a large measure to

cut off the enemy's supplies, and thus force him to surrender or come out from his defenses and give us battle at his disadvantage.

Although disappointed by the recall from their advance, I am happy to state that the officers and men under my command from first to last performed the duties incident to the expedition with ability, fidelity, and rare patience under the most trying circumstances, and whether the plan mentioned or that of a direct attack upon Columbus be adopted, they earnestly ask to be allowed to share in its execution.

Inclosed herewith you will find maps and drawings furnished by Lieut. H. C. Freeman, detached as engineer of my command by Colonel Webster, chief engineer of this military district, which illustrate the route of our march, the forms and places of our encampments, and the relations of a number of important roads and towns.\*

Your obedient servant,

JOHN A. MCCLERNAND,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding District of Cairo.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

*Commanding Department of Missouri.*

## JANUARY 15-25, 1862.—Reconnaissance from Paducah, Ky., to Fort Henry, Tennessee.

### REPORTS.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Charles F. Smith, U. S. Army.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, C. S. Army.

#### No. 1.

#### *Reports of Brig. Gen. Charles F. Smith, U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,  
*Paducah, Ky., January 27, 1862.*

SIR: On the 25th instant I briefly reported my return on that day. The distance from Callaway to Aurora is by water about 3 miles, by land 6. From the latter place to this it is 40 miles; a good road even at this period of the year, but destitute of water, except in the rainy season. We accomplished the march (46 miles) in three days, an average of 15 miles per day. This is the State road, but is not marked on any map I have seen. It is generally on a ridge of clay and gravel, and is called the Ridge road. Its course is nearly straight from Aurora to Paducah, at no point farther than 10 miles from the river.

My reports of the — and — instant\* will give all the necessary information about the march, except on one point, outrages committed by the men in killing hogs and poultry; this, despite every precaution taken by myself and brigade and regimental commanders. Horses even were attempted to be carried off. Some men are in arrest for such offenses, whom I shall bring before a proper tribunal for trial. The reason for this is, in my belief, that the company officers have not done their duty. They will not see, if they do not in fact encourage, this misconduct.

The general will pardon me if I venture to make a suggestion in ref-

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\* Not found.

erence to the future. I know nothing about the course of operations to be pursued, but if Union City (which I have always thought to be a strong strategic point) is to be occupied, the most feasible means of supplying our troops there at this period of the year is from here by rail to the State line. Place good engines and wood cars on our road, repair the road as we go, and guard the whole line with a strong force. The distance from the end of the railway to the Columbus road is but 8 miles to be marched, or we can march the 35 miles to Union City from the terminus of the road. I speak of this on account of the extreme difficulty of sending wagon trains for a large force at this period of the year.

I send herewith a rather meager itinerary of the march.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. F. SMITH,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

*Headquarters District of Cairo, Cairo, Ill.*

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,

*Paducah, Ky., January 28, 1862.*

SIR: I transmit herewith an itinerary of the recent march of this command, which ought to have accompanied my report of yesterday. I spoke of the march from Fulton—the terminus of the railway from this place to the State line—to Union City as 35 miles. It is only 11 miles. From Fulton to the Mobile and Ohio Railway by the State line is 8 miles. It is the same distance from Fulton to the Nashville and Northwestern Railway.

See accompanying sketch.\*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. F. SMITH,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

*Headquarters District of Cairo, Cairo, Ill.*

[Inclosure.]

*Journal of the march of the First and Second Brigades of the United States forces from Paducah, Ky., to Callaway, on the Tennessee River, and back.*

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January 21.—Road towards Callaway bad; Callaway—a small place of three or four houses and one mill, not running now—has got a poor landing place. We found here the gunboat Lexington and the steamer Wilson, with forage and provisions. The gunboat Lexington went up river towards Fort Henry; chased a small rebel gunboat with two 12-pounder rifled guns, but the rebel escaped; then threw twelve shells into Fort Henry. During the night, frost. Four miles north is Aurora, a small place, with a landing and ferry on the Tennessee River.

January 22.—Brigadier-general commanding, C. F. Smith, Brigade Surgeon Dr. Hewitt, and Capt. John Rziha went up the river on the gunboat Lexington to reconnoiter Fort Henry. When our gunboat

\* Omitted as unimportant.



reached the south point of the island, next to Fort Henry, we could see two rebel steamers depart in great haste. We shelled Fort Henry, and the fort returned our fire with one shot, which must have been a 32-pounder rifled gun. The north side of the fort is a *crémaillère* line, mounting four 32-pounders. The three other sides are rectangular, mounting two 64 and two 24 pounders. In front *crémaillère* line is, I should judge, a redan commenced. South of the fort is a large camp. East of the fort is one regiment encamped. From Fort Henry to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, 12 miles; connected by a good road. On the west side of the Tennessee River, opposite the fort, two hills, about 90 feet above river. Fort Henry is strongly built, and I believe well garrisoned. All around the fort abatis, from head of island to the fort, two miles and a half.

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Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN RZIHA,  
*Captain, Nineteenth Infantry, U. S. Army.*

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### No. 2.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, C. S. Army.*

FORT DONELSON, *January 18, 1862—8 a. m.*

All quiet this morning; 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry have landed at Eggnier's Ferry and encamped 6 miles out on road to Murray. Have 15 wagons. Their object, I think, is our railroad at Paris.

Gunboats below us have retired again, with transports. All quiet at Dover.

TILGHMAN.

General POLK.

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FORT DONELSON, *January 18, 1862—11 p. m.*

A second courier from Henry, 4 o'clock, brings further particulars of enemy's position. About same. Will try and destroy Wood's Creek Bridge; it will impede them. I shall draw 600 men from here. Everything quiet here. Am destroying ferry-boats below. Ten-inch gun mounted at Henry at 4 p. m.; another, 32, will be by 12 m. Shall return to Henry at 3 a. m. and lose no time.

TILGHMAN.

General POLK.

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FORT HENRY, *January 19, 1862.*

[C. F.] Smith is at Murray with, I think, 7,500 men, including 1,000 cavalry and twelve field pieces. I have possession of the hill and am fortifying hard. Can make it strong, if time is allowed. One Alabama company of cavalry came to-night; send back boat for the others. Have moved 600 men and three pieces field artillery from Donelson here. Await anxiously to know about re-enforcements. I must and will hold the hill, if I can. Men behave well.

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.*

FORT HENRY, *January 21, 1862*—6 p. m.

Scout informs me that the main body of the enemy made only a feint, and sent 1,000 only to Highland. Main body returned to near Murray, former position. Messenger from near Murray reports proceeding beyond Murray west. Works progressing well on south side. I do not feel satisfied about effect of high water on earthworks at Henry. Say to Gilmer gunboat up at 4 o'clock p. m. opened on us. No harm done. I did not reply.

TILGHMAN.

General POLK.

FORT HENRY, *January 21, 1862*—11 p. m.

Captain Milton's cavalry just in. Has been on rear of Smith's column. Smith tacked about at dark last night, and is now within 9 miles of Highland with whole force. He must cross river at that point, and has good road to Donelson and Henry. He will attack one or both.

TILGHMAN.

General POLK.

FORT HENRY, *January 23, 1862*—10.30 p. m.

Scout from rear of enemy's column reports its movements down river to Eggner's Ferry, 5 miles below. Movement commenced at early hour; rear passed scout at 1 p. m. Nothing yet to base confidence on as to intention of enemy. Have started 950 cavalry and some artillery to harass rear. Progressing with outworks on this side. Shall resume work in thirty hours on south side river. Enemy's force 5,500.

TILGHMAN.

General POLK.

FORT HENRY, *January 25, 1862*—3 p. m.

Courier in from Colonel Miller's command. Miller could not come up with the enemy. The Federals made forced marches; their advance was within 12 miles of Paducah this morning at 6 o'clock. Our troops halted 11 miles from enemy's rear, and determined to return to Fort Henry.

TILGHMAN.

General POLK.

**JANUARY 19, 1862.**—Engagement at Logan's Cross-Roads, on Fishing Creek, near Mill Springs, Ky.

#### REPORTS, ETC.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Ohio, with instructions to Brigadier-General Thomas, and congratulatory orders.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. Army, commanding division, with congratulatory orders.

No. 3.—Col. Mahlon D. Manson, Tenth Indiana Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.

No. 4.—Col. Speed S. Fry, Fourth Kentucky Infantry.

- No. 5.—Col. John M. Harlan, Tenth Kentucky Infantry.  
 No. 6.—Lieut. Col. William C. Kise, Tenth Indiana Infantry.  
 No. 7.—Col. Robert L. McCook, Ninth Ohio Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.  
 No. 8.—Col. Horatio P. Van Cleve, Second Minnesota Infantry.  
 No. 9.—Lieut. George H. Harries, Adjutant Ninth Ohio Infantry.  
 No. 10.—Col. Samuel P. Carter, commanding Twelfth Brigade.  
 No. 11.—Col. William A. Hoskins, Twelfth Kentucky Infantry.  
 No. 12.—Col. Frank Wolford, First Kentucky Cavalry.  
 No. 13.—Capt. William E. Standart, Battery B, First Ohio Light Artillery.  
 No. 14.—Capt. Dennis Kenny, jr., Battery C, First Ohio Light Artillery.  
 No. 15.—Congratulatory order from the President.  
 No. 16.—Gen. A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding the Western Department.  
 No. 17.—Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden, C. S. Army, commanding division.  
 No. 18.—Brig. Gen. William H. Carroll, C. S. Army, commanding Second Brigade.  
 No. 19.—Maj. Horace Rice, Twenty-ninth Tennessee Infantry (Confederate).

## No. 1.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Ohio, with instructions to Brigadier-General Thomas. and congratulatory orders.*

LOUISVILLE, *January 20, 1862.*

By telegraphic dispatches from the command of General G. H. Thomas, whom I had ordered to form a junction with General Schoepf at Somerset and attack Zollicoffer, I have information that General Thomas was attacked by Zollicoffer's forces at 6 o'clock yesterday morning, some 8 miles west of Somerset. He repulsed the enemy handsomely and drove him into his intrenchments at Mill Springs, capturing one piece of artillery and four caissons. The enemy left 200 killed and wounded on the field. Among the killed are Zollicoffer and Bailie Peyton. The difficulty of supplying even General Thomas' force in the present condition of the roads, and with our limited amount of transportation, is almost insurmountable. He has been on half rations for some days.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Major-General McCLELLAN.

LOUISVILLE, *January 22, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN,  
*Commanding U. S. Army:*

The following [dated 21st instant] just received from General Thomas:

The rout of the enemy was complete. After succeeding in getting two pieces of artillery across the river and upwards of fifty wagons they were abandoned, with all the ammunition in depot at Mill Springs. They then threw away their arms and dispersed through the mountain by-ways in direction of Monticello, but are so completely demoralized that I don't believe they will make a stand short of Tennessee. I will forward Schoepf's brigade to Monticello at once if you desire it. Monticello is one of the strongest positions on the borders of Tennessee. The property captured on this river is of great value, amounting to eight 6-pounders and two Parrott guns, with caissons filled with ammunition; about 100 four-horse wagons and upwards of 1,200 horses and mules; several boxes of arms, which have never been opened, and from 500 to 1,000 muskets, mostly flint-locks, but in good order; subsistence stores enough to serve the entire command for three days; also a large amount of hospital stores. As soon as I receive report of brigade commanders will furnish a detailed report of the battle. Our loss was 39 killed and 127 wounded. Among the wounded



were Colonel McCook, of the Ninth Ohio, commanding brigade, and his aide, Lieutenant Burt, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry. The loss of the rebels was Zollicoffer and 114 others killed and buried, 116 wounded, and 45 prisoners not wounded, 5 of whom are surgeons, and Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, Twentieth Tennessee Regiment.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., February 9, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit General Thomas' report of the battle of Mill Springs, and to commend the services of his troops to the approbation of the General-in-Chief for their fortitude under discomforts and difficulties and their gallantry in battle. The question of rewards to meritorious persons will naturally present itself in this connection. It is one which will require to be treated with very great caution. It is one which produces jealousies and dissatisfaction in a regular army, and, composed as ours is, may lead to a most injurious condition of things. I would suggest that rewards for services in battle be conferred exclusively by brevets, leaving the full promotion (to the grade of brigadier) to flow exclusively from fitness for the office as shown by service. The advantage of this rule, in fact the necessity for it, is, I think, obvious.

I commend the general in command for the fidelity and ability with which he executed my instructions.

I would call attention to the following brigade and regimental commanders who were actively engaged in the battle:

Col. R. L. McCook, Ninth Ohio, commanded the Third Brigade. He was distinguished for efficiency and gallantry on the field, and, though severely wounded early in the action, continued in his command until the engagement closed.

Col. M. D. Manson, Tenth Indiana, commanded the Second Brigade, and behaved gallantly on the field.

Col. S. S. Fry commanded the Fourth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, was wounded, and was distinguished for gallantry and efficiency on the field.

Colonel Van Cleve commanded the Second Regiment Minnesota Volunteers, and was distinguished for gallantry and efficiency on the field.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kise commanded the Tenth Regiment Indiana Volunteers, and was distinguished for gallantry and efficiency on the field.

Major Kammerling commanded the Ninth Regiment Ohio Volunteers, and was distinguished for gallantry and efficiency on the field.

For the part taken in the action by the different regiments and batteries and the subordinate officers I would refer to the report of General Thomas and the officers in command under him.

No other reports in relation to the battle have been received.

A box of captured flags will be forwarded by express.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 29, 1861.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division:*

GENERAL: I send you a sketch\* of the country about Somerset, which gives more information in regard to roads than your map. We conversed about the advance upon Zollicoffer through Columbia, and if you remember my idea it is hardly necessary to add anything on this subject. It is for you to move upon his left and endeavor to cut him off from his bridge, while Schoepf, with whom, of course, you must communicate, attacks him in front. The map will indicate the proper moves for that object. The result ought to be at least a severe blow to him or a hasty flight across the river. But to effect the former the movement should be made rapidly and secretly and the blow should be vigorous and decided. There should be no delay after you arrive. It would be better not to have been undertaken if it should result in confining an additional force merely to watching the enemy. The details of the operations must be left to your judgment from the information you gather and your observations on the ground. Take such portion of the cavalry from Columbia as you think necessary. Draw all the supplies you can from the country, and move as light as possible.

Having accomplished the object, be ready to move promptly in any direction, but wait until you hear from me, unless circumstances should require you to act without delay, as I may want you to proceed from there to the other matter about which we have conversed.

Report frequently.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
 No. 4b. } *Louisville, Ky., January 23, 1862.*

The general commanding has the gratification of announcing the achievement of an important victory, on the 19th instant, at Mill Springs, by the troops under General Thomas, over the rebel forces, some 12,000 strong, under General George B. Crittenden and General Zollicoffer.

The defeat of the enemy was thorough and complete, and his loss in killed and wounded was great. Night alone, under cover of which his troops crossed the river from their intrenched camp and dispersed, prevented the capture of his entire force. Fourteen or more pieces of artillery, some 1,500 horses and mules, his entire camp equipage, together with wagons, arms, ammunition, and other stores to a large amount, fell into our hands.

The general has been charged by the General-in-Chief to convey his thanks to General Thomas and his troops for their brilliant victory. No task could be more grateful to him, seconded as it is by his own cordial approbation of their conduct.

By command of Brigadier-General Buell:

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

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\* To appear in Atlas.

## No. 2.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas, U. S. Army, commanding division, with congratulatory orders.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Somerset, Ky., January 31, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that in carrying out the instructions of the general commanding the department, contained in his communication of the 29th of December, I reached Logan's Cross-Roads, about 10 miles north of the intrenched camp of the enemy on the Cumberland River, on the 17th instant, with a portion of the Second and Third Brigades, Kenny's battery of artillery, and a battalion of Wolford's cavalry. The Fourth and Tenth Kentucky, Fourteenth Ohio, and the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry being still in rear, detained by the almost impassable condition of the roads, I determined to halt at this point, to await their arrival and to communicate with General Schoepf.

The Tenth Indiana, Wolford's cavalry, and Kenny's battery took position on the road leading to the enemy's camp. The Ninth Ohio and Second Minnesota (part of Colonel McCook's brigade) encamped three-fourths of a mile to the right, on the Roberts post-road. Strong pickets were thrown out in the direction of the enemy beyond where the Somerset and Mill Springs road comes into the main road from my camp to Mill Springs, and a picket of cavalry some distance in advance of the infantry.

General Schoepf visited me on the day of my arrival, and, after consultation, I directed him to send to my camp Standart's battery, the Twelfth Kentucky, and the First and Second Tennessee Regiments, to remain until the arrival of the regiments in rear.

Having received information on the evening of the 17th that a large train of wagons with its escort were encamped on the Roberts post and Danville road, about 6 miles from Colonel Steedman's camp, I sent an order to him to send his wagons forward under a strong guard, and to march with his regiment (the Fourteenth Ohio) and the Tenth Kentucky (Colonel Harlan), with one day's rations in their haversacks, to the point where the enemy were said to be encamped, and either capture or disperse them.

Nothing of importance occurred from the time of our arrival until the morning of the 19th, except a picket skirmish on the night of the 17th. The Fourth Kentucky, the battalion of Michigan Engineers, and Wetmore's battery joined on the 18th.

About 6.30 o'clock on the morning of the 19th the pickets from Wolford's cavalry encountered the enemy advancing on our camp, retired slowly, and reported their advance to Col. M. D. Manson, commanding the Second Brigade. He immediately formed his regiment (the Tenth Indiana) and took a position on the road to await the attack, ordering the Fourth Kentucky (Col. S. S. Fry) to support him, and then informed me in person that the enemy were advancing in force and what disposition he had made to resist them. I directed him to join his brigade immediately and hold the enemy in check until I could order up the other troops, which were ordered to form immediately and were marching to the field in ten minutes afterwards. The battalion of Michigan Engineers and Company A, Thirty-eighth Ohio (Captain Greenwood), were ordered to remain as guard to the camp.

Upon my arrival on the field soon afterwards I found the Tenth Indiana formed in front of their encampment, apparently awaiting orders, and ordered them forward to the support of the Fourth Kentucky, which



was the only entire regiment then engaged. I then rode forward myself to see the enemy's position, so that I could determine what disposition to make of my troops as they arrived. On reaching the position held by the Fourth Kentucky, Tenth Indiana, and Wolford's cavalry, at a point where the roads fork leading to Somerset, I found the enemy advancing through a corn field and evidently endeavoring to gain the left of the Fourth Kentucky Regiment, which was maintaining its position in a most determined manner. I directed one of my aides to ride back and order up a section of artillery and the Tennessee brigade to advance on the enemy's right, and sent orders for Colonel McCook to advance with his two regiments (the Ninth Ohio and Second Minnesota) to the support of the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana.

A section of Captain Kenny's battery took a position on the edge of the field to the left of the Fourth Kentucky and opened an efficient fire on a regiment of Alabamians, which were advancing on the Fourth Kentucky. Soon afterwards the Second Minnesota (Col. H. P. Van Cleve) arrived, the colonel reporting to me for instructions. I directed him to take the position of the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, which regiments were nearly out of ammunition. The Ninth Ohio, under the immediate command of Major Kammerling, came into position on the right of the road at the same time.

Immediately after these regiments had gained their position the enemy opened a most determined and galling fire, which was returned by our troops in the same spirit, and for nearly half an hour the contest was maintained on both sides in the most obstinate manner. At this time the Twelfth Kentucky (Col. W. A. Hoskins) and the Tennessee brigade reached the field to the left of the Minnesota regiment, and opened fire on the right flank of the enemy, who then began to fall back. The Second Minnesota kept up a most galling fire in front, and the Ninth Ohio charged the enemy on the right with bayonets fixed, turned their flank, and drove them from the field, the whole line giving way and retreating in the utmost disorder and confusion.

As soon as the regiments could be formed and refill their cartridge-boxes I ordered the whole force to advance. A few miles in rear of the battle-field a small force of cavalry was drawn up near the road, but a few shots from our artillery (a section of Standart's battery) dispersed them, and none of the enemy were seen again until we arrived in front of their intrenchments. As we approached their intrenchments the division was deployed in line of battle and steadily advanced to the summit of the hill at Moulden's. From this point I directed their intrenchments to be cannonaded, which was done until dark by Standart's and Wetmore's batteries. Kenny's battery was placed in position on the extreme left at Russell's house, from which point he was directed to fire on their ferry, to deter them from attempting to cross. On the following morning Captain Wetmore's battery was ordered to Russell's house, and assisted with his Parrott guns in firing upon the ferry. Colonel Manson's brigade took position on the left near Kenny's battery, and every preparation was made to assault their intrenchments on the following morning. The Fourteenth Ohio (Colonel Steedman) and the Tenth Kentucky (Colonel Harlan) having joined from detached service soon after the repulse of the enemy, continued with their brigade in the pursuit, although they could not get up in time to join in the fight. These two regiments were placed in front in my advance on the intrenchments the next morning and entered first. General Schoepf also joined me the evening of the 19th with the Seventeenth, Thirty-

first, and Thirty-eighth Ohio. His entire brigade entered with the other troops.

On reaching the intrenchments we found the enemy had abandoned everything and retired during the night. Twelve pieces of artillery, with their caissons packed with ammunition; one battery wagon and two forges; a large amount of ammunition; a large number of small-arms, mostly the old flint-lock muskets; 150 or 160 wagons, and upwards of 1,000 horses and mules; a large amount of commissary stores, intrenching tools, and camp and garrison equipage, fell into our hands. A correct list of all the captured property will be forwarded as soon as it can be made up and the property secured.

The steam and ferry boats having been burned by the enemy in their retreat, it was found impossible to cross the river and pursue them; besides, their command was completely demoralized, and retreated with great haste and in all directions, making their capture in any numbers quite doubtful if pursued. There is no doubt but what the moral effect produced by their complete dispersion will have a more decided effect in re-establishing Union sentiments than though they had been captured.

It affords me much pleasure to be able to testify to the uniform steadiness and good conduct of both officers and men during the battle, and I respectfully refer to the accompanying reports of the different commanders for the names of those officers and men whose good conduct was particularly noticed by them.

I regret to have to report that Col. R. L. McCook, commanding the Third Brigade, and his aide, Lieut. A. S. Burt, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, were both severely wounded in the first advance of the Ninth Ohio Regiment, but continued on duty until the return of the brigade to camp at Logan's Cross-Roads.

Col. S. S. Fry, Fourth Kentucky, was slightly wounded whilst his regiment was gallantly resisting the advance of the enemy, during which time General Zollicoffer fell from a shot from his (Colonel Fry's) pistol, which no doubt contributed materially to the discomfiture of the enemy.

Capt. G. E. Flynt, assistant adjutant-general; Capt. Alvan C. Gillem, division quartermaster; Lieut. Joseph C. Breckinridge, aide-de-camp; Lieut. S. E. Jones, acting assistant quartermaster; Mr. J. W. Scully, quartermaster's clerk; Privates Samuel Letcher, Twenty-first Regiment Kentucky Volunteers; Stitch, Fourth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, rendered me valuable assistance in carrying orders and conducting the troops to their different positions.

Capt. George S. Roper deserves great credit for his perseverance and energy in forwarding commissary stores as far as the hill where our forces bivouacked.

In addition to the duties of guarding the camp, Lieut. Col. K. A. Hinton, commanding the Michigan Engineers, and Captain Greenwood, Company A, Thirty-eighth Regiment Ohio Volunteers, with their commands, performed very efficient service in collecting and burying the dead on both sides and in moving the wounded to the hospitals near the battle-field.

A number of flags were taken on the field of battle and in the intrenchments. They will be forwarded to headquarters as soon as collected together.

The enemy's loss, as far as known, is as follows: Brigadier-General Zollicoffer, Lieutenant Bailie Peyton, and 190 officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, killed; Lieut. Col. M. B. Carter, Twentieth Tennessee; Lieut. J. W. Allen, Fifteenth Mississippi; Lieut. Allen Morse,



Sixteenth Alabama, and 5 officers of the medical staff and 81 non-commissioned officers and privates, taken prisoners; Lieut. J. E. Patterson, Twentieth Tennessee, and A. J. Knapp, Fifteenth Mississippi, and 66 non-commissioned officers and privates, wounded; making 192 killed, 89 prisoners not wounded and 68 wounded; a total of killed, wounded, and prisoners of 349.

Our loss was as follows:

Troops.	Killed.		Wounded.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
10th Indiana .....		10	3	72
1st Kentucky (Cavalry) .....	1	2		19
4th Kentucky .....		8	4	48
2d Minnesota .....		12	2	31
9th Ohio .....		6	4	24
Total .....	1	38	13	194

A complete list of the names of our killed and wounded and of the prisoners is herewith attached.\*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,

*A. A. G., Chief of Staff, Hdqrs. Dept. Ohio, Louisville, Ky.*

[Inclosure.]

CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS BEECH GROVE, KY.,

*January 18, 1862.*

The following will be the order of march:

General Zollicoffer: Fifteenth Mississippi in advance, Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall; battery of four guns, Captain Rutledge; Nineteenth Tennessee, Colonel Cummings; Twentieth Tennessee, Colonel Battle; Twenty-fifth Tennessee, Colonel Stanton.

General Carroll: Seventeenth Tennessee, Colonel Newman; Twenty-eighth Tennessee, Colonel Murray; Twenty-ninth Tennessee, Colonel Powell; two guns in rear of infantry, Captain McClung.

Sixteenth Alabama, Colonel Wood, in reserve, cavalry battalions in rear, Colonel Branner on the right, Colonel McClellan on the left; independent companies in front of the advance regiment; ambulances and ammunition wagons in rear of the whole and in the order of their regiments.

By order of General Crittenden:

A. S. CUNNINGHAM,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,

*Somerset, Ky., February 3, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward to you by Captain Davidson, Tenth Kentucky Volunteers, six rebel flags: one captured on the battle-

\*Omitted.



field by the Second Minnesota Regiment, the others taken in the intrenchments by officers and men of the different regiments. Colonel Kise reports that his regiment captured three stands of colors, but none have been sent to these headquarters. I have ordered him to turn them in, and will forward them as soon as received. In the box with the colors is the regimental order-book of the Fifteenth Mississippi Rifles and a book of copies of all General Zollicoffer's orders from the organization of his brigade until a few days before the battle.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. —.

CAMP OPPOSITE MILL SPRINGS,  
*January 20, 1862.*

1. The general commanding congratulates the troops on the splendid victory achieved over the enemy yesterday. We have met more than double our numbers, fresh from their intrenchments, repulsed them completely, and after a pursuit of 10 miles forced them to abandon their intrenchments with precipitation, leaving all their supplies, camp equipage, and private baggage. It is believed that the route was so complete that the whole force dispersed. When officers and men have behaved with such steadiness and bravery, the general cannot with impartiality particularize the acts of any individuals; all were equally conspicuous.

2. Col. M. D. Manson, commanding the Second Brigade, will take command, and see that all the public property is properly invoiced and forwarded to Somerset without delay. He will also throw a strong force across the river and secure the public property abandoned by the enemy on the other side, after which he will select the most eligible position for his camp and remain until further orders.

3. Col. R. L. McCook, commanding the Third Brigade, will proceed with his command to Somerset, where he will go into camp until further orders.

4. Commanders of brigades, regiments, and detached corps will report the number of killed, wounded, and missing without delay.

By order of Brig. Gen. G. H. Thomas:

GEO. E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

### No. 3.

*Report of Col. Mahlon D. Manson, Tenth Indiana Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.*

HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., FIRST DIV., DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
*Camp near Mill Springs, January 27, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit to you the following report of the part taken by the Second Brigade in the engagement with the enemy at Logan's field, on the 19th instant:

On the morning of the 17th instant I took the advance of all the other troops on the march from Columbia towards the enemy's works with the Tenth Indiana Regiment, and arrived at Logan's farm, distant

about 10 miles from the rebel camp, on Cumberland River, at 1 o'clock on that day. I immediately placed a strong picket, consisting of two companies belonging to the Tenth Indiana Regiment and a section of artillery of Captain Kenny's battery, under Lieutenant Gary, 2 miles out on the road leading to the enemy's fortifications. About 2 o'clock on the morning of the 18th a few of the enemy's cavalry approached and fired upon our pickets, which was returned by them, and the enemy fell back.

On the evening of the 18th instant I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Kise to send out two companies as pickets on the road to the camp of the enemy, which he accordingly did. About daylight on the morning of the 19th instant the advance guard of the enemy came in sight of our extreme pickets and opened a fire upon them. The fire was returned by the pickets, who immediately afterwards fell back to their companies. The picket companies having rallied, held the enemy in check until a courier arrived at my quarters with information that the enemy were advancing with a very large force. I caused the long roll to be beaten. The Tenth Indiana Regiment was quickly formed, and I ordered them to the support of the picket companies. I also ordered Captain Kenny's and Captain Standart's batteries to be got in position to meet the advancing enemy. On the arrival of the Tenth Indiana Regiment to the support of the pickets they immediately engaged three regiments of the enemy, numbering about 2,500 men, and held their whole force in check for over one hour.

As soon as I got the Tenth Indiana Regiment in position I proceeded to the camp of the Fourth Kentucky Regiment, which was about three-quarters of a mile from my camp. I woke up Colonel Fry, and ordered him to form his regiment and proceed toward the enemy. I then went to your quarters, and informed you that the enemy was advancing upon us in force. I immediately returned to the field, and found Colonel Fry, with about 300 men, in the road leading to my camp. I directed him to push forward with his regiment without any further delay and take position in the woods on the left of the Tenth Indiana, which he did, arriving there about one hour after the commencement of the battle, where his regiment did excellent service. I now gave orders to Captain Standart, of the artillery, to throw some shells over the heads of our men to the place where I knew the enemy to be, which he did with admirable effect.

I now discovered that the enemy was bringing other forces into action, extending their lines, and attempting to outflank us upon the right. Seeing that no time was to be lost, I straightway ordered Colonel Byrd's Tennessee Regiment to take position on the right of the Tenth Indiana Regiment, which order was about being executed, and the regiment was moving in the direction indicated, when they received an order from General Carter, commanding them to go and take position on the Somerset road, to meet any portion of the enemy that might attempt to flank us in that direction. When I saw the Tennessee regiment leaving the field I immediately informed you of the fact, when you directed me to order up Colonel McCook's Ninth Ohio and Second Minnesota Regiments to take position on the right, which order I communicated to Colonel McCook, who moved forward with the two regiments of his brigade. You also ordered me to have a section of the battery taken upon the hill if possible, and in compliance with which order Captain Standart, with two sections of artillery, moved forward, and with great difficulty succeeded in getting upon the hill, when a heavy fire from his guns was opened on the enemy.

In the mean time the Ninth Ohio, Second Minnesota, Tenth Indiana, and Fourth Kentucky Regiments had kept up an unceasing fire upon the ranks of the enemy, who now began slowly to fall back before our advancing forces. A portion of the enemy halted at a fence, with the evident intention of making a stand, when Colonel McCook commanded a "charge bayonet," which command was instantly repeated by Lieutenant-Colonel Kise, of the Tenth Indiana, and was splendidly executed by both regiments. The enemy now gave way and fled in every direction in the utmost confusion, being hotly pursued by all your forces in the field.

In accordance with your order I started off to the left of the road through the fields and woods, with the Tenth Indiana and Fourth Kentucky Regiments, in pursuit of the retreating enemy. I proceeded in this way until I struck the lower Fishing Creek road, about one mile from the main road leading to the enemy's fortifications. I turned and proceeded down the road until I formed a junction with your column, and remained with you until we came in sight of the enemy's breast-works, where I halted my brigade until you had arranged your batteries upon the hills commanding the rebel camp. After the artillery had shelled the enemy's works for some time I received your order to move with my brigade to Russell's house, on the north bank of the Cumberland River, and prevent a flank movement of the enemy, and gain an eminence which commanded the ferry at a point where the river divides the enemy's camp. I immediately occupied the place specified in your order with the Tenth Indiana, Fourth Kentucky, Fourteenth Ohio, and Tenth Kentucky Regiments. Captain Kenny's battery of artillery shortly afterwards came by your order and took position on the hill at Russell's house with my brigade. Colonels Steedman and Harlan, of the Fourteenth Ohio and Tenth Kentucky Regiments, had, after a forced march of 18 miles in six hours, overtaken us at the point where your column halted for the purpose of shelling the enemy. I very sincerely regret that you were deprived of the services of these two gallant regiments in the battle. Their reports,\* which I herewith transmit to you, will fully explain why they were not with me on the morning of the engagement.

At 10 o'clock on the night of the 19th I ordered the gallant Colonel Harlan, with his regiment, to advance and take possession of a hill half a mile from Russell's house, which overlooked the camp of the enemy, and to hold it at all hazards, and directed him at daybreak on the following morning to take possession of the enemy's works if it were ascertained that they had evacuated them. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 20th you directed me to send another regiment to the support of Colonel Harlan on the hill. I sent forward Colonel Steedman, of the Fourteenth Ohio Regiment. At daylight Colonels Harlan and Steedman, with their regiments, took possession of the enemy's fortifications, the rebels having deserted them during the night. In a very short time afterwards the Tenth Indiana and Fourth Kentucky Regiments moved up into the deserted intrenchments. My brigade, after reaching the enemy's camp, took possession of twelve pieces of artillery, a large quantity of arms of every description, ammunition, commissary and quartermaster's stores, horses, wagons, &c., all of which the enemy had abandoned in their flight. The panic among them was so great that they even left a number of their sick and wounded in a dying state upon the river bank.

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\* Steedman's not found.



The loss of my brigade in killed and wounded is as follows: Tenth Indiana Regiment, 11 killed and 75 wounded; Fourth Kentucky Regiment, 8 killed and 52 wounded; total, 19 killed and 127 wounded.

The enemy's loss in killed and wounded cannot be short of 800, and some intelligent prisoners estimate it as high as 1,500 in killed and wounded and drowned in crossing the river.

The officers and men under my command behaved themselves with coolness and courage during the entire engagement. Their gallantry and bravery never were excelled upon any battle-field, and seldom equaled. In justice to the enemy I must say they exhibited a courage and determination worthy of a better cause. General Zollicoffer, who commanded a part of their forces, fell while leading on his men, his body pierced by three bullets.

I cannot close my report without mentioning the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Kise and Maj. A. O. Miller, of the Tenth Indiana Regiment, who gallantly and bravely led forward their men and withstood the whole force of the enemy solitary and alone for one hour. Oliver S. Rankin, quartermaster of the Tenth Indiana Regiment, with his characteristic bravery and energy, organized his train for the purpose of advancing or retiring as the circumstances might require, and promptly supplied the men of the Tenth Indiana Regiment with cartridges, from 60 to 75 rounds of which were fired by them during the action.

Capt. A. C. Gillem, division quartermaster, who promptly organized an ammunition train and moved it on to the field, and by his untiring exertions contributed greatly to our success, is deserving of the highest praise.

Capt. George W. Roper, division commissary, merits great praise for his services on the field of battle and for so promptly organizing his provision train, which supplied the men with rations when they were almost exhausted.

Capt. R. C. Kise, my assistant adjutant-general, who was of invaluable service to me in assisting and arranging the troops on the field and communicating my orders, is entitled to the highest praise and honors.

Capt. D. N. Steele, brigade quartermaster, and Capt. D. N. Nye, brigade commissary, for the faithful performance of their duties, are entitled to credit.

The gallant Col. R. L. McCook, commanding the Third Brigade, I shall ever remember with feelings of gratitude and admiration for the prompt manner in which he sustained me in the hour of trial.

To Major Hunt, of the Fourth Kentucky Regiment, who exerted himself in cheering on his men and giving them every encouragement and assistance, great honor and praise should be accorded.

In justice to my own feelings I cannot close this report without congratulating the commanding general of this division on the splendid victory achieved over the rebel forces by the troops under his command at Logan's field. The number of the enemy's forces engaged in battle must have been over 8,000 men, while the Federal force actually engaged did not exceed at any time over 2,500.

All the papers and plans of the late General Zollicoffer have fallen into my hands, which I have preserved for the future use of the Government.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

MAHLON D. MANSON,

*Colonel, Comdg. Second Brigade, First Division, Dept. Ohio.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Department of the Ohio.*

## No. 4.

*Report of Col. Speed S. Fry, Fourth Kentucky Infantry.*

ZOLLI-COFFER'S CAMP, WAYNE COUNTY, KY.,  
*January 25, 1862.*

SIR: In compliance with your orders I herewith transmit my report of the part my regiment took in the engagement with the enemy on the 19th instant.

At about 6.30 o'clock in the morning I was notified by you in person that the enemy was rapidly advancing upon us, and ordered to call out my regiment, which was done as promptly as possible. I was directed by you to proceed at once towards the scene of action, the fight having commenced, and to "go and take a position in the woods." I had no information as to the strength or position of the enemy, and had to be governed entirely by my own judgment as to what was best to be done.

Upon arriving at a point where I could see their position I immediately determined to take mine on an elevated point in the field on the left of the road, filed my regiment to the left through the fence, and formed my line of battle parallel with and near to it, under a heavy and galling fire from the enemy, who were concealed in a deep ravine at the foot of the hill and posted on the opposite hill, distant about 250 yards. Their line extended around the ridge at the head of the ravine and onto the hill occupied by me, and within 50 yards of my right, covered throughout its entire extent by the fence separating the field and woodland and by the timber and thick undergrowth adjacent thereto. The engagement at once became very warm. Finding that I was greatly outnumbered, and the enemy being under cover, I ordered my men to the opposite side of the fence in our rear, the enemy continuing to fire upon us all the while. After gaining this position the enemy was kept at bay until the arrival of re-enforcements, having made during the time two unsuccessful attempts to charge upon us with bayonets fixed and their large cane-knives unsheathed.

Some time after we crossed the fence I was notified by Lieutenant-Colonel Croxton that an attempt was being made to flank us on our right through the woods, with a view, no doubt, of coming up in our rear. As I did not see you upon the field, I assumed the responsibility of requesting through him that another regiment should be ordered up to engage the enemy on the right, while mine might attend more closely to the force in front. After waiting some time the arrival of the regiment, which Lieutenant-Colonel Croxton reported as approaching, and when it was certainly ascertained that the enemy was endeavoring to flank us on the right, I ordered him to bring up two companies from the left of the regiment, to prevent, if possible, the apprehended danger. It was promptly done, and the movement of the enemy checked.

As the right and center were under a much heavier fire and more directly engaged, I considered the transfer of those two companies more judicious than a change of position of the whole regiment, which could not have been executed without interrupting the continuity of my line of fire, which, as the enemy were near and pressing upon us, I held important to preserve unbroken. My command, thus disposed, held the enemy at bay until General Thomas arrived and, seeing the posture of affairs, immediately ordered up the Second Minnesota and Ninth Ohio Regiments. Very soon the enemy gave way, flying before our forces like chaff before the wind. My men replenished their cartridge-boxes, gathered up our



wounded, and joined in the pursuit, which terminated in our unobstructed entrance to this stronghold of the enemy.

I take great pleasure in stating that the conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Croxton, Major Hunt, Adjutant Goodloe, Quartermaster Hope, and all my company officers, without a single exception, was deserving of the highest praise and commendation, and to their coolness and bravery I attribute much of the determination of the men.

Towards the close of the fight I discovered we were getting short of ammunition, and the company officers as well as the field officers fearing that neither ammunition nor re-enforcements would reach us in time, the command was distinctly given by the company officers to their men to "fix bayonets," evidently showing a coolness and determination not to be expected from volunteers, and especially those who had never met an enemy in battle.

Capt. Wellington Harlan, who had been for some time under arrest, was conspicuous with his rifle throughout the battle, and for his gallant conduct on the field was there presented with his sword by Lieutenant-Colonel Croxton (who had caused him to be arrested) and ordered to take command of his company. I cannot but speak, without doing violence to my own feelings, in the highest terms of praise of the conduct both of my officers and men. They all acted nobly their part during the whole of the engagement. I led only 400 men and one-half of my company officers into the fight, nearly all the rest being absent sick.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

SPEED S. FRY,

*Colonel, Comdg. Fourth Kentucky Regiment of Infantry.*

Col. M. D. MANSON,

*Comdg. Second Brigade, First Division, Dept. of the Ohio.*

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No. 5.

*Report of Col. John M. Harlan, Tenth Kentucky Infantry.*

HDQRS. TENTH REGIMENT KENTUCKY VOLUNTEERS,

*Near Mill Springs, Wayne County, Ky., Jan. 27, 1862.*

SIR: I submit the following report of the action of my regiment in connection with the capture of the fortifications erected by the rebel Army at and near Mill Springs:

At this point, however, I deem it proper to state that on the night of the 17th instant an order came from the division commander, addressed to Colonel Steedman, of the Fourteenth Ohio, and myself (then encamped about 8 miles from Logan's, where the battle of the 19th occurred), directing us to march at once to the farm of one Tarter, on the Jamestown road, and about 6 miles off the main road from Columbia to Somerset, and engage two rebel regiments, supposed to be there encamped. This duty was performed, but the enemy was not to be found at the place designated. After remaining at Tarter's until noon of the 18th instant, we returned to our camp in the afternoon of Saturday, too late to make any further forward movement on that day. You will thus perceive that it was physically impossible for my regiment, consistent with other duties imposed upon us, to be present at Logan's on the morning of the 19th, when the enemy, under Crittenden and Zollicoffer, made an attack upon the United States troops.



It is deeply regretted by all the officers and soldiers under my command that it was not their privilege to participate in the brilliant achievement of the 19th instant. We could wish no higher honor for this regiment than to have contributed something to win that most important victory. All honor to the brave men of Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, and Ohio, who on that memorable occasion drove back in dismay three times their number of the vandal horde of secession and treason.

Information came to me Sunday morning of the battle at Logan's. Although the men of my regiment were entirely destitute of provisions, and on that morning had not received half enough for breakfast, my summons to them to fall into line and march to the aid of our brethren was obeyed with commendable alacrity. Starting for the scene of danger, we marched as rapidly as it was possible for men to do. Upon reaching Logan's I found that the enemy had fled and that our troops had followed in pursuit. Without halting at Logan's we came up with this and the other brigade under General Thomas a short while before dark on Sunday. After our arrival, in obedience to orders received from you and approved by the division commander, I took possession of the woods immediately in front of the rebel fortifications, with directions to hold it against any attack of the enemy. There my men lay on the ground during the whole of Sunday night without fire, tents, overcoats, or blankets, and with nothing to eat except about one-fourth of a cracker to each man. A picket guard was stationed in advance, under charge of Capt. G. W. Riley, of Company D.

At daylight Monday morning I formed my regiment into line, and with the approval of both yourself and the division commander started towards the rebel fortifications, sending forward in advance of the main body of the regiment a squad of men under Captain Hill, Company F, who first entered the rebel works. I also sent forward in advance Company A, Captain Davidson, as skirmishers. When we reached the enemy's works it was ascertained that they had, under cover of the previous night, crossed the Cumberland, and abandoned, as it is believed, all of their wagons, mules, horses, ammunition, and artillery. The rear of the fugitive army could not have crossed long before daylight, since when my advance, Company A, reached the crossing at the river some of the rebels were observed on the opposite side on a high hill, from which they fired upon our troops. The fire was returned, and it is believed that a member of Company A killed one of the rebels across the river. Further pursuit was impossible, since the rebels in their retreat had utterly destroyed or removed all means of crossing the river.

Various documents and papers were found by officers and soldiers within the rebel fortifications. Some of them may be of importance to the Government or throw some light upon the plans of the rebels, and they are therefore transmitted with this report.\* Among other documents, I transmit a letter written from this place on the 19th instant by the son of Brigadier-General Carroll, of the rebel Army, in which he states that the entire force which the enemy there had on both sides of the Cumberland River was 13,000. Also a general order, issued on January 3, showing that Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden assumed command here on that day. Also a general order from General Zollicoffer, of January 12, which shows the amount of the rebel force then on this side of the Cumberland under his immediate command. Also the general-order book of Zollicoffer's brigade. The remaining books and papers will not be here described.

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\* Not found.

In conclusion, allow me to say that I do not claim that any special honor is due to my regiment because in advance of all other troops a portion of it first entered the rebel fortifications, or because my advance company first reached the river in their pursuit and there found the artillery and other property of the enemy. Simple justice demands the admission that the capture of the enemy's works and the property abandoned by them was the result of the battle at Logan's on the 19th instant. But I do claim for the officers and soldiers of this regiment that, under circumstances the most discouraging, they made a march (18 miles in about six hours) which indicated their willingness, even eagerness, to endure any fatigue or make any sacrifice in order to meet on the field of battle those wicked and unnatural men who are seeking without cause to destroy the Union of our fathers.

Respectfully,

JNO. M. HARLAN,  
*Colonel, Commanding.*

Col. M. D. MANSON,  
*Comdg. Second Brigade, First Division, Dept. of the Ohio.*

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No. 6.

*Report of Lieut. Col. William C. Kise, Tenth Indiana Infantry.*

CAMP OPPOSITE MILL SPRINGS, WAYNE COUNTY, KY.,  
*January 23, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to report to you the part taken by the Tenth Regiment of Indiana Volunteers, under my command, in the battle fought on the 19th instant, at Logan's farm, Pulaski County, Kentucky:

On the evening of the 18th instant, in accordance with your order, I sent out as pickets Companies K and I, Captains Shortle and Perkins, and had them posted on the road leading to the fortifications of the enemy on Cumberland River, distant about 12 miles. Maj. A. O. Miller, who posted the pickets, stationed Company I 1 mile from our camp, and Company K 300 yards beyond. The latter company received instructions to fall back to Captain Perkins if attacked.

At about 6.30 o'clock on the morning of the 19th instant a courier came to our quarters, with information that the enemy was advancing upon our camp, and almost immediately afterwards the firing of our pickets was heard. The long roll quickly brought the Tenth Regiment into ranks, and I gave orders to Major Miller to go forward with Company A, Captain Hamilton, to the support of the picket companies, which order was promptly executed. I soon proceeded by your order with the remaining seven companies of my regiment down the road in the direction of the picket firing. When I got within 75 yards of the three companies, then hotly engaged, I formed the regiment in line of battle and rapidly disposed it for fighting. Five companies extended through the woods on the right of the road and the remaining companies on the left. A regiment of rebels were advancing in line of battle and their treasonable colors were seen flaunting in the breeze. Having selected as good a position as practicable, I took a stand and ordered the regiment to fire, which order was instantly obeyed.

The firing continued without cessation for one hour, during which time we engaged three of the enemy's regiments and held them at bay. The battle was at its hottest, and our ranks were gradually becoming thinned and mutilated, when I perceived a regiment of rebel cavalry

attempting to flank me on the right and an infantry regiment on the left. I commanded Captain Gregory's company to take position to meet the cavalry on the right, which it did, and opened a galling fire upon them, but they were fast closing in upon us, and I saw myself completely outflanked on the right, and that re-enforcements must soon come to my relief or I would be compelled to fall back. I was eventually forced to order my right wing to retire, when, just as my order was being executed, the Fourth Kentucky Regiment, commanded by Colonel Fry, came up and took position on the left of my left wing and opened a deadly fire on the ranks of the enemy. I now rallied the right wing, the men, with the exception of those who had been detailed to carry off the dead and wounded, quickly taking their places in the line. Just at this moment a heavy force appeared to be advancing on the extreme left of the Fourth Kentucky Regiment, and a portion of Colonel McCook's brigade, which had arrived, engaging the enemy on my right, I was ordered by General Thomas to the extreme left of the Fourth Kentucky Regiment. I moved the regiment through the brush and over logs to the place designated, and, coming to a fence parallel with my line, we hotly engaged the enemy, and after a hard struggle of half an hour's duration drove him before us and put him to flight with great loss.

A part of my left wing still engaged on the right of the Fourth Kentucky against great odds being strongly opposed, I was again ordered by General Thomas to their support. I forthwith obeyed this command, and in doing so brought my right wing upon the identical ground it had been forced to abandon during the earlier part of the engagement. I then moved forward the whole right wing and two companies of the left, and soon got into a fierce contest with the enemy in front. The whole regiment, from right to left, was now warmly engaged, and slowly but surely driving the enemy before them, when I ordered a "charge bayonet," which was promptly executed along the whole line. We soon drove the enemy from his place of concealment in the woods into an open field 200 yards from where I ordered the charge. When we arrived at the fence in our front many of the enemy were found lingering in the corners, and were bayoneted by my men between the rails. I pressed onward, and soon beheld with satisfaction that the enemy were moving in retreat across the field, but I suddenly saw them halt in the southeast corner of the field on a piece of high ground, where they received considerable re-enforcements and made a last and desperate effort to repulse our troops. In the mean time the gallant Colonel McCook, with his invincible Ninth Ohio Regiment, came in to our support, and for twenty or thirty minutes a terrific struggle ensued between the two opposing forces. I never in all my military career saw a harder fight. Finally the enemy began to waver and give back before the shower of lead and glittering steel brought to bear on his shattered ranks, and he commenced a precipitate retreat under a storm of bullets from our advancing forces until his retreat became a perfect rout.

I ordered enough men left to attend to our dead and wounded, and receiving a new supply of cartridges (the most of our boxes being entirely empty), the men refilled their boxes, and, according to your order, I put the regiment in motion after the retreating enemy. Pursuing them the same evening a distance of 10 miles, we arrived near the enemy's fortifications at this place. The way by which the enemy had retreated gave evidence that they had been in haste to reach their den. Wagons, cannon, muskets, swords, blankets, &c., were strewn all along the road from the battle-field to within a mile of this place, where I halted the



regiment and the men slept on their arms in the open field. The men at this time were powder-besmeared, tired, and hungry, having had nothing to eat since the previous night. On the following morning—the 20th instant—after our artillery had shelled the enemy's works, by your order I moved my regiment to his breastworks and into his deserted intrenchments, where I have since remained.

It may be interesting to state here that our regimental colors, which were those presented by the ladies of La Fayette and borne in triumph at the battle of Rich Mountain, were completely torn into shreds by the bullets of the enemy. I have had its scattered fragments gathered and intend preserving them. Three stands of rebel colors were captured by my regiment.

I cannot speak in terms of sufficient praise of the noble and gallant conduct of some of the officers of my regiment. They did their duty and fought like tried veterans. Maj. A. O. Miller was wherever duty called him, and in the thickest of the fight, cheering on the men. Actg. Adj. W. E. Ludlow did his whole duty and rendered me valuable assistance during the day. Asst. Surg. C. S. Perkins and the Rev. Dr. Dougherty, chaplain of the Tenth Regiment, rendered valuable service in their unremitting attention to the wounded. Quartermaster Oliver S. Rankin and Nelson B. Smith, of the same department, are entitled to great credit for the prompt manner in which they brought up and supplied the men with cartridges. Commissary Sergt. David B. Hart, our Rich Mountain guide in the three months' service, was present and in the line of his duty. Fife and Drum Majors Daniel and James Conklin shouldered muskets and fought valliantly during the early part of the engagement, after which they were of great service in carrying off and attending to the wounded. Captains Hamilton, Boyl, J. F. Taylor, Carroll, and Gregory, and Captains M. B. Taylor, Perkins, and Shortle, the three young tigers, were through the entire battle where none but the brave and gallant go, and continually pressed forward with their men where the battle raged the hottest and the rebels were found most plenty. Captain Vanarsdall, of Company B, was present, and discharged his duty faithfully until after the right wing was drawn off. First Lieutenants Cobb, Goben, McAdams, Van Natta, Johnssen, McCoy, Bush, Boswell, Shumate, and Hunt deserve the highest praise for their brave and gallant conduct. Lieutenant McAdams fell while he was nobly leading on his men. Lieutenant Bush commanded Company G, and quite distinguished himself. Second Lieutenants Rodman, Colwell, Merritt, Lutz, Miller, Stall, Simpson, Scott, and Wilds fully merit all that can be said in their praise, as do all the non-commissioned officers and privates that were present during the engagement. Many individual acts of bravery might be mentioned, such as those of Orderly Sergeant Miller, of Company B, and my orderly, Abraham A. Carter, who took a gun and fought manfully during the intervals that his services were not required by me in dispatching orders. But nothing I can say will add to the well-merited laurels already on the brows of both officers and men of the Tenth Regiment of Indiana Volunteers.

My regiment lost in killed 11 men, in wounded 75, a complete list of whose names I herewith submit.\*

Respectfully submitted.

W. C. KISE,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Tenth Indiana Regiment.*

Col. M. D. MANSON,

*Comdg. Second Brigade, First Divison, Dept. of the Ohio.*

## No. 7.

*Report of Col. Robert L. McCook, Ninth Ohio Infantry, commanding  
Third Brigade.*

HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., FIRST DIV., DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
*Somerset, January 27, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor respectfully to submit the following report of the part which my brigade took in the battle of the Cumberland, on the 19th instant:

Shortly before 7 a. m. Colonel Manson informed me that the enemy had driven in his pickets and were approaching in force. That portion of my brigade with me, the Ninth Ohio and the Second Minnesota Regiments, were formed and marched to a point near the junction of the Mill Springs and Columbia roads and immediately in rear of Wetmore's battery, the Ninth Ohio on the right and the Second Minnesota on the left of the Mill Springs road. From this point I ordered a company of the Ninth Ohio to skirmish the woods on the right, to prevent any flank movement of the enemy. Shortly after this Colonel Manson, commanding the Second Brigade, in person informed me that the enemy were in force and in position on the top of the next hill beyond the woods and that they forced him to retire. I ordered my brigade forward through the woods in line of battle, skirting the Mill Springs road. The march of the Second Minnesota Regiment was soon obstructed by the Tenth Indiana, which was scattered through the woods waiting for ammunition. In front of them I saw the Fourth Kentucky engaging the enemy, but evidently retiring. At this moment the enemy with shouts advanced on them about 100 yards, and took position within the field on the hill-top near the second fence from the woods.

At this time I received your order to advance as rapidly as possible to the hill-top. I ordered the Second Minnesota regiment to move by the flank until it had passed the Tenth Indiana and Fourth Kentucky, and then deploy to the left of the road. I ordered the Ninth Ohio Regiment to move through the first corn field on the right of the road and take position at the farther fence, selecting the best cover possible. The position of the Minnesota regiment covered the ground formerly occupied by the Fourth Kentucky and Tenth Indiana, which brought their right flank within about 10 feet of the enemy where he had advanced upon the Fourth Kentucky. The Ninth Ohio's position checked an attempt on the part of the enemy to flank the position taken by the Second Minnesota, and consequently brought the left wing almost against the enemy where he was stationed behind straw stacks and piles of fence rails. Another regiment was stationed immediately in front of the Ninth Ohio, well covered by a fence and some woods, a small field not more than 60 yards wide intervening between the positions. The enemy also had possession of a small log house, stable, and corn-crib, about 50 yards in front of the Ninth Ohio.

Along the lines of each of the regiments and from the enemy's front a hot and deadly fire was opened. On the right wing of the Minnesota regiment the contest at first was almost hand to hand; the enemy and the Second Minnesota were poking their guns through the same fence. However, before the fight continued long in this way that portion of the enemy contending with the Second Minnesota Regiment retired in good order to some rail piles, hastily thrown together, the point from which they had advanced upon the Fourth Kentucky. This portion of the enemy obstinately maintaining its position, and the balance remain-



ing as before described, a desperate fire was continued for about thirty minutes, with seemingly doubtful result. The importance of possessing the log house, stable, and corn-crib became apparent, and Companies A, B, C, and D, of the Ninth Ohio, were ordered to flank the enemy upon the extreme left and obtain possession of the house. This done, still the enemy stood firm to his position and cover.

During this time the artillery of the enemy constantly overshot my brigade. Seeing the superior number of the enemy and their bravery, I concluded the best mode of settling the contest was to order the Ninth Ohio Regiment to charge the enemy's position with the bayonet and turn his left flank. The order was given the regiment to empty their guns and fix bayonets; this done, it was ordered to charge. Every man sprang to it with alacrity and vociferous cheering, the enemy seemingly prepared to resist it, but before the regiment reached him the lines commenced to give way. But few of them stood, possibly 10 or 12.

This broke the enemy's flank, and the whole line gave way in great confusion, and the whole turned into a perfect rout. As soon as I could form the regiments of my brigade I pursued the enemy to the hospital, where you joined the advance. I then moved my command forward under orders in line of battle to the foot of Moulden's Hill, passing on the way one abandoned cannon.

The next morning we marched into the deserted works of the enemy, and on the following day returned to our camp. At the time of the first advance of the Ninth Ohio I was shot through the right leg below the knee. Three other balls passed through my horse, and another through my overcoat. After this I was compelled to go on foot until I got to the hospital of the enemy. About the same time I was shot in the leg my aide-de-camp, Andrew S. Burt, was shot in the side.

Too much praise cannot be awarded to the company officers, non-commissioned officers, and the soldiers of the two regiments. Notwithstanding they had been called out before breakfast and had not tasted food all day, they conducted themselves throughout like veterans, obeying each command and executing every movement as though they were upon parade. Although all the officers of the command evinced the greatest courage and deported themselves under fire in a proper soldierly manner, were I to fail to specify some of them it would be great injustice. Lieut. Andrew S. Burt (aide-de-camp), of the Eighteenth U. S. Infantry; Hunter Brooke, private in the Second Minnesota Regiment and volunteer aide-de-camp; Maj. Gustave Kammerling, commanding the Ninth Ohio; Capt. Charles Joseph, Company A; Capt. Frederick Schroeder, Company D; George H. Harries, adjutant of the Ninth Ohio Regiment; Col. H. P. Van Cleve, James George, lieutenant-colonel, and Alex. Wilkin, major of the Second Minnesota Regiment, each displayed great valor and judgment in the discharge of their respective duties, so much so, in my judgment, as to place this country and every honest friend thereof under obligations to them.

In conclusion, permit me, sir, to congratulate you on the victory achieved, and allow me to express the hope that your future efforts will be crowned with the same success.

Attached you will find the number of the force of my brigade engaged and also a list of the killed and wounded.\*

I am, respectfully, yours,

ROBERT L. MCCOOK,

*Col. 9th Ohio Regt., Comdg. 3d Brig., 1st Div., Dept. of the Ohio.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division.*

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\* Casualties embodied in report No. 2.



## No. 8.

*Report of Col. Horatio P. Van Ciere, Second Minnesota Infantry.*

HDQRS. SECOND REGIMENT MINNESOTA VOLUNTEERS,  
*Camp Hamilton, Ky., January 22, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to submit my report of the part taken by the Second Minnesota Regiment in the action of the Cumberland, on the 19th instant:

About 7 o'clock on the morning of that day, and before breakfast, I was informed by Colonel Manson, of the Tenth Indiana, commanding the Second Brigade of our division, that the enemy were advancing in force and that he was holding them in check, and that it was the order of General Thomas that I should form my regiment and march immediately to the scene of action. Within ten minutes we had left our camp and were marching towards the enemy. Arriving at Logan's field, by your order we halted in line of battle, supporting Standart's battery, which was returning the fire of the enemy's guns, whose balls and shell were falling near us. As soon as the Ninth Ohio came up and had taken its position on our right we continued the march, and after proceeding about half a mile came upon the enemy, who were posted behind a fence along the road, beyond which was an open field broken by ravines. The enemy, opening upon us a galling fire, fought desperately, and a hand-to-hand fight ensued, which lasted about thirty minutes.

The enemy having met with so warm a reception in front and afterwards being flanked on their left by the Ninth Ohio and on their right by a portion of our left, who by their well-directed fire drove them from behind their hiding places, gave way, leaving a large number of their dead and wounded on the field. We joined in the pursuit, which continued till near sunset, when we arrived within a mile of their intrenchments, where we rested upon our arms during the night.

The next morning we marched into their works, which we found deserted. The enemy had crossed the Cumberland.

Six hundred of my regiment were in the engagement, 12 of whom were killed and 33 wounded.

I am well satisfied with the conduct of my entire command during the severe and close engagement in which they took part. Where all behaved so well, I have no desire to make individual distinction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. P. VAN CLEVE,

*Colonel, Commanding Second Minnesota Volunteers.*

Col. ROBERT L. MCCOOK,

*Ninth Ohio, Comdg. Third Brig., First Div., Dept. of the Ohio.*

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No. 9.

*Report of Lieut. George H. Harries, Adjutant Ninth Ohio Infantry.*

CAMP HAMILTON,  
*Pulaski County, Ky., January 22, 1862.*

SIR: The bugle called the Ninth Regiment Ohio Volunteers together on the morning of the 19th instant about 7 o'clock. Led by Acting Lieutenant-Colonel Kammerling, the regiment was marched out of camp to

meet the enemy, who was reported approaching against us on the road leading from the Cumberland River to Logan's farm. The regiment proceeded in line of battle to the scene of action, about a mile and a half from the camp. At a point this side of the thick woods separating the enemy from us Company K was ordered to take position on a side road, and to skirmish the bush, for the purpose of protecting us against any flank attack. The remaining eight companies (Company G was on guard on the other side of our camp, and was left there) proceeded in quick step through the woods to the place of battle, and no sooner had they reached the edge of the woods when they were ordered to attack the enemy. The latter was posted in force on the edge of and in the woods opposite us, and was separated from us by two open corn fields, both of which were fenced. Our left wing touched the main road leading to the Cumberland, and was separated by the same from the right wing of the Second Minnesota Regiment.

With loud hurrahs our boys, most gallantly led by Kammerling, advanced upon the enemy, extending themselves all over the first of said two corn fields, and taking stand along and below the fence. Brisk and heavy firing at once began from both sides and continued for about half an hour. At last Companies A, B, C, and D, from our right wing, made a flank movement by left wheel, and after opening a lively fire against the enemy's left wing they, together with the remaining companies, made a bayonet charge, driving the enemy from his position with loud shouts. The enemy immediately fled precipitately, leaving their dead and wounded, and their knapsacks, blankets, provisions, &c., when our men hastily pursued and made a large number of prisoners.

Company K, detached as stated above, had been ordered to join the main body, but failing to find it, fell in with the Second Minnesota and participated in the action of the left wing of said regiment.

The strength of our regiment during this action was 3 staff officers, 1 staff bugler, 21 company and 93 non-commissioned officers, 505 privates, and 8 buglers.

GEO. H. HARRIES,

*Adjutant Ninth Regiment Ohio Volunteers.*

Col. ROBERT L. MCCOOK,

*Ninth Ohio, Comdg. Third Brig., First Div., Dept. of the Ohio.*

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### No. 10.

*Report of Col. Samuel P. Carter, commanding Twelfth Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH BRIGADE,

*Somerset, Ky., January 30, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of the First and Second Tennessee and Twelfth Kentucky Regiments Volunteers in the engagement of the 19th instant:

On the morning of the 17th January, 1862, I left Somerset, Ky., with the First and Second East Tennessee Regiments, and proceeded to the crossing of Fishing Creek, on the Columbia road. Leaving the regiments at the crossing, I proceeded to Logan's Cross-Roads and reported to you in person. Late on the evening of the 17th I ordered up the Tennessee regiments to Logan's, and by 8 o'clock p. m. they were bivouacked at the junction of the roads leading to Somerset and to Mill

Springs. Captain Wetmore's battery, of two howitzers and two Parrott guns, joined me at Logan's on the 18th, having made a forced march over the deep roads and under a drenching rain from Somerset. My troops were exposed to the rain and inclemency of the weather on Saturday and Saturday night, without shelter and without the usual rations and without tents. The rapid rise of Fishing Creek prevented the regimental wagons from crossing. Notwithstanding their uncomfortable condition for forty-eight hours, they formed in line of battle on Sunday morning with alacrity to meet the enemy. In compliance with your orders, the two Tennessee regiments and the Twelfth Kentucky were formed by me on the left of your line, so as to protect the road leading to Somerset from Mill Springs, in supporting distance of the center and right wing of the army. Captain Wetmore's battery of four pieces was stationed on the right of the line, where it was efficiently worked, throwing shot and shell into the lines of the enemy. Subsequently two pieces of this battery were moved to the left of the line, to assist in protecting that wing from any advance of the enemy on the road from Mill Springs which comes into the Somerset road east of the encampment of the Tenth Indiana Regiment.

Soon after these positions were taken by the Tennessee and Twelfth Kentucky Regiments I received from one of your aides information that the enemy was advancing through the woods and not on the road we were guarding. The brigade was immediately advanced to meet him. After reaching the woods the three regiments were closed in on the enemy's right, the First Tennessee deployed into the field, pressing the enemy's right up the hill, firing at him and capturing some prisoners, among whom was Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, of the Twentieth (rebel) Regiment of Tennessee. In this advance the Twelfth Kentucky, which was on the extreme left of the line, had a brisk skirmish with a part of the enemy's forces and captured several prisoners. The Second East Tennessee Regiment also came up with and captured several of the enemy.

In the pursuit of the enemy, and by your order, the Tennessee regiments took the right of the line in the advance, and maintained that position during the rest of the day. At 3.30 p. m. the brigade arrived at the foot of Moulder's Hill. Here the enemy was expected to make a stand. Wearied by a long march and without provisions during the day, the gallant men of the Twelfth Brigade advanced to the top of the hill with intrepidity and spirit, but the enemy had abandoned this important height, which commanded his fortified camp about three-fourths of a mile on the opposite hills. The artillery was brought up immediately, and the Parrott guns of Captain Wetmore threw shells with great precision into the enemy's works.

After cannonading until dark, the men lay on their arms on Moulder's Hill all night, impatient for the renewal of the combat. Early on Monday morning Wetmore's Parrott guns were again placed in position near your headquarters, Russell's house, and by the precision of their fire burned or compelled the enemy to burn his steamboat, which had been used for some time as a ferry-boat, and commissary stores on the south side of the river. In the advance on the intrenched camp on Monday morning the Tennessee regiments entered the enemy's works on the left of his line, and much to their surprise found the works deserted. The position assigned the First and Second East Tennessee Volunteers on the extreme left of your line, and the enemy making no attempt in force on that flank, these regiments did not come into the hottest part of the combat, but the discipline exhibited in their movements on the field,



their eagerness to engage the enemy, the spirit evinced in the pursuit, and the indomitable perseverance that carried them at the close of the day to the top of Moulden's Hill in hope of meeting the enemy, deserve my highest commendation, and prove that the expectations formed by their friends of their valor in battle will not be disappointed.

To the field and company officers of the regiments of the brigade I am much indebted for the zeal and gallantry displayed by them in the management of their several departments on the march and on the field.

My thanks are especially due to my aide, Lieut. T. J. Tipton, for gallant and efficient services on the field. Capt. M. C. Garber, brigade quartermaster, volunteered to serve on my staff as aide, and rendered me important service, carrying my messages (one of them under the severest fire of the enemy's line) all day Sunday and Monday.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,

*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding Twelfth Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Department of the Ohio.*

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No. 11.

*Report of Col. William A. Hoskins, Twelfth Kentucky Infantry.*

HDQRS. TWELFTH REGIMENT KENTUCKY VOLUNTEERS,  
*Waitsborough, January 26, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: In obedience to the order of Brig. Gen. G. H. Thomas, of this date, I respectfully submit the following report of the humble part performed by the Twelfth Regiment of Kentucky Volunteers, under my command, in the engagement of Logan's fields on the 19th instant, as also on the subsequent day, in the storming the fortifications at Beech Grove:

On the night of the 17th my regiment joined the forces under command of Brig. Gen. G. H. Thomas at Lee's fields, and bivouacked in a lot on the Columbia and Somerset road, opposite the encampment of the Ninth Ohio, my men having waded Fishing Creek on their march from Somerset. Here we remained through the day and night of the 18th, exposed to the excessive rains without shelter, we having been ordered to move without our equipage.

On the morning of the 19th, at about 6 o'clock, we were alarmed by the report of musketry, when my regiment was immediately formed, and notwithstanding it was much reduced in numbers from forced marches and necessary exposure in the performance of picket duty with insufficient clothing (never having drawn their overcoats until a few weeks since), yet no sooner had they received the news of the approach of the enemy than they seemed to grasp their guns with a firmer hold, evincing a determination to discharge their duty as soldiers and Kentuckians.

After awaiting orders a short time, becoming impatient and fearing we had been overlooked in the excitement of the moment, and seeing the Ninth Ohio moving out by the Columbia and Somerset road, I determined to move on to the point of conflict by a more direct line through the fields and woods, and so soon as the Ninth Ohio had passed my regiment was moved out on double-quick, reaching Logan's house in advance of the Ninth Ohio. (Logan's house was on a direct line from

our encampment to the right wing of our forces then engaged with the enemy.) At that point we were ordered to report to Brigadier-General Carter. By General Carter we were ordered to form on the left of the First Tennessee, which was done in the first field beyond the forks of the Columbia and Mill Springs road, and drawn up in line of battle within 75 or 100 yards of and parallel to a dense skirt of timber. Our first line formed was also in the rear of and perpendicular to the line of fire by our artillery. We were next ordered to move by the left flank until both the Twelfth Kentucky and First Tennessee were under cover of the timber, when we were halted. In that position my men imprudently huzzaed, from which the enemy got our position, and opened fire upon us with their artillery, one shot passing directly over us, another striking the ground and exploding 20 feet to the left of my regiment.

The inquiry was then made of General Carter why we could not proceed to the point of conflict. To that he replied, that "We might fire upon our friends." Captain Ham's company of riflemen were then deployed as skirmishers to our left, and the positions of both regiments changed, by advancing some 50 paces in the direction of the enemy. In a short time we were informed by General Carter that a body of rebel infantry 2,000 strong were advancing in the direction of us, and ordered us to cross the ravine to meet them, the bluffs of which on either side were very abrupt, standing at an angle of 45 degrees, rendered more difficult of descent and ascent from the recent rains. In consequence of the abruptness of the bluffs I had to abandon my horse. After crossing the ravine and moving on a short distance I lost sight of the First Tennessee, and on our reaching the battle ground we found the Second Minnesota and Ninth Ohio engaged with the enemy. We moved up on the right wing of the enemy and opened fire upon them, when they retreated beyond the hill, first returning our fire, which passed harmlessly over our heads. We immediately charged the hill, on the summit of which we captured Sergeant-Major Ewing, and sent him into camp. We also discovered a party of rebels retreating down a ridge to our left, whom we pursued, and captured 5 of the number and sent back to camp. I saw no regiment in advance of us when we gained the ridge. Here we were joined by a detachment of cavalry under command of Maj. John A. Brents, who had been dismounted during the engagement. After passing the rebel hospital we were ordered to form on the left of the Ninth Ohio, which position we held during the day. On the morning of the 20th we were ordered to form on the right of the Thirty-fifth, as a reserve to the Third Brigade, which was ordered to storm the fortifications.

I regret that in this action the soldiers of the Twelfth Kentucky did not have an opportunity of displaying more fully their chivalry, being satisfied that in any position in which duty may call them they will deport themselves as soldiers worthy the renown of their fathers.

In consequence of severe indisposition both Lieutenant-Colonel Howard and Major Worsham were unable to move with the regiment. Consequently their places were filled by Captains Ham and Rousseau, who rendered me valuable assistance in restraining the impetuosity of my men.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. A. HOSKINS,

*Colonel, Commanding Twelfth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers.*

Capt. G. E. FLYNT,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## No. 12.

*Report of Col. Frank Wolford, First Kentucky Cavalry.*

CAMP BRENTS, January 22, 1862.

GENERAL: At daylight on Sunday morning, the 19th, my pickets, sent in obedience to your order in the direction of Mill Springs, came in contact with the advance of the enemy and fired on them. I immediately sent word to Colonel Manson, and proceeded with my command to the relief of my picket. In less than 2 miles of our camp we met the enemy and fired on their advance, which constantly retreated. In a very short pursuit I discovered that the enemy were in considerable numbers. I dispatched a messenger to you to inform you that the enemy were advancing in force, and fell back to where Colonel Manson's regiment was formed, and dismounted my men, and formed them in the woods on an elevated place, commanding a field through which the enemy were advancing. Discovering that the enemy were coming in the direction of a hollow, from which under cover of a hill they could flank us, I advanced with a portion of my command to the head of the hollow, where we drove the enemy back four times, and compelled them to change their direction and come down the ridge beyond. At this time Colonel Manson, overwhelmed by superior force and almost surrounded commenced falling back to meet re-enforcements. I ordered my men to follow. When we reached our horses we found them surrounded by the enemy. I cut them loose and let them run down the road, when my men caught them and remounted, the enemy getting two or three of our horses.

Colonel Fry came up at this time and formed on the ground we had previously occupied. I dismounted my men and formed them again with Colonel Fry's, where they were fighting when you came up. The remainder of the fight, so far as my men were concerned, you saw. My officers and men, with a few exceptions, fought most valiantly. Captain Burris, after the first part of the fight, being sick, left his men. He was not wounded, as I understood and verbally reported to you. After he left I placed his men under the command of Adjutant Drye and Lieutenant Coppage, who discharged their duty well. Captain Sweeney mistook my command, and formed about 30 of his men in the wrong place. The balance of his men, under Lieutenant Wolford, formed where they were commanded, and fought well. Captain Sweeney afterwards fell in and did well. Captain Alexander and his men fought well. Lieutenant Miller, in command of Captain Morrison's company, fought well, and fell at their head.

Our loss was 3 killed, one of whom was Lieutenant Miller, and 19 wounded, 8 of whom will die; 15 missing, some of whom I have reason to believe have gone home wounded. We had 3 horses killed and about 20 lost.

Major Brents gave me great assistance during the fight. Two of the band picked up guns and fought; the balance fled.

Yours, &amp;c.,

FRANK WOLFORD.

General THOMAS.



## No. 13.

*Report of Capt. William E. Standart, Battery B, First Ohio Light Artillery.*

SOMERSET, January 26, 1862.

SIR: On the morning of the 19th, at 7 a. m., heard pickets firing in the advance of the Tenth Indiana camp. My horses being in harness, ordered one section, under charge of Lieutenant Bennett, on the road by the Tenth Indiana camp. Moved two sections through the fields. Advanced into the woods. Not finding position, took position between the fields and woods. At this time, finding a by-road on our right, went with the left section on the road, when I was ordered out by Colonel Manson. Lieutenant Bennett at this time was compelled to fall back. At this time got my battery together. Got position on ridge. Fired some 20 shell over the woods. The enemy falling back, moved my battery forward and fired at such parties as could be seen. Moved to within three-quarters of a mile of the fortification, having position on a hill. Shelled the intrenchment until dark. Remained in our position until daylight. Monday, the 20th, advanced with the column through the intrenchments. Shelled the camps over the river. Expended 213 Hotchkiss shell and 11 spherical case. No casualties to report.

Yours, very respectfully,

W. E. STANDART,

*Captain Company B, First Regt. Light Artillery, Ohio Vols.*

Brigadier-General THOMAS.

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No. 14.

*Report of Capt. Dennis Kenny, Jr., Battery C, First Ohio Light Artillery.*

JANUARY 25, 1862.

SIR: On the morning of January 19 my battery was encamped at Logan's Cross-Roads, and was turned out about 7 a. m. by the reports of sharp firing by the out pickets of the Tenth Indiana Regiment. I placed my battery in position on a ridge running parallel with the belt of woods in which our forces were engaging the enemy, and about 20 yards distant, to cover the Tenth Indiana, which I was informed was falling back. I subsequently retired one section to the high knoll near the Somerset road and advanced one through the timber by a narrow angling road to the open field where the battle appeared to be the heaviest. My pieces unlimbered in the lower corner of the open corn field and delivered seven effective shots (James shell) upon a regiment of Mississippians, who were then advancing in line to charge our forces in the edge of the timber on the right of the field. No supporting infantry except a few of the Fourth Kentucky were near, and as the enemy approached they retired under cover of the timber, when it was deemed advisable to withdraw the section, which was done in good order.

When the firing ceased I sent forward for orders to move my battery, and upon the receipt of orders to move my battery to the front attempted to do so, but was prevented by the blocking up of the road by another battery. Upon our arrival in front of the rebel intrenchments I was assigned a position on an eminence to the left of our main position,

from which point we fired 59 rounds of shot and shell; in all, 66 rounds fired by my battery. I have no casualties of any kind to report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. KENNY, JR.,

*Commanding Battery C, First Ohio Artillery.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Department of the Ohio.*

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No. 15.

*Congratulatory order from the President.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 22, 1862.*

The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, has received information of a brilliant victory by the United States forces over a large body of armed traitors and rebels at Mill Springs, in the State of Kentucky. He returns thanks to the gallant officers and soldiers who won that victory, and when the official reports shall be received the military and personal valor displayed in battle will be acknowledged and rewarded in a fitting manner.

The courage that encountered and vanquished the greatly superior numbers of the rebel force, pursued and attacked them in their intrenchments, and paused not until the enemy was completely routed, merits and receives commendation.

The purpose of this war is to attack, pursue, and destroy a rebellious enemy, and to deliver the country from danger menaced by traitors. Alacrity, daring, courageous spirit, and patriotic zeal on all occasions and under every circumstance are expected from the Army of the United States. In the prompt and spirited movements and daring battle of Mill Springs the Nation will realize its hopes, and the people of the United States will rejoice to honor every soldier and officer who proves his courage by charging with the bayonet and storming intrenchments, or in the blaze of the enemy's fire.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

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No. 16.

*Report of General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding the Western Department.*

BOWLING GREEN, KY., *January 22, 1862.*

The following dispatch just received from Nashville:

General Crittenden, with eight regiments of infantry and six pieces of artillery, attacked the enemy on Sunday morning, 19th instant, 7 o'clock, in strong position on Fishing Creek, 11 miles from Mill Springs. The attack was repulsed by superior numbers, and a disorderly retreat commenced after General Zollicoffer fell. The enemy followed to our breastworks and commenced shelling the camp on the right bank of the Cumberland River, which was abandoned during the night, with the loss of our artillery, ammunition, cavalry horses, teams, and camp equipments. The command is in full retreat towards Knoxville. Loss, killed and wounded on our side, about 500.

V. SHELIIA,  
*Captain, on Staff of General Crittenden.*

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, Commanding.*

To J. P. BENJAMIN.

## No. 17.

*Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden, C. S. Army, commanding division.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Beech Grove, Ky., January 18, 1862.*

SIR: I am threatened by a superior force of the enemy in front, and finding it impossible to cross the river, I will have to make the fight on the ground I now occupy.

If you can do so, I would ask that a diversion be made in my favor.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,  
*Headquarters Department of the West.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Monticello, Ky., January 20, 1862.*

SIR: On the night of the 18th (at 12 midnight) I moved my force from Beech Grove and attacked the enemy (in position about 9 or 10 miles from camp) at 7 o'clock the next morning. After a very severe fight of three hours I was compelled to retire, and reoccupied my intrenchments. The enemy advanced the same evening and opened their batteries upon us.

Finding it was impossible to remain where I was, I crossed my command to the south side of the river by a steamboat on the night of the 19th.

I am now on my march to Celina or some other point on the Cumberland River where I can communicate with Nashville. The country is entirely destitute of provisions.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General.*

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,  
*Headquarters Department of the West, Bowling Green, Ky.*

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DIVISION HEADQUARTERS, *January 26, 1862.*

SIR: I arrived at this place\* this afternoon, via Livingston, at which place I remained one day. My marches were slow, and during the time nothing was heard that was reliable of the enemy being on this side of the river. On the contrary, information has been brought me that the enemy moved towards Columbia immediately after the battle. I am unable just yet to send a correct report, but I do not think my loss exceeded 300 killed and wounded. A good many men have left me on account of the country through which I have passed being the homes of a good portion of two regiments. I will in a few days, however, have them all together, when I will proceed at once to reorganize them. I

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\* Gainesborough.



would ask that the orders which I have given on the quartermasters and commissaries at Nashville be approved.

I await your orders at this point.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,

*Major-General.*

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,

*Headquarters, Bowling Green, Ky.*

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DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,  
*Gainesborough, Tenn., January 29, 1862.*

SIR: I would most respectfully state that on the morning of the 19th of this month, at 12 o'clock, I moved from our intrenchments, on the north side of Cumberland River, and attacked the enemy in position about 10 miles from camp. The battle commenced about 7 a. m. and lasted until 10.30 a. m. the same day. The enemy had a superior force to my own, although the information in my possession previous to the battle was that their strength was a little less, or about equal. Re-enforcements were added to them during the engagement. After three and a half hours hard fighting my forces yielded to the overpowering numbers of the enemy, and, retiring, occupied our intrenchments the same afternoon. The enemy pursued me in force and established their batteries in front of my position. The range of their guns being superior to ours, together with the scarcity of provisions, and none to be had in the country, I deemed it advisable the same evening to cross the river, and took up my line of march for this place. From all the information in my possession the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was greater than ours. We lost in killed and wounded not exceeding 300.

The enemy sought evidently to combine their forces stationed at Somerset and Columbia, and, when such junction was made, to invest my intrenchments. I deemed it proper, therefore, to make an attack before the junction could be effected, feeling confident, from the reports of the cavalry pickets, made at a late hour, that the waters of Fishing Creek were so high as to prevent them from uniting. My information in that respect was correct.

A heavy rain occurred during the progress of the engagement, and in consequence a great many of the flint-lock muskets in the hands of my men became almost unserviceable.

I am pained to make report of the death of Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer, who fell while gallantly leading his brigade against the foe. In his fall the country has sustained a great loss. In counsel he has always shown wisdom, and in battle braved dangers, while coolly directing the movements of his troops.

I will as soon as possible reorganize my command. Supplies, camp and garrison equipage, &c., are coming to me daily from Nashville by steamboat.

In a few days I will make a report more in detail.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,

*Major-General.*

To the ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL,

*Richmond, Va.*

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,  
*Camp Fogg, Tenn., February 13, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of January 19, near Fishing Creek, Pulaski County, Kentucky:

On January 17 I was occupying Mill Springs, on the south side of the Cumberland River, with the Seventeenth, Twenty-eighth, and Thirty-seventh Tennessee Regiments, the First Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, two companies of the Third Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, and four pieces of artillery. I was also at the same time occupying Beech Grove, on the north bank of the river, and directly opposite Mill Springs, with the Fifteenth Mississippi, Sixteenth Alabama, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiments, two battalions of Tennessee cavalry, two independent cavalry companies, and twelve pieces of artillery.

For some time the enemy in front of Beech Grove had occupied Somerset, 18 miles distant, with eight regiments of infantry and with artillery; and Columbia, 35 miles distant, with five regiments of infantry. On January 17 I was informed that the force from Columbia, with a large addition, making a total of from 6,000 to 10,000 men, with guns of a large caliber, under General Thomas, commanding the First Division of the Federal Army in Kentucky, was moving across my front, on the road from Columbia towards Somerset, with the intention of forming a junction with the Somerset force and attacking Beech Grove.

On the 18th, at daylight, I moved the Seventeenth and Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiments across the river from Mill Springs to Beech Grove. On the 18th I was informed that the force under General Thomas was encamped at Webb's [Logan's] Cross-Roads, a point 10 miles from Beech Grove and 8 miles from Somerset, at which the roads from Columbia to Somerset and Beech Grove to Somerset unite, and that it would there await both a re-enforcement (that I was advised was advancing from the rear) and the passage of Fishing Creek by the Somerset force. It was necessary that the Somerset force should cross Fishing Creek before it could join the force under General Thomas or approach Beech Grove, and for these purposes it had advanced from Somerset. I was advised that late and continuous rains would prevent the passage of Fishing Creek on the 18th and 19th by any infantry force.

In the then condition of my command I could array for battle about 4,000 effective men. Absolute want of the necessary provisions to feed my command was pressing. The country around was barren or exhausted. Communication with Nashville by water was cut off by a force of the enemy occupying the river below. The line of communication in the rear was too long to admit of winter transportation and extended through a barren or exhausted country.

To defend Beech Grove required me to draw into it the force from Mill Springs. From the course of the river and the condition of things it was easy for a detachment from the force of the enemy occupying it below to cross over, intercept the line of land communication, and, taking Mill Springs, entirely prevent my recrossing the Cumberland. This river (greatly swollen), with high, muddy banks, was a troublesome barrier in the rear of Beech Grove. Transportation over it was, at best, very difficult. A small stern-wheel steamboat, unsuited for the transportation of horses, with two flat-boats, were the only means of crossing.

Beech Grove was protected in front by earthworks; but these incomplete and insufficient, and necessarily of such extent that I had not force to defend them. The range of our artillery was bad, and there were commanding positions for the batteries of the enemy. Every effort had



been made to provision the command, to increase the means of crossing the river, and to perfect the works for defense, under the charge of a skillful engineer officer, Captain Sheliha.

When I first heard that the enemy was approaching in front it was my opinion that I could not retire with my command—artillery, transportation, camp and garrison equipage, baggage, and cavalry horses—from Beech Grove to Mill Springs without information of such a movement reaching the enemy, and a consequent attack during the movement and heavy loss. I was out of reach of support or re-enforcement. Under these circumstances I determined not to retreat without a battle. I decided that it was best to attack the enemy, if possible, before the coming re-enforcements from his rear should arrive and before the Somerset force could cross Fishing Creek. I could reasonably expect much from a bold attack and from the spirit of my command.

On the evening of the 18th I called in council Brigadier-Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll and the commanding officers of regiments and of cavalry and artillery; and there it was determined, without dissent, to march out and attack the enemy under General Thomas on the next morning. Accordingly Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll were ordered to move their brigades at midnight in the following order:

1st. The brigade of General Zollicoffer, in the following order: In front, the independent cavalry companies of Captains Saunders and Bledsoe; then the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall; then the Nineteenth Tennessee, commanded by Col. D. H. Cummings; then the Twentieth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Battle; then the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Col. S. S. Stanton; then four guns of Rutledge's battery, commanded by Captain Rutledge.

2d. The brigade of General Carroll in this order: In front, the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller; then the Twenty-eighth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Murray; then the Twenty-ninth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Powell; then two guns of McClung's battery, commanded by Captain McClung.

In rear were the Sixteenth Alabama, as a reserve, commanded by Col. W. B. Wood, and the cavalry battalions of Lieutenant-Colonel Branner and Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan.

Soon after daylight on the morning of January 19 the cavalry advance came in contact with the pickets of the enemy, after a march of near 9 miles, over a deep and muddy road. With a few shots the enemy's pickets were driven in, retiring about a quarter of a mile to a house on the left of the road. From this house and woods in the rear of it quite a brisk firing was opened upon the head of the column. Skirmishers having been thrown forward, General Zollicoffer's brigade was formed in line of battle and ordered to advance upon the enemy, whom I supposed would come out from their camp, which we were now approaching, to take position. The road here extended straight in front for near a mile towards the north.

A company of skirmishers from the Mississippi regiment, advancing on the left of the road, after sharp firing, drove a body of the enemy from the house and the woods next to it, and then, under orders, crossing the road, fell in with their regiment. Following this company of skirmishers on the left of the road to the point where it crossed to the right, the regiment of Colonel Cummings (Nineteenth Tennessee) kept straight on, and, crossing a field about 250 yards wide at a double-quick, charged into the woods where the enemy was sheltered, driving back the Tenth Indiana Regiment until it was re-enforced.



At this time General Zollicoffer rode up to the Nineteenth Tennessee and ordered Colonel Cummings to cease firing, under the impression that the fire was upon another regiment of his own brigade. Then the general advanced, as if to give an order to the lines of the enemy, within bayonet reach, and I was killed just as he discovered his fatal mistake. Thereupon a conflict ensued, when the Nineteenth Tennessee broke its line and gave back. Rather in the rear and near to this regiment was the Twenty-fifth Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Stanton, which engaged the enemy, when the colonel was wounded at the head of his men; but this regiment, impressed with the same idea which had proved fatal to General Zollicoffer—that it was engaged with friends—soon broke its line and fell into some disorder.

At this time—the fall of General Zollicoffer having been announced to me—I went forward in the road to the regiments of Colonel Cummings and Stanton, and announced to Colonel Cummings the death of General Zollicoffer, and that the command of the brigade devolved upon him.

There was a cessation of firing for a few moments, and I ascertained that the regiment of Colonel Battle was on the right and the Mississippi regiment in the center, neither as yet having been actively engaged, and the enemy in front of the entire line. I had ordered General Carroll to bring up his brigade, and it was now, in supporting distance, displayed in line of battle.

I now repeated my orders for a general advance, and soon the battle raged from right to left. When I sent my aide to order the Fifteenth Mississippi to charge, I sent by him an order to General Carroll to advance a regiment to sustain it. He ordered up for that purpose Colonel Murray's (Twenty-eighth Tennessee) regiment, which engaged the enemy on the left of the Mississippi regiment and on the right of Stanton's (Tennessee) regiment. I ordered Captain Rutledge, with two of his guns, forward in the road to an advanced and hazardous position, ordering Colonel Stanton to support him, where I hoped he might bring them to play effectively upon the enemy; but the position did not permit this, and he soon retired, under my order. At this point the horse of Captain Rutledge was killed under him.

Very soon the enemy began to gain ground on our left and to use their superior force for flanking in that quarter. I was in person at the right of the line of Stanton's regiment, the battle raging, and did not observe this so soon as it was observed by General Carroll, who moved the regiment of Colonel Cummings, then commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, to the left, to meet this movement of the enemy, and formed the Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, to support the regiments on the left. The regiments of Murray, Stanton, and Cummings were driven back by the enemy, and, while reforming in the rear of the Seventeenth Tennessee, that well-disciplined regiment met and held in check for some time the entire right wing of the Northern army. These regiments on my left and on the left of the road retired across the field a distance of about 250 yards, and there for a time repulsed the advancing enemy. Especially the regiment of Colonel Stanton, partially rallied by its gallant field officers, formed behind a fence, and, pouring volleys into the ranks of the enemy coming across the field, repulsed and drove them back for a time with heavy loss.

For an hour now the Fifteenth Mississippi, under Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall, and the Twentieth Tennessee, under Col. Joel A. Battle, of my center and right, had been struggling with the superior force of the enemy.

I cannot omit to mention the heroic valor of these two regiments, offi-

cers and men. When the left retired they were flanked and compelled to leave their position. In their rear, on the right of the road, was the regiment of Colonel Powell (Twenty-ninth Tennessee), which had been formed in the rear and ordered forward by me some time before. General Carroll ordered this regiment to face the flanking force of the enemy, which was crossing the road from the left side, which it did, checking it with a raking fire at 30 paces. In this conflict Colonel Powell, commanding, was badly wounded.

The Sixteenth Alabama, which was the reserve corps of my division, commanded by Colonel Wood, did at this critical juncture most eminent service. Having rushed behind the right and center, it came to a close engagement with the pursuing enemy, to protect the flanks and rear of the Fifteenth Mississippi and Twentieth Tennessee, when they were the last, after long fighting, to leave the front line of the battle, and, well led by its commanding officer, in conjunction with portions of other regiments, it effectually prevented pursuit and protected my return to camp.

Owing to the formation and character of the field of battle I was unable to use my artillery and cavalry to advantage in the action. During much of the time the engagement lasted rain was falling. Many of the men were armed with flint-lock muskets and they became soon unserviceable.

On the field and during the retreat to camp some of the regiments became confused and broken and great disorder prevailed. This was owing, in some measure, to a want of proper drill and discipline, of which the army had been much deprived by reason of the nature of its constant service and of the country in which it had encamped.

During the engagement, or just prior to it, the force under General Thomas was increased by the arrival, on a forced march, of a brigade from his rear, which I had hoped would not arrive until the engagement was over. This made the force of the enemy about 12,000 men. My effective force was four thousand. The engagement lasted three hours.

My loss was 125 killed, 309 wounded, and 99 missing, as follows :

	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
15th Mississippi Regiment .....	44	153	29
20th Tennessee (Battle) .....	33	59	18
19th Tennessee (Cummings) .....	10	22	2
25th Tennessee (Stanton) .....	10	28	17
17th Tennessee (Newman) .....	11	25	2
28th Tennessee (Murray) .....	3	4	5
29th Tennessee (Powell) .....	5	12	10
16th Alabama .....	9	5	12
Captain Saunders' cavalry .....		1	

The loss of the enemy, from the best information I have and statements made by themselves, may be estimated at 700 killed and wounded. It was larger than mine from the fact that my regiments on the left, after first being driven back, fired from the cover of woods and fences upon the large numbers advancing upon them through the open field, inflicting heavy loss and sustaining but little.

My command retired to Beech Grove without any annoyance in the rear by infantry or cavalry. On the return, one piece of artillery, of Captain Rutledge's battery, mired down and was left.

To myself, to the army, and to the country the fall of General Zollicoffer was a severe loss. I found him wise in council, heroic in action. He fell in the front, close to the enemy, and they bore off his body. Of

his staff, Lieutenants Fogg and Shields were mortally wounded and have since died. They displayed conspicuous courage. Lieutenant Bailie Peyton, jr., commanding Company A (of Battle's regiment), was killed in the heat of the action. Adj't. Joel A. Battle, jr., was badly wounded while in front with the colors of his regiment, which he seized when the bearer was shot down. Lieutenant-Colonel Carter, a distinguished officer of this same regiment, was taken prisoner. Colonel Battle commanded with marked ability and courage. Colonel Statham, of the Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment, was absent at the time of the battle on furlough. His regiment was most gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Walthall. The reputation of the Mississippians for heroism was fully sustained by this regiment. Its loss in killed and wounded, which was far greater than that of any other regiment, tells sufficiently the story of discipline and courage. The already extended limits of this report will not permit me, even if I had them at hand, to enumerate the individual acts of courage with which this regiment abounded. Suffice it to say that it is entitled to all praise.

General Carroll, in his dispositions and conduct during the engagement, manifested both military skill and personal valor. My assistant adjutant-general, A. S. Cunningham, and my aides, Lieuts. W. W. Porter and H. I. Thornton, displayed throughout the action intelligence, activity, and courage, and were of great service to me. Happening with me at the time, Maj. James F. Brewer volunteered as my aide and was very active and gallant during the battle. Surgeons Morton, Cliff, and Dulany, unwilling to leave the wounded, remained at the hospital and were taken prisoners by the enemy.

I resumed position at Beech Grove early in the afternoon. The enemy followed and took positions in force on my left, center, and right. On my left they proceeded to establish a battery, which was not ready before nightfall. They opened with two batteries—one in front of my center and one on my right. Captain McClung and Lieutenant Falconet, commanding a section of the battery of Captain Rutledge, replied to the battery of the enemy in front. From the right the enemy fired upon the steamboat, which, at the crossing, was commanded by their position. Their first shots fell short; afterwards, mounting a larger gun, as it grew dark, they fired a shot or two over the boat, and awaited the morning to destroy it. The steamboat destroyed, the crossing of the river would have been impossible.

I considered the determination in the council of war on the previous evening to go out and attack the enemy virtually a determination that Beech Grove was untenable against his concentrating force. That it was so untenable was my decided opinion. With the *morale* of the army impaired by the action of the morning and the loss of what cooked rations had been carried to the field, I deemed an immediate crossing of the Cumberland River necessary. With a view to retiring from Beech Grove, I had already some days before ordered the transfer of trains and unused horses and mules to Mill Springs.

On the evening of the 19th I called in consultation General Carroll, Colonel Cummings, engineers, artillery, and other officers, and it was considered best by all to retire from Beech Grove.

I directed at once that the crossing should be effected during the night, with every effort and artifice to insure perfect concealment from the enemy and the success of the movement. Great difficulty attended the movement from the high and muddy banks and the width and heavy current of the river, the limited means of transportation (the small steamboat and two small flats) and the immediate presence of



the enemy in overwhelming force. I ordered the men to be crossed over—first, by commands, in designated order; then the artillery to be crossed over; then what could be crossed of baggage and mules, horses, wagons, &c. I directed the cavalry to swim their horses over. Time only permitted to cross the infantry under arms, the sick and wounded, one company of cavalry mounted, the rest of the cavalry dismounted, the artillery-men, and some horses. Many cavalry horses, artillery horses, mules, wagons, and eleven pieces of artillery, with baggage and camp and garrison equipage were left behind.

Much is due to the energy, skill, and courage of Captain Spiller, of the cavalry, who commanded the boat, and continued crossing over with it until fired upon by the enemy in the morning, when he burned it, by my directions.

On the morning of the 20th I had my command—nine regiments of infantry, parts of four battalions and two companies of cavalry (dismounted), my sick and wounded, parts of two artillery companies, (without guns or horses), and six pieces of artillery (manned)—on the south side of the Cumberland River, at Mill Springs. On the other side, at Beech Grove (without any means of crossing), were twenty-seven regiments of infantry, with cavalry and artillery, of the enemy.

Any further collision was now prevented, but the want of commissary stores compelled me at once to move to Gainesborough, lower down on the river, a distance of 80 miles, and the nearest point where I could have communication by water with Nashville and could obtain supplies.

My march was through a poor country, over very bad roads. It was hard to obtain the necessaries of life along the route, and from scant subsistence and difficult marching my command suffered greatly. Maj. Giles M. Hillyer, of my staff, division commissary, with untiring energy and marked ability, exhausted every effort in the management of his department, and supplied whatever could be obtained, in some instances sacrificing the forms prescribed for purchase and distribution to the exigencies of the occasion and the necessities of the command.

From the fatigues of the march and the want of proper food many were taken sick. I am much gratified to commend especially the care for the wounded and sick, under most embarrassing circumstances, on the field and on the march, under the efficient charge of the accomplished medical director of my division, Dr. F. A. Ramsey.

From Mill Springs and on the first stages of my march many officers and men, frightened by false rumor of the movements of the enemy, shamelessly deserted, and, stealing horses and mules to ride, fled to Knoxville, Nashville, and other places in Tennessee. To prevent this I used every endeavor, and was laboriously assisted by my staff and other officers of the command.

I am proud to say that the field officers of all the commands, and some commands almost entire, and the main body of each command, remained ready to do their duty in any emergency, except one battalion of cavalry—which had not been in the battle, of which the lieutenant-colonel, together with some other officers and some privates, were absent on furlough—of the body of which being present only one captain, several officers and men—in all about 25—did not run away.

From Gainesborough I have moved my division to this point, where it is refurnished and drilling, and I have the honor to report that it is ready for any service to which it may be assigned.

G. B. CRITTENDEN,

*Major-General Provisional Army Confederate States.*

Lieut. Col. W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## No. 18.

*Report of Brig. Gen. William H. Carroll, C. S. Army, commanding  
Second Brigade.*

HDQRS. SECOND BRIGADE, — DIVISION, C. S. ARMY,  
*Gainesborough, Tenn., September 1, 1862.*

GENERAL: I embrace the first leisure moment, after receiving reports from the different commanding officers of this brigade, to lay before you an account of the operations of my command in the engagement with the enemy near Fishing Creek, Kentucky, on the morning of January 19.

In accordance with your orders of January 17, which reached me at midnight of that date, I moved the Seventeenth Tennessee Regiment, then under command of Lieut. Col. J. P. Murray,\* from their encampment at Mill Springs to the north side of Cumberland River, and halted them at Camp Beech Grove, taking quarters with the Twentieth and Twenty-fifth Tennessee Regiments, commanded by Colonels Battle and Stanton, which were then encamped at that place, at 8 p. m.

On the evening of the 18th instant I received orders from you to move my command at 12 o'clock that night by the Fishing Creek road in the direction of Webb's [Logan's] Cross-Roads, a point some 10 miles distant in a northern direction from the position we then occupied. At the hour designated I put my command in motion and took up the line of march for the point above mentioned. The brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer, preceded me about thirty minutes, taking the same direction and marching about 1 mile in advance of my front. My command, consisting of the Seventeenth, Twenty-eighth, and Twenty-ninth Tennessee and Sixteenth Alabama Regiments of Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Branner's battalion of cavalry, and two pieces of McClung's battery, moved in the following order: The Seventeenth Tennessee, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, marched in front; the Twenty-eighth Tennessee, commanded by Col. J. P. Murray, followed at the distance of about 30 paces in rear of the Seventeenth; the Twenty-ninth Tennessee, Col. S. Powell, marched about the same distance in rear of Colonel Murray; the artillery and one company of Branner's cavalry brought up the rear, and the remaining cavalry companies marched on either flank, with orders to scout the adjoining woods upon the right and left of the Fishing Creek road, along which we were then marching. The Sixteenth Alabama Regiment, under the command of Colonel Wood, marched about 600 paces in rear of the remainder of my command, with orders to hold his command as a reserve corps and be governed in his after movements as emergencies might require.

The night was dark and gloomy; a cold rain was constantly descending, rendering the march extremely difficult and unpleasant. This, together with the almost impassable condition of the roads, rendered so by recent heavy rains, so much retarded our progress, that at daylight we had not advanced more than 10 miles from Camp Beech Grove, thus consuming nearly six hours in marching this short distance.

Just at dawn on the morning of the 19th, and while the troops were toiling slowly along through mud and water, sometimes more than a foot in depth, I heard the report of several guns, fired in quick succession, apparently about half a mile in advance of me. This firing I supposed [to be] from the enemy's pickets, who had discovered the approach of General Zollicoffer's brigade. In a few minutes I heard a heavy

\*The rosters of Tennessee regiments show him to have been colonel of the Twenty-eighth, and T. B. Murray lieutenant-colonel of the Sixteenth, at this date.



volley of musketry proceeding from the direction of the former reports and extending some distance to my right and left in a line running parallel with the front of my command. The rapid and continuous fire in front convinced me that General Zollicoffer had encountered the enemy in strong force and a determined and sanguinary conflict had commenced.

I immediately moved my command forward at double-quick about half a mile to the brow of a hill and deployed my columns in line of battle, making the summit of the hill a partial protection for the men. While forming and preparing for the engagement the regiment of Colonel Murray constituted the right of my line of battle, and was extended the full length of its line on the east side of Fishing Creek road, while the Seventeenth Tennessee Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Miller, composed my left, and extended in a similar manner on the west side of the road. Colonel Powell's regiment (Twenty-ninth Tennessee) was drawn up in the rear of the Twenty-eighth, designed to act as a supporting or reserve corps, as circumstances might require. Colonel Wood's Sixteenth Alabama was posted about 100 paces in rear of the Twenty-ninth, and on the east side of the road. Branner's cavalry was directed to take post in rear and supporting distance of my left flank, while McClung's artillery was stationed in rear of my center.

This disposition of my forces was partly induced by surrounding circumstances. The morning was exceedingly cloudy, and rendered still darker by the dense volumes of smoke arising from the firing in front, so that the eye could distinguish objects clearly only at a short distance. I could, therefore, only judge of the probable force and position of the enemy by the flash and report of their guns. Judging as correctly as I could by these indications, I was induced to think that the most vigorous attack was being made in front and east of my right wing.

In order to determine the proper manner and most available point of bringing my force into action, I left my command stationary, and with my staff rode forward until I came in view of the enemy, on the declivity of the opposite hill, engaged in a fierce conflict with a portion of General Zollicoffer's brigade. I then approached you, reported for orders, and returned to my command. Soon afterwards your aide, Captain Thornton, rode up and ordered me to advance a regiment to sustain the gallant Fifteenth Mississippi in a charge which he was then on the way to order.

I accordingly ordered Colonel Murray's regiment to move forward to the foot of the hill and take shelter behind a rail fence and some surrounding timber. In a few minutes the chivalrous Mississippians gallantly charged and were driving the enemy rapidly before them. While thus engaged a regiment of cavalry commenced a flank movement against their left. I then ordered Colonel Murray to advance his regiment against this flanking force. This order was received with a shout by the entire regiment, who, led by their colonel, dashed into the thickest of the fight. About this time a strong re-enforcement of the enemy appeared on our left, evidently intending to attack and turn our left flank. In order to thwart this design, I ordered Colonel Cummings' regiment, of General Zollicoffer's brigade, which was near at hand and for the moment disengaged, to move by the left flank in the direction of the approaching enemy, thus extending our lines nearly to the full extent of their right. Misunderstanding the order, the regiment fell into some confusion, which was, however, quickly overcome by the promptness and activity of the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Walker. It then moved in good order to the place assigned it and did



good service as long as it remained under my observation. I then ordered up the Seventeenth Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel Miller, and formed it behind a fence, within 80 or 100 yards of the enemy. This position they held for nearly one hour against an overwhelming force, meanwhile pouring a most destructive fire against the advancing column, spreading terror through the ranks of the enemy.

I cannot speak too highly of the striking influence over this regiment, of the thorough and rigid discipline to which it had been reduced by its efficient commander, Col. T. W. Newman, who I regret was prevented from being present at the engagement by some indisposition.

Perceiving that the enemy was being re-enforced in this quarter by several fresh regiments, and that they were pushing on with a most determined courage, I directed my aide, W. H. Carroll, to return and order up the regiments of Colonels Wood and Powell, that had up to this time been held in reserve. Colonel Wood brought his men forward with the steadiness of veterans, and formed them in battle array with the coolness and precision of a holiday parade. Advancing very near the enemy, we kept up a constant and most destructive fire until we were forced to quit the field and fall back before superior numbers. Returning a short distance we rallied and renewed the contest, but were again assailed by an unequal force and again driven slowly back, stubbornly contesting every inch of ground over which the enemy were advancing. The action had now become general all along my entire line—the Federals fighting with unusual vigor and courage. Re-enforcements of the enemy continuing to pour in upon us in every direction, the ground was soon covered with the dead and wounded, and the discharge of small-arms and the roar of cannon were incessant. Whenever we could succeed in driving back one regiment another would supply its place and meet us with a more determined resistance. Their artillery, having been brought into play, swept the entire field, throwing shell, grape, and canister shot into our very midst.

In the mean time the Twenty-eighth Tennessee, Col. J. P. Murray, being assailed by more than twice its numbers, after making a brief resistance, broke and fled in confusion from the field. The Twenty-ninth Tennessee, Colonel Powell, was also attacked in a similar manner, and, the colonel himself being seriously wounded, his men fell back in considerable disorder and could not be induced to face the enemy again, though every effort was made to rally them back by their own officers and members of my staff. Two regiments of General Zollicoffer's command had already been forced to retire from the field. Their retreat through my ranks contributed very much to throw my columns into disorder. The regiments of Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Miller continued to hold the enemy at bay, slowly retiring from the field now lost to us.

Perceiving the fortunes of the day were against us, and that we could not longer maintain the unequal contest, I reluctantly permitted my entire command to retreat in the direction of our works at Mill Springs. I was not able to bring either my cavalry or artillery into action, in consequence of the rugged and uneven nature of the ground over which the battle was fought. While retiring from the field the enemy evinced little disposition to pursue us, having evidently suffered, in all probability, a greater loss than our own.

Late in the afternoon my command reached our encampment at Beech Grove and took possession of the fortifications formerly erected at that place. I succeeded in bringing from the field as many of my wounded as my limited means of transportation would permit.

At about 5 o'clock in the evening the enemy, having approached within about a mile of our works, planted their batteries of heavy guns on commanding eminences and commenced a vigorous cannonade, which would soon have driven us out of our fortifications had not the setting in of night prevented a further prosecution of the attack.

Our position being wholly untenable, it was determined in a council of officers, called by yourself, to abandon it and return to the opposite bank of the Cumberland. Having but one small boat to transport the entire force across, it was found impossible to carry with us any of our camp equipage. It was destroyed, therefore, in order that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy. I was also compelled to abandon two pieces of McClung's battery and nearly all of my cavalry horses. Some of the latter succeeded in swimming the river and many were drowned in the attempt. By daylight in the morning my entire command had reached the south side of the Cumberland.

Being entirely without commissary supplies, and there being none, or but little, in the surrounding country, my men became more apprehensive of destruction by famine than at the hands of the enemy. Under the influence of this panic, created by a fear of starvation, many deserted the army and fled through the mountains into East Tennessee. Among these, I regret to say, were some officers, but mostly, however, of an inferior grade. Most of my officers exerted every effort to preserve their commands intact and maintain the strictest order of discipline in the retreat.

The casualties in my command during the engagement were as follows:

Killed .....	28
Wounded .....	46
Missing .....	29
Total .....	103

It will thus be seen that my entire loss in killed, wounded, and missing amounts in the aggregate to 103.

The repulse of the regiments of my command that gave way in confusion during the battle is attributed (besides the superior numbers with which they were contending), in a great measure, to the inefficient and worthless character of their arms, being old flint-lock muskets and country rifles, nearly half of which would not fire at all.

During the engagement I saw numbers of the men walking deliberately away from the field of action for no other reason than [that] their guns were wholly useless. Another reason why some of the troops under my command did not exhibit a more soldierly bearing is found in the fact that they had only a day or two before been assigned me and were deficient in drill and discipline, having previous to that time had little opportunity of becoming proficient in these particulars.

I cannot close this report without expressing the high appreciation, both by myself and my officers, for the personal courage and skill evinced both by yourself and staff during the entire engagement; and however much I may regret the unfortunate disaster which befel us, I feel conscious that it resulted from no want of gallantry and military tact on the part of the commanding general.

For more minute details I respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports of the commanding officers of my brigade.

I am, general, very respectfully,

Major-General CRITTENDEN,  
*Commanding Division.*

W. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

## No. 19.

*Report of Maj. Horace Rice, Twenty-ninth Tennessee Infantry (Confederate).*

## CAMP NEAR GAINESBOROUGH, TENN., February 2, 1862.

SIR: In compliance with your order I submit a statement of the movements and casualties of the Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiment:

This regiment was under command of Colonel Samuel Powell, and in the order of march from camp to the field was in the last of your brigade, except Colonel Wood's (Alabama) regiment, which was held in reserve. When the fight commenced it was on this side of the branch, near the house afterwards occupied as a hospital for our wounded.

After waiting there for about twenty minutes it moved across the branch and up to the top of the hill, when it was formed in line of battle on the right of the road, and [moved] forward at double-quick to the support of the right, then engaged. It moved down through the wheat field, where it halted just in rear of Colonel Murray, and [was] told to await further orders. It then remained inactive until it was perceived that the enemy were making a flank movement on our left, when orders were received from you to right face, thereby presenting a front to the enemy's flankers on our left. This maneuver was executed, our line being on the brow of the hill at the edge of the woods, about 100 yards to the right of the road. The enemy crossed the road and advanced to within about 30 paces of our line, when he was checked by a raking fire from our boys, and held in that position until portions of Colonel Battle's and the Mississippi regiments passed out to our right.

Colonel Powell was wounded about the time the enemy crossed the road and had to leave the field. After Colonel Battle and the Mississippians passed out, finding the regiment entirely unsupported and in danger of being cut off, I ordered it to fall back and file off after the retreating army.

This regiment was not under fire more than ten minutes; but the officers and men, with but few exceptions, behaved with gallantry and held their position under the most trying circumstances when retreat seemed to be the general order and all were falling back around them.

Some of the friends of one or two of the wounded missing think they crawled to the rear several miles above and made their way out; but they have never been heard of. Colonel Powell was severely wounded and has been taken home.\*

Very respectfully,

HORACE RICE,

*Major, Commanding Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiment.*

Brigadier-General CARROLL.

[Indorsement.]

Major Rice errs in the commands given his regiment. It was ordered by me to face to the right and file left with half of his battalion, halt, and front, in order that Colonel Wood's regiment, which had been ordered forward, could occupy the ground from which the left of Colonel Powell's regiment had been moved. Colonel Wood's regiment numbered only 330 men, half the number of Colonel Powell's command. Colonel Powell was wounded as his regiment was in the act of filing to the left, and, being compelled to leave the field, a large portion of his

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\*Nominal list of casualties shows 5 killed, 12 wounded, and 11 missing.



men retired with him. A portion of the left wing remained with Major Rice, continuing to fight with the Sixteenth Alabama until both were driven back by superior numbers.

## JANUARY 23—FEBRUARY 2, 1862.—Operations near Greensburg and Lebanon, Ky.

### REPORTS.

No. 1.—Capt. John H. Morgan, Kentucky Cavalry (Confederate).

No. 2.—Lieut. Col. T. C. H. Smith, First Ohio Cavalry.

#### No. 1.

*Report of Capt. John H. Morgan, Kentucky Cavalry (Confederate).*

CAMP ASH, February 2, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, as per instructions, I started from camp 28th ultimo, with 9 men and a guide.

First night crossed Barren and Green Rivers, and stopped at a house about 8 miles from Green River; remained all next day, fearing of being seen traveling in daylight; were within 10 miles of Greensburg; rained day and night. Next evening at 6 o'clock started in the direction of Lebanon. Creeks risen so much that it was impossible to reach Mrs. Sanders' that night; tried to cross one stream, and came very near losing both horse and rider.

Put up that night at Daniel Williams', which was about 6 miles of Greensburg and 10 miles from top of Muldraugh's Hill.

Started by day; met negro owned by Lincoln man, L. Thurman; took him along to pilot us through the creek, as the ford was dangerous; stopped at L. Thurman's house; told him we were Government troops, on our way to Lebanon, carrying dispatches from General Buell, and wanted a pilot to take us around a little town (Saloma), which was upon the main road, and which we wished to avoid; he told me to take his negro and keep him as long as we required his services, and wished us a safe trip. About 10 o'clock reached the turnpike leading from Lexington through Lebanon, Campbellsville, Greensburg, and Columbia, the road upon which all their troops and transportation pass. At the point we struck the pike was a large log church, and occupying it was a party of men, in the employ of Government, building telegraph to Columbus. The building had a large quantity of stores and telegraph implements, and a large quantity of mess pork, beans, crackers, flour, soap, sugar, coffee, candles, and stores of various kinds; close around the building were three United States wagons filled with provisions; took 4 men prisoners, who were in charge of the stores, and proceeded down pike in direction of Lebanon. Stopped at Mrs. Sanders' a few moments, and learned that a large party were guarding the bridge over Rolling Fork; that a few sick were at Campbellsville, and a portion of two regiments at Greensburg, and a large force at Columbia; took 1 man and proceeded within about 8 miles of Lebanon; returned to the church and took dinner with prisoners.

While dining, two soldiers were passing along the pike; took them.

Remained at building until 2 o'clock; set fire to building; remained until all the wagons and house were consumed; then took main road which leads to Glasgow, passed through Saloma, a little town about 3 miles from pike; took 2 soldiers and 1 lieutenant prisoners; stopped a few moments at Summersville; took another Federal prisoner, who belonged to Colonel Hobson's regiment, at Greensburg. Captain Twyman had just passed through that place with 40 men. Reached Green River about 5 o'clock; found it out of its bank and a large quantity of drift running; had to go up the river about 2 miles to get a boat, which was owned by a Lincoln man named Montgomery; he took us for Federals, as we had so many Federal uniforms, and came over; made one trip, and had crossed half over with another, when he discovered who we were; it seems that one of our prisoners was a private in Montgomery's son-in-law's company; he ran the boat among some leaning trees, and came near raking all the horses overboard; succeeded in getting one over (which was lost). Directly the boat touched shore he and his negroes ran off, leaving the boat loose. The night being so very dark, it was impossible to shoot them. Some of the men caught the boat and brought it over, and the rest of us succeeded in getting across. We then set it adrift.

Staid that night at Barnett's, near the river. Started at day; crossed Barren River at Brewersburg; it was so high that it was impossible to cross any lower down; reached Glasgow near night; remained until this morning, both men and horses being nearly worn-out.

At the church we captured 8 horses; at one stage took 3 that were used in carrying the mail, and upon our way home took 3 more, which we rode to relieve the ones we had been riding; as we needed the horses in my command, I distributed them among the men.

The man Short, who was a lieutenant, is a man of very bad character; was a leader among the Home Guards last summer, and assisted in stopping goods going South at the very town where we captured him. He, last September, captured me and two loads of jeans I was taking South; he then headed a party of about 30 Home Guards, and kept me part of three days at the church. We also took a negro which was in the Government employ, and is still in my possession.

Respectfully,

JOHN H. MORGAN,  
*Commanding Squadron.*

Brigadier-General HINDMAN.

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No. 2.

*Report of Lieut. Col. T. C. H. Smith, First Ohio Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST OHIO CAVALRY,  
*Near Lebanon, Ky., January 31, 1862.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that at 4 p. m. of the 29th I learned of the depredations of a party of the enemy on the turnpike 12 miles below Lebanon. I started immediately with two companies and pursued them to Vaughn's Ferry, about 24 miles from our camp, reaching that point about midnight. They had crossed the river some hours before in the ferry-boat and set the boat adrift. There was no skiff or

other means to cross the river there with dismounted men, and I left Company E, Captain Eggleston, with orders to wait until early daylight, and if any means could be found to cross the river safely to do so, and marched with the other company (B, Captain Laughlin) to Greensburg, hoping to find a boat on which the river could be passed with mounted men.

We arrived there about 5 p. m., and were informed that there was no boat there. By Colonel Hobson's active exertions a flat was found below the town some distance, bailed out, and put in order by 9 a. m., but it was then too late to give any reasonable probability of reaching the enemy. We had marched 34 miles, most of the distance over very rugged roads and through darkness, and the flat could pass at most but 6 mounted men at a time, requiring four hours and a half without accident to pass the company, with a retreat hazardous, for the same reason that made a further advance promise to be fruitless. I was compelled by these reasons to abandon any further pursuit and returned. I sent orders to Captain Eggleston previously to return if he found no means to cross the river.

The officers and men throughout the march were ready for any exertion for advance and in good discipline.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. C. H. SMITH,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.*

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## FEBRUARY 2, 1862.—Skirmish in Morgan County, Tennessee.

### REPORTS.

No. 1.—Col. D. Leadbetter, C. S. Army.

No. 2.—Lieut. Col. J. W. White, First Tennessee Cavalry.

#### No. 1.

*Letter of Col. D. Leadbetter, C. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Knoxville, Tenn., February 5, 1862.*

SIR: I send herewith an extract from a report of Lieutenant-Colonel White, First Regiment Tennessee Cavalry, from which it appears that a part of that regiment had a skirmish with the traitors of Scott and Morgan counties on Sunday, the 2d instant, capturing 1 prisoner, 4 horses, 2 Minie muskets, and 1 navy revolver, killing the enemy's leader (Duncan) and perhaps 5 others. I inclose herewith some papers found on the body of Duncan.\*

The cavalry, while expecting orders to join General Crittenden, have been directed to scour the counties of Scott, Morgan, and Campbell, for the purpose of putting down rebellion, as well as to give prompt notice of any forward movement of the enemy's army. Half of the company of sappers and miners, organized by Major Lea, has been ordered to Cumberland Gap, while the other half, protected by the cavalry, will endeavor to obstruct the passes leading through the mountains

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\* See note on p. 119.



from Kentucky to Jacksborough. I have no doubt that the enemy will attempt an advance on Knoxville at an early day.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

D. LEADBETTER,

*Colonel, Provisional Army Confederate States.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.*

No. 2.

*Report of Lieut. Col. J. W. White, First Tennessee Cavalry.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST TENNESSEE CAVALRY REGIMENT,  
*Camp Schooler, Morgan County, Tenn., February 3, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that a portion of our regiment engaged the enemy on yesterday at about 12 o'clock 13 miles northwest of this place. A running fight for nearly an hour ensued in the mountains. The enemy's force is variously estimated from 100 to 300, armed with Minie muskets and rifles.

We killed their captain, and, from the best information, 5 others; captured 4 horses, 2 fine Minie muskets, 1 Colt's navy pistol, a small quantity of ammunition, and 1 prisoner.

Inclosed I send you certain papers found by me on the person of their dead captain.\*

It gives me pleasure to say that we lost only 1 horse killed and a few slight scratches. Our men all acted bravely for raw troops.

I cannot forbear to mention the gallant conduct of Captain Brown, of Company C, and Sergeant Reagan, of Company F.

I am satisfied that the Federal Army in force is approaching us; I think by way of Williamsburg, Ky., through Chitwood's Gap. It is raining and the waters are up, so we cannot well get out of here; but I will move Captains McKenzie's and Gorman's companies, if possible, to-morrow on Jacksborough.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

J. W. WHITE,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding First Tennessee Cavalry.*

D. LEADBETTER,

*Colonel, Commanding, Knoxville, Tenn.*

FEBRUARY 6, 1862.—Capture of Fort Henry, Tennessee.

REPORTS, ETC.

- No. 1.—Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Missouri, and correspondence with Flag-Officer Foote and Brigadier-General Grant.
- No. 2.—Flag-Officer A. H. Foote, U. S. Navy, commanding naval forces on the Western waters.
- No. 3.—Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding land forces of the expedition.
- No. 4.—Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.

\*A private letter and some unimportant money vouchers. Omitted.

- No. 5.—General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Western Department.  
 No. 6.—Lieut. Col. Jeremy F. Gilmer, C. S. Army, Chief Engineer.  
 No. 7.—Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. Army, commanding at Columbus, Ky.  
 No. 8.—Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, C. S. Army, commanding Fort Henry.  
 No. 9.—Lieut. Col. Milton A. Haynes, C. S. Army, Chief of Tennessee Corps of Artillery.  
 No. 10.—Col. A. Heiman, Tenth Tennessee Infantry.

## No. 1.

*Reports of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Missouri, and correspondence with Flag-Officer Foote and Brigadier-General Grant.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 7, 1862.*

Fort Henry was taken yesterday, with seventeen heavy guns, General Lloyd Tilghman and staff, and 60 men, after a bombardment of one hour and a quarter by gunboats. General Grant's cavalry and gunboats in pursuit of the remainder of the garrison, who have abandoned artillery on the road. Our loss, killed, wounded, and scalded by destruction of boiler of the Essex, 44. Captain Porter is badly but not dangerously scalded. General C. F. Smith has possession of the enemy's redan on the western bank of the Tennessee. General Grant's infantry and artillery have gone to attack Fort Donelson at Dover, on the Cumberland. The gunboats not disabled are moving up the Tennessee. Commodore Foote, with disabled gunboats, has returned to Cairo—gunboats for repairs; will soon return to the field. Enemy's loss not known.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

Major-General McCLELLAN.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 11, 1862.*

GENERAL: Inclosed herewith I have the honor to forward to the Commander-in-Chief official copies of the reports of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant and Flag-Officer A. H. Foote in regard to the capture of Fort Henry.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

General LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*

CAIRO, *January 28, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. HENRY W. HALLECK,  
*Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Commanding General Grant and myself are of opinion that Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, can be carried with four iron-clad gunboats and troops to permanently occupy. Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready?

A. H. FOOTE,  
*Flag-Officer.*

CAIRO, *January 28, 1862.*Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  
*Saint Louis Mo.:*

With permission, I will take Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large camp there.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier General.*HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 29, 1862.*Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  
*Saint Louis, Mo.:*

In view of the large force now concentrating in this district and the present feasibility of the plan I would respectfully suggest the propriety of subduing Fort Henry, near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, and holding the position. If this is not done soon there is but little doubt but that the defenses on both the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers will be materially strengthened. From Fort Henry it will be easy to operate either on the Cumberland, only 12 miles distant, Memphis, or Columbus. It will, besides, have a moral effect upon our troops to advance them toward the rebel States. The advantages of this move are as perceptible to the general commanding as to myself, therefore further statements are unnecessary.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*SAINT LOUIS, *January 30, 1862.*Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,  
*Cairo, Ill.:*

Make your preparations to take and hold Fort Henry. I will send you written instructions by mail.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 30, 1862.*Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,  
*Cairo, Ill.:*

SIR: You will immediately prepare to send forward to Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, all your available forces from Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Fort Holt, Bird's Point, &c. Sufficient garrisons must be left to hold these places against an attack from Columbus. As the roads are almost impassable for large forces, and as your command is very deficient in transportation, the troops will be taken in steamers up the Tennessee River as far as practicable. Supplies will also be taken up in steamers as far as possible. Flag-Officer Foote will protect the transports with his gunboats. The Benton and perhaps some others should be left for the defense of Cairo. Fort Henry should be taken and held at all hazards. I shall immediately send you three additional companies of artillery from this place.

The river front of the fort is armed with 20-pounders, and it may be necessary for you to take some guns of large caliber and establish a bat-



tery on the opposite side of the river. It is believed that the guns on the land side are of small caliber and can be silenced by our field artillery. It is said that the north side of the river below the fort is favorable for landing. If so, you will land and rapidly occupy the road to Dover and fully invest the place, so as to cut off the retreat of the garrison. Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, U. S. Engineers, will immediately report to you, to act as chief engineer of the expedition. It is very probable that an attempt will be made from Columbus to re-enforce Fort Henry; also from Fort Donelson at Dover. If you can occupy the road to Dover you can prevent the latter. The steamers will give you the means of crossing from one side of the river to the other. It is said that there is a masked battery opposite the island below Fort Henry. If this cannot be avoided or turned it must be taken.

Having invested Fort Henry, a cavalry force will be sent forward to break up the railroad from Paris to Dover. The bridges should be rendered impassable, but not destroyed.

A telegram from Washington says that Beauregard left Manassas four days ago with fifteen regiments for the line of Columbus and Bowling Green. It is therefore of the greatest importance that we cut that line before he arrives. You will move with the least delay possible. You will furnish Commodore Foote with a copy of this letter. A telegraph line will be extended as rapidly as possible from Paducah, east of the Tennessee River, to Fort Henry. Wires and operators will be sent from Saint Louis.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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No. 2.

*Report of Flag-Officer A. H. Foote, U. S. Navy, commanding naval forces on the Western waters.*

CAIRO, ILL., February 7, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 6th instant, at 12.30 o'clock p. m., I made an attack on Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, with the iron-clad gunboats Cincinnati, Commander Stembel; the flag-ship Essex, Commander Porter; Carondelet, Commander Walke, and St. Louis, Lieutenant-Commander Paulding; also taking with me the three old gunboats, Conestoga, Lieutenant-Commander Phelps; the Tyler, Lieutenant-Commander Gwin, and the Lexington, Lieutenant-Commander Shirk, as a second division, in charge of Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, which took position astern and inshore of the armed boats, doing good execution there during the action, while the armed boats were placed in the first order of steaming, approaching the fort in a parallel line.

The fire was opened at 1,700 yards' distance from the flag-ship, which was followed by the other gunboats, and responded to by the fort. As we approached the fort under slow steaming till we reached within 600 yards of the rebel batteries the fire both from the gunboats and fort increased in rapidity and accuracy of range. At twenty minutes before the rebel flag was struck the Essex unfortunately received a shot in her boilers, which resulted in wounding, by scalding, 29 officers and men, including Commander Porter, as will be seen in the inclosed list of cas-

ualties.\* The Essex then necessarily dropped out of line astern, entirely disabled, and unable to continue the fight, in which she had so gallantly participated until the sad catastrophe. The firing continued with unabated rapidity and effect upon the three gunboats as they continued still to approach the fort with their destructive fire until the rebel flag was hauled down, after a very severe and closely-contested action of one hour and fifteen minutes.

A boat containing the adjutant-general and captain of engineers came alongside after the flag was lowered, and reported that General Lloyd Tilghman, the commander of the fort, wished to communicate with the flag-officer, when I dispatched Commander Stembel and Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, with orders to hoist the American flag where the secession ensign had been flying, and to inform General Tilghman that I would see him on board the flag-ship. He came on board soon after the Union had been substituted for the rebel flag by Commander Stembel on the fort and possession taken. I received the general, his staff, and 60 or 70 men as prisoners, and a hospital ship containing 60 invalids, together with the fort and its effects, mounting twenty guns, mostly of heavy caliber, with barracks and tents capable of accommodating 15,000 men, and sundry articles, of which, as I turned the fort and its effects over to General Grant, commanding the Army, on his arrival in an hour after we had made the capture, he will be enabled to give the Government a more correct statement than I am enabled to communicate from the short time I had possession of the fort. The plan of the attack, so far as the Army reaching the rear of the fort to make a demonstration simultaneously with the Navy, was prevented by the excessively muddy roads and high stage of water, preventing the arrival of our troops until some time after I had taken possession of the fort.

On securing the prisoners and making necessary preliminary arrangements I dispatched Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, with his division, up the Tennessee River, as I had previously directed, and as will be seen in the inclosed order to him,\* to remove the rails, and so far render the bridge incapable of railroad transportation and communication between Bowling Green and Columbus, and afterwards to pursue the rebel gunboats and secure their capture, if possible. This being accomplished and the Army in possession of the fort and my services being indispensable at Cairo, I left Fort Henry in the evening of the same day, with the Cincinnati and St. Louis, and arrived here this morning.

The armed gunboats resisted effectually the shot of the enemy when striking the casemate. The Cincinnati (flag-ship) received 31 shots, the Essex 15, the St. Louis 7, and the Carondelet 6, killing 1 and wounding 9 in the Cincinnati and killing 1 in the Essex, while the casualties in the latter from steam amounted to 28 in number. The Carondelet and St. Louis met with no casualties. The steamers were admirably handled by their commanders and officers, presenting only their bow guns to the enemy, to avoid exposure of the vulnerable parts of their vessels. Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, with his division, also executed my orders very effectually, and promptly proceeded up the river in their further execution after the capture of the fort. In fact, all the officers and men gallantly performed their duty, and, considering the little experience they have had under fire, far more than realized my expectations.

Fort Henry was defended with the most determined gallantry by General Tilghman, worthy of a better cause, who, from his own account, went into the action with eleven guns of heavy caliber bearing upon our

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\* Not found.

boats, which he fought until seven of the number were dismounted or otherwise rendered useless.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. FOOTE,

*Flag-Officer, Commanding U. S. Naval Forces Western Waters.*

Major-General HALLECK,

*Commanding Department of the Missouri.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, February 9, 1862.*

I have this moment received the official report of your capture of Fort Henry, and hasten to congratulate you and your command for your brilliant success.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General, Commanding Department.*

Flag-Officer A. H. FOOTE, *Cairo.*

No. 3.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding land forces of the expedition.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

*Fort Henry, February 6, 1862.*

Fort Henry is ours. The gunboats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed. I think the garrison must have commenced the retreat last night. Our cavalry followed, finding two guns abandoned in the retreat.

I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry.

U. S. GRANT,

*Brigadier-General.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

*Fort Henry, February 6, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: Inclosed I send you my order for the attack upon Fort Henry. Owing to dispatches received from Major-General Halleck and corroborating information here to the effect that the enemy were rapidly re-enforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not up at 11 o'clock last night when my order was written, therefore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than 11 o'clock to-day to commence the investment.

The gunboats started up at the same hour to commence the attack, and engaged the enemy at not over 600 yards. In a little over one hour all the batteries were silenced and the fort surrendered at discretion to Flag-Officer Foote, giving us all their guns, camp and garrison



equipage, &c. The prisoners taken are General Tilghman and staff, Captain Taylor and company, and the sick. The garrison, I think, must have commenced their retreat last night or at an early hour this morning. Had I not felt it an imperative necessity to attack Fort Henry to-day I should have made the investment complete and delayed until to-morrow, so as to have secured the garrison. I do not now believe, however, that the result would have been any more satisfactory.

The gunboats have proved themselves well able to resist a severe cannonading. All the iron-clad boats received more or less shots—the flag-ship some 28—without any serious damage to any except the Essex. This vessel received one shot in her boiler that disabled her, killing and wounding some 32 men, Captain Porter among the wounded.

I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry with the forces employed, unless it looks feasible to occupy that place with a small force that could retreat easily to the main body. I shall regard it more in the light of an advance grand guard than as a permanent post. •

For the character of the works at Fort Henry I will refer you to reports of the engineers, which will be required.

Owing to the intolerable state of the roads no transportation will be taken to Fort Donelson and but little artillery, and that with double teams.

Hoping that what has been done will meet the approval of the major-general commanding the department, I remain, &c.,

U. S. GRANT,  
Brigadier-General.

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.*

[Inclosure.]

FIELD ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
No. 1. } *Camp in Field, near Fort Henry, February 5, 1862.*

The First Division, General J. A. McClernand commanding, will move at 11 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, under the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, and take a position on the roads from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and Dover. It will be the special duty of this command to prevent all re-enforcements to Fort Henry or escape from it, also to be held in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm promptly on the receipt of orders. Two brigades of the Second Division, General C. F. Smith commanding, will start at the same hour from the west bank of the river, and take and occupy the heights commanding Fort Henry. This point will be held by so much artillery as can be made available and such other troops as in the opinion of the general commanding Second Division may be necessary for its protection. The Third Brigade, Second Division, will advance up the east bank of the Tennessee River as fast as can be securely done, and be in readiness to charge upon the fort or move to the support of the First Division, as may be necessary. All the forces on the west bank of the river not required to hold the heights commanding Fort Henry will return to their transports, cross to the east bank, and follow the First Division as rapidly as possible. The west bank of the Tennessee River not having been reconnoitered, the commanding officer intrusted with taking possession of the enemy's works there will proceed with great caution, and obtain such information as can be gathered and such guides as can be found in the time intervening before 11 o'clock to-morrow.

The troops will move with two days' rations of bread and meat in

their haversacks. One company of the Second Division, armed with rifles, will be ordered to report to Flag-Officer Foote, as sharpshooters, on board the gunboats.

By order:

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

#### No. 4.

*Report of Brig. Gen. John A. McClelland, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,  
*Fort Foote, February 10, 1862.*

GENERAL: Following is the report of the operations of the First Division of the advance forces, under my command, from the date of their embarkation at Cairo, on the 2d instant, to the date of their marching from Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, to this place:

The division consisted of the First and Second Brigades of the Army of the District of Cairo, of which you were chief.

The First Brigade, commanded by Col. R. J. Oglesby, acting as brigadier, was composed of the Eighth, Lieut. Col. F. L. Rhoads; Eighteenth, Col. M. K. Lawler; Twenty-ninth, Col. James S. Rearden; Thirtieth, Lieut. Col. E. S. Dennis, and Thirty-first Regiments, Col. John A. Logan; Stewart's, Dollins', O'Harnett's, and Carmichael's cavalry companies; Schwartz's battery, Lieut. G. C. Gumbart, commanding, and Dressei's battery of James rifled pieces.

The Second Brigade, commanded by Col. W. H. L. Wallace, was composed of the Eleventh, Lieut. Col. T. E. G. Ransom; Twentieth, Col. C. C. Marsh; Forty-fifth, Lieut. Col. J. A. Maltby, and Forty-eighth Regiments, Col. I. N. Haynie; Fourth Cavalry, Col. T. Lyle Dickey, and Taylor's and McAllister's batteries; all Illinois volunteers, except a few men in Schwartz's battery.

The staff of the First Division consisted of the following officers: Maj. M. Brayman, Twenty-ninth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant-general; Capt. A. Schwartz, light artillery, acting chief of staff; Capt. Warren Stewart, Independent Cavalry, acting aide; Capt. James Dunlap, assistant quartermaster and aide; H. P. Stearns, surgeon and acting aide; Lieut. Henry C. Freeman, acting engineer and aide; Lieut. William H. Heath, acting assistant commissary of subsistence and aide; Lieut. E. S. Jones, Twenty-seventh Regiment, ordnance officer and aide.

Arriving at Paducah at 3 o'clock p. m. of the 2d instant in advance of the transports bearing my division, I awaited their coming up, and in the mean time sought an interview with you, in which you instructed me to continue my advance up the Tennessee River. Prescribing the order in which the transports should proceed and preceded by two gunboats, assigned by Flag-Officer Foote as a convoy, we immediately started, and without accident or delay disembarked at Itra Landing, in Tennessee, 8 miles below Fort Henry, at 4.30 o'clock a. m. next day.

At the moment of disembarking I issued the following field order, viz:

Commanders of brigades, before landing their troops, will cause one company of infantry to be detailed for the purpose of affording protection and other assistance to

each battery. These companies will defend the batteries to the last, the cannoneers having only to attend to the working of the guns.

In forming encampments for the troops, commanders of brigades will strictly observe the following instructions, viz :

1st. The artillery will be placed in the most commanding positions, at all times giving it as wide a range as possible.

2d. Adequate support must always be given to the batteries, and for this purpose the infantry camps should be suitably arranged.

3d. In the absence of commanding positions for the artillery within the limits of the camp it will be placed centrally, so as to be protected by infantry in front and rear and on the flanks. In the latter case the guns will not be unlimbered.

4th. Cavalry not on picket or other duty will be kept in the rear.

5th. In all cases practicable infantry camps will be formed, so as to facilitate an immediate formation in line of battle before the encampment and fronting the enemy.

6th. Public roads and other means of communication must not be obstructed by encampments or baggage trains.

7th. Requisitions and returns for provisions and forage must be made in due form, approved by brigade commanders, and correspond with the showing of the proper reports.

8th. Commanders of brigades are expressly enjoined to punish all depredators upon the persons or property of peaceful citizens—such depredators being members of their commands. In short, as an assurance of success, the utmost discipline and most perfect subordination are required and expected.

Having disembarked at Itra Landing and sent out Lieutenant Freeman and Captain Schwartz to select suitable ground for encamping my division; having also sent forward a detachment of cavalry to reconnoiter toward the enemy, and having gone forward with Captain Stewart, of my staff, for the same purpose, you came up, and upon my return, and in view of the fuller information you had obtained, ordered the re-embarkation of my division, preparatory to a second disembarkation nearer Fort Henry at a more favorable point.

By 10 o'clock, and before the transports bearing any other of our troops had come in sight, preceded by myself and staff, my division had reached Bailey's Ferry, 4 miles below Fort Henry, and by 3 o'clock p. m. had all disembarked on the Tennessee shore. In the mean time a loyal citizen, being the proprietor of a neighboring farm house, informed me that mounted pickets of the enemy had been posted hard by, where some of them had been seen about the time of our landing. Corroborative of this report, upon my return to our transports I observed several mounted pickets of the enemy on the opposite or Kentucky shore of the river. A shot or two from the carbine of one of my orderlies, followed by a shell from one of the gunboats, dispersed not only them, but another party of the enemy in sight farther up the river. Immediately after I ordered an inland movement, which served both as a reconnaissance in force and as an occupation of the neighboring hills.

At this time the Fourth Illinois Cavalry (Colonel Dickey), which had been disembarked at Patterson's Ferry, 13 miles above Paducah, had not joined us, in consequence of heavy rains and miry roads; but making the most of my means, I ordered a small cavalry force to reconnoiter toward the fort, which, soon encountering the enemy's pickets, drove them back. While this was going on my infantry and artillery had moved inland, and, occupying the crest of a range of hills running parallel with and near the river, bivouacked in line of battle, prepared to meet any emergency. The formation of the hills and the disposition of my forces of all arms relatively to the hills, the river, and the enemy are illustrated by the diagram herewith inclosed.\*

A reconnaissance made the same evening by myself and staff convinced me of the expediency of sending forward a battery, supported by at least two regiments of infantry, to command the road leading to Fort

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\*Not found.



Henry where it crossed Panther Creek. By an early hour next morning this had been done. At this place, named by me Camp Halleck, the portion of Colonel Cook's brigade with him, including a battery of Major Cavender's Missouri artillery, formed a part of my command until General Smith's division, of which it was a part, came up.

At Camp Halleck, on the night of the 4th, my men lighted their camp fires for the first time since their departure from Cairo. In the mean time the rations which they had drawn for the 1st and 2d of February had been consumed. On the 4th they had twice disembarked and once embarked, closing the labors and trials of the day by ascending to the crest of high and rocky hills, up which they hauled their artillery by hand and the aid of prolonged ropes. Here, bivouacking in the cold, they cooked a meal for the first time in three days.

Our camp, marked distinctly by its numerous fires, ranging along the crest and down the slopes of lofty hills and in the valley toward the river, together with the many transports and gunboats which had come up and formed the foreground, exhibited a most grand and imposing spectacle, and, having been witnessed by the enemy's scouts on the opposite side of the river, multiplied in their imaginations our numbers, and, as we afterward learned from prisoners, materially contributed to induce the early evacuation of Fort Henry.

On the 5th I ordered Col. R. J. Oglesby, commanding the First Brigade, to send a strong detachment of infantry and cavalry, under instructions to reconnoiter the country between Camp Halleck and Fort Henry, the approaches and accessibility of the latter, and its position and various external relations. The order was promptly executed, under the personal supervision of Colonel Oglesby, accompanied by Col. J. D. Webster, chief of your staff, Capt. A. Schwartz, chief of my staff, and Lieut. H. C. Freeman, engineer of my division and also a member of my staff, whose zeal and efficiency were rewarded by valuable information gained.

During this reconnaissance Captain Schwartz and Lieutenant Freeman, together with their orderlies, being in advance, encountered the pickets of the enemy at the crossing of two paths, about one mile and a half from the fort. A few shots caused the enemy to disappear, but, as was supposed, for the purpose of returning with increased numbers and the hope of capturing our party. Captain Schwartz and Lieutenant Freeman having reported what had transpired and the supposed intention of the enemy to Colonel Oglesby, the latter promptly moved forward his detachment of infantry to and beyond the spot where the enemy had been seen. In the mean time the enemy had shown himself in the rear both of our infantry and cavalry, with the evident design of cutting off the latter. Not being apprised of the proximity of the former, Captain Dollins instantly turned upon the superior numbers of the enemy and boldly met him, and after a sharp skirmish of some ten minutes, in which one man was killed and several wounded on each side, put him to flight, forcing him to abandon a number of his guns and sabers, which were carried away by our cavalry as trophies. All this was done before it was possible for the infantry to extend to Captain Dollins the support which had been promptly attempted by Colonel Oglesby.

On the 5th the division commanded by Brig. Gen. C. F. Smith came up from Paducah to Camp Halleck, and was disembarked on the opposite bank of the river; and about dark the Fourth Illinois Cavalry also came up after a laborious march and joined my division. During the

same evening I had the honor to receive from you the following field order:

The First Division, General J. A. McClelland commanding, will move at 11 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, under the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, and take position on the roads from Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Dover.

2d. It will be the special duty of this command to prevent all re-enforcements to Fort Henry or escapes from it; also to be held in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm promptly on the receipt of orders.

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4th. The Third Brigade, Second Division (General Smith), will advance up the east or same bank of the Tennessee River as fast as it can be securely done, and be in readiness to charge upon the fort or to move to the support of the First Division, as may be necessary.

5th. All of the forces on the west bank of the river not required to hold the heights commanding Fort Henry will return to their transports, cross to the east bank, and follow the Third Brigade as rapidly as possible.

In pursuance of this order, notwithstanding the heavy rains throughout the previous night, which found my division without tents and ill prepared for exposure, it was put in motion by 11 o'clock a. m. of the 6th in the order of march previously directed by me, and so as to enable the different brigades and arms of my command to afford mutual support in case of an attack.

The distance from Camp Halleck to Fort Henry by the route of our march is about 8 miles, whereas by the river it is only half that distance. By 1 o'clock p. m. we had accomplished a march of 4 miles, when the firing of our gunboats upon the fort, being distinctly heard by my men, was hailed by loud shouts, and they pushed on with increased eagerness, hoping to reach the fort in time to cut off the retreat and secure the surrender of the enemy.

About 3 o'clock p. m., the report coming back that the enemy were evacuating the fort, I immediately sent an order to my cavalry in advance to make rapid pursuit if upon investigation it were found to be true.

A similar order had also been sent forward by Colonel Oglesby. Captain Stewart, of my staff, with a squad of his own cavalry, first coming up with the enemy, boldly charged his rear while he was in the act of clearing the outer line of his defenses, while a portion of Colonel Dickey's cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel McCullough, also hastening up, pursued the enemy several miles and until nightfall, and successively overtaking his rear guards of cavalry and infantry quickly dispersed them, killing 1 man, capturing 38 prisoners, and driving him to abandon six pieces of artillery, with their gun-carriages and one caisson, a large number of different kinds of small-arms, knapsacks, blankets, animals; in short, everything calculated to impede his flight, which were subsequently brought into the fort by detachments respectively under the command of Colonel Logan, Captain Dresser, and Lieutenant Gumbart.

The Eighteenth Regiment, Colonel Lawler, forming the head of the column, composed of the First Brigade, eagerly hastening forward, first reached the fort, entering the same at 3.30 o'clock p. m., and were immediately followed by the remainder of that brigade.

The Second Brigade, under the able and judicious lead of Col. W. H. L. Wallace, although unavoidably detained by a battery of heavy siege guns and the aggravated condition of the roads, followed close upon the First, and soon after the portion of Colonel Cook's brigade with him, thus completing the arrival of all the forces under my command within the enemy's works, where they encamped for the night in his deserted



huts and tents—Captain Stewart, of my staff, being temporarily assigned to the command of the main fort.

Although the letter of your order required the halting of my column near the junction of the Dover and Bailey's Ferry roads, some 2 miles from the fort, in view of the information already referred to I did not deem it within its spirit to do so, and accordingly pressed on, as already mentioned, having accomplished a march of near 8 miles in four hours and a half, over the worst possible roads, cutting a portion of them through woods and bridging several streams made too deep for fording by recent rains.

Upon entering the fort it was found to have been defended by seventeen heavy and effective guns, well mounted, and so disposed as to command both river and land approaches. The whole number of guns taken, including the six field pieces brought in as before mentioned, amount to twenty-three. The fortifications are extensive, and afford evidence of a high degree of engineering skill and great labor. Their hasty surrender without a more protracted struggle can only be accounted for by the terrible cannonade from our gunboats and their apprehension of being cut off from retreat by the rapid advance of our land forces.

The casualties in my command, except those already recounted, were chiefly confined to the loss and injury of animals and other property, and are chargeable to the desperate condition of the roads.

The gallant and successful attack made by the gunboats under Flag-Officer Foote is worthy to challenge our warmest admiration, and reflects the highest credit upon him and all the officers and men of his command who participated in it. The success of the Mississippi River fleet in this signal instance triumphantly demonstrates the efficiency of that arm of the public service. As a just tribute to distinguished merit I have the honor to announce the name of Fort Henry has been changed to Fort Foote, by an order formally published by me to that effect.

Of my own command it is my duty as well as my pleasure to say that both officers and men did their whole duty with the most commendable spirit and alacrity. It was the first of the land forces to enter the fort, and I may truly say for them it is their greatest regret that circumstances beyond their control prevented them from accomplishing their greatest desire, which was to cut off the enemy's retreat and force him to fight or surrender.

JOHN A. McCCLERNAND,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Division.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding District of Cairo.*

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No. 5.

*Report of General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Western Department.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*Bowling Green, Ky., February 8, 1862.*

SIR: No reliable particulars of the loss of Fort Henry have yet reached me. This much, however, is known, that nearly all of the force at Fort Henry retreated to Fort Donelson, and it is said that General Tilghman and about 80 officers and men surrendered in the fort.

The capture of that fort by the enemy gives them the control of the



navigation of the Tennessee River, and their gunboats are now ascending the river to Florence.

Operations against Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, are about to be commenced, and that work will soon be attacked.

The slight resistance at Fort Henry indicates that the best open earthworks are not reliable to meet successfully a vigorous attack of iron-clad gunboats, and, although now supported by a considerable force, I think the gunboats of the enemy will probably take Fort Donelson without the necessity of employing their land force in co-operation, as seems to have been done at Fort Henry.

Our force at Fort Donelson, including the force from Fort Henry and three regiments of General Floyd's command, is about 7,000 men, not well armed or drilled, except Heiman's regiment and the regiments of Floyd's command.

General Floyd's command and the force from Hopkinsville is arriving at Clarksville, and can (if necessary) reach Donelson in four hours by steamers, which are there.

Should Fort Donelson be taken, it will open the route to the enemy to Nashville, giving them the means of breaking the bridges and destroying the ferry-boats on the river as far as navigable.

The occurrence of the misfortune of losing the fort will cut off the communication of the force here, under General Hardee, from the south bank of the Cumberland. To avoid the disastrous consequences of such an event I ordered General Hardee yesterday to make (as promptly as it could be done) preparations to fall back to Nashville and cross the river.

The movements of the enemy on my right flank would have made a retrograde in that direction to confront the enemy indispensable in a short time. But the probability of having the passage of this army corps across the Cumberland intercepted by the gunboats of the enemy admits of no delay in making the movement.

Generals Beauregard and Hardee are equally with myself impressed with the necessity of withdrawing our force from this line at once.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

HON. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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No. 6.

*Report of Lieut. Col. Jeremy F. Gilmer, C. S. Army, chief engineer,  
upon the defense of Fort Henry.*

ENGINEER'S OFFICE,  
Decatur, Ala., March 17, 1862.

COLONEL: In obedience to General Johnston's orders of January 29, received at Nashville, I proceeded the next day to Fort Donelson and thence to Fort Henry, to inspect the works and direct what was necessary to be done at both.

I arrived at Fort Henry the afternoon of the 31st, when I met Brigadier-General Tilghman commanding the defenses on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. By the exertions of the commanding general, aided by Lieut. Joseph Dixon, his engineer officer, the main fort (a strong

field work of fine bastion front) had been put in a good condition for defense, and seventeen guns mounted on substantial platforms, twelve of which were so placed as to bear well on the river. These twelve guns were of the following description: One 10-inch columbiad, one rifled gun of 24-pounder caliber (weight of ball 62 pounds), two 42-pounders, and eight 32-pounders, all arranged to fire through embrasures formed by raising the parapet between the guns with sand bags carefully laid.

In addition to placing the main work in good defensive order I found that extensive lines of infantry cover had been thrown up by the troops forming the garrison, with a view to hold commanding ground that would be dangerous to the fort if possessed by the enemy. These lines and the main work were on the right hand of the river and arranged with good defensive relations, making the place capable of offering a strong resistance against a land attack coming from the eastward. On the left bank of the river there was a number of hills within cannon range that commanded the river batteries on the right bank. The necessity of occupying these hills was apparent to me at the time I inspected Fort Henry early in November last, and on the 21st of that month Lieutenant Dixon, the local engineer, was ordered from Fort Donelson to Fort Henry to make the necessary surveys and construct the additional works. He was at the same time informed that a large force of slaves, with troops to protect them, from Alabama, would report to him for the work, which was to be pushed to completion as early as possible.

The surveys were made by the engineer and plans decided upon without delay; but by some unforeseen cause the negroes were not sent until after the 1st of January last. Much valuable time was thus lost, but under your urgent orders, when informed of the delay, General Tilghman and his engineers pressed these defenses forward so rapidly, night and day, that when I reached the fort (January 31 last) they were far advanced, requiring only a few days' additional labor to put them in a state of defense. But no guns had been received that could be put in these works except a few field pieces; and, notwithstanding every effort had been made to procure them from Richmond, Memphis, and other points, it was apprehended they would not arrive in time to anticipate the attack of the enemy, which, from the full information obtained by General Tilghman, was threatened at an early day either at Fort Henry or Fort Donelson, or possibly on both at the same time. The lines of infantry cover, however, which had been thrown up were capable of making a strong resistance, even without the desired artillery, should the attack be made on that (the left) bank of the river. Experimental firing with the 10-inch columbiad, mounted in main work, showed a defect in the cast-iron carriage and chassis, which threatened to impair the usefulness of this most important gun. With the ordinary charge of 16 pounds of powder the recoil was so great as to cause most violent shocks against the rear hurter, threatening each time to dismount the piece. With the aid of an ingenious mechanic clamps were finally made, which served to resist, in some degree, the violence of the recoil. With this exception the guns bearing on the river were in fair working order.

After the batteries of the main work were mounted General Tilghman found much difficulty in getting competent artillerists to man them, and he was not supplied with a sufficient number of artillery officers.

Impressed with the great deficiency in the preparations for defending the passage of the river at Fort Henry, the commanding officer ex-

pressed to me his fears that it might cause disaster if the place were vigorously attacked by the enemy's gunboats. This he thought his greatest danger.

In conjunction with General Tilghman I made every effort during the three days I remained at Fort Henry to get all the works and batteries in as good condition for defense as the means at hand would permit. February 3 we went over to Fort Donelson to do the same. The works there required additions, to prevent the enemy from occupying grounds dangerous to the river batteries and the field work which had been constructed for the immediate defense landward. It was also important that better protection should be made for the heavy guns (mounted for the defense of the river) by raising the parapet with sand bags between the guns to give greater protection to the gunners.

The 3d and 4th days of February were devoted to making preparations for this work and locating lines of infantry cover on the commanding ground around the fort.

In the midst of these labors, on the 4th, heavy firing was heard in the direction of Fort Henry, which warned General Tilghman that the enemy had made his attack upon that work. This was soon confirmed by a report from Colonel Heiman, to the effect that the gunboats had opened fire and that troops were being landed on the right bank of the river  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 4 miles below the fort. The general decided to return to the Tennessee River at once, and expressed with some anxiety a wish that I would accompany him. I finally took the responsibility of doing so, with the hope that my professional services might possibly prove useful during the defense.

On arriving at Fort Henry we found the enemy had landed additional troops below, and that every preparation was being made to attack by land and water. The necessary dispositions for defense were at once entered upon, by making a special organization of the troops and assigning commands to the officers.

Early the next morning, February 5, the troops were drawn out under arms, and marched to the respective points each body was to defend—this with a view to insure order in case it became necessary to form promptly in face of the enemy. The main body of the forces was assigned to the defense of the advanced lines of infantry cover, where they were in a measure beyond the range of shot and shell from the gunboats, and the troops inside of the main fort were to be limited to the men who had received some instructions in the use of heavy guns and such additional force as could be useful in bringing up full supplies of ammunition. Those assigned to the fort were practiced at the battery under the immediate supervision of the commanding officer, and each one taught with as much care as possible his duty in anticipation of the threatened attack.

In such preparations the day was consumed, and it was only at night-fall that the troops were relieved to seek food and rest, it being quite apparent that the enemy would not attack until next day.

#### ATTACK ON FORT HENRY, FEBRUARY 6, 1862.

During the early part of the day preparations of the enemy for an advance with his gunboats could be observed from the fort; also the movements of troops at their encampments along the bank of the river below, making it evident that we were to be attacked by land as well as by water.

About 11.30 o'clock one of the gunboats had reached the head of the



island, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles below our batteries; another soon followed, then a third and a fourth, all coming as nearly abreast as the width of the river would permit. As soon as this line was formed a rapid fire was opened upon our works about 12.30 o'clock, which was returned with spirit by our gunners, who were all at their places eager for the contest. In a short time after the rifled cannon burst, killing 3 of the men at the piece and disabling a number of others. The effect of this explosion was very serious upon our artillerists; first, because it made them doubt the strength of these large guns to resist the shock of full charges, and, secondly, because much was expected from the long range of rifled cannon against the gunboats. Still, all stood firmly to their work, under a most terrific fire from the advancing foe, whose approach was steady and constant.

From the rear of their lines a fifth gunboat was observed to be firing curved shot, many of which fell within the work, but to the rear of our guns. Many shot and shell were lodged in the parapet, making deep penetrations, but in no case passing through, unless they struck the cheek of an embrasure. One of the 32-pounder guns was struck by a heavy shell passing through the embrasure. All the gunners at this piece were disabled and the gun rendered unfit for service.

About the same moment a premature discharge occurred at one of the 42-pounder guns, causing the death of 3 men and seriously injuring the chief of the piece and others.

Not many moments later it was observed that the 10 inch columbiad was silent, the cause of which was at once examined into by General Tilghman, and it was found that the priming wire had been jammed and broken in the vent. A blacksmith (I regret I cannot recall the name of the gallant soldier) was sent for, and he labored with great coolness for a long time exposed to the warmest fire of the enemy, but in spite of his faithful and earnest efforts the broken wire remained in the vent, making this important gun unserviceable for the continued contest. By this time the gunboats, by a steady advance, had reached positions not over 600 or 700 yards from the fort. Our artillerists became very much discouraged when they saw the two heavy guns disabled, the enemy's boats apparently uninjured, and still drawing nearer and nearer. Some of them even ceased to work the 32-pounder guns, under the belief that such shot were too light to produce any effect upon the iron-clad sides of the enemy's boats.

Seeing this, General Tilghman did everything that it was possible to do to encourage and urge his men to further efforts. He assisted to serve one of the pieces himself for at least fifteen minutes; but his men were exhausted, had lost all hope, and there were none others to replace them at the guns. Finally, after the firing had continued about an hour and five minutes, but two guns from our batteries responded to the rapid firing of the enemy, whose shots were telling with effect upon our parapets. It was then suggested to the general that all was lost, unless he could replace the men at the guns by others who were not exhausted. He replied, "I shall not give up the work," and then made an effort to get men from the outer lines to continue the struggle. Failing in this, he sent instructions to the commanders of the troops in the exterior lines to withdraw their forces. As soon as this movement was commenced confusion among the retiring troops followed, many thinking it intended for a rapid retreat to escape from the enemy's forces, expected to approach from the point of landing below. A few moments later the flag was lowered.

From information received the strength of the enemy was estimated

at 9,000 men. These forces were advancing to cut off the communications with Fort Donelson. Probably the movement would have proved a success had the garrison remained a few hours longer. Our force at Fort Henry was about 3,200, of which less than 100 were surrendered with the fort.

The fall of Fort Henry and the power of the enemy to strike at once with an immense force at Fort Donelson, made it necessary that the army at Bowling Green should be withdrawn to a point which would secure a prompt passage of the Cumberland River. The vicinity of Nashville seemed the proper position. If the enemy were defeated at Donelson, with prompt re-enforcements there was still a hope that your army might resist the invader and defend that city; if Donelson fell, it could be promptly passed to the south bank of the river.\*

\* \* \* \* \*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,

*Lieut. Col. of Engineers, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General Western Department.*

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### No. 7.

*Report of Maj. Gen. Leondias Polk, C. S. Army, commanding at Columbus, Ky.*

COLUMBUS, KY., February 8, 1862.

General S. COOPER:

I am officially advised as follows:

FORT DONELSON, TENN., February 7, 1862.

General POLK:

Fort Henry has fallen. General Tilghman, Major Gilmer, and about 80 officers and men were surrendered with the fort. Colonel Heiman brought the rest of the command in good order to this point. About 3,000 in the aggregate arrived at 11 o'clock last night. Owing to the bad state of the roads and the high water of the various water-courses between the two forts, as well as to the fact that they were attacked in the rear by the enemy's cavalry, Colonel Heiman says it was a physical impossibility to save the field batteries. Nothing saved but the small-arms. Colonel Heiman will assume command here this morning until the arrival of General Pillow, who, we learn, will be down in a few hours. The telegraph line from Cumberland City is down. Colonel Heiman does not expect a fight here until to-morrow. I remain here by order of General Tilghman, and shall still do so, offering my services as volunteer aide to whoever is in command.

POWHATAN ELLIS,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

I am just advised the bridges on the Memphis and Bowling Green road over the Tennessee River are not destroyed, as reported. Three of the enemy's gunboats have gone up the Tennessee River as far as Florence. The bridge over Bear Creek, on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, threatened. I have sent six companies of Colonel Looney's regiment and one section of artillery with Deshler's Arkansas battery (Chalmers' regiment) from Corinth. Active preparations on the part of the Government for the defense of this frontier seem now indispensable.

L. POLK.

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\* Portion of report here omitted will be found in the report of the siege of Fort Donelson.



## No. 8.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, C. S. Army, commanding Fort Henry.*

FORT HENRY, TENN., *February 7, 1862.*

Through the courtesy of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding Federal forces, I am permitted to communicate with you in relation to the result of the action between the fort under my command at this place and the Federal gunboats on yesterday.

At 11.40 o'clock on yesterday morning the enemy engaged the fort with seven gunboats, mounting fifty-four guns. I promptly returned their fire with eleven guns bearing on the river. The action was maintained with great bravery by the force under my command until 1.50 p. m., at which time I had but four guns fit for service. At 1.55 p. m., finding it impossible to maintain the fort and wishing to spare the lives of the gallant men under my command, on consultation with my officers I surrendered the fort. Our casualties are small. The effect of our shot was severely felt by the enemy, whose superior and overwhelming force alone gave them the advantage.

The surrender of Fort Henry involved that of Captain Taylor and Lieutenants Watts and Weller, and one other officer of artillery; Captains Hayden and Miller, of the Engineers; Capts. H. L. Jones and McLaughlin, quartermaster's department, and Acting Assistant Adjutant-General McConnico and myself, with some 50 privates and 20 sick, together with all the munitions of war in and about the fort. I communicate this result with deep regret, but feel that I performed my whole duty in the defense of my post.

I take occasion to bear testimony to the gallantry of the officers and men under my command. They sustained their position with consummate bravery as long as there was any hope of success. I also take great pleasure in acknowledging the courtesy and consideration shown by Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant and Commander Foote and the officers under their command.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

RICHMOND, VA., *August 9, 1862.*

GENERAL: Inclosed you will please find a copy of my official report of the bombardment of Fort Henry, on February 6, 1862, by the Federal fleet, together with accompanying papers. The original of this report was forwarded from Alton, Ill., but, not having reached your office, I have prepared a copy of the same at the earliest moment practicable since my release from Fort Warren, Mass.

I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding.*

S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General C. S. Army.*

[Inclosure.]

FEBRUARY 12, 1862.

SIR: My communication of the 7th instant, sent from Fort Henry, having announced the fact of the surrender of that fort to Commodore



Foote, of the Federal Navy, on the 6th instant, I have now the honor to submit the following report of the details of the action, together with the accompanying papers, (marked A and B),\* containing a list of officers and men surrendered, together with casualties, &c.:

On Monday, February 3, in company with Major Gilmer, of the Engineers, I completed the inspection of the main work as well as outworks at Fort Heiman, south of the Tennessee River, as far as I had been able to perfect them, and also the main work, intrenched camp, and exterior line of rifle pits at Fort Henry. At 10 a. m. on that morning (the pickets on both sides of the Tennessee River extended well in our front, having reported no appearance of the enemy), I left, in company with Major Gilmer, for Fort Donelson, for the purpose of inspecting with him the defenses of that place.

Tuesday, the 4th instant, was spent in making a thorough examination of all the defenses at Fort Donelson. At noon heard heavy firing at Fort Henry for half an hour. At 4 p. m. a courier reached me from Colonel Heiman, at Fort Henry, informing me that the enemy were landing in strong force at Bailey's Ferry, 3 miles below and on the east bank of the river.

Delaying no longer than was necessary to give all proper orders for the arrangement of matters at Fort Donelson, I left with an escort of Tennessee cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt, for Fort Henry, accompanied by Major Gilmer, reaching that place at 11.30 p. m. I soon became satisfied that the enemy were really in strong force at Bailey's Ferry, with every indication of re-enforcements arriving constantly.

Colonel Heiman, of the Tenth Tennessee, commanding, with most commendable alacrity and good judgment, had thrown forward to the outworks covering the Dover road two pieces of light artillery, supported by a detachment from the Fourth Mississippi Regiment, under command of Capt. W. C. Red. Scouting parties of cavalry, operating on both sides of the river, had been pushed forward to within a very short distance of the enemy's lines. Without a moment's delay, after reaching the fort, I proceeded to arrange the available force to meet whatever contingency might arise.

The First Brigade, under Colonel Heiman, was composed of the Tenth Tennessee, Lieutenant Colonel MacGaveck commanding; the Twenty-seventh Alabama, under Colonel Hughes; the Forty-eighth Tennessee, under Colonel Voorhies; light battery of four pieces, commanded by Captain Culbertson, and the Tennessee Battalion of Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt. Total officers and men, 1,444.

The Second Brigade, Col. Joseph Drake (Fourth Mississippi Regiment) commanding, was composed of the Fourth Mississippi, under Major Adaire; the Fifteenth Arkansas, Colonel Gee; the Fifty-first Tennessee, Colonel Browder; Alabama Battalion, Major Garvin; light battery of three pieces, under Captain Crain; the Alabama Battalion of Cavalry; Captain Milner's company of cavalry, with Captain Padgett's spy company, and a detachment of Rangers, under Acting Captain Milton. Total officers and men, 1,215. The heavy artillery, under command of Captain Taylor, numbering 75 men, were placed at the guns in Fort Henry.

As indicated some time since to the general commanding the department, I found it impossible to hold the commanding ground south of the Tennessee River with the small force of badly-armed men at my command, and, notwithstanding the fact that all my defenses were com-

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\* Not found.

manded by the high ground on which I had commenced the construction of Fort Heiman, I deemed it proper to trust to the fact that the extremely bad roads leading to that point would prevent the movement of heavy guns by the enemy, by which I might be annoyed, and, leaving the Alabama Battalion of Cavalry and Captain Padgett's spy company on the western bank of the river, transferred the force encamped on that side to the opposite bank. At the time of receiving the first intimation of the approach of the enemy, the Forty-eighth and Fifty-first Tennessee Regiments having only just reported, were encamped at Danville and at the mouth of Sandy, and had to be moved from 5 to 20 miles in order to reach Fort Henry. This movement, together with the transfer of the Twenty-seventh Alabama and Fifteenth Arkansas Regiments from Fort Heiman across the river, was all perfected by 5 a. m. on the morning of the 5th.

Early on the morning of the 5th the enemy were plainly to be seen at Bailey's Ferry, 3 miles below. The large number of heavy transports reported by our scouts gave evidence of the fact that the enemy was there in force even at that time, and the arrival every hour of additional boats showed conclusively that I should be engaged with a heavy force by land, while the presence of seven gunboats, mounting fifty-four guns, indicated plainly that a joint attack was contemplated by land and water.

On leaving Fort Donelson I ordered Colonel Head to hold his own and Colonel Sugg's regiments, Tennessee volunteers, with two pieces of artillery, ready to move at a moment's warning, with three days' cooked rations, and without camp equipage or wagon train of any kind, except enough to carry the surplus ammunition.

On the morning of the 5th I ordered him, in case nothing more had been heard from the country below, on the Cumberland, at the time of the arrival of my messenger, indicating an intention on the part of the enemy to invest Fort Donelson, to move out with the two regiments and the two pieces of artillery and take position at the Furnace, half way on the Dover road to Fort Henry; the force embraced in this order was about 750 men, to act as circumstances might dictate.

Thus matters stood at 9 a. m. on the morning of the 5th. The wretched military position of Fort Henry and the small force at my disposal did not permit me to avail myself of the advantages to be derived from the system of outwork built with the hope of being re-enforced in time, and compelled me to determine to concentrate my efforts by land within the rifle pits surrounding the camp of the Tenth Tennessee and Fourth Mississippi Regiments in case I deemed it possible to do more than operate solely against the attack by the river. Accordingly my entire command was paraded and placed in the rifle pits around the above camps, and minute instructions given, not only to brigades, but to regiments and companies, as to the exact ground each was to occupy. Seconded by the able assistance of Major Gilmer, of the Engineers, of whose valuable services I thus early take pleasure in speaking, and by Colonels Heiman and Drake, everything was arranged to make a formidable resistance against anything like fair odds.

It was known to me on the day before that the enemy had reconnoitered the roads leading to Fort Donelson from Bailey's Ferry by way of Iron Mountain Furnace, and at 10 a. m. on the 5th I sent forward from Fort Henry a strong reconnoitering party of cavalry. They had not advanced more than  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles in the direction of the enemy when they encountered their reconnoitering party. Our cavalry charged them in gallant style, upon which the enemy's cavalry fell back, with a loss



of only 1 man on each side. Very soon the main body of the Federal advance guard, composed of a regiment of infantry and a large force of cavalry, was met, upon which our cavalry retreated.

On receipt of this news I moved out in person with five companies of the Tenth Tennessee, five companies of the Fourth Mississippi, and 50 cavalry, ordering at the same time two additional companies of infantry to support Captain Red at the outworks. Upon advancing well to the front I found that the enemy had retired. I returned to camp at 5 p. m., leaving Captain Red re-enforced at the outworks. The enemy were again re-enforced by the arrival of a number of large transports.

At night the pickets from the west bank reported the landing of troops on that side (opposite Bailey's Ferry), their advance picket having been met  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the river. I at once ordered Captain Hubbard, of the Alabama cavalry, to take 50 men, and, if possible, surprise them. The inclemency of the weather, the rain having commenced to fall in torrents, prevented anything being accomplished.

Early on the morning of the 6th Captain Padgett reported the arrival of five additional transports overnight and the landing of a large force on the west bank of the river at the point indicated above. From that time up to 9 o'clock it appeared as though the force on the east bank was again re-enforced, which was subsequently proven to be true.

The movements of the fleet of gunboats at an early hour prevented any communication, except by a light barge, with the western bank, and by 10 a. m. it was plain that the boats intended to engage the fort with their entire force, aided by an attack on our right and left flanks from the two land forces in overwhelming numbers.

To understand properly the difficulties of my position it is right that I should explain fully the unfortunate location of Fort Henry in reference to resistance by a small force against an attack by land co-operating with the gunboats, as well as its disadvantages in even an engagement with boats alone. The entire fort, together with the intrenched camp spoken of, is enfiladed from three or four points on the opposite shore, while three points on the eastern bank completely command them both, all at easy cannon range. At the same time the intrenched camp, arranged as it was in the best possible manner to meet the case, was two-thirds of it completely under the control of the fire of the gunboats. The history of military engineering records no parallel to this case. Points within a few miles of it, possessing great advantages and few disadvantages, were totally neglected, and a location fixed upon without one redeeming feature or filling one of the many requirements of a site for a work such as Fort Henry. The work itself was well built; it was completed long before I took command, but strengthened greatly by myself in building embrasures and epaulements of sand bags. An enemy had but to use their most common sense in obtaining the advantage of high water, as was the case, to have complete and entire control of the position.

I am guilty of no act of injustice in this frank avowal of the opinions entertained by myself, as well as by all other officers who have become familiar with the location of Fort Henry; nor do I desire the defects of location to have an undue influence in directing public opinion in relation to the battle of the 6th instant. The fort was built when I took charge, and I had no time to build anew. With this seeming digression, rendered necessary, as I believe, to a correct understanding of the whole affair, I will proceed with the details of the subsequent movements of the troops under my command.

By 10 a. m. on the 6th the movements of the gunboats and land



force indicated an immediate engagement, and in such force as gave me no room to change my previously-conceived opinions as to what, under such circumstances, should be my course. The case stood thus: I had at my command a grand total of 2,610 men, only one-third of whom had been at all disciplined or well armed. The high water in the river filling the sloughs gave me but one route by which to retire, if necessary, and that route for some distance in a direction at right angles to the line of approach of the enemy, and over roads well-nigh impassable for artillery, cavalry, or infantry. The enemy had seven gunboats, with an armament of fifty-four guns, to engage the eleven guns at Fort Henry. General Grant was moving up the east bank of the river from his landing, 3 miles below, with a force of 12,000 men, verified afterwards by his own statement, while General Smith, with 6,000 men, was moving up the west bank, to take a position within 400 or 500 yards, which would enable him to enfilade my entire works. The hopes (founded on a knowledge of the fact that the enemy had reconnoitered on the two previous days thoroughly the several roads leading to Fort Donelson) that a portion only of the land force would co-operate with the gunboats in an attack on the fort were dispelled, and but little time left me to meet this change in the circumstances which surrounded me. I argued thus: Fort Donelson might possibly be held, if properly re-enforced, even though Fort Henry should fall; but the reverse of this proposition was not true. The force at Fort Henry was necessary to aid Fort Donelson either in making a successful defense or in holding it long enough to answer the purposes of a new disposition of the entire army from Bowling Green to Columbus, which would necessarily follow the breaking of our center, resting on Forts Donelson and Henry. The latter alternative was all that I deemed possible. I knew that re-enforcements were difficult to be had, and that unless sent in such force as to make the defense certain, which I did not believe practicable, the fate of our right wing at Bowling Green depended upon a concentration of my entire division on Fort Donelson and the holding of that place as long as possible, trusting that the delay by an action at Fort Henry would give time for such re-enforcements as might reasonably be expected to reach a point sufficiently near Fort Donelson to co-operate with my division, by getting to the rear and right flank of the enemy, and in such a position as to control the roads over which a safe retreat might be effected. I hesitated not a moment. My infantry, artillery, and cavalry, removed of necessity to avoid the fire of the gunboats to the out-works, could not meet the enemy there; my only chance was to delay the enemy every moment possible and retire the command, now outside the main work, towards Fort Donelson, resolving to suffer as little loss as possible. I retained only the heavy artillery company to fight the guns, and gave the order to commence the movement at once.

At 10.15 o'clock Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock sent a messenger to me, stating that our pickets reported General Grant approaching rapidly and within half a mile of the advance work, and movements on the west bank indicated that General Smith was fast approaching also. The enemy, ignorant of any movement of my main body, but knowing that they could not engage them behind our intrenched camp until after the fort was reduced or the gunboats retired, without being themselves exposed to the fire of the latter, took a position north of the forks of the river road, in a dense wood (my order being to retreat by way of the Stewart road), to await the result.

At 11 a. m. the flotilla assumed their line of battle. I had no hope of being able successfully to defend the fort against such overwhelming

odds, both in point of numbers and in caliber of guns. My object was to save the main body by delaying matters as long as possible, and to this end I bent every effort.

At precisely 11.45 a. m. the enemy opened from their gunboats on the fort. I waited a few moments until the effects of the first shots of the enemy were fully appreciated. I then gave the order to return the fire, which was gallantly responded to by the brave little band under my command. The enemy, with great deliberation, steadily closed upon the fort, firing very wild until within 1,200 yards. The cool deliberation of our men told from the first shot fired with tremendous effect.

At 12.35 p. m. the bursting of our 24-pounder rifled gun disabled every man at the piece. This great loss was to us in a degree made up by our disabling entirely the Essex gunboat, which immediately floated downstream. Immediately after the loss of this valuable gun we sustained another loss, still greater, in the closing up of the vent of the 10-inch columbiad, rendering that gun perfectly useless and delaying all efforts to reopen it. The fire on both sides was now perfectly terrific. The enemy's entire force was engaged, doing us but little harm, while our shot fell with unerring certainty upon them and with stunning effect. At this time a question presented itself to me with no inconsiderable degree of embarrassment. The moment had arrived when I should join the main body of troops retiring toward Fort Donelson, the safety of which depended upon a protracted defense of the fort. It was equally plain that the gallant men working the batteries, for the first time under fire, with all their heroism, needed my presence. Colonel Heiman, the next in command, had returned to the fort for instructions. The men working the heavy guns were becoming exhausted with the rapid firing. Another gun became useless by an accident, and yet another by the explosion of a shell immediately after, striking the muzzle, involving the death of 2 men and disabling several others. The effect of my absence at such a critical moment would have been disastrous. At the earnest solicitation of many of my officers and men I determined to remain, and ordered Colonel Heiman to join his command and keep up the retreat in good order, while I should fight the guns as long as one man was left, and sacrifice myself to save the main body of my troops.

No sooner was this decision made known than new energy was infused. The enemy closed upon the fort to within 600 yards, improving very much in their fire, which now began to tell with great effect upon the parapets, while the fire from our guns (now reduced to seven) was returned with such deliberation and judgment that we scarcely missed a shot. A second one of the gunboats retired, but I believe was brought into action again.

At 1.10 p. m., so completely broken down were the men, that but for the fact that four only of our guns were then really serviceable I could not well have worked a greater number. The fire was still continued with great energy and tremendous effect upon the enemy's boats.

At 1.30 p. m. I took charge of one of the 32-pounders to relieve the chief of that piece, who had worked with great effect from the beginning of the action. I gave the flag-ship Cincinnati two shots, which had the effect to check a movement intended to enfilade the only guns now left me. It was now plain to be seen that the enemy were breaching the fort directly in front of our guns, and that I could not much longer sustain their fire without an unjustifiable exposure of the valuable lives of the men who had so nobly seconded me in this unequal struggle.

Several of my officers, Major Gilmer among the number, now suggested to me the propriety of taking the subject of a surrender into con-



sideration. Every moment I knew was of vast importance to those retreating on Fort Donelson, and I declined, hoping to find men enough at hand to continue a while longer the fire now so destructive to the enemy. In this I was disappointed. My next effort was to try the experiment of a flag of truce, which I waved from the parapets myself. This was precisely at 1.50 p. m. The flag was not noticed, I presume, from the dense smoke that enveloped it, and leaping again into the fort continued the fire for five minutes, when, with the advice of my brother officers, I ordered the flag to be lowered, and after an engagement of two hours and ten minutes with such an unequal force the surrender was made to Flag-Officer Foote, represented by Captain Stembel, commanding gunboat Cincinnati, and was qualified by the single condition that all officers should retain their side-arms, that both officers and men should be treated with the highest consideration due prisoners of war, which was promptly and gracefully acceded to by Commodore Foote.

The retreat of the main body was effected in good order, though involving the loss of about 20 prisoners, who from sickness and other causes were unable to encounter the heavy roads. The rear of the army was overtaken at a distance of some 3 miles from Fort Henry by a body of the enemy's cavalry, but, on being engaged by a small body of our men, under Major Garvin, were repulsed and retired.

This fact alone shows the necessity of the policy pursued by me in protracting the defense of the fort as long as possible, which only could have been done by my consenting to stand by the brave little band. No loss was sustained by our troops in this affair with the enemy.

I have understood from the prisoners that several pieces of artillery also were lost, it being entirely impossible to move them over 4 or 5 miles with the indifferent teams attached to them.

The entire absence of transportation rendered any attempt to move the camp equipage of the regiments impossible. This may be regarded as fortunate, as the roads were utterly impassable, not only from the rains, but the backwater of Tennessee River.

A small amount of quartermaster's and commissary stores, together with what was left of the ordnance stores, were lost to us also.

The tents of the Alabama Regiment were left on the west bank of the river, the gunboats preventing an opportunity to cross them over.

Our casualties may be reported strictly as follows: Killed by the enemy, 2; wounded severely by the enemy (one since dead), 3; wounded slightly by the enemy, 2; killed by premature explosion, 2; wounded seriously by premature explosion, 1; slightly wounded, 1; temporarily disabled by explosion of rifled gun, 5. Making total killed, 5; seriously wounded, 3; slightly wounded, 3; disabled, 5; missing, 5. Total casualties, 21.

The total casualties of the enemy were stated in my presence on the following morning to be 73, including 1 officer of the Essex killed, and Captain Porter, commanding the Essex, badly scalded.

The enemy report the number of shots that struck their vessels to have been 74, 28 of which struck the flag-ship Cincinnati, so disabling her as to compel her to return to Cairo. The Essex received 22 shots, one of which passed, we know, entirely through the ship, opening one of her boilers and taking off the head of Captain Porter's aide-de-camp. Several shots passed entirely through the Cincinnati, while her outer works were completely riddled. The weak points in all their vessels were known to us, and the cool precision of our firing developed them, showing conclusively that this class of boats, though formidable, cannot stand the test of even the 32-pounders, much less



the 24-caliber rifled shot or that of the 10-inch columbiad. It should be remembered that these results were principally from no heavier metal than the ordinary 32-pounders, using solid shot, fired at point-blank, giving the vessels all the advantages of their peculiar structures, with planes meeting this fire at angles of 45 degrees. The immense area, forming what may be called the roof, is in every respect vulnerable to either a plunging fire from even 32-pounders, or a curved line of fire from heavy guns. In the latter case shell should be used in preference to shot.

Confident of having performed my whole duty to my Government in the defense of Fort Henry, with the totally inadequate means at my disposal, I have but little to add in support of the views before expressed. The reasons for the line of policy pursued by me are to my mind convincing.

Against such overwhelming odds as 16,000 well-armed men (exclusive of the force on the gunboats) to 2,610 badly armed, in the field, and fifty-four heavy guns against eleven medium ones in the fort, no tactics or bravery could avail.

The rapid movements of the enemy, with every facility at their command, rendered the defense from the beginning a hopeless one.

I succeeded in doing even more than was to be hoped for at first. I not only saved my entire command outside of the fort, but damaged materially the flotilla of the enemy, demonstrating thoroughly a problem of infinite value to us in the future.

Had I been re-enforced, so as to have justified my meeting the enemy at the advanced works, I might have made good the land defense on the east bank. I make no inquiry as to why I was not, for I have entire confidence in the judgment of my commanding general.

The elements even were against us, and had the enemy delayed his attack a few days, with the river rising, one-third of the entire fortifications (already affected by it) would have been washed away, while the remaining portion of the works would have been untenable by reason of the depth of water over the whole interior portion.

The number of officers surrendered (see paper marked A\*) was 12; the number of non-commissioned officers and privates in the fort at the time of the surrender (see paper marked B)\* was 66, while the number in the hospital-boat Patton was (see paper marked C)\* 16.

I take great pleasure in making honorable mention of all the officers and men under my command. To Captain Taylor, of the artillery, and the officers of his corps, Lieutenants Watts and Weller; to Capt. G. R. G. Jones, in command of the right battery; to Captains Miller and Hayden, of the Engineers; to Acting Assistant Adjutant-General McConico; to Capt. H. L. Jones, brigade-quartermaster; to Captain McLaughlin, quartermaster of the Tenth Tennessee, and to Surgeons Voorhies and Horton, of the Tenth Tennessee, the thanks of the whole country are due for their consummate devotion to our high and holy cause. To Sergts. John Jones, Hallam, Cubine, and Silcurk, to Corporals Copass, Cavin, and Renfro, in charge of the guns, as well as to all the men, I feel a large debt is due for their bravery and efficiency in working the heavy guns so long and so efficiently.

Officers and men alike seemed actuated but by one spirit—that of devotion to a cause in which was involved life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Every blow struck was aimed by cool heads, supported by strong arms and honest hearts.

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\* Not found.

I feel that it is a duty I owe to Col. A. Heiman, commanding the Tenth Tennessee Regiment (Irish), to give this testimony of my high appreciation of him as a soldier and a man, due to his gallant regiment, both officers and men. I place them second to no regiment I have seen in the Army.

To Captain Dixon, of the Engineers, I owe (as does the whole country) my special acknowledgments of his ability and unceasing energies. Under his immediate eye were all the works proposed by myself at Fort Donelson and Heiman executed, while his fruitfulness in resources to meet the many disadvantages of position alone enabled us to combat its difficulties successfully.

To Lieutenant Watts, of the heavy artillery, as acting ordnance officer at Fort Henry, I owe this special notice of the admirable condition of the ordnance department at that post. Lieutenant Watts is the coolest officer under fire I ever met with.

I take pleasure in acknowledging the marked courtesy and consideration of Flag-Officer Foote, of the Federal Navy; of Captain Stembel and the other naval officers, to myself, officers, and men. Their gallant bearing during the action gave evidence of a brave and therefore generous foe.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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RICHMOND, VA., *August 9, 1862.*

My attention having been called, since writing the above report, to certain statements made in the somewhat unofficial reports of the battles of Fort Donelson, on the subject of the condition of the fortifications at that place at the time of the arrival of the re-enforcements, I deem it highly proper to protect my own as well as the reputation of the officers and men of my command, and place the facts of the case on record.

Nearly broken down by incessant work from the middle of June in organizing and perfecting the First Kentucky Brigade and in remodeling the brigade at Hopkinsville, Ky., I was not in the best condition, so late as December 15, to commence in a new field of operations, and work into perfect shape a third brigade and carry on the system of fortifications on both the Cumberland and Tennessee necessary for the defense of the important line intrusted to my care.

The facts of the case are simply these: On reaching Fort Donelson the middle of December I found at my disposal six undisciplined companies of infantry, with an unorganized light battery, while a small water battery of two light guns constituted the available river defense. Four 32-pounders had been rightly placed, but were not available. By January 25 I had prepared the entire batteries (except one piece, which arrived too late) for the river defenses; built the entire field work with a trace of 2,900 feet, and in the most substantial manner constructed a large amount of abatis, and commenced guarding the approaches by rifle pits and abatis. This was all done when the re-enforcements arrived, and, when the total lack of transportation is taken into consideration, as well as the inclemency of the season, and yet find not only the original troops there, but nearly all my re-enforcements housed in something like 400 good cabins, I conceive my time to have been well spent. While this was being done, the strengthening of Fort Henry, the building of all

the outworks around it, together with the advanced state of the new works south of Tennessee River, Fort Heiman, together with its line of outworks, of rifle pits, and abatis, was all thoroughly performed, and satisfies my own mind that officers and men could not have fallen short in their duties to have accomplished so much.

The failure of adequate support, doubtless from sufficient cause, cast me upon my own resources, and compelled me to assume responsibilities which may have worked a partial evil. I aimed at the general good, and am the last man to shrink from assuming what is most likely to accomplish such an end.

I would further state that I had connected both Forts Henry and Donelson by a line of telegraph from Cumberland City—total length of line about 35 miles—thus placing me in close relations with Bowling Green and Columbus.

[LLOYD TILGHMAN.]

*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

No. 9.



*Report of Lieut. Col. Milton A. Haynes, U. S. Army, Chief of Tennessee Corps of Artillery.*

RICHMOND, VA., March 22, 1862.

SIR: By direction of the honorable Secretary of War I have the honor to submit a report in regard to the defense and surrender of Fort Henry, February 6:

On January 15, Major-General Polk, by his order, a copy of which I annex,\* commanded me to proceed to Forts Henry and Donelson and take charge of the artillery forces in General Tilghman's division. Having been charged by General Tilghman with certain duties at Fort Donelson, on the night of February 5 I proceeded, attended only by my servant, to Fort Henry, but did not enter the fort until after daylight, not being able to cross the backwaters in the night. I then learned, for the first time, that the enemy had landed about 10,000 or 12,000 men at Bailey's Landing, 3 miles beyond the fort, on the same side of the river, and that ten gunboats and several transports were lying at the same point.

After hastily examining the works with Captain Hayden, of the Engineers, I gave it as my opinion that Fort Henry was untenable, and ought to be forthwith abandoned, first, because it was surrounded by water, then cut off from the support of the infantry, and was on the point of being submerged; second, because our whole force, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, amounted to little over 2,000 men, a force wholly inadequate to cope with that of the enemy, even if there had been no extraordinary rise in the river.

About 8 o'clock General Tilghman, who was on my arrival at Fort Heiman (the new but unfinished work on the opposite side of the river), came across to Fort Henry. I had a brief interview with him in regard to the steps to be taken at Fort Donelson, but, it becoming evident that the enemy would attack on that day, further consultation was postponed, and General Tilghman proceeded at once, without consultation with me, to make his dispositions for the defense of Fort Henry. He

\* Not found.



ordered Heiman's regiment to take a position with the main body of our troops outside of the backwater, followed by Lieutenant Culbertson's light battery of six pieces; and men were detailed to throw up earth to keep the water out of the magazine and to repair or extend a temporary bridge across the backwater. While these orders were being rapidly carried out, under the direction of Lieut. Col. R. W. MacGavock, I went around the fort, inspecting the condition of the guns, &c., accompanied by Capt. Jesse Taylor, whose company garrisoned the fort and manned the batteries. I found everything in good condition except the 16-inch columbiad (the only one in the fort), which, from a defect in the construction of the chassis, could be managed only with difficulty and slowly. In the mean time the enemy's gunboats had been taking their position and were making dispositions for an advance, and advices received from scouts showed that General Grant's army was in motion for the purpose of investing the post.

At 11.30 o'clock seven gunboats took their position in line across the river, advancing upon us. Our officers and men were at their posts and our guns trained upon the advancing flotilla, but our fire was withheld till the enemy came within 1,600 yards. A signal gun from the flagship of the enemy was also our signal to open fire, which was done by both sides promptly.

The firing continued for nearly two hours without intermission, the enemy having about sixteen or twenty guns opposed to our nine, a part of theirs being of 10-inch caliber, and we having but one 10-inch columbiad, badly mounted. In the midst of the battle our 32-pounder rifled gun (the most effective in our battery) exploded, killing Sergeant Cubine and disabling every man at the piece, as well as others at the neighboring guns. The shells of the enemy soon set fire in and outside of the fort, which we had not the power to extinguish. Their heavy shot tore away the cheeks of several of our embrasures, throwing the sand bags upon the banquette, and exposing our gunners to the direct shot of the enemy. Near the close of the engagement, which continued for nearly two hours, two of the enemy's gunboats floated down the river in a disabled condition, and the remaining gunboats, being now within 200 or 300 yards of the fort, our 32-pounder shot pierced their sides, tearing holes plainly visible to the naked eye, but apparently some of these guns were silenced. Our men being now reduced by wounds and exhaustion, we had not enough effective men to act as gunners, General Tilghman and other officers being compelled to take their places at the guns. While I was then engaged in working the *pan coupé* battery, some one gave the command, "Cease firing," which order I instantly countermanded, and continued the firing. Soon afterwards, as I was pointing a gun and in the act of firing it, a gunner near me exclaimed, "Look, some one has raised a white flag!" I ordered him to go and tear it down and shoot the man who raised it. This order was given by me because I supposed the flag had been raised without authority, especially as such an order ought to have been given through me as chief of artillery. The man instantly returned, informing me that General Tilghman had ordered the flag to be raised. I ordered the men to stand by their guns, and went to General Tilghman, who was at the middle battery, and asked him if he was going to surrender. His reply was, "Yes, we cannot hold out five minutes longer; our men are disabled, and we have not enough to man two guns." My reply was, "Then, sir, I will not surrender, and you have no right to include me in the capitulation as an officer of this garrison, I being here only for consultation with you." We then shook hands and I left the fort, and passing down

the river to a stable I found a horse without saddle or bridle, and, mounting him, I rode by the fort and passed up the bank of the river, and swam the sheet of backwater a mile above the fort, and soon afterwards came up with our forces *en route* for Fort Donelson, they having been withdrawn under cover of the cannonade, in obedience to General Tilghman's order, before General Grant's force had surrounded their position.

The light battery under Lieutenant Culbertson had been abandoned, he being unable to drag it through the muddy sloughs which he had to cross. His men and horses were then with the retreating army. The enemy's cavalry were hanging upon our rear, occasionally firing at and picking up those who lagged behind.

At 2 a. m. our forces reached Fort Donelson, with the loss of only a few men, having marched 22 miles, and forded Standing Rock Creek at five deep and rapid fords.

Colonel Heiman, having withdrawn from the fort at the close of the action, conducted the retreat in good order, constantly ready to engage the enemy if he had pursued us.

I considered the defense of Fort Henry a military necessity, in order to cover the retreat of our small army. Its defense was made by one small company of artillery, commanded by Capt. Jesse Taylor, General Tilghman and other officers taking part in the action. The whole force numbered, rank and file, less than 70 men, not enough to man all our guns.

Throughout the action General Tilghman displayed cool and manly courage, which commanded admiration and inspired our men with noble enthusiasm, which made them scorn the dangers by which they were surrounded.

All officers present, whether of the artillery or not, participated actively in the engagement, and all deserve praise for their conduct in the action, and Captain Taylor especially, for the skill, promptness, and courage of the officers and men of his company.

Fort Henry was of necessity compelled to surrender; if not to the gunboats, certainly to General Grant's investing army. The fault was in its location, not in its defenders.

The officers who surrendered were General Lloyd Tilghman, commanding Fourth Division; W. L. McCornico, acting assistant adjutant general; Capt. Charles Hayden, of the Engineers; Dr. Voorhies, assistant surgeon, C. S. Army; S. H. McLaughlin, assistant quartermaster; Capt. Jesse Taylor, commanding Tennessee Artillery, and Second Lieut. F. J. Weller and 50 non-commissioned officers and privates, of whom 10 or 12 were wounded.

Maj. J. F. Gilmer, of the Engineers, C. S. Army; Col. A. Heiman, commanding Tenth Tennessee Regiment, and myself, and two privates, wounded, effected their escape, separately—Major Gilmer on foot.

We lost ten pieces of heavy artillery, six field pieces, and a large supply of ordnance and quartermaster's stores—in fact, everything but honor.

I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

MILTON A. HAYNES,

*Lieut. Col. of Art., and Chief of Tenn. Corps of Vol. Art.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant-General C. S. Army.*

## No. 10.

*Report of Col. A. Heiman, Tenth Tennessee Infantry.*

RICHMOND, VA., August 11, 1862.

SIR: Inclosed herewith please find my report in regard to the bombardment and surrender of Fort Henry. I prepared this report at Fort Donelson immediately after the fall of Fort Henry, but my imprisonment after the surrender of the troops at Fort Donelson prevented me from forwarding it to the proper authorities before now. I have now the honor to submit it to you with my high regards.

Your most obedient servant,

A. HEIMAN,  
*Colonel Tenth Tennessee Regiment.*

Adjutant-General COOPER.

[Inclosure.]

FORT DONELSON, TENN., February 8, 1862.

In the absence of General Tilghman, who is a prisoner in the hands of the enemy, being next in command of his division, it becomes my duty, and I have the honor, to submit to you the following report in regard to the bombardment and surrender of Fort Henry and the subsequent retreat of its garrison to Fort Donelson:

The armament of the fort consisted of ten 32-pounders, two 42-pounders, two 12-pounders, one 24-pounder rifled gun, and one 10-inch columbiad. The garrison consisted of my regiment, Tenth Tennessee, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock; the Fourth Mississippi, Colonel Drake; two companies of the Third Alabama Battalion, Major Garvin; a company of artillery, commanded by Captain Taylor; one company of Forrest's cavalry, Captain Milner, and 40 mounted men, acting Captain Milton, stationed as picket and rocket guard at Bailey's Landing, 3 miles below the fort; Captain Culbertson's light battery (four 6 pounders and one 6-pounder rifled gun), amounting in all to an aggregate of 1,885 men.

The heights on the opposite side of the river, with the unfinished works of Fort Heiman, were occupied by the Twenty-seventh Alabama Regiment, Colonel Hughes; the Fifteenth Arkansas, Colonel Gee; two companies of Alabama cavalry, commanded by Captains Hubbard and Houston, and an unorganized company of 40 men, Kentucky cavalry, Captain Padgett, and a section of a light battery, commanded by Lieutenant Hankinicz,\* amounting in all to 1,100 men.

At Paris Landing, 5 miles above the fort, the Forty-eighth Tennessee, Colonel Voorhies, and the Fifty-first Tennessee, Colonel Browder, were stationed. These were skeleton regiments, containing together not more than 400 men.

With the exception of the Tenth Tennessee and the Fourth Mississippi these were all new troops, who had just entered the service. They were not drilled, were badly equipped, and very indifferently armed with shot-guns and Tennessee rifles. None of the cavalry had either sabers or pistols, and were only partly armed with double-barreled shot-guns; no other equipments whatever. There was much sickness among the new troops, so that the forces for the defense of Forts Henry and

\* Reference is probably to P. K. Stankieutiz, who succeeded Capt. Jesse Taylor in command of battery.



Heiman did not amount to more than 2,600 effective men. There were also at Fort Henry the steamers Dunbar, Captain Fowler; Lynn Boyd, Captain Smedley; Appleton Belle, Captain Heffernan (regular packet from the fort to Danville); the Samuel Orr and the Patton. The latter two boats were used for hospitals.

General Tilghman's division headquarters being at Fort Donelson, where he was untiring in his exertions to complete the defenses of that post, Fort Henry during his absence was under my command.

On the morning of the 4th instant, at 4.30 o'clock, the sentinel at our 3-gun battery announced a rocket signal from the picket at Bailey's Landing, which was immediately answered by a rocket from the fort, when three more rockets went up from the picket, announcing the approach of three of the enemy's gunboats. The eleven guns bearing on the river were immediately manned and shotted and everything held in readiness for an attack. The steamers were all moved out of range of the enemy's gunboats, and the Dunbar and Boyd were dispatched to Paris Landing for the two regiments stationed there. I sent a courier to General Tilghman, at Fort Donelson, informing him of these facts.

Shortly after daylight the pickets on both sides of the river reported a large fleet coming up, and the smoke from several gunboats now became visible over the island. I directed Captain Ellis, of the Tenth, with a small escort of mounted men, to proceed down on the right bank of the river, and Captain Anderson, of the same regiment, on the opposite bank, to reconnoiter and ascertain whether the enemy was landing troops. I directed Captain Milner, with his company of cavalry, to occupy the several roads leading from Bailey's Landing to the fort, and throw forward a sufficient number of pickets and vedettes. I directed Colonel Drake to send two companies of his regiment and a section of Culbertson's battery to the rifle pits for the defense of the Dover road, about three-quarters of a mile from the fort, while Major Garvin occupied the rifle pits across the road leading to Bailey's Landing. Twelve torpedoes were sunk in the chute of the river at the foot of the island. For want of powder and time none were sunk in the main channel. Those sunk were rendered utterly useless by the heavy rise in the river.

At about 9 o'clock the gunboats commenced throwing shells at the quarters of our pickets and other buildings in the neighborhood of Bailey's Landing.

Captain Ellis returned, reporting eight gunboats and ten large transports in the river, and that they were landing their cavalry. He also stated that he had seen two light batteries or barges, but that no troops were at that time landing on the opposite side of the river. I again sent a courier to General Tilghman, informing him of these facts. During all this time he had a large force at work on the epaulements and trying to keep the water out of the fort. The lower magazine had already 2 feet of water in it, and the ammunition had been removed to a temporary magazine above ground, which had but very little protection, but we had been at work day and night for the last week to cover it with sand bags and to protect it by a traverse.

At about 12 o'clock five gunboats came in sight in the main channel. All the troops, except the heavy artillery force, were marched out of range of the enemy's guns. The gunboats formed in line of battle across the channel about 2 miles below the fort, beyond the range of our 32-pounders. I gave positive orders that none of these guns should be fired unless the boats came within their range; therefore we had only to depend on the 24-pounder rifled gun and the 10-inch columbiad; the

latter gun, with an iron carriage on an iron chassis, had, on previous trials of firing with 20-pound charges, proved defective, owing to the too great recoil for the length of the chassis or other defects. This was, however, remedied by clamping the carriage to the chassis, and even then it recoiled with such tremendous force against the hurters, that in almost every instance it disarranged the pintle. I have since learned that this defect was common to these guns.

At about 1 o'clock the gunboats opened fire with shell and shot, which was immediately returned by our rifled gun and 10-inch columbiad. The former fired Archer shells. At the third or fourth fire one of the clamps of the columbiad broke, and fearing that another fire would upset the gun, it was not fired again. The rifled gun was fired in quick succession and with good effect; meanwhile the gunboats kept up a constant fire with good practice.

As the boats advanced we opened fire with the eleven guns bearing on the river, which was kept up for about half an hour, when the enemy withdrew. Their shot fell in and around the fort. Some of their shells fell a quarter of a mile beyond the fort, showing a range superior to our own. None of the shells which fell in the fort exploded, and but one man was wounded. I reported the result to General Tilghman, and that the enemy was landing a large force and that additional transports were arriving.

I was satisfied that we could not hold the heights opposite the fort, and that it would be prudent to move the forces from there to Fort Henry, but did not like to take the responsibility without the order of General Tilghman, as a previous order from you stated positively that these heights must be held. However, these troops were held in readiness to move at a moment's warning.

At 5 o'clock I sent another courier, with an escort, to the general, stating my views in regard to the troops at Fort Heiman, and requesting his orders, or, what I desired more, his presence, and cautioned him not to come without a strong escort and by the upper road, believing that the enemy had already cavalry pickets on the main Dover road.

Before night I re-enforced the outposts on the Dover road with two companies of the Tenth Tennessee, under Captains Morgan and Ford, and the 6-pounder rifled gun. At 11.30 General Tilghman and Major Gilmer's corps of engineers arrived, with three companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt's cavalry, from Fort Donelson.

At daylight on the morning of the 5th General Tilghman directed the removal of the troops from Fort Heiman to Fort Henry, with the exception of the cavalry. General Tilghman now formed the troops at the fort into two brigades. The first, commanded by myself, consisting of the Tenth Tennessee, Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock; Forty-eighth Tennessee, Colonel Voorhies; Fifty-first Tennessee, Colonel Browder; Colonel Gantt's battalion of cavalry, and Captain Culbertson's light battery. The second brigade, under command of Colonel Drake, consisted of the Fourth Mississippi, Major Adaire; Twenty-seventh Alabama, Colonel Hughes; Alabama Battalion, Major Garvin; Captains Milner's and Milton's cavalry, and a section of light battery, Captain Crain. He appointed Major McConnico assistant adjutant-general and Lieutenant Phar aide-de-camp, his own staff having remained at Fort Donelson. General Tilghman assigned each brigade its position at the rifle pits, and all preparations were made to receive the enemy by land and water.

A reconnoitering party of cavalry met the enemy, and in a skirmish one man of Captain Milner's company was killed. General Tilghman

then ordered out a battalion of the Tenth Tennessee, a battalion of the Fourth Mississippi, and Milner's cavalry, and proceeded in person with them to the scene of the skirmish, but the enemy had retired.

During the night Col. Milton A. Haynes, of the artillery, arrived from Fort Donelson, to give his aid in the coming engagement, and brought information that, in obedience to orders from General Tilghman, Colonel Head would send two regiments to Kirkman's Furnace from Fort Donelson next morning, which is half way between the forts, to act as a reserve.

Early on the morning of the 6th heavy volumes of black smoke rose over the island, manifesting that the fleet was not to remain idle long; and, judging from the number of transports in the river, they must have landed a very large force during the two days and nights, and, as it was afterwards ascertained, General Grant had 12,000 men between the fort and Bailey's Landing, and General Smith 6,000 men on the opposite bank of the river.

At about 10 o'clock in the morning General Tilghman and Major Gilmer came in a small boat from the steamer Dunbar, which was lying during the night at Fort Heiman, and prepared for the engagement on hand.

At 11 o'clock the gunboats made their appearance in the chute, seven in number, and formed in line of battle 2 miles from the fort. General Tilghman ordered the troops to be marched out of range of the enemy's guns. None were permitted to remain in the fort but those on duty with the artillery, who were under the command of Captain Taylor.

General Tilghman, with his staff, took position at the center battery, to observe the movements of the gunboats and direct the firing of our batteries. The enemy opened fire with shot and shell, which was returned by our 10-inch columbiad and 24-pounder rifled gun until they came in range of the lighter guns, when the whole eleven guns bearing on the river opened fire. The enemy's practice improved as they advanced. The firing on both sides was without a moment's intermission.

Shot after shot was exchanged with admirable rapidity and precision, and the enemy's shell struck and exploded in every direction. Unfortunately, our most reliable gun, the 24-pounder rifled, bursted, wounding all the men who served it. Shortly afterwards the vent of the 10-inch columbiad closed, and could not be opened. Our reliance was now on the 32 and 42 pounders, and, I regret to state, for the latter we had not the proper ammunition. Shortly afterwards a premature explosion of one of the guns killed 2 men. By this time we had lost the use of five guns, but a constant fire was kept up on both sides, the gunboats nearing all the time, their point-blank range telling fearfully on the fort, while we had to depress our guns and change our range after every shot. This unequal fire was kept up with an energy which does great credit to the officers and men at the guns.

This fearful cannonading had lasted now over an hour, and it was evident the fort could not hold out much longer. Major Gilmer called my attention to the state of affairs, requesting me to state to General Tilghman that it was useless to hold out longer; to keep up this unequal contest would cost the lives of many more, without any possible advantage to the result. I replied to Major Gilmer that these were my views, but that I would not like to make any suggestions to the general; that he must be his own judge in regard to this affair. When General Tilghman was shortly after reminded of the state of affairs he would not entertain the idea of a surrender, stating that he had as yet lost but



few men, and inquired the reason why some of the guns had ceased firing. He was told that several of the men were killed, many wounded, and all the rest exhausted, and that we had no men to relieve them. The general threw off his coat, sprang on the chassis of the nearest gun, stating that he would work it himself, ordering, at the same time, 50 men of my regiment to the fort to assist the gunners. Seeing nobody whom I could send for them, I started myself, the bombardment still going on unabated; but before I could reach the command the boats were so close to the fort that further resistance was impossible. The flag was hauled down and the firing ceased.

I returned in person immediately to the fort for further orders. General Tilghman informed me that he had surrendered, believing that it was his duty to do so, as every military man would see the impossibility of holding the fort against such fearful odds, and stating to me that I was not included in the surrender, as I was not in the fort at the time the flag was struck, and directed me to continue the retreat, according to orders, to Fort Donelson by the upper road, having gained all the time necessary for a safe retreat. Owing to bad roads, the high water, and the close pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, I found it a physical impossibility to save the light artillery.

About 3 miles from the fort our rear was attacked by the enemy's cavalry. Their fire was handsomely returned by Colonel Gee and Major Garvin. Major Lee, of the Fifteenth Arkansas, and Captain Leach, of the Alabama Battalion, were surrounded and made prisoners. We sustained no other loss.

I may be permitted to state that the self-sacrificing heroism displayed by General Tilghman in this terrible and most unequal struggle challenges the admiration of all gallant men and entitles him to the gratitude of the whole people of the Confederate States. The tact, skill, and untiring energy which characterized his whole course while in command of the defense of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers proved him a most skillful and gallant leader.

During the bombardment of Fort Henry General Tilghman was ably assisted by Major Gilmer, Colonel Haynes, Major McConnico, Captains Miller and Hayden (Engineers), Captain Taylor, Lieutenants Watts and Weller, and Capt. G. R. G. Jones, and the men under their command deserve particular credit for the effective and energetic manner in which they managed their guns.

My thanks are eminently due to Colonel Drake and the regimental and detachment commanders for the able and orderly manner in which they conducted their commands.

The events which followed so closely upon the fall of Fort Henry—the surrender of the troops at Fort Donelson and my own imprisonment, from which I have just been released—have prevented me from forwarding this report at an earlier date.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. HEIMAN,

*Colonel, Commanding First Brigade, Tilghman's Division.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## FEBRUARY 6-10, 1862.—Expedition to Florence, Ala.

## REPORTS.

No. 1.—Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, U. S. Army.

No. 2.—Lieut. Commander S. L. Phelps, U. S. Navy.

No. 3.—A. J. Hopper, Superintendent Eastern Division Mississippi and Charleston Railroad.

No. 4.—J. G. Norman.

## No. 1.

*Report of Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, U. S. Army.*

SAINT LOUIS, MO., *February 12, 1862.*

The gunboats sent up Tennessee have just returned, after a most successful trip to Florence, in Alabama. Another expedition is moving up Cumberland, under Flag-Officer Foote. I subjoin the telegram of Lieutenant-Commander Phelps:

We have returned to this point from an entirely successful expedition to Florence at foot of the Muscle Shoals, Ala. The rebels were forced to burn six steamers, and we captured two others, beside the half-complete gunboat Eastport. The steamers burned were freighted with rebel military stores. The Eastport has about 250,000 feet of lumber on board. Captured 200 stand of arms and a quantity of clothing and stores, and destroyed the encampment of Colonel Drew at Savannah, Tenn. Found the Union sentiment strong.

H. W. HALLECK.

Major-General McCLELLAN.

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No. 2.

*Report of Lieut. Commander S. L. Phelps, U. S. Navy.*

U. S. GUNBOAT CONESTOGA,  
*Tennessee River, February 10, 1862.*

SIR: Soon after the surrender of Fort Henry, on the 6th instant, I proceeded, in obedience to your orders, up the Tennessee River, with the Tyler, Lieutenant-Commander Gwin; Lexington, Lieutenant-Commander Shirk, and this vessel, forming a division of the flotilla, and arrived after dark at the railroad crossing, 25 miles above the fort, having destroyed on the way a small amount of camp equipage abandoned by the fleeing rebels. The draw of the bridge was found closed and the machinery for turning it disabled. About 1½ miles above were several rebel transport steamers escaping upstream. A party was landed, and in one hour I had the satisfaction to see the draw open. The Tyler being the slowest of the gunboats, Lieutenant-Commander Gwin landed a force to destroy a portion of the railroad track and to secure such military stores as might be found, while I directed Lieutenant-Commander Shirk to follow me with all speed in chase of the fleeing boats. In five hours this boat succeeded in forcing the rebels to abandon and burn three of these boats, loaded with military stores. The first one fired (Samuel Orr) had on board a quantity of submarine batteries, which very soon exploded. The second one was freighted with powder, cannon shot, grape, balls, &c. Fearing an explosion from the

fired boats—there were two together—I had stopped at a distance of 1,000 yards, but even there our skylights were shattered by the concussion, the light upper deck was raised bodily, doors were forced open, and locks and fastenings everywhere broken. The whole river for half a mile around about was completely “beaten up” by the falling fragments and the shower of shot, grape, balls, &c. The house of a reported Union man was blown to pieces, and it was suspected there was design in landing the rebels in front of the doomed house.

The Lexington having fallen astern, and being without a pilot on board, I concluded to wait for both of the boats to come up. Joined by them, we proceeded up the river. Lieutenant-Commander Gwin had destroyed some of the trestle work of the end of the bridge, burning with them a lot of camp equipage. I. N. Brown, formerly a lieutenant in the Navy, now signing himself “Lieutenant, C. S. N.,” had fled with such precipitation as to leave his papers behind. These, Lieutenant-Commander Gwin brought, and I send them to you, as they give an official history of the rebel floating preparations on the Mississippi, Cumberland, and Tennessee.\* Lieutenant Brown had charge of the construction of gunboats.

At night on the 7th we arrived at a landing in Hardin County, Tennessee, known as Cerro Gordo, where we found the steamer Eastport being converted into a gunboat. Armed boat crews were immediately sent on board and search made for means of destruction that might have been devised. She had been scuttled and the suction pipes broken. These leaks were soon stopped. A number of rifle shots were fired at our vessels, but a couple of shells dispersed the rebels. On examination, I found that there were large quantities of timber and lumber prepared for fitting up the Eastport; that the vessel itself—some 280 feet long—was in excellent condition, and already half finished. Considerable of the plating designed for her was lying on the bank, and everything at hand to complete her. I therefore directed Lieutenant-Commander Gwin to remain with the Tyler, to guard the prize, and to load the lumber, &c., while the Lexington and Conestoga should proceed still higher up.

Soon after daylight on the 8th we passed Eastport, Miss., and at Chickasaw, farther up, near the State line, seized two steamers, the Sallie Wood and Muscle, the former laid up, the latter freighted with iron destined for Richmond and for rebel use. We then proceeded on up the river, entering the State of Alabama, and ascending to Florence, at the foot of the Muscle Shoals. On coming in sight of the town three steamers were discovered, which were immediately set on fire by the rebels. Some shots were fired from the opposite side of the river below. A force was landed and considerable quantities of supplies, marked “Fort Henry,” were secured from the burning wrecks. Some had been landed and stored. These I seized, putting such as we could bring away on board our vessels and destroying the remainder. No flats or other craft could be found. I found also more of the iron plating intended for the Eastport.

A deputation of citizens of Florence waited upon me, first desiring that they might be made able to quiet the fears of their wives and daughters with assurances from me that they should not be molested, and secondly praying that I would not destroy their railroad bridge. As for the first, I told them that we were neither ruffians nor savages, and that we were there to protect them from violence and to enforce

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\* Not found.



the law; and with reference to the second that, if the bridge were away, we could ascend no higher, and that it could possess, so far as I saw, no military importance, as it simply connected Florence itself with the railroad on the south side of the river. We had seized three of their steamers, one the half-finished gunboat, and had forced the rebels to burn six others loaded with supplies, and their loss, with that of the freight, is a heavy blow to the enemy. Two boats are still known to be on the river, and are doubtless hidden in some of the creeks, where we shall be able to find them when there is time for the search.

We returned on the night of the 8th to where the Eastport lay. The crew of the Tyler had already gotten on board of the prize an immense amount of lumber, &c. The crews of the three boats set to work to finish the job immediately, and we have brought away probably 250,000 feet of the best quality of ship and building timber, all the iron machinery, spikes, plating, nails, &c., belonging to the rebel gunboat, and I caused the mill to be destroyed where the lumber had been sawed.

Lieutenant-Commander Gwin, in our absence, had enlisted some 25 Tennesseans, who gave information of the encampment of Colonel Drew's rebel regiment at Savannah, Tenn. A portion of the 600 or 700 men were known to be "pressed" men, and all were badly armed. After consultation, with Lieutenant-Commanders Gwin and Shirk, I determined to make a land attack upon the encampment. Lieutenant-Commander Shirk, with 30 riflemen, came on board the Conestoga. Leaving his vessel to guard the Eastport, and accompanied by the Tyler, we proceeded up to that place, prepared to land 130 riflemen and a 12-pounder rifled howitzer. Lieutenant-Commander Gwin took command of this force when landed, but had the mortification to find the encampment deserted. The rebels had fled at 1 o'clock at night, leaving considerable quantities of arms, clothing, shoes, camp utensils, provisions, implements, &c., all of which we secured or destroyed, and their winter quarters of log huts were burned. I seized also a large mail-bag, and send you the letters giving military information. The gunboats were then dropped down to a point where arms gathered under the rebel press law had been stored, and an armed party, under Second Master Gowdy, of the Tyler, succeeded in seizing about 70 rifles and fowling-pieces.

Returning to Cerro Gordo, we took the Eastport, Sallie Wood, and Musclev in tow, and came down the river to the railroad crossing. The Musclev sprang a leak, and, all efforts failing to prevent her sinking, we were forced to abandon her, and with her a considerable quantity of fine lumber. We are having trouble in getting through the draw of the bridge here.

I now come to the most interesting portion of the report, one which has already become lengthy, but I trust you will find some excuse for this in the fact that it embraces a history of labors and movements day and night from the 6th to the 10th of the month, all of which details I deem it proper to give you. We have met with the most gratifying proofs of loyalty everywhere across Tennessee, and in the portions of Mississippi and Alabama we visited most affecting instances greeted us almost hourly. Men, women, and children several times gathered in crowds of hundreds, shouted their welcome, and hailed their national flag with an enthusiasm there was no mistaking. It was genuine and heartfelt. These people braved everything to go to the river bank where a sight of their flag might once more be enjoyed, and they have experienced, as they related, every possible form of persecution. Tears flowed freely down the cheeks of men as well as of women, and there

were those who had fought under the Stars and Stripes at Monterey who in this manner testified to their joy. This display of feeling and sense of gladness at our success and the hopes it created in the breasts of so many people in the heart of the Confederacy astonished us not a little, and I assure you, sir, I would not have failed to witness it for any consideration. I think it has given us all a higher sense of the sacred character of our present duties. I was assured at Savannah that of the several hundred troops there more than one half, had we gone to the attack in time, would have hailed us as deliverers and gladly enlisted with the national force. In Tennessee the people generally in their enthusiasm braved secessionists and spoke their views freely, but in Mississippi and Alabama what was said was guarded. "If we dared express ourselves freely, you would hear such a shout greeting your coming as you never heard." "We know there are many Unionists among us, but a reign of terror makes us afraid of our shadows." We were told, too, "Bring us a small organized force, with arms and ammunition for us, and we can maintain our position and put down rebellion in our midst." There were, it is true, whole communities who on our approach fled to the woods, but these were where there was less of the loyal element, and where the fleeing steamers in advance had spread tales of our coming with fire-brands, burning, destroying, ravishing, and plundering.

The crews of these vessels have had a very laborious time, but have evinced a spirit in the work highly creditable to them. Lieutenant-Commanders Gwin and Shirk have been untiring, and I owe to them and to their officers many obligations for our entire success.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. L. PHELPS,

*Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. Navy.*

Flag-Officer A. H. FOOTE, U. S. Navy,

*Commanding Naval Forces Western Waters.*

### No. 3.

*Report of A. J. Hopper, Superintendent Eastern Division Memphis and Charleston Railroad.*

HUNTSVILLE, February 8, 1862.

General JOHNSTON:

The Federal gunboats have landed at Florence, 5 miles from Tuscumbia and 48 miles west of Decatur; are marching on Tuscumbia; how many boats or men there are not known.

The citizens here have one brass 6-pounder in order, and the M. and C. R. R. one Parrott rifled 6-pounder and carriage, but not wheels; also one not mounted at all.

A company of men with infantry arms go from here some time to-night to assistance of Tuscumbia.

Can you give us any information, orders, or relief? Our trains, except one, are out of their reach, and that one may be for what we can learn.

A. J. HOPPER,

*Superintendent Eastern Division M. and C. R. R.*

## No. 4.

*Report of J. G. Norman.*TUSCUMBIA, ALA., *February 9, 1862.*

Enemy's gunboats (two in number) came to Florence yesterday. Two steamers were burned below Eastport, three others at Florence were burned by the owners, and another scuttled and sunk, to prevent their falling into enemy's hands. The enemy also captured a considerable amount of Government stores at Florence and two steamboats. Gunboats retired down the river last night. The railroad bridge at Florence was not destroyed. The enemy disclaimed any intention to destroy private property. It was rumored here to-day that the enemy were landing troops in force at Eastport to destroy the bridge at Big Bear Creek; this is not credited here. Colonel Chalmers is guarding that bridge with portions of his and Colonel Looney's regiments. Since the fall of Fort Henry there is nothing to prevent the enemy during high water from ascending the Tennessee with their gunboats and invading North Alabama and North Mississippi.

J. G. NORMAN.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN.

FEBRUARY 12-16, 1862.—Siege and Capture of Fort Donelson, Tennessee.

## REPORTS, ETC.

- No. 1.—Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding army in the field.  
 No. 2.—Lieut. Col. James B. McPherson, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer.  
 No. 3.—Col. J. D. Webster, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff.  
 No. 4.—Flag-Officer A. H. Foote, U. S. Navy, of engagement February 14.  
 No. 5.—Return of casualties in the army commanded by Brigadier-General Grant.  
 No. 6.—Brig. Gen. John A. McClelland, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.  
 No. 7.—Col. Richard J. Oglesby, Eighth Illinois Infantry, commanding First Brigade.  
 No. 8.—Lieut. Col. Frank L. Rhoads, Eighth Illinois Infantry.  
 No. 9.—Capt. Samuel B. Marks, Eighteenth Illinois Infantry.  
 No. 10.—Capt. Jasper M. Dresser, Battery A, Illinois Light Artillery.  
 No. 11.—Col. William H. L. Wallace, Eleventh Illinois Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.  
 No. 12.—Lieut. Col. T. E. G. Ransom, Eleventh Illinois Infantry.  
 No. 13.—Col. C. C. Marsh, Twentieth Illinois Infantry.  
 No. 14.—Col. John E. Smith, Forty-fifth Illinois Infantry.  
 No. 15.—Col. Isham N. Haynie, Forty-eighth Illinois Infantry.  
 No. 16.—Capt. Edward McAllister, Battery D, First Illinois Light Artillery.  
 No. 17.—Capt. Ezra Taylor, Battery B, First Illinois Light Artillery.  
 No. 18.—Col. Leonard F. Ross, Seventeenth Illinois Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.  
 No. 19.—Col. William R. Morrison, Forty-ninth Illinois Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.  
 No. 20.—Maj. Francis M. Smith, Seventeenth Illinois Infantry.  
 No. 21.—Col. John McArthur, Twelfth Illinois Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.  
 No. 22.—Lieut. Col. Augustus L. Chetlain, Twelfth Illinois Infantry.  
 No. 23.—Col. Isaac C. Pugh, Forty-first Illinois Infantry.



- No. 24.—Col. John Cook, Seventh Illinois Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 25.—Col. Joseph J. Woods, Twelfth Iowa Infantry.
- No. 26.—Col. Crafts J. Wright, Thirteenth Missouri Infantry.
- No. 27.—Capt. Henry Richardson, Battery D, First Missouri Light Artillery.
- No. 28.—Capt. F. Welker, Battery H, First Missouri Light Artillery.
- No. 29.—Capt. George H. Stone, Battery K, First Missouri Light Artillery.
- No. 30.—Col. James C. Veatch, Twenty-fifth Indiana Infantry, Fourth Brigade.
- No. 31.—Col. James M. Tuttle, Second Iowa Infantry.
- No. 32.—Lieut. Col. James C. Parrott, Seventh Iowa Infantry.
- No. 33.—Col. William T. Shaw, Fourteenth Iowa Infantry.
- No. 34.—Col. Morgan L. Smith, Eighth Missouri Infantry, commanding Fifth Brigade.
- No. 35.—Col. George F. McGinnis, Eleventh Indiana Infantry.
- No. 36.—Maj. John McDonald, Eighth Missouri Infantry.
- No. 37.—Brig. Gen. Lewis Wallace, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.
- No. 38.—Surg. Thomas W. Fry, U. S. Army, Medical Director.
- No. 39.—Col. Charles Craft, Thirty-first Indiana Infantry, commanding First Brigade.
- No. 40.—Maj. Frederick Arn, Thirty-first Indiana Infantry.
- No. 41.—Col. Hugh B. Reed, Forty-fourth Indiana Infantry.
- No. 42.—Col. John H. McHenry, jr., Seventeenth Kentucky Infantry.
- No. 43.—Col. J. M. Shackelford, Twenty-fifth Kentucky Infantry.
- No. 44.—Col. John M. Thayer, First Nebraska Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 45.—Message from the President of the Confederate States.
- No. 46.—Gen. A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding the Western Department, and resulting correspondence.
- No. 47.—Lieut. Col. Jeremy F. Gilmer, C. S. Army, Chief Engineer Western Department.
- No. 48.—Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, C. S. Army, commanding division, &c.
- No. 49.—Col. Gabriel C. Wharton, Fifty-first Virginia Infantry, commanding First Brigade.
- No. 50.—Col. John McCausland, Thirty-sixth Virginia Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 51.—Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, C. S. Army, commanding division, &c., with resulting correspondence.
- No. 52.—Brig. General Simon B. Buckner, C. S. Army, commanding division, &c.
- No. 53.—Col. William E. Baldwin, Fourteenth Mississippi Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.
- No. 54.—Col. Roger W. Hanson, Second Kentucky Infantry (Confederate).
- No. 55.—Maj. W. L. Doss, Fourteenth Mississippi Infantry.
- No. 56.—Col. John M. Lillard, Twenty-sixth Tennessee Infantry.
- No. 57.—Col. Robert Farquharson, Forty-first Tennessee Infantry.
- No. 58.—Col. John C. Brown, Third Tennessee Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
- No. 59.—Maj. Nat. F. Cheairs, Third Tennessee Infantry.
- No. 60.—Col. Joseph B. Palmer, Eighteenth Tennessee Infantry.
- No. 61.—Col. Edward C. Cook, Thirty-second Tennessee Infantry.
- No. 62.—Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, C. S. Army, commanding division, &c.
- No. 63.—Col. A. Heiman, Tenth Tennessee Infantry, commanding brigade.
- No. 64.—Lieut. T. McGinnis, Acting Adjutant Forty-second Tennessee Infantry.
- No. 65.—Lieut. R. B. Ryan, Aide-de-Camp, of operations of Davidson's brigade.
- No. 66.—Col. John M. Simonton, First Mississippi Infantry, commanding brigade.
- No. 67.—Lieut. Col. H. B. Lyon, Eighth Kentucky Infantry, (Confederate).
- No. 68.—Col. John Gregg, Seventh Texas Infantry.
- No. 69.—Col. John W. Head, Thirtieth Tennessee Infantry, commanding brigade.
- No. 70.—Maj. William N. Brown, Twentieth Mississippi Infantry.
- No. 71.—Col. Nathan B. Forrest, Tennessee Cavalry.
- No. 72.—Col. Milton A. Haynes, C. S. Army, Chief of Tennessee Corps of Artillery.
- No. 73.—Col. J. E. Bailey, Forty-ninth Tennessee Infantry, of the water batteries, &c.

No. 74.—Capt. Jacob Culbertson, C. S. Army, commanding batteries.

No. 75.—Capt. B. G. Bidwell, Thirtieth Tennessee Infantry, commanding battery.

No. 76.—Capt. T. W. Beaumont, Fiftieth Tennessee Infantry, commanding battery.

No. 77.—Capt. R. R. Rags, Maury (Tennessee) Artillery.

No. 78.—Extracts from the report of the Special Committee of the Confederate House of Representatives.

### No. 1.

*Report of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army, commanding army in the field.*

FORT DONELSON, February 16, 1862.

GENERAL: I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional surrender this morning of Fort Donelson, with 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant with a force of about 15,000 men, divided into two divisions, under the command of Generals McClelland and Smith. Six regiments were sent around by water the day before, convoyed by a gunboat, or rather started one day later than one of the gunboats, and with instructions not to pass it. The troops made the march in good order, the head of the column arriving within 2 miles of the fort at 12 o'clock m. At this point the enemy's pickets were met and driven in. The fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually approached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing on the line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and re-enforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy and drawn closer to his works, with skirmishing all day.

The evening of the 13th the gunboats and re-enforcements arrived. On the 14th a gallant attack was made by Flag-Officer Foote upon the enemy's works with the fleet. The engagement lasted probably an hour and a half, and bid fair to result favorably to the cause of the Union, when two unlucky shots disabled two of the armored boats so that they were carried back by the current. The remaining two were very much disabled, also having received a number of heavy shots about the pilot-houses and other parts of the vessels. After these mishaps I concluded to make the investment of Fort Donelson as perfect as possible, and partially fortify and await repairs to the gunboats. This plan was frustrated, however, by the enemy making a most vigorous attack upon our right wing, commanded by General J. A. McClelland, with a portion of the force under General L. Wallace. The enemy were repelled after a closely-contested battle of several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The officers, and particularly field officers, suffered out of proportion. I have not the means yet of determining our loss even approximately, but it cannot fall far short of 1,200 killed, wounded, and missing.\* Of the latter I understand through General Buckner about 250 were taken prisoners. I shall retain enough of the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately shipped off and not left for recapture.

About the close of this action the ammunition in cartridge-boxes gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks, and, seeing that the enemy did not take advantage of it, convinced me that equal confusion and possibly greater demoralization existed with him. Taking advantage of this fact, I

\* But see No. 5, p. 167.

ordered a charge upon the left (enemy's right) with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle lasted until dark, giving us possession of part of the intrenchments. An attack was ordered from the other flank after the charge by General Smith was commenced by the divisions under Generals McClermand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding the hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the forepart of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed. At the points thus gained, night having come on, all the troops encamped for the night, feeling that a complete victory would crown their labors at an early hour in the morning.

This morning at a very early hour a note was received from General S. B. Buckner, under a flag of truce, proposing an armistice, &c. A copy of the correspondence which ensued is herewith accompanying.

I cannot mention individuals who specially distinguished themselves, but leave that to division and brigade commanders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received. To division commanders, however, Generals McClermand, Smith, and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that each of them were with their commands in the midst of danger, and were always ready to execute all orders, no matter what the exposure to themselves. At the hour the attack was made on General McClermand's command I was absent, having received a note from Flag-Officer Foote requesting me to go and see him, he being unable to call, in consequence of a wound received the day before.

My personal staff, Col. J. D. Webster, chief of staff; Col. J. Riggins, jr., volunteer aide; Capt. J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general; Capts. C. B. Lagow and W. S. Hillyer, aides, and Lieut. Col. J. B. McPherson, chief engineer, all are deserving of personal mention for their gallantry and service.

For full details see reports of engineers, medical directors, and commanders of brigades and divisions, to follow.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

General G. W. CULLUM,  
*Chief of Staff, Department of the Missouri.*

[Inclosure No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862.*

SIR: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station I propose to the commanding officers of the Federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding U. S. Forces near Fort Donelson.*

[Inclosure No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862.*

Major Cosby will take or send by an officer to the nearest picket of the enemy the accompanying communication to General Grant, and re-



quest information of the point where future communications will reach him. Also inform him that my headquarters will be for the present in Dover.

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Have the white flag hoisted on Fort Donelson, not on the batteries.

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Inclosure No. 3.]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,  
*Camp near Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862.*

SIR: Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

General S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Confederate Army.*

[Inclosure No. 4.]

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Dover, Tenn., February 16, 1862.*

SIR: The distribution of the forces under my command incident to an unexpected change of commanders and the overwhelming force under your command compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose.

I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, U. S. A.

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No. 2.

*Report of Lieut. Col. James B. McPherson, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer.*

SAINT LOUIS, MO., *February 25, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of operations relating to the capture of Fort Donelson:

From the capture of Fort Henry, on the 6th instant, until the 12th, the time was chiefly occupied in making reconnaissances up the Tennessee River to a short distance above Danville and of the roads leading to Fort Donelson, getting our forces in condition to march against the latter place and awaiting the co-operation of the gunboats. The reconnaissance toward Fort Donelson made known the fact that there were two very good roads connecting the two forts, one the direct road, distance about 12 miles, and the other bearing off to the southeast for some distance, soon after leaving Fort Henry, and then continuing essentially parallel to the former, distance about 14 miles. The heaviest part of the whole route was from the Tennessee River at Fort Henry back 2 miles

to the high ground. To overcome this and have the forces in good condition to march against Fort Donelson the artillery and a great portion of the infantry were moved back to the high ground on the 11th instant.

The country between the two forts is very rolling, thickly covered with timber, and sparsely populated; the soil, as a general thing, being poor. The roads had not been obstructed in any manner by the rebels, from the fact that after the fall of Fort Henry our cavalry scoured the country so continually and effectively that they did not venture to send out men for the purpose.

On the morning of the 12th, at an early hour, the troops were put in motion in two divisions, one taking the left-hand road and the other the right, the two divisions coming together about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Fort Donelson. From this point our forces moved forward in line of battle, cautiously examining the ground in advance and on the flanks, which was very hilly and densely wooded, until we came in sight of the enemy's works. These were reconnoitered as thoroughly as possible under the circumstances, and our forces assigned to their respective positions, General McClernand's division on the right and General C. F. Smith's division on the left. Some slight skirmishing ensued and a few prisoners were taken, who informed us that the rebel forces consisted of from 20,000 to 25,000 men, commanded by Generals Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, and Johnson.

Our forces sent around by water, preceded by the gunboat Carondelet, not having arrived, a messenger was dispatched to Fort Henry for General Wallace to bring over a portion of his division, which was promptly done, and it was assigned a position in the center. Wednesday night the gunboat Carondelet arrived, and on Thursday moved up and bombarded the enemy, doing considerable damage and silencing one of his 32-pounder guns. Our lines were at the same time drawn closer, and our batteries placed in position where they could play upon the enemy to the best effect, though great difficulty was experienced in finding good positions, on account of the heavy timber, which prevented us from getting an uninterrupted view. There was a good deal of cannonading and skirmishing the whole day, and a most gallant charge was made upon the rebel intrenchments at "I" by a portion of General McClernand's division, which promised to be successful, when the colonel commanding fell, severely wounded, while bravely leading his men forward; which, with other casualties, forced our troops to retire.

After the arrival of General Wallace's division General McClernand extended his still farther to the right, the object being, if possible, to get some of our guns to bear upon the river above the town of Dover, but the advance in that direction had to be made with the utmost caution, as the ground was very much broken, without roads, and covered with an almost impenetrable growth of small oak. Our reconnaissance had developed the fact that the rebels were strongly posted on a range of hills varying from 50 to 80 feet in height, with batteries placed on the commanding points, their lines extending back from the river some  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles, in advance of which they had felled immense quantities of timber, chopping down the smaller trees about breast-high, and leaving them attached to the stumps, thus making a rude sort of an abatis, but at the same time a most difficult obstacle to get over, while on the north and west they were protected from attack by a creek, which, owing to the backwater from the Cumberland River, was impassable except on bridges or rafts. This, although to their advantage in one sense, was also very much to ours. It enabled us to move our troops and supplies up from the landing place with perfect security, prevented the enemy



from escaping in that direction, and only required our lines to be about half as long as they otherwise would have been in order to invest the works.

Thursday it was decided best to send a detachment from Fort Henry up to the railroad bridge at Danville and destroy one span, which was done, for we were apprehensive, as all the gunboats were required in the Cumberland River, that the enemy might repair the trestle work which had been destroyed, and send over re-enforcements to Donelson, or make a diversion by trying to recapture Fort Henry.

Thursday evening the gunboats and re-enforcements sent by water arrived, and it was arranged that the gunboats should move up about 2 o'clock Friday afternoon, silence the water batteries, take a position opposite and near the town of Dover, and shell the rebels out of their intrenchments near the river, we at the same time sweeping around with our right and taking possession of a portion of their works, cutting them off from the greater part of their supplies, and driving them back upon our center and left, which were strongly posted to prevent their escape. This movement, however, was destined not to be carried into effect, on account of the failure of the gunboats to silence the water batteries, and their being compelled to withdraw after a bombardment of a couple of hours, having experienced considerable damage. After this failure, and on consultation with Flag-Officer Foote, it was thought probable that it might be necessary to partially intrench our position and await re-enforcements which were coming, and repairs to some of the gunboats, and orders were about being given to have all the intrenching tools brought up from the boats Saturday morning, when the enemy, evidently not liking the gradual contracting of our lines, concentrated the greater part of his force against our right, and made a most desperate attempt to cut his way out and effect his escape, in which he was frustrated by the determined bravery of General McClelland's division, which, though forced to fall back after several hours of the most severe fighting, did it, contesting every foot of ground, and the opportune arrival of a portion of General Wallace's division, which had been sent to General McClelland's aid, and which succeeded in checking the advance of the enemy, and finally forcing him to fall back. Word was now sent to General C. F. Smith to carry the works on the enemy's right by assault, which was most gallantly executed by a portion of his division at the point of the bayonet, and our flag soon waved triumphantly from the rebel intrenchments. This news was borne along our lines, cheering and stimulating the men.

Our right was now re-enforced and ordered to advance and recover the ground which had been lost in the morning. Nobly was the task executed. Not only was the lost ground more than regained, but the battery taken from us in the forenoon was recaptured. While the contest was still at its height on our left General Smith's aide came galloping down in great haste, stating that the general wanted some more pieces of artillery. I immediately ordered the captain of a battery to take two 10-pounder Parrott guns and report to the general as soon as possible, and then went to join him myself, sending word to you that I had done so, for I thought I could be of more service there than anywhere else at that particular crisis.

Having carried the advance works on the enemy's right and effected a lodgment in his intrenchments, we had secured a key to his position. We had obtained a point having about as great an elevation as any portion of his works, and where we could plant our artillery to silence his and enfilade a portion of his defenses, at the same time making use of



his rifle pits to cover our men. Our artillery was brought up and placed in position Saturday evening, and a portion of our forces bivouacked in the rebel intrenchments Saturday night, with their supports within convenient distance, prepared to make an assault on their next line at an early hour Sunday morning, everything having been arranged for a combined attack along their whole defenses, when, shortly after daylight, General Buckner, who was left in command (Generals Pillow and Floyd with a part of their forces having made their escape during the night), sent a letter, under cover of a flag of truce, proposing terms of capitulation, which resulted in the immediate surrender of the works and forces under his command.

The map accompanying this report\* will show the character and strength of the enemy's works, the details of their construction, and the good judgment displayed in selecting this point for a defensive position. The water batteries, of which there are two, were well constructed, the principal one having nine guns—one 10-inch columbiad and eight 32-pounders. The exterior crest is essentially a straight line, nearly at right angles to the river, and the interior crest a sort of *crémaillère* line, made necessary on account of one end of the battery being much more elevated than the other, the guns occupying different elevations, with a traverse between each gun to protect them from enfilade fire. The other battery was a small semicircular one in plan, mounting a 6½-inch rifled gun, the exterior form and dimensions being the same as the 10-inch columbiad and two 32-pounder carronades. The guns were all in embrasures arranged with sand bags. These batteries had an elevation of some 32 feet above the water in the river at the time of the attack, which gave them a fine command, and was no doubt the chief reason why they resisted so successfully the gunboat attack.

Sketch A will give an idea of the country between Forts Henry and Donelson and the general direction of the roads connecting the two places.\*

I cannot close this report without speaking particularly of Lieutenants Jenney and Kossak, my assistant engineers, who rendered good service in reconnoitering, superintending the repairs of roads, making sketches, &c.

Respectfully submitted.

JAS. B. MCPHERSON,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Aide-de-Camp, and Chief Engineer.*

Maj. Gen. U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding U. S. Forces Department Western Tennessee.*

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### No. 3.

*Report of Col. J. D. Webster, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, February 22, 1862.*

GENERAL: The preparations made by the enemy for the defense of this position were very extensive. A complete and accurate survey of the works and vicinity would require more means and time than can now be commanded. The sketch\* herewith submitted, carefully made by Lieutenants Jenney and Kossak, volunteer engineers, gives a correct

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\* To appear in Atlas.

general idea of them. The water batteries, upper and lower, which were intended to subserve the primary object of the position—the control of the river navigation—were well located for the purpose. At the lower and principal one were mounted nine 32-pounder guns and a 10-inch columbiad; at the upper, one gun of the exterior form and dimensions of a 10-inch columbiad, but bored as a 32-pounder and rifled. Both these batteries are sunken, or excavated, in the hill-side. In the lower one strong traverses were left between the guns, to secure them against an enfilading fire. Their elevation above the water, say 30 feet at the time of the gunboat attack, gave them a fine command of the river, and made the task of attacking them in front an arduous one. The range of the guns in arc was, however, quite limited. The main fort is shown in rear of these batteries. It occupies a high ridge, cloven by a deep gorge opening towards the south, the entrance being in the valley. The strength of the profile of their work is shown by the cross-section on the margin. At the least exposed places it is weaker, like the rifle pits of the exterior defenses. The outworks are shown by the irregular line extending from the enemy's right at R to their left at L, both these points being on creeks impassable on account of the backwater from the river.

These defenses consisted in the main of what have come to be called rifle pits—shallow ditches, the earth from which is thrown to the front—affording them a shelter from the fire of an attack. The strength of profile of this work, which had evidently been very hastily executed, varied at different points. A general idea of it is given by the cross-section on the margin of the sketch. Along the front of this exterior line the trees had been felled, and the brush cut and bent over breast-high, making a wide abatis, very difficult to pass through. The line runs along a ridge, cut through by several ravines running toward the river. The hill rises by abrupt ascents to a height of perhaps 75 or 80 feet. Our army approached the place with very little knowledge of its topography. Our first line of battle was formed on the 12th instant in some open fields opposite the enemy's center. On the 13th we were established on a line of heights running on general parallelism with the enemy's outworks, and extending a distance of over 3 miles. Various elevations and spurs of the hills afforded positions for our artillery, from which we annoyed the enemy, but which were not of such commanding character as to enable us to achieve decisive results. The ranges were long and the thick woods prevented clear sight. During the next two days our line was gradually extended both to the right and left, our skirmishers thrown out in front, keeping up an active and, as we since learn, an effective fire upon the enemy's outworks. On the 13th a gallant charge was made against them at the point marked M, and was probably only prevented from being successful by the fall of the colonel leading it, who was severely wounded.

Up to the 15th our operations had been chiefly those of investment, but we had not gained a position from which our artillery could be advantageously used against the main fort. On the 15th the enemy seemed to grow uncomfortable under the contracting process, came out of his intrenchments, and attacked our right with great force and determination, achieving considerable success in the forenoon. This active movement necessitated an active retaliation. On the left wing an attack was ordered on the outworks, and the right was re-enforced and ordered to retake the ground lost in the morning. How well both orders were executed need not here be stated. On the right our former position was regained and passed, and on the left a successful assault at A



gave us possession of a position within the enemy's lines, and opened the way to a still better one at B, which nightfall alone prevented us from occupying with our rifled artillery, which would readily have commanded the enemy's works. This repulse from the ground so hardly won in the forenoon, and probably still more our possession of a vantage ground within their lines, induced the enemy to capitulate on the morning of the 16th.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, general, your most obedient servant,

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding District.*

J. D. WEBSTER,  
*Colonel, Chief of Staff.*

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No. 4.

*Report of Flag-Officer A. H. Foote, U. S. Navy, of engagement February 14.*

FLAG-SHIP ST. LOUIS,  
*Near Fort Donelson, Cumberland River, February 15, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that, as you regarded the movement as a military necessity, although not in my judgment properly prepared, I made an attack on Fort Donelson yesterday, the 14th instant, at 3 o'clock p. m., with four iron-clad and two wooden gunboats, the St. Louis, Carondelet, Louisville, and Pittsburg, with the Tyler and Conestoga, and after a severe fight of an hour and a half, being in the latter part of the action less than 400 yards from the fort, the wheel of this vessel, by a shot through her pilot-house, was carried away, and the tiller-ropes of the Louisville also disabled by a shot, which rendered the two boats wholly unmanageable. They then drifted down the river, the relieving tackles not being able to steer or control them in the rapid current. The two remaining boats, the Pittsburg and Carondelet, were also greatly damaged between wind and water, and soon followed us, as the enemy rapidly renewed the fire as we drifted helplessly down the river. This vessel, the St. Louis, alone received 59 shots, 4 between wind and water and one in the pilot-house, mortally wounding the pilot and others, requiring some time to put her in repair. There were 54 killed and wounded in this attack, which, notwithstanding our disadvantages, we have every reason to suppose would in fifteen minutes more, could the action have been continued, have resulted in the capture of the two forts bearing upon us, as the enemy's fire materially slackened and he was running from his batteries when the two gunboats helplessly drifted down the river from disabled steering apparatus, as the relieving tackles could not control the helm in the strong current, when the fleeing enemy returned to their guns and again boldly reopened fire upon us from the river battery, which we had silenced.

The enemy must have brought over twenty heavy guns to bear upon our boats from the water batteries and the main fort on the side of the hill, while we could only return the fire with twelve bow guns from the four boats. One rifled gun aboard the Carondelet burst during the action. The officers and men in this hotly-contested but unequal fight behaved with the greatest gallantry and determination, all deploring the accident rendering two gunboats suddenly helpless in the narrow river and swift current.



On consultation with General Grant and my own officers, as my service here, until we can repair damages by bringing up a competent force from Cairo to attack the fort, are much less required than they are at Cairo, I shall proceed to that point with two of the disabled boats, leaving the two others here to protect the transports, and with all dispatch prepare the mortar boats and Benton, with other boats, to make an effectual attack upon Fort Donelson. I have sent the Tyler to the Tennessee River to render impassable the bridge, so as to prevent the rebels at Columbus re-enforcing their army at Fort Donelson.

I transmit herewith a list of casualties.\* I am informed that the rebels were served by the best gunners from Columbus.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. FOOTE,

*Flag-Officer, Comdg. U. S. Naval Forces on the Western Waters.*

Major-General HALLECK,

*Commanding Army of the West, Saint Louis, Mo.*

### No. 5.

*Return of casualties in the army commanded by Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, at the siege of Fort Donelson, Tennessee, February 12-16, 1862.*

[Compiled from nominal lists of casualties, returns, &c.]

DISTRICT OF CAIRO.—Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT.

Commands.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or miss- ing.		Aggregate.	Remarks
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
FIRST DIVISION.								
Brig. Gen. JOHN A. MCCLERNAND.								
FIRST BRIGADE.								
Col. RICHARD J. OGLESBY.								
8th Illinois.....	3	51	5	183			242	
18th Illinois.....	2	51	6	151	1	17	228	
29th Illinois.....	1	24	4	57		13	99	
30th Illinois.....	1	18	2	67		6	94	
31st Illinois.....	2	29	6	111		28	176	
Illinois Light Artillery, Battery A.....				3			3	
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery E.....		2	2	1			5	
2d Illinois Cavalry, Companies A and B.....			1	3		1	5	
2d U. S. Cavalry, Company C.....								No loss reported.
4th U. S. Cavalry, Company I.....								Do.
Carmichael's Illinois cavalry.....								Do.
Dollins' Illinois cavalry.....				1			1	
O'Harnett's Illinois cavalry.....								No loss reported.
Stewart's Illinois cavalry.....								Do.
Total First Brigade.....	9	175	26	577	1	65	853	

\* List not found, but Captain Foote's report to the Secretary of the Navy shows loss to have been 10 killed and 44 wounded.

*Return of casualties in the army commanded by Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, &c.—Continued.*

Commands.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
SECOND BRIGADE.								
Col. WILLIAM H. L. WALLACE.								
11th Illinois.....	2	68	10	171	2	86	*329	
20th Illinois.....	1	17	2	105		6	132	
45th Illinois.....		2	3	17			22	
48th Illinois.....	1	7	3	28		3	42	
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery B.....		1		8			9	
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery D.....				2			2	
4th Illinois Cavalry.....						1	1	
Total Second Brigade.....	4	95	19	331	2	96	547	
THIRD BRIGADE.								
(1) Col. WILLIAM R. MORRISON (w'd).								
(2) Col. LEONARD F. ROSS.								
17th Illinois.....		13	5	56		7	81	
49th Illinois.....	1	14	3	41		12	71	
Total Third Brigade.....	1	27	8	97		19	152	
Total First Division.....	14	297	53	1,005	3	180	1,552	
SECOND DIVISION.								
Brig. Gen. CHARLES F. SMITH.								
FIRST BRIGADE.								
Col. JOHN MCARTHUR.								
9th Illinois.....		36	5	160		9	210	
12th Illinois.....	1	18	1	61		8	89	
41st Illinois.....	1	13	2	111		3	130	
Total First Brigade.....	2	67	8	332		20	429	
THIRD BRIGADE.								
Col. JOHN COOK.								
7th Illinois.....	1	2	1	18			22	
50th Illinois.....			1	11			12	
52d Indiana.....		4		48			52	
14th Iowa.....		2	1	27			30	
13th Missouri.....				1		1	2	
1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery D.....						1	1	
1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery H.....		1					1	
1st Missouri Light Artillery, Battery K.....				1			1	
Total Third Brigade.....	1	9	3	106		2	121	
FOURTH BRIGADE.								
Col. JACOB G. LAUMAN.								
25th Indiana.....		16	1	74			91	
2d Iowa.....	3	30	4	160			197	
7th Iowa.....		2	2	35			39	
14th Iowa.....		3	1	21		1	26	
Birge's Sharpshooters.....		1		3			4	
Total Fourth Brigade.....	3	52	8	293		1	357	

\* A number of the captured or missing were also wounded.

*Return of casualties in the army commanded by Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, &c.—Continued.*

Commands.	Killed.		Wounded.		Captured or missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
FIFTH BRIGADE.								
Col. MORGAN L. SMITH.								
8th Missouri .....	1	6	1	39			47	
11th Indiana .....		4	2	27			33	
Total Fifth Brigade .....	1	10	3	66			80	
Total Second Division .....	7	138	22	797		23	987	
THIRD DIVISION.								
Brig. Gen. LEWIS WALLACE.								
FIRST BRIGADE.								
Col. CHARLES CRUFT.								
31st Indiana .....		9	8	44		1	62	
44th Indiana .....		7	1	34			42	
17th Kentucky .....		4		34		3	41	
25th Kentucky .....	1	14	3	58		12	88	
Total First Brigade .....	1	34	12	170		16	233	
SECOND BRIGADE.*								
46th Illinois .....				3			3	
57th Illinois .....		1				1	2	
58th Illinois .....		5		12			17	
Total Second Brigade .....		6		15		1	22	
THIRD BRIGADE.								
Col. JOHN M. THAYER.								
1st Nebraska .....		2		0		1	9	
58th Ohio .....		1		0			10	
68th Ohio .....				0			0	No loss reported.
76th Ohio .....								
Total Third Brigade .....		3		24		1	28	
NOT BRIGADED.								
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery A.				3			3	
32d Illinois, Company A.				7			7	
Total not brigaded .....				10			10	
Total Third Division .....	1	43	12	219		18	293	
RECAPITULATION.								
First Division .....	14	297	53	1,005	3	180	1,552	
Second Division .....	7	138	22	797		23	987	
Third Division .....	1	43	12	219		18	293	
Grand total .....	22	478	87	2,021	3	221	2,832	

\* Attached to Third Brigade, under Colonel Thayer.



## No. 6.

*Report of Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand, U. S. Army, commanding First Division.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,  
*Pittsburg Landing, April 21, 1862.*

I transmit herewith the report of the action of the First Division at the battle of Fort Donelson. I have no special comments to make on it, further than that the report is a little highly colored as to the conduct of the First Division, and I failed to hear the suggestions spoken of about the propriety of attacking the enemy all around the lines on Saturday. No suggestions were made by General McClernand at the time spoken of.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Major-General.*

Capt. N. H. McLEAN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Mississippi.*

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION,  
*District of West Tennessee, February 28, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor respectfully to report the operations of my command during the investment and capture of Fort Donelson.

The First Division, of which by your assignment I had been placed in command, was composed of the First Brigade, commanded by Col. Richard J. Oglesby, and comprising the Eighth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, Lieut. Col. F. L. Rhoads; Eighteenth, Col. Michael K. Lawler; Twenty-ninth, Col. James S. Rearden; Thirtieth, Lieut. Col. Elias S. Dennis; Thirty-first, Col. John A. Logan; also Schwartz's and Dresser's batteries of light artillery, and the cavalry companies of Capts. Warren Stewart, Eagleton Carmichael, James J. Dollins, and M. James O'Harnett.

The Second Brigade, Col. William H. L. Wallace, of the Eleventh Regiment Illinois Volunteers, commanding, comprising the same regiment, Lieut. Col. Thomas E. G. Ransom; Twentieth, Col. C. C. Marsh; Forty-fifth, Col. John E. Smith; Forty-eighth, Col. Isham N. Haynie; also the Fourth Regiment Illinois Cavalry, Col. T. Lyle Dickey, and Taylor's and McAllister's batteries.

The Third Brigade, Col. William R. Morrison, of the Forty-ninth Illinois Volunteers, temporarily commanding, comprising the Seventeenth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, Maj. Francis M. Smith, and the Forty-ninth, Lieut. Col. Phineas Pease.

In compliance with your order for marching upon Fort Donelson on the morning of the 12th, I directed in the afternoon of the 11th instant the transfer of the First Brigade from Fort Henry to a night bivouac on the Ridge road about 5 miles in advance. In like manner the Second Brigade was moved upon the Telegraph road about 5½ miles, and the Third Brigade a half mile in rear of the First. At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 12th my whole command was in motion, and before 11 o'clock, the hour of movement fixed by your order, it was within 3 miles of the enemy's pickets. Arriving rapidly and in good order within 2 miles of the enemy's outer intrenchments, Maj. John J. Mudd, a most gallant and enterprising officer, in command of a scouting party, encountered a detachment of the enemy's cavalry strongly supported, indicat-

ing the determination to resist our farther progress. Major Mudd having driven back the enemy's cavalry, held its support in check until the arrival of the advanced guard, under Maj. George A. Bacon, of the Thirtieth Regiment, which instantly formed to resist the threatened attack. Detachments of the enemy still hovering upon the hills in front, the First Brigade was formed in the open fields, while the Second and Third Brigades as they arrived were also formed within supporting distances.

Retiring temporarily from our view while our advance in line was cautiously continued to the right, a large body of the enemy's cavalry again appeared, and, disputing our progress, made a vigorous and determined attack upon our grand guard, but were so promptly met in front that they fell back and attempted by a flank movement to cut it off from its support. This attempt, however, was completely foiled by the timely support afforded by the Eighth Regiment and Lieutenant Gumbart's battery, which, throwing a shell into the enemy's ranks, hastened his flight towards his intrenchments. This encounter, in which Major Bacon displayed admirable skill and courage, resulted in considerable loss on the part of the enemy, and of 1 killed and 4 wounded of the grand guard.

Coming up shortly after (about 2 o'clock p. m.), you advised me of the approach of the Second Division, under command of General C. F. Smith, which you had directed to be disposed on my left, in front of the right of the enemy's works, directing me to continue my advance so as to cover the left of the enemy's works in the direction of the town of Dover, lying on the Cumberland River. Preparatory to this movement I caused a hasty reconnaissance to be made to the Indian Creek road, on my right, which I found open to an advance by the enemy, and in the mean time caused the Third and Second Brigades, in the same order, to ascend the range of steep hills which overlook the center and right of the enemy's works, and to form in order of battle on the left of the First Brigade. This disposition brought the First and Second Divisions within supporting distance, and inclosed the enemy within a continually contracting line. The artillery having been brought to the crest of the hills, Colonel Oglesby advanced his right upon the Indian Creek road towards the enemy's center, and, arriving at a point where it descends into the valley of the Indian Creek, we came in full view of the enemy's tents on the opposite hill. Along the valley and upon the wooded hills inclosing it the enemy were observed in strong force. Colonel Oglesby, having ordered up a howitzer from Schwartz's battery to the brow of the hill upon which a portion of my line still rested, a spirited fire was opened, but the distance proved too great for effective service. To obviate this deficiency, Captain Dresser was ordered to bring forward one of his James rifled pieces, which, opening a well-directed fire, drove the enemy in haste from his tents and cleared the ground in front for a further advance, which was instantly made by the grand guard, led by Major Bacon, and followed by the First Brigade.

Having thus gained a nearer approach to the enemy's center, Colonel Oglesby again deployed the Eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first into line of battle, and moved forward in front of the enemy's works a half mile to the right, throwing forward the Eighteenth across a hill in the same direction. This movement, which was boldly and rapidly executed by Colonel Lawler, brought his regiment within hearing of officers directing the preparation of a battery designed to open a fire upon him in the morning. A timely change of the position of his regiment avoided this result. Colonel Wallace, moving forward the Second



Brigade, formed it into line on the left of the First. The Third Brigade was formed into line on the left of the Second, and in this order my division rested for the night upon its arms.

At daylight on the morning of the 13th the enemy opened fire from a battery in his middle redan, numbered 2, upon the right of my line. Refraining from returning the fire, in compliance with your order to avoid everything calculated to bring on a general engagement until otherwise directed, it was continued, with the aggravation of a fire from the enemy's sharpshooters, for an hour and a half. At the expiration of this time, deeming it within the spirit of your order, which required me, while acting on the defensive, to preserve my line and hold my ground, I ordered the fire to be returned. For this purpose Dresser's battery was brought to a position near the left of the Eighteenth, and opposite redan No. 2, and opened a fire upon it, which in a few minutes silenced the opposing battery. While this was going on two companies of Colonel Noble's Second Illinois Cavalry, Colonel Dickey's cavalry, and Lieutenant Powell, with two companies of regular cavalry, made a further reconnaissance to the right and the enemy's works at Dover, and reporting the fact, my line was advanced under partial cover of a ridge and woods in the same direction to and a short distance beyond the Winn's Ferry road and an evacuated cavalry camp of the enemy. During the execution of this movement the battery before referred to in redan No. 2 reopened fire upon us, which was promptly returned by Schwartz's battery, which had been quickly advanced to a position near a farm house farther to the right. This battery of the enemy having been thus silenced, another in the direction of Dover was opened upon my right, and in turn this was soon after silenced by two pieces of Schwartz's, two pieces of Taylor's, and three pieces of Dresser's batteries, which had been rapidly advanced near the Winn's Ferry road for that purpose and to afford protection to my advancing line.

Besides silencing the enemy's battery, these pieces also poured a destructive fire into a mass of his infantry, which was seen still farther to the right, driving them in confusion to the shelter of their breastworks. In the mean time the enemy had opened a fire from several pieces in redan No. 2 upon the left of my line, and also from redan No. 1 upon McAllister's battery, still farther to the left, on a commanding hill beyond Indian Creek, where it had been left supported by the Forty-eighth. This fire was intended to distract our attention and prevent our advance to the right. It was attended with no serious effect upon my left, but carried away a wheel of one of McAllister's gun-carriages. It was immediately silenced by McAllister's battery and the portions of Taylor's and Dresser's batteries, which had been brought back to a position near the farm house for that purpose.

My right being now engaged in threatening demonstrations and within short range of the enemy's outer works, and the enemy's infantry opposite our right having been thrown into confusion, as already mentioned, I deemed the opportunity favorable for storming redan No. 2, which lay in front of the Second Brigade and in a position to annoy our forces yet advancing, and which afforded a cover from which to dash upon my line at an exposed and comparatively weak point. Accordingly Colonel Morrison was ordered to advance his brigade, Seventeenth and Forty-ninth, joined by the Forty-eighth, Colonel Haynie, from the Second Brigade, to make the contemplated assault. The two detachments having formed in line of battle, Colonel Haynie, a gallant and intelligent officer, being the senior, assumed the command. Passing down the declivity on which they had formed, the assailants, preceded by



skirmishers, moved rapidly up the steep hill on the crest of which was the object of attack. Although the small timber had been felled and interwoven with the sharpened points of brush-wood extending outward, forming an almost impenetrable abatis, they made their way under a fast increasing fire from the enemy's intrenchments to a cleared space in front of them. At this point a heavy cross-fire of artillery and small-arms was poured upon the assailants, yet for an hour they maintained the unequal contest, advancing close to the intrenchments, and firing with deliberation and effect whenever an enemy appeared. For the purpose of strengthening this heroic band and more completely covering the front of the enemy's works, the Forty-fifth, Colonel Smith, in accordance with an order to that effect, moved forward under a heavy fire, and, taking position in line, the assault was renewed. At this critical moment, if the enemy had been diverted by an attack on the left and also from the river by the gunboats, it is probable the redan would have been taken.

Colonel Morrison, who had been conspicuous for the brilliant and daring manner in which he led his men into action, having been seriously wounded and carried from the field, the command devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Pease. Other valuable men and officers having also fallen, killed or wounded, and in the mean time the enemy having been re-enforced by an addition of artillery and a large body of infantry, Colonel Haynie withdrew the attacking force a short distance under cover of the hill, and reported the fact.

Approving what had been done, the four regiments thus temporarily united were brought back to my main line and attached to the Second Brigade. Considering the difficulties attending this attack, the nature of the ground, the large addition to the enemy's repelling force, and the formidable defenses which sheltered him, the brave and steady advance of the assailants may be justly regarded as one of the most brilliant and striking incidents of the four days' siege, gloriously terminating in the fall of Fort Donelson.

The contest still continuing between my right and the enemy's left, near Dover, Schwartz's and Taylor's batteries were advanced beyond the Winn's Ferry road still nearer the enemy's works in that direction, and renewed their fire with telling effect both upon his works and his infantry, assailing us from behind them. About 3 o'clock p. m. Dresser's battery of James rifled pieces opened fire from a new position on the crest of the ridge, between Schwartz's and Taylor's batteries and the farm-house before referred to. This fire was experimental, and designed to show whether it would prove effective upon the fort at a long range, which was distinctly seen through a gorge in the intervening hills. The experiment was attended with the most complete success. Percussion shells were distinctly seen exploding within the fort, dispersing a considerable body of men observed lining the parapet facing its river front, whose purpose seemed to be to resist an apprehended landing of the gunboats and also another body within the fort on the opposite side. Moreover, considerable injury was inflicted upon the barracks within the fort.

Dresser's battery failing ammunition, was taken back to await a new supply, and McAllister's remaining two 24-pounder howitzers were brought up next morning and took its place. From what has been said, it appears unmistakably that another leading feature of the operations of this day was the spirited and masterly artillery fight kept up from day-dawn until night-fall. Seldom has such a fight occurred in the experience of war. On our part it was actively maintained for the most

part with light artillery in the face of protected batteries and swarming sharpshooters, who fired from the cover of breastworks and intervening trees and brush-wood. Although signally successful on our part in silencing the enemy's guns wherever and as often as they opened fire, and in killing and wounding by his own admission many of his officers and men, yet, on the other hand, it cost us a number of valuable lives, among whom was Lieut. Joseph Hauger, who received a mortal wound while gallantly assisting in playing Schwartz's battery, only some 200 yards from the enemy's intrenchments.

During the afternoon of the 13th the weather turned intensely cold, a driving north wind bringing a storm of snow and sleet upon the unprotected men of my division. The night set in gloomily, and the mingled rain and snow congealed as they fell, thus painfully adding to the discomfort of a destitution of tents and camp equipage, all of which had been left behind. The scanty rations which the men could carry on leaving Fort Henry were reduced to a small allowance of hard bread and coffee, which were generously shared with comrades whose supply had become exhausted. Being in point-blank range of the enemy's batteries and sharpshooters, camp fires, inviting shot and shell, were not lighted. The pickets of the enemy and those of my own division, drawing near together, disputed the narrow space between the two armies, which rested uneasily upon their arms, chilled and shivering under the infliction of hostile elements. Yet through the weary hours of the long night the brave men of my command bore themselves without complaint and even with enthusiasm. During the same night, incited by despair, the enemy threw up new intrenchments, planted new batteries, comprising all the field pieces which had been in the fort, and in every practicable way strengthened his defenses along my right.

The morning of Friday, the 14th, dawned cold and cheerless upon men already severely tried by hunger, exposure, and long-continued watching and labor, yet rising promptly to the duties of the day. Anticipating the desire of the enemy to preserve an avenue of escape along the river above Dover, I dispatched Captain Stewart and Lieutenant Freeman, of my staff, accompanied by a small detachment of infantry, for a more thorough examination of the ground in that direction. The result of this reconnaissance, together with others made by Colonels Noble's and Dickey's cavalry and myself, convinced me that without the re-enforcements I had requested it would be safer and quite as effectual, for the purpose of preventing the escape of the enemy, to rest my right on a creek made impassable by the backwater of the Cumberland as to farther extend my already attenuated line in the face of newly erected batteries and an accumulated mass of the enemy's infantry to that river, and accordingly I ordered a disposition with a view to that object.

Col. John McArthur's brigade, consisting of the Ninth, Twelfth, and Forty-first Regiments Illinois Volunteers, coming up a little while before dark, was moved forward in compliance with my order near to the right of my line, and disposed in the order mentioned, in part as a reserve supporting the Eighteenth, and the remaining part so as to extend my line to a point within 400 or 500 yards of the creek. Colonels Noble's and Dickey's cavalry, being my only remaining available force, were disposed to the rear and still farther to the right, so as to command this space. After the Third Brigade had taken the position assigned to it a 10-pounder Parrott gun, of Major Cavender's Missouri Battalion, was brought to the ground, followed by another of the same caliber from the same battalion in the morning. Having been informed by you as



well as by the shouts of the enemy that the gunboats had been disabled in their attack upon the fort and had fallen back and would require time for repairs, and that all aggressive operations on our part must be avoided, the day passed away without any other important incident than occasional interchanges of shots between the sharpshooters and batteries of the opposing forces. Night followed, again bringing with it intermingled snow and rain, during which a fatigue party, with all the implements at my command, unceasingly labored in throwing up on the crest of the ridge already referred to, near the Winn's Ferry road, an earthwork for the protection of a battery intended to open fire in the morning. Two of the 20-pounder Missouri Parrott guns and two of McAllister's 24-pounder howitzers (the third one having been disabled by its own recoil) were placed under cover of this earthwork in the morning. A want of additional implements prevented me from carrying into effect my design to intrench the right of my line.

The morning of the 15th dawned clear and hopeful, and both officers and men, unshaken by another night of intense suffering, stood to their arms, ready for the work of an eventful day. Already three days of skirmishing, cannonading, and mutual assaults had transpired. Already the enemy had dismantled his fort of its field pieces and planted them within range of my right, and at early dawn this morning he was discovered rapidly moving in large masses to my extreme right, all clearly indicating the purpose to open his way for escape by a concentrated and overwhelming attack on that part of my line, or, if successful beyond his expectations, turn my right flank and attack me in reverse.

At the moment of my attack (6 o'clock a. m.) the forces under my command were formed in line of battle as follows: Colonel McArthur's brigade, consisting of the Forty-first, Twelfth, and Ninth, in the same order, with two 10-pounder Parrott guns, on the extreme right; Colonel Oglesby's brigade, comprising the Eighteenth, Eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first, next on the left; the Thirtieth, soon after being detached from the line by Colonel Oglesby, was moved to the rear of the Eighth as a reserve; the Eighth and Twenty-ninth, supporting Schwartz's battery of four guns, posted in their front; Colonel Wallace's brigade, comprising the Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-eighth, Forty-fifth, Forty-ninth, and Seventeenth, next on the left; McAllister's two 24-pounder howitzers and a section of the Missouri battery were posted under cover of the earthworks before referred to, in front of the Forty-fifth and Forty-eighth; Taylor's battery of four 6-pounder and two 12-pounder howitzers was posted in front of the Seventeenth; Dresser's battery of three James rifled 6-pounders was posted on the extreme left, in front of redan No. 2; Schwartz's battery of two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder howitzers was posted in front of the Twenty-ninth, on the right; three pieces pointing towards redan No. 3, and one piece disposed to protect the rear.

The Seventeenth Kentucky, Thirty-first Indiana, and Twenty-fifth Kentucky, commanded by Col. Charles Cruft, coming up between 9 and 10 o'clock a. m., was hailed by members of my staff with encouraging words, and formed as a reserve in the rear of the Twenty-ninth, Eighth, and Thirtieth. The Forty-fourth Indiana, Col. H. B. Reed, followed about an hour after, and formed in the rear of the Thirty-first. This re-enforcement was generously brought forward by Colonel Cruft upon his own responsibility, in the absence of General Wallace, his division commander, in compliance with my request, borne by Major Brayman, assistant adjutant-general of my division. In the mean time the Eighteenth, after a protracted struggle of alternating advantages, hav-



ing fallen back for want of ammunition, was succeeded in the place it had occupied by the Thirtieth.

The cavalry attached to my division, consisting of a portion of Colonels Noble's and Dickey's regiments and four independent companies of cavalry, respectively commanded by Lieutenant King, Captains Carmichael, Dollins, and O'Harnett, all of which had during the march and investment performed gallant and valuable service, were posted in positions favorable for the pursuit of the enemy if the fate of the day should justify it.

The Third Division, commanded by General L. Wallace, was formed on the left of the First, and the Second Division, commanded by General C. F. Smith, was formed opposite the right of the enemy's works, and extending towards the river below the fort. As the enemy moved rapidly towards my right a fire was opened by McAllister's howitzers and the Missouri Parrott guns, which was promptly returned from different points along the enemy's defenses. Skirmishing and the distant firing of sharpshooters were now over, and large masses of the enemy, rushing towards my right, were first met by the Eighteenth and the Ninth and immediately after by the Twelfth, Forty-first, and Eighth, before the enemy had time to deploy into line.

The enemy succeeding with much difficulty in forming a line and obtaining the desired range for his artillery, a fierce struggle ensued. In the course of this struggle two companies of the Twenty-ninth, under command of Lieut. Col. James E. Dunlap, immediately supporting Schwartz' battery, became detached and also hotly engaged. Several times repulsed, the enemy as often returned to renew the conflict with augmented numbers. When the ground had been strewn with the dead and wounded of both parties, the Ninth, Twelfth, and Forty-first failing ammunition and unsupported by their artillery, which had not been brought into action for want of opportunity, fell back before the pressure of overpowering numbers, and reformed a short distance in the rear.

Having dispatched Lieutenant Carter, of the artillery, about 8 o'clock a. m., to your headquarters to advise you that the battle was raging and to ask for immediate re-enforcements, confirmation of the importance of it was brought by Colonel Oglesby, who reported that Colonel McArthur's brigade was falling back, exposing the Eighteenth to a flanking fire; that Colonel Lawler was wounded, the batteries closely pressed, his supply of ammunition fast failing, and unless promptly supported the First Brigade must give way. Instructing him to hold his ground as long as possible, I dispatched Lieutenant Jones, of my staff, on the heels of my first messenger, to urge the absolute necessity of prompt and efficient succor. My messengers brought information that you had been called by an exigency to the gunboats upon the river, and that my appeal would be communicated upon your return.

Left uncovered, the Eighteenth and Eighth and Twenty-ninth became the point of concentrated attack, which was directed both against their front and the flank of the Eighteenth. Assailed by a cross-fire from three batteries, comprising ten guns, Schwartz's battery, under command of Lieutenant Gumbart, replied with 146 rounds, continuing a fire of grape and canister quite two hours. One of his guns being disabled by a shot carrying away the trail of its carriage, its place was promptly supplied by the one in the rear. At this stage of the conflict Lieutenant Gumbart was wounded and carried from the field. In the mean time the exposure of the Eighteenth had been greatly increased. Hard pressed in front and upon the flank, as already mentioned, and driven to rely upon

ammunition taken from the dead and wounded to continue a struggle which had been waged for three hours with doubtful success, they were at length forced to yield to superior numbers, and in obedience to orders fell back upon a new position, where they could be supplied with ammunition and food. Emulous of their example, the Thirtieth, under the chivalrous lead of Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis, hastened forward and took their place, instantly changing their line obliquely to the right to shield their flank, and, together with the Eighth and Twenty-ninth, continued the conflict until all of them in turn were forced in like manner to fall back.

During this engagement Colonel Oglesby's brigade sustained a loss of 836 killed, wounded, and missing, of which the proportion of the Eighth alone was 242. The field was strewn with dead and wounded of both sides. A short time before this I was advised by Colonel Oglesby of a painful casualty. The Twenty-fifth Kentucky, in executing his order to file past the Eighth into position, through mistake fired into a portion of that regiment and into the Twenty-ninth and Schwartz's battery, causing some disorder.

Schwartz's battery being left unsupported by the retirement of the Twenty-ninth, the Thirty-first boldly rushed to its defense, and at the same moment received a combined attack of the forces on the right and of others in front, supposed to be led by General Buckner. The danger was imminent, and called for a change of disposition adapted to meet it, which Colonel Logan made by forming the right wing of his battalion at an angle with the left. In this order he supported the battery, which continued to play upon the enemy and held him in check until his regiment's supply of ammunition was entirely exhausted.

Lieut. Col. John H. White, one of the bravest of the brave, and Capt. James H. Williamson, a veteran officer, both of whom had gained enviable distinction in the battle of Belmont, fell in this obstinate and bloody conflict. Many others were also killed and wounded, including Colonel Logan himself and Lieut. Charles H. Capehart, his adjutant, among the latter.

The Thirty-first being left without the means of longer attack or defense, Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom with generous courage brought up the Eleventh, and, taking their place, engaged the enemy, while the Twentieth, Forty-fifth, Forty-eighth, Forty-ninth, and Seventeenth, in obedience to the order of Colonel Wallace, were advanced and brought into action. Assailed both in front and upon the flank with increased fury and threatened by the enemy's cavalry hovering in the rear of the right, their peril became extreme. Accordingly, I sent Major Brayman, my assistant adjutant-general, to General L. Wallace, in your absence, a first and second time, advising him of the state of affairs, and requesting him to re-enforce me with fresh troops. Appreciating the exigency, he expressed his willingness to do so, but declined, urging the prohibition of your order requiring him to hold his position until otherwise instructed. Failing in this effort, I hastened Capt. G. P. Edgar to General Smith with the same information, who responded substantially in like manner.

In the mean time, having been advised by Colonel Wallace of the loss of many of his men and the increased exposure and danger of his situation, I instructed him to rely upon himself and maintain his position at all hazards until my request for re-enforcements had been answered. He gallantly did so, repulsing and driving back the enemy in front to their intrenchments. In accomplishing this result the artillery bore a conspicuous part. McAllister's, Taylor's, Dresser's, and Schwartz's bat-



teries, and a section of a battery of Major Cavender's Missouri battalion, poured a destructive fire upon the enemy's line, while the infantry, and the Twentieth conspicuous among others, boldly led by Colonel Marsh, charged and pursued. At one time McAllister's battery, while exposed to a cross-fire of artillery, was so closely pressed by the enemy's infantry as to compel his gunners to fall back. At this critical juncture Colonel Smith, of the Forty-fifth, rushed forward with a detachment of his men, and driving them back, rescued it. The carnage in this part of the field was also very great, particularly in the Eleventh, whose loss in killed, wounded, and missing was 328; while the aggregate of the killed, wounded, and missing of the brigade amounted to 534, including Lieut. Col. William Erwin, of the Twentieth, and Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Smith, of the Forty-eighth, who fell gallantly leading their men to the charge. Lieut. Col. Jasper A. Maltby, of the Forty-fifth, a brave and efficient officer, was also wounded in this engagement.

It was now 11 o'clock, and up to this and a still later hour a gun had not been fired either from the gunboats or from any portion of our line, except that formed by the forces under my command. Availing himself of so favorable an opportunity, the enemy directed the combined attack of nearly all his forces against it; yet even under these untoward circumstances the battle was won by the Second Brigade as against the enemy in their front. Unfortunately, however, this partial victory proved fruitless. In the mean time the enemy on the right, having turned the flank of the Second Brigade, whose ammunition was nearly exhausted, advanced both his infantry and cavalry to attack it in reverse. To avoid this I ordered Colonel Wallace, also Colonel Oglesby, to withdraw their commands, as they might think best, preparatory to a reformation and a resupply of ammunition. In the main this was done in good order; but the order to retire failing to reach Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, the Eleventh still stood their ground until by the weight of overwhelming numbers, assailing it in front and rear, it too was forced back. Throughout this terrible struggle Colonel Ransom, although seriously wounded, refused to quit the field, adding to his high reputation as an officer by the valor and constancy of his bearing.

Colonel Cruft, commanding the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky and the Thirty-first, and also, as I am unofficially informed, the Forty-fourth Indiana, not having reported to me, I am unable to detail their operations. Of Colonel Cruft, however, it is proper to say that in all our official relations he showed himself an officer of courage and good conduct, promptly responding to my appeal for aid, and entering with spirit and devotion into the work before him; and of all others, whether officers or privates, I would be proud to speak in appropriate praise if the means necessary to enable me to do so had been placed in my possession.

My whole command falling back some 400 yards from the left of their position in the morning, the Second Brigade was reformed in line of battle upon the ground that I had previously selected, at right angles with their first lines. To meet the contingency of the enemy's approach from the position he had occupied in my rear the First Brigade was disposed in rear of the Second. Here my men were supplied both with ammunition and provisions, which had been brought up for that purpose. Dispatching Captain Stewart, of my staff, and Captain Dollins, of the cavalry, with instructions to reconnoiter the enemy and ascertain his strength and movements, they found a large body of his forces falling back in apparent confusion, their officers vainly endeavoring to bring them to a halt, and reported the fact. From another portion of



the field indications were observed in the direction of the enemy's intrenchments of a hostile movement. This was about 1 o'clock p. m. General Wallace, whose division was formed near the ground selected for my second line, filed it to the right, and, guided by Captain Stewart, of my staff, formed a portion of his fresh troops in front of my second line and in close supporting distance of it, resting the left upon a section of Taylor's battery, which Captain Schwartz, of my staff, had, under my instructions, posted so as to command the road leading back to my former position. The remainder of the battery was placed a short distance in the rear, to guard against a flank approach either from the right or left.

From this position Captain Taylor opened a fire of canister, and was soon after joined by Lieutenant Wood, with a section of Willard's battery, who also opened a fire in the same direction, and generously renewed Captain Taylor's failing stock of ammunition. Several of the enemy afterwards found dead some 400 yards above in the road were supposed to have been killed by the fire of these guns.

Col. L. F. Ross, of the Seventeenth, who had been assigned by you to the Third Brigade of my division, came up about this time and took command of it. General Wallace, having formed the line already mentioned, also opened a fire of musketry in the same general direction, which was mainly answered by a fire of artillery from redan No. 2 and of infantry in the thick woods in front and to the left of his line. About the same time Dresser's battery was advanced under my order upon the same road to a position in front, and opened a fire intended to command the approach to our present position across Indian Creek and to silence the guns of the enemy in that direction. This fire was continued and returned with much spirit for some time. One of the shots from redan No. 2, scathing a tree close to Lieut. Harrison C. Barger, a brave and promising young officer, stunned him by concussion of the air.

While little or no loss was sustained on our part in this second engagement, it served to discourage the enemy and relieve us from any further attack. We rested upon our arms until about 1.30 o'clock p. m., when your arrival gave promise that the general wish to advance would soon be gratified. In reply to my suggestion, urging a simultaneous assault at all points, I was gratified to receive an order to that effect. My command was put in readiness to move while you returned to put the Second Division in motion. Sending Major Mudd, of the Second Illinois Cavalry, to reconnoiter to the right and front, he hastened forward through thick woods and across a field covered with snow in that direction, and, finding a detached body of the enemy, he reported the fact. About the same the Eighth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana came up, and, forming on the right of General Wallace's line, advanced in the same direction.

Major Brayman, my adjutant, and others, in the mean time reporting the hearing of commands in the thick woods a short distance in front and to the left of Taylor's battery and the discovery of other hostile indications farther down in the valley of Indian Creek, I ordered Colonel Wallace to form the Second Brigade in line of battle, resting their right upon the battery and their left near Indian Creek. This disposition, being promptly executed, commanded the space between Taylor's battery and the right of General Smith, and thus protected the left of the second line of battle from flank attack.

While these movements were being executed the sound of General Smith's musketry was heard, indicating an attack upon redan No. 1, in his front. Soon after, Colonel Webster, chief of your staff, came with

the welcome intelligence that the enemy had retired before the gallant and chivalrous assault of General Smith, and that he was already leading his men into this redan, which he firmly held. Colonel Webster also brought your order to press upon the enemy at all points. General Wallace, reporting through one of his officers that he had met the enemy and was pressing him with success, requested me to send forward five or six regiments to his right for the purpose of re-enforcing him. I immediately ordered forward a corresponding detachment. The vigor of this movement gave evidence of the skill and gallantry of the general commanding and the spirit and courage of his men. At the same time I ordered the Forty-sixth Illinois, Colonel Davis, to move forward to the right and near to the road already referred to to support General Wallace's left, and also ordered Colonel Ross, with the Third Brigade of my division, to advance directly in the same road, the object being to command the space between General Wallace's left and my former position on the ridge in front of the enemy's intrenchments. Colonel Ross boldly pushed forward to the point occupied by McAllister's battery in the morning, retaking the former position of the Second Brigade and throwing forward his skirmishers, who drove straggling parties of the enemy to the cover of his works. The loss of this brigade in killed, wounded, and missing during the siege was 149.

The forces of the enemy engaged by General Wallace had been driven back by his spirited assault, their desultory fire indicating the direction of their flight and sounding the termination of a battle which had continued the greater portion of ten hours.

The field, with its dead and wounded, was now in our possession, and the intrenched position of the enemy again invested, cutting off his hope of escape. While holding the ground thus regained, your order for the withdrawal of the First and Third Divisions to a compact position on the enemy's left and encamp for the night was received. Night had set in before compliance by my division with this order had transpired.

Early on the morning of the 16th, in obedience to your order of the evening before, I commenced preparations for a renewed attack upon the enemy's works. While doing so, the welcome intelligence came that he had surrendered at discretion, upon the receipt of which I immediately led my division down to the water battery and the main landing at the fort. In the mean time Captains Stewart and Schwartz, of my staff, had been the first of the Federal arms to enter the town of Dover.

In celebration of our success a national salute was fired by Taylor's battery and the American flag planted within the fort. Encamping my command near the town of Dover, and in front of my first line of the previous day, it welcomed the opportunity for the repose which its exhaustion and suffering so much required.

Seldom has a contest of such obstinacy and protracted duration occurred. The victory, though complete and signal, cost us a dear and mournful price. Bearing the brunt and burden of the battle, my division sustained much the greatest loss. Of 8,000 men brought into action 1,519 were found to have been killed, wounded, and missing, making a percentage of nearly every fifth man, the missing in all amounting to only 74. On the other hand, the loss of the enemy engaging my command, admittedly large, was probably much greater. Our trophies corresponded with the magnitude of the victory; 13,300 prisoners, 20,000 stand of small-arms, 60 pieces of cannon, and corresponding proportions of animals, wagons, ordnance, commissary, and quartermaster's stores



fell into our hands. In short, an army with all its material of war was lost and won.

It is but just and proper that I should bear testimony to the good conduct of my command, all of whom bore themselves with rare and admirable fortitude, courage, and constancy. Colonels Oglesby and Wallace, of the First and Second Brigades of my division, and Colonel McArthur, of the Second [First] Brigade of General Smith's division, temporarily under my command, occupying positions in near proximity to formidable works and batteries and at the points of assault during the principal conflict, were necessarily greatly exposed, but maintained their ground throughout the struggle, directing and inspiring their men by their skill and courageous example. Colonel Ross, Colonel Haynie, and Colonel Morrison, who were in command of brigades of detached regiments during the various engagements, behaved with great gallantry and good judgment. Maj. John P. Post, of the Eighth, while gallantly breasting the assault of the enemy on the morning of the 15th, was stunned by a spent ball and carried off insensible by the enemy, and has not since been recovered. Colonel Noble, of the Second, and Colonel Dickey, of the Fourth Cavalry, ably sustained by Major Mudd and Lieutenant-Colonel McCullough, rendered valuable service. Captains Carmichael, Dollins, O'Harnett, and Lieutenant King, of the cavalry, distinguished themselves for their activity and zeal. After what has been said, it is hardly necessary to add that the artillery performed a material and conspicuous part in the four days' siege, or to bear testimony to what is already sufficiently obvious—the skill, courage, and efficiency of Captains McAllister, Taylor, Dresser, Lieutenant Gumbart, and the officer (name not reported) commanding a section of Major Cavender's battalion, and the officers and men under their commands.

Turning from this grateful topic, I am pained to notice a disgraceful occurrence of which Major Mudd was the unhappy victim. After the surrender, while performing an act of kindness at the request of one of two or three countrymen, one of the party dropped behind and shot him in the back, inflicting a severe, but I trust not mortal, wound.

The members of my staff seconded my efforts and carried my orders with courageous zeal. Major Brayman, my assistant adjutant-general, though in feeble health, performed the duties of his office with fidelity, self-possession, and active and daring courage. Captain Schwartz, acting chief of my staff, an able and experienced officer, especially in artillery service, rendered constant and invaluable aid. Captain Stewart, of the Independent Cavalry, by his quick intelligence, sound judgment, and fearless and ceaseless activity in discovering and reporting the enemy's movements, added to his previous high reputation and obligations already imposed upon me. Maj. H. P. Stearns, chief surgeon of my division, joining me upon the field, devoted himself with characteristic zeal and fidelity to the delicate and trying duties of his position. Lieut. H. C. Freeman, chief engineer, uniting ready professional skill with fearless energy and enterprise, rendered constant and important aid within the sphere of his duties. Lieut. E. S. Jones, ordnance officer, with cheerfulness and alacrity responded to every call made upon his courage and fidelity, both in the camp and on the field. Capt. George P. Edgar, joining me as a volunteer aide on the evening of the 14th, participated with much spirit in the active and exciting scenes of the next day, and laid me under obligations by the prompt and satisfactory discharge of dangerous duty.

I am happy in congratulating you as the respected commander of a victorious army engaged in a just cause, and in believing that no stain



will be found, no word of reproach or disparagement coupled with the record which shall bear the history of this great event down the stream of time, but that it will endure as an imperishable example of duty bravely, manfully, and nobly performed.

Unavoidable deficiencies of this report will be in part supplied by diagrams accompanying it, illustrating the position and plan of the enemy's works, the field of battle, and the different formations of the forces under my command during this engagement.\*

Yours, respectfully,

JOHN A. McCLEARNAND,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Division.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding Advance Forces, &c.*

*Return of casualties in the First Division (McClelland's), at Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 13-15, 1862.†*

Commands.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.		
First Brigade :								
8th Illinois.....	3	51	5	179			238	
18th Illinois.....	2	51	6	134		18	211	
20th Illinois.....	1	24	3	57	1	13	99	
30th Illinois.....	1	18	1	68		6	94	
31st Illinois.....	2	29	6	101		28	166	
Illinois Light Artillery, Battery A.....				3			3	Dresser's.
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery E.....		2	2	1			5	Schwartz's.
Total First Brigade.....	9	175	23	543	1	65	816	
Second Brigade :								
11th Illinois.....	2	66	10	173	2	77	330	
20th Illinois.....	1	17	3	105		6	132	
45th Illinois.....		2	3	17			22	
48th Illinois.....	1	7	3	28		3	42	
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery B.....		1		8			9	Taylor's.
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery D.....				2			2	McAllister's.
Total Second Brigade.....	4	93	19	333	2	86	537	
Third Brigade :								
17th Illinois.....		13	5	57		6	81	
49th Illinois.....	1	12	3	43		9	68	
Total Third Brigade.....	1	25	8	100		15	149	
Grand total.....	14	293	50	976	3	166	1,502	

\* To appear in Atlas.

† But see revised list on p. 167.

## No. 7.

*Report of Col. Richard J. Oglesby, Eighth Illinois Infantry, commanding First Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,  
*District of West Tennessee, Fort Donelson, February 20, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that under Field Orders, No. 125, of Brig. Gen. John A. McClelland, commanding division, of date February 11, I moved with the First Brigade from Fort Henry in the direction of Fort Donelson at 4 o'clock p. m. and encamped on the Ridge road, 4 miles from Fort Henry, at 8 o'clock p. m. of that day. My forces consisted of the Eighth Illinois Regiment, commanded by Lieut. Col. Frank L. Rhoads; Eighteenth Illinois Regiment, commanded by Col. Michael K. Lawler; Twenty-ninth Illinois Regiment, commanded by Col. James S. Rearden; Thirtieth Illinois Regiment, commanded by Lieut. Col. Elias S. Dennis, and the Thirty-first Illinois Regiment, commanded by Col. John A. Logan; four independent companies of cavalry, commanded by Captains Dollins, Carmichael, O'Harnett, and Lieutenant King; Captain Schwartz's battery of two 6-pounder guns and two 12 pounder howitzers, commanded by First Lieut. [G.] Conrad Gumbart, and Captain Dresser's battery of three 6-pounder rifled guns. Early on the morning of the 12th instant Colonel Noble joined the command with two companies of the Second Illinois Cavalry and two companies regular cavalry. He was immediately sent forward with his whole command to reconnoiter to a point within 2 miles of Fort Donelson, using Captains Carmichael and O'Harnett's cavalry as flankers. The column was put in motion at 8 o'clock a. m., and moved slowly to a point 2 miles from the position of the enemy, at which place, meeting their pickets, Major Mudd went forward with a detachment of the Second Illinois Cavalry and drove them back, while a position was taken by the advance guard to receive them. The general commanding, arriving on the ground, ordered the column to move to the right of the Ridge road, through some old fields, to the main road leading from the Big Sandy Creek to Dover.

Ascending the high wood ridge overlooking the fields to our left and rear and within 1 mile of the main fort and about 2½ miles from Dover, which lies 1 mile above the fort on the Cumberland River, a large body of cavalry, under Colonel Forrest, threatened my right, and prepared to attack the head of the column. They were held in check for five minutes, until I could bring forward the grand guard, under Major Bacon, of the Thirtieth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, which was thrown across the slope of the ridge descending into the valley, leading directly into the camp of the enemy. At the same time the right wing of the Eighth Regiment, in column of platoon, took position as a reserve to the grand guard, with Captain O'Harnett's cavalry, holding the high ridge to our right, and Colonel Noble's cavalry in front, ready to retire through the intervals on the right wing of the Eighth Regiment, should it become necessary to do so. The Eighteenth was formed in column of companies at the foot of the hill, and the rest of the column held position as in the line of march. Instantly the attack began and was steadily resisted by the grand guard for ten minutes, when the enemy again gave back, and Major Bacon held the right unbroken.

Finding no chance to break the lines of the guard, they now in large force attempted to gain the rear of it. I ordered Colonel Noble to retire his cavalry through the Eighth Regiment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Rhoads

wheeling into line, the right wing checked their advance by a vigorous fire, until Lieutenant Gumbart, arriving at the point, sent a shell into them, when they fled in confusion from the field. The way was now open for another advance. The general commanding ordered the left wing forward on the high ridge in front of the fort, halting to reconnoiter to the right towards the main road leading from Paris to Dover, and, as I was informed, to bring up the Second Brigade. I ordered Lieutenant Gumbart to take forward one howitzer and throw some shell into the line of the enemy across the main road leading to the Cumberland. The range being too long for the shells, Captain Dresser brought forward a rifled 6-pounder, and in a few shots broke up their lines and drove them from their tents.

Having received orders to move the brigade forward in the direction of the lines of the enemy, I deployed the Eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first Regiments into line of battle, and moved slowly forward a half a mile, at the same time sending the Eighteenth Regiment to the right, over the high ridge, to the Paris road, and at sunset, by a flank movement, moved the rest of the brigade over the ridge to the Paris road, thus occupying the last main outlet from Fort Donelson and the town of Dover by night-fall. Upon going forward to the right I found Colonel Lawler, in his anxiety to push forward, had moved the Eighteenth Regiment under the range of a four-gun battery in the main redoubt in front of Fort Donelson. In attempting to draw my line back an unfortunate discharge of musketry into the ranks of the Twenty-ninth Regiment killed and wounded several men of that regiment. Permission was given to Colonel Rearden to move the Twenty-ninth to the left of the brigade for the night to dispose of his wounded men. Early next morning the regiment returned to its position in line, and was stationed in rear of the Eighth as a reserve for the day.

Early on the morning of the 13th I ordered Captain Dresser to bring forward his battery and take position in front of the main redoubt of the enemy. In twenty minutes the four guns of this redoubt were silenced by him. During the day this battery was moved forward along the line as the column advanced to the right, and in every instance was most effective in silencing the guns of the enemy. Captain Dresser is entitled to much praise for his cool and discreet bearing during the entire action. Lieutenant Barger and the men at the guns did most excellent service. The ammunition of the battery was exhausted on the 13th. On the 14th it was supplied with 120 rounds of shot and shell. On the 15th instant this battery was on my extreme left, under the special orders of the general commanding. Early on the day of the 13th the brigade moved to the right, immediately under the fire of the artillery and sharpshooters of the enemy, one-half mile nearer Dover, on the Paris road, and again, later in the day, a half mile farther, to a point, in one instance, within 100 yards of their line of earthworks. Later in the afternoon, however, at the suggestion of the general commanding, to guard my rear and prevent a surprise in that direction, I drew the forces back onto the next and higher ridge, about 250 yards from their line, and encamped for the night, with the Eighteenth Regiment on the right, still preserving the original order of battle, excepting that Lieutenant Gumbart, commanding Schwartz's light battery, was posted between the Eighth and Twenty-ninth Regiments.

I will not omit the highly creditable part borne by Lieutenant Gumbart with his battery. During the march on the 13th instant, in the afternoon, whilst taking a new position, Lieut. Joseph Hauger was severely, if not mortally, wounded by a ball from one of the sharpshoot-



ers of the enemy at a distance of 500 yards, while directing one of his guns. Both officers and men seemed unconscious of danger. In the midst of a heated artillery contest of one hour, having obtained the consent of Col. William H. L. Wallace to bring up a section of Captain Taylor's battery to this place, both batteries entered into the contest with surprising vigor, and soon the enemy's lines were cleared and their guns silenced. I leave the conduct of Captain Taylor's battery to the notice of Colonel Wallace, who observed them while engaged.

The whole front of my line was covered with skirmishers during the night of the 13th, and the men again stood to arms all night under one of the most persecuting snow-storms ever known in this country, without fires and without reliefs. During the night, in passing from the right of the Eighteenth, under Col. M. K. Lawler, to the left of the Thirty-first, under Col. John A. Logan, there was one universal wish to meet the enemy, to carry the fort, and to end the sufferings of the men.

On the morning of the 14th the sun rose upon our forces, who were nearly torpid from the intense cold of the night. Receiving an order from the general commanding to remain quiet in camp and not attack the enemy until Brigadier-General Grant had communicated with the gunboats, most of the men made coffee. All other rations were exhausted. During the day the brigade had nothing to eat, the wagons not having yet come up with the three days' additional rations, and did not arrive until the afternoon of the 15th instant. During the afternoon of the 14th I moved the brigade the distance of 100 yards to the right, near an open field, in full view of the lines of the enemy. All night long we could hear them felling trees and using picks and shovels to strengthen their defenses.

At this time my right was a half mile from Dover and about 400 yards from the backwater of a small creek, rendering their escape impossible except through this narrow opening of 300 to 400 yards. Colonels Noble's and Dickey's cavalry reported to me early this morning, and soon made a thorough reconnaissance around the left of the enemy and nearly into Dover. As I have no official reports from these forces, I am not able to state what particular companies did this labor. It was very hazardous, and opened the way quite to the river. On the ridge of this old field I was anxious to plant a battery, but could not safely remove Lieutenant Gumbart, who was holding one of the three principal roads leading into Dover from the back country through my lines, on one of which was posted the Eighteenth and on the other two the Eighth and Twenty-ninth Regiments. During the afternoon I posted the Thirtieth Regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dennis, 50 yards in the rear of the Eighth Regiment, as a reserve, for the night, the brushy and broken character of the ground forbidding any greater distance with security. The Twenty-ninth and Thirty-first held the ground from the main Paris road into Dover, reaching along the ridge of the hills to Colonel Wallace's right. Thus we stood to arms again for the night. Scarcely a man slept. By this time the enemy had opportunity to measure the strength and disposition of my forces on his left. In reply to my request for forces to strengthen my reserve, the general sent Colonel McArthur, with the Ninth, Twelfth, and Forty-first Regiments, but without artillery.

Saturday morning, the 15th instant, at fifteen minutes before 6 o'clock, the enemy dared to pass out of his trenches for the first time in a desperate effort to turn our right and escape into the country. By 6 o'clock the whole brigade was in line and ready for the action. Going to my extreme right, where the attack was made by their infantry, I found

that Colonel McArthur had thrown forward the Ninth Regiment on my line of battle, which was now hotly engaged. Going out into the open field, I found the Forty-first, under Col. Isaac C. Pugh, in line, but some distance from the right of the Ninth, with two companies of skirmishers, under Lieut. Col. Ansel Tupper, still farther to the right, and covering the entire ground by which the enemy could escape. These two companies were also then engaged. From the large force of infantry and cavalry moving in front of their line it was obvious the contest was to be upon our right, and in less than twenty minutes their skirmishers, entering the almost impenetrable underbrush and thick woods, followed closely by their main body, moved against the Eighteenth and Eighth Regiments. Lieutenant Gumbart used two pieces of his battery with energy until severely wounded and carried from the field.

The enemy did not spare their grape and canister, and occasionally sent a shell or round shot from the six or eight guns bearing on our lines. The Twenty-ninth soon became generally engaged. Two companies detached on the left of the Eighth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlap, were engaged with the Eighth Regiment. The fire upon our lines continued with unabated fury for an hour longer, when I learned that Colonel McArthur had withdrawn his brigade to take position below the old field. Finding my right uncovered, I sent Captain Brush, now commanding the Eighteenth Regiment—Col. M. K. Lawler having been wounded in the left arm and compelled to leave the field—to the right, so as to bring the Thirtieth Regiment into line on the left of the Eighteenth. In carrying out this order Captain Brush was also wounded. The regiment, by this time having by a steady and unflinching fire nearly exhausted their ammunition, retired as the Thirtieth came into line, leaving 44 dead on the ground and 170 wounded. Continuing to hold my position for still another hour under their galling fire I was tempted to use the bayonet, but the risk of breaking my lines in an effort to go through the thick brush, when the result under the most favorable circumstances could only be to drive them into their lines and expose my command to a raking fire of artillery and musketry upon emerging in broken files from the thick woods, determined me to hold my line to the last.

At this moment Col. F. L. Rhoads reported to me that the cartridge-boxes were nearly empty. I told him to hold his position until re-enforcements came up, when I would move his regiment off the ground for ammunition. In a few moments the Twenty-fifth Kentucky came in sight, commanded by Col. J. M. Shackelford. I led the colonel to his position, and ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Rhoads to show him how to file past the Eighth Regiment as it moved off the ground. From some unaccountable cause the left wing of the Twenty-fifth fired, and, some of the balls taking effect in the Eighth and Twenty-ninth Regiments, threw the men into confusion, when they with the Thirtieth Regiment retired from the ground. I saw no more of the Twenty-fifth Kentucky. The Thirtieth Regiment left on the ground 19 killed and 71 wounded; the Twenty-ninth left 25 killed and 60 wounded; the Eighth left 55 killed and 188 wounded. Most of the wounded were taken off the field. A few men, with Major Post, of the Eighth, who was also badly wounded, were taken prisoners. Three pieces of Lieutenant Gumbart's battery fell into the hands of the enemy. They could have been brought off, but 23 horses had been killed or disabled.

At the moment my line was broken the fire of the enemy had materially slackened, and twice before they had been driven back. The enemy skulked behind every hiding place, and sought refuge in the oak



leaves, between which and their uniforms there was so strong a resemblance, our men were continually deceived by them. Turning to the Thirty-first, which yet held its place in line, I ordered Colonel Logan to throw back his right, so as to form a crochet on the right of the Eleventh Illinois. In this way Colonel Logan held in check the advancing foe for some time under a most destructive fire, whilst I endeavored to assist Colonel Cruft with his brigade in finding a position on the right of the Thirty-first. It was now four hours since the fighting began in the morning. The cartridge-boxes of the Thirty-first were nearly empty. The colonel had been severely wounded, and the lieutenant-colonel, John H. White, had, with some 30 others, fallen dead on the field, and a large number wounded. In this condition Colonel Logan brought off the remainder of his regiment in good order. At the suggestion of Colonel Logan, as he left the ground, the Eleventh Illinois, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, of Col. W. H. L. Wallace's brigade, changed front to the rear upon the ground just occupied by Colonel Logan, and held this position for half an hour under a heavy fire from the enemy.

Reporting to the general commanding the state of affairs, he ordered me to reform the brigade on the left of the division. In two hours the whole brigade was reformed, and having received a new supply of ammunition, awaited orders to march onto the field again. Night coming on, the troops went into camp, three regiments near the hospital, in good order, and the Eighth and Eighteenth on the high ridge in front of the main redoubt. Some of the regiments sent details to bury the dead and take care of the wounded, but Captain Lieb, of the Eighth Illinois, who had the party in charge, was unable to reach the ground, the pickets of the enemy still holding it.

Sunday morning, the 16th instant, the brigade, in common with the whole army, marched into the fort. Feeling a just pride at the honorable part they had borne in its reduction and surrender, I cannot venture to mention the special deeds of daring where all bore so noble a part, nor do I know that any praises of mine can add to the feeling, strong with officers and men, that all was done that could be to uphold the honor of our flag and punish traitors for their treason. I was ably sustained by the colonels commanding regiments, no order being given during the action but was faithfully and cheerfully executed, and I share with them freely whatever of credit may be given to our whole command. Dr. Silas T. Trowbridge, acting brigade surgeon, and Dr. J. M. Phipps, assistant surgeon to the Eighth Regiment, acting as my aides until the wounded demanded their attention, are entitled to much credit for their good services in both capacities. Captain Dollins, volunteer aide-de-camp; Henry N. Pearse, acting brigade quartermaster and aide, and William C. Clark, acting assistant adjutant-general, behaved with much coolness, together with Privates James M. Baxter, E. M. Gard, James Slatton, and Jacob Swafford, orderlies, from Captain Dollins' cavalry, who bore my orders in the hottest of the fight with promptness and courage.

I transmit you copies of the reports of the different colonels commanding and of Captain Dresser, and ask your attention to the names favorably mentioned in them. I also send list of the killed and wounded.\*

I am, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. J. OGLESBY,

*Colonel, Commanding First Brigade.*

Maj. M. BRAYMAN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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\* Embodied in division return, p. 182.



## No. 8.

*Report of Lieut. Col. Frank L. Rhoads, Eighth Illinois Infantry.*

HDQRS. EIGHTH REGIMENT ILLINOIS VOLUNTEERS,  
*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

I have the honor to report the part taken by the Eighth Regiment in the siege and reduction of Fort Donelson from the 12th to the 16th instant.

Col. R. J. Oglesby having been assigned to the command of the First Brigade of the First Division of the District of Cairo, I took command of the Eighth Regiment. On the 12th instant, at noon, marching on the right of the brigade, I received an order to deploy into line of battle on the right of the road leading into Fort Donelson. Skirmishers were sent forward, but the enemy retiring, the column was again formed and the line of march taken up in the direction of the Paris and Fort Donelson road. Passing over some open fields, the right of the column took position on the ridge in front of the fort. The grand guard was thrown forward and met a body of cavalry for a few moments. The right wing of the regiment was formed in column of platoon in face of a large body of the enemy's cavalry. The Second Illinois Cavalry passed through the intervals, and the right wing of the Eighth delivered its fire upon the enemy and dispersed them. Later in the day an order was received to move forward in line of battle through an open field out by the main road leading to the main fort of the enemy. At this point the Eighteenth Regiment was sent to my right over a high ridge. About dark of the same day I also received an order to move by the right flank over the same ridge into the Paris road. The regiment encamped on this ridge for the night and slept on their arms.

On the morning of the 13th the line of march was taken up in front of the main redoubt of the enemy and within 500 yards of his batteries. The regiment filed past Captain Dresser's light battery under a heavy fire of artillery, and took a new position at noon about 1 mile from the Cumberland River, in the direction of Dover. Two companies (C and A) were detached to sustain Lieutenant Gumbart's light battery and one section of Captain Taylor's, engaging the enemy in a hot artillery contest of two hour's duration. At this point, later in the afternoon, the colonel commanding gave the order to prepare to assault the long line of intrenchments on our right and front. By the time the necessary instructions were given to carry this order into effect it was countermanded. The next order to move brought the right of the Eighth Regiment within 100 yards of the enemy's line. Just before dark the line was changed, and the regiment stood to arms all night 200 yards from their intrenchments. The night was intensely cold, and the snow fell full 3 inches deep. Skirmishing was kept up all night. The men were relieved at daylight an hour for breakfast, but only coffee could be obtained. The regiment remained all day on the ground and stood to arms most of the time.

At daylight on the morning of the 15th heavy firing indicated an attack upon our lines. I immediately formed the regiment on the line of battle previously fixed by the colonel commanding, and by 6 o'clock the right of the Eighth had fired a few shots. I sent some skirmishers in advance over the brow of the elevation to annoy the enemy, as well as to give me information of his force and movements. The skirmishers soon reported the enemy approaching in force, and soon the battle became general from the right of the brigade to the left of the Eighth Regi-

ment. The enemy was in strong force, and repeatedly attempted to break the line or turn my right. He was as often baffled and repulsed by the steady and unflinching fire of the whole regiment, which stood like a line of adamant before the stealthy and stubborn advance of the enemy. We were enfiladed at turns by a battery on the left, which never ceased to pour grape and canister into our ranks for three hours. The fire was murderous, as the long list of the dead and wounded sadly shows. My order was to hold the height of the ridge, and not to yield an inch. It was done, but at the cost of 54 killed and 186 wounded (many mortally) of 613 officers and men engaged in the battle.

Finding the ammunition in the cartridge-boxes nearly exhausted, I so reported to Colonel Oglesby, and was informed a re-enforcement was at hand. Soon the Twenty-fifth Kentucky Regiment appeared with flags flying, as previously ordered by Colonel Oglesby. I attempted to march the Eighth from its position to go for ammunition and give place to the Twenty-fifth Kentucky, but at this moment, from some unaccountable cause, the Eighth was fired into by the Twenty-fifth Kentucky, which alarmed the men. The Twenty-fifth Kentucky fell into utter confusion, and I was obliged to retire from our favorite position in some confusion. Receiving the order to reform the regiment again on the left of the division I did so, and, having received a supply of ammunition, was ordered to take position in the line of battle, where the regiment remained for the night. Sunday morning I led the regiment, full of pride, into the fort, in common with the whole army.

Where all fought so nobly, so sacrificingly; where all stood by our noble flag to the last, it is hard to say who has most honor. I was sustained all the time by Major Post on the left until he fell wounded. Lieut. Joseph G. Howell, acting adjutant, fell dead in the latter part of the battle, after rendering me efficient aid, bearing an order from Colonel Oglesby to myself. He was a noble and gallant officer. Capt. Robert Wilson was dangerously wounded in the action, whose loss I severely felt. Capt. Joseph M. Hanna (color company) next fell, dangerously if not mortally wounded, cheering his men to die by their colors. Lieutenant Marsh, Company B, and Lieut. H. A. Sheetz (color company), both fell dead at their posts, examples of true valor. Lieut. John M. Lowry was severely wounded, but did not leave the field. Lieutenants Monroe and Dennison were slightly wounded, but did not leave the field. Capt. James M. Ashmore being absent sick, Captain Harvey was on duty as senior captain, and is entitled to much praise for his cool bearing.

Accompanying please find a list of killed and wounded.\*

[F. L. RHOADS,]

*Lieutenant-Colonel.*

WILLIAM C. CLARK,

*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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### No. 9.

*Report of Capt. Samuel B. Marks, Eighteenth Illinois Infantry.*

FORT DONELSON, *February 22, 1862.*

SIR: In compliance with Order No. — I have the honor to report to you the part taken by the Eighteenth Regiment Illinois Volunteers in the recent engagement at this place.

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\* Embodied in division return, p. 182.



On the night of the 12th instant, being the right of your brigade, we camped upon a hill in front of the enemy's batteries, about 300 yards distant. After forming a line of battle, we sent out a portion of two companies to deploy as skirmishers to the front, who approached the enemy's pickets and fired upon them, killing 2 men and wounding 4 and driving them in in disorder. The regiment was then ordered back by you a short distance to a point less exposed to the enemy's batteries, where it remained on arms during the night without fires. On the morning of the 13th instant we were advanced to the right and in line with the enemy's breastworks for a short distance. During the day frequent skirmishes took place between our scouts and those of the enemy. In the afternoon, in compliance with your order, we advanced over the hill, and within 200 yards of the enemy's breastworks. Here we were fired upon, killing 1 of our men and wounding 4. We then (with a view of storming their batteries) advanced to within about 50 yards of their intrenchments, where we remained under cover of the bushes during the remainder of the evening. A movement against them at that time being deemed impracticable by you, we retired to our position of the morning. The men remained with arms in their hands during the night; the extreme cold and snow forbade their lying down.

On the following day nothing of importance occurred, save a few occasional skirmishes with the enemy. The succeeding night, being inclement and cold, was spent as the preceding one. On the morning of the 15th we were aroused about daybreak by a rapid and heavy firing upon our right and front. The regiment was speedily formed into line, and in a very few minutes we received the fire of the enemy, and the engagement became general along the right wing. It soon became apparent that the enemy were forcing back the regiments upon our right, as they approached us diagonally, their line forming an angle of about 20 degrees with ours. The enemy, so far as we were able to distinguish through the brush, appeared to approach in columns six or eight files deep, adopting a mode similar to that of street fighting, firing and falling back. So rapid was their firing, it was almost impossible to distinguish an interval. Our men stood their ground well, conducting themselves with remarkable coolness and bravery. Early in the engagement Colonel Lawler was severely wounded in the arm, but did not retire from the field. Captain Brush, acting lieutenant-colonel, was in charge of the right wing, and myself, acting as major, that of the left.

Towards the close of the engagement an order was given on the right to march by the right flank, for the purpose of extending our lines in that direction. This order was unfortunately unheard on the left, and in consequence our regiment was divided—the greater portion being with the right wing; but the enemy poured in in such overwhelming numbers and with such rapidity, that both wings were speedily flanked by them and almost surrounded. The majority of our men had exhausted their ammunition and further resistance seemed useless. It was deemed prudent to retire. Both wings fell back in good order, and reformed in the valley to the rear. We then marched some distance to the left and in rear of our lines, when we were furnished with ammunition, and again joined the Eighth Regiment of your brigade, and were posted on a hill in front of one of the enemy's redoubts, and spent another sleepless night upon our arms. In the morning we were preparing to storm their batteries, when they exhibited the white flag, thus ending one of the severest contests ever fought upon the American continent.

I might mention here that Captain Brush was severely wounded during the latter part of the engagement, leaving the entire responsibility



of the command resting upon me. Of the officers connected with this command I cannot speak in too high terms of commendation. They, with one or two exceptions, conducted themselves with remarkable coolness and intrepidity. Colonel Lawler, although severely wounded, remained on the ground until the regiment had all retired, exhibiting throughout the trying scene a perfect coolness and self-possession.\*

Permit me here to congratulate you, sir, upon the skillful and satisfactory manner in which you conducted your command.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. MARKS,

*Captain, Commanding Eighteenth Illinois Regiment.*

Col. RICHARD J. OGLESBY,  
*Commanding First Brigade.*

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No. 10.

*Report of Capt. Jasper M. Dresser, Battery A, Illinois Light Artillery.*

FORT DONELSON, *February 19, 1862.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to hand you herewith a report of the operations of my battery during the battle before Fort Donelson on the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th instant:

We arrived before Fort Donelson on the 12th instant, and were ordered by you to the front with one gun, with which we opened fire upon the enemy's camp at a distance of three-quarters of a mile. We expended in this fire 21 shells under your direction. The result was to disperse a body of infantry which was drawn up in line of battle and to compel the enemy to strike their tents in that camp. During the remainder of the day we followed the movements of your brigade. That night we lay in the woods with our teams hitched up and the men with their equipments on. The next day, the 13th, we again moved forward under your direction, taking a position opposite to a four-gun battery, which we engaged and silenced in fifteen minutes. We were again ordered forward, when we became engaged with a battery of two guns, which was compelled to leave the field in ten minutes. We again limbered up and moved forward to position where the batteries of Captains Schwartz and Taylor were engaged with a battery of the enemy. By our united efforts this battery was silenced when we had expended but five rounds with each gun. The balance of the day we were engaged in shelling the enemy's camp, with what result I am unable to say. This day we exhausted our ammunition. On the 14th we were not engaged. We, however, received a supply of 120 rounds in the following proportions: 75 shells, 30 solid shot, and 15 canister.

On the morning of the 15th we received orders from General McClelland to report at the place we first opened upon the enemy's battery on the morning of the 13th, and engaged a battery which had been planted during the night opposite to that position. This we did under the fire of three different batteries. We succeeded, after a desperate resistance, in forcing the enemy to withdraw their batteries and leave us masters of the field. We were then ordered back to our camp and to hold ourselves in readiness to move forward. About 3 o'clock we were ordered to the position which we occupied in the morning. We

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\* List of casualties shows 53 killed, 155 wounded, and 18 missing.

engaged the batteries which had been replaced, and in ten minutes had expended our last shot, when I ordered my men to limber to the rear. We retired under a galling fire of grape and canister.

In this short engagement Harman Greathouse was wounded in the hand by a piece of shell and Nicholas Myers was struck by a spent grape. Sergeant Harding, while pointing his gun, was severely injured by the bursting of a shell within a few inches of his head. The concussion injured his brain, and he now lies in the hospital in a critical condition.

I cannot too highly praise the coolness of my little band while under the enemy's fire. Second Lieut. H. C. Barger, the only commissioned officer with me, displayed great coolness and daring, and was always to be found at his post, doing his duty as a faithful officer and brave man.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

I am, dear colonel, your most obedient servant,

JASPER M. DRESSER,

*Captain Artillery Company A, First Brigade.*

Col. RICHARD J. OGLESBY,

*Commanding First Brigade.*

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### No. 11.

*Report of Col. William H. L. Wallace, Eleventh Illinois Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,

*U. S. Advance Forces, Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 17, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my brigade from the time of leaving Fort Henry, on the 11th instant, up to the 16th instant, when the Federal forces entered this fortification.

My brigade, as formed by order of General U. S. Grant, commanding the District of Cairo, consisted of the Eleventh Illinois Infantry, Lieut. Col. T. E. G. Ransom commanding; the Twentieth Illinois Infantry, Col. C. C. Marsh commanding; the Forty-fifth Illinois Infantry, Col. John E. Smith commanding; the Forty-eighth Illinois Infantry, Col. I. N. Haynie commanding; the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, Col. T. Lyle Dickey commanding; Capt. Ezra Taylor's Chicago Light Battery B, First Illinois Artillery, four 6-pounder field guns and two 12-pounder howitzers, and Capt. E. McAllister's battery of three 24-pounder howitzers, First Illinois Artillery—the whole constituting the Second Brigade of the First Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand, and containing about 3,400 effective men of all arms.

About noon of the 11th instant, while in camp at Fort Henry, I received orders from General McClernand to put the infantry and artillery of my brigade on the march, and move out 3 or 4 miles on the Telegraph road towards this place. At 4 o'clock p. m. the forces designated marched out and encamped on the road 4 miles from Fort Henry. At sunrise on the next day (the 12th instant) I was joined by Colonel Dickey's cavalry, and marched with my whole command by the Telegraph road towards Fort Donelson, keeping up frequent communication with Colonel Oglesby's First Brigade, which was moving at the same time by the Ridge road, Colonel Dickey's cavalry thoroughly

reconnoitering the country as the column marched. Soon after noon I came in sight of the enemy's encampments on the opposite side of a creek about a mile in advance. Having caused the roads to be reconnoitered, and finding the creek impassable on account of backwater from the Cumberland, I moved to the right up the creek, and effected a junction with Colonel Oglesby's brigade in the low grounds west of Fort Donelson, where heavy wooded hills intervened between us and the enemy's position. Colonel Dickey's cavalry was again thrown forward, and occupied the heights and thoroughly scouted and reconnoitered the ground in front. Colonel Oglesby's brigade moved up the Paris road to the south of Fort Donelson, while I threw my brigade by its front onto the heights, dragging the artillery up the steep, wooded hills.

After further reconnoitering, the brigade advanced and occupied a ridge south of the center of the enemy's fortifications, with its right resting on the left of Colonel Oglesby's brigade. Some slight skirmishing occurred here, and after resting in this position for an hour or more and further reconnoitering, in accordance with orders from General McClelland I moved the brigade by the right flank, following Colonel Oglesby's brigade across the valley towards the left of the enemy's position. By this time it was dark, and Colonel Oglesby's right becoming involved in ground which had not been reconnoitered, and which was very hilly and covered with a dense growth of underbrush, I was ordered by the general commanding the division to return to the position on the west of the valley, which I did, moving by the left flank, where my brigade rested for the night.

At daylight on the morning of the 13th the enemy opened fire with his artillery from the middle redoubt. Soon afterwards, by order of General McClelland, I marched the Eleventh, Twentieth, and Forty-fifth Regiments, and Taylor's battery to the right across the valley, leaving McAllister's battery, supported by the Forty-eighth Illinois, on the ridge west of the valley, and ordered Colonel Dickey's cavalry to move in rear with detachments thrown toward the right to reconnoiter toward the Cumberland and Dover. Reaching the high grounds east of the valley, Taylor's battery was put in position on the road leading up to Dover, where the left of the enemy's line rested behind earthworks and intrenchments, strengthened by strong abatis in front. The whole force continued to move steadily to the right, Colonel Oglesby's brigade leading, the artillery of his brigade and Taylor's battery moving on the road, while the infantry was in rear of and near to the road. Along this road the artillery advanced, taking successive positions to the right, and keeping up a constant cannonade on the enemy's works on the right and in the middle redoubt across the valley. The open space afforded a fine opportunity for artillery practice at long range, and the fire of Taylor's, Schwartz's, and Dresser's guns, warmly returned by those of the enemy in the middle redoubt and the works on his left, presented a rare example of the use of that arm of the service.

About noon I was ordered by General McClelland to detach the Forty-eighth Regiment (Colonel Haynie) to operate with the Seventeenth Illinois (Major Smith commanding) and the Forty-ninth Illinois (Colonel Morrison), of the Third Brigade, in making an assault on the enemy's middle redoubt on the hill west of the valley, supported by the fire of McAllister's guns. This force was under command of Colonel Haynie as senior colonel. They formed in line and advanced in fine order across the intervening ravines, and mounted the steep height on which these works are situated in the most gallant manner, and under



a heavy fire of musketry from the enemy posted in the line of earthworks. They advanced up the hill, delivering their fire with coolness and precision. The line not being long enough to envelop the works, by order of General McClelland I detached the Forty-fifth Illinois (Colonel Smith) to their support on the right. This regiment advanced in beautiful order down the slope, across the valley, and up the opposite steep, with skirmishers deployed in front, and were soon warmly engaged.

These operations had given the enemy time to re-enforce this position with strong bodies of infantry from his reserves in rear and field artillery, which opened a destructive fire on the advancing line. The roll of musketry showed the enemy in powerful force behind his earthworks. Notwithstanding, our forces charged gallantly up the heights to the very foot of the works, which were rendered impassable by the sharp and strong points of brush-wood in which it was built. All the regiments engaged in this daring attempt suffered more or less from the enemy's fire. In the mean time the enemy began to show himself in strength in his intrenchments in front of Colonel Oglesby's brigade. Schwartz's battery was advanced along the road to within 300 yards of the works, but being without canister, they were withdrawn, and by General McClelland's order I directed Captain Taylor to throw forward two sections of his battery to that position. The position being beyond the right of my line, the infantry support was to be furnished from Colonel Oglesby's brigade, which was immediately in the rear. These sections took their positions under a most galling fire of rifles and musketry from the enemy's lines. The ground was covered with brush, and some time was required to put the guns in position, and during this time the enemy's fire was very galling, and Taylor's men suffered somewhat from its effects. As soon as his position was gained, however, the rapid and well-directed fire of the sections soon silenced the enemy. The coolness and daring of the officers and men of these sections, directed by Captain Taylor in person, are worthy of high praise. The Forty-eighth, Forty-fifth, Forty-ninth, and Seventeenth Regiments having been ordered to return from the hill where they had so gallantly assaulted the enemy's works, the Forty-fifth and Forty-eighth resumed their position in my line, and Colonel Morrison, commanding the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth, having been wounded in this assault, those regiments were temporarily attached to my brigade, and acted under my orders during the subsequent operations until noon of the 15th.

The night of the 13th was one of great suffering and hardship to the whole command. We lay within point-blank musket and rifle range of the enemy's breastworks, and at dark a storm of rain, soon turning to snow and accompanied by severe blasts, beat upon our unprotected ranks. The pickets of the enemy were out in strong force, and a constant firing between their pickets and our own was kept up during the night. The spirits of the men, animated and encouraged by the conduct of the officers, never flagged, notwithstanding they were without tents or fires and exposed to the fierce storm and assailed by the enemy's shot. During the night it was evident the enemy was receiving large re-enforcements, and when morning broke on the 14th it showed that they had been busy during the night in erecting new works in commanding positions and mounting them with guns. McAllister's battery was ordered from the other side of the valley and put into position on the road. During this day my brigade occupied a position a little in the rear of the road and under cover of the brow of the hill,

the right resting on the left of Colonel Oglesby's line, and being within 300 or 400 yards of the salient angle of the enemy's works on his left. We lay in this position most of the day, the order of the regiments from right to left being as follows: Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-eighth, Forty-fifth, Forty-ninth, and Seventeenth. Taylor's battery was posted at the interval between the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth, and McAllister's guns were distributed along the front. Dickey's cavalry were in rear and to the right, to observe the enemy and guard the flank. Under instructions from General McClelland I commenced the construction of a small earthwork on the road to cover three or four guns. Mr. Tresilian, of the Forty-ninth Regiment, had charge of the work, which was completed during the night, and two of McAllister's guns and a 10-pounder rifled gun of the First Missouri Artillery were placed in it the next morning. During the whole of the 14th a rambling and irregular fire of sharpshooters was kept up, varied by occasional discharges of artillery. The enemy's shells and round shot fell at times thickly within my lines, but casualties were few.

At daybreak on the morning of the 15th the enemy threw a heavy force of infantry and cavalry, supported by field artillery and his batteries within the works of his intrenchments, and commenced a vigorous assault on the right flank of the whole line. This attack was commenced and continued with great spirit, and gradually drove back our extreme right. About 7 o'clock a. m. the Eleventh and Twentieth Illinois, on my right, became engaged with a heavy force of the enemy's infantry. They charged up the hill and gained the road in front of my position, but the moment the rebel flag appeared above the crest of the hill a storm of shot from the Eleventh and Twentieth drove them back in confusion. Again a new and fresh line of infantry appeared, and I ordered the whole line, except the Seventeenth and the left wing of the Forty-ninth, to advance and occupy the hill. The Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-eighth, and Forty-fifth, with a portion of the Forty-ninth, advanced boldly and in fine order to the brow of the hill, where they were exposed uncovered not only to the fire of the enemy's infantry, but to a raking fire from one of the enemy's batteries of artillery across the valley. They opened their fire, supported by Taylor's battery and two of McAllister's guns (one having been disabled by a shot from the enemy's cannon), and for some time the conflict was strong and fierce; but at length the strong masses of the enemy's infantry gave way before the steady, well-directed, and continued fire of the right of my line. They fell back, however, only to give place to another line of fresh troops who advanced to their support, and who were also compelled, by the steady, unflinching valor of our men, to give way.

In the mean time there were indications that the enemy were gaining some advantages on the right of the whole line. Re-enforcements, consisting of Kentucky and Indiana troops, had been sent forward past my position to support the right, but notwithstanding this it became evident to me from the sounds and from the direction of the enemy's shot, which began to rake my line from the rear of my right, that the right of the line was giving way. My orders being peremptory to hold that portion of the line occupied by my brigade to the last extremity, I sent one of my aides to General McClelland, with information of the state of affairs, and to express my fears that my right flank would be completely turned unless re-enforcements should be speedily sent to that quarter. Finding that no re-enforcements were within reach, and General McClelland having left me discretion to withdraw if I found my position unten-



able, and seeing that the enemy steadily advanced on my right flank and was speedily gaining my rear, and many of the corps having exhausted their ammunition, I gave orders to move the whole brigade to the rear up the road, with a view of forming a new line of battle. Before this order was given all the troops on the right of my brigade had fallen back except the Thirty-first Illinois, Col. John A. Logan, who occupied the left of Colonel Oglesby's brigade. Immediately adjoining the Thirty-first and on the right of my line was the Eleventh Illinois, Lieut. Col. T. E. G. Ransom commanding. When the order to retire was given it failed to reach Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, who with the Eleventh Regiment was gallantly supporting the Thirty-first against a fierce onslaught on their right. Rapidly as gaps were opened in the ranks by the enemy's fire they were as promptly closed to the right, and the shortening front alone showed the destructiveness of that fire. Soon the Thirty-first, their ammunition having failed, retired, and the Eleventh took their place, changing front to the rear under a most galling fire with all the coolness and precision of veterans. In the mean time the order to retire was being executed in good order by the other regiments of the brigade. The character of the ground rendered it impossible for me to see the whole line at once, and when the Eleventh changed their front they were exposed to a fire in front and on both flanks, and the enemy's cavalry charging upon their flank they were thrown into some confusion, and retired, but steadily and in comparatively good order. After falling back some half a mile I halted the brigade, and as speedily as possible procured a supply of ammunition and formed a second line of battle. At this point Colonel Ross, of the Seventeenth Illinois, arrived on the field and took command of the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Regiments, and we were re-enforced by some troops of General Lew. Wallace's division, and with their aid and the assistance of Taylor's artillery and some pieces of Dresser's and Willard's batteries the advance of the enemy was checked and he was driven within his intrenchments, leaving a large number of his dead and wounded on the field.

At night my brigade was withdrawn to a hill between the valleys, so as to be within easy supporting distance of either wing, when I rested until morning. With morning (the 16th) came the news that the enemy had surrendered. The whole brigade was instantly formed and marched down the valley into the center of the enemy's works, where we hoisted the Union flag upon the inner intrenchments of the fort and fired a Federal salute from Taylor's battery. Dickey's cavalry were so disposed as to cover all the approaches and prevent the escape of prisoners, and rendered very effective service in securing and bringing in prisoners during the day.

Would that my task could end here, with the record of the endurance, bravery, and heroism of our troops, crowned as it was with such signal success. The loss of my brigade has been heavy, as the annexed list of killed, wounded, and missing will show.\* The right of my line was more heavily engaged on the 15th than any other portion, though all were under heavy fire for hours. The Eleventh Regiment, being posted on the right of my line, suffered more than any other regiment, having 67 killed on the field. The Twentieth Regiment, which stood next to the Eleventh, was the next heaviest sufferer, having 18 killed on the field. The Forty-eighth, Forty-fifth, Forty-ninth, and Seventeenth each suffered a considerable loss on the 15th, in addition to the loss in the operations of the 13th. In my original brigade every lieutenant-colonel of infantry was

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\* See p. 168.



either killed or wounded. On the 15th Lieutenant-Colonel Erwin, of the Twentieth Illinois, while nobly animating his men and adding new laurels to those he so nobly won at Buena Vista, was struck down by a cannon shot from the enemy's battery. Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Smith, Forty-eighth Illinois, had distinguished himself in the gallant attack of the 13th, he being in command of his regiment on that occasion; Colonel Haynie, as senior colonel, being in command of the whole force detached on that service. Early in the engagement of the 15th Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, while leading his men up the hill to meet the enemy, received a mortal wound, of which he died in about an hour. Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, commanding Eleventh Illinois, was struck in the shoulder by a Minie ball. Merely calling Major Nevins to the command till his wound could be temporarily dressed, he resumed the command and remained with his regiment throughout the day. Lieut. Col. J. A. Maltby, of the Forty-fifth Regiment, while encouraging and animating his men, was shot through the thigh, and severely, though I trust not fatally, wounded.

I cannot find words in which fittingly to express the debt of obligation and gratitude I bear to the officers commanding corps for the prompt, fearless, and cool manner in which my commands were carried out. In every instance except one (and that resulted from the stupidity of an orderly) my orders were perfectly understood and carried into effect with promptness and perfect order. I have already spoken of the part borne by the Eleventh Illinois, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom. Both he and Major Nevins are deserving of the attention of the Department. Col. C. C. Marsh, of the Twentieth Illinois, exhibited the utmost courage, coolness, and self-possession on the field, managing his men with all the order of parade. Major Richards, of the Twentieth, also acted with great bravery. Colonel Haynie and Major Sanford, of the Forty-eighth; Col. John E. Smith and Maj. M. Smith, of the Forty-fifth; Lieutenant-Colonel Pease, of the Forty-ninth; and Captain Bush, commanding Seventeenth Illinois, all distinguished themselves by their bravery, and contributed by their example to the attainment of the brilliant result.

The conduct of Capt. Ezra Taylor, commanding Light Battery B, during the whole series of engagements was such as to distinguish him as a daring, yet cool and sagacious officer. Pushing his guns into positions that were swept by the enemy's shot, he in person directed the posting of his sections, and in many instances himself sighted the guns. Such conduct found its natural reflection in the perfect order and bravery that characterized his entire command. His battery of six pieces fired 1,700 rounds of fixed ammunition during the engagement, being an average of about 284 rounds to the gun.

McAllister's guns did good service. They were three 24-pounder howitzers, without caissons and with a limited supply of ammunition and without a full complement of men. One of them lost a wheel, shot away on the 13th, but supplied it from the limber. On the 15th the trail of another howitzer was broken, and it was rendered useless. They fired all their ammunition, about 50 rounds to the piece.

The cavalry of the brigade (Fourth Illinois, Colonel Dickey) did excellent service in reconnoitering and in holding the enemy in check on the right. Lieutenant-Colonel McCullough, Major Wallace, Captain Rockwood, and Captain Townsend are worthy of particular mention for services rendered. The field music and bands of the several regiments and corps rendered very effective service in taking care of the wounded, especially in the Eleventh and Twentieth Regiments. The

band of the Eleventh lost their instruments. The surgeons and hospital assistants of the entire command performed their painful but important duties in a manner highly creditable. To Surgeon Goodbrake, acting brigade surgeon, I feel under especial obligations. Surgeons Kittoe, of the Forty-fifth; Long, of the Eleventh; Assistant Surgeons Hunt, of the Eleventh; Luce, of the Fourth Cavalry; and Young, of the Forty-eighth Illinois, also rendered valuable assistance. I wish also to return thanks to Surgeon Edgar, of the Thirty-second Illinois, for attention to the wounded of my command. Chaplains Pearson, of the Eleventh, and Button, of the Twentieth, and Woodward, of the Forty-fifth, were indefatigable in their attentions to the wounded and in collecting and burying the dead.

I wish also to call the attention of the general commanding the division to the conduct and bearing of my staff—Lieut. Israel P. Rumsey, of Taylor's battery, aide-de-camp and acting assistant adjutant-general, and Lieut. Guyon I. Davis, Eleventh Illinois, acting brigade quartermaster and commissary, also aide-de-camp. Active, intelligent, ardent, and brave, they were ever ready to render any aid in their power, riding to every part of the field amid the hottest of the fire, and by their daring and coolness contributing much toward the success of the day. Artificer George E. Church, of Taylor's battery, who acted as one of my orderlies, is worthy of commendation for bravery and self-possession on the field.

Many instances of individual daring occurred that are worthy of mention, but where all acted their part so nobly comparisons seem invidious. I cannot forbear citing two instances, to which my attention has been called by commanders of regiments: Corporal Smith, of Company E, Seventeenth Regiment, distinguished himself by great personal bravery in skirmishing with the enemy. Corporal Armstrong, of Company H, Eleventh Illinois, when the color-sergeant of the regiment was shot down and the colors fell, rushed to the spot, and seizing the flag bore it from the field amid a storm of balls. The flag itself was riddled with shot.

In order to a due appreciation of the courage, endurance, and fortitude of the men by whom this victory has been won, it must be borne in mind that they marched from Fort Henry without transportation or tents or rations except what they carried; that they were exposed for three days and nights without tents and almost without fires—being so near the enemy's lines as to render fires imprudent; that the weather was extremely severe, two nights they were thus exposed being accompanied with driving snow-storms and severe cold; that during the whole three days they were under fire, and were compelled to bivouac in line of battle with their arms in their hands; added to this, most of them had never seen a battle, and but few had ever heard a hostile shot. Under all these circumstances it is certainly just matter of congratulation that so long and fierce a conflict against an intrenched enemy, fighting on a position well known to him, unknown to us, and so greatly superior in artillery, has resulted so gloriously for our arms.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. L. WALLACE,

*Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade, First Division.*

Maj. M. BRAYMAN,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division.*

## No. 12.

*Report of Lieut. Col T. E. G. Ransom, Eleventh Illinois Infantry.*

HQRS. 11TH INF., 2D BRIG., 1ST DIV., ILLINOIS VOLS.,  
*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the movements of my command during the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant:

On the morning of the 13th instant my command, consisting of nine companies (Company D having been detached with Taylor's battery), officers and men about 500, having the right of the brigade, took position behind the brow of a hill fronting the left of the enemy's lines and within easy musket-range of their breastworks, which position I held during the day. Nothing of interest occurred. Towards evening I was ordered to move to the right, taking position in an opening immediately in front of a recent camp of the enemy, situated in a valley which passed down through an angle of the enemy's field works, my right resting about 100 yards in front of the left of the Thirty-first Regiment Illinois Volunteer Infantry and my left on the right of the Twentieth Illinois. Early in the evening strong pickets were thrown out along my entire front and on my right flank. Skirmishing was kept up at intervals during the night between my pickets and those of the enemy. Notwithstanding a severe storm of rain and snow during the whole night, my command was under arms most of the time. During the 14th instant nothing of special interest occurred. We occupied the same position as the day before. Many sharpshooters, some from my command and some from the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, did good execution by picking off the enemy as they exposed themselves above the breastworks. During the night my pickets were fired upon by the enemy. About midnight, when the firing became heavy, I ordered my men into line, where they remained for two hours.

At daylight on the morning of the 15th, the firing on the extreme right (Colonel Oglesby's brigade) being very heavy, I again ordered my men into line, where they remained. My pickets were drawn in, and I was attacked in front by a heavy force of the enemy, and after a sharp fight, lasting about three-quarters of an hour, we repulsed them with a loss of about 15 killed and 20 wounded. First Lieutenant Boyce, Company G, fell at his post early in this engagement, urging his men forward and sealing with his blood the sacredness of his cause. But a short time elapsed before we were again attacked by a large force, who brought their colors up in front of ours and not over 100 yards distant, when the fight again commenced with renewed energy.

How long this conflict lasted I am not able to state, but it was an exceedingly firm and bloody one, and after great loss on my part the enemy again fell back. In a few moments I was again attacked by a heavier force on my right flank. I immediately moved my command by the right flank to the rear until my right rested on the left of the Thirty-first Illinois (who had been severely engaged, and bravely maintained their position up to this time), leaving three companies on my left to hold my first position in front. While the fight was raging Colonel Logan, commanding the Thirty-first Illinois, informed me that he was out of ammunition. Just at this time, my wound requiring attention, I turned over the command to Major Nevins, who promptly assumed the responsibility and bravely conducted the fight. In a short time, assuming command, I moved my regiment under a galling fire by



the right flank to the position lately occupied by the Thirty-first, which position I held until attacked by a battalion of cavalry on and in the rear of my left flank, when I immediately ordered my regiment to retire. The movement was executed, but too late to prevent the cavalry from getting in rear of most of my command, who bravely cut their way through with terrible loss. I found what was left of the Eleventh a few hundred yards in the rear of our first position. Finding myself without support and short of ammunition, my command marched into the valley below and joined the brigade, remaining with them the balance of the day. I append a list of the killed, wounded, and missing of my command.\*

It is entirely unnecessary for me to speak in this place of the faithful and gallant conduct of the officers and men under my command during this fatal day, for the record of the killed, wounded, and missing speaks in more emphatic language and fitting terms than I can find words in this brief report to express; but I cannot fail here to mention the invincible courage, bravery, and coolness of Major Nevins and Adjutant Dickey, always at their posts, particularly executing orders and gallantly urging the men to stem the terrible torrent both by word and action; the gallant Shaw, captain of Company B, who was twice wounded but still kept his place, bravely doing his duty until stricken down by a fatal shot; the noble bearing and determined conduct of the color-guard, all of whom were either killed or wounded, and yet kept their colors flying until none were left but Corporal Armstrong, Company H, who, though wounded and cut off by the cavalry, brought the colors from the field, and the faithful and diligent attention of the surgeons, assisted by the members of the band and field music, to the wounded, in promptly carrying them from the field and dressing their wounds and using every exertion to make them comfortable.

I desire here to express my grateful appreciation of the valuable services of Surgeons Dow and Luce, of the Fourth Cavalry Illinois Volunteers, and other surgeons whose names I do not know, in administering to the wants and sufferings of the wounded of my command on the field after the battle.

Respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

T. E. G. RANSOM,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Eleventh Illinois Infantry.*

Lieut. I. P. RUMSEY,

*Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Second Brig., First Div., Illinois Vols.*

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### No. 13.

*Report of Col. C. C. Marsh, Twentieth Illinois Infantry.*

HDQRS. 20TH INF., 2D BRIG., 1ST DIV., ILLINOIS VOLS.,  
*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 17, 1862.*

SIR: In compliance with orders I make the following report of the movements of my command during the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant:

On the morning of the 13th my regiment with the rest of the brigade was formed in line of battle near the brow of the hill fronting the right of the enemy's fortifications. Nothing of special interest affecting my

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\* Embodied in division return, p. 182.

command occurred during the day. Towards evening I was ordered to move to the right and took position on a ridge facing the outworks of the rebels' left, the Eleventh Illinois being on my right and the Forty-eighth Illinois on my left. Shortly after taking position it commenced raining, turning in a short time into snow, and bitterly cold. My regiment was under arms nearly the whole night, the frequent skirmishes between our pickets and those of the enemy leading me to fear an attack at any moment. At daylight on the morning of the 14th I ordered fires started and coffee made for my command, our close proximity to the enemy forbidding the use of fires during the night. Most of this day was spent in watching the movements of the enemy and employing my sharpshooters in picking off the rebels as they exposed themselves above the breastworks. This night was passed very similarly to the preceding one, my men bearing the exposure to the cold and the fatigue with exemplary patience.

At daybreak on the morning of the 15th instant repeated volleys of musketry on the right caused me to form in line of battle. I soon ascertained that the firing was caused by the enemy's attacking the First Brigade, Colonel Oglesby, posted on the extreme right of our line. I immediately strengthened my skirmishers, whom I had kept out all night, giving instructions to report from time to time the movements of the enemy, and, if attacked, to endeavor to drive back their advance, and not retreat until forced to do so by superior force. Matters continued thus for some two hours, the firing on the right being without intermission. At this time the officers in command of the skirmishers informed me that the enemy were advancing in my front. In a few moments my advance were driven back, and almost immediately the rebels appeared, coming over the brow of the hill. Not waiting to receive their attack, I ordered my command to advance, which they did in admirable order, driving the rebels steadily before them till they broke and ran. Advancing in pursuit, I was suddenly met by a fresh force of the enemy, who at once opened fire upon me. Still moving forward, I succeeded in forcing them to retreat, and, following them up till running short of ammunition, I drew back in good order to my first position, and sent back for a fresh supply of ammunition. I remained here without further molestation from the enemy till ordered to march to the left. Shortly after taking my original position the Eleventh Illinois, on my right, became engaged, and at the time of my being ordered off the field were still fighting bravely. Had I received a fresh supply of ammunition I would gladly have gone to their assistance.

I may be pardoned for speaking with pride of the behavior of my entire command, officers and men. During the action the fine order and the coolness and courage with which they advanced in the face of a terrible and continued fire meets my hearty commendation. My every order was promptly and correctly executed and to my complete satisfaction.

Could my record end here I would be indeed happy, but the painful duty yet remains to report the loss of many of my brave men. My lieutenant-colonel, William Erwin, was killed quite early in the action, being struck in the breast by a round shot from one of the enemy's guns. A cool, brave officer, a noble man, he gloriously fell in the execution of his duty, adding in his death new laurels he long since won on the bloody field of Buena Vista. His commander sadly regrets the occasion which calls forth this feeble tribute to his memory. Color-Sergeant Newton and his entire color-guard, except one corporal, were either



killed or wounded. I herewith append a list of the killed, wounded, and missing of my command.\* My field music and band were employed during the action in removing the wounded and dead from the field, thus rendering efficient aid and permitting me to retain all my fighting men in the ranks.

Tendering my congratulations on the glorious victory and capture of Fort Donelson, I have the honor to remain, your very obedient servant,

C. C. MARSH,

*Colonel Twentieth Regiment Illinois Inf., 2d Brig., Illinois Vols.*

Lieut. I. P. RUMSEY,

*Actg. Asst. Adj. Gen., 2d Brig., 1st Div., Illinois Vols.*

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No. 14.

*Report of Col. John E. Smith, Forty-fifth Illinois Infantry.*

HEADQUARTERS WASHBURN LEAD MINE REGIMENT,  
FORTY-FIFTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY VOLUNTEERS,  
*Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862.*

SIR: In obedience to orders I took position with my command on the morning of the 15th instant on the left of the Twentieth Illinois Infantry and opposite to the left wing of the enemy's forces. My men were not brought into action until 1 o'clock p. m. of the same day, at which time I was ordered to the support of the Forty-ninth Illinois Infantry, who were engaging the enemy about 800 yards from the position I then occupied. This order my regiment executed with promptness and steadiness. The advance was made up a slope of ground upon the summit of which the enemy were strongly intrenched and from which they poured forth a heavy and continued fire of musketry. Notwithstanding the severe ordeal to which my regiment was subjected in making this charge our line of battle remained unbroken, and the men marched bravely on until we reached a position in front of the Forty-ninth Illinois Regiment and within 50 yards of the enemy's breastworks, where we halted and opened fire upon them at this point. Our engagement was sharp, and lasted about an hour. Finding that the rebels were in great force, and being unsupported (the Forty-ninth Illinois having retired), I deemed it prudent to change my position to one in the ravine that skirted the hill, and wait for re-enforcements. In making this movement, the right wing retired first, under the protection of the left wing, the latter giving the enemy a murderous volley, that drove them back behind their intrenchments. While waiting for re-enforcements I received an order to retire my regiment to the right of McAllister's battery. The retreat was made in good order, the rear of the battalion occasionally exchanging shots with the enemy. During that night and the day and night following the action of my regiment consisted in skirmishing by company with sharpshooters of the enemy.

On the morning of the 15th instant an attack was made by the enemy upon McAllister's battery. I immediately ordered my regiment forward, and with a charge drove the assailants back. This position we held for over two hours, keeping up a continual though irregular skirmish with the rebels. About 2 o'clock the same day I received your order to take

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\* Embodied in division return, p. 182.



position on the right of the Forty-eighth Illinois, which order I obeyed, and did not again bring my regiment into action.

Below you will find reports of losses sustained by the regiment in the late engagement.\* It will be perceived that the mortality of the regiment was slight, which is attributed to the fact that my men never fell into confusion.

In closing this report I cannot too highly commend the bravery of both the officers and men under my command. No body of soldiers were ever subjected to a more dangerous and exposed position than the one occupied by my regiment on the 13th instant; yet they did not flinch, but, on the contrary, maintained their ground with the most perfect self-possession and determined bravery. They fought well, did much execution, and brought credit upon themselves.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. SMITH,

*Colonel, Commanding Forty-fifth Regiment Illinois Volunteers.*

Col. W. H. L. WALLACE,

*Commanding Second Brigade.*

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No. 15.

*Reports of Colonel Isham N. Haynie, Forty-eighth Illinois Infantry.*

HEADQUARTERS FORTY-EIGHTH ILLINOIS VOLUNTEERS,

*Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862.*

SIR: I have hesitated as to whether it is properly my duty to make a written report of the attempt, on Thursday, the 13th of February, by the three regiments then temporarily under my command, to storm the enemy's redoubts to the south of the main fort, from the fact that the action occurred under your own immediate observation. I have, however, concluded there can be no impropriety in it, and I herewith submit my report of the same.

On the morning of Thursday, the 13th instant, I became temporarily detached from the brigade under Col. W. H. L. Wallace, of the Eleventh Illinois Volunteers, having about the time the brigade were ready to move from their camp grounds of the preceding night received orders to remain where the regiment had encamped, for the purpose of supporting a battery which had been placed immediately in front of the center of the Forty-eighth Illinois Volunteers, under my command. In obedience to this order I remained with this battery, whilst the remainder of the brigade moved to the eastward. During the time I was thus detached your orders were communicated to me, by which I was directed to form my regiment upon the left of the Seventeenth Illinois Volunteers—this last regiment then being formed upon the left of the Forty-ninth Regiment and both being to my right, removed about 500 yards. I at once ordered the Forty-eighth Regiment to be formed at the point indicated, and as soon as it was done I proceeded to the extreme right of the whole line for the purpose of conferring with Colonel Morrison, before then in command of the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Regiments. I there met Colonel Morrison, with Captain Stewart, your aide, and was for the first time then informed that it was your orders for these three regiments (Seventeenth, Forty-eighth, and Forty-ninth) to storm a redoubt

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\* Embodied in division return, p. 182.

of the enemy's to our front and not far removed from us. Colonel Morrison at once expressed his willingness to yield command of the column to me; and with some reluctance, not having any orders from you on this point, I assumed command of the same, and under the direction and guidance of Captain Stewart, your aide, had them formed in line of battle in the Dover road, fronting toward the redoubts, and distant less than a quarter of a mile from us. The order of position of said regiments was not changed by me, and this placed Colonel Morrison and the Forty-ninth Regiment on the right; the Seventeenth, under Major Smith (colonel and lieutenant-colonel being absent), in the center, and the Forty-eighth Regiment (my own), under Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Smith, now deceased, on the left.

Immediately on the formation of the line of battle I directed each regimental commander to deploy skirmishers along the front of the whole line of their respective regiments and to throw them forward from 80 to 100 yards in advance of the main column. This being done, the commandants of regiments were further directed to communicate with me at or about the center of the brigade (center of Seventeenth Regiment) in case of necessity, and to control their movements upon the right and left wings by the center; whereupon I at once ordered the whole line forward towards the enemy's redoubts, situated upon the summit of the opposite hill.

The entire line advanced in good order and with alacrity until the redoubts of the enemy were approached to within a short distance, where from their rifle pits and earthen breastworks, which greatly protected them, the enemy opened a brisk and galling fire upon us. At the same time the enemy's batteries, situated so as to be concealed from us and not before known to bear upon us, were opened and a well-directed fire of shell and canister poured upon our ranks, notwithstanding which our lines continued to advance until almost up to the redoubts of the enemy. In the mean time information which I regarded as reliable reached me that the enemy were in force behind their works and well protected by six guns planted immediately in their rear, and also by cannon situated to their west and north. As quickly as possible I proceeded to ascertain the truth, and became satisfied of the facts.

The entire line had then been held under a brisk and galling fire for nearly an hour. Colonel Morrison, commanding Forty-ninth Illinois Volunteers, had by this time been wounded whilst gallantly leading his men upon the redoubts, and was carried from the field. Other parts of the line had suffered considerably, and seeing that the redoubt could not be taken without great destruction and loss of life, I at length reluctantly gave the order to retire down the hill a short distance and await your orders. This was done by the entire line in good order and without confusion, and was, greatly to my gratification, sanctioned by yourself when reported by me to you.

In this action I am happy to be able to bear testimony to the good conduct of the officers and men of the whole command. All of them under my own observation, with perhaps a solitary exception, labored with the utmost daring and gallantry, challenging my admiration by their heroism and meriting from their general the highest confidence.

I have the honor to be, respectfully,

I. N. HAYNIE,

*Colonel Forty-eighth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.*

Maj. Gen. JOHN A. McCLEARNAND,

*Commanding First Division Illinois Volunteers.*



## HEADQUARTERS FORTY-EIGHTH ILLINOIS VOLUNTEERS.

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

SIR: In obedience to your order, I have the honor to submit the following report of the several actions in which the Forty-eighth Illinois Volunteers, under my command, were engaged during February 13, 14, and 15 instant at this place:

On the evening of the 12th instant we encamped south of Fort Donelson and about 1,000 yards from the redoubts of the enemy, the Eleventh and Twentieth Illinois Volunteers on our right and the Forty-fifth on our left, with a battery between the Forty-eighth and Forty-fifth. In this position we remained until the 13th. Early on the morning of this day (13th) your orders were communicated to me to move with the balance of the Second Brigade and occupy some position on the elevation to the east of us and southeast of the enemy's works, and when about ready to take up the line of march a battery of three guns, belonging to Captain Taylor's artillery, was planted immediately in front of my center, and orders reached me to remain and support this battery with my regiment. By this time our battery had opened upon the enemy, and were sharply replied to by them from their works. I at once ordered my regiment behind the brow or apex of the hill and remained there under cover, but within a very short distance to the rear of it.

The other three regiments had in the mean time moved off in a direction to our right, in obedience to your order, leaving the Forty-eighth separated from the brigade. While supporting this battery I had for the first time an opportunity of witnessing the conduct of the Forty-eighth Regiment while under fire of the enemy. Several shot and shell fell in our midst, but did not kill or wound any one, though several made narrow escapes.

After the battery in front of us had ceased firing orders were conveyed to me from General McClelland to move with the Forty-eighth Regiment and form on the left of the Seventeenth Illinois Regiment, the latter at that time being formed on the left of the Forty-ninth Illinois Volunteers (Colonel Morrison), and both being on my right and distant from me about 500 yards. This I immediately did. As soon as my line was formed I immediately communicated with Colonel Morrison (before then in command of the Forty-ninth and Seventeenth), and being the ranking officer of the three regiments then in line (Colonel Ross, of the Seventeenth, being absent), I assumed command of the whole.

At the same time I was informed that it was General McClelland's order that these regiments were to make the attempt to storm the enemy's redoubts on an elevation southeasterly from their main fort and not far from where the three regiments were then in line. I immediately had the whole column put in motion and formed them in line of battle to the southeast of the redoubt which we were to attack. I placed the Forty-ninth Regiment, under command of Colonel Morrison, on the right; the Seventeenth, under Major Smith, in the center, and the Forty-eighth, under Lieutenant-Colonel Smith, on the left, and taking my own position in the center of the Seventeenth Regiment, I ordered the whole to advance upon the redoubt, then distant less than a quarter of a mile.

In the mean time I had ordered each regiment to deploy one company as skirmishers along its entire front. In this order the whole line advanced through thick underbrush and with great difficulty (except on the right, where the way was open and not so obstructed), until within a short range of the redoubt. At this moment, and rather unexpectedly, the enemy opened a brisk fire upon our lines from behind their works, and also from batteries situated behind them so as to be concealed from



us. Immediately the fire was returned from our line with spirit, and it continued steadily to approach the enemy's works, firing continually upon them as fast as any one of them could be discovered behind the embankments. As near as I can judge, we maintained our position under this most galling fire of rifle, shot, and shell for an hour. I had in the mean time ascertained that six pieces of artillery were planted immediately in our front and within short range of us, and that, besides these, one battery on the hill to the west and another to the westward commanded the point we were assaulting. I therefore thought it useless to hold the men under it longer, and reluctantly ordered the line to retire 40 paces down the hill and await orders from General McClernand, to whom I at once reported (orally) as above. The whole line, under my orders, retired as commanded, without confusion and in good order, and awaited my return from reporting as above mentioned.

During this engagement, and while leading his regiment in the most gallant and daring manner, Colonel Morrison was seriously, but not dangerously, wounded.

I cannot give you any estimate of the killed and wounded in the Forty-ninth and Seventeenth, but know it was considerable.\* In my own regiment there was 1 man killed, to wit, Private W. G. Logan, Company A, and 8 men wounded.

In this action I may be allowed to say that all the officers and men behaved with great gallantry under a most galling fire. As soon as I reported the condition of the defenses upon the hill, which were discovered by me, General McClernand directed me to retire to a position of safety down the hill-side, and there occupy it until further orders. This was done by the whole command in the best order possible and without any confusion.

I had almost omitted to say that while engaged in the attack the Forty-fifth Regiment, Colonel Smith, was sent to support the right (Forty-ninth), and also behaved in a highly creditable and gallant manner. Of this, however, I had not received notice until I found them on the right in action.

In the mean time the other three regiments of the Second Brigade had removed farther away to the east, on a range of hills which encompassed the enemy's fortifications, and here, towards night-fall, the Forty-eighth Regiment was ordered to join them, which we did, and formed in the same order that we had the night before, viz: Eleventh and Twentieth on the right and the Forty-fifth on the left of the Forty-eighth Regiment. This position was within range of rifle-shot from the enemy's embankments, and during the whole of this night (13th) the regiment remained under arms with skirmishers deployed, suffering intensely from the rain and sleet and cold, and but little from the enemy's shot, from which we were only protected by an intervening elevation, behind which we formed.

During February 14 the Forty-eighth Regiment remained in the same position, subject to and within easy range of the enemy's cannon, from which during the day shot and shell were often discharged at the point immediately to our front. So completely were we subjected to the fire from these cannon and from their sharpshooters, that no one could show himself without shots being aimed at him.

The evening of the 14th found us so much exhausted from continual and incessant watchfulness and exposure during the preceding days and nights that the men were but poorly prepared for another night like the previous one; still the officers and men, with a spirit of heroism

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\* See p. 182.

which merited and received my highest admiration, prepared themselves for any emergency of the occasion. Our arms were all put in good order, and each man remained with his arms ready and expecting an attack during the night or early next day. Our skirmishers were continually deployed during the night, and occasionally exchanged shots with the skirmishers of the enemy.

In the morning, just after day and before early breakfast, firing began up to the right and soon after extended itself towards our position. I ordered the regiment to be formed and in line of battle. The men and officers responded promptly and formed at once. It was but a short time after we were formed and ready before we were fired upon by the enemy, who came up in force on the opposite side of the hill. Our skirmishers were compelled to retreat and formed upon the left. While in retreat Lieutenant Stephenson, of Company B, who had command of the skirmishers, was wounded seriously, but not fatally. Immediately the firing began and became general along the whole line of the Forty-eighth until the enemy in our front were driven back in confusion and compelled to retire behind their works. During all the action a battery of two guns to our left and two from our front were playing rapidly upon the point we occupied, and, although seemingly well worked, we escaped with but few wounded from their shot or shell. Our ammunition in the mean time was nearly exhausted; still we remained here after the enemy were repulsed at our front until, I think, near 1 p. m., when orders were received to retire by the left flank. This was done by my regiment in the best possible order and without any appearance of fear or panic.

During the action on this day we lost 7 killed, 31 wounded, and 3 missing. Among those killed I deeply regret to report the death of Lieut. Col. Thomas H. Smith, who received a mortal wound early in the action and died within an hour. He fell gallantly urging the right wing forward to the position from which we repulsed the enemy. His loss was deeply felt by me during the day and will be profoundly lamented by all who knew him. He was a brave and gallant officer, a firm friend, a generous enemy, and an upright and honorable man.

In obedience to the order to retire by the left flank we proceeded to a point about one mile towards the west and halted. The enemy, thinking that we were in retreat and not supported, made another attack at this point, but were repulsed. My regiment, with the balance of the brigade, retired to the position assigned us—to the south of the enemy's works about 1 mile—and there remained for the night.

On the following morning, about 10 o'clock, the fort having surrendered, the Forty-eighth, with the other regiments of the Second Brigade, marched into the enemy's fortifications.

I cannot speak in too high praise of the conduct of my officers and men (with one exception, and his resignation I herewith inclose for your approval) during the entire time of the several actions we were in. I have not failed to have them at any time entirely subject to my control. The utmost coolness, presence of mind, and daring was manifested by them all.

Maj. W. W. Sanford especially, by his coolness and ability during the action, rendered me very great aid, as did all the officers of the line who were not wounded, and I commend them all to your favorable notice and consideration.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, yours, &c.,

I. N. HAYNIE,

*Colonel, Commanding Forty eighth Illinois Volunteers.*

Col. W. H. L. WALLACE,

*Comdg. Second Brigade, First Division, Illinois Volunteers.*



## No. 16.

*Report of Capt. Edward McAllister, Battery D, First Illinois Light Artillery.*

FORT DONELSON, TENN., February 17, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the share my battery bore in the siege of Fort Donelson:

Wednesday, February 12, I took up position on the hill west of the enemy's works and bivouacked on the hill. Thursday morning I opened fire on two batteries, one on the right and one opposite our own position. After throwing a few shell, to obtain the length of fuse and elevation, I was ordered to cease firing and take a better position on the same hill. I selected a point, and about noon opened on the four-gun battery through an opening in which I could see the foe. Our fire was promptly returned with such precision that they cut our right wheel on howitzer No. 3 in two. I had no spare wheel, and had to take one off the limber to continue the fight. I then moved all my howitzers over to the west slope of the ridge and loaded under cover of it, and ran the pieces up by hand until I could get the exact elevation. The recoil would throw the guns back out of sight, and thus we continued the fight until the enemy's battery was silenced. They threw four shots to our one, but owing to the way I conducted our firing after losing the wheel it was harmless. I was then ordered to move around to the south, and took position with howitzers Nos. 1 and 3 opposite and midway between the two batteries on hills to the right and left of us. Howitzer No. 2 was advanced 150 yards farther to the right. I fired three rounds to get elevation and length of fuse that night. Friday no action until our gunboats retired, when both batteries opposite opened on us, compelling us to move our horses far down the slope in rear of the Forty-fifth Regiment.

In obedience to orders I opened on the enemy again, completely silencing them with about 20 shell. Howitzer No. 1 broke its trail short off by its own recoil on the frozen ground and was completely disabled thereby. Saturday morning I opened fire before sunrise. The enemy had planted a six-gun battery on the lower ground forward to the right, their three batteries of fourteen guns forming a crescent, my position being in the focus. I fought our guns by the same tactics used the first day. I directed the fire of the right howitzer on the enemy's right battery, using three-second fuse at 2 degrees elevation. Our shell and shrapnel proving troublesome, they sent a body of skirmishers, that approached our right piece, and poured in so close a volley, that we were driven from the gun. The Forty-fifth advanced, and after a sharp skirmish repulsed them. I continued the firing with coolness and precision until my last round of ammunition had been expended. Ten minutes afterwards an order to retreat by the left came to me, and before I could throw my saddle on my horse I was left by the Forty-fifth Regiment and the single gun of Taylor's battery, whose teams were hitched on. The Parrott gun had left some time before. I got all the teams I could and hitched on to the left gun, but it was so heavy we could not haul it through the brush, and abandoned it, bringing off the limber. I started with two teams to hitch up the right piece, but before reaching it received a heavy volley from the enemy, then in full sight and charging on the gun. All attempt to save it then was hopeless, and I reluctantly ordered my drivers to retreat and followed them.

My men and officers behaved well. First Lieut. George J. Wood acted



gunner, commanding and pointing No. 1 until it was disabled by the broken trail, afterwards rendering all the assistance he could to the other pieces. Lieutenant Borland commanded and pointed No. 3, replacing his broken wheel, and continued to point to the last, fighting with chivalric gallantry. Private Thomas Henry, acting as postilion when moving, volunteered and acted as No. 1 of gun squad on howitzer No. 2 all through the fight. Many others, privates and non-commissioned officers, fought like heroes, and have my heartfelt thanks and gratitude. I had mortally wounded Jason Cheny, by a shrapnel; died next morning. Slightly wounded, Joel A. Boggen, by the same. Both were at their posts. We lost 11 horses, 5 sets harness, 2 mules, 10 tents, 40 knapsacks, 65 blankets, 4 saddles complete, 20 canteens, and 70 rations.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

E. MCALLISTER,

*Captain Artillery, Second Brigade.*

Col. W. H. L. WALLACE,

*Comdg. Second Brigade, First Division, Illinois Volunteers.*

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No. 17.

*Report of Capt. Ezra Taylor, Battery B, First Illinois Light Artillery.*

HEADQUARTERS TAYLOR'S BATTERY,  
*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

COLONEL: I have the honor respectfully to submit the following report of the part taken by the battery under my command in the series of actions which resulted in the reduction of Fort Donelson:

My force consisted of 120 men, rank and file, four 6-pounder field guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, and 92 horses, with 1,730 rounds of fixed ammunition. My guns were first brought into action opposite the strong redoubt in the center of the enemy's works at 9.30 o'clock on Thursday morning, at a range of 800 yards. The enemy responded from a field battery, but only at intervals. We continued to advance up the road, and at about 12 o'clock the right and left sections of my battery took up a position within 200 yards of the enemy's left wing. Four secession flags were flying at this point. Before my guns were unlimbered the enemy had opened a fierce fire of artillery and musketry, killing 1 of my men and severely wounding 2 others. The guns were got into action as soon as possible, and in half an hour I had succeeded in silencing the enemy's batteries opposite, but the enemy's sharpshooters kept up a continuous fire from the rifle pits just outside of their breastworks.

During the night the enemy changed the position of all his guns which bore on my position, as, with the experience of the day, I had secured a perfect range on all his batteries which I had been able to discover. At daylight Friday morning, discovering the change in the enemy's position and he not opening fire, I removed my battery some 500 yards back to a ravine to water and feed my horses and there awaited orders, which were not received until nearly dark, when my whole battery was ordered to take up position near the place we first occupied on the preceding day. Saturday morning at daylight the enemy opened a terrific cannonade on us from six different batteries, thus exposing us to a tremendous cross-fire, which we promptly returned,

firing as rapidly as the guns could be worked. By a judicious disposition of my guns I was enabled to hold six of the enemy's batteries, consisting of thirty-six guns, as I have since learned, in check during the day. The rebel infantry repeatedly charged upon our position, but by a generous distribution of canister shot they were driven back in confusion.

At 11 o'clock I found that the whole of the right wing of our forces had given way and that we were exposed to an attack on the flank, and, in compliance with your order, I retired to the top of the next hill, where a large body of infantry were placed in position to support the battery. Only two of my guns were placed in action here, as the supply of ammunition was nearly exhausted, but Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, of General Wallace's division, coming up just at that time, I was enabled to borrow a supply of canister, and on the rebels making a last desperate charge it was administered with a very good effect, and their forces were soon on the full retreat.

Thus terminated the action so far as my battery was concerned. My loss in killed and wounded was as follows: Private Oscar E. Beckers, killed. Wounded severely, Sergt. James F. Whittle, Corp. B. Franklin Lilly, Privates Tyler A. Mason and Charles H. Machin; slightly wounded, Corp. William H. Prince, Privates William W. Lowrie, Francis N. Marion, and Charles W. Pierce. One thousand and seven hundred rounds of fixed ammunition were fired during the action. It is with great satisfaction that I am enabled to report that all my command behaved with as much coolness as if on parade. When all conducted themselves so gallantly it would be invidious to discriminate. To Company D, of the Eleventh Illinois Regiment, which you detached to support my command, I am under great obligations, and under the exhausted condition of my horses and some of my men it is certain that my battery would have been much less effective were it not for their valuable services, which were always promptly rendered. To the Seventeenth Illinois Regiment Infantry, who supported me during the morning and were always on the alert, ready for action, I also wish to express my thanks.

I beg leave to call your attention to the annexed list of losses sustained during the siege.\*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EZRA TAYLOR,

*Captain Light Battery B, Illinois Volunteers.*

Col. W. H. L. WALLACE,

*Commanding Second Brigade, First Division.*

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No. 18.

*Report of Col. Leonard F. Ross, Seventeenth Illinois Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 25, 1862.*

In obedience to your order requiring a report of the movements and operations of the troops under my command during the investment and siege of this place I have the honor to submit the following:

On Saturday, the 15th instant, at about 1 o'clock p. m., I reported myself to you for duty, and was at once assigned to the command of a

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\* See p. 182.

brigade composed of the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois Volunteer Infantry. Soon after taking command I was ordered to the right of our line for the purpose of supporting General Wallace, who was engaging the enemy on that part of the field. On reporting the reinforcements so sent to General Wallace I by his order took position on his left and advanced, first sending forward two companies deployed as skirmishers. We continued to advance until we reached the summit of a hill previously occupied by Taylor's battery, the skirmishers having advanced meantime beyond the summit of the hill in view of the enemy's batteries, and drew from them a heavy discharge of grape, canister, and shrapnel. The space between our lines and the works of the enemy being examined, and no enemy appearing in the intervening space, I ordered my command to fall back about twenty paces behind the summit to a more secure position, holding the two companies of skirmishers as an advance guard. This position we continued to occupy until dark, when by your order I withdrew for the night.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

L. F. ROSS.

*Colonel Seventeenth Illinois, Commanding Third Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. JOHN A. MCCLERNAND,

*Commanding First Division, District West Tennessee.*

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No. 19.

*Report of Col. William R. Morrison, Forty-ninth Illinois Infantry,  
commanding Third Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS, FORTY-NINTH REGIMENT ILLINOIS INFANTRY,

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 28, 1862.*

GENERAL: Having been assigned to the command of that portion of the Third Brigade of your First Division brought against Fort Donelson in the late engagement, resulting in its fall, I have the honor to report that in the evening of the 11th instant I left the encampment near Fort Henry with my command, numbering in the aggregate 1,377 effective men, composed as follows: Of my own, the Forty-ninth Regiment Illinois Volunteers, numbering 627, and the Seventeenth Illinois Volunteers, Maj. Francis M. Smith commanding, numbering 750. The sick, ailing, and detailed for guard remained with the baggage in the encampment. Marching by the Dover Ridge road 3 miles, we encamped for the night at the junction of the lower Dover road, extending pickets 1 mile on this road for the protection of right rear of First Brigade, Colonel Oglesby, my command forming the reserve corps of your division.

In the early morning of the 12th, when directed by you personally to do so, I marched directly upon Fort Donelson, following immediately upon the rear of Colonel Oglesby's brigade, coming into a cleared valley some 2 miles in front of Fort Donelson. About the hour of 1 o'clock p. m., receiving orders to that effect, my command was quickly drawn up in line of battle, then marched up the plain towards the hill in front and on our right, which was understood to be occupied by the enemy. In executing this movement, the troops, encouraged by your presence in advance, swept over underbrush, fences, ravines, and brooks in the best possible order, casting away their knapsacks, overcoats, and every inconvenience to their most speedy advance. Arriving at the foot of



the hill, I was directed by you to form on the hill-top and engage immediately whatever force might oppose me. The high ground being reached, a few camp fires were the only lingering evidences of the presence of an opposing force. From this point we marched directly to the front, passing from one to another of the many ridges, until the one overlooking Fort Donelson was reached, encountering no portion of the enemy's forces. From thence descending the hill, in obedience to your order to that effect, I took my position in line of battle, immediately on the left of the First Brigade, thus forming the center of your first division, and slept for the night upon our arms in front of the enemy's works and within range of his guns.

With Thursday morning, 13th, you commenced, or rather continued, gradually to close in upon the right with your first (Colonel Oglesby's) brigade, which was supported by the Third Brigade, under my command, until about 10 o'clock, when I was directed to take a position in the valley below and in range of the enemy's guns, where I took a position assigned by your direction, with instructions to await orders, unless attacked by the enemy. Finding my left (of the Seventeenth), which extended up the ridge, exposed to a fire now being provoked by McAllister's battery from the enemy's guns upon the main fort (enemy's right), I caused the left flank to be thrown back behind the ridge, and rested upon our arms, awaiting orders, until about 12.30 o'clock p. m., up to which time we had been greeted with occasional shot and shell from the enemy, but no casualty had occurred. Here I received intelligence that you desired me to make the first assault upon the enemy's works, with an order to move against the enemy's redoubts to my right as soon as Colonel Haynie, of the Forty-eighth Illinois, who, I was informed was ordered to support me, should report to me. I was notified in a very few minutes by Colonel Haynie that he had formed on my left, and that he believed he ranked me. Knowing that this was no time to dispute about a question of rank, I observed to Colonel Haynie that I would conduct the brigade to the point from which the attack was to be made, when he could take command, if he desired to do so. That point being reached, and the line of battle in which order you had directed me to move against the enemy's works being formed, I reported to Colonel Haynie, who, neither declining nor assuming the command, said, "Colonel, let us take it" (meaning the enemy's redoubt) "together." Supposing myself then to be in command of the brigade assigned to me (Forty-ninth and Seventeenth Regiments), skirmishers were quickly thrown forward and the column ordered to advance, the Forty-ninth forming the right, the Seventeenth the center, and the Forty-eighth the left. Having more confidence in the Seventeenth (not in their superior courage, but in their power for efficiency in an assault, acquired by length of service and consequent skill in the use of arms, as well as in evolutions and movements in the field, and having entire confidence in the ability and courage of Major Smith, commanding, and Captain Harding and Adjutant Ryan, in charge of the right and left flanks of that regiment), I took immediate command of my own (Forty-ninth) regiment.

The troops moved forward with much spirit and eagerness, sweeping down the hill some 200 yards through the thick brush in perfect order, at once commencing the ascent of the opposite ridge or mound upon the top of which the redoubt was situated. For some distance from its base a portion of the timber had been removed from the hill-side to be passed over by the troops on the right, and the Forty-ninth were therefore enabled to advance with greater speed than the other forces. Approach.

ing within about 50 paces of the breastworks of the enemy we encountered an almost impassable abatis, made by felling small trees crosswise of each other, the tops always meeting us, the difficulty increasing the nearer we approached the breastworks, where brush had been piled upon brush, with the sharpened ends confronting us. The fortifications were so constructed as to be re-enforced without the knowledge of those making the assault and without exposing their re-enforcements to our guns upon any of the surrounding heights, while the redoubt itself contained a battery of four guns, and was supported by the redoubts on our right and left, mounting several guns within good range. What was the exact force in the intrenchments and rifle pits behind the enemy's works I am not able to say, but the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Arkansas were all represented, and the force is reported to have been very large.

We had advanced to within less than fifty paces of the enemy's works without his offering any opposition, and were making our way slowly but surely, when our skirmishers commenced drawing the fire of the enemy, who was undoubtedly waiting for us. I had now obtained a position from which I could see the nature of the difficulties to our progress, which consisted mostly in the almost impassable nature of the breastworks and the length of time required to climb over them. I at once determined to reserve my fire until the top of the works was reached, when I could create such confusion with one volley as would enable us to get over before the enemy recovered from the shock. Many of my men had already fallen and the others wanted shot for shot. They were undisciplined and had never been under fire, and as I beckoned and called them forward I saw them coming involuntarily to a "ready." Passing quickly to the rear, unfortunately they fired without orders, though with fair precision and some effect. The Seventeenth was pressing forward, encountering like difficulties with the Forty-ninth, and both now advancing under the most terrible fire of musketry, grape, canister, and shell. I now waited with much anxiety for the Forty-eighth to make an assault farther to the left, intending to take advantage of the diversion it might create, and thus get over the enemy's works, now almost reached, but the Forty-eighth failed to support me. The works were, as I thought, almost ours, the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth still forcing their way forward, when I was struck in the right hip with a musket ball, knocked out of the saddle, and compelled in consequence to relinquish my command.

The killed, wounded, and missing in the engagement from my command number 128, of which the Forty-ninth lost 68 and the Seventeenth 60. A complete list of the casualties accompanies this report.\* I am pained to have to communicate to you the loss of Capt. John W. Brokaw, Company D, Forty-ninth Regiment, who fell while leading his company near the intrenchments of the enemy. His many virtues had endeared him to us all. Without military experience, he had judgment, honor, patriotism, courage—attributes which made him a soldier worthy the cause in which he fell.

I take great pleasure in acknowledging my obligations to Major Smith, Captain Harding, and Adjutant Ryan, of the Seventeenth, who at all times co-operated with me, and who behaved with great gallantry, as did the officers and men of that regiment without exception. To Lieutenant-Colonel Pease and Major Bishop, of the Forty-ninth, I return my thanks for the willingness invariably shown by them to execute my orders. Quartermaster James W. Davis and Asst. Surg. Andrew B.

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\* Embodied in division return, p. 182.



Beatty, each in their respective departments, rendered services which were invaluable to me. They were efficient, untiring, and regardless of their own personal safety. Dr. Edgar, surgeon of the Thirty-second, whose regiment was not in the engagement, generously volunteered his professional services in the absence of my surgeon, Dr. W. H. Medcalf. Whenever a poor, suffering soldier could be found he ministered to his wants. My adjutant (my brother) while I was upon the field was most efficient in transmitting my orders by day and night, without regard to the position of the enemy. To all of these gentlemen I tender the acknowledgments due to their bravery and efficiency.

Of the officers of the line and of the men what shall I say? Where shall I begin or end? With a regimental organization but a few weeks old, armed but five days before going into battle, possessing a full knowledge of the inferior quality of their arms, these brave men have performed such deeds of valor as are performed only by those who appreciate the value of that Union which will nerve them to yet other deeds of glory.

I remain, dear general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. R. MORRISON,

*Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade, First Division.*

Brig. Gen. JOHN A. MCCLERNAND,

*Commanding First Division.*

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#### No. 20.

#### *Report of Maj. Francis M. Smith, Seventeenth Illinois Infantry.*

#### HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH ILLINOIS REGIMENT,

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

SIR: In pursuance to your order I submit the following report. I cannot tell the exact number of killed and wounded each day, and will give the total result.\*

On the afternoon of the 13th this regiment, together with the Forty-ninth Illinois and Forty-eighth Illinois, under command of Colonel Haynie, were ordered to move forward from the road up to the rebel breast-works. The ground was difficult to get over, being composed of thick underbrush, and getting within short distance of the enemy's intrenchments, the way was obstructed with fallen timber. At this juncture the enemy opened a cross-fire upon us with artillery and infantry, which was returned with great spirit by the men under my command. After an engagement of about thirty minutes, resulting in severe loss in my regiment, the order was given to fire in retreat. After falling back out of range of the enemy's fire I withdrew my command to the road. My regiment was in line of battle nearly all night, suffering from cold and hunger, yet no one complained, and all were even cheerful.

On the 14th my regiment formed part of the support to Taylor's and Schwartz's batteries, and remained all day in the same position. About 3 o'clock in the evening the enemy opened his batteries on us with shell, but were replied to by the batteries on our front before they did us much damage. Remained in line of battle most of the night, and the cold rain and snow made great suffering among our men. On the morning of the 15th the batteries from the rebel side again commenced with shell against my regiment and others supporting the batteries, killing 4 and wounding several in my regiment. I retired down a ravine a short

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\* Embodied in division return, p. 182.



distance from our former position. In the afternoon my regiment was relieved by the Fifty-eighth Ohio, and, Colonel Ross then being in command, the regiment was moved back to get what they so much needed—food and rest. The regiment was exposed three days and nights to severe cold, with rain and snow, in line of battle nearly all the time.

There were many acts of individual bravery, but as the facts were not reported in time I can mention but one. Corporal Smith, of Company E, went out sharpshooting on his own responsibility, and did good execution among the rebel sharpshooters and the skirmishers in advance of Taylor's battery, firing 40 rounds of ammunition, running great risk, and showing excellent bravery—which praise, in fact, is due the whole regiment.

Respectfully submitting the above report, I remain, yours, respectfully,

F. M. SMITH,

*Major, Commanding Seventeenth Illinois Regiment.*

W. H. L. WALLACE,

*Colonel, Commanding Second Brigade, First Division.*

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No. 21.

*Report of Col. John McArthur, Twelfth Illinois Infantry, commanding First Brigade, Second Division.\**

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 20, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part performed by my brigade during the late operations against Fort Donelson:

First. My brigade, consisting of the Ninth, Twelfth, and Forty-first Illinois Regiments, left Fort Heiman, Ky., on the morning of February 12, 1862, bringing up the rear of the troops that proceeded from Fort Henry, and arriving about 3 miles from our line of operations at 6 p. m. of that day, encamped, and at 10.30 o'clock that night moved the brigade a mile and a half nearer the enemy, again encamping for the remainder of the night.

Second. Under arms next morning (13th) by 8 o'clock, being ordered to hold ourselves in reserve and also support the batteries of Major Cavender, then in position, against the center of the enemy's works. At 4 p. m. moved around to the left of General McClelland's division. That night a portion of my command threw up two small earthworks, and placed in them two 20-pounder and two 10-pounder guns, respectively. These were designed to operate against the left of the enemy's center, but, however, were never used. Same night, at 11.30 o'clock, moved the Ninth and Forty-first by General McClelland's order about a quarter of a mile nearer to his left, remaining under arms all night without fires in the midst of a heavy snow-storm.

Third. 14th, under arms, awaiting orders, until 5 p. m., when we were ordered to occupy ground on the extreme right of our lines. Arrived at our new position a little after dark (about 7 p. m.), having been hotly shelled by the enemy's batteries on the way. Encamped for the night without instructions, and, as I regret to add, without adequate knowledge of the nature of the ground in front and on our right.

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\* Brig. Gen. C. F. Smith commanded the Second Division, but seems to have made no report.

15th, at daylight, were surrounded by the enemy, who opened on us a heavy fire of musketry, at the same time outflanking us by one regiment on our right. We again moved towards the right under a heavy fire and formed a new line, thereby defeating for the time the enemy's object. This ground was steadily maintained until exposed to a flanking fire upon the right from fresh troops of the enemy. With a scarcity of ammunition in a large portion of my line I deemed it my duty to give the order to retire, which was executed steadily and in good order. I at once formed a new line about 300 yards to the rear, supporting the troops on our left, and remaining there until the troops who had occupied our extreme right before our arrival were forced to retire also, when I ordered my brigade farther to the rear within our lines. I then encamped in close order, and had the company rolls called and the men supplied with food (they having had none for nearly thirty-six hours), as also ammunition to replace that expended. At 4 p. m. we were ordered to the extreme left of our lines to support the troops at this place. The Twelfth Illinois remained under arms that night in support of the battery placed in the redoubt taken by assault the previous afternoon.

16th, Sunday morning, the enemy having capitulated, I marched my command into the enemy's works, since which time they have guarded prisoners and captured stores.

I feel proud in bearing testimony to the unflinching firmness and uncomplaining conduct of the men of my command during the whole of the siege; also to their steadiness and courage displayed while under fire; and while I would not detract from any one his just dues, I must mention the gallant conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, of the Ninth Illinois; also Lieutenant-Colonel Chetlain and Major Ducat, of the Twelfth Illinois, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tupper, of the Forty-first Illinois; also my aides, Adjt. J. Bates Dickson and Lieut. George L. Pad-dock, of the Twelfth Illinois, and Lieutenant Babcock, of the Second Illinois Cavalry, for their valuable assistance. I at the same time regret that circumstances placed me for a portion of the time with each division, depriving my men of that favorable notice to which their arduous and soldierly conduct entitled them—conduct inferior to that of no troops on the field.

Trusting that an opportunity may soon occur where the same gallant conduct on the part of my command may be again displayed and appreciated, I remain, your obedient servant,

JOHN MCARTHUR,

*Colonel, Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.*

Capt. M. BRAYMAN,

*Assistant Adjutant-Général.*

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No. 22.

*Report of Lieut. Col. Augustus L. Chetlain, Twelfth Illinois Infantry.*

HDQRS. TWELFTH REGIMENT ILLINOIS VOLUNTEERS,

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

In accordance with Special Orders, No. 2, I beg leave to make the following report:

On the morning of the 12th instant the Twelfth Regiment of Illinois Volunteers, which I have the honor to command, left Fort Heiman with the Ninth and Forty-first Illinois for Fort Donelson via Fort Henry.

During the march my command occupied the extreme left of the column. At dark we camped 3 miles from Fort Donelson. Near midnight I received an order to move  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles nearer to the enemy's lines. The next morning, with balance of the brigade, I was moved up to support Major Cavender's artillery, consisting of three batteries. In the afternoon I was ordered to a point still nearer the lines, where I remained twenty-four hours, assisting during the night in planting two field pieces on a hill in front of my camp. In the evening of Friday, the 14th, I was ordered to the support of the First Division (General McClelland's), and camped for the night near the right of our lines. The Ninth and Forty-first Illinois occupied a hill immediately in front of me. I had at this time 612 effective men besides my officers.

The next morning at 7 o'clock the Ninth Illinois was attacked by a large body of skirmishers. I was ordered to move to the right of the brigade and to the extreme right of our lines. When I reached the ground assigned me and had formed in line of battle the engagement had become general along the line to my left for some distance. Finding that the enemy in large numbers was trying to force in the right of our line, I sent out Company A, Captain Fisher, and Company B, Captain Hale, to my front and right as skirmishers. They became engaged at once. Captain Hale was killed while getting his men in position. Soon after I sent Company C, Captain Chesley, to some vacant buildings in front of the lines, and one half of Company D, under Lieutenant Koehler, to a fence immediately to his right. The fire of the enemy at my right became heavy and very destructive. At the end of twenty to twenty-six minutes Companies A and B fell back, literally cut to pieces. Company C, whose captain was severely wounded, was suffering from the enemy's fire and ordered to fall back, together with Company D. Ascertaining that the rest of my command, though lying down—brought in that position to escape the enemy's fire—was suffering severely; that the Forty-first Illinois, at my left, had fallen back; that the enemy were coming up in great force; that the ground I occupied was very unfavorable, I ordered a retreat, detailing Company E, Captain Van Sellar, and Company F, Captain Campbell, to cover my retreat. The retreat was effected in good order. Another position was selected some 600 yards to the rear, and was held until I was moved to another part of the field. In the afternoon I was ordered to the extreme left of the line in the Second (General Smith's) Division, and there kept my men in position, all sleeping on their arms till next morning, when the enemy surrendered.

During the whole of the engagement my officers and men acted with admirable coolness and bravery. In the hottest of the battle every man stood his ground until ordered to retreat. Captain Fisher and Lieutenant MacLean, of Company A; Lieutenant Towner, Company B; Captain Chesley and Lieutenant Jones, of Company C, and Lieutenant Koehler, of Company D, deserve great praise for their fearlessness and efficiency. All of the above companies suffered severely, especially the first two, who came out of the engagement with nearly half of their men killed or wounded. The officers of Companies E and F acted with great efficiency when covering our retreat. Captain Campbell and Lieutenant Randolph with half their company did fine execution while exposed to a severe fire. Major Ducat, who had charge of the left wing of the battalion, acted with great efficiency. I am under obligations to my aides, Lieutenant McArthur, acting adjutant, and Lieutenant Wetmore, regimental quartermaster, for valuable services during the engagement. The officers of Companies G, H, I, and K stood up to their work manfully, and deserve much praise.



Herewith I send a report of the killed, wounded, and missing of my command.\*

All of which is respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. L. CHETLAIN,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Twelfth Illinois Volunteers.*

Col. JOHN McARTHUR,

*Commanding First Brigade, Second Division.*

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No. 23

*Report of Col. Isaac C. Pugh, Forty-first Illinois Infantry.*

HDQRS. FORTY-FIRST REGIMENT ILLINOIS VOLUNTEERS,  
*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 19, 1862.*

SIR: In accordance with an order issued from headquarters, requiring commandants of regiments to report their operations upon the field of battle during the investment of Fort Donelson by our troops, I herewith transmit the following:

I received an order late Friday, February 14, to move out from my encampment of that day to the extreme right line of our forces, which order I obeyed under the guidance of Major Mudd. My regiment arrived at the designated encampment about sundown on Friday evening. After some instructions from Colonel McArthur, commanding brigade, I hastily examined the ground, but it was too late to form any correct idea of the ground. I threw out my picket guard. My regiment encamped at the foot of the hill. The next morning (Saturday), just at daylight, one of my picket guard came in and informed me the enemy were advancing in strong force. I immediately ordered out two companies as skirmishers, but before they could reach the woods through the open field in front they were fired upon by the enemy. I instantly formed my command in line of battle just under the crest of the hill. A heavy volley was then fired upon my regiment. I ordered a charge upon the enemy, which was obeyed with alacrity, when the enemy retreated from behind the fence on the opposite side of the field and from their ambush in the timber on my right to their rifle pits, a distance of half a mile. As this movement (the charge) had not been general on the part of our troops, I halted my command on the field, when the enemy returned with renewed force and recommenced the conflict. I now discovered he was extending his lines and outflanking me on the right. I then moved my command by the right flank so as to more fully occupy the woods and give room for the Ninth Illinois Regiment to form on my left in battle line.

At this juncture Colonel Oglesby, commanding brigade, arrived, and approved my entire action when he learned that during all this time I had acted upon my own responsibility. Colonel McArthur approved, and gave me some orders as to future movements, and had the Twelfth Illinois Regiment to form in my rear, which they occupied till my command, pressed by an overwhelming force and exposed to a most terrible fire, retired. My right flank passed through the ranks of the Twelfth Illinois Regiment, which movement was made in good order, excepting some little confusion on my right, which was hardest pressed by the

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\* See p. 168.

enemy. They were soon rallied, however, and formed in line by Lieutenant-Colonel Tupper. The firing was kept up until we had in connection with other regiments fallen back 500 yards, where my command was drawn up in line of battle and awaited the renewal of the attack, which the enemy did not make, and we were drawn off in good order by Colonel McArthur.

The officers and men, with but one or two exceptions, acted with great gallantry. My command, consisting of about 500 men, were engaged in battle three hours. I had 15 men killed, 117 wounded, and 3 missing.\*

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

I. C. PUGH,

*Colonel Forty-first Illinois Regiment.*

THOMAS J. NEWSHAM,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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No. 24.

*Report of Col. John Cook, Seventeenth Illinois Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,  
*Clarksville, Tenn., March 6, 1862.*

GENERAL: In pursuance of orders from division headquarters I have the honor to submit the following report:

Monday, the 3d day of February, the Seventh Infantry Illinois Volunteers, under my command, embarked at Fort Holt, Ky., on board the steamer City of Memphis, under orders to join an expedition against Fort Henry, Tenn. Landing at Paducah, I reported to you, from whom orders were received assigning to the Third Brigade the following regiments, viz: Seventh Illinois, Seventh Iowa, Twelfth Iowa, Thirteenth Missouri, and Fiftieth Illinois Volunteers, with Captain Richardson's battery (20-pounder rifled guns) of First Missouri Light Artillery. In company with other troops, the command arrived at Camp Halleck by river, 4 miles below Fort Henry, on the afternoon of the 4th instant, when it was disembarked, under orders from Brigadier-General Grant, commanding the District of Cairo, to proceed by land, without transportation, under temporary command of General McClelland. The 5th instant remained at Camp Halleck. On the morning of the 6th left Camp Halleck by land for Fort Henry. A severe rain storm the night previous to our departure, together with the swollen state of the streams from continued rains and the absence of all transportation, rendered the march extremely difficult, the troops suffering intensely from fording the numerous creeks, often wading so deep as almost to submerge their cartridge-boxes. But, inspired by the frequent reports of artillery from the gunboats, the men pressed on cheerfully. Impeded by the almost impassable roads and the necessity of assisting Captain Richardson's battery out of the innumerable mud-holes, the command proceeded slowly. About 2 p. m. received orders from General Grant to advance the infantry without regard to the artillery. Having gone a short distance, the guide led us off the road about a mile, which had to be countermarched. Surmounting every obstacle, the infantry reached the outworks of Fort Henry soon after *retreat*, where they encamped on the damp ground much wearied, many without a single blanket, all

\* But see p. 168.



transportation having been left in the morning, and some of the regiments leaving even their knapsacks. Captain Richardson's battery was left midway between Camp Halleck and Fort Henry, being unable to proceed on account of the impracticability of the roads. The 7th instant quartered the infantry in Fort Henry, partly in tents and partly in barracks formerly occupied by the rebels.

The 8th instant four companies of infantry were sent by transports to Camp Halleck, with orders to bring up our baggage left there, and also Captain Richardson's battery, which they accomplished, returning the following day. On the 8th the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers, Col. C. J. Wright, which had been assigned to the Third Brigade, arrived from Smithland. The 10th instant, having with much trouble and labor made bridges over the slough formed by backwater from the Tennessee River, the command encamped 1 mile from the river, immediately inside of the outer fortifications, where we remained until the morning of the 12th.

On the 11th instant the Seventh Iowa Volunteers was transferred from the brigade and the Fifty-second Indiana added, Major Cavender's entire battalion of First Missouri Light Artillery having been in the mean time temporarily assigned to the brigade. Leaving Fort Henry at 8 o'clock a. m. the 12th instant, the command arrived within a mile and a half of Fort Donelson at 3 o'clock p. m., the road being excellent and all transportation having been left at Fort Henry. Distance marched, 12 miles. The position assigned the brigade under my command was well chosen, being a high ridge of nearly 1 mile in length, and almost overlooking the enemy's works on his right. In fine spirits, with full assurance of success, the troops passed the night, prepared for an attack should a sally be made from the fort. The 13th, the men's haversacks being well filled, a hearty breakfast was eaten at an early hour, and under orders at 8 a. m. I moved the command up the Dover road to a point within one-half mile of the enemy's outer works; deployed in line the Seventh Illinois on the right and Fifty-second Indiana on the left as skirmishers. The command moved steadily forward through the dense timber, crossing the deep ravine without resistance until the Seventh Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock commanding, found itself within short range of a battery till then undiscovered, which immediately upon appearance of our colors opened a destructive fire, killing instantly Capt. N. E. Mendell, Company I, and wounding several others. Owing to the density of the timber our own artillery was not yet in position. The regiment retired beyond range and to the support of Captain Richardson's battery, First Missouri Light Artillery, just going into position. With the remaining four regiments I proceeded to the summit of a ridge overlooking the fort, a distance of nearly 600 yards intervening, the immensity of the abatis covering the whole precluding the possibility of proceeding farther but by an unwarranted destruction of life, the enemy in force being secure, concealed in his rifle pits and behind his palisades, from which continuous firing was kept up during the remaining portion of the day, answered by sharpshooters and skirmishers from our side, each side sustaining a slight loss. This position gained, it was held during the night, the men resting on their arms without fires and without blankets, everything but arms and ammunition having been cast aside on approaching the fort.

On the 14th, after a long and weary night of watching, the men being unprovided with tents or blankets and our immediate proximity to the enemy's works and batteries precluding the possibility of building fires, knowing that the light would draw his fire from his two strong redoubts,



under which we lay, the troops under my command arose at an early hour, shook the thick covering of snow from their overcoats, partook of a meager breakfast, and cheerfully resumed their old position under the intrenchments. Though suffering from the snow and rain of the previous night, they returned during the whole of the day the enemy's fire, doing him no little damage. Night again coming on, the troops fell back for rest and such refreshments as could under the circumstances be had, reasons before mentioned preventing the building of fires.

Here necessity compels me to state that Colonel Wright, in violation of direct orders, removed his command, the Thirteenth Missouri, to its first position occupied before the investment. Immediately upon being informed of the same, I proceeded on foot, and in person ordered his return. His compliance with the order again left the command in its original line and in readiness for a combined attack on the following day.

Saturday, the 15th, after another night of snow and severe cold, the troops suffering intensely, but without murmurs, four regiments of my command returned to their original position (the Seventh Illinois having been sent the day previous farther to the right to support Captain Richardson's battery), they having been permitted to fall back by companies out of range of the enemy's guns to cook their breakfast and thaw their frozen clothes. At 9 a. m., in pursuance of orders from division headquarters, the Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers was sent to the right to support a battery left unprotected by the withdrawal of a portion of Colonel McArthur's brigade, and the Fifty-second Indiana, Colonel Smith, was ordered to the extreme left to repel any sally which the enemy might make from that quarter, a gap in his breastworks having been left for egress, leaving only the Twelfth Iowa and Fiftieth Illinois, with one battalion of Birge's Sharpshooters, to engage the enemy along a line of half a mile in extent. At 2 p. m. orders came from General Smith to increase the number of skirmishers from my command and more completely engage the enemy's attention, while he in person, with Colonel Lauman's brigade and the Fifty-second Indiana, stormed the entrance previously mentioned.

The fortifications having been gained by General Smith and the enemy's infantry having been driven back, I sent a messenger to General Grant, asking permission to move my brigade up to the support of Colonel Lauman, and, if possible, take the enemy's batteries, which were pouring in upon him a murderous fire of grape, canister, and shell. While awaiting the return of the messenger information was received that the Stars and Stripes were flying over the main battery of the enemy, when orders were immediately given to cease firing, which having been complied with and the companies thrown out as skirmishers ordered to rejoin their commands, I ascertained the Stars and Stripes were raised by the rebels that we might be drawn within their reach. The messenger having returned, I abandoned the position, and with all the speed possible proceeded over the abatis, under a heavy fire of grape and canister. The distance being short, the discharges caused but little damage, overshooting us just enough to tear into shreds the colors of the Seventh Illinois, which regiment had been ordered by General Grant to rejoin me, two pieces of the battery it was supporting having been placed in position within the intrenchments, and succeeded, with the assistance of infantry, in silencing the battery of the enemy, giving us at a late hour full possession of his outer works on his right, he having been driven to take cover under his inner intrenchments. The Fifty-second Indiana, from the lateness of the hour having been ordered back,

by direction of General Smith we were instructed to hold the position obtained during the night and immediately prepare for a combined assault the following morning, with the simple command from General Smith, "Take it, sir!" During the night the men rested upon their arms, and for the first time built fires, which enabled them to rest more comfortably.

Aroused at an early hour Sunday, the 16th, we partook of a scanty breakfast. Called to your headquarters, I was directed to order two regiments to the relief of Colonel Lauman, two additional regiments to their support a little retired, holding one regiment in reserve. The Seventh Regiment having expended more ammunition the day previous than any of the others, having an average of only nine rounds to the man, and being compelled to await the arrival of ammunition with which to fill the boxes, was selected as the reserve. About the time of the arrival of the ammunition, whilst the men were filling their boxes, the woods around were made to ring with loud and enthusiastic cheers from the troops under the command of Colonel Lauman and myself, announcing the unconditional surrender of Fort Donelson, giving us uninterrupted ingress into and peaceful possession of its entire rebel contents. A full and complete statement of the number of killed, wounded, and missing has in a previous report been supplied you.\*

In accordance with your order to allude to and particularize those deserving of commendation, it affords me much pleasure to mention the following officers, viz: Colonel Bane and Adjutant Brown, of the Fifth Illinois; Colonel Smith and staff, of the Fifty-second Indiana; Colonel Woods and Major Brodtbeck, Twelfth Iowa, and Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock and Major Rowett, Captain Monroe, Company B; Captain Ward, Company A; Captain Lawyer, Company C, and Lieutenant Johnson, commanding Company I (Captain Mendell having been killed in the first engagement), of the Seventh Illinois Volunteers, and the following gentlemen of the medical staff, viz: Dr. R. L. Metcalf, surgeon, and James Hamilton, assistant surgeon, Seventh Illinois; Dr. Finley, assistant surgeon of the Twelfth Iowa, and Dr. Brown, assistant surgeon of the Thirtieth Missouri Volunteers, who were constantly upon the field, regardless of danger and fatigue. Too high praise and commendation cannot be bestowed upon the medical staff of my command. Being almost entirely destitute of staff officers myself, I cannot refrain from an expression of both gratitude and approbation for the bravery and conduct exhibited by Lieut. B. F. Smith, acting assistant adjutant-general of the Third Brigade, and Private John C. Brand, composing my entire staff. Being repeatedly called upon to act in the same capacity myself rendered the labors necessary for the proper command of the brigade more arduous than upon any previous occasion.

There are doubtless many others deserving of especial mention at my hand for gallant conduct, but, being almost wholly unacquainted with four regiments of my command, I am unable to render to them the praise merited. Truth and justice require me to say that the entire command behaved in a manner deserving of approbation, cheerfully enduring the fatigue and exposure attendant upon the most inclement weather known in this latitude.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN COOK,

*Colonel, Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.*

Brig. Gen. C. F. SMITH,

*Comdg. Second Division, District West Tennessee, U. S. Army.*

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\* See p. 168.



## No. 25.

*Report of Col. J. J. Woods, Twelfth Iowa Infantry.*HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH IOWA INFANTRY,  
*Fort Donelson, February 18, 1862.*

SIR: In obedience to Special Orders, No. 2, headquarters Second Division, army in the field, Brigadier-General Smith commanding, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Twelfth Iowa Volunteer Infantry in the recent attack on Fort Donelson, Tenn.:

On Wednesday, the 12th instant, the regiment, being a part of Col. J. Cook's (Third) brigade, Second Division, marched from Fort Henry to the neighborhood of Fort Donelson, formed line of battle to the left of the Dover road, and slept on their arms ready for action.

Thursday morning, at 8.30 o'clock, we marched down to and up the Dover road about half a mile, when we filed to the left and formed line of battle; threw forward the flanking companies as skirmishers, and marched forward down a long slope that lay in front, the grape shot and shell of the enemy flying thick around us all the time. Our skirmishers advanced to the top of the hill that lay in front of us. The battalion halted at two-thirds of the distance to the top of the hill, where it was protected from the enemy's fire by the ridge in front. It was but a few minutes after our skirmishers reached the top of the ridge in front when Private Edward C. Buckner, of Company A, was shot dead, a ball taking effect in the eye. No further damage occurred to the regiment that day, though the enemy kept up a constant fire.

The following night was very stormy, and, as we were ordered not to make fires, the men suffered from the wet and cold.

Early on Friday morning skirmishing began between our men and the enemy, which was kept up all day. During the day two of our men were struck with spent balls, but these did not disable them.

At night-fall eight companies retired and built fires, but passed an unpleasant night. Companies D and F remained as a guard over the ground we had occupied during the day.

Saturday until noon a random fire was kept up with the enemy. During this and the preceding days we were nobly supported by the coolness, bravery, and efficiency of a portion of Birge's sharpshooters, who co-operated with us. Our right flank was protected by the Fiftieth Illinois, Colonel Bane commanding. Our front and left flanks were unsupported, except by our own skirmishers and the sharpshooters.

At about 2 p. m. Saturday, 15th, the Twelfth Iowa, Fiftieth Illinois, and sharpshooters were ordered to make a feint attack to draw the enemy's fire. The men went cheerfully to the work assigned them, and kept up a warm fire on the enemy, while Colonel Lauman's brigade, on our left, advanced on the enemy and got possession of a part of the enemy's outworks and hoisted the American flag thereon. We were then ordered to their support. We moved rapidly by the left flank and charged over the down timber which the enemy had cut for his protection. At this time a galling fire of grape from the enemy poured in among us, wounding 8 or 10 of our men.

On reaching the breastworks some confusion was caused by the retreat of a portion of Colonel Lauman's brigade, who, having expended all their ammunition, were compelled to fall back. By some exertion our men were rallied, and we opened a warm fire on the enemy, who also poured a warm fire of grape upon us from their battery on our right



and of musketry on our front. In this cross-fire we fought the enemy two hours, advancing on them into a ravine inside their breastworks. At length we were withdrawn outside of the works. During this time we lost 1 man killed and 27 wounded.

During all this time Lieutenant-Colonel Coulter behaved with the utmost coolness and bravery, performing his duties regardless of the danger to which he was exposed. Major Brodtbeck and Sergeant-Major Morris aided much in rallying the men.

When we began to march to support Colonel Lauman, Companies A and G were out skirmishing. I dispatched Adjutant Duncan to bring them up, which was speedily done, and he performed all other duties required of him promptly and effectively.

Surgeon Parker was on duty at the hospital. Assistant-Surgeon Finley performed faithful service in attending the wounded.

Lieut. J. B. Dorr, quartermaster, was performing his duty in forwarding supplies. His energy and efficiency cannot be too highly praised.

The color-bearer, Sergeant Grannis, showed much coolness amid the sharp fire of the enemy, and, without particularizing, every commissioned officer of the regiment performed his duties without flinching. The same may be said of the non-commissioned officers and privates, with but few exceptions.

Respectfully,

J. J. WOODS,

*Colonel Twelfth Iowa Volunteers.*

Capt. THOMAS J. NEWSHAM,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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No. 26.

*Report of Col. Crafts J. Wright, Thirteenth Missouri Infantry.*

FORT DONELSON, TENN., *February 17, 1862.*

SIR: I herewith report to you, under Order No. 2, the operations of this regiment against the enemy and the casualties which have resulted:

On Friday evening we were ordered to retain our position behind the sharpshooters as skirmishers, and which we had occupied during the day. We remained in this position without fires during the storm of rain, hail, and snow. The clothes of the men were drenched and frozen upon them. I sat upon a log wrapped in my blanket until 3 o'clock, when permission was given to go back half a mile and build fires to dry the men. Saturday, notwithstanding the severe duty and exposure of the previous day, we resumed our position at 8 o'clock a. m. We were ordered by General Smith to change position to prevent the enemy from advancing by one of the roads, and also to sustain a battery of several pieces planted for the same purpose. To be better prepared, our men threw off their knapsacks and blankets at the suggestion of General Grant. We thus prevented any advance in that quarter.

Late in the afternoon we were again changed and ordered to the trenches, through which the entrance was finally made. We were allowed, just as we reached our place, to withdraw and bivouac near by for the night. On Sunday morning we were ordered to the advance in the trenches. I was prepared to leave upon the ground whatever number was necessary to plant the Stars and Stripes of our country on the

intrenched position of the enemy, and all of my men stood to their places. I am happy to say no sacrifice was necessary, but that shortly after being in position I was enabled to send forward the color company (C) with the Stars and Stripes, and that thus your brigade were enabled to announce to our friends beyond and about that Fort Donelson had surrendered and the engagement ended. I can say all did their duty.

Respectfully,

CRAFTS J. WRIGHT,

*Colonel Thirteenth Missouri Volunteers.*

Col. JOHN COOK,

*Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division.*

No. 27.

*Report of Capt. Henry Richardson, Battery D, First Missouri Light Artillery.*

CAMP NEAR FORT DONELSON, *February 18, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report:

On the morning of Thursday, February 13, I placed my battery in position facing an outwork of the enemy, distant about 1,400 yards, and subsequently, by order of General Smith, moved about 500 yards to the right.

During the next day I engaged with one section a battery of the enemy, and being very warmly replied to, was obliged to cease firing after expending about 50 rounds.

During the night I sent my second section to occupy the point of the ridge upon which I was, distant about 400 yards to the right, and had a slight breastwork thrown up.

During the next day (Saturday) both sections tried to engage the enemy's battery, but no reply was elicited. From the guns of the second section several shots were thrown into the enemy's camp.

Late in the afternoon my first section was moved to the extreme right by order of General Grant, but returned without being engaged.

About 100 rounds were expended. One man is missing.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY RICHARDSON,

*Commanding Company D, First Missouri Light Artillery.*

Lient. CHARLES GREEN,

*Adjutant Second Battalion, First Missouri Light Artillery.*

No. 28.

*Report of Capt. F. Welker, Battery H, First Missouri Light Artillery.*

FORT DONELSON, TENN., *February 18, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to furnish you the following report of the engagement:

On Thursday morning, February 13, Lieutenant Tannrath, of my company, received orders to take a position with one piece on the road leading to the enemy's intrenchments and within about 800 yards of the enemy's

guns. After firing 5 rounds the enemy's fire became too severe to longer hold the position. The piece was then taken away, with the loss of 1 man killed. I next took a position farther to the right, on a hill opposite the enemy's center. This position I held until late in the afternoon of Thursday.

February 14, after firing about 30 rounds, I received orders to take my battery to the right. Crossing the ravine, I took a position about the center of the right wing. Here I remained nearly all day Friday, waiting for orders to commence firing. Late in the afternoon of Friday Lieutenant Tannrath, with one piece, proceeded to take a position where the enemy were throwing shell and canister with fearful effect. In the face of a very severe fire the piece was placed in position, and after firing some 8 or 10 shots the enemy's battery was silenced.

This position was held until Saturday morning, the 15th, when the enemy came out in force and drove our troops back. All the infantry having fell back, my piece was brought away. After this I received orders to take my battery to the left and support a charge made by the left wing. I took three pieces and placed them inside the enemy's intrenchments, and held that position until Sunday morning, February 16.

I would mention that too much praise cannot be bestowed upon Lieutenants Tannrath and Edwards. All the rest behaved themselves with credit.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. WELKER,

*Capt. Comdg. Company H, First Regt. Mo. Light Artillery.*

Lieut. CHARLES GREEN,

*Adjutant Second Battalion, First Regt. Mo. Light Artillery.*

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### No. 29.

*Report of Capt. George H. Stone, Battery K, First Missouri Light Artillery.*

FORT DONELSON, CUMBERLAND RIVER, TENN.,

*February 17, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken in the action of the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th instant by Battery K.

Left camp near Fort Henry on the morning of the 12th instant; marched some 10 miles, and placed in position opposite intrenchments of the enemy, where I remained until the morning of the 15th instant, when I changed position and planted a section of battery on hill opposite the center of enemy's column, where we opened fire with great effect, covering the advance of General Smith's division on the left. At about 3 p. m. was ordered by General Smith to the left and to take position in intrenchments, which was done, when we opened a heavy fire of canister and shell on the enemy, forcing them from their position and silencing one of their guns. Remained in this position during the night under command of Lieutenant O'Connell, and marched in at head of column on the morning of the 16th, when the enemy surrendered.

Too much credit cannot be awarded to Lieutenant Hines for the gallantry and bravery with which he comported himself in the engagement of the 15th.

Sergeants Joyce and Donnelly are deserving of great credit, as also Private Miller; in short, where all the men were excellent it would be invidious to particularize.



Our loss in killed and wounded is none; 1 horse killed and 2 severely wounded.

Private Casey was wounded on the night of the 16th, supposed by a shot from pickets; slight.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. STONE,

*Captain Battery K, Second Battalion First Mo. Light Artillery.*

Lieutenant GREEN,

*Adjutant Second Battalion First Missouri Light Artillery.*

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No. 30.

*Report of Col. James C. Veatch, Twenty-fifth Indiana Infantry, Fourth Brigade, Second Division.*

HDQRS. TWENTY-FIFTH REGIMENT INDIANA VOLUNTEERS.

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

In compliance with your order I herewith respectfully submit a report of the part taken by the Twenty-fifth Regiment Indiana Volunteers in the actions which took place between our forces and the rebels on the left wing of our army on the 13th and 15th days of February, 1862, at Fort Donelson.

The Twenty-fifth Indiana Regiment marched with the brigade from Fort Henry on the 12th of February, and bivouacked at night on the extreme left of our lines, within less than half a mile of the enemy. Everything remained quiet during the night. At 10 o'clock a. m. on the 13th we moved forward in line of battle to the top of the hill which was between us and the enemy's breastworks. Here I received your order to fix bayonets and charge the rebels, and, if possible, drive them from their works. The timber was so thick that we could only see here and there a part of the rebel works, but could form no idea of their range or extent. I sent forward, as directed, the flank companies—A and B, Captains Saltzman and Rheinlander—to deploy as skirmishers, which they did most admirably, and the regiment moved forward on the charge. Our flank companies as they advanced found the enemy's works extended far to our left, and they very properly moved to the left and took position on a hill, where they did valuable service by preventing a fire on our flank from the enemy's rifle pits, and in keeping silent a 6-pounder field piece that was brought to bear on us from that direction. At the foot of the hill the enemy poured on us a terrible fire of musketry, grape, and canister, with a few shells.

The rebel breastworks were now in plain view on the top of the hill. The heavy timber on the hill-side had been felled, forming a dense mass of brush and logs. Through and over these obstacles our men advanced against the enemy's fire with perfect coolness and steadiness, never halting for a moment until they received your order. After a halt of a few minutes they again advanced within a short distance of the enemy's breastworks, when their fire from a 6-pounder field piece and 12-pounder howitzer on our right was so destructive, that it became necessary to halt and direct the men to lie down to save us from very heavy loss. After remaining under a very heavy fire for two hours and fifteen minutes, with no opportunity to return the fire to advantage, the enemy being almost entirely hid, and seeing no movement indicating a further advance from any part of the line, I asked your permission to withdraw

my regiment, to save it from heavy loss where we could do no good. In retiring, owing to the nature of the ground and our exposed position, the men were thrown into slight confusion, but they rallied promptly at the foot of the hill and remained in that position until night, when we moved back, as directed by you, to the ground we occupied in the morning. We lost in this action 14 killed and 61 wounded.

On the 14th considerable firing was kept up between our skirmishers and the enemy's sharpshooters, but nothing of importance occurred.

On the 15th, at 2 o'clock p. m., we formed a line of battle, and I sent forward Company B, Captain Rheinlander, to deploy as skirmishers and advance in front of the regiment. This order he executed promptly, and moved his company forward at double-quick. A few moments after, the order came to me to move my regiment by the left flank and follow to support the Fifty-second Indiana and Second Iowa Regiments. This movement left Captain Rheinlander without support, but he advanced boldly to the enemy's rifle pits to the right of the point where they were being attacked by the Second Iowa and drove back the enemy, and was among the first, if not the very first, of our forces that mounted the breastworks.

We moved by the left flank to the creek bottom on our left and beyond some old houses, where the left halted and the right was brought forward, and we advanced in line of battle up the hill on the run, and entered the enemy's works at the point where they had been taken by the Second Iowa. We pushed forward across the field in the direction of the heaviest firing until we reached the bottom of a deep hollow. Here we halted to form our line, which was somewhat broken in advancing, and prepared to move forward, but seeing the forces in front of us slowly retiring, we remained in line to cover them, and when they had all passed by us we marched back in good order to the breastworks, which we held during the night. Our loss in this action was 40 wounded, many of them severely.

I cannot bestow too high praise on the conduct of the officers in both of these actions. To Lieutenant-Colonel Morgan and Major Foster I am much indebted for the fearless and energetic manner in which they discharged their duties. Their conduct is worthy of the highest commendation. Adjutant Walker and Sergeant-Major Jones were brave, prompt, and faithful, and were ever ready to carry orders in the thickest of the fight. Captain Laird, of Company K, was severely wounded in the leg on the 13th while leading his company to the charge. He refused to leave the field, and when at last he was compelled to leave he cheered his men when he retired. Captains Saltzman and Rheinlander, commanding the flank companies, rendered very valuable service, and were often placed in exposed positions. The other captains and lieutenants, almost without exception, displayed great courage and energy, and are worthy of the highest praise. I could not mention one without naming all. The regimental band and chaplain were actively engaged in removing the wounded from the field and providing for their wants at the hospital. The conduct of the surgeon and assistant surgeon is esteemed worthy of especial mention. Asst. Surg. Arthur White devoted himself to relieving the wants of the wounded and suffering at the hospital, while the principal surgeon, Dr. John T. Walker, followed the regiment to the field, and received the wounded as they fell in the fight. It was the first time that our men had ever been exposed to the fire, and they stood it with the firmness of veterans. Many instances of personal courage and good conduct of non-commissioned officers and men occurred, but so numerous were they, that it would be difficult to point

out particular cases. The conduct of the various companies was uniformly good and worthy of the highest praise. The loss on the second day was not so great as the first, although the fire was more severe, but we were not so much exposed to the fire of grape, which was very destructive on the first day. Inclosed I send a list of the killed and wounded.\*

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES C. VEATCH,

*Colonel Twenty-fifth Regiment Indiana Volunteers.*

Col. J. G. LAUMAN,

*Commanding Fourth Brigade, Second Division.*

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No. 31.

*Report of Col. James M. Tuttle, Second Iowa Infantry.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND IOWA INFANTRY,

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to report to you the part which my command took in the capture of this place:

The Second Regiment Iowa Infantry was transported up the Cumberland River on the steamer McGill, and landed about 3 miles below the fort on the 14th instant, and immediately marched to the headquarters of General Smith, where I arrived about 11 a. m. of the same day, and was by General Grant assigned to General Smith's division and by General Smith to your brigade. When we arrived at the top of the hill, nearly opposite the right of the enemy's works, in pursuance of an order from you I deployed Companies A and B as skirmishers. They immediately crossed a ravine in front of our line and skirmished until night, when they were called in.

In the mean time the regiment was assigned position on the extreme left of our forces, where we spent a cold and disagreeable night, without tents or blankets. We remained in this position until 2 p. m. the next day, when we were ordered to storm the fortifications of the enemy in front by advancing the left wing of the regiment, supported a short distance in the rear by the right wing. I took command of the left wing in person and proceeded in line of battle steadily up the hill until we reached the fortifications without firing a gun. On reaching the works we found the enemy fleeing before us, except a few, who were promptly put to the bayonet. I then gave the order to fire, which was responded to with fatal precision until the right wing, with Lieutenant-Colonel Baker, arrived, headed by General Smith, when we formed in line of battle, again under a galling fire, and charged on the encampment across the ravine in front, the enemy still retreating before us. After we had reached the summit of the hill beyond the ravine we made a stand and occupied it for over an hour.

In the mean time the enemy were being re-enforced, and one of our regiments poured a disastrous fire upon us in the rear. Our ammunition being nearly exhausted, I ordered my command to fall back to the intrenchments, which they did steadily and in good order.

I am not able to name the regiment which fired upon our rear, but I do know that the greater part of the casualties we received at that point



was from that source, for I myself saw some of my men fall who I know were shot from the hill behind us.

We then took our position behind the intrenchments, and soon afterwards, owing to an injury received, as reported among the casualties of the engagement, I retired from the field, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Baker in command until the following morning.

During the night our pickets, who were posted in the enemy's camp, were fired upon several times; but with that exception all remained quiet until morning, when the enemy gave signal for a parley, which was succeeded by the joyful intelligence that they had surrendered the fort. We were then ordered by General Smith to take the post of honor in marching to the enemy's fort, where we planted our colors upon the battlements beside the white of the enemy, for which generous consideration he has our hearty thanks.

When I come to speak of those who particularly distinguished themselves for coolness and bravery, so many examples occur to me, that it seems invidious to make distinctions.

Of those few who were in the most responsible positions—Lieutenant-Colonel Baker, Major Chipman, and Adjutant Tuttle—to say that they were cool and brave would not do them justice; they were gallant to perfection. Lieutenant-Colonel Baker had a ball pass through his cap and come out near his temple. Major Chipman was among the first to fall, severely wounded, while cheering on the men of the left wing, and refused to be carried from the field, but waved his sword and exhorted the men to press forward.

Captains Slaymaker and Cloutman fell dead at the head of their companies before they reached the intrenchments. Near them also fell Lieutenant Harper. His death was that of a true and brave soldier.

Captains Cox, Mills, Moore, and Wilkin were at the head of their companies marked examples of gallantry and efficiency.

Lieutenants Scofield, Ensign, Davis, Holmes, Huntington, Weaver, Mastick, Snowden, and Godfrey—in fact, nearly all of my officers, commissioned and non-commissioned—deported themselves nobly throughout the engagement.

Sergeant-Major Brawner deserves very honorable mention for his gallant conduct.

Surgeons Marsh and Nassau also deserve the highest praise for their skill and untiring devotion to the welfare of the wounded. Dr. Nassau was particularly noticed for his bravery on the field, taking off the wounded during a heavy fire from the enemy.

I cannot omit in this report an account of the color-guard. Color-Sergeant Doolittle fell early in the engagement, pierced by four balls and dangerously wounded. The colors were then taken by Corporal Page, Company B, who soon fell dead. They were again raised by Corporal Churcher, Company I, who had his arm broken just as he entered the intrenchments, when they were taken by Corporal Twombly, Company F, who was almost instantly knocked down by a spent ball, immediately rose, and bore them gallantly to the end of the fight. Not a single man of the color-guard but himself was on his feet at the close of the engagement.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. TUTTLE,

*Colonel Second Iowa Infantry.*

Col. J. G. LAUMAN,

*Commanding Fourth Brigade.*

## No. 32.

*Report of Lieut. Col. James C. Parrott, Seventh Iowa Infantry.*

FORT DONELSON, TENN., *February 19, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the movement of the Seventh Regiment Iowa Volunteer Infantry from February 12 to 15 inclusive:

The regiment left Fort Henry on the morning of the 12th and proceeded to the vicinity of Fort Donelson, where it arrived about 6 p. m. same day. The regiment, by your orders, was placed in position on an eminence about half a mile from the outer works of the enemy, to support the First Missouri Battery, consisting of two 20-pounder Parrott guns, where it remained all night, the regiment bivouacking without shelter or blankets.

On the morning of the 13th it was ordered by you to join its brigade on the extreme left wing, where it took part with said brigade in the assault on the rebel fortifications during the day. At sunset it returned to its former position, where it remained during the night, which was one of great inclemency.

On the morning of the 14th it took position in rear of ground occupied the day previous, where it remained quietly during the day and night, sending out through the day two companies as skirmishers.

On the 15th, about 2 p. m., you ordered us forward to the charge on the west end of the enemy's fortifications, where it came up in good order and passed the intrenchments and rendered good service. It then took position in rear of the west breastworks, holding the position we had gained till next morning, when the capitulation took place.

I am proud to say that the officers and men of the regiment behaved themselves with coolness and courage and nobly retained the reputation formerly won.

Our casualties were 2 privates killed on the field; 2 lieutenants, 5 sergeants, 2 corporals, and 28 privates wounded, most of them slightly and none mortally.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. PARROTT,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.*

Col. J. G. LAUMAN,

*Commanding Fourth Brigade, Second Division.*

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No. 33.

*Report of Col. William T. Shaw, Fourteenth Iowa Infantry.*

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH IOWA INFANTRY,

*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 19, 1862.*

SIR: On February 13 my command, consisting of seven companies, was formed in line of battle by order of Colonel Lauman, commanding brigade, and ordered to advance with the Twenty-fifth Indiana upon the works in front and take a battery of two guns. I advanced under a heavy fire of musketry until I passed the point of a ridge on my right. I then received a heavy fire of grape from guns to the right, which, however, did but little damage, as the range was too high. Perceiving no

guns in front, and the line being much broken, owing to unevenness of the ground and the thick fallen timber, I halted my command to place men in the best position to advance, it being impossible to advance in line of battle; also to protect them as much as possible from the cross-fire from my right. I perceived at this time that the forces on my left, under the immediate command of Colonel Lauman, had halted. I waited to see by their movements whether we were to advance on the guns or the rifle pits, the latter being the direction pointed out to me by Colonel Lauman when I was ordered to advance on the guns. After waiting about an hour, and seeing no movement on my left, except from two advanced companies of skirmishers, who were retiring behind the main line, I withdrew my left wing, which was most exposed, out of range of the enemy's guns, and remained there until night, keeping a few of my best marksmen sufficiently advanced to keep the enemy from coming outside their intrenchments to annoy my men by their marksmen.

About dark I received an order from Colonel Lauman to fall back and take my old position for the night, but by a subsequent order from General Smith I took a position one-half mile nearer the enemy.

My loss during the day was light, being but 2 killed and 14 wounded.

On Friday, the 14th instant, we remained in front of the enemy without changing our position.

Saturday, the 15th, I remained in same position until after noon, we being on the right of our brigade. Towards night the attack on the enemy's works was made by a flank movement of the brigade, commencing on the left. Arriving in front of the enemy's works, I deployed my left wing and marched them up the hill in line of battle. The right wing, owing to the nature of the ground, moved up by the left flank and formed inside the intrenchments. After remaining some time under a scattering fire of musketry and rather sharp fire of grape and shell, I formed my men behind the intrenchments on each side of two pieces of artillery, which had been placed in position after our entrance into the intrenchments, where we remained until morning, when the enemy surrendered.

My men behaved themselves well during both engagements, holding their fire till ordered and then delivering it with regularity and precision. I have never seen men behave themselves better, whether under fire or bearing with patience and fortitude the fatigue and hardships necessarily incident to so long an engagement in such weather.

My loss this day was 1 killed and 7 wounded.

Where all behaved so well it is difficult to mention individuals without doing seeming injustice to others, but may mention the valuable services rendered by Sergt. Maj. S. H. Smith, who was shot dead by my side while encouraging the men on to enter the breastworks of the enemy; also First Lieut. William W. Kirkwood, commanding Company K, rendered very valuable assistance in forming the line in front of the enemy's breastworks.

Capt. Warren C. Jones, of Company I, also rendered valuable service in directing the fire of my marksmen, especially protecting the retiring of the skirmishers on the 13th instant.

WM. T. SHAW,

*Colonel Fourteenth Regiment Iowa Volunteers.*

Col. J. G. LAUMAN,

*Commanding Fourth Brigade, Second Division.*



## No. 34.

*Report of Col. Morgan L. Smith, Eighth Missouri Infantry, commanding Fifth Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH BRIGADE,  
*Fort Heiman, Ky., February 18, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 15th instant, in obedience to your order, I stormed the hill on which the enemy were posted with my brigade, consisting of the Eighth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana Regiments, and retook and held the ground lost by some of our forces in the morning. I was gallantly supported by Colonel Cruft's brigade. The hill was occupied by the First and Third Regiments of Mississippi Infantry, First Regiment Texas Infantry, Eighth Regiment Kentucky Infantry, and a battalion of Forrest Cavalry (Tennessee). The hill was covered at intervals with forest and dense underbrush. I deployed Company B, Eighth Missouri, Lieutenant Otis commanding, as skirmishers, to advance rapidly and draw their fire, and ascertain their position. I afterward deployed Company G, Captain Grier; Company H, Captain Swarthout; Company E, Captain Kirby, and Company A, Captain Johnson, with intervals of two paces, so that every advantage could be taken of trees for cover. In two instances their skirmishers and ours were occupying each side of the same tree for cover. It was here that the gallant Captain Swarthout, of Company H, fell. In his efforts to keep his men under cover he forgot himself, and received two rifle bullets, either of which would have killed him instantly. After about an hour's hard fighting, during which time we were advancing slowly, the enemy gave way. We pursued them for about a mile, to within 150 yards of their intrenchments, so closely that some of their arms were thrown away and 5 prisoners were taken, 3 by Company A and 2 by Company B, Eighth Missouri.

I then posted the grand guard between the battle ground of the morning and their intrenchments, with orders not to let them put any grand guard between their intrenchments and us, and had details from the Eleventh Indiana and Eighth Missouri carrying the wounded from the battle ground of the morning to the rear nearly all night. The wounded thus carried off were principally from the Eighth, Eleventh, and Twentieth Illinois Regiments. The small loss that my brigade sustained was owing to the admirable manner in which all orders were executed and the perfect confidence that existed between the officers and men, the officers all vying with each other in accomplishing their object with the least possible loss of their brave men.

The gallant Eleventh Indiana would have gladly been in the lead, but kindly yielded to their brothers, the Eighth Missouri, with the understanding that it opens the ball on the next occasion, for which it is patiently waiting. Suffice it to say that it was in line with the five companies of the Eighth Missouri, not deployed, on the hill exactly at the right time.

Annexed please find report of killed, wounded, and missing;\* also reports of Major McDonald and Colonel McGinnis of their regiments.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

MORGAN L. SMITH,

*Colonel Eighth Missouri Volunteers, Comdg. Fifth Brigade.*

Capt. FRED. KNEFLER,

*Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Division, Fort Henry, Tenn.*

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\* See p. 169.

## No. 35.

*Report of Col. George F. McGinnis, Eleventh Indiana Infantry.*

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH INDIANA REGIMENT.

*Fort Heiman, Ky., February 19, 1862.*

SIR: I beg leave to make the following report of the operations of the Eleventh Indiana, under my command, in the battle at Fort Donelson, on the afternoon of the 15th instant:

At about 1 o'clock the order was given to prepare for action. Our regiment was immediately formed in line of battle under a heavy fire from the enemy, and advanced in good order to sustain the Eighth Missouri, which, being on the right, was the first engaged. As the enemy occupied a very advantageous position on a hill covered with a thick undergrowth which almost hid them from our view, I directed Capt. N. R. Ruckle, of Company E, to deploy his company as skirmishers so far as to cover our whole line, advance as rapidly as the nature of the ground would permit, and find out the position of the enemy; and nobly was this duty performed. After a few well-directed rounds from our men the enemy began to retire, and the Eleventh, gallantly supported by the Eighth Missouri, advanced rapidly, driving the enemy before them, and soon occupied a position in advance of that from which a portion of our forces had been compelled to retire in the morning and within 500 yards of the enemy's intrenchments. We held that position under a heavy fire from the enemy's guns until ordered to fall back and take position for the night. The night was one of the coldest of the season, but being within 800 yards of the enemy's guns, we were not, of course, permitted to build fires, although greatly needed. All, however, submitted willingly and cheerfully and without a word of complaint, expecting to meet the enemy again in the morning.

On the morning of the 16th we were again formed in line of battle, and advanced to within 400 yards of the enemy's lines, expecting every moment to be attacked, when we heard the glorious news that Fort Donelson had surrendered.

I cannot close this report without sincerely thanking every company officer engaged in the action for the gallant manner in which they performed their duties, and especially First Lieuts. John P. Megrew, of Company B, and John L. Hanna, of Company F, who, being the only commissioned officers with their respective companies, controlled them to my entire satisfaction. Lieutenant-Colonel Robinson, Major Elston, and Adjutant Macauley behaved with great gallantry, always at the post of greatest danger, encouraging all and cheering on to the conflict. To them I am much indebted for valuable assistance. Second Lieut. Henry McMullen, of Company C, while gallantly performing his duty, was disabled during the early part of the engagement, and was compelled to retire from the field.

Surgeon Thompson and Assistant Surgeon Brown are deserving of especial mention for their unremitting attentions to the wounded and dying, not only of our own command, but of all others who came under their observation. They labored incessantly for twenty-four hours, attending to all that were brought to their notice, thereby setting an example that it would have been well for other surgeons that could be mentioned to have imitated.

Respectfully,

GEORGE F. MCGINNIS,  
*Colonel Eleventh Indiana.*

Col. MORGAN L. SMITH,  
*Comdg. Fifth Brigade, General C. F. Smith's Division.*

No. 36.

*Report of Maj. John McDonald, Eighth Missouri Infantry.*

HEADQRS. EIGHTH REGIMENT MISSOURI VOLUNTEERS,  
*Fort Heiman, Ky., February 19, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of my command in the late engagement with the enemy at Fort Donelson:

I was ordered by yourself on the 15th instant to take a position on the right wing of the brigade, to retake a hill on the right, which our forces, commanded by General McClelland, had lost in the morning. I made the attack, led by yourself, you at the time taking the command, giving all the necessary directions and commands—in fact, leading the entire engagement, which lasted some three hours. We regained the position and maintained it all that night by standing in position and stationing pickets within 80 yards of the enemy's intrenchments. On the morning following we were notified that there was a flag of truce approaching, which brought the intelligence of the surrender of the enemy's forts and forces. The following is a list of the killed and wounded, also the conduct in general of the officers and men most worthy of mention:

Company A, William A. Johnson commanding, were deployed as skirmishers, and rendered good service throughout the action. Captain Johnson, First Lieut. G. M. Crane, and Second Lieut. Nelson Patterson, are worthy of note for their coolness and bravery throughout the fight.

Company B, First Lieut. Edmund R. Otis commanding, were also deployed as skirmishers, leading the attack and doing excellent service, with but small loss. Much credit is also due Lieutenant Moffett for promptness and courage.

Company C, Second Lieut. Harry B. Harris commanding, took an active part in the engagement, meeting with no loss.

Company D, Capt. Giles A. Smith commanding, deserves great credit for his coolness and the condition in which he held his men during the fight.

Company E, Capt. D. T. Kirby commanding, were deployed as skirmishers, both officers and men acquitting themselves with much credit.

Company F, Capt. A. A. Jameson commanding, acquitted themselves with great credit, having none killed or wounded. First Lieut. J. W. Barr, of Company I, being attached to this company, did excellent service. The same is due to Second Lieut. Philip H. Murphy.

Company G, Capt. David P. Grier commanding, were deployed as skirmishers, causing great destruction in the enemy's ranks. Captain Grier is a brave and efficient officer.

Company H, Capt. George B. Swarthout commanding, were deployed as skirmishers. The captain, a very brave officer, led his company, causing great destruction in the ranks of the enemy.

Company K, Second Lieut. Charles Vierheller commanding, did good service, having but 2 men wounded.

Some of the above officers and men were detached as sharpshooters, under the command of Capt. Hugh Neill, doing excellent service throughout the engagement.

First Sergeant Dwyer, Corporal Powell, Private Braeken, of Company A; First Sergeant Boyd, Private Sartore, Company B; First Sergeant Murray, and Private ———, Company E, being wounded, still remained at their posts as though nothing had happened. First Sergeant Muselman and Sergeants Seabill and Bogert, Corporals Vail and Boggs, Company F; Sergeants O'Donald and Crandall; Corporals Spence and



Bamford, and Privates Bennett, McCullough, and Taylor, Company G, are worthy of much credit for their bravery and willingness when called upon as volunteers to go where danger was greatest.

The aggregate number of this regiment when going into battle was 680. Our loss was comparatively small for the average number of men and the victory achieved, which is attributed to the efficiency of Col. M. L. Smith, commanding the brigade. We captured during the engagement three of the enemy's flags—one from the First Texas Regiment, one from the Second Mississippi, and one from the Fifty-second Tennessee. Capt. William Hill, acting lieutenant-colonel, and Capt. Charles McDonald, acting major, were promptly at their posts throughout the fight. In fact, all in my command acquitted themselves with much credit. All of which I have the honor to submit.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN McDONALD,

*Major, Commanding Eighth Regiment Missouri Volunteers.*

Col. MORGAN L. SMITH,

*Comdg. Fifth Brigade, General C. F. Smith's Div., U. S. Vols.*

### No. 37.

*Report of Brig. Gen. Lewis Wallace, U. S. Army, commanding Third Division.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION U. S. FORCES,  
*District of West Tennessee, Fort Henry, February 20, 1862.*

SIR: A report of the action of my division before Fort Donelson has been delayed from various causes. I submit it to the general speedily as possible.

The Third Division, assigned to me, consisted of the Thirty-first Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Osborn commanding; Seventeenth Kentucky, Col. John H. McHenry; Forty-fourth Indiana, Col. Hugh B. Reed, and the Twenty-fifth Kentucky, Col. James M. Shackelford, all constituting the First Brigade, Col. Charles Cruft commanding; also, the First Nebraska, Lieutenant-Colonel McCord; Seventy-sixth Ohio, Colonel Woods; Sixty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Steedman, constituting the Third Brigade, Col. John M. Thayer commanding. A brigade numbered two in the order was not found together as an organization before or after the action. Three regiments—the Forty-sixth Illinois, Colonel Davis; Fifty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Baldwin, and the Fifty-eighth Illinois, Colonel Lynch, believed to be a portion of the last-mentioned brigade—came up on Saturday during the action and were attached to Colonel Thayer's command.

The position of the Third Division was in the center of the line of attack, General McClelland being on the right and General Smith on the left. My orders, received from General Grant, were to hold my position and prevent the enemy from escaping in that direction; in other words, to remain there and repel any sally from the fort. Under the orders I had no authority to take the offensive. The line established for my command was on the cone of a high ridge, thickly wooded to the front and rear, and traversed by a road which made the way of communication from the right to the left of our army. The right of my division, when posted, was within good supporting distance from General

McClelland and not more than 500 yards from the enemy's outworks; indeed, my whole line was within easy cannon-shot from them.

The evening of the 14th (Friday) was quiet, broken at intervals by guns from the rebels. At night pickets were sent to the front along the line, which was retired somewhat behind the ridge, to enable the men in safety to build fires for their bivouacs. They laid down as best they could on beds of ice and snow, a strong, cold wind making the condition still more disagreeable.

The morning of the 15th my division formed line early, called up by the sound of battle raging on the extreme right, supposed at first to be General McClelland attacking. The firing was very heavy and continuous, being musketry and artillery mixed. About 8 o'clock came a message from General McClelland, asking assistance. It was hurried to headquarters, but General Grant was at that time on board one of the gunboats, arranging, as was understood, an attack from the river-side. Before it was heard from, a second message reached me from General McClelland, stating substantially that the enemy had turned his flanks, and were endangering his whole command. Upon this Colonel Cruft was instantly ordered to move his brigade on to the right and report to General McClelland. Imperfectly directed by a guide, the colonel's command was carried to the extreme right of the engaged lines, where it was attacked by a largely superior force, and, after the retreat or retirement of the division he was sent to support, for a time bore the brunt of the battle. After a varied struggle, charging and receiving charges, the enemy quit him, when he fell back in position nearer to support, his ranks in good order and unbroken except where soldiers of other regiments plunged through them in hurried retreat. In this way a portion of Colonel Shackelford's regiment (Twenty-fifth Kentucky) and about 20 of the Thirty-first Indiana, with their commanding officers, became separated from their colors.

Soon fugitives from the battle came crowding up the hill in rear of my own line, bringing unmistakable signs of disaster. Captain Rawlins was conversing with me at the time, when a mounted officer galloped down the road, shouting "We are cut to pieces." The result was very perceptible. To prevent a panic among the regiments of my Third Brigade I ordered Colonel Thayer to move on by the right flank. He promptly obeyed. Going in advance of the movement myself, I met portions of regiments of General McClelland's division coming back in excellent order, conducted by their brigade commanders, Colonels Wallace, Oglesby, and McArthur, and all calling for more ammunition, want of which was the cause of their misfortune.

Colonel Wallace, whose coolness under the circumstances was astonishing, informed me that the enemy were following and would shortly attack. The crisis was come. There was no time to await orders. My Third Brigade had to be thrust between our retiring forces and the advancing foe. Accordingly, I conducted Colonel Thayer's command up the road to where the ridge dips towards the rebel works, and directed the colonel to form a new line of battle at a right angle with the old one; sent for Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, and dispatched a messenger to inform General Smith of the state of affairs and ask him for assistance.

The head of Colonel Thayer's column filed right double-quick. Lieutenant Wood, commanding the artillery company sent for, galloped up with a portion of his battery and posted his pieces so as to sweep approach by the road in front. A line of reserve was also formed at



convenient distance in rear of the first line, consisting of the Seventy-sixth Ohio and the Forty-sixth and Forty-seventh Illinois. The new front thus formed covered the retiring regiments, helpless from lack of ammunition, but which coolly halted not far off, some of them actually within reach of the enemy's musketry, to refill their cartridge boxes, and, as formed, my new front consisted of Wood's battery across the road; on the right of the battery the First Nebraska and Fifty-eighth Illinois; left of the battery a detached company of the Thirty-second Illinois, Captain Davidson, and the Fifty-eighth Ohio, its left obliquely retired. Scarcely had this formation been made when the enemy attacked, coming up the road and through the shrubs and trees on both sides of it, and making the battery and the First Nebraska the principal points of attack. They met the storm, no man flinching, and their fire was terrible. To say they did well is not enough. Their conduct was splendid. They alone repelled the charge. Colonel Cruft, as was afterwards ascertained, from his position saw the enemy retire to their works pell-mell and in confusion. Too much praise cannot be given Lieutenant Wood and his company and Lieutenant-Colonel McCord and his sturdy regiment. That was the last sally from Fort Donelson.

This assault on my position was unquestionably a bold attempt to follow up the success gained by the enemy in their attack upon our right. Fortunately it was repelled. Time was thus obtained to look up Colonel Cruft's brigade, which after considerable trouble was found in position to the right of my new line, whither it had fallen back. Riding down its front I found the regiments in perfect order, having done their duty nobly but with severe loss, and eager for another engagement. The deployment of a line of skirmishers readily united them with Colonel Thayer's brigade, and once more placed my command in readiness for orders.

About 3 o'clock General Grant rode up the hill and ordered an advance and attack on the enemy's left, while General Smith attacked their right. At General McClernand's request I undertook the proposed assault. Examining the ground forming the position to be assailed (which was almost exactly the ground lost in the morning), I quickly arranged my column of attack. At the head were placed the Eighth Missouri, Col. M. L. Smith, and the Eleventh Indiana, Col. George F. McGinnis, the two regiments, making a brigade, under Colonel Smith. Colonel Cruft's brigade completed the column. As a support two Ohio [Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois] regiments under Colonel Ross were moved up and well advanced on the left flank of the assailing force, but held in reserve. Well aware of the desperate character of the enterprise, I informed the regiments of it as they moved on, and they answered with cheers and cries of "Forward!" "Forward!" and I gave the word.

My directions as to the mode of attack were general, merely to form columns of regiments, march up the hill which was the point of assault, and deploy as occasion should require. Colonel Smith observed that form, attacking with the Eighth Missouri in front. Colonel Cruft, however, formed line of battle at the foot of the hill, extending his regiments around to the right. And now began the most desperate, yet in my opinion the most skillfully executed, performance of the battle.

It is at least 300 steps from the base to the top of the hill. The ascent is much broken by outcropping ledges of rock and for the most part impeded by dense underbrush. Smith's place of attack was clear, but rough and stony. Cruft's was through the trees and brush. The



enemy's lines were distinctly visible on the hill-side. Evidently they were ready. Colonel Smith began the fight without waiting for the First Brigade. A line of skirmishers from the Eighth Missouri sprang out and dashed up, taking intervals as they went, until they covered the head of the column. A lively fire opened on them from the rebel pickets, who retired, obstinately contesting the ground. In several instances assailant and assailed sought cover behind the same tree. Four rebel prisoners were taken in this way, of whom 2 were killed by a shell from their own battery while being taken to the rear.

Meantime the regiments slowly followed the skirmishers. About quarter the way up they received the first volley from the hill-top around which it ran, a long line of fire disclosing somewhat of the strength of the enemy. Instantly, under order of Colonel Smith, both his regiments laid down. The skirmishers were the chief victims. George B. Swarthout, captain of Company H, Eighth Missouri, was killed, gallantly fighting far in advance. Soon as the fury of the fire abated both regiments rose up and rushed on, and in that way they at length closed upon the enemy, falling when the volleys grew hottest, dashing on when they slackened or ceased. Meanwhile their own fire was constant and deadly. Meanwhile, also, Colonel Cruft's line was marching up in support and to the right of Colonel Smith. The woods through which he was moving seemed actually to crackle with musketry. Finally the Eighth and Eleventh cleared the hill, driving the rebel regiments at least three-quarters of a mile before them and halting within 150 yards of the intrenchments behind which the enemy took refuge. This was about 5 o'clock, and concluded the day's fighting. In my opinion it also brought forth the surrender.

While the fighting was in progress an order reached me through Colonel Webster to retire my column, as a new plan of operations was in contemplation for the next day. If carried out, the order would have compelled me to give up the hill so hardly recaptured. Satisfied that the general did not know of our success when he issued the direction, I assumed the responsibility of disobeying it, and held the battle ground that night. Wearied as they were, few slept, for the night was bitter cold, and they had carried the lost field of the morning's action, thickly strewn with the dead and wounded of McClelland's regiments. The number of Illinoisans there found mournfully attested the desperation of their battle and how firmly they had fought it. All night and till far in the morning my soldiers, generous as they were gallant, were engaged ministering to and removing their own wounded and the wounded of the First Division, not forgetting those of the enemy.

Next morning about daybreak Lieutenant Ware, my aide-de-camp, conducted Colonel Thayer's brigade to the foot of the hill. Lieutenant Wood's battery was also ordered to the same point, my intention being to storm the intrenchments about breakfast time. While making disposition for that purpose a white flag made its appearance. The result was that I rode to General Buckner's quarters, sending Lieutenant Ross with Major Rogers, of the Third Mississippi (rebel) Regiment, to inform General Grant that the place was surrendered and my troops in possession of the town and all the works on the right.

In concluding, it gives me infinite pleasure to call attention to certain officers and men of my division. If General McClelland has knowledge of the prompt assistance Colonel Cruft and his brigade carried his brave but suffering regiments in the terrible battle of Saturday morning his notice of their conduct will make it superfluous for me to praise it. In

the afternoon's fight for the recapture of the hill the colonel led his tired column with unabated courage. Maj. Fred. Arn, Thirty-first Indiana; Col. James M. Shackelford, Twenty-fifth Kentucky; Col. Hugh B. Reed, Forty-fourth Indiana, and Col. John H. McHenry, Seventeenth Kentucky, and their field and company officers, all won honor and lasting praise, nor can less be given to the valor and endurance of the men who composed their regiments.

To the promptness and courage of Colonel Thayer, commanding Third Brigade, in the execution of my orders on the occasion, I attribute in a large degree the repulse of the enemy in their attack upon my position about 10.30 or 11 o'clock in the morning. There can be no question about the excellence of his conduct during that fierce trial. Lieutenant-Colonel McCord and his First Nebraska Regiment, and Lient. P. P. Wood and his company, A, Chicago Light Artillery, have already been spoken of in terms warmer than mere commendation.

I have reserved for the last the mention of that officer whose mention I confess gives me most pleasure—Col. Morgan L. Smith. This officer led his old regiment, the Eighth Missouri, and the Eleventh Indiana, united as a brigade under his command, in the charge that resulted in the recapture of our position on the right. Words cannot do justice to his courage and coolness. All through the conflict I could see him ride to and fro, and could hear his voice, clear as a bugle's, and as long as I heard it I knew the regiments were safe and their victory sure. Promotion has been frequently promised him; if it does not come now Missouri will fail to recognize and honor her bravest soldier.

To Major McDonald, commanding Eighth Missouri, and to Colonel McGinnis, Lieut. Col. W. J. H. Robinson, and Maj. I. C. Elston, of the Eleventh Indiana, and the officers and men of both those regiments, most honorable mention is due.

Capt. Fred. Knefler, my assistant adjutant-general, and Lieuts. James R. Ross and Addison Ware, my aides-de-camp, rendered me prompt and efficient service in the field. Their courage and fidelity have earned my lasting gratitude. Nor am I less indebted to my orderlies, Thomas W. Simpson and Bird Fletcher, of Company I, Fourth U. S. Cavalry, both of whom are brave, intelligent soldiers, worthy promotion.

Of that portion of my division not mentioned as in action I would say they were being carefully saved for the proposed assault on Sunday. Had the surrender not taken place they would have been placed foremost in the attack. When my position was attacked in the forenoon they were under fire, and by their patient endurance and soldierly behavior won my fullest confidence. The regiments alluded to were the Seventy-sixth, Sixty-eighth, and Fifty-eighth Ohio and the Forty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Illinois.

Maj. T. W. Fry, surgeon, attached to my staff, who performed his duties in the most skillful manner, freely exposing himself, will at the earliest moment furnish a list of the casualties that happened in my division during the battle.

Sincerely hoping the general may prove as fortunate in every battle he may have occasion to fight, I beg leave to congratulate him on his success in this one, and subscribe myself, most respectfully, his very obedient servant,

LEWIS WALLACE,  
*General, Third Division.*

Capt. JOHN A. RAWLINS,  
*Asst. Adjt. Gen. U. S. Forces, District West Tennessee.*

## No. 38.

*Report of Surg. Thomas W. Fry, U. S. Army, Medical Director.*

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION, U. S. FORCES,  
*Fort Henry, February 22, 1862.*

The following is the official report of the killed, wounded, and missing of the Third Division of the army in the battle of Fort Donelson, on Saturday, the 15th day of January, 1862, so far as reported to me by brigade and regimental surgeons. Several regiments of the division remained at Fort Donelson, whose surgeons will no doubt report directly to you.\*

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*Recapitulation.*

Commands.	Killed.		Wounded.		Missing.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
11th Indiana .....		4	2	27			33
31st Indiana .....		9	8	44			61
44th Indiana .....		3	1	31			35
17th Kentucky .....		4		31			35
25th Kentucky .....	2	11	3	58		5	79
8th Missouri .....	1	6	1	39			47
Chicago Light Artillery .....				3			3
Total .....	3	37	15	233		5	293

In making this report I take great pleasure in bearing testimony to the promptness, faithfulness, and ability with which Brigade Surgeon Keenon and the surgeons and assistants of this division of the army performed their duties. They followed their regiments into the midst of danger and exposed their lives to aid the wounded. Surg. J. C. Thompson and Asst. Surg. Clay Brown, of the Eleventh Indiana, and Surgeon Bailey and Assistant Surgeon Winnis, of the Eighth Missouri, were exposed to a most terrible fire from the enemy, having been ordered to follow their men into the field of battle by the medical director, H. S. Hewitt. The surgeons of this division generally complain of discourteous treatment on the part of the medical director. When manifesting an earnest solicitude for their wounded and making inquiries as to the time and manner of transportation and ultimate destination they were rudely and offensively repulsed without the desired information. They also complain that in the exercise of extra and arbitrary power they were deprived the privilege of attending their own men, of dressing their wounds, or attending them when taken to the boats. The report of such conduct is to me a matter of deep regret, and against such conduct I beg leave to protest.

In my opinion, which is sustained by all the surgeons with whom I have conversed, the removal of those on whom amputations and other severe operations had been performed was unwise and highly injudi-

\* Nominal list omitted.



cious, endangering the lives of those who might otherwise recover. The houses occupied as hospitals could have been retained, and surgeons detailed to wait on them until recovery had so far advanced as to render removal comparatively safe. The hurry of moving, the necessary or careless displacement of dressings, the pain inflicted by incessant jarring must add fearfully to the already dangerous condition of the wounded. If necessary, surgeons and nurses in sufficient numbers would volunteer to render every service to those who were injured in defense of their government. Had dangers of an attack or of falling into the enemy's hands existed, the necessity of removal would have been imperative, but no such danger existed. It is greatly to be feared that the mortality will be fearfully increased, more especially when steamboats crowded with the wounded, as was the case with the steamer *Tuts*, were sent off without a single surgeon. Dressings would necessarily be displaced, requiring immediate readjustment, and secondary hemorrhage likely to occur, which is always alarming, and especially when the patient is in motion. There were surgeons belonging to this division anxious to attend the wounded on their perilous journey whose services would have been cheerfully dispensed with by their regiments, but they were refused, and ordered to join their regiments, and the wounded sent without medical attention. Imperative duty compels me to report these facts, unpleasant though it be. That they were suffered to occur can be attributed alone to incapacity or willful neglect on the part of those having charge.

Most of the forenoon on the day of battle I was busily engaged at the hospital on the extreme right, in a narrow valley near the scene of action, where the wounded from General McClelland's division were rapidly crowding in. Here the slightly wounded, the mangled, the dying, and the dead presented a scene which baffles description; and, adding to the difficulties and dangers of our position, hundreds of armed soldiers rushed in, and remained until a volley of musketry from the enemy caused them to seek other and safer quarters.

It was my fortune to administer to Lieutenant-Colonels White and Erwin, of the Eleventh and Thirty-first Illinois Regiments, in their last moments. They died without a murmur and without a struggle—Colonel White, if I mistake not, from a shot in the neck, and Colonel Erwin, in the side. When the hospital was fired on, Surgeon Thompson, of Illinois, and myself retired, with all the wounded that could be moved, to hospitals farther in the rear. Since the surrender, officers of the rebel army have informed me that the fire on the hospital was accidental and ceased the moment the flag was seen. About noon I established a general hospital on the extreme left, in the headquarters of General Grant, who very kindly and generously offered them for that purpose. Notwithstanding the abundant supply of hospital stores which the medical director informed me were on hand, nothing was sent us, neither medicine nor food, neither bandage nor plaster. The field service of the surgeons and such articles as could be pressed into service constituted our supply, and the little food obtained was secured by dint of perseverance from regimental quartermasters. That hospital stores and provisions were not supplied under such circumstances involves criminal neglect or incapacity on the part of those in charge of this department.

Kind and careful attention to the wounded soldier is a high and most sacred duty. Surgeon Sexton, of [52d] Indiana Regiment, and Assistant Surgeon Christy, of the Thirty-second Illinois, were aiding me at the hospital. Surgeon Marsh, of the Second Iowa, and Assistant Sur-

geon Martin at times gave us most valuable assistance. Dr. Sexton, an efficient and skillful surgeon when sober, was so much under the influence of liquor for twenty-four hours as to be incapable of discharging the responsible duties of his office. Assistant Surgeon Christy was exceedingly kind, prompt, and skillful, rendering most timely and efficient aid.

In our hospital there were three amputations above the knee, a number of fingers taken off, balls extracted, and wounds such as described in the foregoing report dressed.

All of which is most respectfully submitted.

THOS. W. FRY,

*Brigade Surgeon, Acting Medical Director.*

H. S. HEWITT,

*Brigade Surgeon and Medical Director U. S. Forces.*

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No. 39.

*Report of Col. Charles Craft, Thirty-first Indiana Infantry, commanding First Brigade.*

HQRS. 1ST BRIG., 3D DIV., DEPT. WEST TENNESSEE.

*Fort Henry, February 18, 1862.*

I have the honor to report to you the part taken in the reduction of Fort Donelson and the fortifications near Dover, Tenn., on the 15th instant, by the First Brigade of your division. The brigade was composed of the Thirty-first Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Osborn temporarily commanding; Twenty-fifth Kentucky Volunteers, Col. James M. Shackelford; eight companies of the Forty-fourth Indiana Volunteers, Col. Hugh B. Reed, and the Seventeenth Kentucky Volunteers, Col. John H. McHenry.

At 8.30 o'clock a. m. General Wallace's order was received to put the brigade in rapid motion to the extreme right of our line, for the purpose of re-enforcing General McClernand's division. It was speedily moved forward in column of companies, the Twenty-fifth Kentucky in advance, followed by the Thirty-first Indiana, the Seventeenth Kentucky, and the Forty-fourth Indiana. An order to halt the column at a point indicated for the formation of the regiments in line was not executed by the advance, owing to the pressing request of a messenger from one of the Illinois regiments, then to the right, to hurry forward and engage the enemy. The guide sent with the head of the column here shamefully abandoned it, not, however, until he had given Colonel Shackelford an improper instruction after passing Taylor's battery in the direction of the enemy's intrenchments, and entering the woods just beyond, the head of the column became suddenly engaged with a superior force of the enemy in front and to the right. This appeared to be a force that was endeavoring to outflank the battery and the line of infantry supporting it and pass into the ravine behind. A well-directed fire was opened on the Twenty-fifth Kentucky and Thirty-first Indiana before they could form to resist it. The line of battle, however, was formed rapidly and steadily under continued volleys of the enemy's musketry. The Seventeenth Kentucky and Forty-fourth Indiana were shortly brought up in good order and entered the action. The enemy's fire upon the right continued to be very severe, and this assault was pressed up to within 20 feet of our lines. It continued for some minutes with much



fury and was replied to with effect by our men. I was then at the left of the line. At this juncture it was reported to me that two officers from other regiments then on the right came up, and, without consulting the colonel of the Twenty-fifth Kentucky, ordered his men forward down the enemy's line. They pressed down under a heavy volley and again opened their fire. While thus fighting, officers from the other regiments then at the right rode up and ordered the Twenty-fifth Kentucky to cease firing, and it accordingly did. Almost simultaneously with this, troops from the other brigade at the right retreated in confusion, and some of them passing obliquely against my line broke through it, disconnecting a portion of the Twenty-fifth Kentucky, with Colonel Shackelford and his associate field and staff officers, and Lieutenant-Colonel Osborn, of the Thirty-first Indiana, with a few of the privates of his command.

The brigade was now left without support, occupying the extreme right of the line of investment and in advance of it half a mile. It was ordered to fall back in line and occupy the slope of the hill a few hundred feet in the rear of the point of attack. The movement was accomplished in good order. This brought the Forty-fourth Indiana in line on the left. A message was now received from one of the Illinois regiments, requesting that the left should not fire. This message was regarded, and the Forty-fourth Indiana commanded to reserve their fire till ordered. In the mean time a heavy fire was poured into the regiment by the enemy. The line was here twice attacked and the enemy each time repulsed. From this position an effective charge was made, forcing the enemy to retire for some distance. An attempt was now made to outflank my line on the right. It was continually worked to our right, however, to resist this. A company of the Thirty-first Indiana was detailed as skirmishers on the right, in the bushes beyond. The fight was still progressing, but at this time the regiment to our left, supporting the battery, gave way (from want of ammunition, as was said), and a portion rushed into our rear, creating some confusion in the Forty-fourth Indiana, carrying with them some men of that regiment and exposing it to the flanking fire of the enemy, who appeared at that point with a considerable force of both cavalry and infantry. It was ordered to return the fire, and soon repulsed the enemy. The whole brigade was now moved in line to the rear in complete order, and occupied a better position on a commanding ridge in front of the enemy. An ineffectual advance was again made by the enemy, which was repulsed, and the firing ceased, except some skirmishing between a small detail of men sent to the front and the enemy's sharpshooters. Here the enemy drew off, leaving us in possession of the ground, and commenced retreating to the right, pursuing the woods, at times in sight, to a ridge across a large ravine about a half mile to our right, and establishing himself there in force. This threw him to the right and rear of us, and endangered the hospital buildings in our rear, to which our wounded had been conveyed.

The firing had now ceased on all sides. It being impossible to communicate with General Wallace or get dispatches to him, and information being casually received that the main line had been established farther back, it was deemed prudent to retire upon it. This was accordingly done, and the brigade was formed in column and marched to the high ground just north of the hospital buildings, with a view to protect them, to form part of the main line and to watch the enemy on our right. Upon communicating with the general commanding division, the position was regarded by him as well taken, and the order given to hold



it at all hazards. Here the men rested on their arms for some time, having been hotly engaged with the enemy at intervals for more than three hours.

This concluded our engagement of the morning. The brigade remained in position on the extreme right (a short distance from Colonel Thayer's brigade), in view of the enemy during the subsequent action at the center, holding him in check and protecting the hospital. During the engagement at the center a volley was fired on the hospital by the enemy's sharpshooters from the hills to the right, and but for the presence of the brigade it would doubtless have been taken. In this position valuable information was obtained as to the enemy's movements on the right. From this point dispatches were sent and here subsequently General Wallace met me.

The ground on which the action occurred is a succession of hills and ravines, covered with a thick undergrowth of oak bushes. The deadened leaves of the oak shrubs were almost identical in color with the brown jean uniforms of the enemy, and rendered it almost impossible to distinguish their line until a fire revealed its locality. This fact, together with the character of the ground, gave the enemy a great advantage, and spread a feeling of uncertainty among the men as to the location of the attacking lines. It is impossible to say with accuracy what force of the enemy was encountered. From the best observations that could be made it is believed that there were at least five regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, the whole under command of Col. Roger W. Hanson.

At about 4 p. m. an order was received from General Wallace to co-operate with Colonel Smith's brigade, consisting of the Eighth Missouri and the Eleventh Indiana, in carrying the enemy's works on the right, in the front of Dover, by storm. The officers and men, though much fatigued from the action of the morning and worn from loss of rest and lack of food, responded cheerfully to the order and wheeled into column. The enemy was in force on the hill, under cover of the wood on both sides of the only road leading up into the direction of the works. It was necessary to cross an open space of several hundred feet, exposed to the enemy's fire, before the foot of the hill could be reached. The Eighth Missouri led the advance up the road. The Eleventh Indiana charged up the hill on the left. The Forty-fourth Indiana followed up the road. Five companies of the Thirty-first Indiana were ordered up the hill on the extreme left, and the remainder of this regiment, with the residue of the brigade, were ordered to the right, to outflank the enemy and attack in rear. The assault was a complete success. All the regiments behaved handsomely. The whole of my brigade was actually engaged. In a sharp and desperate fight of a few minutes' duration the hill was carried by storm, and the enemy, with tremendous cheers, driven up to and within his breastworks. The flank attack of the portion of my brigade up the hill, in a line at a right angle to the main advance, was gallantly conducted, and contributed no doubt largely to the rout of the enemy. Colonel Dickey, of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, during the attack, at my request dismounted four-fifths of his troops, armed with Sharp's rifles, and led them up the hill in support of regiments engaged. His aid, however, was not required.

This action, a brilliant one in any view, was rendered more so from the fact that it was made in the face of a heavy fire of grape and sharp-nel from the battery of the enemy located across the ravine to the left of the road, in full command of the hill and the approaches to it. After pursuing the enemy to the open ground in front of the fortifications, a

distance of over half a mile, an order was received to fall back to the hill where the attack was made and there encamp, hold the position during the night, and prepare to storm the works early in the morning. The regiments slept on the hill-side, and were aroused early the following morning (16th) and drawn up in column, ready to march to the assault, when intelligence of the surrender of the enemy was received. According to orders, I then marched the brigade through the enemy's works to Dover, and took possession of the town and the large number of prisoners and amount of army stores which it contained.

As a whole, the officers and men of the various regiments of my command behaved well. They received the enemy's fire with coolness and returned it with steadiness and effect. Orders were executed with commendable promptness and precision. In view of such general soldierly bearing it is difficult to discriminate individual instances of valor. Many such fell under my immediate observation and others are reported by commanders of regiments. These cases will form the subject of a subsequent report at an early day.

The members of the brigade staff are entitled to commendation for their conduct during the day. They accompanied me through every danger, and were at all times ready to brave any personal hazard. Capt. W. H. Fairbanks, acting assistant adjutant-general, was constantly in the field, at times also acting aide-de-camp. His conduct was creditable throughout. Lieut. Frank H. Bristow, acting aide-de-camp, discharged his duties in a courageous and satisfactory manner. He was fired upon frequently and had several narrow escapes. Private Charles Edwin Terry, my secretary, acted also as aide-de-camp during both actions, and exhibited a cool and determined bravery worthy of special notice.

I am, captain, very respectfully, yours, &c,

CHARLES CRUFT,  
Colonel, Commanding.

Capt. FRED. KNEFLER,  
Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Division.

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No. 40.

*Report of Maj. Frederick Arn, Thirty-first Indiana Infantry.*

HDQRS. THIRTY-FIRST REGIMENT INDIANA VOLUNTEERS,  
Fort Henry, Tenn., February 18, 1862.

SIR: In obedience to your order, the regiment left its camp, near Fort Donelson, on the morning of the 15th February, 1862, with an effective force of 727 men. The order given to Lieutenant-Colonel Osborn was to follow the Twenty-fifth Kentucky Regiment and form in line on the left, and await further orders. Before the regiment could reach the position which it was to occupy it was exposed to a galling fire of musketry and artillery from the hill on our left, which was occupied by the enemy in strong force. The regiment was promptly formed in line of battle at the foot of the hill, and opened a cool and effective fire on the enemy until it was broken by the troops which gave way on our right and front and came rushing through our ranks near the center. Our lines were, however, promptly reformed on the hill to the right and rear of our position. This movement was made necessary by the movements of the enemy, who had outflanked and driven back the

Twenty-fifth Kentucky, formed in line at the foot of the hill occupied by your brigade in its new position. In the change of position a few men with Lieutenant-Colonel Osborn became detached from the regiment and were unable to rejoin it during the day.

From this position a most effective fire was poured into the enemy's ranks, which was interrupted by Colonel Logan, who stated that we were firing into his brigade from our right. To ascertain the correctness of the statement you ordered me to deploy the first company, Captain Smith, as skirmishers. He soon reported that it was the enemy in force which we had been firing upon, and that their line extended a considerable distance beyond our right.

In accordance with your order I then moved the line farther to the right, the movement being executed with the greatest coolness and order. From this position the enemy's fire was replied to with such precision that they soon gave way. You then ordered two companies to be deployed forward as skirmishers. I ordered Companies I and C to deploy in front of our line, which was promptly executed, and the woods and bushes were soon cleared of the enemy. At this time, the report reaching us that the enemy were forming in a hollow leading to the hospital in our rear, you ordered me to move with the brigade to the hill immediately in rear of the hospital. No further attack being made, the regiment was kept in this position till about 4 o'clock p. m. At this time I was ordered to march the regiment into the ravine below the fort, on the extreme right of our lines, and support the Eleventh Indiana and Eighth Missouri Regiments, which were ordered with us to assault the hills and drive the enemy within their works. I formed the regiment on the left of the Seventeenth Kentucky, and charged over the hills until we reached a ravine immediately below the enemy's batteries, where we were exposed to a terrible fire of grape, shrapnel, and shells. To avoid this, I moved the regiment by the right flank farther up the ravine, when, the enemy having retreated within their works, we were ordered back to the position from which we charged.

I cannot speak too highly, colonel, of the coolness and bravery of the men and the gallant behavior of the officers who were with the regiment during the day. Where all were so prompt in performing their duty as brave soldiers it would be unjust to particularize. Although brought into action for the first time, under a terrible fire from an enemy concealed in a dense undergrowth of leafy oak bushes, they never for a moment lost coolness and presence of mind. They used their arms with the greatest deliberation, retaining their fire until they could procure a deliberate aim. In the afternoon engagement they exhibited, if possible, even more daring, not flinching in the least from the storm of iron which raked the bushes and plowed the ground around them.

In conclusion, colonel, permit me to congratulate you upon your escape from the terrible fire to which you exposed yourself continually during both actions without receiving any dangerous wounds, and also to thank you for giving your brigade and our regiment an opportunity to assist so materially in the consummation of the great victory.

I am, colonel, your most obedient servant,

FRED. ARN,

*Major Thirty-first Indiana Volunteers.*

Col. CHARLES CRUFT,

*Commanding First Brigade, Third Division.*



## No. 41.

*Report of Col. Hugh B. Reed, Forty-fourth Indiana Infantry.*

HDQRS. FORTY-FOURTH REGIMENT INDIANA VOLUNTEERS,  
*Fort Henry, February 18, 1862.*

SIR: On the morning of Saturday, February 15, the Forty-fourth Regiment Indiana Volunteers left their bivouac near the enemy's lines and marched to the attack on Fort Donelson. By order of General McClelland, we first took position near the battery (which was afterwards assaulted by the rebels). In this position the enemy's shot passed over our heads. Shortly afterwards we were ordered forward into line with our brigade (First). As we marched past the enemy's breastworks we received a heavy fire, wounding some of our men. We took our position on the left wing of our brigade, in front of and in range of the enemy's guns. They were invisible to us, while we were exposed to their view. There was part of a regiment of Union troops (Colonel Logan) on the slope of the hill between us and the enemy. Colonel Logan came to our lines and requested we would not fire, as it would endanger his men. I gave the order to the men to withhold their fire. We remained exposed to the enemy's fire for fifteen or twenty minutes without being able to return it or to determine whether our friends were still in danger of our guns.

At this time, the enemy's fire partly subsiding, the regimental colors were ordered forward and were planted 10 paces in front of our line of battle by First Lieutenant Story, of Company C. This failing to call forth a fire, Captain Bingham, of Company H, advanced to a point 10 or 12 paces in front of our line and waved our colors in the air. This drew his fire, which was most heartily responded to by our men, and was followed up in rapid succession on both sides. Our men behaved most gallantly. In the early part of the action Captain Cuppy, of Company E, was severely wounded while in advance of his men bravely cheering them on.

By this time, the regiment on our left having entirely changed their position, leaving our flank exposed, a movement was made by a well-mounted cavalry regiment and a body of infantry to turn our left wing. Captain Murray, Company B, was ordered to open fire upon them, and did so with terrible effect. Companies E and H were ordered to the support of Company B and poured in a well-directed fire, causing them to fall back in disorder.

At this time, finding my regiment was left entirely alone and unsupported, the regiments on our left having withdrawn and our brigade having changed position to the right, thus exposing both wings, of which the enemy were about to take advantage, the order was given to change position to the right, which was done by right flank in good order, with the exception of a part of the left wing, which, from not having fully understood the order, became separated from the main body and some confusion ensued, but in a few minutes they rejoined us. Ours was the last regiment engaged with the enemy during the fight in the morning. Having joined our brigade, we took position on an adjoining elevation and awaited orders.

Major Stoughton, posted during the entire action in the most exposed position, deserves the highest praise for the cool courage and daring displayed.

I would gladly specify very many instances of personal bravery dis-

played. Adjutant Colgrove acted with coolness and bravery during the entire day.

Too much credit cannot be bestowed on our men for their cool and determined courage, and especially during the trying time when exposed to the enemy's bullets without being permitted to return them, both officers and men in this our first engagement; but where almost all performed their part so well, it would require too lengthily a list to name them personally, whilst many justly deserving might be unintentionally omitted.

The Forty-fourth Indiana does its duty. We lost in this engagement 7 killed, 34 wounded, and 2 missing.\*

From our position on the hill where our column rested we could see the battle-field of the morning and the enemy again form his line of battle. At about 3.30 o'clock p. m. a renewed attack upon their lines was ordered by General Wallace. My regiment advanced to the foot of the hill occupied by the enemy, formed in line of battle in face of a storm of bullets. Finding ground in our front occupied by the Eighth Missouri Regiment, I advanced my regiment 100 yards, faced to the front, and charged up the hill at double-quick, our men loudly cheering. We advanced rapidly to summit of hill, firing at the enemy. The enemy soon retreated inside their intrenchments, closely followed by our troops. A fire was opened on us by their batteries, the shell falling near our lines. Whilst deliberating upon an attack upon their fortifications we received an order from General Grant to fall back to the brow of the hill, which was done. Here we bivouacked for the night.

The following morning (Sunday) we were ordered by you to march forward to attack the enemy's works. When just ready to march the joyful intelligence was brought us that the enemy had surrendered, which was received with hearty cheers.

Our column being in motion, we were the first to march into the town of Dover.

I am, colonel, your very obedient servant,

HUGH B. REED,

*Colonel, Comdg. Forty-fourth Regiment Indiana Volunteers.*

Col. CHARLES CRUFT,

*Commanding First Brigade, Third Division.*

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No. 42.

*Report of Col. John H. McHenry, jr., Seventeenth Kentucky Infantry.*

FORT HENRY, February 18, 1862.

COLONEL: On the morning of the 15th instant my regiment, numbering 510 men, preceded by the Twenty-fifth Kentucky and Thirty-first Indiana, took up our march, leaving behind our blankets, knapsacks, and a few great-coats. Hearing brisk firing on our right, we followed close upon the Thirty-first, and soon passed the right of the line of battle, when the enemy opened fire upon my right wing from behind clumps of bushes and trees, that entirely concealed them from our men. My right, with the exception of two companies on the left, were driven back from the line. I promptly rallied them on the next hill, and being joined by Captains Vaughan's and Davison's companies, from whom

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\* But see revised list, p. 169.



we had become separated, the regiment was moved forward and supported the Forty-fourth Indiana on our left, which had sustained a severe shock from the enemy. We soon met the enemy, and drove them back from the position they occupied against us. The firing at this point was deadly and severe. I am greatly indebted to Lieutenant-Colonel Stout and Major Calhoun for their successful efforts in encouraging the men and keeping them in their proper places in line of battle under fire of the enemy. Their efforts were particularly successful at this point, but their services were faithful and unceasing during the whole day. Lieutenant-Colonel Stout's horse was severely wounded at this place.

About this time Colonel Logan, of Illinois, rode up and informed me that his regiment had entered between me and the enemy, and the brigade was by your order withdrawn a short distance. Some of the enemy were discovered in force on our left, where they encountered our troops and had a terrible battle, in which some 50 of my regiment, who had been separated at the first attack of the enemy, were engaged, under Adjutant Starling. This engagement was at the place where the regiment had encamped the night previous, and resulted most disastrously to our knapsacks and blankets, which had been left hanging upon the trees.

My regiment, with the Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Indiana, was withdrawn to the top of a neighboring hill, where we soon discovered the enemy in large force. We were ordered down, and I was instructed to throw my regiment out on the right, with a view of attacking the enemy, who occupied a strong position on a hill among the trees, where they could see us and were at the same time entirely concealed from our view. I ordered a charge up the hill, which, although hotly contested, was successful.

All of the officers and men behaved gallantly in this engagement. Captain Barnett led the charge on the right, and he, as well as his men, behaved nobly during the engagement. Captains Morton, Vaughan, and Davison were in the thickest of the fight, cheering their men, who behaved as gallantly as troops under the same circumstances could possibly have done. You witnessed this conflict, however, and are probably better prepared to describe it than I am myself. My regiment by your order bivouacked on this hill, where we remained during the night, and rose with the determination of renewing the attack, when we learned that the enemy had surrendered.

Captain Beckham, Lieutenants Brown, Keith, Harrison, Byers, Briggs, Davis, and Bandy deserve mention for their unceasing attention to their men during the whole day, and I feel proud I have received this positive evidence of their good qualities as officers. Lieutenants Taylor and Rogers, in command of a company, behaved gallantly during the day.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN H. MCHENRY, JR.,  
*Colonel Seventeenth Kentucky Volunteers.*

Colonel CRUFT,  
*Commanding First Brigade, Third Division.*



## No. 43.

*Report of Col. J. M. Shackelford, Twenty-fifth Kentucky Infantry.*

## HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-FIFTH KENTUCKY REGIMENT.

*Camp Cloak, near Fort Henry, February 18, 1862.*

SIR : Below I give you a list of the killed, wounded, and missing in the Twenty-fifth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers in the battle at Dover, on the 13th instant.

	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Sergeants.	Corporals.	Privates.	Aggregate.
Killed .....	1	1	2	3	6	12
Wounded .....		2	4	7	46	60
Missing .....					12	12
*Total .....	1	3	6	10	64	84

Pursuant to your order, on Saturday morning, the 13th instant, I proceeded with my regiment in the direction of General McClelland's extreme right. Following the guide you sent me, I passed General McClelland at his headquarters, and he ordered me to go at double-quick. The guide continued with me, leading me within range of the enemy's guns, until we passed in the rear of one of our batteries on the hill, when the guide left me, directing me to proceed around the hill. I then proceeded, in utter ignorance of the point at which I was needed and the position of the enemy, until I came up in the rear of one of General McClelland's regiments, when the colonel came running down to me and appealed to me to come to his rescue, stating that his men were about out of ammunition. I halted my regiment, formed them, and led them up in the face of a most galling and terrific fire. My officers and men marched upon it with the coolness and firmness of regulars, and opened a most deadly fire upon the enemy.

After some time two officers came up, and, without consulting me, ordered my men to forward down the line. My men then moved down the line under a most deadly fire from the enemy. When I again opened fire upon them, and whilst my men were fighting as bravely and gallantly as men ever fought, some officers came upon my extreme right and ordered them cease firing; that some of my men were firing upon them off to the right of my regiment, moving through and breaking my line, when my command fell back, a number of the officers and men fighting as they retired. The regiment was subsequently reformed and entered the action.

Respectfully, yours,

J. M. SHACKELFORD,

*Colonel Twenty-fifth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers.*

Colonel CRUFT,

*Commanding First Brigade, Third Division.*

\* But see revised list, p. 169.

## No. 44.

*Report of Col. John M. Thayer, First Nebraska Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.*

HDQRS. 3D BRIG., 3D DIV., DEPT. WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Henry, February 18, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: I have the honor herewith to submit a report of the part taken in the battle of Fort Donelson by the brigade under my command, composed of the First Nebraska, Lieutenant-Colonel McCord; the Seventy-sixth Ohio, Colonel Woods; the Fifty-eighth Ohio and the Sixty-eighth Ohio, Colonel Steedman. There were also attached to my brigade during the action the Forty-sixth Illinois, Colonel Davis, the Fifty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Baldwin, and the Fifty-eighth Illinois, Colonel Lynch.

At 3 o'clock on the afternoon of Friday, the 14th instant, I moved the brigade forward, under orders from General Wallace, commanding the Third Division, of which this brigade constitutes a part, from the small settlement in the valley some 2 miles south of the fortifications to take up a position on the left of Colonel Cruft's brigade, which had gone on in the direction of General McClernand's division. After passing up a mile the line of battle was formed in the road fronting the valley leading to the western redoubt. No enemy appearing in that direction, we bivouacked for the night on the side of the road, the troops lying on the ground with their arms in their hands. At daylight the next morning the line was again formed. At about 10 o'clock I received orders from General Wallace in person to move forward with my command to the support of General McClernand, who had been engaged with the enemy during the morning. Passing along the central road leading to the breastworks half a mile I met and passed the column of General McClernand retreating. Moving my men at double-quick, we were soon between the forces of General McClernand and the enemy, who was rapidly approaching.

On arriving at a small opening in the timber I filed into the right, crossing the ravine and ascending the hill; placed Colonel Lynch's Fifty-eighth Regiment on the right slope of the hill. The Chicago battery, Lieutenant Wood, taking position, by direction of the general, in the road, the Nebraska regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel McCord, was placed immediately on the right of the battery, on the line of the Fifty-eighth Illinois. A detached company of the Thirty-second Illinois (Company A, Captain Davidson) occupied the position next to the battery on the left. The Fifty-eighth Ohio were in position on the left of this company. The line of battle was thus formed across the road at right angles with it. The Seventy-sixth Ohio was placed some 50 yards in the rear of the First Nebraska, and directed to lie upon the ground as a reserve. The Forty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Illinois were also held in reserve on the road in the rear, ready and anxious for the fight. Colonel Steedman's Sixty-eighth Ohio were stationed on a road on the left, leading to the fort. In this position we had not long to wait for the enemy, who soon approached, with a battery supported by a large body of infantry. Lieutenant Wood immediately commenced an effective fire with his battery, which was instantly returned by the enemy. The extreme left of the First Nebraska, resting on the battery, under orders previously given, at once opened a well-directed fire, which rapidly extended along the line to its right. This regiment continued an almost incessant discharge

of musketry for three-quarters of an hour, the battery continuing its firing at the same time, when the enemy were completely repulsed and fled. Nothing but the thick underbrush prevented a charge with the bayonet. The enemy made an effort three times to push forward through our lines, but were as often driven back.

Colonel Cruft's brigade was engaged on my right in the direction of the river with the enemy's forces, who were endeavoring to outflank his right. The enemy approaching the center of our lines, where my brigade was posted, evidently shows that it was his intention to open his way through and unite with the forces that should outflank Colonel Cruft, but in both of these attempts he was overcome and forced to retreat. I have since learned from the enemy that his force in the engagement which I have described, in addition to his battery, was three regiments of infantry and a squadron of horse, which were repulsed by one regiment of our infantry, the First Nebraska, and the Chicago battery. The enemy also admit a large number of killed and wounded in this action. The Nebraska regiment had but 3 killed and 7 wounded. The enemy poured volley after volley upon us, but, fortunately, aimed too high to do much execution. The Nebraska regiment being the only one engaged at this time, I was with it during the action, and am pleased to be able to say that every officer and soldier behaved very gallantly throughout. I cannot omit to speak in high terms of the soldierly bearing and efficient conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel McCord and Major Livingston during the engagement.

Colonel Woods and his regiment were also exposed to the full fire of the enemy, and their position was rendered the more trying, as I had directed them not to fire until ordered forward for that purpose, if the emergency should arise, which, however, was not necessary. In the afternoon Colonel Lynch was sent forward with his regiment to the assistance of our forces who were engaged on the right, where General Wallace with a part of his division had encountered the enemy, and who drove them back within their intrenchments, recovering the ground lost in the morning. Colonel Davis moved forward and took position on the road in front. The other regiments of the brigade remained in the positions occupied by them during the engagement and camped there that night. The next morning at daylight (Sunday), on receiving orders from General Wallace, I moved my command over to the road on the right and passed down the road to the base of the hill leading to the fortifications, where the line was formed in connection with our other forces, with the intention of storming the works, but before this could be attempted the enemy surrendered.

Not having received reports from the different regiments under my command during the battle, I am not able to submit a detailed report of its casualties.

I must acknowledge the efficient services in the prompt execution of orders of S. A. Strickland, my acting assistant adjutant-general, my aide-de-camp, Capt. Allen Blacker, and Lieut. Charles E. Provost.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. THAYER,

*Col. 1st Nebr., Comdg. 3d Brig., 3d Div., Dept. West Tenn.*

Capt. FRED. KNEFLER,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Division*



## No. 45.

*Message from the President of the Confederate States.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, March 11, 1862.

*To the Speaker of the House of Representatives:*

I transmit herewith copies of such official reports as have been received at the War Department of the defense and fall of Fort Donelson.\* They will be found incomplete and unsatisfactory. Instructions have been given to furnish further information upon the points not made intelligible by the reports.

It is not stated that re-enforcements were at any time asked for; nor is it demonstrated to have been impossible to have saved the army by evacuating the position; nor is it known by what means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the garrison, leaving the remainder to surrender; nor upon what authority or principle of action the senior generals abandoned responsibility, by transferring the command to a junior officer.

In a former communication to Congress I presented the propriety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the disaster at Fort Donelson until official reports could be received. I regret that the information now furnished is so defective. In the mean time, hopeful that satisfactory explanation may be made, I have directed, upon the exhibition of the case as presented by the two senior generals, that they be relieved from command, to await further orders whenever a suitable judgment can be rendered on the merits of the case.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

[Addenda.]

RICHMOND, VA., March 11, 1862.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,

*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: The reports of Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Pillow of the defense and fall of Fort Donelson are unsatisfactory. I can but hope that explanations may be made which will change the aspect given to the affair by their statements.

In the mean time you will order General A. S. Johnston to relieve both of those officers from command, and to indicate to them that information is wanted as to their failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison to repel the attack and their failure to attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when it was found to be untenable, and especially why they abandoned the command and by what means their escape was effected; further, to state upon what principle was a selection made of particular troops, being certain regiments of the senior general's brigade, to whose use the transportation on hand should be appropriated.

Copies of the reports received will be furnished to me for transmission to Congress.

Very respectfully, yours,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

\* This message transmitted Pillow's report of February 18 (No. 51), Floyd's of February 27 (No. 48), and Wharton's and McCausland's reports (Nos. 49 and 50).

## No. 46.

*Reports of General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding the Western Department, and resulting correspondence.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 14, 1862.*

SECRETARY OF WAR:

The latest from General Pillow at Fort Donelson:

We have just had the fiercest fight on record between our guns and six gunboats, which lasted two hours. They came within 200 yards of our batteries. We drove them back, damaged two of them badly, and crippled a third very badly. No damage done to our battery and not a man killed.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Edgefield, February 15, 1862—5.15 p. m.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

The attack at Fort Donelson was this morning renewed by the enemy at dawn with great vigor and continued until 1 o'clock, when the conflict was still raging. We had taken some 200 prisoners, forced their positions, and captured four pieces of artillery. At that hour the enemy were still bringing up re-enforcements for the attack. Our arms were successful, the field having been carried inch by inch, with severe loss on both sides. There is no intelligence since 1 o'clock.

A. S. JOHNSTON.

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EDGEFIELD, TENN., *February 15—midnight,*  
*Via Chattanooga, Tenn., February 16, 1862—11.30 p. m.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

We have had to-day at Fort Donelson one of the most sanguinary conflicts of the war. Our forces attacked the enemy with energy and won a brilliant victory. I have the satisfaction to transmit the dispatch, after night-fall, of General Floyd, who was in command of our forces.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 16, 1862.*

J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of War:*

I have received the following dispatch:

FORT DONELSON, TENN., *February 15, 1862—11 p. m.*

A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

The enemy having invested our lines, it was determined to attack them, which we did this morning at 5.30 o'clock. General Pillow led the attack upon the enemy's right flank, and, after a most obstinate and sanguinary conflict, succeeded in driving the enemy from his position and forcing him back towards his left flank. General Buckner led the attack on the right, in which many of his troops displayed commendable determination and courage. General Johnson led his command with firmness and spirit in the conflict. Nothing could exceed the steady and determined courage of many of our troops, with numbers much less than half. The enemy maintained a successful struggle, which continued for nine hours, and resulted in driving him from the field, with a loss on his part of 1,240-odd killed and wounded, of whom 1,000 were killed. About 300 prisoners, six pieces of artillery, and 1,600 stand of arms were

captured. Our own loss amounted to about 500 killed and wounded. They have a force of forty-two regiments.

JOHN B. FLOYD,  
*Brigadier-General.*

A. S. JOHNSTON.

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 16, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

The following dispatch was received at 3.45 o'clock this morning:

FORT DONELSON, TENN., *February 16, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

Last evening there arrived in the river near Fort Donelson eleven transports, laden with troops. We are completely invested with an army many times our own numbers. I regret to say the unanimous opinion of the officers seems to be that we cannot maintain ourselves against these forces.

JOHN B. FLOYD,  
*Brigadier-General.*

A. S. JOHNSTON.

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 17, 1862.*

SECRETARY OF WAR:

Fort Donelson was surrendered at 4.10 p. m. yesterday, after most gallant defense. Floyd saved about 1,000 men. He and Pillow are here. Buckner surrendered after they left. This army is across the Cumberland.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, March 11, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Decatur, Ala.:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your dispatches through Major Liddell. The reports of Brigadier-Generals Floyd and Pillow are unsatisfactory, and the President directs that both these generals be relieved from command till further orders. In the mean time you will request them to add to their reports such statements as they may deem proper on the following points:

1st. The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to repel attack.

2d. The failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found to be untenable.

3d. Why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer, instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army.

4th. What was the precise mode by which each effected his escape from the fort and what dangers were encountered in the retreat.

5th. Upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments of the senior general's brigade, to whose use all the transportation on hand was appropriated.

6th. A particular designation of the regiments saved and the regiments abandoned which formed part of the senior general's brigade.



In addition to the foregoing, you are requested to direct Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson to make a full and detailed report as promptly as possible; also to require a like report of Colonel Forrest, and to ask Colonel Forrest to detail particularly in his report the time and manner of his escape, the road he took, the number of enemies he met or saw in making his escape, the difficulties, if any, which existed to prevent the remainder of the army from following the route taken by himself in his escape with his command.

You are further requested to make up a report from all the sources of information accessible to you of all the particulars connected with the unfortunate affair which can contribute to enlighten the judgment of the Executive and of Congress, and to fix the blame, if blame there be, on those who were delinquent in duty.

I am, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

—  
RICHMOND, VA., March 12, 1862.

[To General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON?]

MY DEAR GENERAL: The departure of Captain Wickliffe offers an opportunity of which I avail myself to write you an unofficial letter. We have suffered great anxiety because of recent events in Kentucky and Tennessee, and I have been not a little disturbed by the repetition of reflections upon yourself. I expected you to have made a full report of events precedent and consequent to the fall of Fort Donelson. In the meantime I made for you such defense as friendship prompted and many years' acquaintance justified, but I needed facts to rebut the wholesale assertions made against you to cover others and to condemn my administration. The public, as you are aware, have no correct measure for military operations, and journals are very reckless in their statements. Your force has been magnified and the movements of an army [measured?] by the capacity for locomotion of an individual. The readiness of the people among whom you are operating to aid you in every method has been constantly asserted, the purpose of your army at Bowling Green wholly misunderstood, and the absence of an effective force at Nashville ignored. You have been held responsible for the fall of Donelson and the capture of Nashville. 'Tis charged that no effort was made to save the stores at Nashville and that the panic of the people was caused by the army. Such representations, with the sad forebodings naturally belonging to them, have been painful to me and injurious to us both; but, worse than this, they have undermined public confidence and damaged our cause.

A full development of the truth is necessary for future success. I respect the generosity which has kept you silent, but would impress upon you that the subject is not personal but public in its nature; that you and I might be content to suffer, but neither of us can willingly permit detriment to the country.

As soon as circumstances will permit it is my purpose to visit the field of your present operations; not that I should expect to give you any aid in the discharge of your duties as a commander, but with the hope that my position would enable me to effect something in bringing men to your standard.

With a sufficient force, the audacity which the enemy exhibits would no doubt give you the opportunity to cut some of his lines of communi-

cation, to break up his plan of campaign, and, defeating some of his columns, to drive him from the soil as well of Tennessee as of Kentucky. We are deficient in arms, wanting in discipline, and inferior in numbers. Private arms must supply the first want; time and the presence of an enemy, with diligence on the part of commanders, will remove the second, and public confidence will overcome the third.

General Bragg brings you disciplined troops, and you will find in him the highest administrative capacity. General E. K. Smith will soon have in East Tennessee a sufficient force to create a strong diversion in your favor; or, if his strength cannot be made available in that way, you will best know how to employ it otherwise. I suppose the Tennessee or Mississippi River will be the object of the enemy's next campaign, and I trust you will be able to concentrate a force which will defeat either attempt.

The fleet which you will soon have on the Mississippi River, if the enemy's gunboats ascend the Tennessee, may enable you to strike an effective blow at Cairo; but to one so well informed and vigilant I will not assume to offer suggestions as to when and how the ends you seek may be obtained.

With the confidence and regard of many years, I am, very truly, your friend,

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

—  
DECATUR, ALA., *March 18, 1862.*

[To President DAVIS:]

MY DEAR GENERAL: I received the dispatches from Richmond, with your private letter, by Captain Wickliffe,\* three days since, but the pressure of affairs and the necessity of getting my command across the Tennessee prevented me from sending you an earlier reply.

I anticipated all that you tell as to the censures which the fall of Fort Donelson drew upon me and the attacks to which you might be subjected, but it was impossible for me to gather the facts for a detailed report or spare the time required to extricate the remainder of my troops and save the large accumulation of stores and provisions after the disheartening disaster.

I transmitted the reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow without examining or analyzing the facts, and scarcely with time to read them.

When about to assume command of the department the Government charged me with the duty of deciding the question of occupying Bowling Green, which involved not only military but political considerations. At the time of my arrival at Nashville the action of the Legislature of Kentucky had put an end to the latter, by sanctioning the formation of camps menacing Tennessee, by assuming the cause of the Government at Washington, and by abandoning the neutrality it professed, and, in consequence of their action, the occupation of Bowling Green became necessary as an act of self-defense, at least in the first step.

About the middle of September General Buckner advanced with a small force of about 4,000 men, which was increased by the 15th of October to 12,000, and, though accessions of force were received, continued at about the same strength till the end of the month of November (measles, &c., keeping down the effective force). The enemy's force then was, as reported to the War Department, 50,000, and an advance impossible. No enthusiasm, as we imagined and hoped, but hostility,

\* See Davis to Johnston, March 12, p. 257.

was manifested in Kentucky. Believing it to be of the greatest moment to protract the campaign, as the dearth of cotton might bring strength from abroad and discourage the North and to gain time to strengthen myself by new troops from Tennessee and other States, I magnified my forces to the enemy, but made known my true strength to the Department and the Governors of the States. The aid given was small. At length, when General Beauregard came out, in February, he expressed his surprise at the smallness of my force and was impressed with the danger. I admitted what was so manifest, and laid before him my views for the future, in which he entirely concurred, and sent me a memorandum of our conference, a copy of which I send to you. I determined to fight for Nashville at Donelson, and gave the best part of my army to do it, retaining only 14,000 men to cover my front, and giving 16,000 to defend Donelson. The force at Donelson is stated in General Pillow's report at much less, and I do not doubt the correctness of his statement, for the force at Bowling Green, which I supposed 14,000 men (the medical report showing only a little over 500 sick in hospitals), was diminished more than 5,000 by those who were unable to stand the fatigue of a march, and made my effective force on reaching Nashville less than 10,000 men. I inclose medical director's report.\* Had I wholly uncovered my front to defend Donelson, Buell would have known it and marched directly on Nashville. There were only ten small steamers, only three of which were available at Nashville, in the Cumberland, in imperfect condition, while the transportation of the enemy was great.

The evacuation of Bowling Green was imperatively necessary, and was ordered before and executed while the battle was being fought at Donelson. I had made every disposition for the defense of the fort my means allowed, and the troops were among the best of my forces, and the generals—Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner—were high in the opinion of officers and men for skill and courage, and among the best officers of my command. They were popular with the volunteers, and all had seen much service. No re-enforcements were asked. I waited the event opposite Nashville. The result of the conflict each day was favorable. At midnight on the 15th I received the news of a glorious victory; at dawn, of a defeat. My column was during the day and night (of the 16th) thrown over the river. A battery had been established below the city to secure the passage. Nashville was incapable of defense from its position and from the forces advancing from Bowling Green and up the Cumberland. A rear guard was left, under General Floyd, to secure the stores and provisions, but did not completely effect the object. The people were terrified and some of the troops were disheartened. The discouragement was spreading, and I ordered the command to Murfreesborough, where I managed, by assembling Crittenden's division and the fugitives from Donelson, to collect an army able to offer battle. The weather was inclement, the floods excessive, and the bridges were washed away, but most of the stores and provisions were saved and conveyed to new depots. This having been accomplished, though with serious loss, in conformity with my original design I marched southward and crossed the Tennessee at this point, so as to co-operate or unite with General Beauregard for the defense of the valley of the Mississippi. The passage is almost completed, and the head of my column is already with General Bragg, at Corinth.

The movement was deemed too hazardous by the most experienced members of my staff, but the object warranted the risk. The difficulty

\* Not found.



of effecting a junction is not wholly overcome, but it approaches completion. Day after to-morrow, unless the enemy interrupts me, my force will be with Bragg, and my army nearly 50,000 strong. This must be destroyed before the enemy can attain his object.

I have given this sketch so that you may appreciate the embarrassments which surrounded me in my attempts to avert or remedy the disaster of Donelson before alluding to the conduct of the generals.

When the force was detached, I was in hopes that such dispositions would have been made as would have enabled the forces to defend the fort or withdraw without sacrificing the army.

On the 14th I ordered General Floyd, by telegram, "if he lost the fort, to get his troops back to Nashville." It is possible this might have been done, but justice requires to look at events as they appeared at the time, and not alone by the light of subsequent information.

All the facts in relation to the surrender will be transmitted to the Secretary of War as soon as they can be collected, in obedience to his order. It appears from the information received that General Buckner (being the junior officer) took the lead in advising the surrender and General Floyd acquiesced, and they all concurred in the belief that their force could not maintain their position. All concurred that it would involve a great sacrifice of life to extricate the command. Subsequent events show that the investment was not so complete as their information from their scouts led them to believe. The conference resulted in the surrender. The command was irregularly transferred, and devolved on the junior general, but not apparently to avoid any just responsibility or from any want of personal or moral intrepidity.

The blow was most disastrous and almost without remedy. I therefore in my first report remained silent. This silence you were kind enough to attribute to my generosity. I will not lay claim to the motive to excuse my course. I observed silence, as it seemed to me the best way to serve the cause and the country. The facts were not fully known, discontent prevailed, and criticism or condemnation were more likely to augment than to cure the evil. I refrained, well knowing that heavy censures would fall upon me, but convinced that it was better to endure them for the present, and defer to a more propitious time an investigation of the conduct of the generals; for in the mean time their services were required and their influence useful. For these reasons Generals Floyd and Pillow were assigned to duty, for I still felt confidence in their gallantry, their energy, and their devotion to the Confederacy.

I have thus recurred to the motives by which I have been governed from a deep personal sense of the friendship and confidence you have always shown me and from the conviction that they have not been withdrawn from me in adversity.

All the reports requisite for a full official investigation have been ordered.

You mention that you intend to visit the field of operations here. I hope soon to see you, for your presence would encourage my troops, inspire the people, and augment the army. To me personally it would give the greatest satisfaction. Merely a soldier myself, and having no acquaintance with the statesmen or leaders of the South, I cannot touch springs familiar to you. Were you to assume command, it would afford me the most unfeigned pleasure to help you to victory and the country to independence. Were you to decline, still your presence alone would be of inestimable advantage. The enemy are now at Nashville, about 50,000 strong, advancing in this direction by Columbia. He has also

forces, according to the report of General Bragg, landing at Pittsburg, from 25,000 to 50,000, and moving in the direction of Purdy.

This army corps moving to join Bragg is about 20,000 strong. Two brigades (Hindman's and Wood's) are, I suppose, at Corinth; one regiment of Hardee's division (Lieutenant-Colonel Patton commanding) is moving by cars to-day (20th March), and Statham's brigade (Crittenden's division). The brigade will halt at Iuka; the regiment at Burnsville. Cleburne's brigade, Hardee's division, except regiment at Burnsville, and Carroll's brigade, Crittenden's division, and Helm's cavalry, at Tusculum. Bowen's brigade at Courtland; Breckinridge's brigade here; the regiments of cavalry of Adams and Wharton on the opposite bank of the river; Scott's Louisiana cavalry at Pulaski, sending forward supplies; Morgan's cavalry at Shelbyville ordered on.

To-morrow Breckinridge's brigade will go to Corinth; then Bowen's. When these pass Tusculum and Iuka, transportation will be ready there to further other troops to follow immediately from these points, and, if necessary, from Burnsville. The cavalry will cross and move forward as soon as their trains can be passed over the railroad bridge.

I have troubled you with these details, as I cannot possibly communicate them by telegram. The test of merit in my profession with the people is success. It is a hard rule, but I think it right. If I join this corps to the forces of Beauregard (I confess a hazardous experiment), those who are now declaiming against me will be without an argument.

Your friend,

A. S. JOHNSTON.

I will prepare answers to the questions propounded by General Foote, chairman of the committee to investigate the causes, &c., of the loss of the forts, as soon as practicable; but, engaged as I am in a most hazardous movement of a large force, even the most minute detail requiring my attention for its accomplishment, I cannot say when it will be forwarded to the Secretary of War, to be handed to him if he thinks proper to do so.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, U. S. Army.*

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No. 47.

*Reports of Lieut. Col. Jeremy F. Gilmer, U. S. Army, Chief Engineer  
Western Department.\**

ENGINEER'S OFFICE,  
*Decatur, Ala., March 17, 1862.*

COLONEL: The capture of Fort Henry was for the enemy a great success, which it was felt would embolden him to make an early attack upon Fort Donelson.

To meet this every effort was made to strengthen the defenses. Lines of infantry cover were laid out on commanding grounds around the place and fatigue parties were daily employed in their construction. To aid the local engineer in the work of defense I remained at the fort February 7, 8, and 9, when General Pillow took command of the whole. At his request I asked and received authority to remain and aid in the defense.

\* See pp. 131-135 for so much of this report as relates to capture of Fort Henry.



Immediately on his arrival the general took active measures to inform himself as to the character of the defenses and had the additional works pressed forward with the greatest activity. Having received re-enforcements and others being expected daily the lines of infantry cover were extended so as to embrace the town of Dover, where many of our munitions were stored. The lines for these works being decided upon, they were at once pressed to completion and the batteries for the defense of the river strengthened.

By the night of the 12th these were in readiness and the heavy guns recently received at the fort were mounted. To provide an ample force of artillerists to work the heavy guns through a long-continued attack General Pillow detailed Capt. R. R. Ross and his company of well-drilled men from his battery to aid in the river defense. The selection of this officer and his command proved most fortunate, as in the obstinate attack that was made by the gunboats they performed noble and effective service.

Brigadier-General Buckner arrived at Fort Donelson on the afternoon of the 12th.

In the mean time the enemy had landed in large force on the bank of the river below and other troops were brought over from Fort Henry. The smoke of his gunboats was seen in the distance, warning us that a combined attack was to be expected. Skirmishes were frequent between our pickets and the enemy's forces advancing to meet us.

On the 13th the besiegers opened with artillery upon our land defenses, and their sharpshooters annoyed our men constantly whenever exposed above the infantry covers, as at the field batteries. One of the gunboats commenced firing upon the river batteries early in the day, throwing shot and shell at long range. The same morning General Floyd arrived with re-enforcements, including three batteries of field artillery, which were placed in position as promptly as possible. The enemy's fire was kept up throughout the day and responded to with spirit by our artillery and infantry. In the afternoon an attempt was made to storm the intrenchments on the heights near our center but failed, the assailants being handsomely repulsed. One of the guns in the river batteries was struck by a heavy shot from the gunboat, disabling the carriage and killing Lieut. Joseph Dixon, the local engineer officer. Our total loss during the day was considerable, but I am unable to report numbers.

The contest of the day closed. The enemy had gained no footing on our works nor produced any important impression upon them. But our forces were much fatigued, having been under arms all day, and this after three or four days' hard labor upon the intrenchments. To add to their sufferings it turned suddenly cold in the afternoon and at dark commenced snowing, and so continued the greater part of the night. Inclement as was the weather, it was necessary (to guard against surprise) that the troops should be all night in position along the lines of infantry cover. The next day, the 14th, the besiegers brought up large re-enforcements, just landed from numerous transports, and extended their lines in great strength towards their right, enveloping our extreme left. They took positions that placed it in their power to plant batteries on the river bank above and cut off our communications. Such appeared to be their design. In consequence of these movements the firing of the enemy was less frequent than on the previous day.

Early on this afternoon the gunboats were observed to be advancing to attack the river batteries, and at 3 o'clock a vigorous fire was opened from five boats approaching *en échelon*. Our gunners reserved their fire



until the gunboats had come within effective range, and then at a signal every gun was fired—twelve in number. This fire told with great effect, penetrating the iron sides of the boats. The firing now became terrific, the enemy still advancing. In rear of the five boats first engaged a sixth was reported throwing curved shot, which passed over our works, exploding in the air just above. After some time one of the boats was seen to pull back, probably disabled by our shot. The others continued to advance, keeping up a rapid fire.

Our batteries were well served and responded with great effect, disabling, as it was believed, two more of the gunboats. The engagement lasted until 4.10, the gunboats having approached to within 300 or 400 yards of our guns, when they withdrew from the contest. Our batteries were uninjured and not a man in them killed.

The repulse of the gunboats closed the operations of the day, except a few scattering shot along the land defenses. It was evident, however, from the movements of numerous bodies of troops around our lines, that the enemy had resolved to invest us, and, when prepared, to attack us in overwhelming numbers or press us to a capitulation by cutting off supplies and re-enforcements.

Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner met in council soon after dark; I was present. After an interchange of views it was decided to attack the enemy on his extreme right and right center at 5 o'clock in the morning. It was believed that the enemy might be thrown back and an opportunity secured to withdraw in safety our forces; that possibly greater advantages might be gained by the attack, which, if well followed up on our part, would result in disaster to the invaders.

This being decided upon, the brigade commanders were at once sent for, and the positions for their respective commands in the order of attack assigned. Brigadier-General Pillow was to direct the movement against the right of the enemy; Brigadier-General Buckner that against his right center, advancing along the Wynn's Ferry road. A few regiments were to remain to guard the lines.

About 5 o'clock next morning (the 15th) the left wing, under General Pillow, moved to the attack. Brisk fires were opened and kept up by the enemy and responded to with spirit from our lines, his men generally overshooting, while ours were constantly warned to aim low.

The enemy's fire after some time extended towards their extreme right, indicating a design to turn our left. To meet this, a body of troops under Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson made a flank movement and met the foe. After a long struggle the enemy finally gave way, at first falling back slowly. Our troops pressed forward, and about 9.30 o'clock his right wing was in full retreat. Now the cavalry on our extreme left was brought up and charged with effect on the retreating enemy. Six field pieces were captured at different points, and at a later hour of the day brought within the line of intrenchments. Our success against the right wing was complete.

I now accompanied General Pillow across the field to the point of attack assigned to General Buckner's division. On our arrival there his division was in rear of the lines of infantry covers, the general and his officers encouraging the troops to renew the attack on the enemy, who still held position in their front. General Buckner stated that he had, soon after the firing of General Pillow's forces was heard, opened on the enemy with artillery, and followed it up by sending forward two of his best regiments to the assault; that they moved from the infantry covers with spirit and advanced steadily and in order against the enemy.

They were soon exposed to heavy fires of small-arms and of a field battery planted in their front, and they responded well for some time to the volleys of the besiegers; but finally their ranks were thrown into confusion, and they fell back rapidly in rear of our intrenchments. General Buckner continued to encourage his men, feeling that a little time was necessary to overcome the dispiriting effects of the repulse earlier in the day.

In the mean time the fires of our left wing were heard steadily advancing, driving the enemy back upon his right center. This was referred to with encouraging effect upon General Buckner's division. Artillery fires were kept up against the enemy in his front, and soon afterwards he moved forward with his division to renew the attack. The enemy, being now pressed in front of his center by this advance and on his right flank by the pursuing forces of General Pillow's division, retreated rapidly for some distance towards his left wing; but, receiving heavy reinforcements, the pursuit was checked, and finally the retreating foe made a firm stand, opening from a field battery strongly supported by masses of infantry.

About 1 o'clock an order was given by General Pillow recalling our forces to the defensive lines. Our forces having returned, they were ordered to the positions they occupied the day previous, involving a march of over a mile for the troops on the extreme right. The enemy at the same time advanced with his re-enforcements to attack that flank, and by a prompt movement succeeded in effecting a lodgment within the lines just as our exhausted forces arrived.

A vigorous attempt to dislodge him failed, and at length our men, having suffered much, fell back, leaving him in possession of that portion of our defenses. The advantage gained by the enemy placed him in position to assault our right in full force with his fresh troops next morning. Such was the condition of affairs when the darkness of night closed the bloody struggle of the day. In the course of the night Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner met in council. I was not present.

The following morning, about 3 o'clock, I was told by General Pillow that a surrender had been decided on. He invited me to join himself and staff, as they were not included in the proposed surrender. This I accepted, and accompanied him to Clarksville and Nashville, where I had the honor to report to you in person.

From information received the strength of the enemy at Donelson was estimated to be about 50,000. Our effective force was about 15,000.

The surrender at Fort Donelson made Nashville untenable by the forces under your command. Situated in a wide basin, intersected by a navigable river in possession of the invader; approached from all directions by good turnpike roads and surrounded by commanding hills, involving works of not less than 20 miles in extent, the city could not be held by a force less than 50,000. With all the re-enforcements to be hoped for your army could not be raised to that number before the place would have been attacked by heavy forces of the enemy both by land and water. The alternative was to withdraw to the interior of the State of Tennessee.

J. F. GILMER,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,

*Asst. Adj. Gen. Western Department, Decatur, Ala.*

ENGINEER BUREAU.  
*Richmond, Va., December 2, 1862.*

SIR: Indorsed on a letter of the 1st instant, from Brigadier-General Pillow to you, I have had the honor to receive your instructions, as follows:

On the allegations of General Pillow, as within, justice requires a supplemental report from Colonel Gilmer, and he will accordingly make it.

In the letter on which your instructions are indorsed General Pillow complains that in an order of your predecessor, reflecting on his conduct in the operations of the army at Fort Donelson, injustice was done him, and then states:

The knowledge of Colonel Gilmer, chief of engineers, is important for the information of the Government. His original report in regard to the result of the conference of general officers, on the night of February 14, at Dover, and his knowledge of the condition of the army when the field was won on the 15th, and his opinion of the practicability of a successful retreat from the battle-field on that day, is not as full as his knowledge of the facts will enable him to make.

As a preliminary to the supplemental report which I am directed to make, I have respectfully to state that my original report upon the defense of Fort Donelson was made the 17th of March last, to General Albert Sidney Johnston, then commanding the Western Department. That distinguished officer paid me the flattering compliment to say it gave him a clearer knowledge of the operations than he had received from other sources, which led me to suppose that my effort to report all that was "important for the information of the Government" had been successful. With this remark I have the honor to submit the following supplemental report:

On the evening of February 14, 1862, Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner met in council at Dover, to decide upon a plan of action under the threatening state of affairs then existing. I was present by invitation. Although the gunboats had been repulsed that afternoon by the water batteries, it was evident from the movement of large bodies of troops towards the left of our lines that the enemy had resolved to complete the investment of the place by gaining the bank of the Cumberland River above, and then attack in overwhelming numbers, or force a capitulation by cutting off all supplies and re-enforcements. The necessity for prompt action was apparent, and, after mature deliberation and interchange of views, it was decided to attack the enemy at 5 o'clock next morning, on his extreme right and right center, with a view to drive him back and secure an opportunity to withdraw in safety our forces towards Charlotte and Nashville, Tenn. It was hoped even greater advantages might be gained by the attack, which, if well followed up on our part, might result in disaster to the besiegers. The brigade commanders were then sent for, the plan of operations explained, and the positions for their respective commands in the order of attack assigned.

Brigadier-General Pillow was to direct the movement against the right of the enemy; Brigadier-General Buckner that against his right center, advancing along the Wynn's Ferry road. A few regiments were to remain to guard the lines. The details of preparation for carrying out the plan decided upon, such as the number of rations that should be prepared; whether blankets and knapsacks should be taken or not; what should be the order of march on retreat for the different commands; who should take the advance, and who should protect the rear,



were not arranged, to the best of my recollection, in the council of February 14. The decision of the council was in general terms, and, as I have already stated, to attack the enemy, secure a retreat towards Charlotte, and, if circumstances justified it, to follow up all advantages, and hurl the invaders back to their transports.

As decided in council, the attack on the right of the enemy was made next morning by the forces under General Pillow, and, after a hot and long-continued contest, the besiegers fell back, disputing obstinately each foot of ground. General Buckner's division was brought up in front of their right center, and a part of his force, after he had prepared the way by his artillery, was advanced to the attack. For some time the result of the day appeared doubtful and but little advantage was gained in the center. The enemy was hotly engaged for hours on his right by Pillow's division, and forced to yield point after point until he was thrown back on his right center, when the advance of Buckner's forces united our strength, and for the moment gave promise of a brilliant victory. The forces by which we were first opposed were in full retreat and our men were eager in the pursuit, fatigued as they were by the long continued struggle of the day; but this bright picture was suddenly changed. Large masses of fresh troops were brought up by the besiegers, the contest was fast becoming unequal, and our men were well-nigh exhausted, having been under arms or on fatigue duty almost constantly for the four preceding days and nights, some of them for even a longer time. What was the strength of the re-enforcements brought forward to cover the retreat of the enemy and check our advance I am unable to state with any accuracy. It was very great, however, as was evident by the heavy masses that were seen to approach along the roads from the landing below (distant about 3 miles), and by the extent of the fire as they advanced to the contest.

It was now about 1 o'clock; the battle had been waged for about seven hours; the ground was covered with snow; the troops were hungry and fatigued, their ammunition falling short, and the besiegers largely re-enforced.

To commence a retreat at this time would have been hazardous, and must have resulted in great suffering, as a large part of the men were without their blankets, rations, or other preparations for a march. It was a choice of evils. Prompt decision and action were imperative. The commanding general must at once decide as to the practicability of making the contemplated retreat or wait the turn of events. A retreat commenced from the battle-field would have, in my opinion, resulted in the deliverance of a large part of the army, but much broken and demoralized.

Under these circumstances an order was given by General Pillow, and approved afterwards, as I understood, by General Floyd, to withdraw our forces and place them back to former positions within the lines. This was done as promptly as possible, but the enemy, by a quick advance of fresh troops against the extreme right of our lines, effected a lodgment within them before the returning troops could arrive for their defense. He afterwards reoccupied the ground from which he had been driven in the morning, and the sad sequel has been long since reported to the Government by the commanding generals.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,

*Colonel of Engineers and Chief of Bureau.*

Hon. JAMES A. SEDDON,  
*Secretary of War.*

No. 48.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, U. S. Army.*

CAMP NEAR MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN.,

*February 27, 1862.*

SIR: Your order of the 12th of this month, transmitted to me from Bowling Green by telegraph to Cumberland City, reached me the same evening. It directed me to repair at once, with what force I could command, to the support of the garrison at Fort Donelson. I immediately prepared for my departure, and effected it in time to reach Fort Donelson the next morning (13th) before daylight. Measures had been already taken by Brigadier-General Pillow, then in command, to render our resistance to the attack of the enemy as effectual as possible. He had, with activity and industry, pushed forward the defensive works towards completion.

These defenses consisted in an earthwork in Fort Donelson, in which were mounted guns of different calibers to the number of thirteen. A field work, intended for the infantry support, was constructed immediately behind the battery and upon the summit of the hill in rear. Sweeping away from this field work eastward, to the extent of nearly 2 miles in its windings, was a line of intrenchments, defended on the outside at some points with abatis. These intrenchments were occupied by the troops already there and by the addition of those which came upon the field with me. The position of the fort, which was established by the Tennessee authorities, was by no means commanding, nor was the least military significance attached to the position. The intrenchments, afterwards hastily made, in many places were injudiciously constructed, because of the distance they were placed from the brow of the hill, subjecting the men to a heavy fire from the enemy's sharpshooters opposite as they advanced to or retired from the intrenchments.

Soon after my arrival the intrenchments were fully occupied from one end to the other, and just as the sun rose the cannonade from one of the enemy's gunboats announced the opening of the conflict, which was destined to continue for three days and nights. In a very short time the fire became general along our whole lines, and the enemy, who had already planted batteries at several points around the whole circuit of our intrenchments, as shown by a diagram herewith sent,\* opened a general and active fire from all arms upon our trenches, which continued until darkness put an end to the conflict. They charged with uncommon spirit at several points along on the line, but most particularly at a point undefended by intrenchments, down a hollow, which separated the right wing, under the command of Brigadier-General Buckner, from the right of the center, commanded by Colonel Heiman. This charge was prosecuted with uncommon vigor, but was met with a determined spirit of resistance—a cool, deliberate courage—both by the troops of Brigadier-General Buckner and Colonel Heiman, which drove the enemy, discomfited and cut to pieces, back upon the position he had assumed in the morning. Too high praise cannot be bestowed upon the battery of Captain Porter for their participation in the rout of the enemy in this assault. My position was immediately in front of the point of attack, and I was thus enabled to witness more distinctly the incidents of it.

The enemy continued their fire upon different parts of our intrenchments throughout the night, which deprived our men of any opportu-

\* Not found.

nity to sleep. We lay that night upon our arms in the trenches. We confidently expected at the dawn of day a more vigorous attack than ever; but in this we were entirely mistaken. The day advanced and no preparations seemed to be making for a general onset; but an extremely annoying fire was kept up from the enemy's sharpshooters throughout the whole length of the intrenchments from their long-range rifles. While this mode of attack was not attended with any considerable loss, it nevertheless confined the men to their trenches and prevented their taking their usual rest.

So stood the affairs of the field until about 3 p. m., when the fleet of gunboats in full force advanced upon the fort and opened fire. They advanced in the shape of a crescent, and kept up a constant and incessant fire for one hour and a half, which was replied to with uncommon spirit and vigor by the fort. Once the boats reached a point within a few hundred yards of the fort, at which time it was that three of their boats sustained serious injuries from our batteries and were compelled to fall back. The line was broken and the enemy discomfited on the water, giving up the fight entirely, which he never afterwards renewed.

I was satisfied from the incidents of the last two days that the enemy did not intend again to give us battle in our trenches. They had been fairly repulsed with very heavy slaughter upon every effort to storm our position, and it was but fair to infer that they would not again renew the unavailing attempt at our dislodgment when certain means to effect the same end without loss were perfectly at their command. We were aware of the fact that extremely heavy re-enforcements had been continually arriving day and night for three days and nights, and I had no doubt whatever that their whole available force on the Western waters could and would be concentrated here if it was deemed necessary to reduce our position. I had already seen the impossibility of holding out for any length of time with our inadequate numbers and indefensible position. There was no place within our intrenchments but could be reached by the enemy's artillery from their boats or their batteries.

It was but fair to infer that while they kept up a sufficient fire upon our intrenchments to keep our men from sleep and prevent repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a column above us on the river, both on the right and the left banks, and thus to cut off all our communication and to prevent the possibility of egress. I then saw clearly that but one course was left by which a rational hope could be entertained of saving the garrison or a part of it—that was to dislodge the enemy from his position on our left, and thus to pass our people into the open country lying southward towards Nashville. I called for a consultation of the officers of divisions and brigades to take place after dark, when this plan was laid before them, approved, and adopted, and at which it was determined to move from the trenches at an early hour on the next morning and attack the enemy in his position.

It was agreed that the attack should commence upon our extreme left, and this duty was assigned Brigadier-General Pillow, assisted by Brigadier-General Johnson, having also under his command commanders of brigades Colonel Baldwin, commanding Mississippi and Tennessee troops, and Colonel Wharton and Colonel McCausland, commanding Virginians. To Brigadier-General Buckner was assigned the duty of making the attack from near the center of our lines upon the enemy's forces upon the Wynn's Ferry road. The attack on the left was delayed longer than I expected, and consequently the enemy was found in position when our troops advanced. The attack, however, on our part was



extremely spirited; and although the resistance of the enemy was obstinate, and their numbers far exceeded ours, our people succeeded in driving them, discomfited and terribly cut to pieces, from the entire left. The Kentucky troops, under Brigadier-General Buckner, advanced from their position behind the intrenchments upon the Wynn's Ferry road, but not until the enemy had been driven in a great measure from the position he occupied in the morning.

I had ordered on the night before that the two regiments stationed in Fort Donelson should occupy the trenches vacated by Brigadier-General Buckner's forces, which, together with the men whom he detached to assist in this purpose, I thought sufficient to hold them. My intention was to hold with Brigadier-General Buckner's command the Wynn's Ferry road, and thus to prevent the enemy during the night from occupying the position on our left which he occupied in the morning. I gave him orders upon the field to that effect.

Leaving him in position, then, I started for the right of our command, to see that all was secure there, my intention being, if things could be held in the condition that they then were, to move the whole army, if possible, to the open country lying southward beyond the Randolph Forge. During my absence, and from some misapprehension, I presume, of the previous order given, Brigadier-General Pillow ordered Brigadier-General Buckner to leave his position on the Wynn's Ferry road and to resume his place in his trenches on the right. This movement was nearly executed before I was aware of it. As the enemy were pressing upon the trenches, I deemed that the execution of this last order was all that was left to be done. The enemy, in fact, succeeded in occupying an angle of the trenches on the extreme right of Brigadier-General Buckner's command; and, as the fresh forces of the enemy had begun already to move towards our left to occupy the position they held in the morning, and as we had no force adequate to oppose their progress, we had to submit to the mortification of seeing the ground which we had won by such a severe conflict in the morning reoccupied by the enemy before midnight.

The enemy had been landing re-enforcements throughout the day. His numbers had been augmented to eighty-three regiments. Our troops were completely exhausted by four days and nights of continued conflict. To renew it, with any hope of successful result was obviously vain, and such I understand to be the unanimous opinion of all the officers present at the council called to consider what was best to be done. I thought, and so announced, that a desperate onset upon the right of the enemy's forces, on the ground where we had attacked them in the morning, might result in the extricating of a considerable proportion of the command from the position we were in, and this opinion I understood to be concurred in by all who were present; but it was likewise agreed, with the same unanimity, that it would result in the slaughter of nearly all who did not succeed in effecting their escape. The question then arose whether, in point of humanity and a sound military policy, a course should be adopted from which the probabilities were that the larger proportion of the command would be cut to pieces in an unavailing fight against overwhelming numbers. I understood the general sentiment to be averse to the proposition. I felt that in this contingency, while it might be questioned whether I should, as commander of the army, lead it to certain destruction in an unavailing fight, I had a right individually to determine that I would not survive a surrender there. To satisfy both propositions, I agreed to hand over the command to Brigadier-General Buckner through Brigadier-General Pillow, and to make an effort

for my own extrication by any and every means that might present themselves to me. I therefore directed Colonel Forrest, a daring and determined officer, at the head of an efficient regiment of cavalry, to be present, for the purpose of accompanying me in what I supposed would be an effort to pass through the enemy's lines. I announced the fact upon turning the command over to Brigadier-General Buckner that I would bring away with me by any means I could command my own particular brigade, the propriety of which was acquiesced in on all hands. This, by various modes, I succeeded in accomplishing to a great extent, and would have brought off my whole command in one way or another if I had had the assistance of the field officers who were absent from several of the regiments. The command was turned over to Brigadier-General Buckner, who at once opened negotiations with the enemy, which resulted in the surrender of the place.

Thus ended the conflict, running through four days and four nights, a large portion of which time it was maintained with the greatest fierceness and obstinacy, in which we, with a force not exceeding 13,000, a large part of whom were illy armed, succeeded in resisting and driving back with discomfiture an army consisting of more than 50,000 men.

I have no means of accurately estimating the loss of the enemy. From what I saw upon the battle-field; from what I witnessed throughout the whole period of the conflict; from what I was able to learn from sources of information deemed by me worthy of credit, I have no doubt that the enemy's loss in killed and wounded reached a number beyond 5,000. Our own losses were extremely heavy, but, for want of exact returns, I am unable to state precise numbers. I think there will not be far from 1,500 killed and wounded.

Nothing could exceed the coolness and determined spirit of resistance which animated the men in this long and perilous conflict; nothing could exceed the determined courage which characterized them throughout this terrible struggle, and nothing could be more admirable than the steadiness which they exhibited, until nature itself was exhausted, in what they knew to be a desperate fight against a foe very many times their superior in numbers. I cannot particularize in this report to you the numberless instances of heroic daring performed by both officers and men, but must content myself for the present by saying in my judgment they all deserve well of their country.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON.

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KNOXVILLE, TENN., March 20, 1862.

SIR: Your communication of the 16th instant, from Decatur, reached me here to-day, where I came in compliance with an order from Major-General Smith, who felt his position endangered from the advance of the enemy.

In that communication you say:

Under date of March 11th the Secretary of War says:

"The reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow are unsatisfactory, and the President directs that both these generals be relieved from command till further orders." He further directs General Johnston "in the mean time to request them to add to their reports such statements as they may deem proper on the following points:

"1st. The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to repel attacks.

"2d. The failure of an attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found to be untenable.

"3d. Why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer, instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army.

"4th. What was the precise mode by which each effected his escape from the post and what dangers were encountered in the retreat?

"5th. Upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments of the senior general's brigade, to whose use all the transportation on hand was appropriated.

"6th. A particular designation of the regiments saved and the regiments abandoned which formed part of the senior general's brigade."

In obedience to this order I am directed by General Johnston to request your compliance with the wishes of the President in these particulars with as little delay as possible, and forward the report to these headquarters.

Under the same direction General Johnston has required a report from Colonel Forrest, detailing particularly the time and manner of his escape from Fort Donelson, the road he took, the number of enemies he met or saw in making his escape, and the difficulties which existed to prevent the remainder of the army from following the route taken by him in his escape with his command.

I give at once the additional information which seems to be asked for in the communication of the Secretary of War to which you refer.

The first charge is as follows:

The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to repel attacks.

I presume the general knew, before I was ordered to Fort Donelson, that neither the works nor the troops sent there could withstand the force which he knew the enemy had in hand and which could be brought speedily to that point. I knew perfectly well that if the whole force under General Johnston's command at Bowling Green had been sent to Fort Donelson it would prove utterly insufficient to repel the advance of the enemy up the Cumberland River. General Johnston's entire force, including the troops at Donelson, as I understood it, did not exceed 30,000 men. I knew what I believe everybody else did, for it was made public through the newspapers, that the enemy had in Kentucky alone one hundred and nineteen regiments, and that he had nearly if not quite as many at Cairo, Saint Louis, and the towns near the mouth of the Cumberland. It was also known that the enemy had unlimited means of transportation for concentrating troops. How, then, was it possible for General Johnston's whole army to meet that force, which was known to be moving towards the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers? The sequel proved that this information was correct, for not only were the troops occupying Kentucky sent up the Cumberland, but large additions were made to them from Missouri and Illinois, as stated by prisoners and by the official reports of their own commanders. I could not, under a sense of duty, call for re-enforcements, because the force under General Johnston was not strong enough to afford a sufficient number to hold the place. I consider the place illy chosen, out of position, and entirely indefensible by any re-enforcements which could be brought there to its support. It had but thirteen guns, and it turned out that but three of these were effective against iron-clad steamers. I thought the force already there sufficient for sacrifice, as well as enough to hold the place until Bowling Green could be evacuated, with its supplies and munitions of war. This I supposed to be the main object of the movement to Donelson, and the only good that could be effected by desperately holding that post with the entirely inadequate means in hand for defense of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.

With a less force than 50,000 men the position at Fort Donelson was, in my judgment, quite untenable, and even with that force it could have been held for only a short time, unless a force of 20,000 men was sup-



porting it at Clarksville and 25,000 more at least had been stationed at Nashville. While these were my own views and opinions, I nevertheless transmitted to General Johnston the exact state of affairs at the fort at every stage of the conflict.

My views and opinions upon the defense of Fort Donelson and the means of extricating the army from the trap in which necessity had thrown it there had been set forth in a letter addressed to the general from Clarksville before I received orders to go to Fort Donelson, bearing date of February 12. I annex a copy of that letter:

CLARKSVILLE, TENN., *February 12, 1862.*

General JOHNSTON:

SIR: There is but little known satisfactorily of the enemy or their movements; up to 10 o'clock last night all was quiet as usual at the fort. General Buckner is now there. I have thought the best disposition to make of the troops on this line was to concentrate the main force at Cumberland City, leaving at Fort Donelson enough to make all possible resistance to any attack which may be made upon the fort, but no more. The character of the country in the rear and to the left of the fort is such as to make it dangerous to concentrate our whole force there; for, if their gunboats should pass the fort and command the river, our troops would be in danger of being cut off by a force from the Tennessee. In this event their road would be open to Nashville, without any obstruction whatever. The position at Cumberland City is better; for there the railroad diverges from the river, which would afford some little facility for transportation in case of necessity; and from thence the open country southward towards Nashville is easily reached. Besides, from that point we threaten the flank of any force sent from the Tennessee against the fort. I am making every possible effort to concentrate the forces here at Cumberland City. I have been in the greatest dread ever since I reached this place at their scattered condition. The force is inadequate to defend a line of 40 miles in length, which can be attacked from three different directions. We can only be formidable by concentration. A strong guard is all that can be left here, and this no longer than your movement can be made. I shall begin to-day, if the engineers report favorably, to blockade the river at the piers of the railroad bridge. I have taken up an idea that a raft, secured against this bridge, can render the river impassable for the gunboats. If this is possible, it will be an immense relief to the movements above. I am quite sure this blockade can be made at a lower stage of water; but the present stage of water renders this experiment somewhat doubtful; still I will make every exertion to effect the blockade, if possible. I received by telegraph your authority to make any disposition of the troops which in my judgment was best, and acknowledged it by a dispatch immediately. I am acting accordingly.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

CHARGE 2.—The failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found to be untenable.

I have been unfortunate if I have failed to show in my report of the battle at Fort Donelson that the fight on February 15, outside of our intrenchments, was nothing but an attempt to save the army by evacuating the fort, which the position and numbers of the enemy had already rendered untenable. In my report of February 27 I attempted to explain why we left our intrenchments on the 15th to give battle and the object I had in view in doing so. I said:

I had already seen the impossibility of holding out for any length of time with our inadequate numbers and indefensible position. There was no place in our intrenchments but could be reached by the enemy's artillery from their boats or their batteries. It was but fair to infer that while they kept up a sufficient fire upon our intrenchments to keep our men from sleep and prevent repose, their object was merely to give time to pass a column above us on the river, both on the right and the left banks, and thus to cut off all our communications and to prevent the possibility of egress. I then saw clearly that but one course was left by which a rational hope could be entertained of saving the garrison or a part of it—that was to dislodge the enemy from his position on our left, and thus to pass our people into the open country lying southward towards Nashville.

Upon the failure of this enterprise, the causes of which are fully set forth in my report, it obviously became impossible to save the army by evac-

nating the post; the attempt to save the army had been made. I thought then, and still think, that a more earnest attempt could not have been made by an equal number of men to accomplish any enterprise by force of arms. To extricate the army then involved the necessity of another battle that night, more desperate than that of the morning, because the enemy had been greatly re-enforced, and held their former position with fresh troops. There is such a thing as human exhaustion, an end of physical ability in man to march and fight, however little such a contingency may seem possible to those who sleep quietly upon soft beds, who fare sumptuously every day, and have never tried the exposure of protracted battles and hard campaigns. This point had been reached by our men; the conflict, toil, and excitement of unsuspended battle, running through eighty-four hours, was enough to wear out the physical strength of any men; especially so when the greater part of the time they were exposed to a storm of sleet, snow, and continued frost, and opposed to a force five or six times greater than their own, without shelter or fire. Many of the men had been frost-bitten, and a great many were so overcome by fatigue and want of sleep as to be unable to keep open their eyes standing on their feet in the face and under the fire of the enemy. In fact, the men were totally out of condition to fight.

There were but two roads by which it was possible to retire. If they went by the upper road, they would certainly have a strong position of the enemy to cut through, besides having to march over the battle-field strewn with corpses; and if they retired by the lower road, they would have to wade through water 3 feet deep; which latter ordeal the medical director stated would be death to more than half of the command on account of the severity of the weather and their physical prostration. It was believed in council that the army could not retire without sacrificing three-fourths of it. The consultation which took place among the officers on the night of the 15th was to ascertain whether a further struggle could be maintained, and it was resolved in the negative unconditionally and emphatically. General Buckner, whose immediate command was the largest in the fort, was positive and unequivocal in his opinion that the fight could not be renewed. I confess I was myself strongly influenced by this opinion of General Buckner; for I have not yet seen an officer in whose superior military ability, clear, discriminating judgment, in whose calm, unflinching courage and unselfish patriotism I more fully confide than in his. The loss to the Confederacy of so able, brave, and accomplished a soldier is irreparable.

From my own knowledge of the condition of the men I thought that but few of them were in condition to encounter a night conflict; so the plan of renewing the battle was abandoned, and thus the necessity of surrender was prevented. All agreed that the necessity existed. That conclusion having been reached, nothing remained but to consider the manner of it, and that is fully set forth in my former report.

CHARGE 3.—Why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer, instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army.

The "abandonment of command" here imputed I suppose to mean the act of transferring to General Buckner, who was willing to execute it, the performance of the formalities of surrender. The surrender was a painful and inexorable necessity, which could not be avoided, and not a "measure deemed proper for the entire army." On the contrary, my proposition to take away as large a portion of the forces as possible met, I am sure, with the approbation of the whole council. One of the reasons which induced me to make this transfer to General Buckner was



in order that I might be untrammelled in the effort I was determined to make to extricate as many of the command as possible from the fort, to which object I devoted myself during the night of the 15th. So that I accomplished the fact of bringing off troops from the position, I thought little of the manner of doing so. All possibility of further fighting was over. Not another gun was to be fired; no personal risk was to be incurred; certain and absolute freedom from all personal danger was secured to those who surrendered; further danger, conflict, and toil could befall those only who should attempt to escape and those I chose to lead.

Nothing was to be done by those who remained but to hoist the white flag and to surrender. This I would not do, for the "measure" of surrender had not been thought of by myself or any officer present in the council as one proper for the "entire army." I suppose it to be an unquestionable principle of military action that in case of disaster it is better to save a part of a command than to lose the whole. The alternative proposition which I adopted in preference to surrendering the "entire army" was to make my way out of the beleaguered camp with such men as were still able to make another struggle, if it could be accomplished; and, if it could not be, then to take any consequences that did not involve a surrender.

CHARGE 5.—Upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments of the senior general's brigade, to whose use all the transportation on hand was appropriated.

The answer to this charge leads directly to that of the fourth, and I therefore respond first to this. I presume it is well established that a senior general can select any troops under his command for any service or purpose or plan he may choose to execute; and if the means were offered of extricating only a portion of men from a general surrender, I presume the selection of this portion would rest with him rather than with any other person or persons. This would be a sufficient answer to the charge in question, if I chose to rely upon it, which I do not. My real answer I will give fully. It is untrue that "all the transportation on hand was appropriated to certain regiments of the senior general's brigade." It is untrue that a selection was made of "particular troops." I am sure that quite as many men belonging to other brigades were provided with "means of escape" "by the transportation on hand" as were of the senior general's brigade.

Late at night it was ascertained that two steamboats would probably reach the landing before daylight. Then I determined to let Colonel Forrest's cavalry proceed on their march by the river road, which was impassable for anything but cavalry, on account of the backwater and overflow, while I would remain behind and endeavor to get away as many men as possible by the boats. The boats came a short time before daylight, when I hastened to the river and began to ferry the men over to the opposite shore as rapidly as possible.

The men were taken on indiscriminately as they came to the boats; but, in the first instance, more of the "senior general's brigade" were present than of other troops, from this circumstance, namely, that when I determined not to surrender, I caused my brigade to be drawn up in line and to await my final preparation for a forward movement. This was promptly done, and as they were nearest the left flank, where the fight would first begin, so likewise were they nearest to the river landing. From this circumstance it happened that the troops from my immediate command were among the first to enter the boats; but all the men from all portions of the army who were present and could be gotten on board were taken indiscriminately, as far as I had any knowledge. No man of the army was excluded to make room for my brigade. On the con-



frary, all who came were taken on board until some time after daylight, when I received a message from General Buckner that any further delay at the wharf would certainly cause the loss of the boat with all on board. Such was the want of all order and discipline by this time on shore that a wild rush was made at the boat, which the captain said would swamp her unless he pushed off immediately. This was done, and about sunrise the boat on which I was (the other having gone) left the shore and steered up the river. By this "precise mode" I effected my "escape," and after leaving the wharf the Department will be pleased to hear that I encountered no dangers whatever from the enemy.

I had announced in council my determination to take my own brigade and attempt a retreat; and this, I presume, is what is referred to in the charge of "selecting certain regiments of the senior general's brigade." I "selected" this command because they had been with me in the most trying service for seven months; had been repeatedly under fire; had been exposed to every hardship incident to a campaign; had never on any occasion flinched or faltered; had never uttered a complaint, and I knew were to be relied on for any enterprise that could be accomplished. In announcing this intention it was far from my purpose to exclude any troops who might think proper or might be physically able to join me in making the movement.

CHARGE 6.—A particular designation of the regiments saved and the regiments abandoned which formed a part of the senior general's brigade.

My brigade consisted of the Thirty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, the Fiftieth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, the Fifty-first Regiment Virginia Volunteers, the Fifty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, and the Twentieth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers. No one of these regiments was either wholly saved or wholly left. I could obtain no reports from regiments until I arrived at Murfreesborough. There our morning reports show the aggregate of each regiment present respectively to have been: Of the Thirty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, 243; Fiftieth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, 285; Fifty-first Regiment Virginia Volunteers, 274; Fifty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, 184. The Twentieth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers handed in no report at Murfreesborough, and what there was of it was ordered away by General Johnston; but I am informed that their morning report will show over 300 as present. These reports were made before those who had been ferried over the river at Donelson had come up.

A considerable number of men from each of these regiments were "saved" and many of each were left behind. Of my own brigade, a great many who were left effected their escape by every means they could command and joined their regiments and companies, except the Twentieth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, which, by General Johnston's order, was detached and sent home to recruit. This regiment, at the last accounts I had of it, immediately after the fight of Fort Donelson, numbered, as already stated, about 300 men; but I have no accurate information on the subject. The loss I felt most seriously was that of my three artillery companies of Virginia troops,\* so remarkable for their efficiency and real gallantry, who had followed me so faithfully throughout my service in Virginia, and who fought so bravely during the whole of the trying conflict at Donelson.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD, *Brig. Gen., U. S. A.*

PETER OTEY, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

\*It has been impossible to identify these batteries; they were probably French's, Guy's, and Jackson's.

## No. 49.

*Report of Col. Gabriel C. Wharton, Fifty-first Virginia Infantry, commanding First Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FLOYD'S DIVISION,  
*Camp near Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 22, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the participation of this brigade in the engagement at Fort Donelson:

The advance of the brigade, the Fifty-first Regiment Virginia Volunteers, reached Dover, 1 mile from the fort, about 11 p. m. on Friday, the 7th, and immediately reported to Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson, who was then in command, and was ordered to encamp near the wharf.

About 4 p. m. on the 8th the Fifty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers arrived and was ordered to encamp near the Fifty-first. From Saturday to Wednesday following there was skirmishing between our cavalry picket and the enemy.

On Wednesday our pickets were driven in and the enemy reported advancing in force. The brigade was then ordered to take position on the left of Brigadier-General Buckner's division and near the center of our line of defense. Soon after taking position, the enemy commenced to throw shot and shell, which did no execution. Captain Porter's battery was then ordered to take the position which had been assigned to this brigade, and we were ordered to the support of the left wing, commanded by Brigadier-General Johnson. We were engaged during the evening and night in constructing breastworks and rifle pits.

During Thursday we were under a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries. There were also frequent engagements with the infantry, in all of which the enemy were repulsed. Thursday night we remained again in the ditches.

On Friday there was skirmishing with the infantry and sharpshooters; occasionally sharp firing from the batteries. On Friday evening occurred the terrific cannonading between the gunboats and the fort, some of the shells from the boats exploding in and near our lines, but doing no injury.

On Saturday morning, at 4 o'clock, the brigade was withdrawn from the ditches and placed in line, by order of Brigadier-General Pillow, to make an attack on the enemy's extreme right flank. Colonel Baldwin's brigade was placed in advance; this brigade followed next. About 6 o'clock the column was put in motion. We had scarcely passed beyond the line of our defense when the skirmishers of Colonel Baldwin's brigade engaged the enemy's pickets, and in a few minutes the engagement became general. We were then ordered to deploy and advance, which was done with spirit and promptness. The enemy, after a very obstinate resistance, was forced to retire, but were either rallied or re-enforced on the several ridges, from which they were again and again driven. Our men, cheering as they charged, pursued them nearly 2 miles, when orders were received that we should retire to our intrenchments. The brigade was very much exhausted, having been under fire or in the ditches for more than four days.

The loss of the Fifty-first was 9 killed, 43 wounded, and 5 missing. Of the Fifty-sixth, 8 were killed, 37 wounded, and 115 missing.

Lieut. Col. J. M. Massie commanded the Fifty-first Regiment; his bearing was most chivalric and gallant. Capt. G. W. Davis gallantly led the Fifty-sixth Regiment. Lieut. August Forsberg, attached to the brigade as engineer officer, rendered very efficient service in rallying

and leading the men, and throughout the day distinguished himself for gallantry and acts of daring. To mention the many individual instances of heroism and daring would too much lengthen this report; therefore suffice it to say that all the officers and men of both regiments behaved with commendable coolness and bravery.

Capt. Samuel H. Newberry, Lieutenants Henderson and Painter, of the Fifty-first, were wounded. Captain Dabney C. Harrison, of the Fifty-sixth, was mortally wounded while leading his men to a charge. Lieutenants Ferguson and Haskins were also wounded.

A number of improved arms were captured and brought to camp.

On Sunday morning, the 16th, brigade was ordered from Fort Donelson to Nashville, where valuable service was rendered in guarding and shipping Government stores.

Thursday, the 20th, the brigade was ordered to this place, where we are now encamped.

Respectfully submitted.

G. C. WILARTON,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. JOHN B. FLOYD.

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No. 50.

*Report of Col. John McCausland, Thirty-sixth Virginia Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, FLOYD'S DIVISION,  
*Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 23, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the action of this brigade, February 13, 14, and 15, in the engagement near Fort Donelson between the Confederate States forces and the United States forces under General Grant:

On the morning of the 13th I received your orders to proceed at once from Cumberland City to Fort Donelson, where we arrived at daylight and were at once ordered to the trenches. This brigade was posted as a support to Green's battery, on the left wing. During the entire day the enemy kept up an incessant fire of shot and shell upon the battery and its support. The men and officers behaved well under the circumstances, and soon became accustomed to the firing. There were 5 men wounded during the day.

On the 14th there was continued skirmishing, with artillery and musketry. About 2 p. m. the gunboats commenced a heavy bombardment of the fort, the shells passing over and taking the line of works in reverse, and many passing over and through this brigade. However, we suffered no loss, and gathered several large shell—64-pounders, I think. About dark another battery was posted in front of our position, and during the night it was placed behind a good earthwork thrown up by the men.

About midnight I received orders to concentrate my brigade near the left wing, which was done promptly, and at daylight on the morning of the 15th the column, under General Pillow, sallied from the left and engaged the enemy in a short space of time. This brigade was a reserve for Colonel Baldwin's brigade, but, the enemy pressing his right, I at once moved up to his support and engaged the enemy posted in thick undergrowth and in a rough and rolling country. I ordered the firing



to commence as soon as the enemy was in sight. They were advancing just in front of the Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiment. They in a short time were checked, and then I ordered a charge upon them. The men came up with a shout and charged the enemy, routed and pursued him for 2 miles, when we were called back by order of General Pillow.

The Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiment had 14 killed and 46 wounded, and the Fiftieth Virginia Regiment had 10 killed and 40 wounded.

On Sunday morning this brigade was ferried across the river, and are now arriving at this camp.

Lieutenant-Colonel [L. W.] Reid was wounded about the close of the action. He and Major [Thomas] Smith behaved gallantly during the day; in fact, men and officers all behaved well. We captured 1 field gun and 200 Enfield muskets.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. McCAUSLAND,  
*Commanding Second Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. JOHN B. FLOYD.

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No. 51.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow, C. S. Army, with resulting correspondence.*

COLUMBIA, TENN., *February 18, 1862.*

On the 9th instant General A. S. Johnston ordered me to proceed to Fort Donelson and take command of that post. On the 10th instant I arrived at that place.

In detailing the operations of the forces under my command at Fort Donelson it is proper to state the condition of that work and of the forces constituting its garrison. When I arrived I found the work on the river battery unfinished and wholly too weak to resist the force of heavy artillery. I found a 10-inch columbiad and a 32-pounder rifled gun which had not been mounted. Deep gloom was hanging over the command, and the troops were greatly depressed and demoralized by the circumstances attending the surrender of Fort Henry and the manner of retiring from that place.

My first attention was given to the necessity of strengthening this work, mounting the two heavy guns, and to the construction of defensive works to protect the rear of the river battery. I imparted to the work all the energy which it was possible to do, working day and night with the whole command. The battery was without a competent number of artillerists, and those that were there were not well instructed in the use of their guns.

To provide for this want I placed the artillery companies under active course of instruction in the use of their guns. I detailed Captain Ross, with his company of light artillerists, to the command of one of the river batteries. These heavy guns being mounted and provision made for working them, and a proper supply of ammunition having been procured by my orders from Nashville, I felt myself prepared to test the effect of the fire of heavy metal against the enemy's gunboats, though the work stood much in need of more heavy pieces.

The armament of the batteries consisted of eight 32-pounders, three 32-pounder carronades, one 10-inch columbiad, and one rifled gun of 32-pounder caliber.

The selection of the site for the work was an unfortunate one. While its command of the river was favorable, the site was commanded by the heights above and below on the river and by a continuous range of hills all around the works to its rear. A field work of very contracted dimensions had been constructed by the garrison to protect the battery; but the field works were commanded by the hills already referred to, and lay open to a fire of artillery from every direction except from the hills below.

To guard against the effects of fire of artillery from these heights a line of defensive works, consisting of rifle pits and abatis for infantry, detached on our right but continuous on our left, with defenses for our light artillery, were laid off by Major Gilmer, engineer, of General A. S. Johnston's staff (but on duty with me at the post), around the rear of the battery and on the heights from which artillery could reach our battery and inner field work, enveloping the inner work and the town of Dover, where our principal supplies of commissary and quartermaster's stores were in depot.

These works, pushed with the utmost possible energy, were not quite completed, nor were my troops all in position, though nearly so, when Brigadier-General Floyd, my senior officer, reached that station. The works were laid off with great judgment and skill by Major Gilmer, and were well executed and designed for the defense of the rear of the work; the only objection being to the length of the line, which, however, was unavoidable from the surroundings. The length of the line and the inadequacy of the force for its defense was a source of embarrassment throughout the struggle which subsequently ensued in the defense of the position.

I had placed Brigadier-General Buckner in command of the right wing and Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson in command of the left. By extraordinary efforts we had barely got these works in defensible condition when the enemy made an advance in force around and against the entire line of outer works.

#### THE BATTLE OF THE TRENCHES.

The assault was commenced by the enemy's artillery against the center of our left wing, which was promptly responded to by Captain Green's battery of field artillery. After several hours of firing between the artillery of the two armies the enemy's infantry advanced to the conflict all along the line, which was kept up and increased in volume from one end of the line to the other for several hours, when at last the enemy made a vigorous assault against the right of our left wing, the position assaulted being a height commanded by Col. A. Heiman and defended by his brigade, consisting of the Tenth Tennessee, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. MacGavock, Colonel [W. M.] Voorhies', Colonel [A. A.] Hughes',\* and Colonel [J. W.] Head's regiments Tennessee Volunteers, and defended by Captain [Frank] Maney's field battery.

This assault was vigorously made and the position as vigorously defended, and resulted in the repulse of the enemy here and everywhere around the line. The result of the day's work pretty well tested the strength of our defensive line, and established beyond question the gallantry of the entire command, all of which fought gallantly their portion of the line.

The loss sustained by our forces in this engagement was not large, our men being mostly under shelter in the rifle pits; but we neverthe-

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\* Hughes' regiment was the Twenty-seventh Alabama.



less had quite a number killed and wounded, but owing to the continued fighting which followed it was impossible to get any official report of the casualties of the day.

On the same day our battery on the river was engaged with one of the enemy's gunboats, which occasioned quite a lively cannonading for more than an hour, in which the gallant Capt. Joseph Dixon, of the Engineer Corps, was killed instantly at the battery. This officer had been on duty for some months at the post, and had shown great energy and professional skill, and by his gallant bearing on that day, while directing the operations of the day, under my orders, had justly earned for himself high distinction. His death was a serious loss to the service and was a source of no little embarrassment in our after operations.

On the 12th [13th] we had quiet, but we saw the smoke of a large number of gunboats and steamboats a short distance below. We also received reliable information of the arrival of a large number of new troops, greatly increasing the strength of the enemy's forces, already said to be from 20,000 to 30,000 strong.

#### BATTLE WITH THE GUNBOATS.

On the 13th [14th] these re-enforcements were seen advancing to their position in the line of investment, and while this was being done six of the enemy's iron-cased gunboats were seen advancing up the river, five of which were abreast and in line of battle and the sixth some distance to the rear. When these gunboats arrived within a mile and a half of our battery they opened fire on it.

My orders to the officers (Captains Shuster and Standewitz [Stankiewitz or Starkovitch],\* who commanded the lower battery of eight guns, and Captain Ross, who commanded the upper battery of four guns), were to hold their fire until the enemy's boats should come within point-blank range of their guns. This they did, though the ordeal of holding their fire while the enemy's shot and shell fell thick around their position was a severe restraint to their patriotic impulses; but, nevertheless, our batteries made no response until the enemy's gunboats got within range of their guns. Our entire line of batteries then opened fire. The guns of both parties were well served, the enemy constantly advancing, delivering direct fire against our batteries from his line of five gunboats, while the sixth boat, moving up in rear of the line, kept the air filled with shells, which fell thick and close around the position of our batteries.

The fight continued, the enemy steadily advancing slowly up the river, the shot and shell from fifteen heavy rifled guns tearing our parapets and plunging deep into the earth around and over our batteries for nearly two hours and until his boats had reached within the distance of 150 yards of our batteries. Having come in such close conflict, I could distinctly see the effects of our shot upon his iron-cased boats. We had given two or three well-directed shots from the heavy guns to one of his boats, when she instantly shrank back and drifted helpless below the line. Several shot struck another boat, tearing her iron case and splintering her timbers and making them crack as if by a stroke of lightning, when she, too, fell back. Then a third received several severe shots, making her metal ring and her timbers crack, when the whole line gave way and fell rapidly back from our fire until they passed out of range.

Thus ended the first severe and close conflict of our heavy guns with the enemy's gunboats, testing their strength and the power of our heavy guns to resist them. The shot from our 32-pounder guns produced but

\* Probably Stankieuriz.



little effect. They struck and rebounded, apparently doing but little damage; but I am satisfied, by close observation, that the timbers of the frame-work did not and could not withstand the shock of the 10-inch columbiad or 32 pounder rifled gun.

These gunboats never renewed the attack. I learned from citizens living on the river below that one of the injured boats sank and that the others had to be towed to Cairo. This information may or may not be true, but it is certain that all of the boats were repulsed and driven back after a most vigorous and determined attack, and that two of the boats were badly damaged and a third more or less injured.

It is difficult to overestimate the gallant bearing and heroic conduct of the officers and men of our batteries who so well and so persistently fought our guns until the enemy's determined advance brought his boats and guns into such close and desperate conflict. Where all did their duty so well it is almost impossible to discriminate. The captains already named and their lieutenants (whose names, for want of official reports, I cannot give) all deserve the highest commendation. Lieut. George S. Martin, whose company is at Columbus, Ky., but who was ordered to that post by Major-General Polk, commanded one of the guns, particularly attracted my attention by his energy and the judgment with which he fought his gun. The wadding of his gun having given out, he pulled off his coat and rammed it down his gun as wadding, and thus kept up the fire until the enemy were finally repulsed.

On the evening of this day we received information of the arrival of additional re-enforcements of infantry, cavalry, and light artillery by steamboat, all of which were disembarked a short distance below our position.

#### BATTLE OF DOVER.

On the 14th instant the enemy were busy throwing his forces of every arm around us, extending his line of investment entirely around our position and completely enveloping us.

On the evening of this day we ascertained that the enemy had received by steamboat additional re-enforcements. We were now surrounded by an immense force, said by prisoners whom we had taken to amount to fifty-two regiments, and every road and possible avenue of departure cut off, with the certainty that our sources of supply by river could soon be cut off by the enemy's batteries placed upon the river above us.

At a meeting of general officers, called by General Floyd, it was determined unanimously to give the enemy battle next day at daylight, so as to cut open a route of exit for our troops to the interior of the country, and thus save our army. We had knowledge that the principal portion of the enemy's forces were massed in encampment in front of the extreme left of our position, commanding the two roads leading to the interior, one of which we must take in retiring from our position.

We knew he had massed in encampment another large force on the Wynn's Ferry road, opposite the center of our left wing, while still another was massed nearly in front of the left of our right wing, his fresh arrival of troops being encamped on the bank of the river two miles and a half below us, from which latter encampment a stream of fresh troops were constantly pouring around us on his line of investment, and strengthening his general encampment on the extreme right. At each of his encampments and on each road he had in position a battery of field artillery and 24-pounder iron guns on siege carriages. Between these encampments on the roads was a thick undergrowth of brush and

black-jack, making it impossible to advance or maneuver any considerable body of troops.

The plan of attack agreed upon and directed by General Floyd to be executed was that, with the main body of the forces defending our left wing, I should attack the right wing of the enemy, occupying and resting on the heights reaching to the bank of the river, accompanied by Colonel Forrest's brigade of cavalry; that General Buckner, with the forces under his command, and defending the right of our line, should strike the enemy's encampment and forces on the Wynn's Ferry road; that the forces under Colonel Heiman should hold his position, and that each command should leave in the trenches troops to hold the trenches. In this order of battle it was easy to be seen that if my attack was successful and the enemy was routed his retreat would be along his line of investment towards the Wynn's Ferry encampment, and thence towards his reserve, at the gunboats below. In other words, my success would roll the enemy's force in retreat over upon General Buckner, when by his attack in flank and rear we could cut up the enemy and put him completely to rout.

Accordingly dispositions were made to attack the enemy. At 5 o'clock on the morning of the 15th I moved out of my position to engage the enemy. In less than one-half hour our forces were engaged. The enemy was prepared to receive me in advance of his encampment, and he did receive me before I had assumed a line of battle and while I was moving against him without any formation for the engagement. For the first half hour of the engagement I was much embarrassed in getting the command in position properly to engage the enemy. Having extricated myself from the position and fairly engaged the enemy, we fought him for nearly two hours before I made any decided advance upon him. He contested the field most stubbornly.

The loss of both armies on this portion of the field was heavy—the enemy's particularly so, as I discovered by riding over the field after the battle. The enemy, having been forced to yield this portion of the field, retired slowly towards the Wynn's Ferry road—Buckner's point of attack.

The fight was hotly contested and stubborn on both sides, and consumed the day till 12 o'clock to drive the enemy as far back as the center, where General Buckner's command was to flank him. While my command was slowly advancing and driving back the enemy, I was anxiously expecting to hear General Buckner's command open fire in his rear, which, not taking place, I was apprehensive of some misapprehension of orders, and came from the field of battle within the work to ascertain what was the matter. I there found the command of General Buckner massed behind the ridge within the work, taking shelter from the enemy's artillery on the Wynn's Ferry road, it having been forced to retire before the battery, as I learned from him. My force was still slowly advancing, driving the enemy towards the battery. I directed General Buckner immediately to move his command around to the rear of the battery, turning its left, keeping in the hollow, and attack and carry it. Before the movement was executed my forces, forming the attacking party on the right, with Colonel Forrest's regiment of cavalry, had reached the position of the battery. Colonel Forrest's cavalry gallantly charged a large body of infantry supporting the battery, driving it and forcing the battery to retire, and taking six pieces of artillery—four brass pieces and two 24-pounder iron pieces.

In pursuing the enemy, falling back from this position, General Buckner's forces became united with mine, and engaged the enemy in a hot

contest of nearly an hour, with large forces of fresh troops that had now met us. This position of the enemy being carried by our joint forces, I called off the further pursuit, after seven and a half hours of continuous and bloody conflict. After the troops were called off from the pursuit, orders were immediately given to the different commands to form and retire to their original position in the intrenchments.

The operations of the day had forced the entire command of the enemy around to our right and in front of General Buckner's position in the intrenchments, and when he reached his position he found the enemy advancing rapidly to take possession of his portion of our works. He had a stubborn conflict, lasting one and a half hours, to regain his position, and the enemy actually got possession of the extreme right of his works, and held them so firmly that he could not dislodge him.

The position thus gained by the enemy was a most important and commanding one, being immediately in rear of our river batteries and field work for its protection. From it he could readily turn the intrenched work occupied by General Buckner and attack him in reverse, or he could advance, under cover of an intervening ridge, directly upon our battery and field work. While the enemy held the position it was manifest we could not hold the main work or battery.

Such was the condition of the two armies at night-fall, after nine hours of conflict, on the 15th instant, in which our loss was severe, and leaving not less than 1,000 of the enemy dead upon the field. We left upon the field nearly all of his wounded, because we could not remove them. We left his dead unburied, because we could not bury them. Such carnage and conflict has perhaps never before occurred on this continent. We took about 300 prisoners and a large number of arms.

We had fought the battle to open the way for our army and to relieve us from an investment which would necessarily reduce us and the position we occupied by famine. We had accomplished our object, but it occupied the whole day, and before we could prepare to leave, after taking in the wounded and dead, the enemy had thrown around us again in the night an immense force of fresh troops and reoccupied his original position in the line of investment, thus again cutting off our retreat. We had only about 13,000 troops all told; of these we had lost a large proportion in the three battles. The command had been in the trenches night and day for five days, exposed to the snow, sleet, mud, and ice-water, without shelter and without adequate covering and without sleep. In this condition the general officers held a consultation, to determine what we should do. General Buckner gave it as his decided opinion that he could not hold his position a half hour against an assault of the enemy, and said he was satisfied the enemy would attack him at daylight the next morning. The proposition was then made by the undersigned to again fight our way through the enemy's line and cut our way out. General Buckner said his command was so worn-out and cut to pieces and demoralized that he could not make another fight; that it would cost the command three-fourths its present numbers to cut its way out; that it was wrong to sacrifice three-fourths of a command to save one-fourth, and that no officer had a right to cause such a sacrifice. General Floyd and Major Gilmer I understood to concur in this opinion. I then expressed the opinion that we could hold out another day, and in that time we could get steamboats and set the command over the river and probably save a large portion of it. To this General Buckner replied that the enemy would certainly attack him in the morning and that he could not hold his position a half hour.

The alternative of these propositions was a surrender of the position



and command. General Floyd said he would not surrender the command nor would he surrender himself a prisoner. I had taken the same position. General Buckner said he was satisfied nothing else could be done, and that therefore he would surrender the command, if placed in command. General Floyd said he would turn over the command to him, if he could be allowed to withdraw his command. To this General Buckner consented. Thereupon the command was turned over to me, I passing it instantly to General Buckner, saying I would neither surrender the command nor myself. I directed Colonel Forrest to cut his way out.

Under these circumstances General Buckner accepted the command and sent a flag of truce to the enemy for an armistice of six hours, to negotiate for terms of capitulation. Before this flag and communication were delivered I retired from the garrison.

Before closing my report of the operations of the army at Donelson I must, in justice to the officers and commands under my immediate command, say that harder fighting or more gallant conduct in officers and men I have never witnessed. In the absence of official reports of brigade and regimental commanders, of which I am deprived by the circumstances detailed in this report, I may not be able to do justice to the different corps. I will say, however, that the forces under my immediate command during the action bore themselves most gallantly throughout the long and bloody conflict. I speak with especial commendation of the brigades commanded by Colonels [Wm. E.] Baldwin, [G. C.] Wharton, [John] McCausland, [J. M.] Simonton, and [Joseph] Drake, and of Captains Maney and Green, who fought their guns under the constant and annoying fire of the enemy's sharpshooters and of the concentrated fire from his field batteries, from which both commands suffered severely. Captain Maney was himself wounded, and had several lieutenants killed and wounded and many of his company killed and wounded; so did Captains Porter and Graves. If I should hereafter receive the reports of regimental and brigade commanders, giving me detailed information of the conduct and bearing of officers and men, I will make a supplemental report.

The absence of official reports deprives me of the means of giving lists of the killed and wounded of the different commands. I am satisfied that in such a series of conflicts our loss was heavy. I know the enemy's was, from passing over the field of battle in the evening, immediately after the battle, in company with General Floyd. His loss in killed was terrible, exceeding anything I have ever seen upon a battlefield.

Our total force in the field did not exceed 10,000 men, while, from what I saw of the enemy's force and from information derived from many prisoners of the enemy, we are sure he had between 30,000 and 40,000 men in the field.

I must acknowledge many obligations to Major Gilmer, engineer, for especial and valuable services rendered me in laying off these works and the energy displayed by him in directing their construction, and for his counsel and advice. I likewise acknowledge my obligations to Capt. Gus. A. Henry, jr., my assistant adjutant-general; to Col. John C. Burch, my aide-de-camp; to Major Field, to Lieutenant Nicholson, to Lieut. Charles F. Martin, and Colonel Brandon, my volunteer aides-de-camp; to Major Haynes, my assistant commissary, and Major Jones, my assistant quartermaster, for the prompt manner in which they executed my orders under trying circumstances throughout the long and continued conflicts, and to Major Gilmer, who accompanied me to the field and was

on duty with me during the entire day; also to Captain Parker, of my staff, whom I assigned to the command of Captain Ross' field battery, with new recruits as gunners, and who fought and served them well. The conduct of these officers, coming under my immediate attention and observation, met my hearty approval and commendation. Colonel Brandon was severely wounded early in the action.

Colonel Baldwin's brigade constituted the front of the attacking force, sustained immediately by Colonel Wharton's brigade. These two brigades deserve especial commendation for the manner in which they sustained the first shock of battle, and, under circumstances of great embarrassment, threw themselves into position and followed up the conflict throughout the day. Being mostly with these two brigades, I can speak from personal knowledge of the gallant conduct and bearing of the two brigade commanders, Colonels Baldwin and Wharton. I must also acknowledge my obligations to Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson, who assisted me in the command of the forces with which I attacked the enemy and who bore himself gallantly throughout the conflict; but having received no official report from him, I cannot give the detailed operations of his command.

I have pleasure in being able to say that Colonel Forrest, whose command greatly distinguished its commander as a bold and judicious commander, and reflected distinguished honor upon itself, passed safely through the enemy's line of investment, and trust it will yet win other honors in defense of our rights and just cause of our country.

GID. J. PILLOW,

*Brigadier General, U. S. Army.*

Capt. CLARENCE DERRICK.

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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#### HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION,

*Decatur, Ala., March 14, 1862.*

The position we occupied was invested on February 11 by a force which we estimated to be about 20,000 strong. This force had approached us partly by water, but mainly by land, from Fort Henry. I considered the force we had sufficient to repulse the assault of this force. We repulsed everywhere a vigorous assault made by the enemy against our position.

Fresh troops, however, continued [to arrive] every day by water until the 14th. We are satisfied the enemy's forces were not short of 30,000 men. Our impressions of his strength were confirmed by information derived from prisoners we had taken on that day. That evening the enemy landed thirteen steamboat loads of fresh troops.

It was now manifest we could not long maintain our position against such overwhelming numbers. I was satisfied that their last troops were of General Buell's command. We felt the want of re-enforcements, but did not ask for them, because we knew they were not to be had. I had just come from Bowling Green, and knew that General Johnston could not spare a man from his position; he had, in fact, already so weakened himself that he could not have maintained his position against a vigorous assault. Under these circumstances, deeming it utterly useless to apply for re-enforcements, we determined to make the best possible defense with the force in hand.

Our investment by a force of 30,000 men on the 14th being completed, and the enemy on that evening having received thirteen boat loads of fresh troops, a council of general officers was convened by General Floyd,



at which it was determined to give the enemy battle at daylight next day, so as to cut up the investing force, if possible, before the fresh troops were in position.

In that council I proposed, as the plan of attack, that with the force in the intrenchments of our left wing and Colonel [R. W.] Hanson's regiment, of General Buckner's division, I would attack the enemy's main force on his right, and, if successful, that would roll the enemy on his line of investment to a point opposite General Buckner's position, when he would attack him in flank and rear, and drive him with our united commands back upon his encampments at the river.

To this proposition, so far as allowing me to have Colonel Hanson's regiment, General Buckner objected, and I waived the point, saying I only asked the assistance of that regiment because my portion of the labor to be performed was by far the greatest, and that upon my success depended the fortunes of the day, and that a very large portion of the force I had to fight were fresh troops and badly armed.

General Buckner then proposed, as a modification of my plan of battle, that he should attack the enemy simultaneously with my attack; that his attack should be against the position on the Wynn's Ferry road, where he had a battery nearly opposite the center of the left wing, and that he would thus lessen the labors for my command and strike the enemy in a more vital point. To this modification I agreed, as an improvement upon my proposed plan.

In carrying out this plan thus agreed upon it became proper for Colonel Heiman's brigade to maintain its position in the line, otherwise the enemy might turn the right of General Buckner's position and take his forces on the right flank, and thus defeat our success. It was arranged accordingly.

General Floyd approved this plan of battle and ordered that it should be carried out next morning at daylight. I then sent for all the commanders of brigades, to explain to them our situation (being invested), our purpose and plan of battle, and to assign to each brigade its position in my column; all of which was done, and I gave orders to have my whole force under arms at 4.30 o'clock and to be ready to march out of our works precisely at 5 o'clock.

At 4 o'clock I was with my command, all of which was in position, except Colonel Davidson's brigade, none of which was present. I immediately directed General B. R. Johnson, who was present, and to whose immediate command Colonel Davidson's brigade belonged, to dispatch officers for that brigade, and to ascertain the cause of its delay. He did so. I likewise sent several officers of my staff upon the same duty. Both sets of officers made the same report, viz, that Colonel Davidson had failed to give any orders to the colonels of his brigade, and that Colonel Davidson was sick. It is proper to state that he was complaining of being unwell when the orders were received. The instructions to the brigade commanders were given about 2 o'clock that morning. My command was delayed in its advance about half an hour by the necessity of bringing up this brigade.

My column was finally ready and put in motion about 5.15 o'clock. I moved with the advance, and directed General B. R. Johnson to bring up the rear. The command of Colonel Davidson's brigade devolved upon Colonel Simonton, which, owing to the reasons already stated, was brought into column in the rear and into action last, under General Johnson, to whose report for its good behavior on the field I particularly refer, having in my original report omitted to state its position on the field.



Many of these incidents, not deemed essential to the proper understanding of the main features of the battle of February 15, were omitted in my original report, but are now given as parts of its history. In my original report I gave the after operations in the battle of February 15, and shall now pass over all the events occurring until the council of general officers, held on the night of the 15th. The lodgment of the enemy's force in the rifle pits of General Buckner's extreme right, late in the evening of the 15th of February, induced General Floyd to call a meeting of general officers at my headquarters on that night.

We had fought the battle of the 15th to open the way through the enemy's line of investment to retire to the interior. The battle had occupied the day, and we were until about 12 o'clock that night bringing in the wounded. At about 1 o'clock we had all the commanders of regiments and brigades assembled, and given orders to the entire command to be under arms at 4 o'clock, to march out on the road leading towards Charlotte. I had given instructions to Major Haynes, my commissary, and Major Jones, my quartermaster, immediately after our evacuation of the place to burn all their stores.

About 3 o'clock (perhaps a little earlier) we received intelligence from the troops in the trenches that they heard dogs barking around on the outside of our lines and they thought the enemy were reinvesting our position. General Floyd immediately directed me to send out scouts to ascertain the fact. This duty was performed; when the scouts returned they reported the enemy in large force occupying his original positions and closing up the routes to the interior. Not being satisfied with the truth of the report, I directed Colonel Forrest to send out a second set of scouts, and at the same time directed him to send two intelligent men up the bank of the river, to examine a valley of overflowed ground lying to the rear and right of the enemy's position, and if the valley of overflowed ground could be crossed by infantry and cavalry, and to ascertain if the enemy's forces reached the river bank.

The one set of scouts returned and confirmed the previous reports, viz, that the woods were full of the enemy, occupying all of his previous positions in great numbers. The scouts sent up the river to examine the overflow reported that the overflowed valley was not practicable for infantry; that the soft mud was about half-leg deep, and that the water was about saddle-skirt deep to the horses, and that there was a good deal of drift in the way. We then sent for a citizen, whose name is not remembered, said to know that part of the country well, and asked his opinion. He confirmed the reports of the river scouts. In addition to the depth of the water, the weather was intensely cold. Many of the troops were frost-bitten, and they could not have stood a passage through a sheet of water.

With these facts all before Generals Floyd, Buckner, and myself (the two former having remained at my quarters all the intervening while), General Floyd said: "Well, gentlemen, what is best now to be done?" Neither General Buckner nor myself having answered promptly, General Floyd repeated his inquiry, addressing himself to me by name. My reply was that it was difficult to determine what was best to be done, but that I was in favor of cutting our way out. He then asked General Buckner what he thought we ought to do. General Buckner said his command was so worn down, cut up, and demoralized that he could not make another fight; that he thought we would lose three-fourths of the command we had left in cutting our way out, and that it was wrong; that no officer had the right to sacrifice three-fourths of the command to save one-fourth; that we had fought the enemy from the trenches, we

had fought his gunboats, and had fought him in the open field, to cut our way through his line of investment; that we were again invested with an immense force of fresh troops; that the army had done all it was possible to do, and that duty and honor required no more. General Floyd then remarked that his opinion coincided with General Buckner's.

Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson had previously retired from the council to his quarters in the field, and was not present. In my original report I stated it was my impression Major Gilmer was consulted, and concurred in the opinion of Generals Buckner and Floyd; but, from subsequent conversation with Major Gilmer, I learned from him that he had retired to another room and laid down, and was not present at this part of the conference; and I am therefore satisfied that I was mistaken in the statement in regard to him.

The proposition to cut our way out being thus disposed of, I remarked that we could hold our position another day and fight the enemy from our trenches; that by night our steamboats that had taken off the prisoners and our mounted men would return; that during the next night we could set our troops on the right bank of the river, and that we could make our escape by Clarksville, and thus save the army.

To this proposition General Buckner said: "Gentlemen, you know the enemy occupy the rifle pits on my right, and can easily turn my position and attack me in rear or move down on the river battery. I am satisfied he will attack me at daylight, and I cannot hold my position half an hour." Regarding General Buckner's reply as settling this proposition in the negative—for I had quite enough to do with my heavy losses in the battle of the previous day to defend my own portion of the line and I could give him no re-enforcements—I then said: "Gentlemen, if we cannot cut our way out nor fight on there is no alternative left us but capitulation, and I am determined that I will never surrender the command nor will I ever surrender myself a prisoner. I will die first." General Floyd remarked that that was his determination; that he would die before he would do either. General Buckner said that such determination was personal, and that personal considerations should never influence official action. General Floyd said he acknowledged it was personal with him, but nevertheless such was his determination. Thereupon General Buckner said that, being satisfied that nothing else could be done, if he was placed in command he would surrender the command and would take the fate of the command.

General Floyd immediately said: "General Buckner, I place you in command; will you permit me to draw out my brigade?" General Buckner promptly replied: "Yes, provided you do so before the enemy act upon my communication." General Floyd immediately remarked: "General Pillow, I turn over the command." I replied instantly: "I pass it." General Buckner said: "I assume it; bring on a bugler, pen, ink, and paper." General Buckner had received pen, ink, and paper, and sat down to the table and commenced writing, when I left and crossed the river, passing outside the garrison before General Buckner prepared his communication to the enemy, and went to Clarksville, by land, on horseback.

I did not know what he had written until I saw the published correspondence with General Grant. It may be asked if I was in favor of cutting our way out, why, when the command was turned over to me, I did not take it out. My reply is that, though technically speaking the command devolved on me when turned over by General Floyd, it was turned over to General Buckner in point of fact. All parties so under-

stood it. In proof of this, General Floyd, under his agreement with General Buckner, actually withdrew with a large portion of his brigade by setting them across the river in the steamer General Anderson, that arrived just before daylight. In further proof of this I embody in this report an order of General Buckner's to General B. R. Johnson after he had assumed command.

The following is a copy of the order:

HEADQUARTERS, Dover, Tenn., February 16, 1862.

SIR: The command of the forces in this vicinity has devolved upon me by order of General Floyd. I have sent a flag to General Grant, and during the correspondence and until further orders refrain from hostile demonstrations with a view to preventing a like movement on the enemy's part. You will endeavor to send a flag to the posts in front of your position, notifying them of the fact that I have sent a communication to General Grant from the right of our position, and desire to know his present headquarters.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

In addition to this, General Floyd was my senior, and of high character and acknowledged ability. General Buckner, though my junior in rank, possessed high reputation as an officer of talent and experience. With the judgment of both against my position, if I had acted upon my own convictions and had failed or involved the command in heavy loss, I was apprehensive it would be regarded as an act of rashness, and brought upon me the censure of the Government and the condemnation of the country. Besides, without their assistance in command and with the moral weight of their opinions with the troops against the step, I did not regard it practicable to make a successful effort to cut out. I declined to assume command when turned over by General Floyd, because it was against my convictions of duty to surrender the command, and under the decision of Generals Floyd and Buckner (a majority of the council) I could do nothing but surrender it. It is proper to say that the difference of opinion between Generals Floyd, Buckner, and myself upon this branch of the subject consisted in this, viz: They thought that it would cost three-fourths of the command to cut out. I did not think the loss would be so great. If it had been settled that the sacrifice would be as much as three-fourths, I should have agreed with them that it was wrong to make the attempt.

Again, I believe we could have maintained our position another day, and have saved the army by getting back our boats and setting the command across the river; but, inasmuch as General Buckner was of opinion that he could not hold his position half an hour and I could not possibly do more than hold my own portion of the line, I had no alternative but but to submit to the decision of a majority of my brother general officers.

While I thus differed with them in opinion, I still think I did right in acquiescing in opinion with them. We all agreed in opinion that we could not long maintain the position against such overwhelming numbers of fresh troops as were daily arriving. We all agreed that the army had performed prodigies of valor, and that, if possible, further sacrifice should be avoided. Men will differ or agree according to their mental organizations. I censure not their opinions nor do I claim merit for my own. The whole matter is submitted to the judgment of the Government.

Since my original report was prepared I have seen and read the official reports of General Grant and Commodore Foote. From these reports I learn that the damage done the enemy's fleet of gunboats on the 13th [14th] was greater by far than was represented in my original report.



Four of the enemy's gunboats were badly disabled, receiving over 100 shots from our battery, many of which went entirely through from stem to stern, tearing the frame of the boats and machinery to pieces, killing and wounding 55 of their crews, among whom was the commodore himself. There can, therefore, no longer be a doubt as to the vulnerability of these to heavy shots; but it required a desperate fight to settle the question, and there is danger that the public mind will run from one extreme to the other, and arrive at a conclusion underrating the power of the enemy's gunboats.

In estimating the loss inflicted upon the enemy on the 15th, I saw that the whole field of battle for a mile and a half was covered with his dead and wounded, and believe that his loss could not fall short of 5,000 men. I am satisfied, from published letters of the officers and men of the enemy and from the acknowledgments of the Northern press, that his loss was much greater than was originally estimated in my report.

I stated in my original report that after we had driven the enemy from and captured his battery on the Wynn's Ferry road, and were pursuing him around to our right, and after we had met and overcome a fresh force of the enemy on the route towards his gunboats, I called off the pursuit, but in the hurry in which that report was prepared I omitted to state my reasons for so doing. I knew that the enemy had twenty boat loads of fresh troops at his landing, then only about 3 miles distant. I knew, from the great loss my command had sustained during the protracted fight of over seven hours, my command was in no condition to meet a large body of fresh troops, who, I had every reason to believe, were then rapidly approaching the field.

General Buckner's command, so far as labor was concerned, was comparatively fresh, but its demoralization, from being repulsed by the battery, had unfitted it to meet and fight a large body of fresh troops. I therefore called off the pursuit, explained my reasons to General Floyd, who approved the order. This explanation is now given as necessary to a proper understanding of that order. It is further proper to say that from the moment of my arrival at Donelson I had the whole force engaged night and day in the work of strengthening my position until the fighting commenced and when the fighting ceased at night it was again at work.

I did not, therefore, and could not, get a single morning report of the strength of my command. The four Virginia regiments did not exceed, I am confident, 350 men each for duty. The Texas regiment did not number 300 men. Several Mississippi regiments were nearly equally reduced, while those of Colonels Voorhies, Abernathy, and Hughes (new regiments) were almost disbanded by measles, and did not exceed 200 men each for duty. Colonel Browder's regiment had but 60 men, and it was, by my order, placed under Captain Parker, to work artillery. All others were greatly reduced by wastage. The whole force, therefore, was greatly less than would be supposed from the number of nominal regiments.

Of this force General Floyd, under his agreement with General Buckner before he turned over the command, drew out a large portion of his brigade (how many I do not know), by taking possession of the steamer Anderson, which arrived at Dover just before day, and setting them across the river. A large portion of the cavalry, under orders, passed out. All of the cavalry was ordered to cut out, and could have gone out but for the timidity of officers. Several thousand infantry escaped, one way or another, many of whom are now at this place, and all others are ordered here as a rendezvous for reorganization.

From the list of prisoners published in Northern papers, which I have seen, it required the prisoners of six regiments to make 900 men. I do not believe that the number of prisoners exceeded that stated by the Northern papers, which is put at 5,170 privates.

During the afternoon of the 15th I had caused the arms lost by the enemy to be gathered up from about half the field of battle, and had hauled and stacked up over 5,000 stand of arms and six pieces of artillery, all of which were lost in the surrender of the place for want of transportation to bring them away.

In regard to the enemy's force with which we were engaged in the battle of Dover, General Grant, in an official report, says that he had taken 15,000 prisoners; that Generals Floyd and Pillow made their escape with about 15,000 men, and that the forces engaged were about equal. While his estimate of the number of prisoners taken and the number with which General Floyd escaped is wide of the mark, yet the aggregate of the numbers, as given by himself, is 30,000, and his acknowledgment that the forces were about equal furnishes conclusive evidence that we fought 30,000 men, the same number given by prisoners we had taken and agreeing with my original estimate of his strength.

General Halleck, in a telegraphic dispatch of February 16, from Saint Louis to General McClellan, said he had invested Fort Donelson with a force of 50,000 men, and he had no doubt all communication and supplies were cut off. This corroborates Grant's statement, for the troops which arrived on the 14th and 15th, yet, being twenty steamboat loads, had not reached the battle-field on the morning of the 15th, and it is probable that parts of those that arrived on the evening of the 15th had not reached it.

These sources of information make it clear that we fought 30,000 of the enemy on the 15th; and that we were reinvested that night with all the enemy's disposable force, including his fresh troops, cannot be doubted.

Nothing has occurred to change my original estimate of our loss in the several conflicts with the enemy at the trenches, with the gunboats, and in the battle of Dover. My original estimate was that our loss in killed was from 1,500 to 2,000. We sent up from Dover 1,134 wounded. A Federal surgeon's certificate which I have seen says there were about 400 wounded Confederates in the hospital at Paducah, making 1,534 wounded. I was satisfied that the killed would increase the number to 2,000.

As in the absence still of regimental and brigade commanders it is probable that I have not done justice to all the officers or their commands.

To Brigadier-General Johnson's report, which is herewith forwarded, I particularly refer for the conduct of officers and commands under his immediate observation during the battle.

The forces under my immediate command in the conflict with the enemy's right did not exceed 7,000 men, though it never faltered, and drove the enemy from the position of his extreme right slowly but steadily, advancing over  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, carrying the positions of his first battery and two of his guns and of the battery on the Wynn's Ferry road taking four more guns, and afterwards, uniting with General Buckner's command, drove him (the enemy) back, sustained by a large accession of fresh troops. Yet it is manifest that the points of our victory would have been far greater had General Buckner's column been successful in its assault upon the Wynn's Ferry road battery.

Equally clear is it that the enemy, effecting a lodgment in General



Buckner's rifle pits, on his right, brought the command and position into extreme peril, making it absolutely necessary to take immediate action, in which we were under the necessity of cutting our way out, of holding out another day, and throwing the command across the river, or of capitulation. My own position upon these several propositions having been explained more fully and in detail in this my supplemental report, nothing more remains in the performance of my duty to the Government but to subscribe myself, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

P. S.—That there may be no doubt about the facts stated in this report, I append the sworn testimony of Colonels Burch and Forrest, Majors Henry, Haynes, and Nicholson, to which I ask the attention of the Government.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS FORT DONELSON,  
*February 10, 1862.*

I am apprehensive, from the large accumulation of the enemy's forces in the neighborhood of Fort Henry, that the enemy will attempt to cross the country south of my position and cut my communication by river, thus depriving me of supplies from above. The country south of me is exceedingly broken and rugged, so much so as to be nearly impracticable, but the enemy may possibly make it. His difficulty will be in procuring supplies for his forces, which is one almost (if not altogether) insurmountable. I think that is my safety.

The conflict of yesterday between our cavalry and that of the enemy resulted in 3 of ours wounded and 20 of ours taken prisoners by being thrown from their horses and in 3 of the enemy killed and 6 mortally wounded. Three of the enemy's gunboats have gone up the Tennessee River above the bridge. The Eastport, which we were converting into a gunboat, was burned and sunk, as was one steamboat, to keep them from falling into the hands of the enemy. The enemy have destroyed the high trestle work on the left bank of the Tennessee River, but have not damaged the bridge.

I am pushing the work on my river batteries day and night, and on my field works and defensive lines on the river also day and night. In one week's time (if I am allowed that much time) I will try very hard to make my batteries bomb-proof. I am now raising the parapets and strengthening them. I got my heavy rifled 32-pounders and 10-inch columbiad in position to-day, and tried them and my whole battery. The trial was most satisfactory. I need two additional heavy guns very much, and if I am not engaged by him in three or six days, I shall apply for the 42-pounders at Clarksville. It is certain that if I cannot hold this position, the two 42-pounders at Clarksville will not arrest his movements by Clarksville. Upon one thing you may rest assured, viz, that I will never surrender the position, and with God's help I mean to maintain it.

I send up the Hillman for a boat load of flour and meat. Let her bring a full load. You will please give orders accordingly to the commissary of your post. I shall continue to draw supplies of subsistence to this place until I have a heavy store on hand.

I have established a line of vedettes on the right bank of the Cum-



berland to within 8 miles of Smithland, so that I will be posted of the movements and advance of the enemy.

I hope you will order forward at once the tents and baggage of the troops of General Buckner's command, as they are suffering very much for want of them this cold weather.

I must request that you will forward this letter, after reading it, to General Johnston. My engagements and duties press me so much that I cannot address you both, and knowing his anxiety, I am anxious to place before him the intelligence contained in the letter.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,

*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

General FLOYD.

(Inclosure No. 2.)

*Statement of Col. John C. Burch.*

DECATUR, ALA., March 15, 1862.

On Saturday evening, February 15, all of the boats which we had at Donelson were sent up the river with our sick, wounded, and prisoners. After supper a council of officers was held at Brigadier-General Pillow's headquarters. I was not present at this council, but during its session, being in an adjoining room, I learned from some officers that intelligence had been received from scouts on the east side of the river that fourteen of the enemy's transports were landing re-enforcements  $1\frac{1}{2}$  or 2 miles below us, at their usual place of landing.

After I learned this, and during the session of the same council, two couriers came to Brigadier-General Buckner, one, and perhaps both, sent by Captain Graves, of the artillery—one stating that a large force was forming in front of our right (General Buckner's) wing, the second stating that large bodies of the enemy were seen moving in front of our right around towards our left.

After the adjournment of this council, about 11 or 12 o'clock, I learned that it had been determined to evacuate the post, cut our way through the right wing of the enemy's investing force, and make our way towards Charlotte, in Dickson County.

Orders were given for the command to be in readiness to march at 4 a. m. After this, being in General Pillow's private room, where Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner all were, two scouts came in, stating that the enemy's camp-fires could be seen at the same places in front of our left that they had occupied Friday. From the remarks of the generals this information seemed to be confirmatory of information which they had previously received.

Major Rice, an intelligent citizen of Dover, was called in and interrogated as to the character of the road to Charlotte. His account of it was decidedly unfavorable. In the course of the conversation which then followed among the generals—General Pillow insisting upon carrying out the previous determination of the council—to cut our way out Brigadier-General Buckner said that such was the exhausted condition of the men that if they should succeed in cutting their way out it would be at a heavy sacrifice; and if pursued by the large cavalry force of the enemy they would be almost entirely cut to pieces. General Floyd concurred with General Buckner. General Pillow said: "Then we can fight them another day in our trenches, and by to-morrow night we can have boats enough here to transport our troops across the river and let them make their escape to Clarksville." General Buckner said that such was the position of the enemy on his right, and the demoralization of his

forces from exposure and exhaustion that he could not hold his trenches half an hour. As an illustration of the correctness of his remark he said: "You, gentlemen, know that yesterday morning I considered the Second Kentucky (Hanson's) Regiment as good a regiment as there was in the service; yet such was their condition yesterday afternoon that, when I learned the enemy was in their trenches (which were to our extreme right and detached from the others), before I could rally and form them I had to take at least twenty men by the shoulders and pull them into line as a nucleus for formation." General Floyd concurred with General Buckner in his opinion as to the impossibility of holding the trenches longer, and asked: "What shall we do?" General Buckner stated that no officer had a right to sacrifice his men; referred to the various successes since Wednesday at Donelson, and concluded by saying that an officer who had successfully resisted an assault of a much larger force and was still surrounded by an increased force could surrender with honor, and that we had accomplished much more than was required by this rule. General Pillow said that he never would surrender. General Floyd said that he would suffer any fate before he would surrender or fall into the hands of the enemy alive. At the suggestion of some one present he said that personal considerations influenced him in coming to this determination, and further stated that such considerations should never govern a general officer. Colonel Forrest, of the cavalry, who was present, said he would die before he would surrender; that such of his men as would follow him he would take out. General Floyd said he would take his chances with Forrest, and asked General Buckner if he would make the surrender. General Buckner asked him if he (General Floyd) would pass the command to him. General Floyd replied in the affirmative. I understood General Pillow as doing the same. "Then," said General Buckner, "I shall propose terms of capitulation;" and asked for ink and paper, and directed one of his staff to send for a bugler and prepare white flags to plant at various points on our works.

Preparations were immediately begun to be made by General Floyd and staff, General Pillow and staff, and Colonel Forrest to leave. This was about 3 a. m. It was suggested by some one that two boats that were known to be coming down might arrive before day, and General Floyd asked if they came that he might be permitted to take off on them his troops. General Buckner replied that all might leave who could before his note was sent to General Grant, the Federal commander. Thus ended the conference.

After this I met or called General Pillow in the passage, and asked him if there was any possibility of a misunderstanding as to his position. He thought not; but I suggested to him the propriety of again seeing Generals Floyd and Buckner, and see that there was no possibility of his position being misunderstood by them. He said he would, and returned to the room in which the conference was held.

In my statement of what transpired and of the conversations that were had I do not pretend to have given the exact language used, and I may be mistaken as to the order of the remarks that I have endeavored to narrate.

JNO. C. BURCH,  
*Aide to General Pillow.*

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 15th day of March, 1862.

LEVI SUGARS,  
*Intendant of the Town of Decatur, Ala.,  
and ex-officio Justice of the Peace.*

[Inclosure No. 3.]

*Statement of Col. N. B. Forrest.*

MARCH 15, 1862.

Between 1 and 2 o'clock on Sunday morning, February 16, being sent for, I arrived at General Pillow's headquarters, and found him, General Floyd, and General Buckner in conversation. General Pillow told me that they had received information that the enemy were again occupying the same ground they had occupied the morning before. I told him I did not believe it, as I had left that part of the field, on our left, late the evening before. He told me he had sent out scouts, who reported a large force of the enemy moving around to our left. He instructed me to go immediately and send two reliable men to ascertain the condition of a road running near the river bank and between the enemy's right and the river, and also to ascertain the position of the enemy. I obeyed his instructions and awaited the return of the scouts. They stated that they saw no enemy, but could see their fires in the same place where they were Friday night; that from their examination and information obtained from a citizen living on the river road the water was about to the saddle skirts, and the mud about half-leg deep in the bottom where it had been overflowed. The bottom was about a quarter of a mile wide and the water then about 100 yards wide.

During the conversation that then ensued among the general officers General Pillow was in favor of trying to cut our way out. General Buckner said that he could not hold his position over half an hour in the morning, and that if he attempted to take his force out it would be seen by the enemy (who held part of his intrenchments), and he followed and cut to pieces. I told him that I would take my cavalry around there and he could draw out under cover of them. He said that an attempt to cut our way out would involve the loss of three-fourths of the men. General Floyd said our force was so demoralized as to cause him to agree with General Buckner as to our probable loss in attempting to cut our way out. I said that I would agree to cut my way through the enemy's lines at any point the general might designate, and stated that I could keep back their cavalry, which General Buckner thought would greatly harass our infantry in retreat. General Buckner or General Floyd said that they (the enemy) would bring their artillery to bear on us. I went out of the room, and when I returned General Floyd said he could not and would not surrender himself. I then asked if they were going to surrender the command. General Buckner remarked that they were. I then stated that I had not come out for the purpose of surrendering my command, and would not do it if they would follow me out; that I intended to go out if I saved but one man; and then turning to General Pillow I asked him what I should do. He replied, "Cut your way out." I immediately left the house and sent for all the officers under my command, and stated to them the facts that had occurred and stated my determination to leave, and remarked that all who wanted to go could follow me, and those who wished to stay and take the consequences might remain in camp. All of my own regiment and Captain Williams, of Helm's Kentucky regiment, said they would go with me if the last man fell. Colonel Gantt was sent for and urged to get out his battalion as often as three times, but he and two Kentucky companies (Captains Wilcox and Huey) refused to come. I marched out the remainder of my command, with Captain Porter's artillery horses, and about 200 men of different commands up the river road and across the overflow, which I found to be about saddle-skirt deep. The weather was intensely cold;



a great many of the men were already frost-bitten, and it was the opinion of the generals that the infantry could not have passed through the water and have survived it.

N. B. FORREST,  
*Colonel, Commanding Forrest's Regiment of Cavalry.*

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the 15th day of March, 1862.

LEVI SUGARS,  
*Intendant of the Town of Decatur, Ala.,  
and ex-officio Justice of the Peace.*

[Inclosure No. 4.]

*Statement of Maj. Gus. A. Henry.*

DECATUR, ALA., March 13, 1862.

On the morning of February 16 I was present during the council of war, held in Brigadier-General Pillow's headquarters, at Dover, Tenn., Generals Floyd, Pillow, Buckner, and General Pillow's staff being present. On account of being very much exhausted from the fight of the 15th instant I slept the forepart of the night, and came down-stairs from my room into General Pillow's about 1 or 2 o'clock. At the time I entered General Pillow's room it had been decided that we should fight our way out, and General Pillow gave me orders to gather up all the papers and books belonging to my department; whereupon I immediately executed the orders given to me, and then returned to General Pillow's room, when a change of operations had been decided upon, on account of information received from scouts, ordered out by General Pillow, to ascertain whether the enemy had reoccupied the ground they were driven from the day previous. The scouts returned and reported that the enemy had swung entirely around, and were in possession of the very same ground. General Pillow, being still in doubt, sent a second party of scouts, who made a thorough reconnoissance, and reported that the woods were perfectly alive with troops, and that their camp-fires were burning in every direction.

General Pillow then sent a party of cavalry to inspect a slough that was filled with backwater from the river, to see if infantry could pass. They returned, after having made a thorough examination on horseback and on foot, and reported that infantry could not pass, but they thought cavalry could.

Communication being thus cut off, General Pillow urged the propriety of making a desperate attempt to cut our way out, whatever might be the consequences, or make a fight in the work and hold our position one more day, by which time we could get steamboats sufficient to put the whole command over the river and make our escape by the way of Clarksville.

General Buckner then said that, in consequence of the worn-out condition and demoralization of the troops under his command, and the occupation of his rifle pits on his extreme right by the enemy, he could not hold his position a half hour after being attacked, which he thought would begin about daylight.

General Pillow then said that by the enemy's occupation of the rifle pits on General Buckner's right it was an open gateway to our river battery, and that he thought we ought to cut our way through, carrying with us as many as possible, leaving the killed and wounded on the field.

General Buckner then said that it would cost three-fourths of the

command to get the other out, and that he did not think any general had the right to make such a sacrifice of human life.

General Floyd agreed with General Buckner on this point.

General Pillow then rose up and said, "Gentlemen, as you refuse to make an attempt to cut our way out, and General Buckner says he will not be able to hold his position a half hour after being attacked, there is only one alternative left, that is capitulation," and then and there remarked that he would not surrender the command or himself; that he would die first.

General Floyd then spoke out, and said that he would not surrender the command or himself.

General Buckner remarked that, if placed in command, he would surrender the command and share its fate.

General Floyd then said, "General Buckner, if I place you in command, will you allow me to get out as much of my brigade as I can?"

General Buckner replied, "I will, provided you do so before the enemy receives my proposition for capitulation."

General Floyd then turned to General Pillow and said, "I turn the command over, sir."

General Pillow replied promptly, "I pass it."

General Buckner said, "I assume it. Give me pen, ink, and paper, and send for a bugler."

General Pillow then started out of the room to make arrangements for his escape, when Colonel Forrest said to him, "General Pillow, what shall I do?" General Pillow replied, "Cut your way out, sir." Forrest said, "I will do it," and left the room.

GUS. A. HENRY, JR.,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Brigadier-General PILLOW.

STATE OF ALABAMA,

*Morgan County, ss:*

This day personally came before me, Levi Sugars, intendant of the town of Decatur, county and State aforesaid, Maj. Gus. A. Henry, jr., who makes oath in due form of law that the above statements are true.

GUS. A. HENRY, JR.,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Sworn to and subscribed before me on the 14th day of March, 1862.

LEVI SUGARS.

*Intendant.*

[Inclosure No. 5.]

*Statement of Maj. W. H. Haynes.*

OFFICE OF DIVISION COMMISSARY,

*Decatur, Ala., March 13, 1862,*

I was present at the council of officers held at Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow's headquarters, in the town of Dover, Tenn., on the morning of February 16. Was awoke in my quarters at 1 a. m. by Col. John C. Burch, aide-de camp, and ordered to report to General Pillow forthwith. I instantly proceeded to headquarters, where I saw Brigadier Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, Colonel Forrest, Majors Henry (assistant adjutant-general), Gilmer, and Jones, and Lieutenants Nicholson and Martin; the two latter volunteer aides to General Pillow. On my entrance into the room I was accosted by General Pillow, and, being taken to one side, was informed by him that they had determined to cut their way through the enemy's lines and retreat from Dover to Nash-



ville, and he desired me to destroy all the commissary stores and then make my escape across the river. I desired to know at what hour General Pillow wished his order to be executed, when, looking at his watch, he replied, "At 5.30 o'clock." I then retired from the room to inform my assistants of the order, but in an hour returned to headquarters.

On re-entering the room heard General Buckner say, "I cannot hold my position half an hour after the attack," and General Pillow, who was sitting next to General Buckner and immediately fronting the fireplace, promptly asked, "Why can't you?" at the same time adding, "I think you can hold your position; I think you can, sir." General Buckner retorted, "I know my position; I can only bring to bear against the enemy about 4,000 men, while he can oppose me with any given number." General Pillow then said: "Well, gentlemen, what do you intend to do; I am in favor of fighting out." General Floyd then spoke and asked General Buckner what he had to say, and General Buckner answered quickly, that to attempt to cut a way through the enemy's lines and retreat would cost a sacrifice of three-fourths of the command, and no commander had a right to make such a sacrifice. General Floyd, concurring, remarked, "We will have to capitulate; but, gentlemen, I cannot surrender; you know my position with the Federals; it wouldn't do; it wouldn't do;" whereupon General Pillow, addressing General Floyd, said, "I will not surrender myself nor the command; will die first." "Then I suppose, gentlemen," said General Buckner, "the surrender will devolve upon me." General Floyd replied, speaking to General Buckner, "General, if you are put in command will you allow me to take out by the river my brigade?" "Yes, sir," responded General Buckner, "if you move your command before the enemy act upon my communication offering to capitulate." "Then, sir," said General Floyd, "I surrender the command," and General Pillow, who was next in command, very quickly exclaimed, "I will not accept it; I will never surrender;" and while speaking turned to General Buckner, who remarked, "I will accept and share the fate of my command," and called for pen, ink, paper, and a bugler.

After the capitulation was determined upon General Pillow wished to know if it would be improper for him to make his escape, when General Floyd replied that the question was one for every man to decide for himself, but he would be glad for every one to escape that could. "Then, sir, I shall leave here," replied General Pillow. Colonel Forrest, who was in the room and heard what passed, then spoke: "I think there is more fight in these men than you all suppose, and, if you will let me, I will take out my command." General Pillow, responding to him, "Yes, sir; take out your command; cut your way out." Generals Floyd and Buckner assented, General Floyd by saying, "Yes, take out your command," and General Buckner by expressing, "I have no objection."

The means of getting away was then discussed, and soon after we began to disperse. While the gentlemen were leaving the room I approached General Buckner and wished to know if General Pillow's order to destroy the commissary stores should be carried out, and he answered, "Major Haynes, I countermand the order."

It may be proper for me to say that I never met General Pillow before the morning of February 9, having been upon Brig. Gen. Charles Clark's staff since my entrance into the service, and only went to Donelson with General Pillow to take temporary charge of the commissariat. General Pillow assigned me to duty on his staff after arriving at Donelson, February 10.

W. H. HAYNES,  
*Major and Brigade Commissary.*



## STATE OF ALABAMA.

*Morgan County, ss :*

Personally appeared before me, Levi Sugars, intendant of the town of Decatur, and *ex officio* justice of the peace, Maj. W. H. Haynes, who makes oath that the statements herein made, relating to what was said in the council of officers on the morning of February 16, 1862, is true.

W. H. HAYNES,

*Major and Brigade Com., Proc. Army, Confederate States.*

Sworn to and subscribed before me on this the 14th of March, 1862.

LEVI SUGARS,

*Intendant.*

[Inclosure No. 6.]

*Hunter Nicholson's statement.*

I was present at the council of war, held at Brigadier-General Pillow's headquarters, in Dover, on Saturday night, February 15, 1862. I came into the room about 2 o'clock. There were present Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, Major Gilmer, Colonel Forrest, and several staff officers, among whom I distinctly remember Major Henry and Colonel Burch, of General Pillow's staff.

The generals were discussing the necessity and practicality of marching the forces out of the intrenchments and evacuating the place. Major Rice, a resident of Dover, and aide-de-camp of General Pillow, was describing the nature of the country and character of the roads over which the army would have to pass. He referred to some citizen—I think a doctor, but do not remember his name—whom he represented as more familiar with the roads. In a little while, or perhaps during the conversation of Major Rice, the gentleman referred to was announced. He gave a description of the roads which, from my ignorance of the locality, I am unable to repeat. The substance was, however, that, though exceedingly difficult, it was possible to pass the roads with light baggage trains. General Pillow asked most of the questions propounded to this gentleman, as also those to Major Rice.

At this point I was called into an adjoining room, where I remained but a few minutes. When I returned Major Jones, brigade-quartermaster, was just entering the room. General Pillow at once approached him, and taking him a little one side, explained to him that it had been determined to evacuate the place, and that he must prepare to burn the quartermaster's stores in his hands. Major Jones inquired at what time. General Pillow replied, "About daybreak: about 5.30 o'clock." Major Jones left very soon, and I did not see him in the room afterwards, that I recollect. In a few minutes Major Haynes, brigade-commissary, entered the room, and received similar instructions as to the commissary stores under his charge.

About this time a scout was ushered in, who answered that the enemy had reoccupied the lines from which they had been driven during the fight on Saturday. General Pillow doubted if the scout was not mistaken: so another was sent out. About half an hour had elapsed when Major Haynes returned and remained near me in the room during the remainder of the discussion. Just as he entered General Buckner remarked, "I am confident that the enemy will attack my lines by light, and I cannot hold them for half an hour." General Pillow replied quickly, "Why so; why so, general?" General Buckner replied, "Because I can bring into action not over 4,000 men, and they demoralized by long and uninterrupted exposure and fighting, while they can bring

any number of fresh troops to the attack." General Pillow replied, "I differ with you. I think you can hold your lines; I think you can, sir." General Buckner replied, "I know my position, and I know that the lines cannot be held with my troops in the present condition." General Floyd, it was, I think, who then remarked, "Then, gentlemen, a capitulation is all that is left us." To which General Pillow replied, "I do not think so; at any rate, we can cut our way out." General Buckner replied, "To cut our way out would cost three-fourths of our men, and I do not think any commander has a right to sacrifice three-fourths of his command to save one-fourth." To which General Floyd replied, "Certainly not."

About this time the second scout sent out returned, and reported the enemy in force occupying the position from which they had been driven. Thereupon two of Colonel Forrest's cavalry were sent to examine the backwater and report if it could be crossed by the army. These scouts returned in a short time and reported that cavalry could pass, but infantry could not. General Buckner then asked, "Well, gentlemen, what are we to do?" General Pillow replied, "You understand me, gentlemen; I am for holding out at least to-day, getting boats, and crossing the command over the river. As for myself, I will never surrender the command or myself; I will die first." General Floyd replied, "Nor will I; I cannot and will not surrender, but I must confess personal reasons control me." General Buckner replied, "But such considerations should not control a general's actions." General Floyd replied, "Certainly not; nor would I permit it to cause me to sacrifice the command." General Buckner replied, "Then I suppose the duty of surrendering the command will devolve on me." General Floyd asked, "How will you proceed?" General Buckner replied, "I will send a flag asking for General Grant's quarters, that I may send a message to him. I will propose an armistice of six hours to arrange terms." A pause here ensued. Then General Buckner asked, "Am I to consider the command as turned over to me?" General Floyd replied, "Certainly, I turn over the command." General Pillow replied quickly, "I pass it; I will not surrender." General Buckner then called for pen, ink, and paper, and a bugler. General Floyd then said, "Well, general, will I be permitted to take my little brigade out if I can?" General Buckner replied, "Certainly, if you can get them out before the terms of capitulation are agreed on." Colonel Forrest then asked, "Gentlemen, have I leave to cut my way out with my command?" General Pillow replied, "Yes, sir; cut your way out;" and, continuing, "Gentlemen, is there anything wrong in my leaving?" General Floyd replied, "Every man must judge for himself of that." General Pillow replied, "Then I shall leave this place." Here General Pillow left the room, but returned in a short time, and, taking a seat between Generals Floyd and Buckner, said, "Gentlemen, in order that we may understand each other, let me state what is my position; I differ with you as to the cost of cutting our way out, but if it were ascertained that it would cost three-fourths of the command, I agree that it would be wrong to sacrifice them for the remaining fourth." Generals Floyd and Buckner replied, "We understand you, general, and you understand us." After this I left the room, and soon after the place.

HUNTER NICHOLSON.

Sworn to and subscribed before me on this 18th day of March, 1862.

LEVI SUGARS,

*Intendant of the Town of Decatur, Ala.,  
and ex-officio Justice of the Peace.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Decatur, Ala., March 16, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. GIDEON J. PILLOW,  
*Chattanooga, Tenn.:*

GENERAL: Under date of March 11 the Secretary of War says:

The reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow are unsatisfactory, and the President directs that both these generals be relieved from command until further orders.

He further directs General Johnston in the mean time [to] request them to add to their [reports] such statements as they may deem proper on the following points:

1st. The failure to give timely notice of the insufficiency of the garrison of Fort Donelson to repel the attack.

2d. The failure of any attempt to save the army by evacuating the post when found untenable.

3d. Why they abandoned the command to their inferior officer instead of executing themselves whatever measure was deemed proper for the entire army.

4th. What was the precise mode by which each effected his escape from the fort and what dangers were encountered in the retreat.

5th. Upon what principle a selection was made of particular troops, being certain regiments of the senior general's brigade, to whose use all the transportation on hand was appropriated.

6th. A particular designation of the regiments saved and the regiments abandoned which formed a part of the senior general's brigade.

In obedience to this order I am directed by General Johnston to request your compliance with the wishes of the President in these particulars with as little delay as possible, and report to these headquarters. Under the same direction General Johnston has requested a report from Colonel Forrest, detailing particularly the time and manner of his escape from Fort Donelson, the road he took, and the number of the enemy he met or saw in making his escape, and the difficulties which existed to prevent the remainder of the army from following the route taken by him in his escape with his command.

I am, your obedient servant,

H. P. BREWSTER,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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SIR: In my supplemental report, which is forwarded through General A. S. Johnston, I have, as I conceived, substantially answered the points indicated in the order of the Secretary of War as unsatisfactory to the President; but, to be more specific and to reply directly to these points, I beg to say that—

1st. General Floyd reached Fort Donelson early on the morning of February 13, and, being my senior officer, assumed command. Up to that time we had no need of additional forces, for at that time the enemy had only about 20,000 troops, and we had a force fully sufficient to defend the place against that force, and I did not and could not know with what force they meant to invest us. We were attacked by that force on the 13th around our whole line, and after three or four hours of vigorous assault we repulsed his forces everywhere.

After General Floyd's arrival, being second in command, I could not, without a violation of military usage, apply for re-enforcements; but I do not seek to shelter myself from responsibility by this consideration. Though the enemy's force greatly exceeded ours, we felt that we could hold our position against him until his large force of fresh troops arrived on the evenings of the 13th, 14th, and 15th. These arrivals of about 30,000 troops made it manifest that we could not hold the posi-



tion long against such overwhelming numbers, particularly as they were then enabled to completely invest us and cut off our communication by river. It was then impossible to get re-enforcements from Bowling Green or elsewhere in time to relieve us. It required three days, by railroad and river, for the forces which did come to us to get there, owing to the shortness of transportation.

I apprised General Johnston of the arrival of the enemy's large re-enforcements, giving him every arrival; but I had just come from Bowling Green, and was of opinion that the force reserved for that position was inadequate for its defense against a large assaulting force, and I knew General Johnston could not give me any re-enforcements unless he abandoned that place; a measure which I did not consider it my province to suggest. Knowing this, I felt it my duty to make the best possible defense with the forces we had. We had one additional regiment or battalion there, which General Floyd sent to Cumberland City to protect public stores that had been forwarded to that place. These are the reasons why no application was made for re-enforcements.

2d. In response to the second point made by the Secretary's order, I have to say that arrangements were all made, orders given to the whole command to evacuate the works, and troops were under arms to march out, when information was received that we were invested. Up to this time the general officers were all agreed upon and the line of action necessary and proper under the circumstances. (See supplemental report.) It was as to the necessity of a change of policy in the new state of the case that a difference of opinion arose between the general officers. I was for cutting our way out. Generals Floyd and Buckner thought surrender was a necessity of the position of the army.

In response to the point made by the Secretary's order, that it was not satisfactorily explained how a part of the command was withdrawn and the balance surrendered, I have to say:

On the evening and night of February 15, after the battle, in expectation of evacuating the place that night, General Floyd had sent off every steamboat we had, with the prisoners and our sick and wounded. As matters turned out this was most unfortunate; but I do not perceive that the act could be censured for it was a measure preparatory to evacuation, and no one could have foreseen the course of events which late that night defeated that measure. The act, however, was that of my senior officer, and I was not even consulted about its propriety.

When we ascertained, between 3 and 4 o'clock that night, that we were reinvested, and the question of our position became one of vital interest to the commanding officers, we had not a single boat, neither skiff, yawl, nor even flat or other ferry boat. There was no means of crossing the river. The river was full and the weather intensely cold.

About daybreak the steamer General Anderson and one other little boat came down. One of the boats had on board about 400 raw troops. I had then crossed the river in a small hand flat, about 4 feet wide by 12 long, which Mr. Rice, a citizen of Dover (acting as my volunteer aide-de-camp), had, by some means, brought over from the opposite side of the river.

Upon the arrival of these steamers General Floyd, acting, I presume, under the agreement between himself and General Buckner before the command was turned over, crossed over to the opposite shore as many of his troops as he could, until he was directed by General Buckner's staff officer to leave, as the gunboats of the enemy were approaching. This information was given me by General Floyd when we met at Clarksville. My horses were brought across the river on one of the

boats that brought over the troops. Myself and staff then made our way to Clarksville by land. These facts explain how a portion of the command were withdrawn when the balance could not be. However, I had no kind of agency in it.

3d. In response to the third point upon which information is called for by the Secretary's order, viz, upon what principle the senior officers avoided responsibility by transferring the command, I have only to say that I urged from first to last the duty of cutting through the enemy's lines with the entire command. I was not sustained, but was alone in my position; and with General Buckner's avowal that his troops could not make another fight, and without the assistance of either general in the command, and in an enterprise of great difficulty and peril, I could scarcely hope to cut through the enemy's line unaided. Yet it was against my conviction of duty to surrender. Under the circumstances in which I was placed I saw no means of defeating the surrender, and, therefore, considering myself only technically the recipient of the command, when turned over by General Floyd, I promptly passed or declined to accept it.

It was in this sense that I said in my original report that when the command was turned over to me I passed it. In point of fact, however, the command was turned over by General Floyd to General Buckner. In proof of which I embody in this report a dispatch from General Floyd to General A. S. Johnston on the morning of February 16. I also embody an order of General Buckner, after he had assumed command, to Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson.

CUMBERLAND CITY, TENN., *February 16, 1862.*

General JOHNSTON:

This morning at 2 o'clock, not feeling willing myself to surrender, I turned over the command to General Buckner, who determined a surrender of the fort and the army, as any further resistance would only result in the unavailing spilling of blood. I succeeded in saving half of my own command by availing myself of two little boats at the wharf, all that could be commanded. The balance of the entire reserve of the army fell into the hands of the enemy. The enemy's force was largely augmented yesterday by the arrival of thirteen transports, and his force could not have been less than 50,000. I have attempted to do my duty in this trying and difficult position, and only regret that my exertions have not been more successful.

J. B. FLOYD.

HEADQUARTERS, *Dover, Tenn., February 16, 1862.*

SIR: The command of the forces in this vicinity has devolved upon me by order of General Floyd. I have sent a flag to General Grant, and during the correspondence and until further orders you will refrain from any hostile demonstrations with a view to preventing a like movement on the enemy's part. You will endeavor to send a flag to the enemy's posts in front of your position, notifying them of the fact that I have sent a communication to General Grant from the right of our position, and desire to know his present headquarters.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

These orders show that all parties understood that the command was turned over, not to myself, but to General Buckner. The reason for this was obvious. Both Generals Floyd and Buckner were of opinion that a surrender of the command was a necessity of its position. They had both heard me say that I would die before I would surrender the command. General Buckner had said if placed in command he would make the surrender, and he had agreed with General Floyd that he might withdraw his brigade. This understanding and agreement and my position necessarily excluded me from actual command.



Having gone into the council of general officers and taken part in its deliberations, I felt bound by its decision, although against my conviction of duty. I therefore determined not to assume nor accept the command. I still think that in acquiescing in their decision, as a necessity of my position, I acted correctly, although my judgment was wholly against the surrender. I had no agency whatever in withdrawing any portion of the command, except to direct Colonel Forrest to cut his way out with the cavalry, all of which I had organized into a brigade under him.

5th and 6th. In response to the 5th and 6th inquiries of the Secretary's order I reply:

I do not know what regiments of General Floyd's brigade were surrendered nor which were withdrawn, nor do I know upon what principle the selection was made. For further information reference is made to my original and supplemental reports.

Before closing this response to the honorable Secretary's order I deem it not improper to say that the only doubt I felt, in any opinion I expressed, position assumed, or act I did, was as to the propriety of retiring from the garrison when I could not control the fate of the command, whose surrender was not my act nor with my approval. Upon this point I consulted Generals Floyd and Buckner. For these reasons, and knowing that the general officers would not be permitted to accompany the men into captivity, I finally determined to retire, hoping that I might be able to render some service to the country.

Very respectfully,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

Capt. H. P. BREWSTER,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va., March 26, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. J. PILLOW,  
*Exchange Hotel, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your supplemental report of the battle and surrender of Fort Donelson and of your answer to the various points indicated in the letter of the Secretary of War to General A. S. Johnston, together with the several statements of staff officers and the statement of Colonel Forrest appended thereto.

As the commanding general of the department has not yet made his report nor forwarded any communication to this Department, and as Generals Floyd and B. R. Johnson have not yet been heard from, you will readily perceive that it is impossible that the President should now take any action in a matter which so deeply concerns others as well as yourself.

I have therefore the honor to inform you that the Government still keeps its judgment suspended on the entire subject until all information necessary for forming a considerate decision shall have been received.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. RANDOLPH,  
*Secretary of War.*



OXFORD, MISS., May 15, 1862.

HON. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,

*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

I had expected the decision of the President on the case in which I was suspended from command at an earlier day, and I had hoped that when the facts were all known that he would see nothing in my conduct at Fort Donelson deserving censure. But I am not able to understand the delay in his action except upon the supposition that he is not yet satisfied.

All the facts are before him. I know of no material conflict between my statements and those of any other officers. There are several statements in General Floyd's report to the Secretary's order in which my memory and his are at variance; but these statements of his in no way affect me, and can have no possible influence in the decision of the President in my branch of the case. If, however, there were contradictory statements between General Floyd and myself, it would seem to me that they ought to be settled by the sworn testimony of five officers, whose testimony accompanies my reply to the Secretary's interrogatories. If the facts of the case had not been thus clearly made out, I should have felt it my duty to demand a court of inquiry; but as such a court could only find the facts and give opinion thereon, and as the President already had these facts before him, I have deemed a court unnecessary, even if one could be ordered without injury to [the] service.

When it was determined by Generals Floyd and Buckner [that the command] could not be saved, but must be surrendered; when General Floyd, before parting with the command, had stipulated with General Buckner (not to myself), what could I do but acquiesce? If I had attempted to defeat their purpose, General Floyd would have resumed command and arrested me for insubordination. At least such was my understanding of his rights and powers and of my position and responsibilities as his junior in rank. General Floyd, in his late published reply to the Secretary's interrogatories, as well as in his telegram to General A. S. Johnston, says that he turned over the command to General Buckner; that he and General Buckner agreed that it was determined that the command could not be saved, &c., but he nowhere says I agreed with him or pretends that I was in favor of surrendering the command. Under the proof as it is before the President, I cannot understand in his mind (?) as to the facts. I feel conscious of having tried to do my duty at Donelson and of having served the Government of my country faithfully, and I confess I did not expect its censure.

When I was suspended from command I believed [the President] had acted under misapprehension of my position. As promptly as possible I answered the interrogatories of the Secretary, and sustained the statements by the sworn testimony of five officers as reputable as belong to the Army. In reply I was informed that the case could not be taken up until answer was received. Having rested under the displeasure of the Government for more than two months, it ought not to excite surprise that I am anxious to be relieved from his order.

I understand that the President has been informed that my horses and servants were taken across the river some time before I crossed myself. This statement is untrue, as my report and the proof in his possession will show. I had but one horse and one servant there; the horse was borrowed of General Clark. I did not leave Dover until the command was turned over and General Buckner had commenced preparing his communication to the Federal commanders, asking terms of

capitulation. I then left the garrison, crossed the river in a small hand flat, leaving my horse and servant in Dover. At that time no steamboat had reached Dover; my horse was brought over by the steamboat that arrived afterwards. When it crossed over, General Floyd, my trunk (all the baggage I had), and my servant were brought up the river in the steamboat in which General Floyd and a portion of his command reached Clarksville.

These facts all appear in the proofs now in your possession, and are susceptible of proof by more than one hundred witnesses. If, from all the facts, the President thinks my conduct censurable, it is my duty to submit to his judgment; but if I cannot serve the Government satisfactorily, I would prefer to retire. Indeed, but for the interest I felt in the issues involved in this great revolution I would not have accepted the commission I now hold. The fortunes of war have placed [me] as the principal actor in two hard-fought and bloody fields (of Belmont and Donelson), where we fought most unequal numbers. In what I considered the most meritorious service of my life—the battle of Donelson or Dover—it was my misfortune to have been placed after the battle was fought in a position which brings upon me the displeasure of the Government.

While resting under this displeasure, two of my brother general officers from my own State, who came into the Tennessee army under me, as its commanding general, and neither of whom had then performed any distinguished services or fought any battle, are promoted over me. I originally thought this was done under misapprehension of my position. If it shall turn out this impression of mine was erroneous, it becomes questionable if my honor as an officer is not so far compromised as to make it my duty to retire. Until I know the decision of the President I cannot determine my own course. Painful as would be the necessity of retiring at a time of so much peril to the country, yet I could not hesitate in my course if satisfied that I was the object of intentional injustice. To be just is the highest duty of government. I yet have the fullest confidence in the President's sense of justice. If any part of my conduct is not properly understood by him, or if he has received from any quarter statements contradictory to mine, [I] ask at his hands information of the fact, that I may have an opportunity of explanation or refutation.

My apology for troubling you with this long communication must be found in the circumstances in which I am placed. The great delay and uncertainty of the mails induces me to send Major Nicholson, my aide-de-camp, with it. I trust you will find it convenient to place in his hands such orders as in the President's judgment are proper.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

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TUPELO, MISS., *June 21, 1862.*

HON. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,

*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

On the 11th day of March last I was suspended from command by order of the President, and through the Secretary of War interrogatories were propounded to me in regard to the operations of the army at Donelson. These interrogatories were promptly answered, and, together with my supplemental report, were delivered to the Government.

That there might be no doubt left upon the mind of the President as

to the facts, I took the sworn testimony of five officers, who were present at the council of general officers on the night of February 15, these fully verifying the statement of the facts contained in my supplemental report and my answers to the Secretary's interrogatories. More than a month since I prepared and forwarded to you by Major Nicholson, of my staff, a dispatch to the Government, briefly reviewing the case as it was made out, and respectfully calling the attention of the President to the case and asking his decision. To this communication I have received no reply.

I have now been suspended from my command nearly four months. I am accused of no crime. No charges have been preferred against me. I have never been informed that my answers to the interrogatories of the Secretary of War were not satisfactory, nor in what my conduct was censurable. I know of no statement from any quarter in conflict with mine; but if there were, my statement is sustained by the sworn testimony of Colonels Forrest and Burch, Majors Henry, Haynes, and Nicholson. They all testify that I opposed from first to last and earnestly the surrender of the command at Donelson; that I urged the duty of cutting our way through the enemy's lines, but that Generals Floyd and Buckner were of opinion that the command could not be saved; that its surrender was a necessity of its condition, and that General Floyd turned the command over to General Buckner to make terms of capitulation with the enemy.

If the facts be that way, I do not understand how the decision of a council of war (the senior general being present and approving and afterwards taking measures, according to his convictions, to carry into effect that decision) can be regarded otherwise than a military order of that commander: nor do I understand how I could have attempted to defeat the execution of that purpose (viz. to surrender the command) without a violation of all discipline and subjecting myself to arrest for insubordination. Certainly I saw no alternative, but acquiesced in what I could not avert. I cannot suppose it will be maintained that before any capitulation took place or was agreed upon I could honorably retire from a garrison whose surrender was determined upon and in violation of my expressed convictions. To have voluntarily surrendered myself into the power of the enemy under such circumstances would have looked to me like treachery to the Government whose commission I bore. It should be borne in mind that I was not in chief command. How could the responsibility of the surrender rest on me when I was opposed to it? My command was at Columbus, Ky., and I was only ordered by General A. S. Johnston to that post for special duty, and, when that was ended by General Floyd's determination to surrender the command, I felt it a duty I owed to my Government no less than to myself not voluntarily to place myself in the power of the enemy. That the command was not turned over to me is proven by the telegram of General Floyd to General A. S. Johnston on the morning of February 16. General Buckner's order to General B. R. Johnson, of the same date, after he had assumed command, proves the same thing. If, however, it had been turned over to me under the circumstances as they are proven, it is difficult to see how I could have done otherwise than to have carried out General Floyd's determination to surrender the garrison, for the decision of the council and General Floyd's approval and his turning over the command for the purpose of surrender would have been, in all military usage, equivalent to an order to capitulate. It is, however, proven that the command was not—in fact, was never intended to have been—devolved upon me. If the surrender was an unavoidable necessity (as Generals



Floyd and Buckner believed), I do not perceive the grounds upon which I am to be censured. If, on the contrary, the surrender was improper (as was my opinion), I do not understand why I am censured, when it is known that I opposed it and did all I properly could to prevent it.

The President will perceive upon examination of the documents and proofs that this view of the case is fully made out.

Under these circumstances, that I should be suspended from command and held up before the country as a culprit for nearly four months may well excite surprise. If I am to continue in the service, I respectfully submit that such treatment is not likely to increase my efficiency for command or my usefulness as an officer.

The facts in regard to General Floyd have all been laid before the public by the publication of his official report and his answers to the interrogatories of the Secretary of War by the committee of the House of Congress. The same committee summoned me before [it] and propounded interrogatories, which, from motives of delicacy, I declined answering. It then requested copies of my supplemental report and my answer to the Secretary's interrogatories and the accompanying proofs, which I declined furnishing, upon the ground that proper respect for the Government forbade it while the Government had the subject under consideration. Since then I have seen from the Richmond papers that the President declined furnishing copies of them under a resolution of the House, upon the ground that he considered it inexpedient to do so. While, therefore, I am held suspended from command for so long a period, the public are denied the means of judging how or in what I have been derelict in duty. Is this right? Can the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, reconcile it to his sense of justice longer to hold me in my present position? If the pressure of public duty has heretofore been heavy upon his time, as I am persuaded is the case, surely the great lapse of time since my suspension will excuse me for again calling his attention to the subject.

If the President were not in possession of the facts I should feel it my duty to demand an investigation by a court of inquiry, but as these are before him and made clear by the proof, such proceeding would seem to me wholly useless, even if the officers necessary to constitute the court could be spared from duty in the field. I have submitted to the judgment of the Government as patiently as possible when conscious of the commission of no wrong. If I were informed in what my conduct was considered censurable, so that I might have an opportunity of explanation or refutation, I should not deem it my duty to take the final step now proposed. That I should continue patient under indefinite suspension could hardly be expected.

If the Government does not need or does not want my services, it is my duty to retire. I have no wish to be in the way. I am unwilling to embarrass it by holding on to a position which I only accepted in the hope of rendering some service. It is a painful necessity which forces me to retire at a time of so much peril to the country, but if the President cannot now dispose of the case, I feel that proper self-respect and personal dignity leave me no alternative but to retire from the service. If, therefore, no action is deemed proper in response to this communication, I respectfully tender this as my resignation.

Being at present at Tupelo, with the headquarters of the army, I forward this through General Bragg.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

[Indorsement No. 1.]

Considering Brigadier-General Pillow as still belonging to this command, his appeal to the Department for an official investigation is approved, as due to himself and the Government.

BRAXTON BRAGG,  
*Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT WEST,  
*Tupelo, 22d June, 1862.*

[Indorsement No. 2.]

Respectfully submitted to the President. I think it will be well for me to inform General Pillow that negotiations are going on for a general exchange of prisoners, which will probably release General Buckner and the rest of the Donelson prisoners at an early day and render an investigation practicable, which cannot be entered upon now with justice to them.

G. W. RANDOLPH,  
*Secretary of War.*

[Indorsement No. 3.]

Answer as proposed, and correct the impression that the action is a reflection on him specially. The effort at a full investigation has failed from causes for which the Government is not responsible and regrets.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

WAR DEPARTMENT, U. S. A.,  
*Richmond, July 5, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. GIDEON J. PILLOW, *Tupelo, Miss. :*

GENERAL: Your communication of the 21st ultimo having been considered by the President, I am instructed to inform you that your suspension has never been considered an accusation, but as preliminary to an investigation which the circumstances of the Fort Donelson affair rendered necessary. The President regrets that the detention of the Fort Donelson prisoners renders such investigation impossible at present, but as this detention could not be foreseen, but, on the contrary, was in violation of an agreement made with General Wool for an exchange of prisoners, neither the President nor the War Department is responsible for the delay which has occurred.

General Wool has again announced his readiness to agree to a general exchange, and negotiations are about to be commenced which no doubt will lead to that result. So soon as the actors in the Fort Donelson surrender are at liberty the matter will receive thorough investigation and justice be done. I am quite sure, general, that you desire nothing else, and I very much regret that the Department could not, with due regard to the absent parties, order an investigation which necessarily implicates them.

Very respectfully,

G. W. RANDOLPH,  
*Secretary of War.*



OXFORD, MISS., July 20, 1862.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

Your reply of the 5th instant to my communication of the 21st ultimo to the President is acknowledged. In this communication you say:

Your [my] suspension has never been considered an accusation, but as preliminary to an investigation which the circumstances of the Fort Donelson affair rendered necessary. \* \* \*

[That] so soon as the actors in the Fort Donelson surrender are at liberty the matter will receive thorough investigation and justice be done. \* \* \*

I am quite sure, general, you desire nothing else, and very much regret the Department could not, with due respect to absent parties, order an investigation which necessarily implicates them. \* \* \*

This is the first information I have received of the purpose of the Government to order an investigation. Such investigation I have always desired as the only means by which my own position and conduct could be properly understood by the country, unless, from the facts as they are shown to have existed, the President should relieve me from censure. How that matter would be, and what course the President would ultimately adopt, I had no means of judging. I had supposed, from the message of the President to Congress and from the order of the Department of March 11 to General A. S. Johnston, that the order of suspension in its duration would depend on the character of the information which should be elicited under that order. If the information thus obtained should prove satisfactory and acquit any one of the "actors in the surrender" from blame, then I had supposed the object of the order would have been answered as to him, and such acquitted officer relieved from the censure implied by the order and restored to duty. It was with this understanding of the objects of the proceedings that I accompanied my supplemental report and answers with sworn statements of the five officers present.

This impression was confirmed by your communication of March 26, in which you say:

As the commanding general of the department (General A. S. Johnston) has not yet made his report nor forwarded any communication to this Department, and as Generals Floyd and B. R. Johnson have not yet been heard from, you will readily perceive that it is impossible that the President should now take any action in a matter which so deeply concerns others as well as yourself.

I have never regarded the order itself [as] an accusation, but I did then and do yet consider it as implying censure and displeasure of the President, and the country so understands it.

While you do not say in your communication of the 5th instant that my conduct is not considered censurable, yet I infer as much. If there is nothing elicited in all the reports and testimony before the Department showing that my participation in the surrender was such as rendered my [conduct] censurable, it seems to me unjust to continue me under this censure in order to discover in the future if something might not be found objectionable. This looks like arresting a man upon suspicion, without proof or circumstances to warrant it, and holding him in custody to hunt up evidences of his guilt, which is condemned by all law writers. When such investigation is had and the result before the President it would be as competent then as now to embrace me in any proceeding the President might deem proper; but with every circumstance in my favor to hold me suspended until others thought to have offended can be got at could only be justified by a well-founded belief on the part of the Government that I could not be found when wanted.



Such, too, is the practice in all analogous cases of offenders in all countries where law regulates and protects the rights of the citizen, and it seems to me that officers of the Army are entitled to the benefit of the rule of law which is universal in practice and founded in wisdom and on the experience of ages. As a lawyer yourself, I am willing to submit the decision of the question to your judgment.

In my military experience such has been the usage of the service. It certainly has in its favor the great principle of justice. The history of the present case shows that there is but one of the actors in the surrender not present, viz. General Buckner. I have already been suspended from command over four months. It may be four months more, possibly until the end of the war, if I am to be held under this order until all the actors are at liberty.

It will not be denied that suspension from command is a punishment, if it is not an accusation. It is one of the modes of punishment, and when that is answered, the party is restored to duty without accusation, charge, or investigation. This is in accordance with military authority and practice. If, then, there be nothing elicited in the case showing that I have offended or been derelict in duty, but, on the contrary, every circumstance in all the proof, by the first reports of the officers engaged or present at the surrender (except one, and he absent)—if it is shown that my views of what was proper were coincident with those of the President and were urged as far as my rank and military propriety would allow—is it not a hard case that I should be thus punished for the faults of others?

I know that the President, so far as he sees and understands a case, will carry out his sense of justice. I believe his intentions to be inflexibly just, but I do not believe he has, in the great pressure of weightier matters, had the time properly to consider the effects of the position in which I am placed by his order. I do not complain of the original order at the time it was issued, for I was well aware that my original report was, for want of time necessary for its preparation, but a skeleton account of the important events which had occurred at Donelson, and hence in that report I promised to prepare a supplemental one the moment my public duties would permit. Before, however, I had completed this report I was suspended from command. But I do complain of and deeply feel the injustice of holding me under this order until the conduct of others, not now in the power of the Government, can be properly investigated. If the actors were all present, an investigation of their case might be joint or separate by the rules of law. They could not be forced by military [power] into joint trial or investigation. The right of severance is an unquestioned one.

If my services are worth anything as an officer, they are needed in the field. If I have any reputation or character as an officer, it cannot be denied that they are already deeply injured in the judgment of the country. In addition to this injury to myself, there are many persons who are using my position and the supposed sympathy for me in the public mind as a means of attack upon the President. They ascribe as the motives of his treatment of me a secret hostility of long standing, thus intimating that he is using his official power and position to gratify personal malice. In defense of these assaults of the President his zealous friends, determined to sustain him, are attacking me, believing there is something by them not understood. Thus they find a motive for my detraction. I have myself been asked if there was such ancient hostility. Even Senators of Congress have asked me the question. Under the existing circumstances of the country everything which is calculated

to divide the country and weaken the influence of the President should be carefully avoided. I can give no explanation to relieve him. I can make no defense of myself. If the facts of the case were published to the world as they exist in your office, it would in some degree satisfy the public mind.

I have been careful to avoid any discourtesy to the President. I have avoided everything calculated to excite controversy or create excitement. I have uniformly denied the existence of any motive in the President to do me injustice, and all knowledge or belief of the existence of any secret hostility. I have preserved rigid silence, abstaining from every demonstration of popular sympathy, declining to make speeches (with the exception at Raleigh, N. C., where my remarks were very badly reported). I have violated no law or regulation, except in the publication of my original report at Memphis, which I did, believing that under the circumstances the President would excuse the act. My object was to give the public mind, then greatly excited and greatly depressed, correct information as to the character, extent, and causes of the surrender, and as far as possible to arrest the many false reports as to its extent. In doing this I first consulted General A. S. Johnston, and have in my possession his approval of the necessity of its being placed before the public—not his authority for the act. He thought that had better be done by indirection. I chose to do it, avowing the responsibility for the act, and have heretofore expressed my willingness to submit to the judgment of the President if he shall consider me censurable for the act. My excuse and apology for it is the peculiar condition of the public [mind] at the time and my own position. I telegraphed Senator Benjamin for permission to publish the report, but failed to get an answer, and afterwards by telegram advised him of what I had done.

I now introduce the subject in this communication as an apology for the offense, that it may remain on record. These last suggestions are not introduced here as strictly pertaining to the subject or argument in hand, but in explanation of matters proper to be understood and as due to myself.

Returning to the more important object of this communication, that is, the injurious effects of the order on my reputation, I desire to say that I am satisfied the President is incapable of being influenced by motives not properly pertaining to the subject-matter; that I myself utterly discredit the report of his alleged secret hostility to me, and that I would not have him relieve me or restore me to command unless from the proofs before him—entitled to his confidence—he shall be satisfied that my conduct in the Donelson affair was blameless. If upon this point his mind is satisfied, then, as an act of justice which I feel sure he will not deny me, I ask the cessation of the punishment, feeling that I have been already deeply injured by it. You, sir, very properly say that you are sure that I only want justice. This is all I want or ask; but, if I have done no wrong, do I get justice when so long held in a position which the world can understand in no other light than as a punishment or as showing unfitness for command?

This is the last communication which I shall address to the President upon this subject, and I ask for it his respectful consideration. I am obliged to submit to his decision. I will sustain [him] and oppose all his enemies in every measure that is proper and right of itself until this struggle is over though he should incarcerate me in a dungeon the balance of my life; but if I am to be continued in a position of so much humiliation, if the best efforts of my life to serve my country are to be thus rewarded, if I possess so little of the respect or sympathy of the

President that for one error of judgment (if such I have committed) I am to be thus dishonored by the man who was my own first choice for the Presidency of all the statesmen in the Confederacy, then I am forever done with the service, whether my resignation is accepted or not. I could not return to the Army pursued by the sense of humility, from which death without dishonor would be relief.

With respect, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, ( ADJT. AND INSP. GENERAL'S OFFICE.  
No. 196. ( *Richmond, Va., August 22, 1862.*  
\* \* \* \* \*

XL. The reports of the Fort Donelson disaster having now been received and considered, it is impossible to acquit Brig. Gen. G. J. Pillow of grave errors of judgment in the military operations which resulted in the surrender of the army, but there being no reason to question his courage and loyalty, his suspension from duty is removed, and he will report to General B. Bragg for orders.\*

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of the Secretary of War :

JNO. WITHERS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

OXFORD, MISS., *August 27, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant-General, Richmond :*

Is the order of suspension simply removed, without anything being said relieving me from censure? Am I required to report to General Van Dorn, or will the President allow me to report to General Bragg and assist in relieving my own State?

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

RICHMOND, VA., *September 12, 1862.*

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,  
*Secretary of War :*

The order of the Government restoring me to duty ascribes to me errors of judgment in the military operations at Donelson. The explanations as to what constitutes those errors, in our personal interview, indicated to my order to call off the pursuit of the army after the battle of the 15th February and back into the works as erroneous. In my communication of the 11th instant I gave my understanding of the objects and purposes of that combat, and solemnly asseverated that I never understood that the army was to retreat from the battle-field towards Charlotte, and I assigned reasons to show that that step was then impossible. I beg now to refer the Department to the original and supplemental reports of Colonel Gilmer, of the Engineer Corps, who was on duty with me at that post.

\* See Special Orders, No. 259, December 10, 1862.



The supplemental report will be filed in a few days. From these reports [you] will, I am persuaded, be satisfied that my order was not only a proper one, but that it was the means of saving the army from a conflict with a large fresh force of the enemy, which would greatly have endangered its existence, and that General Buckner was himself in error in supposing that my order had defeated or had any reference to the army retreating from the battle-field. That step was never contemplated or spoken of or even suggested as proper. It is difficult to understand how he could have taken up such impression, and it is singular that if my order had interfered with the previously-understood programme of action, why General Floyd should have so promptly approved my order, as General Buckner himself states in his report, and why neither he nor General Floyd should have said something about it.

I hope to make the point clear by other testimony, when, I trust, the Department will perceive the justice of rescinding the order.

Respectfully,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. A.*

RICHMOND, VA., *September 18, 1862.*

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,  
*Secretary of War :*

In the personal interview with the President and yourself explanatory of the errors of judgment which I am considered by the Government to have committed (as stated in the order of August 22 past), I understood that the Government was satisfied that I was opposed to the surrender of the army of Donelson, and that in regard to the surrender my error consisted in not accepting the command when turned over by General Floyd to General Buckner for the purpose of capitulation and myself fighting it out (if I believed that was practicable), or of surrendering the command and myself with it. I have stated in my correspondence with the Department that I consider the action of Generals Floyd and Buckner in determining that the command could not be saved but must be surrendered was binding upon me, and that I refused to accept the command to carry this determination (by a surrender) into effect. The decision of the President upon the point settles the question, and I accept that decision as the law of the case, and acknowledge myself relieved of a question upon which (suddenly sprung upon me) my mind was never free from doubt.

The other error, as I understand your explanation of the order, consisted in the order I gave after our army had driven the enemy from all his positions in front of our lines, where he was slowly falling back upon his large fresh force of 20,000 men at the gunboat landing.

My order was to draw off from further pursuit, and for our forces to return to our line of defenses. This order was given to avoid a conflict, after a long and bloody battle, with the enemy's large body of fresh troops, which I was satisfied would be brought to the field, and which I knew we could not withstand in the exhausted condition of our small force. I had kept up the fight with the forces under my immediate command for the last two hours by carrying ammunition in boxes upon the heads of details from the command for that purpose, my supply of 60 rounds having been exhausted in the long struggle, and no wagon could go to the battle-field on account of the thick undergrowth and want of road. The order that I gave had no other object, and when its object

was explained to General Floyd he unhesitatingly approved it. I did not prevail upon him or use any arguments or persuasive measures to induce him to approve of it. He at once saw its necessity, and countermanded the order which he had given upon the field for General Buckner's command to occupy the open field in front of our line and from which we had driven the enemy on the Wynn's Ferry road.

This order of mine did not prevent the command from retiring from the position on the retreat towards Charlotte and Nashville, for the reason that it was not ready nor in condition to assume the march. I solemnly aver before God that I never understood it to be the purpose, object, or determination of the general officers, or of any of them, to march in retreat from the battle-field if we won it. So far from it, and as an evidence that we all so understood it, the command went into the action without the necessary subsistence and covering for a long march over a country scarcely practicable for infantry and deemed impracticable for anything else, covered as it was with a deep snow and sheeted over with sleet. The army could not have taken the field for battle, encumbered with the necessary rations, blankets, knapsacks, &c., for the march.

Neither in the council of the night of the 14th nor at any other time was it understood or even suggested that we should march from the field of battle on retiring from Donelson. General Buckner seems to have understood it differently, but he never explained to me this view of his, and I did not know that he so understood it until I read his official report. I was in the midst of his troops several times during the after part of the battle and after they returned into the work, and I am satisfied they had not the rations and other necessary preparations for the march.

It will be recollected that the first purpose was to have fought the enemy on February 14; but it was deferred, at my suggestion, as being too late in the day. General Buckner never reported himself ready for the march nor intimated to me after the battle that my order had interfered with his views or intended action. No orders had been issued to the command, either written or verbal, to march from the field; no preparations had been made for that purpose.

The battle of the 15th was fought to cut up the investing force before the fresh forces could get in position to open the way to Charlotte, but it never entered into my head that we were to march from the field of battle without any subsistence, blankets, or knapsacks, leaving all of our wounded upon the field of snow, with the different regiments and brigades broken, mixed, and scattered, leaving behind the artillerists in the river bottoms, the two regiments at that place as a protecting force, the four regiments of Heiman's brigade left in its position in the line of works to protect General Buckner's right flank, and all the pickets along our whole line then drawn back into the works to hold them, while the main army contested the field outside of the works. To none of these forces had orders been given. Neither had any of our field artillery been taken outside of our works before the battle was won. Its participation in the conflict was from the inside of the works. General Buckner's artillery was left in his part of the works, and the piece ordered by him into the field after the battle was fought was taken from my portion of the works.

I feel confident General Floyd will sustain me in this view of the subject. This point (deemed to involve error on my part) is raised by General Buckner's report; was unknown to me until I read his report, and I am persuaded that upon a full view of all the circumstances the Gov-



ernment will see the injustice done me in ascribing to me an error of judgment. My order for the army to be called off from the pursuit and brought back into the works alone saved it from being crushed by the large, fresh force of the enemy which did in a short time afterwards attack and carry a portion of General Buckner's rifle pits.

For these reasons the order of the Government ascribing to me error of judgment I feel is unjust, and I respectfully request that part of the case may be held by the Government for further information, which I hope to present to the Department in the future.

I also ask that the Department will, in writing, specify the points of error ascribed to me as stated in our verbal conversation, believing that, when the errors are stated in order, they will be less injurious to me than the general ascription of errors without specifying them. I cannot believe the President or yourself will do me intentional injustice, and yet, as the order now stands, I feel that it is more hurtful to my reputation than if the errors were pointed out.

Respectfully,

GID. J. PILLOW.

—  
OXFORD, MISS., *October 10, 1862.*

HON. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,

*Secretary of War:*

Having made up my mind to retire from the service unless a reconsideration of its action by the Government shall cause a correction of those acts considered unjust towards me, I consider it respectful to the Government as well as due to my own reputation as a patriot to explain the reasons of my determination. In doing so, I may refer to past occurrences, in which the President has felt but little interest, yet, as they are truths, they should be known as parts of the history of this war.

When Tennessee, by her declaration of independence, had separated herself from the Lincoln Government, she provided by law for raising and arming a force of 55,000 men, and placed me, as the senior major-general, in command of this force. When I had organized about 35,000 of this force, had established shops for the manufacture of cannon and small-arms of every description, and had gathered a large amount of powder and other material of war, and before a man had been transferred to the Confederate service, the President appointed Bishop Polk, of Louisiana, a major-general, and assigned him to the command of the department which embraced my then field of operations, and instructed him to have the Tennessee forces transferred to the Confederate service. Subsequently he tendered me the appointment of major-general. That I should have felt deeply humiliated at being thus deprived of my command, reduced in rank, and placed under the orders of a priest, who had devoted his life to religious pursuits and had no experience in the field as a military man, ought not to excite surprise. That this injustice should have been done by a fellow-soldier of the Mexican war, for whom I had always cherished a warm friendship and for whom I had a high admiration, neither diminished my surprise nor mortification. From a sense of duty to the country (under certain pledges of the major-general), I accepted the position.

Subsequently I fought the battles of Belmont and Donelson. In both of these battles the great inequality of the forces engaged made the conflicts most unequal and bloody. In both our arms were victorious. In the battle of Donelson the forces commanded by myself fought with brilliant success and with a gallantry never surpassed. Had General



Buckner's command been equally successful we would have destroyed the enemy's army of 30,000 men. But unfortunately, by his failure in the assault on the Wynn's Ferry road battery, and permitting the enemy after the main battle had been won to take possession of a portion of his rifle pits, the position we occupied became untenable, and having reinvested us with 40,000 troops, half of which were fresh, Generals Floyd and Buckner were of opinion that the army could not be saved, and that capitulation was all that was left us. In this opinion I differed with them. I believed we could cut our way through the enemy's new line and insisted that it was our duty to do so. But not being sustained in these views, and regarding their decision, approved as it was by General Floyd (the senior general present), as equivalent to a military order of that commander, I felt constrained to acquiesce in what I could not prevent.

In pursuance of this decision General Floyd devolved the command upon General Buckner, who surrendered it accordingly. It is proper here to state that I refused to receive the command for the purpose of capitulation. It appeared afterwards, from the President's special message to Congress, that he was surprised and offended at the surrender, and by his orders General Floyd and myself were suspended from command. Believing the President had acted under a misapprehension of my position, I took the sworn testimonials of five officers present, all of whom proved that I opposed the surrender, and early in April I laid it before the Government, and asked to be relieved from the order of suspension. This was not done. On the contrary, I was held suspended for nearly six months and until General Buckner's release. When his report [was] received by the Government the order of suspension was removed, but in the order relieving me from suspension it is recited:

It is impossible to acquit Maj. Gen. G. J. Pillow of grave errors of judgment in the military operations which resulted in the surrender of the army at Donelson, but there being no reason to question his courage or loyalty, the order of suspension is removed, and he will report to General Bragg for orders.

From this order it appears that the President was of opinion that the surrender of the army was caused by my grave errors of judgment. I was conscious of the commission of no errors. None were specified in the order. To enable me to guard against like errors in the future it was essential that I should understand what were the errors of judgment ascribed to me. For the purpose of having this explanation of the order I visited Richmond, and in a personal interview with the President and yourself I asked for this explanation. In reply, the first error specified was that it was my duty—notwithstanding the decision of Generals Floyd and Buckner that the command must be surrendered—to have taken command and fought it out, if that was practicable, or have surrendered the command and myself with it. I accepted this decision of the President as the law of the case, though I had thought I would have subjected myself to arrest for insubordination had I taken that course. I then asked what other error I had committed. The answer was that it appeared from General Buckner's reports that, after we had driven the enemy from our front to the right of our position, he was in position to protect the retreat of the army towards Charlotte, and that my order calling off the pursuit and ordering it back into our works defeated this retreat. In reply to this I stated that this was a new point; that I had never heard of it before as offensive to the Government: that it was founded on a total misapprehension of the order I had given and of the condition of the army. I stated that we fought the battle of February 15 to cut up the investing force

before the fresh force of 20,000, which arrived at the gunboat landing on the evening of the 14th, could be got into position, with the view of opening our communications with Charlotte and Nashville, and intending ultimately to avail ourselves of a successful issue of the battle to retire from the post. All parties regarded the issue as more or less doubtful. We knew we should have a desperate fight; but we made no preparation before going into the battle for retreating from the battle-field. No suggestion or proposition was ever made that we should do so, and all that was determined upon in the conference on the night of February 14 was that we would give the investing force battle next morning. We could not have gone into such a fight with the men loaded down with blankets, knapsacks, and six days' rations, and without these the march over 60 miles of extremely broken and poor country, covered with snow and sleet 4 inches deep, could not have been made. We had left all of our field artillery within our works, because we could not use it on a battle-field covered over with a thick undergrowth of black-jack bushes. We could not have commenced a retreat before the enemy's large force of cavalry and artillery without artillery to protect our rear.

We had fought the battle, leaving the three companies of artillery in the river batteries, with two regiments of infantry as a supporting force. We had left Heiman's brigade of four regiments in its position in the line of works to protect the right flank of General Buckner's force when he should attack the enemy's position on the Wynn's Ferry road. All these forces were left within our works, without orders or a knowledge that we contemplated a retreat from the battle-field.

Again, when the army had been engaged in a close and bloody fight for seven and a half hours, every officer of experience in the field knows that regiments and brigades are broken and mixed and more or less scattered over the field. To have attempted a retreat from the battle-field under such circumstances, and without reformation and in compact order, would have resulted, if pursued, in a massacre of the command. All these circumstances I stated as showing that the statement in General Buckner's reports was founded in error on his part as to our intention to retreat from the battle-field. If such was then his understanding he would certainly have reported himself to me as ready to commence the retreat, which he never did; and when we were engaged on the night of the 15th (after the battle) in making arrangements for the retreat, then we called together all the commanders of companies, regiments, and brigades, of every arm of the service; gave orders for the retreat; assigned to the different corps their respective positions; gave orders for the whole command to have their blankets, knapsacks, new supply of ammunition, and five days' rations, and directed General Buckner (then nearest the position of the enemy) to protect the rear of the army in the retreat. General Buckner, after so great a lapse of time, evidently has his memory confused as to what was determined upon on the night of the 15th, confounding them with events and purposes entertained on the night of February 14.

I further said that as this point was a new one, suggested for the first time in General Buckner's report, it would have been but fair to give me notice of the point and an opportunity of explanation before my conduct was condemned; that my object in giving the order was to avoid a conflict with the enemy's fresh force of 20,000 men, which, in our then exhausted condition, I knew we could not withstand; that the moment the reasons of the order were explained to General Floyd he revoked his own order, approved of mine, and directed General Buckner to re-

turn as promptly as possible to his position in the rifle pits. The necessity of this order is proved beyond all question by the result which quickly followed, for before General Buckner got back to his position he found the enemy advancing rapidly upon and into some of them, and he actually made so firm a lodgment into those on his right that he could not be dislodged. I further said that I was satisfied that Major Gilmer and General Floyd would sustain me in this view of the order imputed to me as error of judgment.

Before leaving Richmond I saw Major Gilmer, had a full conversation with him, and ascertained that his recollection and opinions fully sustained mine on this whole subject. I then addressed an official communication to you, referring you to the original and supplemental reports of Major Gilmer as sustaining me on the point, and requested that the specifications of error might remain open for further information. To this I have received no reply. General Floyd being in Western Virginia, I could not see him.

Such, sir, was the substance of my explanation to yourself and the President of the order of mine which you regard as having resulted in the surrender of the army; yet my communication addressed to you from Richmond remains unnoticed, and I still rest under the censure of this order.

From the above history of the operations of the army at Donelson it is manifest that the position of peril to which the army was reduced, which produced the necessity of its surrender, was caused by General Buckner's unsuccessful attack on the Wynn's Ferry road battery and his failure to hold his rifle pits and by his afterwards advocating the necessity of a surrender, and not by any error of judgment on my part; and yet in your order I am made to bear all the odium of that measure, while he who caused it is held blameless and uncensured. That I should feel deeply aggrieved by such treatment at the hands of my Government might be expected. Against such injustice I solemnly protest. If the Government is determined to shut its eyes to the light of truth, and at no time to do me justice, it is time for me to retire.

Again, after being so long held suspended I was ordered to report to General Bragg for orders. He ordered me by telegram to report to General Van Dorn, and placed General Buckner in command of the division which General A. S. Johnston had organized for me, and which was under my command when I was suspended. I have twice reported to General Van Dorn, and yet I have no command now after the lapse of about a month. The Secretary of War has been informed by telegram of the state of facts. I have applied for permission to raise a new command of war volunteers or to take ten regiments of skeleton returned volunteers and fill them up, but have failed to get any favorable response.

Believing now that I am the victim of injustice; that my past services are not and never will be appreciated; being without command after every effort on my part to procure one, and believing that I can render the country no service, I am forced to the conclusion that it is my duty to retire from the service. Yet I have determined to make the very last effort at vindication and to procure a command before retiring finally from the service.

I need not say that the promotion of my juniors in rank, who, when promoted had fought no battle, had no experience in high command and little of any sort, taken from the very forces organized by myself as a part of the Army of Tennessee, of which I was the commander—promo-



tions made over me while I was suspended under an unjust order—adds additional poignancy to other acts of injustice I have sustained.

I am the more induced to hesitate in taking final action from personal considerations affecting my family. My whole fortune, large as it was, has been swept away by the enemy. In evacuating my portion of Tennessee the enemy took away my negro property from that State also. The policy of my own Government induced it to burn all my cotton. In this way I am reduced to poverty, with a large and dependent family of grown-up and unmarried daughters on my hands. While I see no means of supporting my family in the future, I am, on the other hand, doubly important to them. In addition to this source of embarrassment my taxes for the present year were assessed on my whole estate, and amount to some \$5,000. This sum I have no means of paying, and my lands will be sacrificed to pay this sum unless the Government make me advances on the cotton burned. The consideration of these matters does not properly belong to official communications, but yet are proper to be made known to the Government, as having their influence on the course I feel constrained to inform you I am about to take.

Protesting, as I solemnly do, against the injustice of this last order of the Government (explained above), and claiming a right that this my protest shall be filed on record in its archives, and having no command after a month's delay waiting for one, I now inform the Government that I shall proceed to my residence in Tennessee and there await the action and orders of the Government upon this communication. It is proper to state likewise that I never expect to take further part in this struggle unless upon a review of its own action in regard to myself it shall do me full justice. If satisfied no such action on its part will be taken, I shall, of course, promptly forward my resignation.

I transmit this by Major Cheatam, who will bring to me your reply.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va., October 21, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. GIDEON J. PILLOW:

GENERAL: I have received and carefully considered your letter of the 10th instant, and am constrained to say that I find in it nothing in reference to the operations at Fort Donelson which you had not already communicated in conversation, except the statement, now for the first time made, that "the necessity for the surrender was caused by General Buckner's unsuccessful attack on the Wynn's Ferry road battery and his failure to hold his rifle pits."

Declining to enter into this new point of controversy between General Buckner and yourself, I find nothing in the letter to change my opinion of your conduct at Fort Donelson or to render it proper that the order of which you complain should be rescinded. Neither do I find in the report of Colonel Gilmer any confirmation of your opinions. His supplemental report, if made, has not been laid before me. Should it satisfy me that I have done you injustice, I need not assure you, general, that it will give me great pleasure to repair it.

I have not received your application "to raise a new command of war volunteers or to take ten regiments of skeleton returned volunteers and fill them up"; but the conscript act would hinder you from raising a new

command, and the disposition already made of the returned prisoners renders it impossible to place ten regiments of them at your disposal. I regret to hear of your losses, and have expressed my sense of your courage and patriotism; but, as you rightly remark, the question of indemnifying you for the sacrifices of property cannot find a place in this correspondence. It only remains for me to say that, entertaining the opinion expressed in the order of which you complain, I cannot rescind it; and since you make your retirement from service the only alternative, your resignation is accepted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. RANDOLPH.

*Secretary of War.*

MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., November 8, 1862.

Hon. GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,

*Secretary of War :*

Your communication of October 21 is received. I have not resigned. In my letter of October 10, to which yours is in reply, I used the following language :

Believing now that I am the victim of injustice; that my past services are not and never will be appreciated; being without command after every effort on my part to procure one, and believing that I can render the country no service, I am forced to the conclusion that it is my duty to retire from the service. Yet I have determined to make the very last effort at vindication and to procure a command before retiring finally from the service.

Again, I said in that letter :

Protesting, as I solemnly do, against the injustice of this last order of the Government (explained above), and claiming a right that this my protest shall be filed on record in its archives, and having no command after a month's delay waiting for one, I now inform the Government that I shall proceed to my residence in Tennessee and there await the action and orders of the Government upon this communication. It is proper to state likewise that I never expect to take further part in this struggle unless upon a review of its own action in regard to myself it shall do me full justice. If satisfied no such action on its part will be taken, I shall, of course, promptly forward my resignation.

By no popular or legal interpretation can this language be construed into resignation nor was it so intended. The language used, "will forward my resignation," expressly negatives and excludes the inference that there was a resignation. By it my future course was made to depend upon my conviction that justice would not be done me by the Government. Upon this subject my mind is not satisfied.

The "grave error of judgment" imputed to me is that it was determined in council of February 14, 1862—for no other council was held before the battle—that the army should cut its way through the enemy's line of investment and retreat from the battle-field, and that, in contravention of this purpose, when we had driven the enemy from his position in the battle of February 15 I ordered the pursuit discontinued and our works reoccupied. The only evidence of this as an error is found in a paragraph of General Buckner's report, in which he treats the order as defeating the retreat. My reply has been and is that General Buckner is in error in stating that any purpose was ever determined upon in council or ordered elsewhere previously to the battle to retreat from the battle-field; that my order was made to avoid collision with a large, fresh force of the enemy, which in our then condition we could not have withstood, and that a retreat at that time was impracticable; that General Floyd, my senior in command, approved and adopted my



order, and repeated it to General Buckner as his own before it was executed, as is distinctly stated in General Buckner's report. In proof of the correctness of this explanation and of the necessity of my order I refer to Colonel Gilmer's supplemental report. I learn with surprise from your communication of October 21 that his supplemental report was not filed, or, if filed, was not laid before you. When last in Richmond, upon my written application you made an order directing him to make a supplemental report upon the points under consideration. He being on duty in that city, I had a right, after the lapse of a month, to suppose that document was on file in the Department and was before you. I find, however, in your dispatch of October 21 this sentence:

His (Colonel Gilmer's) supplemental report, if made, has not been laid before me. Should it satisfy me that I have done you injustice, I need not assure you, general, that it will give me great pleasure to repair it.

From this it is manifest that no proof, other than the circumstances given by me in explanation, was before the Department when your letter of October 21 was written.

Having it in my power to place before you proofs which I am persuaded will be satisfactory, I shall cause to be laid before you as promptly as possible, in the shape of supplemental reports, official statements of Brig. Gens. B. R. Johnson and Forrest, and Colonel Gilmer. They will accompany this communication, except Colonel Gilmer's report, which as early as possible I shall cause to be laid before you.

The labors I have performed in behalf of the cause in which we are engaged, and the sacrifices I have endured, prove my devotion, and should satisfy the President that I did not desire to quit the service until we had achieved the independence of the country; but I have felt and still feel deeply aggrieved by the order of the Government, knowing that it is founded in error and is unjust. Until the merits of the case shall have been passed upon by the President with these proofs before him (however indifferent I feel about the position I hold), I cannot and never contemplated retiring. Holding myself subject to the orders of the Government and in communication with Major-General Breckinridge's headquarters, I shall await its action.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.

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*Brief of General Pillow for the Secretary of War.*

A preliminary question for consideration is, was my letter of October 10 a resignation in fact or in law? I deny that it is. This will be settled by the letter itself. If the letter was not a resignation, should not the letter of the honorable Secretary of October 21 be withdrawn?

The order complained of as unjust is in the following language, viz:

\* \* \* It is impossible to acquit Brig. Gen. Gideon J. Pillow of grave errors in the military operation of the army at Donelson, resulting in its surrender.

In reply to my application for an explanation and specification of the errors ascribed to me, it is said that my order calling off the pursuit (after the main battle of February 15 had been fought, and ordering the reoccupation of our works) defeated the previously-settled determination of a council of general officers, held on the night of February 16, to retreat from the battle-field on February 15, and was a grave error of judgment.



In the first place, I deny that my order was in contravention of any previously-settled purpose of the council of general officers held on the night of February 14. I deny that it was ever determined or even proposed in the council of the night of the 14th to retreat from the battle-field or to abandon the works. In that council we determined to give the enemy battle on the next day (15th), and we settled the plans of battle, nothing else. Our purpose was to cut up the enemy's investing forces before his fresh troops could get in position, thus defeating his designs upon our position and opening our communications, and intending afterwards to be governed by circumstances. We all believed we would ultimately be forced to retire from the position, then invested by a force of 30,000 men, threatened with a fresh force of 20,000; but it was likewise believed that if we were completely successful in the sally we might hold the position for a time and save the vast interests known to depend upon our doing so.

In proof of the correctness of this position I refer to the supplemental reports of Brig. Gens. B. R. Johnson and Forrest and Colonel Gilmer. I maintain, therefore, that my order calling off the pursuit was not in contravention of any purpose previously settled by the council of general officers before the battle and was not a grave error of judgment.

Secondly, no retreat of the army was defeated by the order, for none had been resolved upon, and at that time a successful retreat from the battle-field could not have been made. I maintain that the order was necessary and proper, and was the only means of avoiding an immediate conflict with a vastly superior force of fresh troops, which in our then condition we could not have withstood.

We had fought seven and a half hours a force of three to one. We had pursued the retreating foe nearly 3 miles and to within 3 miles of the gunboat landing, and until we met and had a severe conflict with the advance of his fresh troops, under General C. F. Smith. These facts all appear in General Buckner's report as well as in my own.

My own command (full two-thirds of the army in the fight) was out of ammunition, and the reports of General Buckner and those of his colonels show that his command had but little left. Our artillery was left in the works because we could not use it in the field. If we had pursued the enemy farther, we would have had to contend with his veterans and fresh forces combined—fully 40,000 men. With our small and exhausted command (originally only 10,000 men in the fight), it is obvious that we would have been crushed, and perhaps annihilated.

If we had remained in the open field outside our works long enough to have reformed the command, supplied its wants, and brought out our artillery and the six regiments left within, as necessary in their positions, the whole force of the enemy would have been precipitated upon us before it was possible to have commenced the retreat.

When fully prepared, it is known to be a most difficult operation for an exhausted command to retreat before a superior force; but when the retreating force is without ammunition and artillery and the pursuing force is fresh, a successful retreat is impossible.

The proof shows that the weather was intensely cold; that the country over which we would have had to pass was destitute of any supplies; that we had no artillery at hand; that my command had neither rations, knapsacks, blankets, nor ammunition, and that General Buckner's had an inadequate supply; that the regiments and brigades were broken, mixed, and scattered over the field, as is always the case after so long and severe a battle. Under such circumstances I maintain that retreat

was impracticable, and that my order was necessary and proper, and the only means of saving the army from imminent peril of annihilation.

It was in this most obvious view of the case that General Floyd, who had, as he states in his report, ordered the command to remain in the open field, countermanded his order, approved, adopted, and issued my order as his own, before my order was executed, as is stated by General Buckner in his report, at page 102 of the pamphlet.

To have attempted a retreat without reformation of the command, without artillery, without a fresh supply of ammunition (which we could only obtain from our works), with one-third of our whole force left in the works, and in the face of 20,000 fresh troops, must have resulted in the massacre or capture of the command.

In proof of the facts stated above reference is made to the reports already referred to. An additional proof of the necessity of my order is seen in the fact stated by General Buckner, that before he got back to his rifle pits the enemy had taken possession of a portion of them, from which he could not be dislodged. This made it impossible for us long to hold the position. Indeed, there remained only one of two alternatives, viz, to capitulate or to supply the wants of our army and cut our way out on the night of the 15th, which I was in favor of attempting. (See statements of Forrest, Burch, and others.)

In addition to this, I aver that General Buckner never gave me to understand, nor did I know, that he expected me to retreat from the battle-field; nor did he report his readiness to do so, or his opinion that we ought or could do so, neither did General Floyd say one word to me upon that subject.

My original reports, at page 35 of the pamphlet, written on February 18, only three days after the capitulation, sustained the views herein expressed as to the purpose we had settled on the night of the 14th and as to the impracticability of any other course than the one pursued. That the loss of the garrison was a severe misfortune none will pretend to deny. That loss was the result of the investment by vastly superior numbers. We all saw our danger, and the battle of the 15th in the open field proves it was given for the express purpose of relieving us; but yet, in view of the disastrous consequences to the country of the fall of the position, we felt our duty (as General Johnston instructed the undersigned) to hold the position as long as was possible. I was then and am now clear in the conviction that we could not have retreated from the battle-field. If the army could have been saved, as I believed it could, it was on the night of February 15 and morning of the 16th. None of these proofs were before the Government when the order complained of was issued. I had no notice of the points made in General Buckner's report until the order had issued, and as I then had no opportunity of explanation, I trust the Government will pardon the length of these remarks, submitted in the shape of a brief of the facts. Trusting that the President will be satisfied, from the proofs now presented, that the order does me injustice, I cheerfully submit the case to his judgment and sense of right.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

NOTE.—See Colonel Gilmer's original report, pages 167 and 168 [p. 263], for a clear statement of what was determined upon the night of February 14.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } ADJT. AND INSP. GENERAL'S OFFICE.  
 No. 289. } *Richmond, December 10, 1862.*

On review of the communication of Brig. Gen. G. J. Pillow, construed as a tender of his resignation and acted on by its acceptance, but not, as General Pillow contends, so intended or correctly interpreted, the order accepting his resignation is revoked, and he will be regarded as having never surrendered his commission. He will report to General Joseph E. Johnston for duty.

By command of Secretary of War:

JNO. WITHERS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Brigadier-General PILLOW, *Richmond.*

—  
 MARIETTA, GA., *October 1, 1863.*

His Excellency President DAVIS:

SIR: In addressing you this unofficial letter, calling your attention to a matter of personal interest to myself, I simply appeal to your sense of justice, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, in the only way I can communicate personally with you.

I do not believe, I cannot believe, you capable of intentional injustice to any man or officer, much less to *one* who has been your personal and political friend for the last fifteen years. Yet, as matters now stand, I feel that great injustice has been done me, and that *you alone* have the power of correction. I allude to the order of the Secretary of War, Mr. Randolph, in regard to the operations of the army at Fort Donelson. Without intending any reflection upon Mr. Randolph, it is nevertheless not improper to inform you that he was my *personal enemy*, growing out of my controversy with General Scott, in which Mr. N. P. Trist (Mr. Randolph's brother-in-law) was a chief witness. I think it the more necessary to give this information because you mentioned in my presence to Mr. Randolph that you had not seen the order until in that interview.

Knowing the view you took of the operations of the army at that place, upon the then existing state of the case as it appeared in the record (the Secretary's order having been based entirely on the report of General Buckner, in which I know he had fallen into error), I have since taken the testimony of General B. R. Johnson, General Forrest, and Colonel Gilmer, all of whom testify that, in the *then condition of our army* and in the face of General C. F. Smith's fresh force of 20,000 men, a successful retreat of our army was *impracticable*, and that no previous determination to retreat from the battle-field had been determined upon or even suggested.

I have also taken the sworn testimony of four other witnesses, to wit: Captain Hinson, Dr. Moore, Captain Newberry, and Lieutenant Hollister, all of whom testify that the enemy had not *reinvested* our position or army on the night of the 15th February, as was then supposed, and never did reinvest, and that the army was surrendered under a *delusion*, and that our army could have marched out on the night of the 15th or morning of the 16th February without any obstacle or opposition. If these facts be so, and they are fully so proved by the most indisputable testimony, it follows as a necessary consequence that I was right in not attempting to retreat when it was impracticable on the 15th, and that the *error* was committed by the *officers* who refused to march out on



the night of the 15th, when we could have done so without risk or obstacle. Upon this point I inclose you the statement of Brig. Gen. W. A. Quarles, recently furnished me, having just met him for the first time since we separated at Donelson.

All this testimony is on file in the War Office, but has never, I presume, been laid before you. When I last saw you in Richmond, in November last, you told me you had *not* seen *any* of the testimony, but you assured me, as soon as your public duties would permit, after your return from your western tour, you would take the case up, examine it, and "*would do me justice.*" Under this assurance I have been content to work on in the humble position to which I have been assigned, never doubting but that you would ultimately do me justice. To my letters to the Secretary of War I have received no answer; my communications transmitting the proofs above adverted to were not even acknowledged.

I am therefore driven to the necessity of addressing you privately and unofficially, appealing to your sense of justice, or of resting forever under the censure implied by the order of Secretary Randolph, while the proof on file, but which you have not seen, fully vindicates me against the very *error* ascribed to me as *causing* the sacrifice of that army. My position is rendered more painful from the conviction resting upon the minds of my friends, who know the truth of the case, and of that of the public, resulting from the fact that I have never been promoted while all others who fought under me have been. They very naturally suppose that there is something else in my conduct which your judgment condemns as much more criminal than even the error ascribed to me in the order.

Under these circumstances I feel well assured, from my knowledge of your character, that you will pardon the liberty which, as a citizen, I take of calling your attention to the case of an injured officer and earnestly asking your attention to the case. If you will take up the case and examine the proof I will cheerfully submit to your own sense of right and justice.

I am, sir, with great respect, your friend and obedient servant,  
GID. J. PILLOW.

—  
MARIETTA, GA., October 3, 1863.

His Excellency President DAVIS:

Having found the original letter or statement of General Quarles, I herewith forward it. You will perceive an error in the copy I sent you, the copy using the word "partially" instead of "positively" in regard to the determination to surrender the command.

With assurances of my continued friendship, I am, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW.

[Inclosure.]

*Col. W. A. Quarles' statement of facts relative to Fort Donelson.*

MARIETTA, GA., August 1, 1863.

General GIDEON J. PILLOW:

In accordance with your request I make the following statement of a conversation with you on the morning of the day of the surrender of the troops at Fort Donelson:

I called at the general headquarters for orders, and while there heard that we were about to be surrendered.

I immediately approached you and asked you if it was true. You replied it was. I then asked you if there was no possible way to prevent it and fight out. Your reply was, "No; I have fought against the surrender in the council, but my senior and junior in command overrule me. I can do nothing; I am powerless; the surrender has been positively determined on; had I my way I would fight the troops; I believe I could get them out." Your words are impressed upon my memory, and I think I give your very language.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. A. QUARLES,

*Colonel Forty-second Tennessee Regiment.*

This conversation was before the flag of truce was sent out.

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No. 52.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, U. S. Army, commanding division, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS CUMBERLAND ARMY,

*Dover, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

SIR: It becomes my duty to report that the remains of this army, after winning some brilliant successes both in repulsing the assaults of the enemy and in sallying successfully through their lines, have been reduced to the necessity of a surrender.

At the earliest practicable day I will send a detailed report of its operations. I can only say now that, after the battle of the 15th instant had been won and my division of the army was being established in position to cover the retreat of the army, the plan of battle seemed to have been changed and the troops were ordered back to the trenches. Before my own division returned to their works on the extreme right the lines were assailed at that point and my extreme right was occupied by a large force of the enemy, but I successfully repelled their further assaults.

It was the purpose of General Floyd to effect the retreat of the army over the ground which had been won in the morning, and the troops moved from their works with that view; but before any movement for that purpose was organized a reconnaissance showed that the ground was occupied by the enemy in great strength. General Floyd then determined to retreat across the river with such force as could escape; but as there were no boats until nearly daylight on the 16th, he left with some regiments of Virginia troops about daylight, and was accompanied by Brigadier-General Pillow.

I was thus left in command of the remnant of the army, which had been placed in movement for a retreat which was discovered to be impracticable. My men were in a state of complete exhaustion from extreme suffering from cold and fatigue. The supply of ammunition, especially for the artillery, was being rapidly exhausted; the army was to a great extent demoralized by the retrograde movement. On being placed in command I ordered such troops as could not cross the river to return to their intrenchments, to make at the last moment such resistance as was possible to the overwhelming force of the enemy. But a small portion of the forces had returned to the lines when I received from General Grant a reply to my proposal to negotiate for terms of



surrender. To have refused his terms would, in the condition of the army at that time, have led to the massacre of my troops without any advantage resulting from the sacrifice. I therefore felt it my highest duty to these brave men, whose conduct had been so brilliant and whose sufferings had been so intense, to accept the ungenerous terms proposed by the Federal commander, who overcame us solely by overwhelming superiority of numbers. This army is accordingly prisoners of war, the officers retaining their side-arms and private property and the soldiers their clothing and blankets. I regret to state, however, that, notwithstanding the earnest efforts of General Grant and many of his officers to prevent it, our camps have been a scene of almost indiscriminate pillage by the Federal troops.

In conclusion, I request, at the earliest time practicable, a court of inquiry, to examine into the causes of this army.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Nashville, Tenn.*

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RICHMOND, VA., *August 11, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of that portion of the Second Division of the Central Army of Kentucky which was detached from Bowling Green and Russellville, Ky., to aid in the defense of Fort Donelson and the village of Dover, on the Cumberland River, Tenn.:

By the courtesy of Brig. Gen. Grant, U. S. Army, I was permitted to transmit to Clarksville, Tenn., a brief report of the surrender of Fort Donelson, but, as I now learn it never reached the headquarters of General A. S. Johnston, I transmit herewith a copy.

I have been prevented from making an early report by the refusal of the Federal authorities during my imprisonment either to permit me to make a report or to receive the report of subordinate commanders. Such, indeed, was the discourtesy of the Federal War Department that, though kept in solitary confinement during my imprisonment and prevented from holding communications with any of my fellow-prisoners, a request on my part to be informed of the cause of a proceeding so unusual amongst nations pretending to follow the rules of civilized warfare failed to elicit a response.

On February 11 ultimo Brigadier-General Floyd had resolved to concentrate his division and my own at Cumberland City, with a view of operating from some point on the railway west of that position in the direction of Fort Donelson or Fort Henry, thus maintaining his communications with Nashville by the way of Charlotte.

I reached Fort Donelson on the night of February 11, with orders from General Floyd to direct General Pillow to send back at once to Cumberland City the troops which had been designated.

Before leaving Clarksville I had, by authority of General Floyd, ordered Scott's regiment of Louisiana cavalry to operate on the north side of the Cumberland River, in the direction of Fort Donelson, with a view to prevent the establishment of any of the enemy's field batteries which might interfere with our transports. General Pillow declined to execute the order of which I was the bearer until he should have a personal interview with General Floyd.



Accordingly on the morning of the 12th he left me temporarily in command and proceeded himself in a steamer to Cumberland City. Before leaving he informed me that he had directed a reconnaissance to be made by Colonel Forrest's cavalry, with instructions in no event to bring on an engagement should the enemy approach in force.

General Pillow left me under the impression that he did not expect an immediate advance of the enemy, and regarded their approach from the direction of Fort Henry as impracticable. During the morning Forrest reported the enemy advancing in force, with the view of enveloping our line of defense, and for a time he was engaged with his usual gallantry in heavy skirmishing with them, at one time driving one of their battalions back upon their artillery.

About noon General Pillow returned and resumed command, it having been determined to re-enforce the garrison with the remaining troops from Cumberland City and Clarksville.

The defenses were in a very imperfect condition. The space to be defended by the army was quadrangular in shape, being limited on the north by the Cumberland River, on the east and west by small streams now converted into deep sloughs by the high water, and on the south by our line of defense. The river line exceeded a mile in length. The line of defense was about two miles and a half long, and its distance from the river varied from one-fourth to three-fourths of a mile. The line of intrenchments consisted of a few logs rolled together and but slightly covered with earth, forming an insufficient protection even against field artillery.

Not more than one-third of the line was completed on the morning of the 12th. It had been located under the direction of that able engineer officer Major Gilmer near the crests of a series of ridges, which sloped backwards to the river, and were again commanded in several places by other ridges at a still greater distance from the river. This chain of heights was intersected by deep valleys and ravines, which materially interfered with communications between different parts of the line. Between the village of Dover and the water batteries a broad and deep valley, extending directly back from the river and flooded by the high water, intersected the quadrangular area occupied by the army and almost completely isolated the right wing. That part of the line which covered the land approach to the water batteries, and constituted our right wing, was assigned to me, with a portion of my division, consisting of the Third or Col. John C. Brown's brigade, which was composed of the Third Tennessee Volunteers (which was Colonel Brown's regiment); Eighteenth Tennessee Regiment, Col. Jos. B. Palmer; Thirty-second Tennessee Regiment, Colonel [E. C.] Cook; half of Colonel Baldwin's Second Brigade (temporarily attached to Colonel Brown's); Second Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Col. R. W. Hanson; Fourteenth Mississippi Volunteers, Major [W. L.] Doss; Forty-first Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel [Robert] Farquharson; Porter's battery of six field pieces, and Graves' battery of six field pieces.

The remaining regiments of Baldwin's brigade, the Twenty-sixth Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel [John M.] Lillard, and the Twenty-sixth Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel [A. E.] Reynolds, together with the brigade commander, were detached from my command by Brigadier-General Pillow, and assigned a position on the left of the line of intrenchments.

The work on my lines was prosecuted with energy and was urged forward as rapidly as the limited number of tools would permit, so that by the morning of the 13th my position was in a respectable state of defense.

My disposition of the troops was as follows :

Hanson's regiment on the extreme right; Palmer's regiment, with its reserve, in position to re-enforce Hanson; Porter's battery occupying the advanced salient, sweeping the road which led to the front, and flanking the intrenchments both to the right and to the left. The reserve of the Fourteenth Mississippi was held as its support. Brown's, Cook's, and Farquharson's regiments were on the left. Graves' battery occupied a position near the extreme left of the intrenchments on the declivity of the hill, whence it swept the valley with its fire and flanked the position of Colonel Heiman to the east of the valley.

From three to five companies of each regiment were deployed as skirmishers in the rifle pits. The other companies of each regiment were massed in columns, sheltered from the enemy's fire behind the irregularities of the ground, and held in convenient positions to re-enforce any portion of the line that might be seriously threatened.

No serious demonstration was made on our lines on the 12th.

Early on the morning of the 13th a column of the enemy's infantry, which was apparently forming to move down the valley between my left and Heiman's right, was driven back by a few well-directed shots from Graves' battery.

About 10 o'clock in the morning the enemy made a vigorous attack upon Hanson's position, but was repulsed with heavy loss. The attack was subsequently renewed by three heavy regiments, but was again repulsed by the Second Kentucky Regiment, aided by a part of the Eighteenth Tennessee. In both these affairs, and also in a third repulse of the enemy from the same position, Porter's battery played a conspicuous part.

About 11 o'clock a strong attack was made on Colonel Heiman's position beyond my left. A well-directed fire from Graves' battery upon the flank of the assaulting column materially contributed to repulse the enemy with heavy loss.

The fire of the enemy's artillery and riflemen was incessant throughout the day, but was responded to by a well-directed fire from the intrenchments, which inflicted upon the assailant considerable loss and almost silenced his fire late in the afternoon.

On the preceding night General Floyd had arrived and assumed command of all the troops, and during the morning visited and inspected my lines. My loss during the day was 39 in killed and wounded.

The enemy were comparatively quiet in front of my position during the 14th. On the morning of that day I was summoned to a council of general officers, in which it was decided unanimously, in view of the arrival of heavy re-enforcements of the enemy below, to make an immediate attack upon their right, in order to open our communications with Charlotte, in the direction of Nashville. It was urged that this attack should be made at once, before the disembarkation of the enemy's re-enforcements, supposed to be about 15,000 men. I proposed, with my division, to cover the retreat of the army should the sortie prove successful. I made the necessary dispositions preparatory to executing the movement, but early in the afternoon the order was countermanded by General Floyd, at the instance, as I afterwards learned, of General Pillow, who, after drawing out his troops for the attack, thought it too late for the attempt.

On the night of the 14th it was unanimously decided, in a council of general officers and regimental commanders, to attack the enemy's right at daylight. The object of the attack was to force our way through his lines, recover our communications, and effect our retreat upon Nashville



by way of Charlotte, Tenn. This movement had become imperatively necessary in consequence of the vastly superior and constantly increasing force of the enemy, who had already completely enveloped our position. The general plan was for General Pillow to attack his extreme right, and for that portion of my division remaining under my command, after being relieved in the rifle pits by Colonel Head's regiment, to make an attack upon the right of the enemy's center, and, if successful, to take up a position in advance of our works on the Wynn's Ferry road, to cover the retreat of the whole army, after which my division was to act as the rear guard.

On Saturday morning, the 15th, a considerable portion of my division was delayed by the non-arrival of Head's regiment at the appointed time, and by the slippery condition of the icy road, which forbade a rapid march. My advance regiment, however (the Third Tennessee), reached its position by daylight in rear of a portion of the intrenchments which had been occupied by General Pillow's troops. As no guards had been left in this portion of the line, and even a battery was left in position without a cannoneer, I deployed the Third Tennessee in the rifle pits, to cover the formation of my division as it arrived. The regiments were formed partly in line and partly in column, and covered from the enemy's artillery fire by a slight acclivity in front. In the mean time the attack on the enemy's right was made in the most gallant and determined manner by the division of General Pillow. For the progress of that action I refer to the reports of Colonel Baldwin, Colonel Gregg, and their subordinate commanders, which have been transmitted to me, as the senior officer left with the army.

In front of my position the enemy had a heavy battery posted on the Wynn's Ferry road, with another battery opposite my left—both sustained by a heavy infantry force.

Major Davidson, acting chief of my artillery, established Graves' battery to the left of the Wynn's Ferry road and opened upon the enemy's batteries a destructive fire. I also directed a portion of the artillery to open upon the flank and left rear of the enemy's infantry, who were contesting the advance of General Pillow's division. In view of the heavy duty which I expected my division to undergo in covering the retreat of the army, I thought it unadvisable to attempt an assault at this time in my front until the enemy's batteries were to some extent crippled and their supports shaken by the fire of my artillery.

About 9 o'clock General Pillow urged an advance to relieve his forces. I accordingly sent forward the Fourteenth Mississippi, Major Doss, deployed as skirmishers. At the request of its commander I assigned the direction of its movements to Maj. Alexander Casseday, of my staff. The line of skirmishers was sustained by the Third and Eighteenth Tennessee. Their line of march unfortunately masked the fire of my artillery upon the Wynn's Ferry road, but it continued to play with effect upon the force which was opposing General Pillow's advance. The combined attack compelled the enemy to retire, not, however, without inflicting upon my troops considerable loss. Under a misapprehension of instructions, at a time when my artillery was directed over the heads of the advanced troops upon the enemy's battery, these regiments withdrew without panic, but in some confusion, to the trenches, after the enemy's infantry had been driven a considerable distance from their position.

As the enemy's line of retreat was along the Wynn's Ferry road, I now organized an attack farther to my right, up a deep valley, which led



from Heiman's left, in rear of the position occupied by the enemy's batteries.

In order to cover the advance of the infantry column I directed Captain Porter, with his artillerists, to serve Green's battery, which was already in position, and at the same time sent a request to Colonel Heiman to direct Maney's battery to open its fire, while he should deploy a line of skirmishers in advance of his position to cover the right of the valley. General Pillow was at this time, as I afterwards learned, on the heights to my right, occupied by Heiman. Maney's, Porter's, and Graves' batteries now opened a cross-fire upon the enemy's battery and position, soon crippling some of his guns and driving their supports, while the Third, Eighteenth, and Thirty-second Tennessee Regiments, under their brigade commander, Col. John C. Brown, moved steadily up the valley, preceded by their skirmishers, who soon became engaged with those of the enemy. This movement, combined with the brisk fire of three batteries, induced a rapid retreat of the enemy, who abandoned a section of his artillery. At the same time my infantry were thus penetrating the enemy's line of retreat Forrest, with a portion of his cavalry, charged upon their right, while General Pillow's division, under the orders of General B. R. Johnson and Colonel Baldwin, were pressing their extreme right about half a mile to the left of this position.

In this latter movement a section of Graves' battery participated, playing with destructive effect upon the enemy's left, while about the same time the Second Kentucky, under Colonel Hanson, charged in quick-time, as if upon parade, through an open field and under a destructive fire, without firing a gun, upon a superior force of the enemy, who broke and fled in all directions. A large portion of the enemy's right dispersed through the woods, and made their way, as was afterwards learned, to Fort Henry.

While this movement was going on I conducted one piece of artillery, under Captain Graves, along the Wynn's Ferry road, supported by the Fourteenth Mississippi, and sent orders to the residue of Graves' battery and Porter's and Jackson's batteries and Farquharson's Tennessee regiment to follow the movement with rapidity. I also sent to direct Hanson's regiment to rejoin me. The enemy, in his retreat, had now taken up a strong position on the road beyond the point where it crosses the valley. I directed the position to be attacked by the Third, Eighteenth, and Thirty-second Tennessee Regiments, the first on the left, the others on the right of the road, while Graves' piece took position in the road within 250 or 300 yards of the enemy's guns. These regiments, under the immediate command of Colonel Brown, advanced gallantly to the attack, while Graves' piece responded with effect to the enemy's artillery. Notwithstanding their vast superiority in numbers, the enemy were driven, with very heavy loss, from their position, and retreated to the right of Wynn's Ferry road, leaving it entirely open. In this position I awaited the arrival of my artillery and reserves, either to continue the pursuit of the enemy or to defend the position I now held, in order that the army might pass out on the Forge road, which was now completely covered by the position occupied by my division. But General Pillow had prevented my artillery from leaving the intrenchments, and had ordered Farquharson not to join me, and also sent me reiterated orders to return to my intrenchments on the extreme right. I was in the act of returning to the lines when I met General Floyd, who seemed surprised at the order. At his request to know my opinion of the movement I replied that nothing had occurred to change my views of the necessity of the evacuation of the post, that the road was

open, that the first part of our purpose was fully accomplished, and I thought we should at once avail ourselves of the existing opportunity to regain our communications. These seemed to be his own views; for he directed me to halt my troops and remain in position until he should have conversed with General Pillow, who was now within the intrenchments.

After that consultation he sent me an order to retire within the lines and to repair as rapidly as possible to my former position on the extreme right, which was in danger of attack. The enemy made no attempt at pursuit. I secured the section of artillery which had been captured, and covered my retrograde movement by Hanson's and Farquharson's regiments. My troops were already much exhausted, but returned as rapidly as possible, a distance of 2 miles, to their positions. But a small portion of my division had reached their position when a division of the enemy, under command of General C. F. Smith, assaulted the extreme right of my position, falling upon Hanson's regiment before it had reached its rifle pits. This gallant regiment was necessarily thrown back in confusion upon the position of the Eighteenth Tennessee. At this period I reached that position, and, aided by a number of officers, I succeeded in hastily forming a line behind the crest of the hill which overlooked the detached works which had been seized by the enemy before Hanson had been able to throw his regiment into them. The enemy advanced gallantly upon this new position, but was repulsed with heavy loss. I re-enforced this position by other regiments as they successively arrived and by a section of Graves' battery, while a section of Porter's battery was placed in its former position. During a contest of more than two hours the enemy threatened my left with a heavy column and made repeated attempts to storm my line on the right, but the well-directed fire of Porter's and Graves' artillery and the musketry fire of the infantry repelled the attempts, and finally drove him to seek shelter behind the works he had taken and amid the irregularities of the ground. There was probably no period of the action when his force was not from three to five times the strength of mine. Towards the close of the action I was re-enforced by the regiments of Colonels Quarles, Sugg, and Bailey. Generals Floyd and Pillow also visited the position about the close of the action.

In a council of general and field officers, held after night, it was unanimously resolved that if the enemy had not reoccupied in strength the position in front of General Pillow the army should effect its retreat, and orders to assemble the regiments for that purpose were given by General Floyd; but as the enemy had late in the afternoon appeared in considerable force on the battle-field of the morning, a reconnaissance was ordered, I think by General Pillow, under the instructions of General Floyd. The report of this reconnaissance, made by Colonel Forrest, has been fully stated by Generals Floyd and Pillow, and, from what I have been able to learn since, I am satisfied the information reported was correct.

Among other incidents showing that the enemy had not only reoccupied their former ground, but extended their lines still farther to our left, is the fact that Overton's cavalry, following after Forrest's, was cut off from retreat by an infantry force of the enemy at the point where Forrest had crossed the stream on the river road. When the information of our reinvestment was reported, General Floyd, General Pillow, and myself were the only members of the council present. Both of these officers have stated the views of the council, but my recollection of some of the incidents narrated differ so materially from that of General Pil-



low, that, without intending any reflection upon either of those officers, I feel called upon to notice some of the differences of opinion between us.

Both officers have correctly stated that I regarded the position of the army as desperate, and that an attempt to extricate it by another battle, in the suffering and exhausted condition of the troops, was almost hopeless. The troops had been worn down with watching, with labor, with fighting. Many of them were frosted by the intensity of the cold; all of them were suffering and exhausted by their incessant labors. There had been no regular issue of rations for a number of days and scarcely any means of cooking. Their ammunition was nearly expended. We were completely invested by a force fully four times the strength of our own. In their exhausted condition they could not have made a march. An attempt to make a sortie would have been resisted by a superior force of fresh troops, and that attempt would have been the signal for the fall of the water batteries and the presence of the enemy's gunboats sweeping with the fire at close range the positions of our troops, who would thus have been assailed on their front, rear, and right flank at the same instant. The result would have been a virtual massacre of the troops, more disheartening in its effects than a surrender.

In this opinion General Floyd coincided, and I am certain that both he and I were convinced that General Pillow agreed with us in opinion. General Pillow then asked our opinion as to the practicability of holding our position another day. I replied that my right was already turned, a portion of my intrenchments in the enemy's possession—they were in position successfully to assail my position and the water batteries—and that, with my weakened and exhausted force, I could not successfully resist the assault which would be made at daylight by a vastly superior force. I farther remarked that I understood the principal object of the defense of Donelson to be to cover the movement of General A. S. Johnston's army from Bowling Green to Nashville, and that if that movement was not completed it was my opinion that we should attempt a further defense, even at the risk of the destruction of our entire force, as the delay even of a few hours might gain the safety of General Johnston's force. General Floyd remarked that General Johnston's army had already reached Nashville. I then expressed the opinion that it would be wrong to subject the army to a virtual massacre when no good could result from the sacrifice, and that the general officers owed it to their men, when further resistance was unavailing, to obtain the best terms of capitulation possible for them. General Floyd expressed himself in similar terms, and in his opinion I understood General Pillow to acquiesce. For reasons which he has stated General Floyd then announced his purpose to leave, with such portions of his division as could be transported in two small steamers, which were expected about daylight. General Pillow, addressing General Floyd, then remarked that he thought there were no two persons in the Confederacy whom the Yankees would prefer to capture than himself and General Floyd, and asked the latter's opinion as to the propriety of his accompanying General Floyd. To this inquiry the latter replied that it was a question for every man to decide for himself. General Pillow then addressed the inquiry to me, to which I remarked that I could only reply as General Floyd had done, that it was a question for every officer to decide for himself, and that in my own case I regarded it as my duty to remain with my men and share their fate, whatever it might be. General Pillow, however, announced his purpose to leave; when General Floyd directed me to consider myself in command. I remarked that a capitulation would be as bitter to me as it could be to any one, but I regarded it as a



necessity of our position, and I could not reconcile it with my sense of duty to separate my fortune from those of my command.

It is due to General Pillow to state that some time after the command had been transferred to me, and while preparations were making for his departure, he returned to the room and said to General Floyd and myself that he wished it understood that he had thought it would have been better to have held the fort another day, in order to await the arrival of steamers to transport the troops across the river. I again recapitulated my reasons for thinking it impossible to hold our position; and, whatever may have been General Pillow's opinion, he certainly impressed me with the belief that he again acquiesced in the necessity of a surrender.

It was now near daylight of Sunday morning, the 16th. I ordered the troops back to their positions in intrenchments, and addressed a note, a copy of which is inclosed, to the Federal commander, Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant. His reply is also transmitted.\* When it was received, but a small portion of the troops had returned to their lines. A portion of my field guns had been spiked when the troops had been withdrawn under General Floyd's order. The gunners had not yet returned to the water batteries. A degree of confusion, amounting almost to a state of disorganization, resulting from the knowledge of our position, pervaded a considerable portion of the troops. A corps of not less than 15,000 of the enemy, with fifteen pieces of artillery, were in position to assault the extreme right of the line, which was effectually turned and the water batteries exposed to assault, without the power of resisting the attack. At the point most strongly threatened I could not have opposed at the time a thousand men. Every road leading from the lines was effectually closed. Even the river road, by which the cavalry had left and which was impassable by infantry, was closed by a force of the enemy within fifteen minutes after Forrest had passed, and Overton's cavalry was forced to return to the lines. The troops were broken down by unusual privations. Most of them had labored or fought almost incessantly for a week. From Thursday morning until Saturday night they had been almost constantly under fire. From Thursday evening until Sunday morning they had suffered intensely in a heavy snow-storm and from intense cold, almost without shelter, with insufficient food, and almost without sleep. They had behaved with a gallantry unsurpassed, until the power of further endurance was exhausted. The supply of ammunition was very small.

The aggregate of the army, never greater than 12,000, was now reduced to less than 9,000 men after the departure of General Floyd's brigade. The investing force of the enemy was about 50,000 strong, and considerably exceeded that force by the following morning. Under these circumstances no alternative was left me but to accept the terms demanded by our ungenerous enemy. A copy of the order of General Grant, fixing the terms of surrender, is herewith inclosed.

I do not seek to avoid any responsibility which in the judgment of the President may attach to my action, which was guided in every instance by a feeling of duty. My chief wish is that he will find it consistent with the public interest to permit me still to unite my fortunes in the contest for independence with those of the brave men whose gallantry I have witnessed, whose dangers and hardships I have shared, and in common with whom I have endured the privations of imprisonment among a vindictive and tyrannical foe.

I cannot close this report without calling special attention to the gal-

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\* This correspondence follows Grant's report, p. 160.

lant and able conduct of my brigade commanders, Col. John C. Brown, of the Third Tennessee; William E. Baldwin, of the Fourteenth Mississippi, and R. W. Hanson, commanding the Second Kentucky, detached from Breckinridge's Kentucky brigade.

For the operations of Colonel Baldwin's troops I refer to his report, as he was detached from my command during the siege. But he, as well as the other two officers, were conspicuous on every occasion for their gallantry and military judgment, and merit the special approbation of the Government.

Among the regimental commanders, Cols. J. M. Lillard and E. C. Cook merit the highest commendation for their gallant bearing and the excellent manner in which they handled their regiments. Maj. W. L. Doss behaved with marked gallantry. Maj. George B. Cosby, my chief of staff, deserves the highest commendation for the gallant and intelligent discharge of his duties, and the other members of my staff are entitled to my thanks for their gallantry and for the efficient discharge of their appropriate duties. Lieuts. Charles F. Johnson, aide-de-camp, and T. J. Clay, acting aide; Majs. Alexander Casseday, acting inspector-general, and S. K. Hays, quartermaster; Capt. R. C. Winter-smith, commissary of subsistence; Major Davidson, chief of artillery; Messrs. J. N. Gallaher, acting aide; Moore, acting topographical officer; J. Walker Taylor, commanding a detachment of guides, and D. P. Buckner, volunteer aide.

Major Barbour, aide-de-camp to Brigadier-General Tilghman, though wounded, remained with me on the 13th. I cannot bestow sufficient praise upon Captains Porter and Rice E. Graves and their officers and men for the gallant and efficient handling of their batteries. Artillery was never better served, and artillerymen never behaved under trying circumstances with greater coolness. Porter's battery, from its exposed position, lost more than half its gunners, and its intrepid commander was severely wounded late in the afternoon of Saturday, being succeeded in command by the gallant Lieutenant Morton. Captain Jackson's Virginia battery, though not so frequently engaged, is entitled to notice.

For an understanding of the particular operations of General Pillow's division I refer you to the reports of his brigade commanders, Cols. William E. Baldwin, A. Heiman, and John Gregg, and to the reports of their subordinate commanders.

Accompanying this report is a list of the strength of my division and of its killed and wounded. My aggregate force at the beginning of the contests, which was constantly diminishing, did not exceed 3,025 infantry and two batteries of artillery. Two of my regiments, in addition (844 men), were constantly under the command of General Pillow. The length of my lines exceeded three-fourths of a mile.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,

*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army,*

*Lately Comdg. Second Division, Central Army of Kentucky.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adj. and Insp. Gen. C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.*

[Inclosures.]

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. — }

HEADQUARTERS ARMY IN THE FIELD,  
*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 16, 1862.*

All prisoners taken at the surrender of Fort Donelson will be collected as rapidly as practicable near the village of Dover, under their respect-

ive company and regimental commanders, or in such manner as may be deemed best by Brig. Gen. S. B. Buckner, and will receive two days' rations, preparatory to embarking for Cairo.

Prisoners are to be allowed their clothing, blankets, and such private property as may be carried about the person, and commissioned officers will be allowed their side-arms.

By order:

U. S. GRANT,  
Brigadier-General.

*Summary of killed and wounded in the Second Division, Central Army of Kentucky.*

Organizations.	Killed.	Wounded.	Aggregate.
In the 3d Brigade, Col. John C. Brown commanding .....	38	246	284
2d Kentucky Regiment (about) .....			80
Issaquena Battery (about) .....			3
Porter's battery (about) .....			25
Totals .....	38	246	392
In the two regiments of the 2d Brigade, Colonel Baldwin, detached and under the command of General Pillow:			
26th Tennessee .....	11	78	
26th Mississippi .....	11	68	
Staff and other officers .....	2	15	
Aggregate .....			185
Total .....			577

The approximate aggregate strength of the various regiments was as follows:

Organizations.	Totals.	Aggregate.
3d Tennessee .....	750	
18th Tennessee .....	625	
32d Tennessee .....	400	
14th Mississippi .....	650	
41st Tennessee .....	400	
2d Kentucky .....	600	
Aggregate strength of Buckner's division, under his own command, exclusive of two batteries of artillery. ....		3,425
26th Tennessee .....	401	
26th Mississippi .....	443	
Aggregate detached under General Pillow .....		844
Aggregate infantry of Buckner's division, under him and General Pillow. ....		4,269

*Estimates of killed and wounded in portions of General Pillow's command, reporting through General Buckner.*

Organizations.	Killed.	Wounded.
Colonel Heiman's brigade .....	10	30
Colonel Gregg's regiment .....	20	34
Major Brown's regiment .....	18	55
Total .....	48	119
Aggregate .....		167



## No. 53.

*Report of Col. William E. Baldwin, Fourteenth Mississippi Infantry, commanding Second Brigade.*

FORT WARREN, BOSTON HARBOR, March 12, 1862.

SIR: Left by General Buckner at Cumberland City on February 11, on the night of the 12th ultimo I received orders by telegraph from Brigadier-General Pillow, commanding at Fort Donelson, to hasten to that place with two regiments of my command. The Twenty-sixth Tennessee, Colonel Lillard, and the Twenty-sixth Mississippi, Colonel Reynolds, were immediately embarked, and arrived at Dover about 1 a. m. Thursday, the 13th. These regiments were at first posted immediately on the left of the center of our lines of rifle trenches, as a support to one of our batteries. This disposition was changed after daylight the same morning; the Twenty-sixth Mississippi being placed in the trenches on the extreme left and the Twenty-sixth Tennessee placed in reserve as a support to the former.

About 9 a. m. the enemy commenced a brisk artillery fire apparently on our whole line. This fire, kept up with but little intermission throughout the entire day, produced but little effect upon the left until late in the evening, when, the enemy having reduced his charges, several of the shells, which had previously passed too high, fell in our midst, mortally wounding one man and slightly wounding two others in Colonel Lillard's regiment.

On the 14th the fire was not renewed. About noon General Pillow directed the left wing to be formed in the open ground to the left and rear of our position in the lines, for the purpose apparently of attacking the enemy's right. My command, to which the Twentieth Mississippi, Major Brown, was temporarily attached, constituted the advance, in the following order: 1st, the Twenty-sixth Mississippi; 2d, the Twenty-sixth Tennessee; 3d, the Twentieth Mississippi.

Formed in column by platoon, we advanced in a road leading from a point about 200 yards from the left of our trenches, and approaching nearly perpendicularly the enemy's right. We had proceeded not more than one-fourth of a mile, when General Pillow ordered a countermarch, saying that it was too late in the day to accomplish anything; and we returned to our former position in the lines.

Late that night commanders of brigades were summoned to a council at General Pillow's headquarters, where, after being duly advised of our perilous situation, enveloped by a largely superior force, which was being constantly increased, and our communications already at the mercy of the enemy, it was unanimously determined to endeavor to extricate the army by a bold and vigorous attack on the right of the Federal lines early on the morrow.

The regiments composing our left wing were to form at 4 a. m. on the same ground and in the same order as on the previous evening, and to advance, under command of General Pillow, to attack the extreme right of the enemy, supposed to be posted in force at a distance of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  or 2 miles.

This movement was to be supported by our right wing, under General Buckner, who was to move from the lines at a later period, follow up the first blow, and, should the combined movement not prove successful in creating a panic in the enemy's ranks, a way might at least be opened, by turning his right, for the egress of our whole force. In anticipation of thus attempting our escape, the men were directed to take

knapsacks, blankets, and all the rations that could be immediately provided.

Precisely at 4.10 on the morning of Saturday, the 15th, General Pillow arrived on the ground, and found my three regiments, which were to constitute the advance, formed and ready to march. Some delay was caused by regiments not arriving promptly, and it was 6 o'clock before the column was put in motion. Marching by the right flank in a narrow and obstructed by-road, the head of the column had advanced not more than one-third of a mile when, ascending a slight elevation, the advanced guard, composed of a company of the Twenty-sixth Mississippi deployed, was fired upon by what was supposed at first to be only the enemy's pickets. A second company of the same regiment was immediately thrown forward to support the first; but both were soon driven back by a brisk and well-sustained fire, which indicated the presence of a considerable force. Meanwhile the column was formed by company and the leading regiment deployed into line to the right. This method of forming line of battle was rendered advisable by the peculiar features of the ground, which sloped gently to the right, thickly covered with timber. About 10 yards to the left of the road, and running nearly parallel, was a fence, which bounded on that side an open field of some 400 or 500 acres' extent. This field afforded no protection to our troops if brought "forward into line," but would expose them, in executing the movement, to a destructive fire, should the enemy have taken advantage of the position.

In executing the deployment the Twenty-sixth Mississippi was three times thrown into confusion by the close and rapid fire of the enemy, taking the men in flank, and three times were they rallied, finishing the movement some 50 yards to the rear and a little to the right of the exact point where their line should have been placed. The subsequent conduct of this regiment fully demonstrates the fact that any other than forward movements are extremely dangerous with volunteers, for during the remainder of the day both officers and men behaved with great coolness and gallantry.

The Twenty-sixth Tennessee was then brought forward, and five companies deployed so as to occupy the space between the fence on the left and the Twenty-sixth Mississippi on the right, leaving the remaining five companies in column in the road to strengthen that point, which would evidently become the center and pivot of operations.

Soon after this disposition was completed, a staff officer having been sent to advise General Pillow that the enemy was before us in force, other regiments were sent forward from the rear of the column to the right and left. Colonel McCausland, of Virginia, with his command, formed on the right of the Twenty-sixth Mississippi, the First Mississippi, Colonel Gregg's [Seventh] Texas, and Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon's Eighth Kentucky Regiments were formed still farther to our right, the latter regiment thrown back perpendicularly to our line, to prevent the enemy's taking advantage of the cover afforded by the slope of the ground to turn our right.

The Twentieth Mississippi was sent into action, as I have since learned, by direct order of General Pillow, and caused to take position in the field on the left, where they were openly exposed to a destructive fire, which they were not able to return with effect. The regiment was soon recalled, but not before its left wing had suffered heavy loss. Our line advanced some 50 or 100 yards up the slope and remained stationary for more than an hour, the position of the enemy being so well chosen and covered that it seemed impossible to gain an inch of ground. A small



detachment of Virginia troops on the left of the Twenty-sixth Tennessee, and in the open field, twice endeavored to gain ground forward to a point where their fire could be effective, but were unable to stand the destructive effect of the Minie balls.

At this juncture the Twentieth Mississippi again came up across the field and took possession, slightly covered by an irregularity of the ground.

Observing a regiment or more of our troops posted inactive some 300 or 400 yards still more to our left, where the shallow ravine (which covered our front) spread out and was lost in the plain, I requested the commanding officer to throw forward his left and advance up the hollow in a direction nearly parallel to our line of battle, and attack the enemy's right flank. This movement being supported by the whole line, all the regiments on the left throwing forward their left wings, we succeeded in executing a change of front to the right, turning the right of the enemy and driving him at once from his position.

Up to this time our condition was one of extreme peril, and nothing but the native gallantry of troops brought forth for the first time under heavy fire and the extraordinary exertions of many of the field and company officers saved us from being thrown back in confusion into our trenches.

From this time the enemy were slowly driven from each position which the ground favorable for defense enabled them to take. Two sections of artillery were taken. Those placed to bear on our lines of rifle trenches were rushed upon in flanks and seized before they could be turned upon us or be taken from the field. The first section was taken by the Twenty-sixth Tennessee, the second by the Twenty-sixth Mississippi. Advancing in a direction nearly parallel to our line of defense, when nearly opposite the center our course was for some time impeded by the desperate stand made by the enemy, who was probably re-enforced and occupied ground most favorable for sheltering his troops. Our ammunition had been so rapidly expended as to entirely exhaust the supply of some regiments. Numbers had provided themselves from the cartridge boxes of the dead and wounded enemy.

Our force had been considerably reduced by casualties and the numerous attendants who conveyed the wounded from the field. Having no mounted officer to send, I rode up to where Captain Graves' battery was posted in the trenches, and requested supplies of ammunition and re-enforcements, if any could be spared, giving Captain Graves an intimation as to the relative positions of the forces engaged. Immediately on my return he opened a fire of grape, which so disordered the enemy that we were again enabled to advance, driving him from his camp of the night before.

He took a new position, still farther retired, holding it for some time, until Colonel Hanson, with the Second Kentucky Regiment, coming to our assistance, poured a fire into the enemy's flank, who immediately fled in confusion.

This completed the rout of the extreme right of the Federal forces. Uncertain as to the movements of our right wing, I paused to obtain the information necessary to render our future movements effective and to restore order from the confusion incident to a continuous combat of nearly six hours in the woods.

Here General B. R. Johnson came up to me for the first time, although I learned that he had at different times during the morning directed other portions of the line. He could give no information, but soon after, while my attention was directed to the Twenty-sixth Mississippi and Twenty-



sixth Tennessee, moved off all the other regiments, including the Twentieth Mississippi. I saw no more of these during the remainder of the day.

After the lapse of an hour, observing troops from the right returning to their original positions in the lines, I directed the two regiments left with me also to return to the trenches.

Three times during the day I had sent a staff officer to General Pillow for instructions, advising him of our situation; but no orders or directions were received from him, except to do the best I could.

Being totally unacquainted with the topographical features of the ground and unadvised as to the movements of the general command, it was impossible for me to do more than simply dislodge the enemy as from time to time he made a stand before us.

I would beg leave to remark here that the efficiency of the smooth-bore musket and ball and buck-shot cartridges was fully demonstrated on this occasion, and to recommend that our troops be impressed with the advantage of closing rapidly upon the enemy, when our rapid loading and firing proves immensely destructive and the long-range arms of the enemy lose their superiority.

For lists of killed and wounded, and minor details, recounting the conduct of subaltern officers and men, I beg leave respectfully to refer to the reports of regimental commanders, which accompany this report.

Justice requires that I should refer to the coolness and gallantry of Col. John M. Lillard, who, though wounded in the early part of the engagement, remained at the head of his command during the whole day. It is difficult to determine which deserves most commendation, this regiment or its commander.

Lieut. Col. F. M. Boone and Maj. T. F. Parker, Twenty-sixth Mississippi, both conducted themselves as officers and brave men, and this regiment bore its part well in the conflict.

Major [Wm. N.] Brown, commanding the Twentieth Mississippi, is entitled to honorable mention; his left wing, thrown in the early part of the day into an exposed position by an ill-advised order, held its ground until recalled, and afterwards the whole regiment was among the foremost in every advance.

I cannot forbear to mention that Colonel McCausland, [Thirty-sixth] Virginia, not assigned to my command, voluntarily tendered his co-operation, and was conspicuous for his daring intrepidity. The members of my personal staff deserve especial notice.

Lieut. S. D. Harris, Fourteenth Mississippi, acting assistant adjutant-general, was of great assistance. He merited and has received my thanks. So likewise did Thomas A. Burke, a private in Company I, Fourteenth Mississippi, appointed an acting aide-de-camp. T. F. Carington, a private in Company K, Fourteenth Mississippi, also an acting aide-de-camp, was severely, and I fear mortally, wounded in the early part of the action; an accident which deprived me of the services of a valuable aide.

Capt. D. H. Spence, of Murfreesborough, Tenn., volunteer aide, was severely wounded in the head while gallantly exposing himself on the top of a fence and urging Tennesseans onward.

My own regiment, the Fourteenth Mississippi, Major Doss, was sent to Fort Donelson some days in advance of my arrival. The Forty-first Tennessee, Colonel Farquharson, was brought down on the 13th. Both regiments were posted on the right and temporarily separated from my command.

Neither representations nor solicitations on my part could avail in

inducing such change as would reunite these regiments, or place me where I desired to be, under the immediate direction of my proper commander.

The reports of these latter regiments have been made to Col. John C. Brown, commanding Third Brigade, under whose orders they were temporarily placed.

A condensed statement of killed and wounded is annexed.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. E. BALDWIN,

*Colonel, Comdg. Second Brigade, General Buckner's Division.*

Maj. GEORGE B. COSBY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Inclosure.]

Troops.	Number in action February 15.		Killed.		Wounded.		Aggregate.
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
20th Mississippi.....	31	469	1	18	5	55	79
26th Mississippi.....	39	404	1	11	1	68	81
26th Tennessee.....	33	377		11	7	78	96
Staff.....	5				2		2
Total.....	108	1,250	2	40	15	201	258

#### No. 54.

*Report of Col. Roger W. Hanson, Second Kentucky Infantry (Confederate).*

RICHMOND, VA., August 8, 1862.

On February —, in pursuance of orders, I proceeded, with my regiment upon the cars, from Russellville, Ky., to Clarksville, Tenn. When I arrived there I was ordered by General Pillow to embark immediately for Fort Donelson. I arrived there that night. General Bushrod R. Johnson accompanied us, and when we arrived he took command.

General Pillow arrived on the —, and soon after his arrival he placed the troops in the position afterwards held by them. I was assigned to the extreme right of the line, extending from the right of Colonel Palmer's regiment to a slough formed by the high state of water in the river. The position was about half a mile in length, and was a protection in front and to the right of the original line of defense marked out for the fort. I was directed to construct rifle pits, which I did, locating them more than a hundred yards apart, at points best commanding the approaches to the position. They were made in a day and night, and were necessarily very imperfect. I was directed to give up my tools, to be used upon other parts of the defenses.

On Wednesday, February 12, the enemy made his appearance in large force, pressing around in our front, with the evident intention of investing our position. Nothing was done to oppose or prevent his progress, and the following morning found his lines extending from the point of their disembarking to a point on the river above our position.

On Thursday morning the enemy made three several attacks upon my position; in all of which they were repulsed, with but slight loss upon our part and very heavy upon theirs. In resisting these attacks I was

greatly assisted by Porter's battery upon the left. It always fired at the right time and to the right place.

On Thursday night I was re-enforced by Captain Jackson's Virginia artillery, four pieces. Although the night was cold and inclement, and the men much exhausted from the day's fighting and several days of hard work, we succeeded in getting these pieces in good position and well protected.

On Friday I was re-enforced also by Colonel Palmer's regiment. We remained under arms and in ranks all day Friday, expecting the attack to be renewed. The firing of the sharpshooters was incessant from Thursday morning until the surrender, disturbing and almost destroying the repose of my command.

On Saturday morning I was conducted by yourself to the position assigned us as a reserved regiment and a supporting force for Graves' artillery. I was directed not to leave my trenches until I was relieved by a Tennessee regiment from the fort. The failure of this regiment to arrive as soon as contemplated delayed me in reaching the point assigned me. A small detachment of Tennesseans arrived and I placed them in the trenches, and immediately thereafter moved rapidly to the battle-field.

I remained in rear or near Graves' battery, under the immediate supervision of General Buckner, until about noon, when Colonel Baldwin, of Mississippi, announced to me that he was out of ammunition, and stated that unless he could get ammunition and re-enforcements there was great danger of losing the ground which had been won. I had near by a wagon of ammunition, and with the perseverance of Quartermaster Estep and Lieutenant Semple the ammunition was soon supplied. Previous to this period some one mounted, purporting to be a staff officer, approached the regiment and ordered off two of the left companies to re-enforce Colonel Baldwin's command. These two companies, supposing it to be the order of Generals Pillow or Buckner, moved off at a double-quick, and were soon engaged with the enemy and against greatly superior numbers. Colonel McCausland, of Virginia, arrived, and said that unless they were re-enforced the enemy would retake what they had gained; that after four hours of hard fighting the enemy were bringing forward new troops and in overwhelming numbers. I examined the state of the contest. I saw Colonel Forrest make two gallant but unsuccessful charges. I saw that the enemy were gradually driving us back. My men were eager for the fight. I felt confident that I could dislodge the enemy and drive them from their position. I sent for General Buckner. He had gone to the right and was conducting another movement. There was no time for delay. I concluded to take the responsibility and make the effort. I marched the regiment across the abatis, a distance of more than a quarter of a mile. When I reached the little ravine where Forrest was with his cavalry I halted the regiment, and was joined by the two detached companies. In front of us was an open space, which had formerly been occupied as a camp. This space was about 250 yards in width. Beyond the space in the timber and thick undergrowth the enemy were posted. I directed the regiment, when the command was given, to march at quick-time across the space and not to fire a gun until they reached the woods in which the enemy were posted. The order was admirably executed, and although we lost 50 men in killed and wounded in crossing the space, not a gun was fired until the woods were reached. The enemy stood their ground until we were within 40 yards of them, when they fled in great confusion, under a most destructive fire. This



was not, strictly speaking, a "charge bayonets," but it would have been one if the enemy had not fled. Graves' battery was then moved up, and my regiment moved forward several hundred yards. While Graves was moving up his ammunition and other preparations were being made to hold this position the order came from General Pillow to return to the trenches. Up to this period the success was complete.

When I returned to my position and before the companies had reached the trenches the enemy attacked in large force and took them. I fell back to the original line of defense, and, being re-enforced by several regiments, this position was retrieved; General Buckner at this point being present and in command. This position was a stronger one than the one lost, and every effort was made that night to construct defenses; but the men were so exhausted from labor and loss of sleep that it was utterly impossible.

I will take the liberty to add, that up to the time when we were ordered back to the trenches our success was complete and our escape secure.

It is also my opinion that the exhaustion of the men from loss of sleep and labor, together with the demoralization caused by the loss of our trenches on the right, rendered the surrender unavoidable.

The officers and men of my regiment acted with great gallantry.

The list of the killed and wounded I have heretofore furnished.\*

ROGER W. HANSON,

*Colonel Second Kentucky Regiment.*

Maj. GEORGE B. COSBY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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No. 55.

*Report of Maj. W. L. Doss, Fourteenth Mississippi Infantry.*

—, —, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report the following operations of the Fourteenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers during the engagement at Fort Donelson, ending February 15:

On the morning of February 15, at 3 a. m., I received orders to have my regiment in readiness to move in two hours. About daylight we took up line of march in the direction of our left wing. It was with great difficulty that we progressed, owing to the country, which was hilly or mountainous, and covered with snow and ice.

During our march shells were constantly falling around us, without doing us any damage, until we halted in rear of the intrenchments, where I formed the regiment in close column by company. We were protected to some extent from the shells of the enemy by forming on the hill-side, which was thickly set with undergrowth. At this place Capt. J. L. Craigler, of Company G, was severely wounded in the right arm by the explosion of a shell, and was unable to proceed farther with his company.

I received orders to deploy two companies as skirmishers, and soon after the battalion was ordered to dislodge a battery in position, apparently about 400 yards to our front. The regiment moved off by the right flank until it reached our intrenchments, when it advanced in line of battle. We very soon came to a small field, containing about 10 or

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\* Not found. Aggregate estimated by General Buckner at 80. See p. 337.

15 acres, where our march was somewhat impeded by an abatis made by the enemy.

At this point we were fired upon by the skirmishers. I ordered the battalion not to return the fire. The right wing of the battalion was faced to the right and marched up the hill some distance under a heavy fire, then faced to the front, and ordered to open fire upon the enemy. In the mean time the left wing had marched through a gap in the abatis, faced to the right, and rejoined the four right companies, when a general engagement ensued. At this point Capt. F. M. Rogers, of Company E, fell, gallantly cheering his men on. The engagement at this point continued for about an hour or more, the men displaying great coolness and bravery and the officers great gallantry.

The regiment suffered severely at this point, and was ordered to retreat by Major Casseday, who had been appointed by General Buckner to assist me (Colonel Baldwin being in command of a brigade on the extreme left). After falling back some 200 yards I endeavored to rally the regiment on the Eighteenth Tennessee Regiment, but Major Casseday insisted, and gave the order to the regiment to fall back to the intrenchments, which was done.

After remaining there about an hour, we were again ordered out by General Buckner to support a section of Captain Graves' battery. We marched down the Wynn's Ferry road about 1 mile, and were halted on the top of the hill by General Buckner, when the enemy's battery opened a galling fire of shot and shell upon us. It was soon ascertained that Captain Graves' battery could do but little good there, and was ordered back (I think by General Pillow), whereupon my regiment was ordered to take its original position on the right. Upon our arrival there we found that the enemy were in possession of the intrenchments on the extreme right, which had been occupied by the Second Kentucky Regiment, and which was then engaged with the enemy to regain the original position.

My regiment was immediately ordered to their support, and, on arriving there, we found the enemy advancing upon us in considerable numbers, when we were ordered to open fire upon them, which was kept up from about 3 o'clock until about dark, when the enemy retired. The men slept upon their arms during the night.

About 1 o'clock I received your order to have my regiment ready to march in an hour, which order was countermanded about daylight.\*

Respectfully submitted.


W. L. DOSS,

*Major, Comdg. Fourteenth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers.*

Col. JOHN C. BROWN,

*Commanding First Brigade, General Buckner's Division.*

—  
No. 53.



*Report of Col. John M. Lillard, Twenty-sixth Tennessee Infantry.*

FEBRUARY —, 1862.

The regiment went into action on Saturday, February 15, with 400, including field, staff, &c. There were 11 killed and 85 wounded, many mortally, and who have since died. Total killed and wounded, 96.

\* Nominal list of casualties accompanying this report shows 17 killed, 85 wounded, and 10 missing.

The enemy were driven back by us, their right wing being driven on their center and left, making repeated stands and being repeatedly routed, in which this regiment captured two brass cannon, two flags, the instruments of a band, and several prisoners. Of the conduct of the regiment in action it is left for the brigade commander to speak.

The killed and wounded are as follows, to wit.\*

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Respectfully submitted.

JOHN M. LILLARD,

*Colonel Twenty-sixth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers.*

Col. W. E. BALDWIN,

*Fourteenth Mississippi, Commanding Brigade.*

No. 57.

*Report of Col. Robert Farquharson, Forty-first Tennessee Infantry.*

—, —, 1862.

In obedience to an order from General Pillow, the regiment arrived at Fort Donelson about 10 a. m. Thursday, February 13.

Field officers, commissioned and non-commissioned staff officers: Robert Farquharson, colonel; Robert G. McClure, lieutenant colonel; Thomas G. Miller, major; Jake Anthony, lieutenant and adjutant; Albert G. Clopton, surgeon; William B. Smith, assistant surgeon; Edward A. Norton, acting assistant surgeon; John K. Farris, hospital steward and acting assistant surgeon; Thomas B. McNaughton, commissary of subsistence; John Gordon, acting commissary of subsistence; William E. Barringer and William G. Reed, first lieutenants and drill instructors; John L. Dusenbury, sergeant-major; Erwin P. Jett, quartermaster-sergeant, and Albert Frierson, ordnance-sergeant.

Field officers, commissioned and non-commissioned staff, &c., 15. Aggregate, 575.

Casualties: Killed 2; wounded, 6; and missing, 26.

The regiment executed all the orders given to it, and as far as I know each man did his duty.

R. FARQUHARSON,

*Colonel Forty-first Regiment Tennessee Volunteers.*

No. 58.

*Report of Col. John C. Brown, Third Tennessee Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.*

FEBRUARY 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Third, Eighteenth, and Thirty-second Tennessee Regiments, composing the Third Brigade of your division, arrived at Fort Donelson on February 9 and 10, and were assigned position by Brigadier-General Pillow, then in command, on the right of the line of defenses, the extreme right being occupied by the Second Kentucky Regiment. I commenced at once the construction of

\* Nominal list omitted shows 11 killed and 85 wounded.



rifle pits and forming abatis by felling timber, but the supply of tools was wholly inadequate, and before the works were scarcely half completed the enemy appeared in our front on Wednesday, the 12th, about 12 m.

After this the incessant fire from the enemy's sharpshooters rendered labor upon our works almost impossible during the day, and large fatigue parties were necessary during the entire nights of Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, although the weather was intensely cold.

On Thursday, the 13th, the Fourteenth Mississippi, commanded by Maj. W. L. Doss, and the Forty-first Tennessee, commanded by Colonel Farquharson, were temporarily attached to my brigade. The center of my portion of the line, being the most elevated and commanding point, was defended by Captain Porter's light battery of six guns, while Captain Graves' battery was posted near the left, commanding a long, wide valley, separating my left from Colonel Heiman's right. The position was an admirable one to support my left and Colonel Heiman's right, while it also commanded the hills immediately in front.

About 11 o'clock on Thursday I discovered the enemy moving in considerable force upon Colonel Heiman's center, and before the column came within range of Colonel Heiman, and, indeed, before it could be seen from Colonel Heiman's position, I directed Captain Graves to open fire from all his guns, which he did with such spirit and fatal precision that in less than fifteen minutes the whole column staggered and took shelter in confusion and disorder beyond the summit of the hill still farther to our left, when Colonel Heiman opened fire upon it and drove it beyond range of both his and my guns.

Later in the day the enemy planted one section of a battery on a hill almost in front of Captain Graves and opened an enfilading fire upon the left of my line, and at the same time a cross-fire upon Colonel Heiman. Captain Graves, handling his favorite rifle piece with the same fearless coolness that characterized his conduct during the entire week, in less than ten minutes knocked one of the enemy's guns from its carriage, and almost at the same moment the gallant Porter disabled and silenced the other, while the supporting infantry retreated precipitately before the storm of grape and canister poured into their ranks from both batteries.

Nearly one-half of my command was constantly deployed in the rifle pits, while the residue was held under arms and in position as a reserve; but on Thursday, Colonel Hanson, on the extreme right, being attacked by a large force, I sent, by General Buckner's orders, the Eighteenth Tennessee to his support, which remained with him until Friday night.

On Saturday morning I had orders to move my command towards the left so soon as Colonel Head should relieve my men in the rifle pits. He was late in reporting, and, without waiting longer, I put the column in motion, directing the men in the rifle pits to follow us as soon as relieved, which they did very promptly, but in some disorder. My whole command was provided with three days' cooked rations, and marched with their knapsacks, the purpose being to turn the enemy's right wing and march out on the Wynn's Ferry road to fall back upon Nashville.

Arriving at the point where the Wynn's Ferry road crosses the intrenchments, the Third Tennessee was deployed in the rifle pits, while remaining regiments were held in reserve. The enemy had already been attacked on his right by our left wing, and we were awaiting the proper moment of co-operation, and by General Buckner's directions I sent the Fourteenth Mississippi to the front as skirmishers, the enemy occupying a hill in considerable force not far distant. The Third and Eight-

teenth Tennessee Regiments (the former commanded by Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Gordon and the latter by Col. J. B. Palmer) were sent forward in quick succession to support the Fourteenth Mississippi. As they advanced over the abatis and through comparatively open ground, and especially on reaching the summit of the hill, they were met by a murderous fire. Some confusion ensued, but they returned a steady fire, until the enemy retired, under cover of dense timber and undergrowth, withdrawing his battery, which had been pouring a heavy fire into our reserves.

Further pursuit being impracticable in that direction, and companies having become separated and somewhat intermixed, on account of the obstacles over which they had marched, the command retired within the intrenchments, and immediately reformed, to renew the attack still farther to the right, whither the enemy were retiring.

About 12 o'clock, under the direction of Brigadier-General Buckner, I led the Third and Eighteenth Tennessee, as well as the Thirty-second Tennessee (Col. Edward C. Cook), across an open field on the right of Wynn's Ferry road, under the fire of a battery posted on that road. As we appeared upon the summit of the hill the force supporting the battery retreated about 300 or 400 yards still farther to our right and farther from our lines, leaving one section of the battery, which fell into our hands.

The hill to which the enemy retreated was so densely covered with trees and undergrowth that our skirmishers could not ascertain his position and numbers, but we were led to suppose that his battery at that point was supported by a force not exceeding 1,000 men, but it was afterwards ascertained that his strength was nearly 7,000, while there were five regiments within supporting distance.

Acting upon the first and only information we could then obtain, a charge was ordered, and the whole command moved forward with spirit and animation; but when within about 100 yards of the enemy, who was upon higher ground, we were met by a fire of grape and musketry that was terrific, but fortunately passing above our heads. We halted and opened a fire of musketry upon them, which, although continuing only a few minutes, killed and wounded not less than 800 of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, of the Third, having been wounded, ordered the regiment to fall back under cover of the hill. I rallied it at about 100 yards, and placed it in command of Major Cheairs. The Eighteenth and Thirty-second fell back a short distance, and just then, being re-enforced by the Fourteenth Mississippi, we were renewing the attack, when the enemy left the field, leaving his dead and wounded. While we were engaged the gallant Graves came in full speed to our assistance with a part of his battery, and maintained his position until the enemy retired.

Our loss in this engagement did not exceed 50 in killed and wounded; but the brave and accomplished Lieutenant-Colonel Moore, of the Thirty-second Tennessee Regiment, fell mortally wounded while aiding his no less worthy commander in cheering his men to the charge.

Just as the enemy left the field, entirely opening the Wynn's Ferry road, my command was ordered by Brigadier-General Pillow, repeated by Brigadier-General Floyd, to return at once to its position on the right of our line of defenses.

My men had scarcely deployed in the rifle pits when I was ordered to re-enforce Colonel Hanson on the extreme right, whose works had been stormed and taken by the enemy before he had reoccupied them. An obstinate fire was maintained until dark, but we held the ground to

which Colonel Hanson had retired, although opposed by a superior force of fresh troops.

Captains Porter and Graves did efficient service in the engagement with their batteries; indeed they excited the admiration of the whole command by an exhibition of coolness and bravery under a heavy fire, from which they had no protection, which could not be excelled. Captain Porter fell dangerously wounded by a Minie ball through his thigh while working one of his guns, his gunners being nearly all of them disabled or killed. The command then devolved upon Lieutenant Morton, a beardless youth, who stepped forward like an old veteran, and nobly did he emulate the example of his brave captain.

Fatigue parties were employed until 2 o'clock Sunday morning strengthening our position, when an order reached me to spike the guns on my line and march my command towards the left, as on Saturday morning. The order was instantly executed, but before the column had proceeded 1 mile I was directed to countermarch and reoccupy the works and display flags of truce from the front of our works. At 9 o'clock the same morning the command was surrendered.

My command was so much worn and exhausted from incessant labor and watching during the entire week, exposure to intense cold, as well as from the fatigues of the battle on the preceding day, as to be wholly unable to meet any spirited attack from the enemy on Sunday morning. Our ammunition, both for artillery and small-arms, was well-nigh exhausted.

It might do injustice to others to particularize many instances of daring and bravery among officers and men. With but few exceptions they all deserve the highest praise for the determined and gallant spirit with which they bore themselves under their first exposure to fire.

My killed amounted to 38; my wounded amounted to 244.

For details, reference is made to the reports of regimental commanders.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN C. BROWN,

*Colonel Third Tennessee Regiment, Comdg. Third Brigade.*

Maj. GEORGE B. COSBY,

*Asst. Adj. Gen., Second Div., Central Army of Kentucky.*

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No. 59.

*Report of Maj. Nat. F. Cheairs, Third Tennessee Infantry.*

FORT WARREN, BOSTON HARBOR, MASS.,

*March 10, 1862.*

The Third Tennessee Regiment of Volunteers arrived at Fort Donelson on the night of February 8, with an aggregate reported for duty of 750 men.

On the day after reaching Donelson the whole regiment was employed in the preparation of works of defense, rifle pits, trenches, &c., at which both men and officers continued night and day until the evening of the 12th, at which time a skirmish took place with the Federals, about a mile or a mile and a half in advance of our trenches, by a company of the Eighteenth Tennessee Regiment, which had been sent out on picket



duty. Immediately after the return of the said company to the trenches General Buckner's division, which occupied the right of the whole line of our defense, was arranged in order of battle for the general engagement which ensued. The Third Tennessee Regiment occupied the fourth position from the right, and five companies were deployed in the rifle pits, and five held in reserve, commanded by myself, with orders to sustain the companies deployed in the pits, under the command of Lieut. Col. T. M. Gordon, and to support Porter's artillery on my right, as circumstances might require.

Such was the position held by the Third Tennessee Regiment until the morning of February 15. At about 4 o'clock of said morning the Third Tennessee Regiment was ordered to be put in motion and march in the direction of our left wing, with knapsacks, haversacks, and three days' rations, with whatever else could be conveniently carried. This order was immediately executed, and the regiment marched out beyond to the right of Dover, where it was halted and ordered to deploy as skirmishers in the rifle pits and to the left of the Fourteenth Mississippi and Eighteenth Tennessee. At about 8.30 or 9 o'clock in the morning the Fourteenth Mississippi and the Third Tennessee were ordered by Colonel Brown (General Buckner also being present) to attack one of the enemy's batteries, located some 300 or 400 yards in front of our trenches, and from their position firing heavily upon us. This battery was supported by several regiments of infantry. We succeeded, after a hot contest of about three-quarters of an hour, in driving the enemy back, and occupied their position until ordered back to the trenches by Major Casseday, of General Buckner's staff.

The Third, Eighteenth, and Thirty-second Tennessee Regiments were ordered across the trenches to attack another one of the enemy's batteries, supported by a heavy column of infantry, located on or near the Wynn's Ferry road, and much farther from our works. The Third Tennessee was on the left, the Eighteenth in the center, and the Thirty-second on the right, in the arrangement for this attack. The trenches were soon crossed and the battalions formed in double column and marched in the direction of the battery. When in about 150 yards of it, it opened upon us with grape and canister and seconded by the infantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon, being in command of the Third Regiment, ordered it to lie down; in a few seconds he was wounded, and some unfortunate order being given just at that time, which the regiment took for retreat, they thereupon did retreat some 100 or 150 yards, when they were rallied by Colonel Brown and reformed in line of battle.

General Buckner being present, and discovering the enemy had also fallen back, ordered me, as next in command to Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon (he having retired from the field), to take the Third Tennessee Regiment back to the trenches, which order I obeyed.

On arriving in the trenches I met with General Pillow, who ordered me, after ascertaining I was in command, to take the Third Tennessee Regiment back to the position we had occupied on the right wing and the one we had left at about 4 o'clock in the morning. I immediately formed the regiment and executed the order.

A few minutes after reaching our original position an attack was made upon Colonel Hanson, the Second Kentucky Regiment's trenches, by the enemy in strong force. Colonel Hanson, not having more than one or two companies in position, fell back upon the Eighteenth Tennessee (Colonel Palmer), and I was ordered to bring up the Third Tennessee to support the Second Kentucky and Eighteenth Tennessee Regiments,

which order was executed at the shortest possible notice; and in justice to the officers and soldiers must say they bore themselves most gallantly. Notwithstanding they were completely (or nearly so) worn down by incessant fighting and fatigue duty for eight consecutive days, we succeeded in driving back the enemy, although they had fresh and we had exhausted troops.

Lieutenant-Colonel Gordon was in command of the regiment from the time we arrived at Donelson, on the night of the 8th, until about 1 p. m. on the 15th, when he was wounded and retired from the field. I was then in command until the surrender, which was at 6 o'clock Sunday morning, February 16.

For a detailed account of the killed and wounded of the Third Tennessee Regiment during the entire fight at Donelson I refer you to the subjoined paper, marked A.\*

The foregoing report of the conduct and actions of the Third Tennessee Regiment and of its casualties at Fort Donelson I have the honor to submit to you. Killed, 12; wounded, 76.

Very respectfully,

N. F. CHEAIRS,

*Major, Commanding Third Tennessee Regiment.*

Col. JOHN C. BROWN,

*Commanding Third Brigade, Second Division,  
Central Army of Kentucky, C. S. Army.*

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No. 60.

*Report of Col. Joseph B. Palmer, Eighteenth Tennessee Infantry.*

FORT WARREN, BOSTON HARBOR, MASS.,  
*March 7, 1862.*

The Eighteenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers arrived at Fort Donelson February 8, 1862, with an aggregate reported for duty of 685, and these encamped mainly without tents or other protection from the weather, and with scarcely any cooking utensils, until the surrender of the forces at that point on the 16th day of the same month.

On the day after reaching Donelson the whole regiment was employed in the preparation of works of defense—rifle pits, trenches, &c., at which both men and officers continued without relief or rest night and day until the 12th. Early in the forenoon of that day, pursuant to orders from brigade headquarters, I ordered out Company C, commanded by Capt. W. R. Butler, on picket service, with the usual instructions. They went in the direction of the enemy's lines about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles and took position, when suddenly they discovered several thousand Federal troops advancing towards our encampment. Captain Butler, thus finding his position greatly exposed, conducted a prudent and skillful retreat, gradually falling back so as to keep the enemy under constant observation—finally fired upon them and came within my encampment, submitting a report of this intelligence, which I immediately communicated to you and General Buckner in person. General Buckner's division, which occupied the right of the whole line of our defense, was therefore arranged in order of battle for the general engagement which ensued.

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\* Not found.



The Second Kentucky (Colonel Hanson's) was first, and my regiment second, on the right. I deployed Companies A, B, and G (Captains Rushing, Joyner, and McWhirter) in the rifle pits immediately in my front, placing them in command of Maj. S. W. Davis. The other companies were formed in double column, first in rear of the former, in charge of myself and Lieut. Col. A. G. Carden, with orders from General Buckner to sustain the line covered by my deployment; to support Porter's artillery on my left or re-enforce Colonel Hanson on my right, as circumstances might require. Such was the position held by me until the morning of February 15. I had occasion, however, on the 13th to dispatch Companies E and K (Captains Lowe and Bandy) to re-enforce Colonel Hanson, upon whom the enemy was opening a considerable fire; but after a very spirited engagement the attack was repulsed. I had occasion also, on the 14th, to send the balance of my reserve (Captains Webb's, Wood's, Putman's, Butler's, and St. John's companies) to re-enforce the right, where it was expected the enemy would on that day make a desperate attack simultaneously with a fire on the fort from their gunboats; but owing probably to a failure of success in the latter, no further than the general fire was made upon us at that time.

On Saturday morning, February 15, at about 2.30 or 3 o'clock, I received orders from brigade headquarters to put my whole command in motion and to march in the direction of our left wing, with knapsacks, haversacks provided with three days' rations, and whatever else men and officers could carry, sending all my wagons, except enough for the transportation of ordnance stores, across Cumberland River. I proceeded immediately to execute this order, and marched out beyond and to the right of Dover, where I was ordered to halt and take position in a general line of battle on the right of the Third Tennessee Regiment. Very soon afterwards the Fourteenth Mississippi and Third Tennessee were ordered by Colonel Brown (General Buckner also being present) to attack one of the enemy's batteries just in our front, and about 300 yards beyond the trenches, which from its position was firing heavily upon us. This battery was supported by several regiments of infantry, which, in connection with it, turned a terrible fire on the two regiments just named, against which they fought gallantly and bravely, thus making a severe engagement, which continued for some considerable time, when I was ordered across the trenches to their support, and reached there just about the time the enemy abandoned their position and yielded the ground. Under the order of Major Casseday I returned to my former position, in connection with the other two regiments, in the general line of battle. The Third, Thirty-second, and Eighteenth Tennessee were then ordered across the trenches to attack another one of the enemy's batteries located on or near the Wynn's Ferry road, and much farther beyond our works. Colonel Cook's regiment was on the right, my own in the center, and Colonel Brown's on the left, in the arrangement for this attack. The trenches were soon crossed, the battalions formed in double column, and we marched on to the supposed position of the battery, Colonel Cook being in advance of my regiment, with skirmishers in his front. We found some, I may say much, embarrassment in having insufficient information in regard to the enemy's location, as we could only judge in reference to that by the smoke and reports of pieces lately heard and seen in that direction. We found also very considerable difficulty in marching in the requisite order, owing to the timber and denseness of the undergrowth, on which the snow was thickly depositing and melting somewhat rapidly.



We advanced forward, however, in quick-time until, nearing the enemy, we halted for the purpose of gaining, if possible, some more definite idea of his position, the skirmishers having rallied on their battalion without (as I learned from Colonel Cook) being able to furnish very definite information. Colonel Cook and myself advanced a few paces beyond our commands, for the purpose of taking such observations as would enable us to direct the movements of our regiments to the best possible advantage. We discovered portions of the enemy's baggage at the distance of about 100 yards, just over the point of a hill in our front. Being thus better satisfied of their position, and that an engagement must immediately occur, we accordingly deployed as rapidly as possible in line of battle, my right resting on Colonel Cook's left and the Third Tennessee on my left. The enemy opened a terrific fire upon us about the time or before we had fairly executed the deployment. The force here against us consisted of one battery, supported by six infantry regiments, all of which ultimately engaged in the fight. I ordered my entire command to fire and load kneeling, as in that position the main body of the enemy's fire would and did pass over us.

The officers and men under me on this occasion evinced great coolness, bravery, and determination for success in this most unequal contest. They directed their fire with unusual accuracy, which told desperately and rapidly upon the enemy, who under its terrible effect and force gave ground, while we advanced upon them 20 paces. A further advance would have lost on our part an advantage in position by which we had been very considerably benefited; and although the enemy continued their retreat until they had gone beyond the reach of our guns, it was not deemed consistent with the orders for the movements of our whole army on that day, as made known on the previous night from Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner to myself and other commanders of regiments, to pursue the several forces any farther in that direction. Besides this, many of my arms (flint-lock muskets), by coming in contact with the melting snow, had become too inefficient for further use until they could be dried and put in proper order. My ordnance wagons were more than a half mile distant, and the men only had a few rounds of ammunition each remaining in their boxes. I marched my regiment therefore back to a better position, a distance of, say, 150 paces, ordered the men to put their pieces in order by drying them as rapidly as possible, sent for an additional supply of ammunition, made details to have my wounded taken from the field and properly cared for, and threw out a small number of skirmishers in connection with Colonel Cook, to notice the movements and position of the enemy, who reported that he had gone back beyond the Wynn's Ferry road, and could not be seen at all from the position of our late engagement.

I was informed on the afternoon of February 14 and again at a late hour of that night, by General Buckner and Colonel Brown, that, for the reasons given at the time (not material here to recite), the generals in command had determined to evacuate Donelson and move the whole of our troops to Nashville or in that direction, and orders were given me by Colonel Brown to prepare my command accordingly with rations, &c., for the march. I was further informed that to execute this purpose our whole army would at an early hour on the morning of the 15th move upon the right wing of the Federal lines, cut our way through, and march out in the direction stated. I was informed that the whole of the enemy's right were driven back, thus removing all further difficulty in the way of executing our purpose. I was every moment expecting to receive orders to march my regiment, together with the balance

of our troops, in the direction of Nashville; but before I could get all my dead and wounded from the field and have them provided for and disposed of an order came to me, said at the time to come from General Pillow, to move my command immediately back to the position from which I started on that morning, and which I had been holding for several days. I accordingly returned to my trenches. In a very few minutes after I reached my position, and before Colonel Hanson (just to my right) had gained his trenches, several Federal regiments, under command of General C. F. Smith, commenced their attack, and took possession of a part of Colonel Hanson's unoccupied works. Unable, under these circumstances and against such remarkable odds, to drive back the attacking regiments, Colonel Hanson immediately fell back with his command on my line, where, re-enforced by the Fourteenth Mississippi, the Third, Forty-first, Forty-ninth Tennessee, and parts of other commands, a long and desperate struggle ensued, closing at sunset with a decided and brilliant victory to our arms, the fight having lasted for at least two hours. The losses of the enemy in all the engagements above referred to, as ascertained by subsequent visits to their grounds, were indeed very great, exceeding ours both in killed and wounded, I must say, in any moderate estimate, at least seven to one.

Besides the conflicts already named in this report the Federal forces made several attempts upon my works, but were in every instance gallantly met and signally repulsed.

On the night of the 15th the whole of my command, except the detail made to continue the work of strengthening and extending our breast-works, stood to their arms, constantly expecting a renewal of engagements, until about 2 o'clock of the following morning. At this hour I received orders from brigade headquarters to move my regiment as rapidly as possible to Dover, a distance of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, where I was informed further orders would be given me. It was, however, well understood among all parties that the object of the march was to evacuate our entire position. I reached Dover some time before daylight and reported to Generals Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, all of whom were still there, and who ordered me to halt and await further directions.

A messenger from Colonel Brown's headquarters soon came, ordering me back to my trenches, and on returning to my quarters I found that General Buckner's whole command had been surrendered. This was my first notice of that fact, and was thus received on Sunday morning at 5.30 o'clock.

Throughout the period covered by this report the men and officers of my command underwent an astonishing amount of hard labor and toil, suffering greatly from the want of rest, from terrible exposure and fatigue, and the absence of nearly all the comforts even of camp life; but every demand upon their strength and energy was promptly met; every order was unhesitatingly obeyed, and every hardship and suffering bravely and patiently endured, evincing a glorious spirit of self-sacrifice and determination, now mentioned alike in simple justice to them and with the utmost pride and satisfaction to myself.

On the field my entire field and staff and company officers and men (with scarcely a noticeable exception) bore themselves nobly and gallantly, displaying on every occasion a dauntless courage and patriotism, alike deserving the praises of their chivalrous State and the approval of a glorious country.

Many officers and men of my command are justly entitled to the merit of personal honor and distinction. Lieut. W. W. Smith, of Company

C, shot and killed instantly on the field, fell covered with glory, in the gallant discharge of his duties, as did the other lamented dead and wounded of my regiment.

With a very grateful recollection of my whole command, for their soldierly and manly demeanor throughout our whole campaign, I cannot close this report without submitting with it acknowledgments for valuable services and kind offices done me by Lieuts. Nath. Gooch, of Company C, and John M. Douglass, of Company G, who are also very justly entitled to all I have heretofore stated on behalf of other officers.

Owing to the sudden and unexpected separation from my company officers I am unable to submit with this report the names of the killed and wounded of my regiment, and can therefore only state them in the aggregate:

There were killed on the field.....	4
Mortally wounded.....	6
Supposed not mortally.....	38
Missing.....	4
Total.....	52

The foregoing report of the conduct and action of my regiment and of its casualties at Fort Donelson I have on this day the honor to submit to you.

Very respectfully,

JOSEPH B. PALMER,

*Colonel, Commanding Eighteenth Tennessee Regiment.*

Col. JOHN C. BROWN,

*Comdg. 3d Brig., 2d Div., Cent. Army of Kentucky, C. S. Army.*

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No. 61.

*Report of Col. Edward C. Cook, Thirty-second Tennessee Infantry.*

FORT DONELSON, STEWART COUNTY, TENN.,

*February 16, 1862.*

The Thirty-second Tennessee Regiment reached Fort Donelson on the night of the 10th instant, with 555 men, rank and file, many of the regiment having been left sick at Russellville, Ky., many at Bowling Green, Ky., and some on furlough, sick at home. We were placed on the left of General Buckner's division. The entire regiment was employed making intrenchments till the same were finished. The enemy began to fire upon us with artillery and sharpshooters as early as Tuesday evening, the 11th.

The weather was extremely cold, and being kept continually at labor and on duty, we suffered much from exposure. The regiment, although held in readiness at every moment, was not engaged in actual fight until Saturday, the 15th.

On Friday night we were ordered to have cooked rations for three days, and, with knapsacks packed, to be ready to march at 4 o'clock the next morning. I then learned that it had been determined by the generals in council at that hour to march to the extreme left of our intrenchments, attack the enemy's right wing and turn it, and, if we succeeded, to march for Nashville.



The next morning at 4 o'clock our brigade marched to the left of our intrenchments. Just as we were approaching the extreme left of our intrenchments General Buckner ordered me to place my regiment in column of division under cover of the hill in the rear of Green's battery and to sustain it.

We remained here until about 10 a. m., when General Pillow ordered me to move my regiment to the right and to cross the intrenchments and attack a battery of the enemy, which was then firing at us, and seemed to be situated some 800 yards from our intrenchments. Just as we were marching across the intrenchments General Buckner and Colonel Brown came up, and, upon learning the order General Pillow had given, General Buckner ordered me to proceed to attack the battery, and ordered Colonel Palmer, with his regiment, to sustain me. I forwarded the regiment, crossed the intrenchments, threw out two companies as skirmishers, and moved the regiment forward in the direction of the enemy's battery. The skirmishers very soon engaged those of the enemy, drove them back, killing some, taking 5 prisoners, and capturing some fine muskets.

We moved forward through woods with thick undergrowth; the bushes were covered with snow, which was melting slowly, and it was very difficult to move forward. We had advanced within 75 or 100 yards of the enemy, and he had opened fire upon us with his battery, when Colonel Brown rode up and ordered me to move my regiment to the right and attack the battery at this point. The bushes were very thick, and we could with great difficulty move forward. Our skirmishers fired upon the enemy and rallied upon the battalion. I immediately ordered the regiment to kneel and fire and to load and fire kneeling. The fire began. Colonel Palmer, on my left, immediately opened fire from his regiment. The firing was kept up rapidly. The regiment all the while slowly, but gradually, moved forward. We were protected by cover of the timber and hill from the enemy's shot. Lieut. Col. W. P. Moore fell very early in the action, wounded in the right knee, and was carried from the field to the hospital. This left me with no field officer to aid me, Major Brownlow having been left sick at Russellville; Adjutant Jones being on duty part of the day, but was not with the regiment in the engagement. I soon discovered many of the muskets failed to fire, the priming being wet (the most of the regiment being armed with inferior flint-lock muskets). After a while the left wing of the regiment began to fall back slowly, and then the right wing in good order, and, being satisfied that many of the guns, in good order to do execution, must be wiped and dried, and knowing that the regiment, after falling back a short distance, would be entirely protected from the enemy's shot, I determined to let them fall back. After they fell back about 100 yards I halted the regiment and ordered the men to wipe and dry their guns. Upon inquiry as to why they fell back, the officers informed me they heard an order to fall back, and believed it came from proper authority.

After the guns were cleaned I threw out two companies of skirmishers, who proceeded as far as the Wynn's Ferry road, in which was placed the enemy's battery, when we attacked, and the skirmishers returned and reported that the enemy had retired beyond the road and could not be seen. After waiting some time and receiving no orders, Colonel Palmer and I, after consultation, determined to march our regiments back to the intrenchments where we had crossed and where my regiment had left their knapsacks.

When we reached the intrenchments, Major Cosby gave me an order from General Buckner to march my regiment immediately back to the intrenchments we had left in the morning. At this moment we felt satisfied that the Wynn's Ferry road was clear and the way to Nashville open; that fortune had smiled upon us, and that we ought to prove to her we were worthy of her favors. We marched rapidly back to our intrenchments and took position in them. In a few minutes the enemy appeared in large force in front of us and threatened to attack us, when night came on.

Early at night I received orders to have three days' cooked rations prepared, and, with knapsacks packed, to be ready to march at 4 o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour we marched out for Dover, and before we reached Dover we were ordered to return to our intrenchments, and learned that capitulation for a surrender was going on.

It gives me pleasure to state that the officers and privates of the regiment, although jaded from labor and exposure, at all times exhibited great willingness to obey and anxiety to promptly execute all orders. In battle they behaved coolly and courageously, and not one of the regiment ever left the line or his post of duty. The *morale* of the regiment was not corrupted or destroyed, and even after it was known we were surrendered, we had not a single straggler from the regiment.

During the engagement on the 15th we lost in killed and had wounded in Company A, commanded by Capt. Willis Worley, 1 killed and 3 wounded, whose names I cannot give, as I have no report from Company A. I hereto attach a list of the other companies of the regiment, giving the names, number engaged, and the killed, wounded, and missing.\* At the earliest moment it can be obtained I will forward a list of Company A, to be made a part of the exhibit hereto.

Our gallant Colonel Moore died from the wound he received. The regiment, as well as all who knew him, deeply mourn his death. The surgeon, James F. Grant, Quartermaster John T. Shephard, Commissary E. Shields Wilson, Quartermaster-Sergt. James P. Campbell, were all at their post and did their full duty. Capt. John D. Clarke, a drill master, was on duty during the entire week, and in the engagement of the 15th. Capt. D. C. Sims, a drill master, assigned to my regiment, was on duty a portion of the week, but not in the engagement of the 15th, being reported sick.

## RECAPITULATION.

Rank and file, at Fort Donelson .....	55
At Donelson, not engaged on Saturday.....	21
At Donelson, engaged on Saturday .....	534
Killed .....	3
Wounded and surrendered .....	15
Wounded and not surrendered .....	21
Missing .....	1
Escaped .....	1
Wounded .....	36
Surrendered .....	528

Respectfully,

ED. C. COOK,

*Colonel Thirty-second Tennessee Regiment.*

Col. JOHN C. BROWN,

*Col., Comdg. 3d Brig., 2d Div., Central Army of Kentucky.*

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\* Not found.



## No. 62.

*Reports of Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, C. S. Army, commanding division, &c.*

HUNTSVILLE, ALA., *March 4, 1862.*

SIR: Between the hours of 11 and 12 p. m., on February 6, I received at Nashville, Tenn., a telegraphic dispatch of same date from Maj. W. W. Mackall, assistant adjutant-general to General A. S. Johnston, commanding the Western Department of C. S. Army, ordering me to take instant command of Fort Donelson.

In compliance with this order, I proceeded by the first boat to the point designated. On my way I reported to Brigadier-General Pillow, in Clarksville, from whom I received an additional order to assume command at Fort Donelson. Upon my arrival, on the night of February 7, I found at the fort the troops which, under Col. A. Heiman, had reached there during the previous night from Fort Henry, consisting of the Tenth Regiment Tennessee Infantry, Lieut. Col. R. W. MacGavock; Fourth Regiment Mississippi Infantry, Colonel Drake; eight companies of Twenty-seventh Regiment Alabama Infantry, Colonel Hughes; eight companies of Forty-eighth Regiment Tennessee Infantry, Col. W. M. Voorhies; Fifteenth Regiment Arkansas Infantry, Colonel Gee; Tennessee Battalion, Colonel Browder; two companies of Alabama Battalion, Major Garvin; detachment of light artillery, Captain Culbertson; Ninth Battalion Tennessee cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt; one company of Tennessee cavalry, Captain Milton.

Also the forces stationed at Fort Donelson, consisting of the Thirtieth Regiment Tennessee Infantry, Col. J. W. Head; Forty-ninth Regiment Tennessee Infantry, Col. J. E. Bailey; Fiftieth Regiment Tennessee Infantry, Colonel Sugg; Fifty-third Regiment Tennessee Infantry, Colonel Abernathy; five companies of Tennessee infantry, Colonel S. H. Colms; one company light battery, Captain Maney.

The batteries of heavy artillery were manned by two companies of infantry, one commanded by Captain Bidwell, detached from Colonel Head's regiment, and the other commanded by Capt. T. W. Beaumont, from Colonel Sugg's regiment of Tennessee volunteers.

With and after my arrival at Fort Donelson re-enforcements were added which it will be unnecessary here to enumerate. Subsistence stores and munitions of war were being daily landed from transports, and, without adequate means of transportation, required storage. Work for the improvement of the original plan of the defenses was in hand; the sick had to be sent away to hospitals, and troops had to be assigned and moved to their positions without definite knowledge of the strength of the re-enforcements destined for the place. Such were the duties, with many others incidental to the nature and condition of the command, to which my attention was immediately directed.

On February 9, however, General Pillow arrived and assumed command, and having disposed of the forces for the defense of the place, assigned me to the command of the left wing, consisting at that time of—

Col. A. Heiman's brigade: Tenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Lieut. Col. R. W. MacGavock; Fifty-third Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Col. Alfred [H.] Abernathy; eight companies of Forty-eighth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Voorhies; eight companies of Twenty-seventh Regiment Alabama Volunteers, Colonel Hughes; light battery, Captain Maney.



Colonel Davidson's brigade: Third Regiment Mississippi Volunteers,\* Lieutenant-Colonel Wells; Eighth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon; Seventh Regiment Texas Volunteers, Colonel Gregg; First Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Lieut. Col. A. S. Hamilton.

Colonel Drake's brigade: Fourth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Major Adair; Fifteenth Regiment Arkansas Volunteers, Colonel Gee; two companies of Twenty-sixth Regiment Alabama Volunteers, Major Garvin; Tennessee Battalion, Colonel Browder.

During the progress of the defenses of Fort Donelson the following additions were made to my command, viz:

The Thirtieth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Head; Forty-second Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Col. W. A. Quarles.

Colonel Wharton's brigade: Fifty-first Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Massie; Fifty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Captain Davis.

Colonel McCausland's brigade: Thirty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Reid; Fiftieth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Major Thorburn; Twentieth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Maj. W. N. Brown.

Colonel Baldwin's brigade: Twenty-sixth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Reynolds; Twenty-sixth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Lillard.

Light artillery: Seven pieces, Captain Green; four pieces, Captain French; four pieces, Captain Guy.

On February 11, the enemy having made their appearance on the land side of our defenses and in rear of the town of Dover, our troops were ordered out by General Pillow, our line of rifle pits marked out for construction by Major Gilmer, of the Engineers, and during the night of the 12th these were brought nearly to completion and rendered quite efficient for defensive purposes. Captain Maney's and Captain Green's batteries were placed in position, and epaulements thrown up in front of them.

At dusk, on the 12th instant, I threw out pickets in front of the center of my command, on the Wynn's Ferry road, and prepared to extend the abatis at that point. My pickets and working party were immediately driven in by the enemy, and 1 man was killed on the outside of the trenches and 1 inside; 1 man was also wounded on the outside who was never afterwards found, though search was immediately made for him. These were the first casualties that occurred on the left wing.

The following was the order in which the troops of the left wing were posted in the trenches, commencing on the right: 1st, Tenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Lieut. Col. R. W. MacGavock; 2d, Fifty-third Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Col. Alfred [H.] Abernathy; 3d, battery light artillery, Capt. Frank Maney; 4th, eight companies Forty-eighth Tennessee Regiment, Col. W. M. Voorhies; 5th, eight companies Twenty-seventh Alabama, Colonel Hughes; 6th, Thirtieth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Head; 7th, Fourth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Major Adair; 8th, four pieces light artillery, Captain French; 9th, Fifteenth Regiment Arkansas Volunteers, Colonel Gee; 10th, two companies Alabama Battalion, Major Garvin; 11th, Tennessee Battalion, Colonel Browder; 12th, Fifty-first Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Massie; 13th, Third Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Lieut. Col. J. M. Wells; 14th, first division Green's battery, Captain

\* This regiment was afterwards known as the Twenty-third. Col. J. B. Deason's regiment retained its designation, "Third Mississippi."

Green; 15th, four pieces light artillery, Captain Guy; 16th, Eighth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon; 17th, Seventh Regiment Texas Volunteers, Colonel Gregg; 18th, Fifty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, Captain Davis; 19th, First Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Lieut. Col. A. S. Hamilton; 20th, second division Green's battery, Lieutenant Perkins; 21st, Twenty-sixth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Reynolds.

The following forces were in reserve on the left wing, viz: Forty-second Tennessee, Twentieth Mississippi, Thirty-sixth Virginia, and Twenty-sixth Tennessee Regiments.

Brig. Gen. J. B. Floyd arrived at Fort Donelson at daylight on the morning of February 13.

A part of Colonel Heiman's brigade was posted on the most elevated point on our left wing, and on it was made the first attack on my command at about 12 m. on February 13. The enemy's infantry, supported by artillery, made two assaults, the second one after being re-enforced, and were both times gallantly repulsed within the period of two hours. The left of the Tenth Tennessee Regiment, the whole of the Fifty-third Tennessee Regiment, commanded by Lieut. Col. Thomas F. Winston, the right of the Forty-eighth Tennessee Regiment, and Captain Maney's battery met the attack. The Forty-second Tennessee Regiment, under Colonel Quarles, arriving in rear of the heights about the time of the second attack—having been dispatched to me by General Pillow for that purpose—was pressed forward to support the defense, and was warmly engaged with the enemy, losing about 8 killed and wounded. The Fifty-third Tennessee Regiment lost a somewhat larger number.

Having received the report of but one colonel—that of Colonel Lyon—it is proper here to state that I cannot give the casualties or do that complete justice to each and every part of my command which I desire and which they so much merit.

In this attack Captain Maney's company of artillery and Colonels Abernathy's and Quarles' regiments principally suffered and deserve more particular notice. In Captain Maney's company the loss was such that he was unable afterwards to man but two guns of the four which composed his battery.

During this attack and until night most of the left wing was exposed to the fire of sharpshooters and of field artillery. Colonel Lyon's (Eighth Kentucky) regiment, posted in rifle pits, in front of which was planted, at 700 yards, a battery varying from two to four pieces, lost by these and sharpshooters 2 men killed and 10 wounded within six hours of this day, and the Seventh Texas Regiment, I am informed, lost 1 lieutenant killed.

During February 14 the main attack was made with the enemy's gun-boats on our water batteries, which, being on the right wing, did not affect my command. It was, however, exposed to the fire of sharpshooters and occasional artillery fire, without important results.

Between 12 and 1 a. m. on February 15 it was resolved, in council, convened by General Floyd, to attack the enemy's strong position on his right, while General Buckner should assault the enemy on the Wynn's Ferry road. By this attack it was proposed to roll the enemy's right wing back on his left, and at least to cut a way for our forces to retreat and save our army from capitulation. To provide for every contingency, even that of failure, a rallying point, far beyond the enemy's lines, was designated, and all the plans were skillfully and minutely adjusted. The commanding officers of brigades were dismissed from the council, with orders to marshal their forces with the utmost dispatch, but from some



cause Colonel Davidson's brigade did not appear punctually in its place. Proceeding to his headquarters, I learned from his aide, Capt. R. B. Ryan, that Colonel Davidson was severely indisposed, and had only given orders that his command should be held in readiness to move. I caused the brigade to be put in motion immediately, and at about 4 a. m. all the brigades designated were formed in columns of regiments on the left of and outside of our trenches. Here Colonel Simonton was placed in command of Colonel Davidson's brigade.

At early dawn the head of the column moved, under the orders of General Pillow, who led them, and very soon engaged the enemy with small-arms. Somewhat later Lieutenant Perkins opened fire upon the enemy from his artillery posted in the trenches. Colonel Baldwin's brigade formed the right of the attacking force and was first to open fire. Colonels Wharton's and McCausland's brigades formed a line on the left of Colonel Baldwin. Colonel Simonton's brigade was the next to advance, which it did in the following order from right to left, viz: Third Mississippi, Eighth Kentucky, Seventh Texas, and First Mississippi Regiments. When the head of this brigade had advanced about half way up the hill occupied by the enemy, the Third [Twenty-third] Mississippi Regiment was brought forward and put into action. The Eighth Kentucky Regiment was then met by a heavy fire, which caused it to form in line of battle under cover of [a] hollow to the right of the Third Mississippi Regiment, from which it moved into action under a heavy fire from the enemy. The regiments of Colonel Gregg and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton (the Seventh Texas and First Mississippi) moved forward together, and came into action on the right of the Eighth Kentucky Regiment. This brigade being heavily pressed by the enemy, the Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiment was brought up to its left and put into action, so as to take the enemy in [the] flank. The left brigade, commanded by Colonel Drake, I placed in position, forming a handsome line, and pressed it forward to the attack. In passing from the left towards the right of our trenches, as did our line of battle, our left had to traverse a much larger circle than our right, and as our right moved near the trenches our left was the only wing liable to be outflanked. I therefore found ample occupation in pressing forward the left wing, keeping a regular, well-directed line, and in guarding the left flank.

In the last of these duties I was greatly assisted by Colonel Forrest and his regiment of cavalry. Colonel Drake's brigade, under its very gallant, steady, and efficient commander, moved almost constantly under my eye, and, when necessary, at my command. It moved in admirable order, preserving in a perfect manner a regular, well-connected line, almost constantly under fire, driving the enemy slowly from hill to hill until about 1 p. m., when we reached a position nearly opposite the center of the left wing of our trenches. Here, observing the enemy in force in front and no troops supporting us on our right, I sent an aide-de-camp to ask for re-enforcements, and received an order to report in person to the commanding general within our defensive works. Upon hazarding the suggestion that the enemy in front of Colonel Drake's brigade should be attacked, it was, after slight discussion, ordered by General Floyd that this brigade should for a time be displayed before the enemy, and that the other brigades should take their positions in the rifle pits. Having duly disposed of Colonel Drake's brigade according to orders, I returned in person to the intrenchments, at about 800 yards distant. Very soon I found the enemy had advanced and engaged this brigade. After some personal examination of the enemy, and after learning that the right wing, under General Buckner, had called for



re-enforcements from the left, rendering it, perhaps, injudicious to send out more of the troops from the rifle pits, I directed Colonel Forrest, with a portion of his cavalry, to give aid to Colonel Drake, if necessary and practicable. Colonel Forrest soon returned and reported to me that he had advised Colonel Drake to fall back. Yet the enemy were finally driven back in gallant style by the brigade with heavy loss to them and without the loss of a single man on our side. Having nearly exhausted his ammunition, Colonel Drake fell back with his brigade into the rifle pits. Thus ended the conflict on the left wing on February 15, the enemy having been driven back at every point where we had engaged him with heavy losses.

The Eighth Kentucky, Seventh Texas, and First Mississippi Regiments, of Colonel Simonton's brigade, suffered, perhaps, the greatest losses. The Eighth Kentucky reports 17 men killed and 46 officers and men wounded, making its total loss, including 1 man wounded on the 14th, 19 killed and 57 wounded. Capt. Robert Slaughter's company (A), of the Eighth Kentucky, which advanced immediately on the two pieces of artillery on the first hill, is said to have suffered severely.

The Seventh Texas Regiment, under Colonel Gregg, met with heavy losses near the top of the same hill. Here Lieutenant-Colonel [J. M.] Clough and Lieutenant [J. W.] Nowlin fell nearly together, nobly performing their duties on the field.

When the two guns were carried on the first hill there were no troops on the right of Simonton's brigade. The Virginia brigades occupied a position on its left, having driven the enemy from his first position and planted its colors on the top of the hill. Colonel Simonton's brigade continued in action until the battery near the Wynn's Ferry road had been carried by Colonel Forrest's cavalry, where it was found in line of battle in advance of the point when the action ended, and was finally withdrawn into the trenches.

I regret that I am unable to give any particulars in regard to the Virginia brigades during this day's action. I learned from some of its officers that it had suffered severe losses.

During February 12 and 13 the whole of my command were in the trenches day and night, toiling, watching, and fighting, amid rain and sleet. On the night of the 13th the weather was very inclement and the men were exposed without shelter or fire.

On the nights of the 14th and 15th the men were withdrawn a part at a time from the rifle pits, but by reason of their being marshaled for combat they found little repose. Perhaps but few instances of such continued fatigue and exposure will be found on record. It would seem that the command should have been well-nigh exhausted, yet not a single instance of repining ever reached my ear. Every privation was endured with unconquerable courage, and at all times, even at the surrender of our forces, they manifested an invincible spirit.

After the battle of the 15th the left wing remained in the trenches until between 1 and 2 a. m. on the 16th, when, having received orders from the commanding general, I drew out the whole of my command with a view to cut our way through the enemy's right and retreat, as proposed on the night previous. The left wing was duly paraded in column of regiments outside of the left of our intrenchments by 3 a. m. Somewhat later I discovered the Virginia Regiments moving from my command to the Dover landing, and learned that they moved by order of General Floyd. After waiting some time for orders I sent an aide to report my command ready to move, and received a written communication from General Buckner to the effect that the command had de-

volved upon him, and directing me to await further orders. Shortly afterwards, learning that a courier from General Buckner was searching for me and being unable to find him, I repaired to the general's headquarters, and there learned that a surrender of our forces was proposed, and that measures had been taken preparatory thereto, and I was directed to communicate with the enemy's pickets and to request that our forces should not be fired upon. Upon my return to my command I received the following communication from General Buckner, which had previously failed to reach me :

HEADQUARTERS, *Dover, Tenn., February 16, 1862.*

General B. R. JOHNSON, or  
COMMANDER OF INTRENCHMENTS,  
*Near Dover, Tenn. :*

SIR: The command of the forces in this vicinity has devolved upon me by the order of General Floyd. I have sent a flag to General Grant, and during the correspondence and until further orders refrain from any hostile demonstrations. With a view to preventing a like movement on the enemy's part you will endeavor to send a flag to the enemy's posts in front of your position, notifying them of the fact that I have sent a communication to General Grant from the right of our position and desire to know his present headquarters.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

P. S.—Your command will include that of General Pillow.

S. B. B.

Having dismissed the brigades of my command to allow them to return to their camps, I was cognizant of no act connected with the surrender of the Confederate forces at Fort Donelson and know not the terms of capitulation, but was informed in answer to queries that the men and officers were allowed to retain their personal effects and that the officers would retain their side-arms. The latter, it was stated to me, was not complied with, and some officers at least were disarmed as they passed aboard the transports.

I here take occasion to do simple justice to the gentlemen of my staff at Fort Donelson. Maj. Powhatan Ellis and William T. Blakemore, formerly of Brigadier-General Tilghman's staff, I continued on the same duty, and I appointed Lieut. Frank J. McLean, of Colonel Gantt's cavalry, to act as aide-de-camp. Subsequently I accepted the services of Lieut. George T. Moorman, of the artillery, as volunteer aide, all of whom proved themselves zealous and efficient officers. They were present with me in every danger and privation, and on many occasions during the conflict at Fort Donelson they performed difficult and dangerous duties, and in carrying orders were much exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters.

They especially rendered efficient service during the actions on February 13 and 15, in carrying out my orders on the field under the enemy's fire; nor must I omit to mention in favorable terms the services of Mr. Gwinn and N. M. Blakemore, of the quartermaster's department, who volunteered their services with my staff.

The following is a copy of the list (furnished by my aide to General Buckner) of the troops surrendered as my command at Fort Donelson on February 16:

Colonel Heiman's brigade: Tenth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Lieut. Col. R. W. MacGavock; Fifty-third Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Col. A. H. Abernathy; Forty-second Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Col. W. A. Quarles; eight companies Forty-eighth Regiment Ten-



nessee Volunteers, Col. W. M. Voorhies, and eight companies Twenty-seventh Alabama Volunteers, Colonel Hughes.

Colonel Drake's brigade: Fourth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Major Adair; Fifteenth Regiment Arkansas Volunteers, Colonel Gee; Alabama Battalion, Major Garvin, and Tennessee Battalion, Colonel Browder.

Colonel Davidson's brigade: Third [Twenty-third] Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Lieut. Col. Joseph M. Wells; Eighth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Lieut. Col. H. B. Lyon; Seventh Regiment Texas Volunteers, Colonel Gregg, and First Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Simonton.

Colonel Baldwin's brigade: Twenty-sixth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Colonel Reynolds, and Twenty-sixth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Lillard.

Colonel Head's brigade, commanded by Col. J. E. Bailey: Thirtieth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Maj. J. J. Turner; Forty-ninth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Col. J. E. Bailey, and Fiftieth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, Colonel Sugg.

Unattached commands: Twentieth Regiment Mississippi Volunteers, Maj. W. N. Brown; five companies Tennessee Battalion, Maj. S. H. Colms, and Ninth Battalion Tennessee Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt.

Cavalry of Colonel Forrest's regiment, commanded by Captain Overton, and consisting of Lieutenant Flournoy and five other lieutenants, and men of the Fifty-sixth, Thirty-sixth, and Fifty first Virginia Regiments, as follows: About 80 men of the Fifty-sixth, 3 of the Thirty-sixth, and 2 of the Fifty-first Virginia Regiments.

Light batteries commanded by Capts. Reuben [R.] Ross, Frank Maney, J. H. Guy, and D. A. French.

Heavy artillery, commanded by Captain Culberston.

Staff: B. R. Johnson, brigadier-general C. S. Army; George Triplett Moorman, light artillery, and Frank J. McLean, light cavalry, aides-de-camp.

Reported belonging to Brigadier-General Tilghman's staff: Herbert S. Dallam, major and commissary, and Louis Gerard, light artillery.

It is proper to state that many of [the] men and officers commenced to leave Fort Donelson as soon as they were aware of the proposed surrender, and hundreds of them no doubt have made their way to their homes and to the Army. I have not learned that a single one who attempted to escape met with any obstacle.

Almost immediately upon discovering that steps had been taken towards surrendering our forces, the question occurred to me whether the example of our commanding general was an appropriate one, under the circumstances in which I was placed, to be followed, especially as I had no part in the surrender, and had only on an emergency taken command of the troops with which I had not been previously identified. I, however, concluded to stay with the men, promote their comfort as far as possible, and share their fate.

By Tuesday, February 18, the troops of my command had been separated from me, having been sent down the river on board of steamers, and I concluded that it was unlikely that I could be of any more service to them. I, however, formed no purpose or plan of escape.

In the afternoon, towards sunset, of February 18 I walked out with a Confederate officer and took my course towards the rifle pits on the hill, formerly occupied by Colonel Heiman, and finding no sentinel to obstruct me, I passed on and was soon beyond the Federal encampments. I had



taken no part in the surrender; had received no orders or instructions from the Federal authorities; had not been recognized or even seen by any of the general officers; had been given no parole, and had made no promises. If my escape involves any question of military law, duty, or honor, I desire it may be thoroughly investigated, and I shall submit with pleasure to any decision of the proper authorities.

Having failed to do so in the proper place, I take pleasure in acknowledging my indebtedness to R. B. Ryan, aide-de-camp to Colonels Davidson and Simonton, for a written statement of facts connected with the operations of Colonel Davidson's brigade on February 15. I also can bear testimony to the activity and efficiency of Lieutenant Ryan during the defense of Fort Donelson.

My impression is that our loss in killed and wounded on the left wing does not exceed 500; that of the enemy was perhaps 3,000.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. B. JOHNSON,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

Capt. G. A. HENRY, Jr.,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Estill Springs, Tenn., November 8, 1862.*

Having been advised by General Pillow that I shall subserve the simple cause of justice and aid to furnish facts necessary to a proper understanding by the Government of the operations of the army at Fort Donelson by giving a statement of the purposes determined upon in the conference of general officers on the night of February 14, I cheerfully submit the following facts as a supplementary report:

It was resolved to attack the enemy's right, with a view first to whip him and drive him from his design upon our position. Failing in this, it was proposed and decided to cut our way out of the fort and unite with the army at Nashville. The plans and preparations necessary to commence the retreat, after the way was opened, or the circumstances which should determine exactly when it should commence, were not settled more definitely than indicated in general terms given above. How and when the retreat should begin was not determined in conference, and these were clearly things to be determined at a subsequent period. There was no proposition made in the conference to retreat from the battle-field and no determination made to do so. If a proposition had been made for a retreat from the field of battle, it would at once have suggested the necessity of making proper provisions for the march, of food and clothing for the intensely cold weather, and an additional supply of ammunition; and such preparation made previously to the battle would have greatly loaded down and encumbered the men in the fight.

From the character of the field upon which we fought we were not able to use our artillery on it, and did not take it out of our line of works. From the position of the enemy and the condition in which we found our army after the fight I do not believe a successful retreat could have been immediately made. The retreat would have had to be made fighting. The proper time, in my opinion, would have been at night, after reforming the command and supplying its wants.

I was not present at the conference of officers on the night of the 15th, but during the night I received orders announcing the fact that

we were going to evacuate the place and retreat towards Charlotte, Tenn. I was directed to have my men supplied with subsistence, ammunition, blankets, and knapsacks, the time, position, and their formation on the field being designated in the order. The command was duly formed by the time designated, but the necessity of carrying out the order was obviated by instructions afterwards received from General Buckner, referred to in my original report. The necessity for the statement of these facts was not foreseen when I prepared my original report.

Very truly, your obedient servant,

B. R. JOHNSON,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Indorsement No. 1.]

I have compared the above copy with the original supplemental report of General B. R. Johnson, and attest it as a true copy.

W. H. HUMPHREYS,  
*Confederate States District Judge.*

[Indorsement No. 2.]

The services detailed in this report having been performed while Brig. Gen. B. R. Johnson was under my immediate command, and General Floyd being out of the service and inaccessible, and General A. S. Johnston being dead, I forward this report directly to the Secretary of War, through the Adjutant-General.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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No. 63.

*Report of Col. A. Heiman, Tenth Tennessee Infantry, commanding brigade.*

RICHMOND, VA., August 9, 1862.

SIR: My imprisonment since the surrender of the troops at Fort Donelson has prevented me from reporting the operations of the brigade under my command during the action at Fort Donelson before now. In the absence of General Pillow, who commanded the division to which my brigade was attached, it becomes my duty, and I have the honor, to submit to you the following report:

After the battle of Fort Henry, on February 6 last, I was directed by General Tilghman, then in command of the defenses of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, to retreat with the garrison of the fort by the upper road to Fort Donelson. The garrison consisted, besides the company of artillery which was surrendered with the fort, of two brigades, the first commanded by myself and the second by Colonel Drake, consisting of an aggregate of about 2,600 men. After a very tedious march we reached Fort Donelson at 12 o'clock at night, where Colonel Head, of the Thirtieth Tennessee, was in command during the absence of General Tilghman. Expecting the arrival of General B. R. Johnson and other general officers in a few days I did not assume command, which would have been my duty, being next in command to General Tilghman.

General Johnson arrived on the 8th, General Pillow on the 9th, General Buckner on the 12th, and General Floyd on the 13th of February.

The brigade assigned to my command consisted of the Tenth Tennes-

see, Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock; Forty-second Tennessee, Colonel Quarles; Forty-eighth Tennessee, Colonel Voorhies; Fifty-third Tennessee, Colonel Abernathy; Twenty-seventh Alabama, Colonel Hughes, and Captain Maney's light battery, amounting in all to an aggregate of about 1,600 men.

This brigade formed the right of General Pillow's division, and was in line on the left of the division of General Buckner, who commanded the right wing.

The ground I occupied in line of defense was a hill somewhat in the shape of a V, with the apex at the angle, which was the advance point as well as the center of my command, and nearly the center of the whole line of defense. From this point the ground descended abruptly on each side to a valley. The valley on my right was about 500 yards in width, and divided my command from General Buckner's left wing. The one on my left was about half that width, and ran between my left wing and the brigade commanded by Colonel Drake. These two valleys united about half a mile in the rear. The ground in front of my line (2,600 feet in length) was sloping down to a ravine and was heavily timbered.

We commenced digging rifle pits and felling abatis on the 11th, and continued this work during the following night, under the directions of Major Gilmer and Lieutenant Morris, engineers, the latter belonging to General Tilghman's staff. The pits were occupied by Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock's regiment on the right, Colonel Voorhies' regiment on the left, Colonel Abernathy's and Hughes' regiments and Maney's battery in the center. Colonel Quarles' regiment I held in reserve, but several of his companies also had to occupy the pits, the other regiments not being sufficient to cover the whole line. Colonel Head, of the Thirtieth Tennessee Regiment, occupied the valley between my command and Colonel Drake's brigade. I was afterwards informed that this regiment was also placed under my command, but, the colonel not having reported to me, I did not know it.

In the mean time the enemy commenced forming his line by investment and his pickets were seen in every direction. Early on the morning of the 12th he had two batteries placed in range of my position, one on my left and front, and the other on the other side of the valley on my right. Both were in the edge of the woods and under cover, while Captain Maney's battery, on the summit of the hill, was entirely exposed not only to the enemy's artillery, but also to their sharpshooters. No time could yet have been spared to protect his guns by a parapet; besides, we were ill-provided with tools for that purpose. However, our battery had some advantage over the battery on my left in altitude, and had also a full range of a large and nearly level field to the left, which the enemy had to cross to attack Colonel Drake's position or my own from that direction. In that respect and some other points the position of my battery was superb.

The enemy's battery on my right had only range of part of my right wing, but was in a better position to operate on General Buckner's left wing. Both batteries opened fire at 7 o'clock in the morning and kept it up until 5 o'clock in the evening, firing at any position on our line within their range. Their fire was returned by Maney's battery, Graves' battery of Colonel Brown's command, and a battery at Colonel Drake's position. The enemy's guns were nearly all rifled, which gave them a great advantage in range and otherwise. However, with the exception of the loss of two artillery horses, my command met with no other serious casualties on that day.



At night I strengthened my pickets and directed Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock to throw a strong picket across the valley on my right. There were no rifle pits or any other defenses in that valley, although a road leading from Dover to Paris Landing, on the Tennessee River, runs through it. Colonel Cook, of Colonel Brown's brigade, co-operated with Lieutenant-Colonel MacGavock in guarding this point afterwards. Strong parties were kept at work during the whole night in improving the rifle pits and felling abatis.

Daylight next morning (13th) showed that the enemy was not idle either. During the night he placed another battery in position on my left, and the one on my right he had considerably advanced to get a better range on my right and center and on Captain Graves' battery. He had also thrown across the main valley two lines of infantry (advance and rear), about three-quarters of a mile from our line, and the firing of all his batteries was resumed early in the morning and was promptly answered by our batteries. One of the gunners had both his hands shot off while in the act of inserting the friction primer.

At about 11 o'clock my pickets came in, informing me of the advance of a large column of the enemy. Having myself been convinced of that fact, and finding that they were deploying their columns in the woods in front of my right and center, I directed Captain Maney to shell the woods, and use grape and canister when they came within the proper range, which was promptly executed. Captain Graves, seeing the enemy advancing upon my line, with excellent judgment opened his battery upon them across the valley. In the mean time their sharpshooters had approached my line through the woods, fired their rifles from behind the trees, killing and wounding Maney's gunners in quick succession. First Lieutenant Burns was one of the first who fell. Second Lieutenant Massie was also mortally wounded; but the gallant Maney, with the balance of his men, stood by their guns like true heroes, and kept firing into their lines, which steadily advanced within 40 yards of our rifle pits, determined to force my right wing and center. Now the firing commenced from the whole line of rifle pits in quick succession. This constant roar of musketry from both lines was kept up for about fifteen minutes, when the enemy were repulsed; but they were rallied, and vigorously attacked us the second and third time, but with the same result, and they finally retired. They could not stand our galling fire. The dry leaves on the ground were set on fire by our batteries, and, I regret to state, several of their wounded perished in the flames. The pickets I sent out after their retreat brought in about 60 muskets and other equipments they had left behind. I learned from two prisoners who were brought in that the attack was made by the Seventeenth, Forty-eighth, and Forty-ninth Illinois Regiments, and have since learned from their own report that they lost in that attack 40 killed and 200 wounded.

Our loss I cannot accurately state, nor am I able to give the names of killed and wounded, as subsequent events prevented me from getting reports of the different commanders; but I am sure that my loss is not over 10 killed and about 30 wounded, nearly all belonging to Captain Maney's artillery and Colonel Abernathy's regiment, which was at that time under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Winston. The firing from their batteries continued all day.

Late in the evening General Pillow re-enforced me with a section of a light battery, under Captain Parker. The night was unusually cold and disagreeable. Snow and sleet fell during the whole night; nevertheless we constructed a formidable parapet in front of the battery, in

which I was actively assisted by Major Grace, of the Tenth Tennessee. This hard and most unpleasant labor was chiefly performed by Colonel Quarles' regiment. It was a horrible night, and the troops suffered dreadfully, being without blankets.

Next day (14th), finding the enemy again in line across the valley, and believing that he would attempt to force my line on my right, I directed Captain Maney to move a section of his battery down the hill, in range of the valley. The advance of the enemy towards this direction would then have been checked by Graves' and Maney's batteries, and the fires of MacGavock's and Cook's regiments from the right and left; but no demonstration was made in that direction, although I considered it the weakest point in our line.

During the whole day my command was exposed to a cross-fire of the enemy's batteries and were much annoyed by their sharpshooters.

At 11 o'clock at night I was summoned to attend a consultation of general officers at General Floyd's headquarters. The general opinion prevailed that the place could not be held against at least treble the number of our forces, besides their gunboats, and that they could cut off our communication at any time and force a surrender; therefore it was agreed to attack the enemy's right wing in force at 4 o'clock in the morning, and then to act according to circumstances, either to continue the fight or to cut through their lines and retreat towards Nashville. General Buckner was to move a little later and attack the enemy's flank at the moment he gave way to our forces in his front. I was directed to hold my position. Colonel Bailey was to remain in the fort (near the river), and Head's regiment was to occupy the vacated rifle pits of General Buckner's command. I doubted very much that these positions, isolated as they were from each other, could be held if attacked, and I stated my fears to General Floyd, who replied, if I was pressed to fall back on the fort or act as circumstances would dictate.

At the appointed hour on the 15th the different brigades moved to their assigned positions. Major Rice, aide-de-camp to General Pillow, brought an order to me from General Buckner to send a regiment forward and hold the Wynn's Ferry road until the arrival of General Buckner's division. This duty I assigned to Colonel Quarles' regiment, which returned after the fulfillment of this order. Major Cunningham, chief of artillery (directed by General Floyd), reported to me that two light batteries were at my disposal. Having more guns than I could use to an advantage, and not a sufficient number of gunners to work them, I respectfully declined the offer, but requested him to send me efficient gunners for at least one battery. This was done. Major Cunningham came with them and remained with me for some time. During the day my guns were used to the best advantage, and at one time with excellent effect, against the enemy's cavalry, who immediately after were pursued by Forrest's cavalry.

About noon I was directed by an aide-de-camp of General Buckner to guard the fire of my battery, as he intended to send a column to charge one of the enemy's batteries. Seeing these regiments pass my left in the open field, and being aware that my left wing could not be attacked at that time, I sent two regiments from my left (Colonel Voorhies' and Colonel Hughes') to their support; but before they could reach the ground the three attacking regiments were withdrawn. The battery was not taken, and my regiments returned. Early in the evening the different troops were ordered back to their respective rifle pits, but the fighting continued at different points until night.

At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 16th Lieutenant Moorman, aide-



de-camp to General Johnson, brought the order to vacate the rifle pits without the least noise and to follow the movement of the troops on my left, stating at the same time that it was the intention to fight through their lines before the break of day. All the forces were concentrated near Dover, under the command of General Johnson. In the mean time white flags were placed on the works of our former lines, and by the time the sun rose above the horizon our forces were surrendered.

Much credit is due to Captains Maney and Parker, of the artillery, for their gallant conduct during the action, as well as to many other officers and men, whom, in the absence of reports from their respective commanders, I am unable to particularize; but it gives me great pleasure to state that, with very few exceptions, they all have done their duty like brave and gallant soldiers.

To Capt. Leslie Ellis, acting assistant adjutant-general, and my aide-de-camp, Captain Bolen, I am particularly indebted for their untiring exertions in assisting me in the performance of my duties.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. HEIMAN,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

Maj. GEORGE B. COSBY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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No. 64.

*Report of Lieut. T. McGinnis, Acting Adjutant Forty-second Tennessee Infantry.*

COLUMBIAN HOTEL,  
*Richmond, Va., August 11, 1862.*

SIR: The Forty-second Tennessee Regiment, Colonel Quarles, was quartered at Clarksville, Tenn., and Wednesday, February 12, received orders from Brigadier-General Pillow to proceed to Fort Donelson, where we arrived next morning, on a transport, under a heavy fire. The companies were formed on the boat and marched off in regular order, and in passing through the village of Dover we had 2 or 3 men wounded (1 mortally) by the enemy's shells. We were consigned to Colonel Heiman's brigade, where a hot fire was then being carried on. Three companies were thrown into the trenches on the flank of Colonel Abernathy's regiment; the balance were retained as a support. Soon after our arrival the firing ceased and the enemy withdrew.

In the course of the evening the whole regiment was thrown into the trenches, where they remained until Saturday morning, with but little skirmishing, when the regiment was ordered about half a mile to the left and again placed in the trenches. Here it was not designated to what brigade the regiment belonged. A heavy conflict was here being waged in our front about 10 a. m. I believe it was your brigade engaged, and it was here the coolness and daring of Colonel Quarles first became conspicuous. The regiment on his flank began to leave the trenches under a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries. Colonel Quarles rallied the stragglers and returned them to the trenches.

The regiment remained here until about 4 p. m., when we were ordered to the extreme right, where the enemy were reported to have taken some of our trenches. Cold and benumbed as were the troops, they double-



quicked for  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles through the mud, slush, ice, and snow, formed in front of the enemy, and, with a brisk fire of some twenty minutes, caused the enemy to retire. I believe you were present and know with what gallantry it was done.

Before closing my report I will call your attention to the cool and gallant conduct of Colonel Quarles. He was always at the head of his regiment, and set a gallant example for his officers and men.

The loss of the regiment was 11 wounded, 4 mortally. The number engaged was 498, rank and file.

The above report is respectfully submitted.

T. MCGINNIS,

*Acting Adjutant Forty-second Tennessee Regiment.*

Brigadier-General BUCKNER.

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No. 65.

*Report of Lieut. R. B. Ryan, Aide-de-Camp, of operations of Davidson's Brigade.*

HUNTSVILLE, ALA., March 6, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part which was taken by Colonel Davidson's brigade in the action near Fort Donelson, on Saturday, the 15th of February last.

On Saturday morning, between 3 and 4 o'clock, Colonel Davidson ordered me to have the four regiments composing his brigade in readiness to march at a moment's notice. As soon as the commanders of the regiments had been notified orders were received from yourself to hurry the formation of the brigade behind the left of our line of intrenchments, which orders were executed, I think, before 5 o'clock. Taking the position assigned us in the column under command of Colonel Simonton, of the First Mississippi, we moved forward in the following order, marching by the right flank: The Third [Twenty-third] Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Wells, on the right; the Eighth Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, on the right of the center; the Seventh Texas, Colonel Gregg, on the left of the center; the First Mississippi, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, on the left.

When our right had advanced half way up the hill or ridge, occupied by the enemy, the Third Mississippi was ordered forward into line and shortly after came into action; the Eighth Kentucky was met by such a heavy fire that it was formed in a hollow to the right of the Third Mississippi, and moved forward in line of battle, receiving a very severe and destructive fire from the first moment of coming into action. The regiments of Colonel Gregg and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton were formed into line of battle to the right of the Eighth Kentucky and moved forward together into action. The enemy pressing us very hard, Colonel Simonton was afraid our men would give way, and sent me to General Pillow for some re-enforcements at about 8 o'clock. General Pillow gave me orders for a regiment stationed on the extreme left of our line to move to our assistance. I found it to be the Thirty-sixth Virginia, under command of the major, whose name I do not know, and conducted it along the brow of the hill until near the left of our brigade, where I suggested to the major to form and bring his men into action so as to take the enemy, that was pressing us so hard, in the flank, which he did, and his men fought gallantly.

The greatest loss we sustained was near where the two pieces of artillery were captured, nearly half of Captain Slaughter's company (A), Eighth Kentucky, being cut down in the advance on the position of the enemy. Colonel Gregg's regiment met with severe losses while near the top of the hill; in some places it seemed as if a whole rank fell at a time. Lieutenant-Colonel Clough and Lieutenant Nowlin, of this regiment, fell dead near together. The First Mississippi also suffered severely, but I could not approximate the loss in killed and wounded of the brigade; I can only say that after coming out of the action the First Mississippi, Eighth Kentucky, and Seventh Texas seemed to have lost half their numbers, while the Third Mississippi was the only one that suffered a trifling loss; the loss in this regiment being not more than 12 or 15 killed and wounded.

Our men continued in action until the taking of a battery by the cavalry or throughout the day's fighting, after which our brigade was formed into line of battle towards the right or in advance of the point where the action ended, and, after remaining in this position for perhaps three-quarters of an hour, was marched back to the intrenchments.

R. B. RYAN,

*Aide to Colonel Davidson, Commanding Brigade.*

Maj. Gen. BUSHROD R. JOHNSON.

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No. 66.

*Report of Col. John M. Simonton, First Mississippi Infantry, commanding brigade.*

JACKSON, MISS., September 24, 1862.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit a report of the action and casualties of the brigade I commanded at the battle of Fort Donelson, on February 15.

I have been prevented from doing so sooner from the discourtesy of the Federal authorities, either to allow me to make it to a superior officer in captivity with me (but in a different prison) or in any other way; and I now make this report to you direct, because I do not know the whereabouts of the proper division commanders, and from a desire to do justice to the gallant officers and men under my command upon the bloody field; also that the Government may know who not only met the invading foe, but shed their blood in defense of the most holy cause for which freemen ever fought, and that the families, in after times, may reap the benefits of their noble deeds and costly sacrifices.

On Saturday, February 15, about 1 a. m., I received a verbal order from Brigadier-General Pillow to take command of the brigade commanded up to that time by Colonel Davidson, of the Third [Twenty-third] Mississippi (and properly the brigade of Brigadier-General Clark, of Mississippi), composed of the following regiments, viz: Third Mississippi, Colonel Davidson, Lieutenant-Colonel Wells commanding; First Mississippi, Colonel Simonton, Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton commanding; Seventh Texas, Colonel Gregg commanding; Eighth Kentucky, Colonel Burnett, Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon commanding; and the Forty-second Tennessee, Colonel Quarles commanding. The last-named regiment, however, was detached previous to going into the action, and from which I have received no report.

In obedience to orders, the brigade was formed in column under the crest of the hill in rear of and to the left of the rifle pits occupied by our army, and in rear of the brigade commanded by Colonel Baldwin, of the Fourteenth Mississippi, in which position we remained until 5 a. m. The enemy were in position behind the crests of a number of small hills in front and to the right of our rifle pits, and encircling our entire left wing.

At the hour above mentioned, Colonel Baldwin received orders to move in the direction of the enemy and attack them on the right. I was ordered to follow with my command, which order I obeyed, but owing to the ground and timber we were compelled to march by the flank, and had not moved more than 400 yards when the head of the column was fired upon. I immediately sent an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Wells to face his right wing to the right, and wheel it to the right, so that I might occupy a position on Colonel Baldwin's right (the one General Pillow had directed), but by some misunderstanding of the order, or its being miscarried, Lieutenant-Colonel Wells changed his front forward on first company, breaking my line at the left of his regiment. I then ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, of the Eighth Kentucky, to file right and move by the flank at double-time, which the gallant officer obeyed under a heavy fire of the enemy's musketry. Before they had completed the movement many of his noble men had bravely fallen, but they held their position determinedly, and immediately I ordered Colonel Gregg, of the Seventh Texas, and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton, of the First Mississippi, to move their respective regiments at double-quick in rear of and beyond the Eighth Kentucky, which movement those officers executed with as much coolness and their commands in as good order as if they had been on review. I at the same time dispatched an order to Lieutenant-Colonel Wells to occupy the position on the left of the Eighth Kentucky. (I make this explanation to show how the regiments changed position in going into action and that justice may be done to all as near as possible.)

This threw me in line of battle in the following order: The Seventh Texas on the right, First Mississippi second, Eighth Kentucky third, and Third Mississippi on the left and in front of the left of General McClelland's division of the Federal army. During this entire time the enemy kept up a continuous volley of musketry, with, however, but little effect, most of the balls passing over us. I now ordered the entire command to advance and occupy the crest of the hill, which was executed with a coolness and steadiness that would have done honor to soldiers of a hundred battles. That heroic band of less than 1,500 in number marched up the hill, loading and firing as they moved, gaining inch by inch on an enemy at least four times their number. For one long hour this point was hotly contested by the enemy, and many gallant officers and brave men fell in the faithful discharge of their duty, among whom was the lamented and daring Lieutenant-Colonel Clough, of the Seventh Texas, together with a number of company officers, whose names are mentioned in the list of killed and wounded.

At this moment I was informed by an adjutant that the command was running short of ammunition. I immediately dispatched an aide, Captain Ryan, to General Pillow for re-enforcements, and at the same time ordered Colonel Gregg to move his regiment farther to the right, to prevent a flank movement I discovered the enemy were attempting to make, and the remainder of my command to charge the enemy's lines, which movements were executed with a spirit and determination that insured success. The enemy's lines gave way, and the rattle of



musketry was drowned by the shouts of victory that rose along the lines of men conscious of superiority and right. The enemy, however, again rallied, and formed in line of battle a few hundred yards in rear of their first position and in rear of four pieces of artillery of Schwartz's battery.

The line of my brigade, in the charge over the hills and in passing through the enemy's camp, having become somewhat broken, I ordered the commandant to halt and rectify their alignments, which was quickly done; and, being now informed by Captain Ryan that the Fifty-sixth Virginia Regiment was on my left, I again ordered an advance, which was promptly obeyed by all, and soon the enemy was again driven from his position and four pieces of Schwartz's battery in our possession. The enemy continued to fall back, contesting the crest of every hill, until we had driven them over  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, and had possession of the ground occupied by the left of McClelland's and Wallace's divisions of the Federal army. The enemy had disappeared behind the crests of a range of hills about half a mile in our front and in the direction of their transports. At this point I was ordered to halt my command and await further orders.

In the mean time the brigade was furnished with ammunition (chiefly gathered from the slain of the enemy), the lines rectified, and the command brought to a rest, in which position we remained for a considerable time, until orders came for us to march inside the rifle pits, which order was obeyed without the fire of a gun, or even the sight of the foe, unless he was wounded or a prisoner. I had not fully occupied my position in the rifle pits when an order came to me to move at double-quick to the right of our line. The men were again ordered into line and moved in the direction indicated, but before arriving at the specified point another order was received to return. Thus ended the battle of February 15, so far as the brigade I commanded participated.

The number of killed and wounded in each regiment, as per adjutant's reports, is as follows:

Organization.	Men and officers.	Killed.	Wounded.
3d [23d] Mississippi Regiment .....	546	5	46
8th Kentucky Regiment .....	312	27	72
7th Texas Regiment .....	305	20	39
1st Mississippi Regiment .....	331	16	61
Total .....	1,494	68	218

Making a total of 286 killed and wounded out of 1,494 officers and men.

I respectfully refer you to documents A, B, C, and D for the names of the killed and wounded of the different regiments.\*

I cannot call especial attention to one of the field officers under my command without doing injustice to the others. Lieutenant-Colonel Wells, assisted by Captains Kenedy and Wells, of the Third Mississippi; Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, assisted by Major Henry, of the Eighth Kentucky; Colonel Gregg, Lieutenant-Colonel Clough, and Major Granbury, of the Seventh Texas; Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton and Major

\* Not found.

Johnston, of the First Mississippi, all won for themselves the confidence of their command and are entitled to the highest commendation of their countrymen. Capt. R. B. Ryan and Sergt. Maj. T. H. Wilson acted as my aides, and discharged their duty gallantly.

It would give me much pleasure to mention the names of company officers who distinguished themselves for efficiency and gallantry, but their conduct will be made known by their respective regimental commanders.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN M. SIMONTON,

*Col. First Miss. Regt., Comdg. Brig. at Battle of Fort Donelson.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, C. S. Army.*

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No. 67.

*Report of Lieut. Col. H. B. Lyon, Eighth Kentucky Infantry (Confederate).*

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH KENTUCKY REGIMENT,

*Boyer, Tenn., February 17, 1862.*

SIR: In our engagement with the Federal troops on Thursday, the 13th instant, the Eighth Kentucky Regiment was behind our intrenchments and withstood the fire of a battery of at times four and two guns, stationed immediately in its front, at about 700 yards distance from the regiment, for about six hours. The firing was often terrible, and the regiment lost 2 killed and 10 wounded. The men were also exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, but received no injury from it. On the 14th instant the regiment was behind our intrenchments, and was fired upon only by the enemy's sharpshooters, by which only 1 man was slightly wounded.

On the 15th instant the regiment engaged the enemy in the woods on the left flank and in front of our intrenchments; fought gallantly, assisting to whip and drive back the enemy; sustaining the loss of 17 men killed, 46 officers and men wounded, and 1 man missing, and returned to the intrenchments about 12 o'clock m., from which time until night it was exposed to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters, but losing no men from their fire.

No officers and men could have acted more gallantly than did those of the Eighth Kentucky Regiment at all times during the three days' fight. Among the most daring on the 15th on the field I must mention Maj. R. W. Henry, who had his horse shot under him, and was conspicuous for his bravery in all parts of the field where there was danger. Among the captains, lieutenants, and men I cannot discriminate; the actions of all were very gallant and highly commendable at all times.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. B. LYON,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Eighth Kentucky Regiment.*

Colonel DAVIDSON,

*Commanding Brigade.*



## No. 68.

*Report of Col. John Gregg, Seventh Texas Infantry.*

RICHMOND, VA., August 8, 1862.

MAJOR: In the absence of any one who was in command of the brigade or division of which my regiment was a part at the time of the battle of Fort Donelson, I make my report of the action of the regiment to General S. B. Buckner. I hope this will be considered proper, as it is the only method by which I can give to the brave men under my command the tribute which I think due to their behavior in that battle.

The regiment was assigned its place in the line designated as our line of defense on Wednesday, February 12; cleared away the timber in our front, and completed the digging of our rifle pits during the day and night. The enemy began to cannonade our intrenchments at 9 a. m. on Thursday and kept it up until 4 p. m., during a greater part of the time making an enfilading fire with shells, which was well directed, and by which Lieut. E. B. Rosson, of Company A, was killed, and Thomas Jordan, a private in Company G, was slightly wounded.

On Friday we were not engaged, but on Saturday morning, about half an hour before sunrise, we set out, with other regiments, to make the sortie upon the enemy's right wing. After filing around the base of the hill upon which the enemy were drawn up we came to our position, at the distance of half a mile, upon the right of our line. I caused the regiment to front and advance up the hill-side under a fire from the enemy's skirmishers. Just before reaching the crest of the hill, their line, drawn up behind it, delivered fire, and a most galling one it was. Here fell Lieut. Col. J. M. Clough, Capt. William B. Hill, of Company H, and Lieut. J. W. Nowlin, of Company A, neither of whom spoke after being shot; and here also quite a number of our non-commissioned officers and privates were killed and wounded. But our line continued to advance, pouring a most destructive fire into the enemy's ranks.

In about half an hour their line broke, and we pursued them to the next ridge, upon which a fresh line was drawn up. I caused the regiment to continue our forward movement and to keep up a continuous fire, and in a short time the second line broke and fled, leaving in our hands one 6-pounder, with ammunition and horses. We continued to press them until a third force was seen drawn up in a ravine near a clearing; and upon this we pressed and continued to fire until it also broke and fled, and, although the slaughter of the enemy had before been very great, their difficulty in getting through the felled timber caused our fire to be much more destructive upon them at this place.

For more than the distance of a mile through the woods the earth was strewn with the killed and wounded of the enemy. George Blain, a private in Company G, captured and brought to me Major Post, of the Eighth Illinois Infantry, and there were other prisoners taken. But all this was not done without severe loss to ourselves. Of the 350 or 360 officers and men whom I led into the fight, 20 were killed on the field and 34 were disabled by wounds.

I must acknowledge the very efficient assistance of Major Granbury in the management of the regiment throughout the entire day. When all behaved with such coolness and courage it is hardly admissible to name particular individuals, but the conspicuous gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Clough, of Captain Hill, and of Lieutenants Rosson and



Nowlin will ever be thought of with admiration by those who witnessed it, and cherished as a glorious memory by their friends.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN GREGG,

*Colonel Seventh Regiment Texas Infantry.*

Maj. GEORGE B. COSBY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va.*

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No. 69.

*Report of Col. John W. Head, Thirtieth Tennessee Infantry, commanding brigade.*

CHATTANOOGA, TENN., August 23, 1862.

SIR: The surrender of Fort Donelson having prevented me from making a regular report, by the advice of General Buckner I respectfully submit the following to you:

In the organization of the troops at Fort Donelson by General Pillow, after the fall of Fort Henry, the Forty-ninth Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, commanded by Colonel Bailey; the Fiftieth, commanded by Colonel Sugg, and the Thirtieth, commanded by myself, were placed under my command as a brigade, and ordered to garrison the fort.

On Wednesday, February 12, two of the enemy's gunboats ascended the river and opened a fire upon the river batteries and fort. This was continued but a short time and resulted in no injury to us.

On Wednesday evening the Thirtieth Regiment was ordered by General Pillow to take position in the outer line of defense, between the right of the brigade commanded by Colonel Drake and the left of the brigade commanded by Colonel Heiman.

The enemy were encamped in force in front of the position. I accompanied the regiment, leaving the fort garrisoned by the Forty-ninth and Fiftieth, under the immediate command of Colonel Bailey. The men were immediately put to work preparing rifle pits for their protection. The pits were completed by Thursday morning.

We were fired upon occasionally during the fight on Thursday, but the enemy not being in range of our guns, it was not returned by us.

During the bombardment of the fort and river batteries on Friday by the enemy from their boats our position was in range of their fire. The officers and men, however, behaved with coolness and gallantry.

About 2 o'clock on Saturday morning I received orders to report my regiment to General Buckner on the right wing. This I did without delay. I was ordered by General Buckner to occupy with my regiment the line of defense before held by his command, and, if attacked and overpowered, to fall back into the fort.

The trenches to be held covered a distance of about three-quarters of a mile. The regiment numbered about 450 men fit for duty. The companies of Captains Carson and Semple were placed in the pits on the extreme right, before held by the regiment of Colonel Hanson. The company of Captain Martin was held as a reserve. The three companies were placed under Major Turner, with instruction to report the first appearance of the enemy. The balance of the regiment was disposed of along the pits occupied by the remainder of General Buckner's forces. During the morning a brisk fire was kept up with the enemy's sharpshooters, resulting in a few casualties on both sides.

About 2 p. m. the forces of General Buckner commenced arriving at their encampments from the conflict with the enemy on their right wing, my regiment still occupying the pits. About 4 p. m., and before the regiment of Colonel Hanson could be arranged in the pits, the enemy, in heavy force, attacked the three companies under Major Turner on the extreme right. They held their position with great gallantry, pouring a destructive fire into the ranks of the enemy until he passed between the pits and overpowered them. They then fell back across a ravine on the next hill, and, in connection with other forces, resumed the fight. I immediately reported the facts to General Buckner, who ordered out a part of his command to sustain us. Seeing that the soldiers of General Buckner's command were greatly exhausted from the severe conflict they had been engaged in with the enemy in the forenoon, and that a bold and desperate effort was being made to force us back, I ordered the Forty-ninth and the right wing of the Fiftieth Regiments from the fort to sustain us. This I was forced to do without consultation with or orders from General Buckner, in consequence of his position, rallying and bringing his men into the engagement. The left wing of the Fiftieth was left in the fort, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lockhart, with orders to report promptly the first demonstration against the fort. I also ordered the companies of Captains Jones and Lovell, of the Thirtieth, from their position in the trenches, it being out of the range of the enemy, to sustain their comrades on the right. The remainder of the Thirtieth were in position and engaged in the fight.

Lieutenant Colonel Robb, of the Forty-ninth, was mortally wounded while aiding in bringing the regiment into the fight. He was an officer of high moral worth, beloved by his command, and acted with commendable courage. His death was a serious loss to the service. Colonels Bailey and Sugg gallantly led their commands into the action. Their men fought with great coolness and courage, and contributed very materially in repulsing the enemy. Indeed, all the officers and men under my command, although imperfectly drilled, discharged their duty, and are entitled to the thanks of the country. They suffered much from exposure in the sleet and snow, for want of sleep and food, but they bore it without a murmur. Lieutenant-Colonel Murphy, of the Thirtieth, was confined during the greater part of the week to his bed from sickness, but when able was with the command and rendered efficient service.

Company A, of the Thirtieth, commanded by Captain Bidwell, was in charge of one of the river batteries, and both officers and men won for themselves the praise of all who witnessed their heroic conduct.

During the engagement I also ordered two of the heavy guns in the fort to open upon the enemy. About 11 o'clock Saturday night I received orders to march my brigade into Dover immediately, to join the army in the evacuation of the place.

By 2 a. m. I was in Dover with my command, but was then ordered back to camp, information having been received that the place was surrounded. I was also advised that a surrender was determined upon, and that the command had been transferred to General Buckner. I was suffering from exposure and threatened with pneumonia. When it was known that a surrender was determined upon, the surgeon of the Thirtieth advised me that if I was taken prisoner in my condition it might cost me my life. I called upon General Buckner, stated the facts to him, and asked his advice as to the propriety of my escaping. He replied that it was a matter that I must determine for myself; that he felt it his duty to remain and share the fate of his men. Feeling that

I could be of no service to my command or to the country by a surrender, I left the encampment and made my escape up the river. On my return I reported myself to General A. S. Johnston, at Murfreesborough, for duty. He assigned me none. I was unwilling to retain my commission under the circumstances and tendered my resignation, the acceptance of which was, as I was advised, recommended by General Johnston.

JOHN W. HEAD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

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No. 70.

*Report of Maj. William N. Brown, Twentieth Mississippi Infantry.*

RICHMOND, VA., April 12, 1862.

I am directed by his excellency President Davis to make to your Department a report of the part taken by the Twentieth Mississippi Regiment in the engagement with the enemy at Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 13, 14, and 15; also all other facts concerning the investment and subsequent surrender of that post.

The regiment was assigned to the command of Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, in Western Virginia, during the past summer, and went to Kentucky, and from thence to Fort Donelson, as part of his "immediate command," arriving at that place at daylight February 13.

By sunrise we were ordered into position as a reserve immediately in rear of a point which was said to be our center. During the day heavy cannonading was kept up by both sides, mostly of shells and shrapnel, which resulted in killing 1 man and wounding slightly 3 or 4 others.

At night we bivouacked in position until 12 o'clock, when an order came from General Pillow to relieve the Seventh Texas Regiment, commanded by Col. John Gregg, then in the trenches. At that time a brisk firing was going on, supposed to be induced by the enemy's scouts and sharpshooters. The breastworks were thought insufficient from the test of the preceding day, so the remainder of the night was occupied in strengthening them and cleaning out the trenches, now partially filled with water and snow.

The next day (Friday) was spent in occasional engagements with the enemy's sharpshooters. The fort was actively engaged in repelling an attack of the gunboats of the enemy. My position did not afford me a view of the proceedings, which have been fully reported by others.

About 1 o'clock I received an order to form my regiment on the extreme left, in an open field, for the purpose of making a sortie on the enemy, which formation was executed in a very short time. By order of General Pillow, the Twentieth Mississippi was attached to the brigade of Col. William E. Baldwin, Fourteenth Mississippi Regiment, for this occasion. Before the order to advance had been given a few guns of the enemy were heard, and by the time we had advanced 100 yards a private of Company D was shot down, showing that the enemy was close at hand. We continued the march for 100 yards more, when the order to halt was given—said to come from General Floyd—with the explanation that we did not have time to accomplish what he wanted, and, the order to countermarch being given, we did so in proper order and retook our position in the trenches.

About 1 o'clock on that night (Friday) I received an order to form



again, as on the preceding evening, which was executed promptly, and, by direction of General Pillow was again placed under the command of Col. William E. Baldwin, Fourteenth Mississippi Regiment, acting brigadier-general. I made a report to him of the casualties of that day while in captivity, but as he has been prohibited from making a statement to the War Department of this Government, as likewise General Buckner, I hereby append substantially the same, of that day's proceedings, which was confined particularly to the Twentieth Mississippi Regiment.

Being the only field officer present, I was in command, and greatly assisted by Capt. H. Cantey, Company A, and Capt. C. K. Massey, Company D, who were selected voluntarily by the officers of the regiment to assist in field duty, there being some difficulty as to seniority of captains. Adj. I. M. Couper was also very efficient and rendered valuable assistance. Asst. Surg. T. B. Elkin was present and rendered every assistance in his power to the wounded.

#### RECAPITULATION.

Aggregate engaged .....	500
Killed .....	20
Wounded .....	58
Surrendered .....	454

That being the number returned by the commanding officers of companies on Sunday, February 16, the day we were surrendered. Afterwards many of them reported that they had several to escape.

On the morning of Saturday, February 15, when marched out to attack the enemy, we were third in the order of advance. The enemy's pickets and sharpshooters commenced firing upon us soon after the order to advance, and by the time we had gained 300 yards we were under a brisk fire, which came from a hill in front covered with timber.

By order from General Pillow the regiment was formed on the left of the road, perpendicular to the road, in the woods, immediately behind a fence, with an open field in front. Subsequently I received an order from the same source to wheel the regiment to the right through the field, behind the line of fence, parallel to the road. This movement subjected us to a cross-fire, and very much exposed us to the enemy on both sides, under cover of the woods. I had this fact represented to General Pillow, who ordered me back to our first position.

At this time the five left companies were actively engaged on the hill, and, not hearing the command, did not obey with promptness. The destruction in their ranks at that time demonstrated the fierceness of the conflict and their unflinching bravery.

I would mention especially Lieut. R. W. Paine, of Company H, who fell at this time a martyr to his country's cause. Here also was wounded Capt. D. T. Patterson, Company K. Lieut. O. R. Eastland, of Company F, was badly, perhaps mortally, wounded. He refused to be carried from the field, and exclaimed, "Never mind me, boys; fight on! fight on!" Lieut. J. H. Barbee, Company H, was wounded and forced to retire.

Capt. W. A. Rorer, commanding Company B; Lieut. W. R. Nelson, commanding Company G; Lieuts. T. B. Sykes, Conway, Muff, Roberts, W. S. Champlin, commanding Company E, and Lieutenant Harrison, are all deserving of honorable mention for their conduct at this place.

To enumerate all the officers and privates who were deserving of notice for their gallantry throughout the day would be to return a list of all who were on the field, and I would refer you to the foregoing list, but as fortune had thrown the left of the regiment in a more fiercely-

contested place, which the suffering truthfully indicates, it is but justice to give those companies some special notice.

On several other occasions during the day we were ordered to advance and charge through the woods, part of the time under the eye and immediate direction of General B. R. Johnson, on the extreme left, until the enemy were entirely driven off. Our movements under that officer seemed to take the enemy by their flank and rear. We opposed several of their lines of reserves, which retired with but little resistance.

At 12 o'clock I was instructed by General Johnson to remain with the brigade of Col. Joseph Drake, of the Fourth Mississippi, then on my left. The regiments on my right very soon commenced retiring to the intrenchments; I did not learn by whose order or for what purpose. In two or three hours a heavy column of the enemy attacked us in front, which was repulsed with little or no loss to us. They then endeavored to flank our right and thereby cut us off from the breastworks, now about three-fourths of a mile distant. Colonel Drake being so informed, gave the order to move by the right flank and continue the firing, which was executed. By this time many companies were without ammunition. Such was the case of many of Colonel Drake's command. On this account we retired to the trenches in perfect order.

When called upon the field the regiment had been without sleep for four nights, during which time they were marching, working, and watching in the trenches, encountering a severe snow-storm, without tents or cooking utensils. Notwithstanding all these privations and sufferings, every order was obeyed with the greatest alacrity, every man seeming to feel that much depended upon himself.

At 1 o'clock on Saturday night I was sent for to report to General J. B. Floyd, which I did promptly, and received notice from him that the place was to be surrendered, but that he would not surrender himself, and would cut his way out with his immediate command. To carry out this determination he ordered me to form my regiment on the left of our line, as the previous morning, with the Virginia regiments. While executing this order an aide-de-camp of General Buckner brought an order countermanding this arrangement, and directing me to the steamboat-landing, to embark on one of the two boats then momentarily expected.

I went immediately to General Floyd, so as better to understand the movement, and from him learned the authenticity of the instructions, and also that we would embark according to the rank of commanding officers (Colonel Wharton's brigade and Colonel McCausland's brigade would precede me in order). I was further directed to place a strong guard around the steamboat landing, to prohibit stragglers from going aboard. The boats being detained until nearly daylight and the news of a surrender spreading through the camp, caused many to flock to the river, almost panic-stricken and frantic, to make good their escape by getting aboard. In all this confusion I am proud to say that the Twentieth Mississippi Regiment stood like a stone wall, which, as the necessity had required, I had thrown in a semicircle around the landing, to protect General Floyd and his Virginia regiments while embarking; and, when the last hope had vanished of getting aboard according to the orders and promises of General Floyd, and we realized the sad fate that we had been surrendered, the regiment stacked arms in perfect order, without the least intimidation, but full of regret.

I am not able to state why we were not taken aboard the boat; there were about 200 men and officers between my regiment and the boat and General Floyd was aboard. I sent my adjutant to inform him we



were ready to go aboard. I did not get a satisfactory answer, but learned that the general was fighting off the men in my front, who I thought belonged to one of the Virginia regiments, commanded by Maj. Thomas Smith, who has since informed me that some did not go.

There seemed to me to be room enough on board for us all, and if he had wanted them out of the way I could have cleared the bank in a moment's time. When the boat left there did not seem to me to be 50 men on deck. It is, perhaps, unbecoming in me to say whose fault it was that my regiment was not embarked, but I certainly owe it to myself to show that it was not mine. While this excitement was going on General Buckner sent for me and informed me that unless the steamboat left the landing immediately he would have a bomb-shell thrown into it; that he had sent word to the boat to that effect. He made some further remarks of an explanatory character, among others that we were in danger of being shelled by the gunboats of the enemy, as he had surrendered the place, and the gunboats were or might be at the fort; that his honor as an officer and the honor and good faith of the Confederacy required that at daylight he should turn over everything under his command agreeably to the terms of capitulation with General Grant, of the Federal Army. I returned to the boat to make every effort to get aboard, but it had shoved off and was making up the river, with very few persons aboard.

If I have been at fault and caused the unnecessary imprisonment of my regiment, I am deserving the eternal infamy of my fellow-soldiers; but, to the contrary, not an officer or private of the regiment who witnessed the proceedings but freely and cheerfully exonerates me from any blame whatever.

During the summer and fall campaign in Western Virginia, in Kentucky, and in Tennessee this regiment has done credit to themselves and their State for the arduous service they have performed. At Sewell Mountain, Cotton Hill, and Fort Donelson their manly endurance of privations, prompt obedience to orders, and their eagerness for the fray was never excelled by veteran soldiers of any army, and has entitled the Twentieth Mississippi to a prominent place in the history of this revolution.

In obedience to my instructions to furnish the Department whatever information I may have of the battle of Donelson, I hereby append an unofficial statement, which I have in my possession, made by W. E. Baldwin, captain of infantry, C. S. Army, colonel Fourteenth Mississippi Volunteers, commanding Second Brigade, Second Division (General Buckner's), Central Army of Kentucky, from October 30, 1861:

Fort Warren, Mass., *March 19, 1862.*

To supply an anticipated omission in the future history of our country, it may not be improper here to state that this brigade, composed of the following regiments: Fourteenth Mississippi, commanded by Maj. W. L. Doss; Twenty-sixth Tennessee, commanded by Col. J. M. Lillard; Twenty-sixth Mississippi, commanded by Col. A. E. Reynolds, and Forty-first Tennessee, commanded by Col. R. Farquharson, was temporarily divided in the line around Fort Donelson, the Fourteenth Mississippi and the Forty-first Tennessee being posted on the right wing, under General Buckner's immediate supervision. The Twenty-sixth Tennessee and the Twenty-sixth Mississippi were posted under my own command on our extreme left. These regiments, with the Twentieth Mississippi, Maj. W. N. Brown, which was added to the command, constituted the advance in our attack on the right of the enemy at 6 o'clock on the morning of February 15. They all behaved with great gallantry in a six-hours' combat, which resulted in the total defeat of the enemy's right, whereby a way was opened for the retreat of the army. The opportunity not having been seized, and the enemy, 60,000 strong, having completely enveloped our little force, numbering before the losses occasioned by four days' constant engagement, but 12,000 officers and men, the senior generals, Floyd and Pillow, relinquished the command to General Buckner and made



their escape, the former taking with him some 1,500 troops of his immediate command, only leaving Major Brown with the Twentieth Mississippi, who, like veterans, were silently and steadily, though sullenly, guarding the embarkation of troops while their chief was seeking safety.

The command was unconditionally surrendered on the morning of February 16 by General Buckner, who shared the fate of his command. It is unbecoming in soldiers to criticise the conduct of superiors, but when, after rejecting the counsels of juniors, the condition of affairs is placed beyond the power of human means to retrieve, the seniors endeavor to escape responsibility by throwing the same upon the former, comment is unnecessary.

After surrendering the force was taken on transports, the rank and file separated from the officers. Most of the officers were confined in Camp Chase, near Columbus, Ohio.

On March 4 the field officers, 50 in number, were brought from that place to this (Fort Warren), where we have since been waiting with patience for the time when we can again strike for our homes and our country's independence.

It may not be improper for me here to state that, should an arrangement be established with the Federal Government for the exchange of prisoners of war, in consideration of the services rendered by this regiment and the further fact that it is mustered for the war, I would request that it be placed first in the list to be exchanged.

Respectfully submitted.

W. N. BROWN,

*Major, Twentieth Mississippi Regiment.*

General GEORGE W. RANDOLPH,

*Secretary of War, U. S. A.*

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No. 71.

*Reports of Col. Nathan B. Forrest, Tennessee Cavalry.*

FEBRUARY —, 1862.

Having been ordered by Brigadier-General Clark to Fort Donelson from Hopkinsville, I arrived at Fort Donelson on Monday evening, February 10, and finished crossing with my command on Tuesday morning.

On the same afternoon I was ordered, with 300 of my cavalry, to reconnoiter in the direction of Fort Henry. We met about 3 miles from Fort Donelson the enemy's cavalry, supposed to be about 600, and, after a short skirmish, pressing them hard about 6 miles, captured 1 prisoner and mortally wounded several others.

The following morning I was ordered out with my own regiment, three Kentucky companies, viz, Captains Williams, Wilcox, and Hewey's, and Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt's battalion of Tennessee cavalry (the commanding general having signified to me the night before his desire that I should take charge of all the cavalry at the post as brigadier of cavalry.)

I had gone about 2 miles on the road towards Fort Henry when we met the advance of the enemy. My advance guard engaged them, when I sent forward three rifle companies, and after a skirmish they retreated, leaving several dead and wounded. The enemy halted, and, after maneuvering for some time, commenced to move by a parallel road towards the fort. Receiving information of this change, I changed my position from the right to the extreme left of my line of battle, throwing two squadrons of cavalry across the road. As soon as the enemy's advance came in sight I again attacked them vigorously. The enemy were on an elevated ridge, thickly wooded, and, when the attack was made, little else than their cavalry could be seen.

My first squadron as skirmishers, having been dismounted, were hotly engaged with greatly superior numbers. To enable them to withdraw, the second squadron was ordered to charge, hearing which, Major Kelly, by my request, commanding the left (now center) of my line, ordered an advance of the three squadrons under his command. The enemy gave back at the point where the charge was made, and the cavalry wheeling out of the way on their flank opposite Major Kelly, the infantry rose from the ground and poured in at short range a terrific fire of musketry, accompanied by a volley of grape. I was now able to mount and draw off in good order my skirmishers, and, finding the enemy in large force, ordered my cavalry to fall back, no infantry being near to support me. In answer to my couriers from the fort, General Buckner (General G. J. Pillow absent at Cumberland City) now ordered me back within our intrenchments.

This skirmish was from about 9 a. m. to near 2 p. m. We killed during the day a hundred men and wounded several hundred more, which so delayed the advance of the enemy that they did not move to the attack that day, satisfying themselves with planting a few cannon and commencing at long range a slow cannonade.

In the afternoon General Floyd reached the fort, and the whole army, infantry and cavalry, were engaged during the night in throwing up intrenchments, crowning several hills surrounding Dover. The enemy planted their batteries during the night, and commenced a cannonade from their batteries and ten gunboats early on the morning of Thursday. Soon after, our intrenchments were vigorously attacked at all points, and for six hours there was scarcely a cessation of small-arms and artillery. The musketry ceased about 1 p. m., the cannonading continuing until after dark. The gunboats drew off early in the engagement, supposed to be crippled, returning occasionally. The cavalry were but little engaged, acting only as pickets and couriers.

On Friday I was ordered out with the infantry, passing our intrenchments on the left; but after maneuvering a short time and some sharp shooting between the cavalry and the enemy, I was ordered back into the intrenchments. A demand was then made on me for sharpshooters to dislodge the enemy, who were from heights and trees annoying our infantry in the intrenchments, which we accomplished in about two hours, returning to my command about the time the gunboat attack was made on the fort. Of this attack I was an eye-witness, and have never seen a description which did anything like justice to the attack or defense. More determination could not have been exhibited by the attacking party, while more coolness and bravery never was manifested than was seen in our artillerists. Never was there greater anxiety depicted in the face of brave men than during the terrific roar of cannon, relieved ever and anon by the slow but regular report of our one single 10-inch gun. Never were men more jubilant than when the victory crowned the steady bravery of our little fort; old men wept; shout after shout went up; the gunboats driven back; the army was in the best possible spirits, feeling that, relieved of their greatest terror, they could whip any land force that could be brought against them.

During the night I was called into council with the generals commanding, when it was determined to bring on the attack the next morning by again passing our intrenchments and attacking the enemy's right.

In the early gray of the morning I moved to the attack, the cavalry on the left and in the advance. I found the enemy prepared to receive us, and were again engaged with the sharpshooters till our infantry



were formed for the attack, the first gun from the enemy killing a horse in my regiment. General B. R. Johnson commanded the left, which now moved to the front. An obstinate fight of two hours ended in the retreat of the enemy. The undergrowth was so thick that I could scarcely press my horses through it. Finding that the flank of the enemy in retreat was exposed across an open field to my front and left, I immediately led my cavalry to the field, but found the ground a marsh, and we were unable to pass it.

The enemy formed in the edge of a second field to our front and right, and flanking the left of our advancing line of infantry. We could not move to flank them, but by maneuvering to their front and right doubtless prevented their attempting a flank movement on our infantry. Finding that our advancing line of infantry would cut them off, while the cavalry prevented their flanking us, they commenced a retreat, accompanied by their cavalry, which we could now see in the distance, but not participating during the day in the fight. Our infantry had now driven them near a mile, they doggedly disputing the whole ground, leaving dead and wounded scattered through the woods and fields up in the ravine. The enemy, leaving their third position for the first time, retreated in haste, advancing by a road through a ravine. I here passed our line of infantry with my command in moving to the center.

I charged the enemy's battery of six guns, which had kept several of our regiments in check for several hours, killing and slaughtering a great many of our men. I captured the battery, killing most of the men and horses. I then immediately moved on the flank of the enemy, obstinately maintaining their position. They finally gave way, our infantry and cavalry both charging them at the same time, committing great slaughter. Moving still farther to our right, I found a regiment of our infantry in confusion, which I relieved by charging the enemy to their front. Here 64 of the enemy were found in 40 yards square. General Pillow, coming up, ordered me to charge the enemy in a ravine. I charged by squadrons, filing the first company of each squadron to the right, and the second to the left, on reaching the ravine, firing and falling in the rear of the third squadron until the three squadrons had charged. We here completely routed the enemy, leaving some 200 dead in the hollow, accomplishing what three different regiments had failed to do. Seeing the enemy's battery to our right about to turn on us, I now ordered a charge on this battery, from which we drove the enemy, capturing two guns. Following down the ravine captured the third, which they were endeavoring to carry off, gunners and drivers retreating up the hill. In this charge I killed about 50 sharpshooters, who were supporting the guns. I ordered forward a number of scouts, who, returning, informed me that the enemy, with three guns and three regiments of infantry, were moving up by the road from Fort Henry. We had driven the enemy back without a reverse from the left of our intrenchments to the center, having opened three different roads by which we might have retired if the generals had, as was deemed best in the council the night before, ordered the retreat of the army. Informing General Pillow of the position the enemy had taken, he ordered two new regiments and one of the regiments in the field, with one piece of artillery, to attack the enemy.

The fight here ended about 2.30 p. m. without any change in our relative positions. We were employed the remainder of the evening in gathering up the arms, and assisting in getting off the wounded. I was three times over the battle-field, and late in the evening was 2 miles up the river on the road to the forge. There were none of the enemy in



sight when dark came on. Saturday night our troops slept, flushed with victory, and confident they could drive the enemy back to the Tennessee River the next morning.

About 12 o'clock at night I was called in council with the generals, who had under discussion the surrender of the fort. They reported that the enemy had received 11,000 re-enforcements since the fight. They supposed the enemy had returned to the positions they had occupied the day before.

I returned to my quarters and sent out two men, who, going by a road up the bank of the river, returned without seeing any of the enemy, only fires, which I believed to be the old camp fires, and so stated to the generals; the wind, being very high, had fanned them into a blaze.

When I returned General Buckner declared that he could not hold his position. Generals Floyd and Pillow gave up the responsibility of the command to him, and I told them that I neither could nor would surrender my command. General Pillow then said I could cut my way out if I chose to do so, and he and General Floyd agreed to come out with me. I got my command ready and reported at headquarters. General Floyd informed me that General Pillow had left, and that he would go by boat.

I moved out by the road we had gone out the morning before. When about a mile out crossed a deep slough from the river, saddle-skirt deep, and filed into the road to Cumberland Iron Works. I ordered Major Kelly and Adjutant Schuyler to remain at the point where we entered this road with one company, where the enemy's cavalry would attack if they attempted to follow us. They remained until day was dawning. Over 500 cavalry had passed, a company of artillery horses had followed, and a number of men from different regiments, passing over hard-frozen ground. More than two hours had been occupied in passing. Not a gun had been fired at us. Not an enemy had been seen or heard.

The enemy could not have reinvested their former position without traveling a considerable distance and camped upon the dead and dying, as there had been great slaughter upon that portion of the field, and I am clearly of the opinion that two-thirds of our army could have marched out without loss, and that, had we continued the fight the next day, we should have gained a glorious victory, as our troops were in fine spirits, believing we had whipped them, and the roads through which we came were open as late as 8 o'clock Sunday morning, as many of my men, who came out afterwards, report.

I made a slow march with my exhausted horses to Nashville, Tenn., where we arrived on Tuesday morning, and reported myself to General Floyd, who placed me in command of the city on Thursday, at the time of his leaving. I remained in the city until Sunday evening, during which time I was busily engaged with my regiment restoring order to the city and removing public property.

My loss at the battle in killed, wounded, and taken prisoners amounted to between 300 and 400 men. Among the number was Capt. Charles May, who fell at the head of his company while leading a charge.

My regiment charged two batteries, taking nine pieces of artillery, which, with near 4,000 stands of arms, I had taken inside of our lines. I cannot speak too highly of the gallant manner in which my officers and men conducted themselves on that occasion, as well as others that came under my observation, with the exception of Lieutenant-Colonel Gantt, commanding a battalion of Tennessee Cavalry, who failed to fight

on Saturday, and refused to bring his men out with my regiment on Sunday morning when ordered to do so.

Respectfully submitted.

N. B. FORREST,  
*Colonel, Commanding Forrest's Regiment of Cavalry.*

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MURFREESBOROUGH, TENN., November 7, 1862.

Being informed by General Pillow that it is material for the purposes of justice and a proper understanding by the Government of the operations of the army at Donelson that I should make a statement of the result of the conference of general officers on the night of February 14, at which I was present by order of General Floyd, I make the following supplemental report:

On that day and the day before a large, fresh force, said to be 20,000 men, had reached the landing below us. At that time we were invested by a force which our information led us to estimate at 30,000. All the officers present felt the necessity of cutting our way out and resuming our communication with General Johnston. It was therefore resolved to give them battle in the open field the next morning.

I understood it to be the ultimate intention to retire from the place if we succeeded in opening our way, but nothing was said about our retreating from the field. No order was given to that effect and no preparation was made for that purpose; no suggestion was made of that character and no such determination arrived at.

On the day of the fight (15th) no artillery was taken from our intrenchments, except, perhaps, one piece late in the evening; no rations were prepared or taken on the field; blankets and knapsacks were left behind; no order of retreat was prescribed; no quartermaster, commissary, or ordnance stores were prepared to accompany a retreat; and, if a retreat had been attempted from the field of fight, it could not have been accomplished. The commands were scattered and mixed in fragments; very many of the men after the middle of the day had gone back into the town, and were around the fires and up and down the river bank. I had again and again during the day sent portions of my command into the intrenchments and had ammunition brought out on horseback.

The day itself was mainly occupied in the active operations of the fight. Soon after the fighting in the field was terminated fighting was begun on our right, in General Buckner's rifle pits, which lasted until about sundown.

In my opinion the pursuit of the enemy could not have been continued longer without coming in contact with a large, fresh force, which, in the scattered and exhausted condition of our troops, we could not have withstood.

The character of the country over which we would have had to retreat from Donelson to Charlotte was excessively poor and broken, and at that time covered with snow and sleet, and could not have furnished a half-day's ration for our force.

N. B. FORREST,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding Cavalry.*

[Indorsement No. 1.]

I have compared the above copy with the original supplemental report of General Forrest and attest it as a true copy.

W. H. HUMPHREYS,  
*Confederate States District Judge.*



[Indorsement No. 2.]

The services detailed in this report having been performed while General Forrest was under my immediate command and General Floyd being out of service and inaccessible and General A. S. Johnston being dead, I transmit the report direct to the War Department, through the Adjutant-General.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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No. 72.

*Report of Lieut. Col. Milton A. Haynes, C. S. Army, Chief of Tennessee Corps of Artillery.*

RICHMOND, VA., March 24, 1862.

SIR: By direction of the honorable Secretary of War I have the honor to make the following report in regard to the defense of Fort Donelson, on February 12, &c.:

On January 15 General L. Polk ordered me to report to Brigadier-General Tilghman, for the purpose of organizing the artillery defenses of Forts Henry and Donelson, which order I obeyed by reporting on the 16th to General Tilghman in person at Fort Henry, who immediately sent me to Fort Donelson. That post was then under the command of Col. J. W. Head, Tennessee volunteers, with a force of three newly-raised regiments and one company of light artillery. Two companies of volunteer infantry were detailed to act as artillerists, under Captains Beaumont and Bidwell. These companies and Captain Maney's light battery were by me at once organized into a battalion, and General Polk, in response to a telegraphic dispatch, sent two lieutenants, viz, Martin and McDaniel, of the artillery, to report to me for duty, both well versed in the management of heavy artillery. These officers drilled and instructed the men daily, and under my own eye they were trained in firing their guns at targets at 1,000, 1,500, and 2,000 yards, and the ranges of the guns were explained to them. At the same time every man in the battalion fit for duty worked daily in putting the battery, embrasures, magazines, &c., in order.

A new bomb-proof magazine, of capacity to hold 100 rounds for ten guns, was rapidly constructed, under the direction of Captain Beaumont and Lieutenant Bedford, which was immediately connected with the battery by a covered way, also bomb-proof.

Under the direction of Capt. J. P. Shuster, formerly of the U. S. Navy, but now on artillery duty with me, by General Johnston's order, the shot and shells were distributed at the pieces, the ammunition, &c., placed in the magazine, and each man assigned to his post, and his especial duty explained to him in case of an engagement.

The entire armament of the fort at that time was ten 32-pounder guns (two of them ship carronades), one 8-inch howitzer, two nondescript 9-pounders, one 10-inch columbiad, and one rifled gun throwing a conical shell of 128 pounds. The columbiad had been mounted about January 25, but, upon trial, its recoil threw the gun back against the hurters, throwing the chassis off the pintle, and seriously damaging the iron barbette carriage. In this condition it was (like the one at Fort Henry) useless. To remedy this defect I had it dismounted, and sent a com-



petent officer to the rolling-mill, and had two new rear traverse wheels cast, 4 inches in diameter larger than the older ones. These wheels were not to be obtained until a short time before the battle, and only reached us in time to enable us to remount this valuable gun the day before the battle began. With these new wheels it worked like a charm.

The large rifled gun was sent to us more than ten days before the engagement, but neither pintle nor pintle plate (without which it could not be mounted) was sent with it. I sent an officer of artillery at once to Nashville to obtain and bring forward these and other important fixtures, to enable us to mount this and other guns and work them to advantage. Fortunately they reached us just in time to enable us to place this gun in working order.

Our batteries being now in readiness, the following dispositions were ordered by me: 200 additional men were called for to act as supernumeraries, to aid in repairing the works or remounting guns, to carry ammunition, to extinguish fires, and to supply the places of disabled artillerymen.

Capt. T. W. Beaumont, with his company (80 men), had charge of the five 32-pounder guns next the river, assisted by several lieutenants. Capt. B. G. Bidwell's company, 75 strong, had the 10-inch columbiad and four 32-pounder guns on the left, all under the eye of Captain Dixon, of the Engineers. Capt. J. P. Shuster, chief of battalion, and Lieut. Jacob Culbertson, C. S. Army, on special duty. Captain Ross (just arrived from Hopkinsville) and his company voluntarily gave up their light battery and took charge of the half-moon battery, containing the rifled gun and two carronades, furnishing a detachment, under charge of Lieutenant Starkovitch,\* to manage the 8-inch howitzer and two 9-pounder nondescripts, and Captain Maney's light battery was moved to the rifle trenches, in General Pillow's division, and no longer acted under my orders.

On the 12th the gunboats made their appearance, but did not venture within the range of our guns. Early the next morning (a vigorous attack then being made by the enemy on the exterior defenses) the gunboats opened a spirited cannonade of shot and shells from heavy rifled and smooth-bore guns upon the batteries and fort, which was, though at too long a range, returned with spirit by our guns—one of the boats being struck and damaged by shot from Captain Ross' rifled gun, driving the boats back under the shelter of a bend in the river, from which they continued to throw shells. Unfortunately a single shot dismounted one of our 32-pounder guns, instantly killing the brave Captain Dixon, disabling for a short time Captain Shuster, and killing and wounding 2 or 3 privates.

I immediately placed Lieutenant (Acting Captain) Culbertson in charge of these batteries, and although unable to walk without crutches and then with great pain, I took my post at the river batteries. In the mean time the two armies were hotly engaged along our whole line, and soon the gunboats returned to the contest, keeping up a continued discharge of shells and solid shot upon our batteries, without, however, doing us any material damage. Our fire was for some time carefully withheld in order to draw the boats nearer to us, and, as expected, they soon ventured nearer, when a few well-directed shots from our columbiad and rifled gun drove them back, one of the boats being so seriously injured that she (as we afterwards learned) was with difficulty kept from sinking. The contest at the close of the day ceased by land and water,

\* Probably Stankienriz

and our batteries were visited by Generals Floyd and Pillow in person, and our artillerists especially commended by them.

On the following day the increased inflammation and pain of my wound rendered it impossible for me to remain longer at the batteries, and I was, by direction of Surgeon Williams, placed on board a steamer, with other wounded soldiers, to be conveyed to Nashville.

During my services at Fort Donelson, both before and during the engagements, I was under obligations to Acting Adjt. W. W. Foote, of the Corps of Artillery, and to Lieut. H. S. Bedford, adjutant of the battalion, for the prompt and faithful manner with which they discharged their duty.

I cannot close this statement of my brief and humble connection with the defense of Fort Donelson without expressing my particular obligations to First Lieut. (Acting Captain) J. Culbertson, of the Regular Artillery, and Lieut. H. S. Bedford and Lieutenant Cobb, of the Ordnance Department, for their zeal and energy in superintending the work at the batteries and valuable services rendered during the engagement, in all of which they were greatly assisted by Capt. T. W. Beaumont; nor to Lieutenants Martin and McDaniel, for their untiring energy in imparting instructions to the artillerists under my command. Neither can too much be said in praise of the 200 volunteer infantry, who, after three weeks' instruction, in the midst of labor and toils, both day and night, acquired such skill in the management of their guns as to be able to maintain successfully a four days' cannonade with a flotilla of gunboats, crippling at least five of them, and compelling their flag-officer to withdraw his fleet entirely from the contest so badly crippled that he was unable to renew the fight. Nor should the gallant Captain Ross and Lieutenant Starkovitch\* (both old artillery officers, who, in command of Captain Ross' light artillerists, worked their heavy guns with such admirable precision) be forgotten in the award of praise.

Our success was greatly due to the admirable position of our guns, rising as they did successively from the river to the height of 50 feet, thus enabling us to throw our shot by a plunging fire into the holds of the boats, and thus reaching and crippling their machinery; and to the narrowness of the river (here only 500 feet wide), which compelled the boats to approach the guns with their prows exposed.

I may here add that, from information derived from the men themselves, I afterwards learned that Captain Bidwell, Lieutenant Burt, with 36 men, and all the horses of Porter's light battery, and Forrest's cavalry regiment, and many stragglers from various corps, effected their safe retreat on Saturday night without the loss of a man or any opposition from the enemy.

In justice to myself (as I had for a short time had charge of the artillery defenses at Fort Donelson), I may with propriety say that I had nothing whatever to do with the arrangements of the exterior defenses, which were entirely under the direction of the general commanding and engineers.

In my opinion the site itself was most unfortunate—first, because the space inclosed by the trenches formed a *cul-de-sac*, cut in the middle by an impassable backwater, thus rendering communication between the wings of our army difficult and hazardous; second, because the whole position was surrounded by hills at the distance of from 800 to 1,500 yards higher than those occupied by us, thus giving commanding positions for the enemy's rifled field guns, from which every point in our lines could be reached.

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\* Probably Stankieuriz.



Hence the utmost courage and endurance could not and did not avail to save us from disaster; but the deeds of daring performed by our army will form the brightest picture in the pages of our history, and make the names of the heroes of Dover and its blood-stained hills immortal.

I am, your obedient servant,

MILTON A. HAYNES,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, Chief of Tennessee Corps of Artillery.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant-General C. S. Army.*

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No. 73.

*Report of Col. J. E. Bailey, Forty-ninth Tennessee Infantry, of the water batteries, &c.*

JACKSON, MISS., October 9, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the position of the water batteries and the garrison of the fort proper during the siege of Fort Donelson:

The batteries near the river mounted one 68-pounder rifle, one 10-inch columbiad, manned by Captain Ross' light artillery company—the first under immediate command of Captain Ross, the last under Lieutenant Bedford—and eight 32-pounders, under command of Captain Bidwell, of the Thirtieth Tennessee, and Captain Beaumont, of the Fiftieth Tennessee; all under command of Captain Dixon.

The garrison of the fort consisted of the Thirtieth Tennessee, Colonel Head; Forty-ninth Tennessee, my own regiment; and the Fiftieth Tennessee, Colonel Sugg; one 8-inch howitzer and two 12-pounder howitzers, under Lieutenant Starkovitch\* and 9 men; Colonel Head being in command of the fort and water batteries on the evening of February 12. Colonel Head, with the Thirtieth Tennessee, was ordered to join General Pillow's division, when, by order of General Pillow, I assumed command.

On Thursday, February 13, one of the enemy's gunboats, approaching to about 1 mile of the fort, threw about 50 shot and shell at us, killing Captain Dixon and one man of the Fiftieth Tennessee and wounding 4 others of the same regiment. Captain Shuster, a volunteer in the batteries, being injured by the blast of one of the guns, the command of the batteries, after Captain Dixon's death, devolved upon Captain Culbertson.

In the afternoon of February 14 an attack was made on the batteries and fort by six of the enemy's gunboats, four of them approaching within 300 yards of the batteries, the other two lying near a mile off. The boats were repulsed and evidently seriously damaged. Lieutenant Johnson, of the Forty-ninth, was wounded by a fragment of a shell.

On the morning of the 16th, after the surrender of the army, the enemy threw five or six shells into the fort.

The officers and men in the batteries were cool and steady; their fire was delivered with remarkable precision; but I would call attention particularly to the conduct of Captains Culbertson, Ross, Beaumont, Bidwell, and Lieutenant Bedford—Captain Dixon inspiring the men with his own heroic courage.

On the evening of February 15, when the enemy attacked General Buckner's right wing, I was ordered to move with the Forty-ninth Ten-

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\*Probably Stankieuriz.



nessee to his support. This regiment, numbering 300 effective men, advanced at a double-quick about 800 yards to the ridge on which General Buckner's line was then forming, taking position to his right. The enemy, after occupying the rifle pits near which the Second Kentucky had been driven back, had thrown forward a line of skirmishers in considerable force, which on my extreme right had crossed the abatis in front, had advanced near one-third the distance from the valley in rear of the rifle pits to the crest of the ridge on which we were formed, threatening to flank General Buckner. The Forty-ninth immediately delivered its fire into the enemy's line and in a few minutes drove it in confusion to the opposite ridge near the rifle pits, from which, for one hour and fifteen minutes, a heavy fire of musketry and canister was directed against us.

Five companies of the Fiftieth Tennessee, Colonel Sugg commanding, after the engagement had continued a short time, were ordered from the fort, taking position on my right, and by their gallant conduct assisted in defeating the apparent purpose of the enemy to flank our lines. Lieutenant Starkovitch\* contributed to the result by a few well-aimed shells from the 9-inch howitzers in the fort.

My officers and men behaved with coolness and courage. The loss of the Forty-ninth was 4 men killed and 17 wounded; of the Fiftieth, 1 killed and 3 wounded. Among the wounded was Lieutenant-Colonel Robb, of the Forty-ninth, who survived the action only a few hours. In his death our country lost one of its noblest men, our army one of its most valuable officers.

I make this report directly to you, for the reason that Colonel Head has quit the service, and the brigade to which I was attached was not assigned to any division of the army.

Permit me to call attention to an error into which General Buckner has fallen in his report of the engagement of the evening of the 15th, in stating that my regiment (the Forty-ninth) reached the field "towards the close of the action." The regiment came under fire in less than twenty minutes after the action began, and kept its position under fire, hotly contesting the ground with the enemy for more than one hour, and until the close of the action in that quarter, when by order of General Buckner it returned to the fort. It repulsed the advancing lines of the enemy threatening to turn General Buckner's right.

I inclose Captain Culbertson's report and accompanying paper.

I am, your obedient servant,

J. E. BAILEY,  
Colonel Forty-ninth Tennessee Regiment,  
late Comdg. Fort and Batteries at Fort Donelson.

General S. COOPER, Adjt. and Insp. Gen., Richmond, Va.

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No. 74.

*Report of Capt. Jacob Culbertson, U. S. Army, commanding batteries.*

JACKSON, TENN., October 3, 1862.

COLONEL: The command of the river batteries at Fort Donelson having devolved upon me upon the death of Capt. Joseph Dixon, it becomes my duty to report to you the operations in said batteries during the siege. The four guns on the right of our 32-pounder battery were manned by Company A, Fiftieth Tennessee Volunteers; the four

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\* Probably Stankieuriz.

on the left by Company —, Thirtieth Tennessee—both companies commanded by their captains (Beaumont and Bidwell) in person. Our two heavy guns (a 10-inch columbiad and a 68-pounder rifle) were manned by Capt. Ross, Maury Light Artillery, the rifle being under his personal direction in all the actions.

The first engagement took place on Thursday, February 13, about 11 a. m., when one gunboat approached and took position about a mile off and commenced a bombardment, obviously to draw out an exhibition of our strength. We responded with our rifle and 10-inch gun. Being in command of the 32-pounder only, I did not open fire until directed to do so by Captain Dixon, half an hour after action commenced. We opened with the 32-pounder at our maximum elevation; but our shot all fell short. The enemy then immediately retired. One of their last shot (from a rifle) striking one of our guns, dismounted it and instantly killed Captain Dixon. This was the only damage done to the batteries during the siege.

The next day, Friday, February 14, a combined land and naval attack was made on our works, six of the enemy's gunboats shelling our batteries during nearly an hour and a half. By General Pillow's order I withheld the fire of the 32-pounder until the enemy reached our point-blank nearly. This was opposed to my judgment, as it showed the enemy the positions of our two heavy guns, which I regarded as constituting our only hope. They took no advantage of it, however, but fired almost at random, and the fire of the 32-pounder became so destructive when the enemy had advanced to within 300 yards that they were compelled to retire.

It is to be remarked that the after portion (about one-third) of the armor of the four boats which approached so close to our guns is of wood, and that a further advance would have exposed them to a reverse fire through this portion.

In this action our rifle became unserviceable after the third or fourth shot, a priming wire having become lodged in the vent through the want of skill of the cannoneers in loading. They had had but two days' experience.

In the first day's fight Captain Shuster was disabled by the blast from one of the 32-pounders, near which he was standing when it was fired.

The gunboats remained with steam up just out of range for four days and nights, obliging our men to sleep by their guns ready for an attack. They suffered severely from the cold, want of sleep, and properly-prepared food.

Our then recent disaster at Fort Henry was calculated to inspire distrust of our own guns and a belief in the invulnerability of the gunboats. Nevertheless the men went to their work with heroic alacrity, and bore themselves with a steadiness worthy of veterans. Their conduct is the fitting and only necessary encomium upon the efficiency and bravery of their company commanders.

My thanks are due to Major Robertson, of the Fiftieth Tennessee, for his very valuable and voluntary aid in both actions. Much praise was deserved by Lieut. H. S. Bedford, to whose skillful direction of the 10-inch gun our success is mainly to be attributed.

For further particulars I refer you to the accompanying reports of Captains Beaumont and Bidwell.

Your obedient servant,

JACOB CULBERTSON,

*Captain of Artillery, Commanding Batteries.*

Colonel BAILEY, *Comdg. Fort Donelson and River Batteries.*



## No. 75.

*Reports of Capt. B. G. Bidwell, Thirtieth Tennessee Infantry, commanding battery.*

COURTLAND, ALA., March 13, 1862.

SIR: Being the only officer connected with the heavy batteries at Fort Donelson who was fortunate enough to escape, I inclose you the following account, not as a report, but as a source of information:

It may be proper to first give some description of our batteries and their position. Fort Donelson was on the crest of a hill, on the south bank of the Cumberland, about 1 mile below the little town of Dover. The vicinage around was very broken below the fort. Running back from the river was a deep ravine or gorge, filled with backwater for a mile back. Breaking off from this was another deep hollow, which ran up behind the fort, making almost all of the fort on the crest of the hill. Just above the main part of the fort a hollow makes out from the river, which runs diagonally across the fort, making the inner fort nothing but a hollow and the side of the hill. The most of the work was tolerably good earthwork, the remainder nothing but rifle pits, thrown up after the fall of Fort Henry. There was in the fort one large howitzer (a good one) and two small 9 or 12 pounders, made in Clarksville, of very little account. Below the fort, and just at the foot of the hill, was our battery of eight 32-pounders and one 10-inch columbiad. On the extreme left, just above on the river bank and on the point of the hill above, was another battery, including one rifled gun and two old caronades or ship's guns, which were worthless there or anywhere else. Their trunnions, being too small, were bent. This battery was separated from the other by another hollow and point of land projecting to the river bank between them. The 32-pounders were in good condition. Four of them were under the charge of Captain Beaumont and the other four commanded by myself. The rifled gun was under the charge of Captain Ross. The columbiad was manned by a detachment of Captain Ross' men, under Lieutenant Bedford, of Mississippi, a most excellent artillerist. This gun was not in good condition, owing to the following facts: After the fall of Fort Henry our gunners tried, with a 20-pound charge, to test it. The gun-carriage was found too short and weak every way for the gun. The recoil was so great it injured the carriage considerably and nearly dismounted itself. It was found necessary to increase the inclination of the carriage. This was done by substituting a large traverse wheel in the rear and depressing the traverse circle in front. This depression was so great that it produced a valley or bed out of which the front wheels could not be rolled, thus diminishing very greatly the range of the gun right and left. This gun could only fire when their boats passed the field of its range, and probably on the right boat all the time.

One boat made its appearance around the point about two miles and a half below us on Thursday, February 13, and fired a few rounds at us, to which our battery replied pretty warmly until she retired. The next to the last shot from the boat came through the embrasure of the second gun in my battery, striking the left cheek of the carriage, shivering it, and disabling the gun, killing Captain Dixon, of the Engineer Corps, who had, by order of General Pillow, been placed in command of the entire heavy artillery as chief. Upon his death Captain Culbertson, of the old Army, took command, a position he had held for some time with credit to himself and satisfaction to those under him.



All was quiet until the evening of the 14th (Friday), when four boats came around the point, arranged themselves in line of battle, and advanced slowly, but steadily, up the river to within 200 yards of our battery, and halted, when a most incessant fire was kept up for some time. We were ordered to hold our fire until they got within range of our 32-pounder. We remained perfectly silent, while they came over about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, pouring a heavy fire of shot and shell upon us all the time. Two more boats came around the point and threw shell at us. Our gunners were inexperienced and knew very little of the firing of heavy guns. They, however, did some excellent shooting. The rifled gun was disabled by the ramming of a cartridge while the wire was in the vent, it being left in there by a careless gunner—being bent, it could not be got out—but the two center boats were both disabled, the left center (I think) by a ricochet shot entering one of the port-holes, which are tolerably large. The right center boat was very soon injured by a ball striking her on top, and also a direct shot in the port-hole, when she fell back, the two flank boats closing in behind them and protecting them from our fire in retreat. I think these two were not seriously injured. They must have fired near 2,000 shot and shell at us. Our columbiad fired about twenty-seven times, the rifled gun very few times, and the 32-pounders about 45 or 50 rounds each. A great many of our balls took effect, being well aimed. I am confident the efficiency of the gunboat is in the gun it carries rather than in the boat itself. We can whip them always if our men will only stand to their guns. Not a man of all ours was hurt, notwithstanding they threw grape at us. Their fire was more destructive to our works at 2 miles than at 200 yards. They overfired us from that distance.

Our men all did well. I probably ought not to make any distinction, but will refer to the gallant conduct of John G. Frequa, a private and gunner. At the highest gun in my battery he stood perfectly straight, calm, cool, and collected. I heard him say, "Now, boys, see me take a chimney." The chimney and flag both fell. He threw his cap in the air, shouting to them defiance. "Come on, you cowardly scoundrels; you are not at Fort Henry," were his words to them. Very soon he sent a ball through a port-hole and the boat fell back. This boy is one of the prisoners so unnecessarily and wrongfully surrendered at Donelson—surrendered, with his comrades, while at his post Sunday morning, without any knowledge of what was being done and no chance for escape.

I was sent for by a colonel of a Tennessee regiment and was at Dover when the white flags were sent out early Sunday morning, and had no chance to communicate with my men or save them.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. G. BIDWELL.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN.

P. S.—I am here with the army, moving west somewhere.

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JACKSON, MISS., *September 30, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement between the Federal gunboats and our batteries at Fort Donelson, so far, at least, as my company was concerned in the engagement:

I was detached, by order of General Tilghman, from the Thirtieth Tennessee Regiment for heavy artillery service about one month, as well

as I can remember now, before the attack on the fort. My company had at that time never drilled in heavy artillery nor knew anything about it, and I myself had never directed my attention to that branch of the service; but, with the assistance of yourself, Captain Dixon, and Lieutenants Martin and McDaniel, I was enabled to arrive at a tolerable degree of proficiency for myself and company by the time of the attack on the fort.

On Wednesday, February 12, the boats first made their appearance below the fort; but one boat came above the point below, fired several rounds, and retired without any reply from our batteries. I remained all night at my guns, four 32-pounders, to which I had been assigned. The suffering from severe cold was intense. I had to carry several of the men to the quarters next morning so nearly frozen that they were unable to walk.

Some time in the forenoon on Thursday the gunboat appeared again above the point below and opened fire upon the battery, which was continued some time before I received an order from Captain Dixon to open fire. I ordered it immediately, and opened with my guns at the highest possible elevation. I soon found, however, that I could do no good, as they were beyond my range, and, the boat falling below the point, I ceased firing. Just as Captain Dixon gave the order to open fire he passed from the first gun of my battery to the second and was killed immediately. He was stooping, when a screw-tap struck him in the left temple, killing him instantly. The ball was descending when it struck the inner base of the embrasure, and turned upwards to the left, striking and shattering the right cheek of my second gun. The gun was never fired, but was loaded when disabled.

Several of my men were slightly stunned, but were not sufficiently injured to keep them from duty. Captain Shuster was also slightly injured by negligently standing too near the muzzle of one of my guns.

I spent another very disagreeable night, sleepless and severely cold. The enemy appeared again about 1 o'clock and attacked our battery with more vigor than on any other day. They came up four abreast in line of battle; two more some distance behind. They threw shells, while the boats threw shot, shell, and grape. They came within 200 yards of my guns, when the action grew terrible for about one hour and a half, without any damage to us.

There were no casualties, I believe, in any of the 32-pounders. The boats fired steadily, but with little effect, except to the earthworks, which were damaged considerably. I fired about 50 rounds to each gun, which were tolerably well directed, and with effect. I saw several shots enter port-holes and do other damage to the boats. I am confident that the 32-pounders did almost all the damage to the boats, although I have seen it stated otherwise by distinguished officers. The right center boat was first injured and fell back; next the left center boat. About that time the right boat, a large, long boat, floated around against the bank of the river, but turned her bow straight across the river, ran to the middle, fired several shots, and retired down the river.

Nothing of interest occurred again until Saturday evening late. One boat came above the point and fired several shots, but did no damage.

I was ordered by Colonel Head to leave my battery at 2 o'clock Sunday morning and rejoin the regiment, which I did, and never returned to the guns again.

Respectfully,

B. G. BIDWELL,

*Captain.*

Captain CULBERTSON.

## No. 76.

*Report of Capt. T. W. Beaumont, Fiftieth Tennessee Infantry, commanding battery.*

JACKSON, MISS., October 1, 1862.

In compliance with your order I submit the following report:

During the several engagements between the batteries at Fort Donelson and the Federal gunboats on the 12th, 13th, 14th, and 15th of February, 1862, my company, numbering 67 effective men, had charge of four 32-pounders, under your command. There were no serious casualties of any kind. Two large shots penetrated the battery without doing any harm, and some few of the men were slightly bruised by jumps of earth thrown up by the balls of the enemy, and one by the rebound of a canister shot which struck one of the guns.

Gun No. 1, nearest the river, was superintended by Lieut. George Martin; No. 2 by Major Robertson, formerly a lieutenant in my company (who volunteered his services on the occasion), and No. 3 by Lieut. W. C. Allen, and each was admirably served by these gallant officers. Gun No. 4 was managed by Lieutenant Raimey.

Among the privates who acted with conspicuous courage and coolness were Elisha Downs, Poston Couts, Nelson Davis, Isaac Christie, William Trotter, Thomas Pearce, and R. M. Crumpler.

Sergt. J. S. Martin and Corpl. W. H. Proctor deserve honorable mention as gallant and meritorious non-commissioned officers. Corp. Dan. C. Lyle had charge of the battery magazine, and by his efficiency aided materially in the victory achieved over the gunboats.

T. W. BEAUMONT,

*Captain Company A, Fiftieth Tennessee Volunteers, Detached.*

Major CULBERTSON,

*Commanding Heavy Artillery, Fort Donelson, Tenn.*

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No. 77.

*Report of Capt. R. R. Ross, Maury Artillery.*

RICHMOND, VA., October 16, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to state to you the events of the heavy artillery engagement which came under my observation at the battle of Fort Donelson.

On Tuesday, February 11, the day before the battle began, I reported the arrival of my battery entire to General Pillow at Dover. It was a light battery, called the Maury Artillery. The general ordered me to take position on the left of our line of battle in his brigade. We had not more than reached this position before orders came to all or most of the captains of light batteries to report at headquarters. Arriving, we were informed by the general that one company was needed at the heavy batteries, remarking that it was the "post of danger, but the post of honor." I accepted the position and obeyed the order to distribute my artillery and ammunition out among the other batteries. The men had never learned the heavy artillery drill, so we went with all speed to get all the practice possible. Arriving there, Captain Dixon, commanding, assigned us to the columbiads, consisting of a .32 caliber rifle and a 10-inch smooth bore. Two 32-pounder sea-coast howitzers were also placed in charge of this company. The remaining guns (32-pounders), eight in



number, were under charge of Lieut. Jacob Culbertson, Regular C. S. Army, who had already drilled three infantry companies (Captains Beaumont's, Bidwell's, and Graham's) to them, as I was informed. We were all placed under command of Captain Dixon.

We drilled diligently that evening and had commenced again the following morning, when Lieutenant Bedford suddenly informed me that the gunboats were coming, and we set to work to prepare for them. I felt the necessity of taking charge of the rifle personally. Lieutenants Sparkman and Bedford, the latter of another company, superintended the 10-inch columbiad. The extreme view of the river was distant two miles and one-fourth. A single gunboat anchored at this point and opened upon us with 10-inch shells and 8-inch Parrott rifles, elongated. We replied only with the rifle, and by using great pains succeeded in striking much more frequently than we expected. We thought the object of this boat was to try our range and to find and dismount our guns. We exchanged some dozens of shots, when she drew off, with no damage done to us at all, though all her shot reached us easily. This was considered remarkable, as we had no covering overhead and moderately high epaulements. A respectable citizen, from in view of the boat below the bend, sent us up word that this boat was taken off in a sinking condition between two other boats, but that she could not be kept up and that he saw her sink finally. We could not know and hesitated to believe in such good news. The columbiad was fired a few times, and Lieutenant Sparkman thought with effect. Our balls could be heard to strike with tolerable distinctness. This was on Wednesday, 12th.

On the day following another boat came in view about 9 a. m., and fired terrifically with large Parrott projectiles, evidently with the object of dismounting our two heavy guns. One of these entered the embrasure of a 32-pounder, dismounted the gun by knocking off the cheek of the carriage, out of which flew a short screw-bolt that killed Captain Dixon. This caused universal regret, and was our only casualty, very strange to say, during the whole of the bombardment. We returned her fire with great vigor from the rifle, firing as often as the heat of the gun would allow. During this hour and forty minutes' cannonade 14 of her balls were collected in the battery within the narrow radius of as many yards. The columbiads (10-inch) also aided with vigor.

Still another boat repeated this movement in the evening, but she soon appeared to be in distress and finally dropped down.

I visited Dover about dark and there heard the rumor from almost every one that these two boats were badly crippled or sunk; but as it came from citizens we did not rely upon it.

After Captain Dixon was killed General Floyd (now arrived) sent an aide to Colonel Bailey to place the next in rank in command. Being the only artillery captain, I was notified that it devolved on me, but found no necessity nor had any desire to take any authority over so accomplished an officer as Major Culbertson, as we called him, and continued virtually as before.

It was seldom that the rifle missed now, we supposed, as we could tell by the spray to the right or left when we did not strike. The land engagement generally went on with that of the gunboats. Rain and snow and a final freeze of the same rendered this a dangerous night for the gunboats passing in obscurity. We therefore masked for night firing and fired at intervals.

It is due Col. J. E. Bailey and his lamented lieutenant-colonel (Robb) to say that they worked with their regiment (Forty-ninth Tennessee) night and day, remaining much of their time with us at night, thus encouraging us to persevere; also that they cooked our rations for us and sent

us spirits, all from their regiments. The other garrison regiments aided much also.

Colonel Sugg and others, Lieut. Robert Cobb, of Tennessee, ordnance officer, together with Sergeant Stone, ordnance sergeant, gave us valuable assistance, the latter remaining with us continually, obtaining and fabricating anything we could ask for.

Early on Friday morning, the 14th, we looked for a renewal of the attack, but for some reason we did not yet understand there was no sign of an advance. About 9 o'clock, however, the delay was accounted for. We discovered the river full of transports below and close to the bend, here almost at right angles, and that heavy re-enforcements were landing under cover of their gunboats. I proposed to Colonel Bailey to annoy them with our long-range guns, not caring to take the responsibility myself on account of a moderate supply of ammunition. He finally agreed to send an aide to consult General Floyd on the subject.

We did not get authority from him until after 12 m., when he sent word we might fire on the line of troops filing in our sight. They had all passed, but I did not resist the temptation to fire on their immense fleet of transports. We gave the requisite elevation, placed percussion shells in our splendid rifle, and opened on them with that and the columbiad. Peter Casey, of Kentucky, brother-in-law of General Grant, a citizen with the gunboat fleet, stated afterwards to Mr. Comstock, a friend, that one of our shots tore off the prow of a transport and that we never missed their gunboats at all; that not unfrequently would a ball take their gunboats lengthwise, ripping it badly, and carrying away in some cases a whole tier of bunks, bedding, &c.; that he often saw the surface of the water covered with these wrecks, intermingled with arms, legs, and fragments of every form. This is what he stated, but I am satisfied he much overestimated these things.

We had not fired more than two or three rounds apiece at the transports before they all had up steam and were leaving. The gunboat fleet also raised steam and at the same time advanced to the attack. Up to this time I imagined signs of timidity had been shown by the whole fleet, everything appearing to be done with extreme timidity, but now they advanced with much show of resolution. Some time being taken arranging their line of battle, getting up steam, &c., as we could discover by the many columns of black smoke, we ceased firing until they came into view. As was our custom, we opened on the first one before she had half come into view, and from that time cannonaded them with all the vigor and as rapidly as the perfect safety of our rifle would admit. Four large boats swung around the bend, forming the front line, two more formed a second line, and a single one brought up the rear, in company with an undistinguishable number of tugs, hospital boats, &c. All opened fire as they came in view and advanced with the most terrific rain of projectiles conceivable. With only seven 32-pounders, one .32 caliber rifle, and the 10-inch columbiad, the two sea-coast howitzers with their shell and short range being entirely useless, that is, nine guns in all effective and seven of these with only about 1,200 yards effective range, it must be confessed we felt unequally matched with this fleet, armed with ten times or more our number of their best artillery. We had resolved to defend the fort, however, and would not allow ourselves time to become alarmed. The range was yet too great for the columbiad. I selected their left-hand boat, a large one, aiming every time with all my ability. Their guns fired so incessantly that we could no longer screen ourselves at each discharge. I had instructed Lieutenants Sparkman and Bedford, two most gallant officers, to hold their fire until the fleet was certainly in range; they had the



columbiad. When the first line had advanced to within  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles their noble gun joined in with me, and I suppose with terrific effect, as it was only necessary that she should strike a boat below the water line to stop her. Thus we continued until they had come nearly half way, when my boat left the line and ran in to the shore—we reverently hoped to sink. All the rest continued the fire, but there was one remarkable circumstance: though the air was full of their projectiles, smoke, and noise, not one man was hurt at our batteries. I am unable to account for so remarkable a circumstance, except that our always prompt and vigorous firing at long ranges had intimidated them and destroyed their capacity to take aim.

I had trained the rifle during the three preliminary bombardments so that I could strike her as well far as near. Her effect was apparently the same, as far as we learned from concurrent and undoubted testimony while prisoners. She penetrated their entire length whenever she struck that way. One of the iron plates, penetrated by a rifle ball, was sent from Saint Louis (we were told while there prisoners) as a curiosity, on to Washington City, with the elongated shell which penetrated it.

When the fleet reached the blockade, the point for which Captain Culbertson had arranged the sights of his 32-pounders, he joined in the cannonade with masterly effect and ability. The bombardment was then at its height; all our guns against all of theirs. This was the first engagement of these artillerists, but the conduct of all was now especially heroic. Coolness and deliberation reigned supreme, increasing with the warmth of the action. Soon the guns of the enemy, one after another, ceased firing, until, when their boats came to within 250 yards of the batteries, their guns had ceased almost to fire. We were told afterwards by their officers that they could not get their men to remain longer at their guns, so many were killed. This was due to the excellent practice of Captain Culbertson, whose balls, they said, never failed to enter their ports.

We were busily working our guns, and had gone so far as to conclude how we would resist them when they landed and stormed our batteries, when we discovered that all had fallen back and were retreating—confirmed by loud cheers from all our troops in view. We still continued our work with vigor, when we noticed the three right-hand boats run together, evidently to support their middle one. This afforded us a large mark, and we took due advantage of it. Finally, when they had fallen down about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, loud cheering arose from our men on the surrounding heights, and the report that a boat was sinking accompanied.

It was a somber evening, growing late and dark, but I finally distinguished, when the group partially separated, a long, black object nearly crosswise the river, apparently about 3 feet out of the water. Unless it was a sinking boat I am unable to account for its appearance. They were soon out of sight, and thus the bombardment closed.

We afterwards learned in the North that General Grant and Commodore Foote, commanders of land and river forces, held a council of war that night on the flag-ship, in which the latter declined any further co-operation, on the ground that his fleet was completely disabled. This we did not know, but set to work that night to prepare for them on the next day (Saturday). I determined to try to sink whatever boats should come up the next day. For this purpose the artificers were set to work to make what we called disparts—long, triangular pieces of thick plank, which, placed on the line of sight and lashed on the pieces with cord, made the thickness at the muzzle equal to that at the breech, and therefore at short ranges enabled us to aim exactly at the object. Ordnance-



Sergeant Stone then filled some shells with melted lead to give them great weight and strength, and on the next day, when they had reached their nearest range, we intended to lash on our disparts and fire them at great depression, so as to go through their hulks.

No boats, however, came up except one late in the evening, and, firing at her with the rifle, she soon got out of sight. This was Saturday, and the day on which General Buckner's lines were penetrated. Finding the garrison called out to support him and no gunboats threatening, I took a detachment, and, with Sergeant Stone, took charge of a small siege gun on the infantry fortifications of the fort, and played on the enemy's land forces over the heads of our troops, with what effect we could not tell.

Lieutenant Stankieuriz was firing a siege howitzer from another salient at the same time, and apparently with good effect, as we could see his shells fall.

Lieutenant Fitzgerald, of my company, with First Lieutenant Sparkman, are most gallant officers; also Lieutenant Bedford. Captain Culbertson, with Captains Beaumont, Bidwell, and Graham, and their companies, deserve great credit, Captain Culbertson being one of the best officers I have ever seen, and of military education.

I must not omit to mention a gallant feat performed by Sergt. Patrick Cook (since died in prison at Chicago), Corporal Dockery, Privates Johnson and Mays, and eight or ten others at the rifle. In the midst of the bombardment of Friday evening, during the rapid firing of this gun, a ball suddenly stopped about half way down, resisting all efforts to drive it farther. This detachment boldly left their battery, as instructed, hunted up a long log just fitting the bore, all mounted the parapet, in the height of the bombardment, and drove the ball home, thus saving the gun from bursting or entire disuse for the time.

We were so busily engaged at our batteries that it was impossible for us to know much of what took place in other parts of the field.

This will be closed with the remark that all of us were surrendered the following (Sunday) morning with the rest of the troops.

With due apology for whatever of improper length, want of taste, &c., which the short notice given me to prepare the above has allowed, believe me, respectfully,

R. R. ROSS,

*Captain Maury Artillery.*

To His Excellency President DAVIS.

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No. 78.

*Extracts\* from report of the special committee on the recent military disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson and the evacuation of Nashville.*

*Resolutions creating committee.*

*Resolved*, That a special committee be instructed to inquire into the military disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson and the surrender of

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\* The reports and statements of Colonels Baldwin and Brown, General Buckner, Major Cheairs, Colonel Cook, Major Doss, Colonel Farquharson, General Floyd, Lieutenant Colonel Gilmer, Colonels Gregg, Hanson, and Heiman, General Johnston, Colonel Lillard, Adjutant McGinnis, Colonel Palmer, General Pillow, and Colonel Trousdale, omitted under this heading, appear either among the reports of the capture of Fort Henry, the siege of Fort Donelson, or of the evacuation of Nashville, &c.

Nashville into the hands of the enemy, and to report the result of their investigations as early as practicable.

*Resolved* (on motion of Thomas J. Foster, of Alabama), That the special committee appointed to investigate the late military disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson and the surrender of Nashville into the hands of the enemy be also instructed to investigate the causes of the surrender of Fort Henry; to ascertain by whom said fort was located; whether the commanding general had previously examined the site of said fort; whether the hills on the opposite side of the river were properly fortified, or whether were they fortified at all; and, if not, why they were not fortified at the time when labor and troops from Alabama were dispatched to Fort Henry for that purpose.

*Resolved* (on motion of Hon. H. C. Burnett), That the committee appointed to investigate the causes of our recent disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson, &c., be instructed to report to this House who was the senior general commanding at Fort Donelson during the engagements at that point; who was second in command, and who third in command; also why it was that the two senior generals in command abandoned the position, leaving the junior general to surrender; also to report why the transports then in the vicinity of Fort Donelson were not used in removing our forces from the presence of an overwhelming foe.

*Special report on the surrender of Fort Donelson, &c.*

Mr. Foote, on leave, reported from the special committee appointed to examine into the surrender of Fort Donelson, &c., as follows:

The special committee appointed to examine into the causes of the recent military disaster at Fort Donelson, and into the circumstances connected with the surrender of the city of Nashville into the hands of the enemy (to which committee various other collateral matters have been subsequently referred), beg leave to report that they have, in the performance of the duties assigned them, found it necessary to accumulate a large mass of testimony, all of which is herewith reported to this House for such action in regard to the same as shall be deemed expedient. It is recommended by the committee that the House do cause said testimony, together with such other as may be taken, to be printed for the use of the members.

H. S. FOOTE,  
Chairman, &c.  
THOS. B. HANLEY.  
THOS. J. FOSTER.  
H. W. BRUCE.  
E. BARKSDALE.

The report was agreed to.

A true copy. Teste:

H. C. McLAUGHLIN,  
Clerk.

*Message of the President.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, April 1, 1862.

*To the Hon. Speaker of the House of Representatives:*

SIR: I herewith transmit to the House of Representatives a communication from the Secretary of War, affording, as far as practicable, the

information sought by the "resolution of inquiry adopted by the House of Representatives in regard to the disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson," &c., and replying to the "additional resolution of the House of Representatives," adopted March 31, 1862, calling for the official response of General A. S. Johnston to the interrogatories propounded to him in regard to those subjects; and also for a copy of the supplementary report of General Pillow in regard to the affair at Fort Donelson, &c.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

[Inclosure.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va., March 31, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following answers, prepared by my predecessor in office, to the resolutions of inquiry adopted by the House of Representatives in regard to the disasters at Forts Henry and Donelson, &c.

I have just had the honor to receive a copy of the additional resolution of the House of Representatives, this day adopted, calling for the official response of General Albert S. Johnston to the interrogatories propounded to him in regard to those subjects; and also for a copy of the supplementary report of General Pillow in regard to the affair at Fort Donelson, &c.\*

I have the honor to reply that the Department is informed that General Johnston is engaged, as rapidly as the circumstances of his command will permit, in preparing an answer to these inquiries, and it is not deemed expedient to submit General Pillow's supplemental report in advance of the other military documents by which it should be accompanied. Only a copy of this report has been submitted to the Department. The original is in possession of General Johnston, and will be forwarded by him, with the accompanying documents, in connection with his own report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. W. RANDOLPH,  
*Secretary of War.*

His Excellency the PRESIDENT.

[Subinclosure.]

I have the honor to submit the following answers to certain inquiries of the House of Representatives of which copies were furnished to this Department on the 11th instant. Much delay has intervened in the hope of receiving such report from the army in Tennessee as would render it possible to make full and satisfactory answer. Some of these reports are still delayed, and it is therefore considered due to the House to give all the information now possessed by the Department and to add hereafter whatever further details may be received. The inquiries and answers have been numbered for the sake of convenience:

1. At what period was it that the Confederate forces under General Johnston first established themselves in the city of Bowling Green and what was our force at that time and within the period of a week?

2. What was the force of the enemy at that period between Bowling Green and the Ohio River and where located?

General Johnston first established himself with the Confederate forces at Bowling Green early in October; the precise day not known.

There is nothing on file in the Department showing the number of his forces and those

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\* See his report of March 14, p. 285.



of the enemy at that period. It is, however, known that the enemy's force was largely in excess of that of General Johnston.

3. What prevented General Johnston at that time from making a forward movement towards the Ohio River? Was he restrained by instructions from the War Department or was he left to his own discretion in the matter?

The cause which prevented General Johnston from making a forward movement at that time towards the Ohio River was thus stated by him in a letter of October 22, 1861: "We have received but little accession to our ranks since the Confederate forces crossed the line; in fact, no such enthusiastic demonstration as to justify any movements not warranted by our ability to maintain our own communications." General Johnston was left to his own discretion in all his military movements, and was never at any time restrained by instructions from the War Department from moving his forces in any manner he deemed advisable.

4. What forces, if any, were sent from Bowling Green to Fort Donelson previous to the first battle at that place and under whose command?

5. What number of forces did General Johnston retain at Bowling Green up to the time of its evacuation?

6. Did General Johnston re-enforce or attempt to re-enforce the Confederate army at Fort Donelson during the progress of the conflicts at that place?

To these inquiries the only information that can be given must necessarily be derived from the official report of General Johnston, which has been called for but not yet received at the Department. It will be submitted as soon as received.

7. Is it within the knowledge of the War Department that any applications were made by the commanders of our forces at Fort Donelson during the progress of the conflicts at that place?

It is now known to the Department, through the reports of Generals Floyd and Pillow and the supplementary report of General Pillow, that no such applications for re-enforcements were made.

8. Was General Johnston restrained by orders from the War Department from sending re-enforcements or was he left to his own discretion in that regard?

No orders on the subject were issued from the Department. General Johnston's discretion on the subject was unrestrained.

9. What means of transportation had General Johnston at Bowling Green to enable him to re-enforce Fort Donelson during the contests, had he been disposed to do so?

10. When were the fortifications at Forts Donelson and Henry constructed and in what mode?

11. Was there any military reconnaissance along the banks of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, with the view to judicious selections of places for fortifications, before the sites for Forts Henry and Donelson were selected?

On these subjects nothing is recorded in the books of the War Department.

12. Did General Johnston fall back from Bowling Green in accordance with instructions from the War Department or was he left to his own discretion in the matter?

General Johnston received no instructions from the War Department on this subject. He acted on this, as on all other questions of military movements and operations, in accordance with his own judgment. He counseled with Generals Beauregard and Hardee before withdrawing from Bowling Green.

13. Why was Nashville surrendered to the enemy?

14. Did General Johnston proceed upon his own discretion, or under

instructions from the War Department, in regard to the act of surrendering that city into the hands of the enemy?

The reasons for evacuating the city of Nashville are given by General Johnston in his letter of February 25, of which a copy is hereto annexed. In doing this he acted on his own judgment and without instructions from the War Department.

15. When General Johnston, about October 1 last, made a call upon several of the States of the Southwest, including the State of Tennessee, for large numbers of troops, why was that call revoked? Was the act of revocation in pursuance of an order of the War Department or upon his own judgment merely?

General Johnston received no orders on the subject from the War Department; but in a private and confidential letter to him he was informed by the Secretary of War that the Government did not approve of calling for unarmed men for a less period than the war; that the Government could procure unarmed men for the war in numbers as large as it could supply with arms; that it gave the preference to "war" men over "twelve-months" men in distributing arms; that unarmed twelve-months men were the most costly and least useful troops that could be called for, and that it was desirable he should call for no more men for a less period than three years or the war unless they came with arms.

16. Has the Department received any official report of the affair at Forts Henry or Donelson or touching the surrender of Nashville? If so, communicate the same.

The Department has already communicated all the reports received by it of the above-mentioned affairs, except a copy, unofficially communicated, of a supplementary report of General Pillow to General Johnston, which is retained until the original, as well as other reports, are received from General Johnston, so that the whole subject may be submitted together. The only report of the surrender, or rather the evacuation, of Nashville is contained in the letter of General A. S. Johnston above mentioned, and of which a copy is annexed. It is, however, known to the Department that General Johnston is engaged as actively as the exigencies of his command will permit in preparing for Congress full information on all the points suggested in the above inquiries, and it is hoped that the report will be received at a very early day.

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*Letter of General John B. Floyd to Chairman of Special Committee.*

ABINGDON, VA., March 25, 1862.

SIR: Just as I was getting ready to leave Knoxville, where I had been ordered by Major-General Smith to assist with my command in the defense of that locality, I received your letter, sent back from Decatur, whither it had been first sent.

I had the day before received the order from the War Department relieving me from my command, and a letter preferring certain charges against me, for which, I suppose, this punishment was inflicted. To these charges I was required to answer, which I have done; and as they cover the points of inquiry pending before your honorable committee I have thought proper to send you, in answer to your inquiries, for the information of your committee, a copy of my answer to the charges of the War Department. The delay in responding to these inquiries has grown out of my failure to get the official documents requiring the answer until within a few days past.

I regret that my first report should have proved so unsatisfactory to the authorities of the Confederacy. It was, to be sure, written very hurriedly in my tent at night, after a long day's march, and after the business of that day and the preparations for the march of the next were completed. But I supposed that a simple narrative of the transactions which led through the terrible and most sanguinary fight of Fort Don-



elson to the painful but unavoidable necessity of a small force yielding at last to an overwhelming one was all that could be expected officially at my hands.

If I had been at leisure and had determined to go into a detailed statement of all the facts and incidents within my knowledge I should equally have failed to cover the points raised in the accusations preferred against me by the Department. I never dreamed for a moment that I had done anything or had neglected any duty for which in my report of that battle I should find it necessary to present a defense against grave and dishonoring charges. But far less did I suppose it possible that I should be held responsible for failing to defend the Cumberland River and the capital of Tennessee with the insignificant means put at my command against an overwhelming force at least six times my own in numbers, advancing with perfect preparation by land and water.

It ought to have been understood that this fort could not withstand the force which the enemy were certain to bring against it. It was ill-conceived, badly executed, and still worse located, with only thirteen guns of all calibers, the greater part of them small, and therefore useless. It had, in fact, only three effective guns, and an important portion of its defensive works was not commenced until the enemy had made his appearance before it in force. It was to sustain a continued attack from the gunboat fleet, known for months to have been preparing in the West by the enemy for operations against our Western rivers, and numbering at least ten, carrying each probably sixteen to twenty guns of the largest caliber. These gunboats were to be seconded by a land force, drawn from an army in the West, well known to be organized on the most formidable scale, amounting, in the aggregate, to 200,000 men, all so stationed as to be easily concentrated on the banks of the Cumberland or any other Western river in the space of one week, heavy columns of which, at the time I was sent to Fort Donelson, were known to be moving upon the Cumberland River.

The naked fort, as I have described it, constituted the entire preparation of the Confederate Government for meeting the advance of this most formidable array up the Cumberland River. The little intrenchments or rifle pits around the encampments, constructed to defend our people against the land attack, were not completed until the morning of February 13, the men working all the night before upon them, the enemy having appeared in force and begun the attack on the preceding day.

I have caused a diagram of the fort and defenses around it to be made, which I append to this communication.\* You will see from it that the river bounded our position entirely on the north and the encampment and batteries of the enemy surrounded us on every other side.

Again referring you particularly to my supplemental report of the 20th instant, heretofore forwarded through General A. S. Johnston to the War Department, a copy of which is herewith sent,† as containing minute answers to the points of inquiry embraced in your letter to me, I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,

*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

Hon. HENRY S. FOOTE,

*Chairman, &c., House of Representatives.*

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\* Not found.

† See p. 270.



*Statement of Capt. Jack Davis, of Texas.*

I was in the different battles of Fort Donelson, and belonged to the outside forces; was captain of Company E, Colonel Gregg's regiment Texas volunteers. I was in the battles of Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. Was one of those taken prisoners, but made my escape on Sunday morning on a flat-boat across the river from Dover. To the best of my knowledge we were surrendered on Sunday morning between daylight and sunup.

Some hours before daylight we were aroused from our slumber (which, by an arrangement of alternation, we were allowed to take) by the announcement that we were to retreat immediately. In pursuance of this announcement we immediately took to our line of march, and had advanced some distance to an open field, when a halt was ordered. At this order the men became much dissatisfied. It was exceedingly cold and uncomfortable. We remained in this position until it was understood that we were surrendered, and we were ordered to march back to our quarters.

Our regiment belonged to Brigadier-General Clark's brigade, stationed at Hopkinsville, Ky. We reached Fort Donelson, to the best of my recollection, on the Monday evening preceding the battle; were in all the conflicts that occurred outside the fort. The great body of the soldiers behaved with gallantry and valor, and had the most implicit confidence in the generals, which I believe the generals merited.

The enemy commenced the regular attack on Thursday morning, their infantry assailing us on the right, while their batteries opened on our left. We had, so far as I am able to form an opinion, about 12,000 altogether, in the fort and outside. The whole body of our troops was not engaged in the battle of Thursday, reserves having been kept on the left, and, I suppose, also in the fort and between the fort and our intrenchments. I will here explain what I mean by intrenchments. They consisted of small saplings, with which that country abounds, thrown lengthwise along the outside margin of ditches, dug some 5 feet wide and 2 feet deep, the dirt having been thrown upon the saplings, and giving us a protection of about 5 feet. These ditches extended about 3 miles in length, the whole or the greater part of the work having been thrown up during the night of Wednesday, some slight additions and improvements having been completed on Thursday night.

The locality was most judiciously selected. This line of ditches was so constructed that it afforded a complete protection to the fort, which was situated in its rear, except on the water side, the fort being on the bank of the Cumberland River. The infantry of both armies mainly conducted the battle on Thursday, the heaviest fighting having occurred on our right wing, the left being assailed with shot, shell, and grape from their batteries. Our loss on the right wing, from the best information I could obtain, amounted to from 50 to 100 killed, while that of the enemy, as I was informed, was not less than from 400 to 500 killed and wounded. On the left wing our loss amounted to from 4 to 6 killed.

On Thursday night I suppose that the various regiments were able, by alternately relieving each other, to obtain some partial repose, which was facilitated by having the reserves already referred to.

On Friday morning the fight was renewed about 8 or 9 o'clock, the battle, as on Thursday, having been chiefly confined to our right wing, the left being assailed by the enemy's sharpshooters. The battle continued on Friday between the infantry on both sides until about noon, resulting in about equal loss on both sides with that of the preceding

day. The fighting on land ceased about noon, and the gunboats, four in number, opened upon the fort, which returned the fire, resulting, after a conflict of about one hour and a quarter, in but little, if any, damage to the fort, while all but one of the gunboats were disabled. I will be more particular :

The gunboats commenced the assault when about  $1\frac{1}{4}$  miles from the fort, coming up four abreast and, continuing their fire until they were opposite the fort. The fort kept up a regular fire with guns of a smaller caliber, evidently reserving the heavy guns until the gunboats were within a distance of about 150 yards. The effect, as witnessed by our troops and by the citizens who had gathered on the hills around Dover, was beyond the power of description. After having received a shot from a 128-pounder one of the gunboats rolled towards the opposite bank of the river, silenced, crippled, and apparently unmanageable ; a second soon shared the same fate ; a third was totally disabled ; and the fourth, turning her head, took to a precipitate flight down the river. The excitement at this time among the military and citizen spectators was intense and almost wild, the latter testifying their joy by tossing their hats in the air, and the former by a general huzza, commencing on the right wing and soon caught up and became universal along the entire line.

With the exception of some random shots from both sides there was no further fighting on that evening. On that night we received orders to cook three days' provisions and be ready for marching the next morning. We did not know whither we were to proceed, but we supposed in the direction of Fort Henry, to which it was believed the enemy were retreating.

On Saturday morning the battle was renewed about sunrise, commencing to-day on our left. At an early hour in the morning we were informed that we were to attack the enemy. This I regarded as an indiscreet though a bold movement, as we did not know the force of the enemy or the number and locality of his batteries.

Three of our regiments commenced the attack on the enemy's right, and the fight was kept up until they commenced retreating, when our batteries were brought to bear upon them. We pursued them over a mile, the regiment to which I belonged having been relieved and a fresh regiment having taken our place in the pursuit. From the movements of the enemy this morning I became convinced that when we can get within a hundred yards of the enemy they will not stand either a close fight or a charge. The result of to-day's fighting was much more disastrous to the enemy than on any of the preceding days, their loss being at least three to one. On each day our army took prisoners, varying in number.

Another result of to-day's battle was the capture by our troops of eleven or more pieces of artillery, five of which I know of myself ; the capture of the others I learned from good authority and general belief. This battle continued until between 11 and 12 o'clock, the enemy at this time having been driven over a mile—perhaps a mile and a half—along their camp.

Our army returned, all believing that we had gained a signal victory, but later in the day the fight was renewed by an attack of the enemy on our right wing, with results on both sides more disastrous than at any previous period of the conflict. The disasters on our side were attributed to the fact that, for some cause unknown to me, a portion of our forces left their intrenchments, which were immediately occupied by the enemy. Our greatest loss occurred in connection with a successful and gallant charge, conducted by General Buckner, to dislodge the enemy from the intrenchments.



As to the subsequent surrender and the circumstances connected with it, I have no personal knowledge. We went to rest supposing ourselves completely victorious, but I was informed by several persons, especially by some prisoners, that on that night as well as on the night previous the enemy were re-enforced to an extent that increased their army to 80,000 men. Meanwhile we received no re-enforcements, although we had been led to believe that they were on their way to our relief from Bowling Green.

I have already referred to our movements on Saturday morning. When the intelligence of our surrender was communicated to the troops there was a general feeling of indignation, mingled with surprise, among all. The men were frantic to be permitted to fight their way out. It is my firm belief and the general impression that had a re-enforcement of 10,000 men reached us on Sunday morning we could have held out and secured a decisive victory.

Interrogatory by H. S. Foote. Had the steamer or steamers that were employed in taking off General Floyd and his command been employed in removing our men and munitions of war on Saturday night, could they have done so?

Answer. Yes; two boats could have taken the men and munitions of war in two hours. The enemy did not come within gunshot distance of the fort until after the surrender. Had some 5,000 men been kept in the intrenchments even on Sunday morning, we could have transferred across the river 10,000 men.

JACK DAVIS,

*Captain Co. E, Col. John Gregg's Regiment Texas Volunteers.*

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*Statement of Lieut. Col. Milton A. Haynes.*

RICHMOND, VA., March 24, 1862.

SIR: In answer to the order of your committee, requiring me to report the facts connected with the defense and fall of Fort Donelson, I have the honor to inform you that on January 15 last I was ordered by Major-General Polk to proceed at once from Columbus, Ky., to Forts Henry and Donelson, to take charge of the artillery forces at those points.

The next day I reported in person to Brigadier-General Tilghman at Fort Henry, and by his order was appointed chief of artillery of the Fourth Division, and directed to Fort Donelson, to take charge of the artillery there, he saying that for the present he would attend to Fort Henry.

That same day I proceeded to Donelson and at once entered upon my duty. There was but one artillery company (Captain Maney's light battery) there; but two volunteer infantry companies, under Captains Beaumont and Bidwell, had been detailed to man the heavy guns; but they had been but slightly and imperfectly trained, and Captain Bidwell's not at all. I at once organized these three companies into a battalion and placed them under daily instruction. I telegraphed to General Polk for officers of artillery to act as instructors, and he sent to me for duty Lieutenants Martin and McDaniel, who drilled the men daily at the heavy guns, and they were, under my own eye, taught to fire their guns at targets 1,000, 1,500, and 2,000 yards, and the elevation for particular range explained and taught to them. Every man in the battalion of artillery, nearly 300, who was fit for duty, was required to labor in mounting the guns, repairing and finishing the merions,



embrasures, and platforms. A new bomb-proof magazine, near the main battery, approached by a bomb-proof covered way of capacity sufficient to hold 100 rounds for ten guns, was rapidly constructed, under the direction of Captain Beaumont, and Lieut. H. S. Bedford, acting adjutant of the battalion.

Capt. J. P. Shuster, who had reported to me for duty by order of General A. S. Johnston, was appointed chief of the battalion, and under his direction the ammunition and stores necessary for ten guns were arranged in the magazine, with matches, port-fires, lanterns, &c. The men were divided into detachments of 15 to a gun, with supernumeraries to each, and each detachment assigned under its chief to its gun and each man to his place at the gun, and their duties explained to them in case of an attack by day or night.

By February 10 we had our batteries finished and ten 32-pounder guns mounted, and there were only two other guns not mounted—the columbiad and rifled guns.

The 10-inch columbiad was mounted about January 25, but upon firing it the shock threw it back against the hurters, and the recoil threw the chassis off the pintle, and the counter-shock threw the muzzle of the gun so violently against the transom bar as to injure the carriage. In this condition (like the one at Fort Henry) it was useless. I therefore dismounted it, remodeled the platform, and sent an officer to the rolling-mill and had new rear traverse wheels cast 4 inches greater in diameter. These wheels were cast and sent to us only in time to enable us to remount this important gun. With its new wheels it worked like a charm.

The rifled gun, throwing a conical shell of 128 pounds, was sent to us about February 1 from Nashville, but neither pintle nor pintle plate (without which it could not be mounted) was sent with it. I at once sent Lieut. G. T. Moorman, of the artillery, to Nashville, to procure these and other fixtures necessary for this and other guns, and we only obtained these indispensable fixtures two days before the fight, and scarcely in time to mount this gun. It was, however, successfully mounted on the 11th.

Our batteries, being now in order, were manned and commanded as follows: Captain Beaumont's company at the five 32-pounders next the river; Captain Bidwell's company, with the other four guns, to the left, including the 10-inch columbiad; each with several lieutenants, all under the eye of Captain Shuster, commander of battalion; Captain Dixon, engineer, and Lieut. Jacob Culbertson, C. S. Army, on special duty with me. Captain Ross (just arrived from Hopkinsville), having given up his light battery, with his men took charge of the half-moon battery, composed of the rifled gun and two ship carronades, furnishing a detachment, under Lieutenant Stankieuriz (Captain Taylor's company), to man the 8-inch howitzer and the two 9-pounder nondescripts. Captain Maney's light battery took post on the left of the rifle trenches, in General Pillow's division, and was not under my further charge. The light battery and horses of Captain Ross' company were placed under Lieutenant Parker, with a volunteer infantry company to man them, and stationed at the grave-yard, above Dover.

On the 12th (Wednesday) the gunboats made their approach, but did not venture within the range of our guns; but early the next morning, a vigorous attack having been made upon our whole line by the enemy, the gunboats opened a spirited fire upon our batteries, throwing during the forenoon about 150 shot and shells from large rifle and smooth-bore guns. Their fire was returned with spirit by our guns, a shot piercing

one at her water line and compelling it to fall back. Unfortunately a single rifle shell from one of the enemy's guns dismounted one of our 32-pounder guns, instantly killing the brave Captain Dixon, disabling for the time Captain Shuster, and killing and wounding several privates. I immediately placed Lieutenant (acting captain) Culbertson in charge of the 10-gun battery, and took my post at the river battery, although not able to walk without crutches, and then only with great pain.

In the afternoon, our army being hotly engaged along our whole line, the gunboats renewed the attack, keeping up a continual discharge of shot and shells, without, however, doing much damage. Our own fire was carefully withheld, in order to draw the boats nearer to us, and, as was expected, they soon ventured within range. A few well-directed shots from our rifled gun and columbiad soon drove them back, one of their boats being, as I learned that night, with difficulty kept from sinking. At the close of the day the contest by land and water ceased, and our batteries were visited by Generals Floyd and Pillow, and our artilleryists complimented by them, General Floyd ordering the dismantled gun to be that night, if possible, remounted. Upon an inspection made by Major Gilmer, of the Engineers, and myself, I ordered a detail of 12 artificers and carpenters for that purpose.

On the next day the increased pain and inflammation of my wound rendered it impossible for me to remain longer at the batteries, and the next day I was, by direction of Surgeon Williams, placed on board a steamer, with the wounded, to be sent up the river.

During my service at Fort Donelson, both before and in the engagement at that place, I was under obligations to Acting Adj. W. W. Foote, (a boy only sixteen years old), and to Lieut. H. S. Bedford, adjutant of artillery battalion, for the prompt and faithful discharge of the arduous and dangerous duties which they had to perform.

I cannot close this statement of the brief and humble part which I performed in preparing and maintaining the defenses of Fort Donelson without expressing my particular obligations to Lieut. J. Culbertson, of the C. S. Army, on special duty, and Lieutenants Bedford and Cobb, of the Ordnance Department, for the zeal and energy displayed by them in superintending the work at the batteries and valuable services during the engagement, in all of which they were greatly assisted by Capt. T. W. Beaumont and his subalterns; nor to Lieutenants Martin and McDaniel, of the Tennessee Corps of Artillery, for their untiring energy in imparting instructions to the battalion of artillery under my command; nor can too much be said in praise of the volunteer infantry, who, after three or four weeks' instruction, in the midst of toil and labor, both day and night, acquired such skill in the management of their guns as to be able to maintain successfully a four days' cannonade against a flotilla of gunboats carrying twice as many and better guns than theirs, or ppling at least five of them, and compelling their flag-officer, Foote (himself wounded), to withdraw his fleet entirely from the hopeless effort to pass their batteries; nor in this meed of praise should the gallant Captain Ross and Lieutenant Stankieuziz (both old artillery officers), with their subalterns and privates, be forgotten.

Our success was greatly due to the admirable position of our guns, rising gradually from the river to an elevation of 50 feet, thus affording a plunging fire, and from the narrowness of the river (only 500 feet wide) enabling us to throw our balls into the holds of the boats and cripple their machinery.

I may here add, from information derived from some of the parties,



that on Saturday night Captain Bidwell and one private of artillery, Lieutenant Burt and about 40 men, and all the horses of Captain Porter's light battery and Colonel Forrest's regiment of cavalry and many stragglers from various corps, made good their retreat without meeting any obstruction from the enemy.

In justice to myself, as I was in charge of the artillery for a short time at Fort Donelson, I ought to add that I had nothing whatever to do with the exterior defenses of the place, which were arranged under the direction of the commanding general and engineers.

In my opinion the site itself was the most unfortunate—first, because the space inclosed by the trenches formed a *cul-de-sac*, divided in the middle by a sheet of backwater, thus rendering communication between the wings of our army difficult and hazardous; second, because the area inclosed, though strong itself, was surrounded at a distance of from 800 to 1,200 yards by a range of hills higher than those occupied by us, thus affording a commanding position (eagerly seized by the enemy) for their batteries of rifled guns, from which they could reach every point within our lines.

Hence the utmost courage and endurance could not and did not avail to save us from disaster; but the deeds of daring performed by our army will form the brightest picture in the pages of our history and render the names of the heroes who fell on Dover's blood-stained hills immortal.

Respectfully,

MILTON A. HAYNES,

*Lieutenant-Colonel, and Chief of Corps of Tennessee Artillery.*

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*Major Munford's answers to interrogatories of Special Committee.\**

Answer 1st. General Johnston did not take command in person at Bowling Green till October 28, 1861. He arrived there on the 14th, and General Buckner remained in command till the 28th.

Answer 2d. The force under Buckner when General Johnston arrived was a fraction under 6,000, and were being re-enforced by Major-General Hardee's division, of about 5,000, and Colonel Terry's regiment of Texas Rangers, about 1,000, making the force before General Johnston took immediate command within a fraction of 12,000. I have not the means of stating the weekly increase. Disease fell upon the army, particularly measles, both at Bowling Green and at the different rendezvous for fresh enlistments which had not been turned over to the Confederacy. It was a terrible scourge, and the ranks were so thinned that on the last of November our effective force was estimated at 12,500, showing no material increase for more than a month.

Answer 3d. I do not know. General Buckner took possession of Bowling Green on September 17 with about 4,000 troops. I have heard, and believe it to be true, that as Buckner moved in on one side of Kentucky Rousseau moved in on the other. Rousseau's force, or the number of Home Guards, who were regarded as equally hostile to us, I do not know, nor have I heard. This, however, is true: that on October 4 General Buckner dispatched to General Johnston at Columbus that the enemy, 13,000 or 14,000 strong, were advancing upon him; that his own (Buckner's) force was "less than 6,000," and asked for re-enforcements.

It was this dispatch which led to re-enforcing Bowling Green as

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\* Interrogatories not found.



promptly as possible with Hardee's division and Texas cavalry. Stanton's regiment, from Overton County, was also ordered to that place, but in consequence of depredations of Home Guards had to be sent back to repress them. Another regiment was also ordered to Bowling Green, but, as now remembered, was not carried forward because it was unarmed and there were no arms to give them. The more rapid advance of the enemy had been checked by burning the bridge over Rolling Fork.

Answer 4th. I have heard General Johnston assign many reasons for not ordering General Buckner to advance in the first instance to Muldraugh's Hill. He regarded that position as unsuited for a base of military operations and as possessing but slight strategic importance. It was beyond the Green River, the navigability of which had to be destroyed to prevent the enemy from moving by water from Paducah, Cairo, and other points in Buckner's rear. With that navigable stream open, they could transport upon it not only troops, but the heaviest ordnance and other munitions of war, and effectually cut Buckner's line of communication with Tennessee and the South, whence his supplies of men and munitions must be drawn. Buckner's force was small (about 4,000); his troops were fresh, most of them illy armed and many illy disciplined; their general appointments for a campaign defective; and, being wholly without transportation, they would have been tied down to the railroad.

The line of Barren River, however, on which Bowling Green is, he regarded as a good base of operations, the advance column occupying the country to the Green River, and Bowling Green being in supporting distance from Tennessee, from and through which supplies and reinforcements must come if unexpectedly the Kentuckians failed to rush to Buckner's standard at his approach. He regarded it as necessary to hold Bowling Green, not only till the navigability of the Green River was destroyed, but to make it a depot of supplies. He also thought it should be fortified, that it might be garrisoned and held by as small a force as possible, to increase thereby the numbers for the field. If a superior force should advance on that position by being fortified, compensation would be had for disparity of numbers.

Answer 5th. As nearly as I can ascertain, between 3,000 and 4,000, the balance of his force being distributed along the turnpike on the march to Nashville.

General Johnston had ordered on Friday, before the conflicts at Donelson, that preparations be made to evacuate Bowling Green. The army began the march on Tuesday, and the troops remaining were engaged in removing Government stores by the railroad. They were under the command of Brigadier-General Hindman, and detained for that purpose.

Answer 6th. For the troops along the turnpike, none. They would have been compelled to march. For those at Bowling Green, who were still engaged in removing the stores, the engines and cars on hand; what number of either I do not know. The railroad runs to Clarksville; steamers thence to Donelson.

Answer 7th. See No. 5.

Answer 8th. I do not know nor have I the means of ascertaining.

Answers 9th and 10th. I do not believe re-enforcements were asked of General Johnston by either General Floyd, Pillow, or Buckner, or any other commander there during those conflicts. I had access to the dispatches; think I read every one. I never saw such a request, except when I heard it reported in Richmond that General Johnston had been asked by the generals at Donelson. I thought it a mistake then, and as

no member of this staff ever saw such a dispatch, I am confirmed in that impression. The generals at Donelson can settle it, and I entertain no doubt that they will all assert that no re-enforcements were asked for, as they knew how much the command had been weakened by sending Floyd's and Buckner's forces to that place, and how greatly larger was the enemy's forces pressing on his rear, as well as the fact that General Johnston's troops were on their march between Bowling Green and Nashville and could not get there in time to do any good.

And further I say not.

ED. W. MUNFORD.

*Extract from letter of Major Munford to committee, covering the foregoing.*

SIR: With this note be pleased to receive answers to the interrogatories propounded to me by yourself as the chairman of the special committee of the House. They have been prepared from the records, from my own memory of facts, and from such other sources of information as I knew to be reliable, and are sent with the hope that both you and the committee may be somewhat assisted by them in arriving at the truth.

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ED. W. MUNFORD.

HON. HENRY S. FOOTE, &c.

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*Testimony of Col. John McCausland and Capt. F. P. Turner.*

The following are the questions propounded to Col. John McCausland, of the Thirty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, and Capt. F. P. Turner, Company G, Thirty-sixth Regiment Virginia Volunteers:

1st. How long had you been serving in the command of Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd prior to the surrender of Fort Donelson?

Answer by Colonel McCausland. I have been serving in that brigade from August last until after the surrender of the fort in question.

2d. Were you with your regiment in the contest at Fort Donelson which resulted in its surrender by the Confederate troops?

Answer by the same. I was.

3d. Was the army, in your opinion, in such a condition on Saturday morning preceding the surrender of Donelson on Sunday morning as to have rendered it possible to enable it to cut its way through the enemy's lines and make its escape without a surrender; and, if so, what, in your judgment, must have been the loss by such an effort, whether successful or unsuccessful?

Answer by the same. I do not think it would have been possible for our troops to have cut their way through the enemy's lines. An attempt would certainly have resulted in the loss of one-half of our entire army, including the whole baggage, army supplies, and artillery.

4th. When did the steamboats, upon which General Floyd and a portion of his command escaped from Donelson, arrive at that point?

Answer by the same. They did not arrive until Sunday morning about daylight, and when they did arrive they were loaded—one with corn and the other with ammunition and provisions, brought for immediate use.

JOHN MCCAUSLAND,  
*Colonel Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiment.*

The same questions being propounded to Captain Turner, he says he concurs in the responses made by Colonel McCausland, and adopts his statements above as his to the same questions.

F. P. TURNER,  
*Captain Company G, Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiment.*

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*Interrogatories propounded to Colonel Russell.*

1st. How long was your regiment a part of General Floyd's brigade?  
2d. What was the number of your regiment at Fort Donelson in the battle which led to the surrender?

3d. How many were absent on furlough, sick leave, and otherwise, and where were they?

4th. How many escaped with General Floyd from the surrender?

5th. How many escaped after the surrender who were on the field of battle and what means were open to them of effecting their escape?

6th. Where was your regiment when the other portion of General Floyd's brigade escaped and what were they engaged in doing?

7th. Why did they occupy the position assigned them?

8th. How wide is the backwater of the slough over which the men of your regiment escaped? Did your son and others make their escape across that water? Relate the circumstances of their escape.

9th. Was that portion of your regiment on duty wholly left at Donelson or not?

10th. State any other facts you know or have learned bearing upon the case.

*Answers of Col. Daniel R. Russell to questions propounded by Special Committee of the House of Representatives.*

Answer to 1st interrogation. My regiment joined General Floyd about September 25, 1861, and was with him about five months.

Answer to 2d. A memorandum from my adjutant, sent to me, shows an aggregate, on February 13, of 552.

Answer to 3d. I cannot answer accurately without my regimental books. The aggregate of the regiment was something over 800; thus the number absent would be about 250. Some were at their homes sick and on furlough; some at Nashville, Clarksville, and elsewhere in hospitals, and some on detached service at Cumberland City and elsewhere, teamsters, &c.

Answer to 4th. I have been able to hear of but one man (him I saw), by name Henry Williford. After the boat pushed off he says he jumped into the water and clambered over the guards of the boat. It is possible some wounded went up with General Floyd. The boat used by General Floyd was the General Anderson.

Answer to 5th. I do not know certainly. I have seen 5 men, communicated with others, and suppose, from all I can learn, about 25. Their means of escape were rafts to cross the river or skiffs, or to wade through a sheet of backwater in the rear and left of the army.

Answer to 6th. I do not know, except from narration of those who were in the field, officers and others, who say they were drawn up in military order on the bank of the river near where the Anderson backed, and that they were guarding the gangways to the boat, to secure order in embarking the troops. My regiment, in the march from Clarksville,



was the left and rear of Floyd's brigade, and I suppose was still in that position, and hence would be last to embark, unless the order of march was reversed.

Answer to 7th. I have never seen the slough, but have been told by persons who waded through it on Sunday morning that it was about 50 yards wide. My son made his escape with Adjutant Couper and Lieutenant Conway after they were ordered to stack arms. They waded the slough, which my son says was about breast-high to him, and then they marched, without encountering the enemy, to the railroad, reaching it at Columbia, Tenn.

Answer to 8th. I have heard of no one who was not left that was on duty on the field. Williford made his escape, as stated above, after the boat left.

DAN. R. RUSSELL,  
*Colonel Twentieth Mississippi Regiment.*

### FEBRUARY 13, 1862.—Skirmish near Fort Heiman, Ky.

*Report of Lieut. Col. J. H. Miller, First Battalion Mississippi Cavalry.*

#### CAMP PORTER, *Paris, February 14, 1862.*

Having learned that the enemy were committing terrible depredations on the citizens between Concord and Fort Heiman, I took on yesterday two battalions, Hill's and Herndon's, and proceeded to that neighborhood, intending to strike the road leading to those points about midway, and thus cut off any detachments that might have been sent off towards Concord. I entered the road about 4 miles from the fort, but found by my advance guards that their pickets were near us, and in a few moments observed the enemy throwing out skirmishers. I took a position with my force, but the ground being exceedingly broken and hilly, unfit for cavalry, I fell back to the west, to find ground upon which we could operate.

I soon learned that the enemy had learned of our coming and had a regiment of infantry in waiting to surprise us.

I detached Captain Stock's company to act as skirmishers in the rear and right over a ridge around which the enemy were attempting to come up. He soon was engaged in a skirmish with the enemy, but seeing their whole force, about 200, before him, he fell back, having 2 men wounded slightly, and 1 I fear mortally, who was left on the field.

Captain Stock reported 2 or 3 of the enemy killed.

The expedition was undertaken at the earnest entreaty of the citizens, to check the depredations of the enemy and to force them to draw in their foraging parties.

I now believe they had been advised of our coming, and my advance guards and skirmishers saved us from a surprise.

General, what am I to do with my men this terrible weather? Half supplied with tents and cooking utensils, we cannot remain in this condition. I beg your attention to their wants. Pagett's, Hubbard's, and Houston's broken companies have no tents at all or supplies of any kind, having lost them at Fort Heiman.

J. H. MILLER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.*

Major-General POLK.

## FEBRUARY 14, 1862.—Skirmish near Cumberland Gap, Tenn.

## REPORTS.

No. 1.—Brig. Gen. S. P. Carter, U. S. Army.

No. 2.—Col. James E. Rains, C. S. Army.

## No. 1.

*Report of Brig. Gen. S. P. Carter, U. S. Army.*HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Cumberland, February 14, 1862.*

CAPTAIN: A reconnaissance was made to-day by a company of First Battalion Kentucky Cavalry, under the immediate command of Lieutenant-Colonel Munday. Lieutenant-Colonel Munday reports that he advanced quite close to the Gap; attacked the enemy's cavalry picket; killed 5, wounded 2, and took 2 prisoners, 8 horses, 7 sabers, and 5 double-barrel shot-guns. No one was injured in the colonel's command. Our party advanced so near the enemy's defenses that they got within range of their batteries, which opened on them, when they returned to camp.

Respectfully, &amp;c.,

S. P. CARTER,

*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding Twelfth Brigade.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, and Chief of Staff.*

## No. 2.

*Reports of Col. James E. Rains, C. S. Army.*HEADQUARTERS CUMBERLAND GAP,  
*February 14, 1862.*

SIR: I am convinced that the enemy will attack us at this place within a week. An attack to-morrow is probable. Their cavalry drove in our pickets to-day about 3 miles in advance of us. The force, seven regiments, are reported to be at Cumberland Ford, 15 miles in front.

The force we have cannot hold the place, being insufficient to man the works. The strength of the position has been greatly exaggerated. On the Kentucky side it is naturally very weak and difficult to defend. It has been our policy to give currency to a different opinion of the place, and hence the error. It will require two regiments, in addition to the two now here, to resist the force menacing us.

The position should never be abandoned. Its strategic importance cannot be exaggerated. On the Tennessee side it is naturally almost impregnable and art can make it completely so. If abandoned, it cannot be easily retaken.

Can re-enforcements be sent us?

Respectfully,

JAMES E. RAINS,  
*Colonel, Commanding Post.*

General S. COOPER.

## HEADQUARTERS CUMBERLAND GAP,

*February 18, 1862.*

SIR: In a dispatch of the 14th instant I acquainted you with the fact that our cavalry pickets had been attacked by the cavalry of the enemy and that an attack on this place was probable.

During the night following the engagement between the pickets there fell a deep snow, which, followed by constant rains up to this time, has placed the roads and streams between us and the enemy in such condition that an immediate attack is improbable. Several days of fair weather must elapse before the enemy, distant about a day's march, would attempt to reach us.

By a dispatch from Colonel Vance, commanding at Knoxville, I learn that three regiments are on their way to re-enforce us. If these regiments reach us in time the place is safe against any force that can be brought over the roads in our front. Indeed, it is not probable that thus re-enforced we will be attacked at all. If not re-enforced, an attack is highly probable.

I would respectfully suggest that the whole East Tennessee border is much exposed and several important gaps wholly undefended, through any one of which it would not be difficult for the enemy to throw a force.

Respectfully,

General S. COOPER.

JAMES E. RAINS,  
*Colonel, Commanding Post.*

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**FEBRUARY 14-15, 1862.**—Evacuation of Bowling Green, Ky., by the Confederates and its occupation by the Union forces.

## REPORTS.

No. 1.—General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Western Department.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. O. M. Mitchel, U. S. Army.

## No. 1.

*Report of General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Western Department.*

## HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*Nashville, Tenn., February 18, 1862.*

SIR: In conformity with the intention announced to the Department, the corps under the command of Major-General Hardee completed the evacuation of Bowling Green on the 14th instant, and the rear guard crossed the Cumberland at this point yesterday morning in good order. I have ordered the army to intrench to-night midway between this place and Murfreesborough. My purpose is to place the force in such a position that the enemy cannot concentrate his superior strength against the command, and to enable me to assemble as rapidly as possible such other troops in addition as it may be in my power to collect. The complete command which their gunboats and transports give them on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers renders it necessary for me to retire my line between the rivers. I entertain the hope that this disposition will enable me to hold the enemy in check, and when my forces are sufficiently increased to drive him back.



In a previous dispatch I informed you of my anticipation of the fall of Fort Donelson. These movements were commenced under that impression. The enemy attacked the fort on the 13th instant at sunrise in great force with gunboats and by troops on land. The assault was continued with vigor and the enemy repulsed with loss.

On the morning of the 15th our forces, under the command of General Floyd, about 10,000 strong, advanced from their trenches upon the enemy, more than double their number, and drove him back about 2 miles, capturing his artillery, taking prisoners, and forcing his positions. The conflict was one of the most sanguinary of the war, and continued from dawn until night-fall, with a loss of about 1,000 killed and wounded on our part.

During the night the enemy was heavily re-enforced by thirteen transports coming to his relief loaded with fresh troops, while our men were exhausted by cold, privation, and three days' continued battle.

During the night, the position being found no longer tenable in consequence of the exhaustion of the men, and the enemy having obtained a lodgment on the extreme right in the intrenchments, the fort being uninjured, General Floyd and a portion of his command withdrew and General Pillow retired, leaving General Buckner in command of the place and the remaining troops.

General Buckner informed me that at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 16th he had sent a flag of truce, which I presume was for the purpose of surrendering, though I have not received official information of the fact.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.*

P. S.—General Floyd mentions the fact that the loss of the enemy, killed and wounded, was much greater than our own—at least 1,500.

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No. 2.

*Report of Brig. Gen. O. M. Mitchel, U. S. Army.*

HDQRS. THIRD DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., February 15, 1862.*

GENERAL: I have the honor to announce that the advance guard, consisting of Colonel Turchin's brigade, under cover of artillery from each of the batteries, commanded by Captain Loomis, effected a passage of the river during the night by means of a large flat-boat, which was found by our scouts during the afternoon at a large flouring-mill about 4 miles below the town of Bowling Green. The advance guard, accompanied by a detachment of Colonel Kennett's cavalry, supported by three regiments of a reserve from the main body, marched upon the town, and entered without finding an enemy at 5 o'clock this morning. Our cavalry pickets are now thrown forward 5 or 6 miles along the railroad leading to Nashville, the railroad leading to Russellville, and the turnpike leading to Nashville. Every precaution has been taken to prevent the surprise of our advance guard. The entire division is encamped upon the north side of the river near the railroad, and convenient to wood and

water. Our troops, though they have been upon the march for two days and without sleep for the greater part of three successive nights, are in the highest spirits. I know not how to express my grateful acknowledgments to all the officers and soldiers comprising the Third Division. Their promptitude, energy, and indomitable courage will win, I trust, the confidence and approval of the general commanding the department and of the entire country.

Our victory is a bloodless one, but not the less important. I find on examination Bowling Green is susceptible of the most perfect defense. One of the works on the north side of the river is admirably constructed and beautifully finished. I regret the loss of many valuable buildings in the town by fire. Our effort to drive the enemy from the town by our artillery did not prevent them from firing the depot and several other public buildings. We found a large supply of corn, partly consumed by fire. One locomotive on the track was injured badly by firing the wood in the tender. Five or six locomotives in the engine-house have been partially destroyed by the fire. Three of them it is thought may be repaired. We find on the track at the depot several platform cars, some house cars, several hand cars, with a piece of artillery mounted upon a platform car ready for removal, but which the enemy was compelled to abandon by our unexpected attack. A large supply of flour and beef has been distributed among the citizens. Should our troops require it, I shall feel it to be my duty to use these stores as the property of the United States. Other stores, consisting of boxes of boots and shoes, of sugar, coffee, nails, tents, and saddles, have fallen into our hands, the enemy being unable to remove them from General Hindman's former headquarters to the south side of the river. Indeed, our approach was so rapid and so unexpected that the first intelligence the enemy had of our presence was communicated by the explosion of a shell near the depot.

I am informed by the inhabitants that our firing created the greatest consternation, and that the troops of the enemy precipitately abandoned the town, which but for this they would have done probably at an early day, feeling that other points had become of greater importance, and as their troops were limited in number they were compelled to concentrate them where most needed.

The railroad from this point to the tunnel is in perfect condition. The line of telegraph is also complete. About four miles and a half of track have been destroyed by burning the ties and bending the rails. If the rails were sent forward with chairs and spikes promptly, I think a single regiment could open the road in a week. I shall establish to-day a ferry across the river near the turnpike bridge. Captain Yates, commanding mechanics and engineers, reports that the bridge can be in order so as to pass teams in four or five days.

I send this morning a very large train of wagons to Green River for supplies and forage. The quartermaster has been ordered to the country to purchase beef cattle, mutton, and pork. If orders were given to send by rail our supplies and forage as far as the railway is in order it would greatly aid us in supplying the division. It is important that some arrangement be made by means of which our mails may be received regularly and promptly.

I respectfully request your orders as to the disposition of those troops which have been sent forward to support my division. I think it important that Glasgow should be occupied for the present by one brigade. With that force thus posted I feel that our present position can be held against any force which the enemy may be able to send against

us. The commanding general will please announce to the country the fall of Bowling Green and its present occupation by United States troops.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. M. MITCHEL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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FEBRUARY 15-22, 1862.—Expedition from Cairo, Ill., to Eastport, Miss.

*Report of Lieut. William Gwin, U. S. Navy.*

U. S. GUNBOAT TYLER,  
*Cairo, February 23, 1862.*

SIR: I have returned to this place after having gone up the Tennessee River as high as Eastport, Miss. I am happy to state that I have met with an increased Union sentiment in South Tennessee and North Alabama. I saw few Mississippians. In Hardin, McNairy, Wayne, Decatur, and a portion of Hardeman, all of which border upon the river, the Union sentiment is strong, and those who do not express themselves openly loyal are only prevented by their fears of the military tyranny and coercion which is practiced by marauding bands of guerrilla companies of cavalry.

I waited at Fort Henry as long as I deemed it advisable for the company of cavalry designated to accompany me up the river. Not being able to get transportation for them I concluded to take in their stead some fifty sharpshooters, as I could accommodate them on board of the Tyler. I was not able to accomplish the destruction of Bear Creek Bridge (my great desire), as I found that the rebels had sent immediately after our first ascent of the river a large force—1,000—to this bridge, and some 3,000 or 4,000 to a station called Iuka, 3 miles from the bridge. Learning that a large quantity of wheat and flour was stored in Clifton, Tenn., intended, of course, to be shipped to the South, a large portion of it having been bought for a firm in Memphis, on my way down I landed there and took on board about a thousand sacks and one hundred barrels of flour, and some six thousand bushels of wheat. I considered it my duty to take possession of the above, to prevent its being seized by the rebels or disposed of in rebel country.

The glorious success of our arms at Forts Henry and Donelson has been most beneficial to the Union cause throughout South and West Tennessee and Alabama. Union men can now begin to express their loyal sentiments without fear of being mobbed, especially along the banks of the river. I would suggest that you would urge upon the commanding general the necessity of sending a force (a brigade, if possible; at least a regiment of cavalry), locate it at Savannah, Hardin County, a place well adapted for its support; and then it would be in a section almost entirely Union, a nucleus around which Union men could rally.

I feel confident that a regiment of Home Guards could be raised in ten days. Savannah is in good striking distance of Eastport, Miss. (45 miles by the river), which is the nearest point to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad (8 miles). At that point there is an important bridge over Bear Creek, as well as some extent of trestle-work, which, if destroyed, together with a part of the Mobile and Ohio road at its junction with the Memphis and Ohio Railroad, will cut the Southern Confederacy almost in two.



I brought down under arrest a man named William P. Poole, who has been active in oppressing Union men in his community. I have warned the inhabitants of the different towns of the river that I would hold secessionists and their property responsible for any outrages committed on Unionists in their community. I have enlisted seventeen men and have brought down fourteen refugees.

Hoping that my course will meet your approval, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. GWIN,  
*Lieutenant, Commanding.*

Flag-Officer A. H. FOOTE, U. S. N.,  
*Commanding Naval Forces on Western Waters.*

[Indorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS, CAIRO, ILL., *February 24, 1862.*

The within paper, which contains important facts and good suggestions, was written after discussion of the subject with me and at my request. With the Tennessee River as a line of operations, Corinth, the junction of the Mobile with the Memphis Railroad, becomes an important objective point, which turns Columbia on the left and Memphis on the right. Leaving the Tennessee at Hammond, a good road, 18 miles long, leads direct to Corinth.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brig. Gen. Vols., U. S. A., Chief of Staff and Engr.*

**FEBRUARY 19, 1862.**—Clarksville, Tenn., occupied by United States forces.

#### REPORTS.

No. 1.—Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote, U. S. Navy.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army.

#### No. 1.

*Report of Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote, U. S. Navy.*

U. S. FLAG-STEAMER CONESTOGA,  
*Fort Donelson, February 20, 1862.*

SIR: I have the honor to inform the Department that I left Cairo with the Conestoga, Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, on the 18th instant, having previously dispatched the gunboat Cairo, Lieutenant-Commander Bryant, and six mortar boats, in charge of Lieutenant Bishop and Lieutenant Lyford as ordnance officer, for Fort Donelson.

Yesterday (on the 19th instant) I came up the river on an armed reconnaissance with the Conestoga and Cairo, having Colonel Webster, of the Engineer Corps, and chief of General Grant's staff, on board. On nearing Fort Defiance, near Clarksville, we found a white flag displayed, and on landing found the fort deserted. Lieutenant-Commander Phelps and Colonel Webster took possession of the fort, the former hoisting the American flag. There were three guns mounted on this fort, three in the fort near the city, and two in a fort a short distance up the Red River.

On reaching Clarksville I sent for the authorities of the city, and soon after the Hon. Cave Johnson, the mayor, and Judge Wisdom came aboard, stating that the rebel soldiers had left the city, and, with the portion of the defeated army which had escaped from Fort Donelson,

had fled to Nashville, after having wantonly burned the splendid railroad bridge near the city, against the remonstrance of the citizens. I further ascertained that two-thirds of the citizens had fled from the place panic-stricken. In short, the city was in a state of the wildest commotion from the rumors that we would not respect the citizens either in their persons or their property.

I assured those gentlemen that we came not to destroy anything but tents, military stores, and army equipments. With this assurance they earnestly importuned me to issue a proclamation embodying my views and intentions to the citizens, that the confidence and quiet of the community might be restored. I was constrained, contrary to my predetermination of never writing such a document, to issue the proclamation of which the inclosed is a copy.

I leave this morning with the Conestoga to bring up one or two iron-clad gunboats with this vessel and six mortar boats, and then proceed with all possible dispatch up the Cumberland River to Nashville, and, in conjunction with the army, make an attack on Nashville. The rebels have great terror of the gunboats, as will be seen in their papers. One of them a short distance above Fort Donelson had previously fired an iron-rolling mill belonging to the Hon. John Bell.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. H. FOOTE,

*Flag-Officer, Commanding Naval Forces Western Waters.*

P. S.—I write in great hurry, as mail-boat is waiting.

[Inclosure.]

#### PROCLAMATION.

*To the Inhabitants of Clarksville, Tenn.:*

At the suggestion of the Hon. Cave Johnson, Judge Wisdom, and the mayor of the city, who called upon me yesterday, after our hoisting the Union flag and taking possession of the forts, to ascertain my views and intentions towards the citizens and private property, I hereby announce to all peaceably-disposed persons that neither in their persons nor in their property shall they suffer molestation by me or the naval force under my command, and that they may in safety resume their business avocations with the assurance of my protection.

At the same time I require that all military stores and army equipments shall be surrendered, no part of them being withheld or destroyed; and, further, that no secession flag or manifestation of secession feeling shall be exhibited; and for the faithful observance of these conditions I shall hold the authorities of the city responsible.

A. H. FOOTE,

*Flag-Officer, Commanding Naval Forces Western Waters.*

U. S. FLAG-STEAMER CONESTOGA,  
*Clarksville, Tenn., February 20, 1862.*

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#### No. 2.

*Report of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, February 21, 1862.*

I am now in possession of Clarksville, but will move no force there except General Smith's division until I hear from General Halleck.

There is a considerable amount of army stores at Clarksville, particularly flour and bacon, which it will be necessary to move if the army is to fall back this way. I would suggest, however, that points above Forts Henry and Donelson would be more advantageous for us to occupy than where we are now—I would say about the railroad crossing on the two rivers.

It is my impression that by following up our success Nashville would be an easy conquest; but I only throw this out as a suggestion, based simply upon information from people who have no sympathy with us. White flags are flying from here to Clarksville, and rumor says the same thing extends to Nashville. At Nashville I understand one party put the white flag on the State-house, but it was torn down by another party.

I wrote you some days ago to have forwarded blankets and overcoats to issue to troops who lost theirs on the field of battle. The men are suffering for them. Shoes and other clothing are beginning to be wanting to some extent. I am ready for any move the general commanding may order.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM,  
*Chief of Staff, Department Missouri.*

**FEBRUARY 23-25, 1862.**—Evacuation of Nashville, Tenn., by the Confederate forces and its occupation by the Union troops.

#### REPORTS, ETC.

- No. 1.—Hon. Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War.
- No. 2.—Brig. Gen. D. C. Buell, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Ohio.
- No. 3.—Col. James Barnett, U. S. Army, of ordnance captured.
- No. 4.—General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Western Department.
- No. 5.—Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, C. S. Army.
- No. 6.—Col. Nathan B. Forrest's responses to interrogatories of Committee of Confederate House of Representatives.
- No. 7.—Col. Leon Trousdale's responses to interrogatories of Committee of Confederate House of Representatives.
- No. 8.—Memorandum of Col. W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant-General.

#### No. 1.

*Report of Hon. Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 25, 1862.*

Nashville was taken possession of to-day. The mayor, accompanied by committee of citizens, met General Buell this morning on the north bank of the Cumberland. Interview entirely satisfactory to all parties. One gunboat and twelve steamers at the wharf. Troops passing the river in good order.

THOMAS A. SCOTT.

Hon. E. M. STANTON.



## No. 2.

*Report of Brig. Gen. D. C. Buell, U. S. Army, commanding Department of the Ohio.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 26, 1862.*

I arrived opposite the city with Mitchell's division, about 9,000 effective, on the night of the 24th. The enemy's cavalry were still in the city in small force. I did not intend to cross until I could do so in sufficient force to run no great hazard, but during the night General Nelson arrived with about 7,000 men, and landed before I was aware of it. I deemed it unadvisable to withdraw them, lest it should embolden the enemy and have a bad effect on the people, and so determined to cross with all the force at hand, and we are now crossing and taking a position some 4 or 5 miles out in the direction of Murfreesborough. The difficulty of crossing the river is very great. Notwithstanding we have steamers, the want of fuel for them is a most embarrassing matter. Our force is too small, and offers a strong inducement to the enemy, only 30 miles distant, with some 30,000 men, to assume the offensive; but I have deemed it necessary to run the risk. I have dispatched steamers to bring up the force at Clarksville, and our troops are moving on from Bowling Green as rapidly as possible, but it must be two or three days before we will be able to show much force. General Thomas' division ought to be here by water by the 13th of March. The troops from Clarksville may be here to-night. McCook's division will, I hope, be up to the river to-morrow, and will then have to cross. If the enemy advances, as is said to be his intention, we will probably meet him to-morrow. It is said here that the enemy has either evacuated Columbus or is doing so. There are no violent demonstrations of hostility, though the mass of the people appear to look upon us as invaders, but I have seen several strong indications of loyalty in individuals.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN.

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No. 3.

*Report of Col. James Barnett, U. S. Army, of ordnance captured.*

HEADQUARTERS FOURTEENTH ARMY CORPS,  
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,  
*Nashville, Tenn., December 5, 1862.*

GENERAL: Below is a report of the number and caliber of guns, mounted and dismounted, at Nashville, which were captured from the enemy:

- No. 1, 24-pounder iron gun, mounted on bank of river near reservoir.
- No. 2, 32-pounder iron gun (Parrott), mounted on corner of reservoir.
- No. 3, 24-pounder iron gun (smooth bore), mounted on Lebanon pike.
- No. 4, 32-pounder iron gun (Parrott), mounted on end of Summer street.
- No. 5, 32-pounder iron gun (Parrott), mounted at General Palmer's headquarters.
- No. 6, 24-pounder iron gun (smooth bore), mounted under Saint Cloud Hill.

Nos. 7 and 8, 24-pounder iron guns (smooth bore), mounted on Fort Negley.

No. 9, 24-pounder iron gun (smooth bore), mounted at railroad tunnel.

No. 10, 24-pounder iron gun (smooth bore), dismounted at Fort Negley.

No. 11, 32-pounder howitzer (iron), mounted at old Lunatic Asylum.

No. 12, 32-pounder iron Parrott, mounted on floating bridge.

Dismounted at ordnance depot: one 100-pounder columbiad, two 32-pounder rifled iron guns, five 24-pounder carronades, and twelve 6-pounder iron guns, unserviceable, spiked; three 24-pounder iron smooth bores and one 18 pounder iron smooth bore, serviceable, and four 6-pounder iron guns, unserviceable.

Of the guns at the ordnance depot there are but three 24-pounders and one 18-pounder iron smooth bores that are considered safe.

Very respectfully,

JAMES BARNETT,

*Colonel, and Chief of Artillery Fourteenth Army Corps.*

Maj. Gen. W. S. ROSECRANS,

*Commanding Fourteenth Army Corps.*

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No. 4.

*Report of General A. Sidney Johnston, C. S. Army, commanding Western Department.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 25, 1862.*

SIR: The fall of Fort Donelson compelled me to withdraw the remaining forces under my command from the north bank of the Cumberland and to abandon the defense of Nashville, which but for that disaster it was my intention to protect to the utmost. Not more than 11,000 effective men were left under my command to oppose a column of General Buell's of not less than 40,000 troops, moving by Bowling Green, while another superior force, under General Thomas, outflanked me to the east, and the army from Fort Donelson, with the gunboats and transports, had it in their power to ascend the Cumberland, now swollen by recent flood, so as to intercept all communication with the South. The situation left me no alternative but to evacuate Nashville or sacrifice the army. By remaining the place would have been unnecessarily subjected to destruction, as it is very indefensible, and no adequate force would have been left to keep the enemy in check in Tennessee.

Under these circumstances I moved the main body of my command to this place on the 17th and 18th instant, and left a brigade under General Floyd to bring on such stores and property as were at Nashville, with instructions to remain until the approach of the enemy, and then to rejoin me. This has been in a great measure effected; and nearly all the stores would have been saved but for the heavy and unusual rains, which have washed away the bridges, swept away portions of the railroad, and rendered transportation almost impossible. General Floyd has arrived here.

The rear guard left Nashville on the night of the 23d. Edgefield, on the north bank of the Cumberland, opposite the city, was occupied yesterday by the advanced pickets of the enemy.

I have remained here for the purpose of augmenting my forces and

securing the transportation of the public stores. By the junction of the command of General Crittenden and the fugitives from Fort Donelson, which have been reorganized as far as practicable, the force now under my command will amount to about 17,000 men. General Floyd, with a force of some 2,500 men, has been ordered to Chattanooga, to defend the approaches towards Northern Alabama and Georgia and the communication between the Mississippi and Atlantic and with the view to increase his forces by such troops as may be sent forward from the neighboring States.

The quartermaster's, commissary, and ordnance stores which are not required for immediate use have been ordered to Chattanooga, and those which will be necessary on the march have been forwarded to Huntsville and Decatur. I have ordered a depot to be established at Atlanta for the manufacture of supplies for the Quartermaster's Department and also a laboratory for the manufacture of percussion caps and ordnance stores, and at Chattanooga depots for distribution of these supplies. The machinery will be immediately sent forward.

Considering the peculiar topography of this State and the great power which the enemy's means of transportation affords them upon the Tennessee and Cumberland, it will be seen that the force under my command cannot successfully cover the whole line against the advance of the enemy. I am compelled to elect whether he shall be permitted to occupy Middle Tennessee, or turn Columbus, take Memphis, and open the valley of the Mississippi. To me the defense of the valley appears of paramount importance, and, consequently, I will move this corps of the army, of which I have assumed the immediate command, towards the left bank of the Tennessee, crossing the river near Decatur, in order to enable me to co-operate or unite with General Beauregard for the defense of Memphis and the Mississippi.

The Department has sent eight regiments to Knoxville for the defense of East Tennessee, and the protection of that region will be confided to them and such additional forces as may be hereafter sent from the adjacent States. General Buckner was ordered by the Department to take command of the troops at Knoxville; but as he was at that time in presence of the enemy, the order was not fulfilled. As it would be almost impossible for me under present circumstances to superintend the operations at Knoxville and Chattanooga, I would respectfully suggest that the local commanders at those points should receive orders from the Department directly or be allowed to exercise their discretion.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.*

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No. 5.

*Report of Brig. Gen. John B. Floyd, C. S. Army.*

KNOXVILLE, TENN., March 22, 1862.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report in regard to the movements, disposition, and transportation of my command from the date of my arrival at Nashville until I reported to General A. S. Johnston, at Murfreesborough.

I arrived at Nashville on a steamboat, together with a portion of the



command rescued from Fort Donelson, consisting of parts of the various regiments from Virginia, Texas, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Tennessee, at 7 o'clock on the morning of the 17th of February. Immediately on coming within view of the landing at the city I beheld a sight which is worthy of notice. The rabble on the wharf were in possession of boats loaded with Government bacon, and were pitching it from these boats to the shore, and carrying what did not fall into the water by hand and carts away to various places in the city. The persons engaged in this reprehensible conduct avowed that the meat had been given to them by the city council. As soon as practicable I reported to General Johnston for duty, and on the same day I was placed in command of the city, and immediately took steps to arrest the panic that pervaded all classes and to restore order and quiet. One regiment, the First Missouri, Lieutenant-Colonel Rich, together with a portion of Colonel Forrest's and Captain Morgan's cavalry, were added to my command, and these were principally occupied in guarding public warehouses and the streets of the city. The only other force which I could use for the purposes above mentioned were the fragments of regiments that I had brought with me, and all of which were well-nigh totally exhausted from the exertions and fatigues to which they had been subjected on the 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th days of February.

I immediately stopped the indiscriminate distribution of public stores by placing guards over them, and, having thus secured them from the grasp of the populace, I commenced the work of saving the stores that were in the city. Day and night the work was continued, being only temporarily stopped at times for the purpose of feeding the teams that were at work transporting articles of Government property from the wharves and store-houses to the railroad depot. My men worked incessantly with commendable perseverance and energy under my immediate supervision. Owing to the exhausted condition of the men thus engaged, it became absolutely necessary to force the able-bodied men who were strolling about the city unoccupied to assist in the labor before me. I was greatly assisted in this arduous duty by the energy of Colonel Wharton, whose brigade was principally engaged and who promptly executed the orders issued by me. I likewise would express my appreciation of the valuable services of Maj. J. Dawson, of General Hardee's command, of Lieutenant-Colonel Kennard, and of Captains Derrick, Ellis, and Otey, of my staff. I finally succeeded in loading all the cars standing at the depot at about 4 o'clock on the evening of the 20th of February.

During the interval between the morning of the 17th and the evening of the 20th of February trains were loaded and dispatched as fast as they arrived. Much more could have been saved had there been more system and regularity in the disposition of the transportation by rail. Several trains were occupied in carrying off sick and wounded soldiers. The weather was exceedingly inclement during the entire time occupied as above mentioned, and there was an excessively heavy rain on the 19th of February.

As the moment for destroying the bridges had been left to my discretion up to a certain period, I allowed them to stand until a large amount of transportation, a large number of cattle, and some troops had been brought from the north side of the river. At 10 o'clock on the evening of the 19th the destruction of the suspension bridge was commenced; the wood work was burned and the cables on the south side were cut. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 20th the railroad bridge was destroyed. I was greatly aided in this work by Lieutenant Crump and Lieutenant Forsberg, of the Engineers.

During the period embraced by this report Colonel Forrest and Captain Morgan, with their cavalry, rendered signal and efficient service in dispersing the mobs which gathered in the vicinity of the warehouses containing Government property, and which often had to be scattered at the point of the saber. I had succeeded in collecting a large amount of stores of various kinds at the depot, but as I had no control of the transportation by rail, and hence obliged to await the action of others, much that would have been valuable to the Government was necessarily left at the depot. Among the articles saved were all the cannon, caisson, and battery wagons of which we had any knowledge.

At 4 o'clock p. m. on the 20th February I started with my staff for Murfreesborough, which point I reached on the morning of the 21st, where I reported to General Johnston in person.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,

*Brigadier-General.*

H. P. BREWSTER,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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No. 6.

*Col. Nathan B. Forrest's responses to interrogatories of Committee of Confederate House of Representatives.*

Interrogatory 1st. I was not at the city of Nashville at the time of its surrender, but was there at the time the enemy made their entrance into that part of the city known as Edgefield, having left Fort Donelson, with my command, on the morning of its surrender, and reached Nashville on Tuesday, February 18, about 10 a. m. I remained in the city up to the Sunday evening following.

Interrogatory 2d. It would be impossible to state, from the data before me, the value of the stores either in the Quartermaster's or Commissary Departments, having no papers then nor any previous knowledge of the stores. The stores in the Quartermaster's Department consisted of all stores necessary to the department—clothing especially, in large amounts, shoes, harness, &c., with considerable unmanufactured material. The commissary stores were meat, flour, sugar, molasses, and coffee. There was a very large amount of meat in store and on the landing at my arrival, though large amounts had already been carried away by citizens.

Interrogatory 3d. A portion of these stores had been removed before the surrender. A considerable amount of meat on the landing, I was informed, was thrown into the river on Sunday before my arrival and carried off by the citizens. The doors of the commissary depot were thrown open, and the citizens in dense crowds were packing and hauling off the balance at the time of my arrival on Tuesday. The quartermaster's stores were also open, and the citizens were invited to come and help themselves, which they did in larger crowds, if possible, than at the other department.

Interrogatories 4th and 5th. On Tuesday morning I was ordered by General Floyd to take command of the city, and attempted to drive the mob from the doors of the departments, which mob was composed of straggling soldiers and citizens of all grades. The mob had taken possession of the city to that extent that every species of property was un-



safe. Houses were closed, carriages and wagons were concealed to prevent the mob from taking possession of them. Houses were being seized everywhere. I had to call out my cavalry, and, after every other means failed, charge the mob before I could get it so dispersed as to get wagons to the doors of the departments to load up the stores for transportation. After the mob was partially dispersed and quiet restored a number of citizens furnished wagons and assisted in loading them. I was busily engaged in this work on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday. I transported 700 hundred large boxes of clothing to the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad depot, several hundred bales of osnaburgs and other military goods from the Quartermaster's Department, most, if not all, of the shoes having been seized by the mob. I removed about 700 or 800 wagon loads of meat. The high water having destroyed the bridges so as to stop the transportation over the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, I had large amounts of this meat taken over the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad. By examination on Sunday morning I found a large amount of fixed ammunition in the shape of cartridges and ammunition for light artillery in the magazine, which, with the assistance of General Harding, I conveyed over 7 miles on the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad in wagons, to the amount of 30 odd wagon loads, after the enemy had reached the river. A portion was sent on to Murfreesborough in wagons. The quartermaster's stores which had not already fallen into the hands of the mob were all removed, save a lot of rope, loose shoes, and a large number of tents. The mob had already possessed themselves of a large amount of these stores. A large quantity of meat was left in store and on the river bank and some at the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad depot, on account of the break in the railroad. I cannot estimate the amount, as several store-houses had not been opened up to the time of my leaving. All stores left fell into the hands of the enemy, except forty pieces of light artillery, which were burned and spiked by order of General Floyd, as were the guns at Fort Zollicoffer. My proposition to remove these stores, made by telegraph to Murfreesborough, had the sanction of General A. S. Johnston.

Interrogatory 6th. No effort was made, save by the mob, who were endeavoring to possess themselves of these stores, to prevent their removal, and a very large amount was taken off before I was placed in command of the city.

Interrogatory 7th. It was eight days from the time the quartermaster left the city before the arrival of the enemy, commissaries and other persons connected with these departments leaving at the same time. With proper diligence on their part I have no doubt all the public stores might have been transported to places of safety.

Interrogatory 8th. Up to Saturday the railroads were open and might have been used to transport these stores. Saturday the bridges of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad gave way. Besides these modes of conveyance, a large number of wagons might have been obtained, had the quiet and order of the city been maintained, and large additional amounts of stores might by these means have been transported to places of safety.

Interrogatories 9th and 10th. I saw no officer connected with the Quartermaster's or Commissary Departments except Mr. Patton, who left on Friday. I did not at any time meet or hear of Maj. V. K. Stevenson in the city during my stay there.

Interrogatories 11th, 12th, and 13th. From my personal knowledge I can say nothing of the manner in which Major Stevenson left the city.



Common rumor and many reliable citizens informed me that Major Stevenson left by a special train Sunday evening, February 16, taking personal baggage, furniture, carriage, and carriage-horses, the train ordered by himself, as president of the railroad.

Interrogatory 14th. All the means of transportation were actually necessary for the transportation of Government stores and sick and wounded soldiers, many of whom fell into the hands of the enemy for want of it, and might have been saved by the proper use of the means at hand. The necessity for these means of transportation for stores will be seen by the above answers which I have given. I have been compelled to be as brief as possible in making the above answers, my whole time being engaged, as we seem to be upon the eve of another great battle. The city was in a much worse condition than I can convey an idea of on paper, and the loss of public stores must be estimated by millions of dollars. The panic was entirely useless and not at all justified by the circumstances. General Harding and the mayor of the city, with Mr. Williams, deserve special mention for assistance rendered in removing the public property. In my judgment, if the quartermaster and commissary had remained at their post and worked diligently with the means at their command, the Government stores might all have been saved between the time of the fall of Fort Donelson and the arrival of the enemy at Nashville.

Respectfully submitted.

N. B. FORREST,  
*Colonel, Commanding Forrest's Brigade of Cavalry.*

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No. 7.

*Col. Leon Trosdale's responses to interrogatories of Committee of Confederate House of Representatives.*

RICHMOND, VA., March 11, 1862.

SIR: Herewith I hand you my answers to the interrogatories propounded to me by the committee and transmitted to me by you.

Very respectfully,

LEON TROUSDALE.

To the CLERK of the Special Committee on the Recent Military Disasters of Forts Henry and Donelson.

Answer to interrogatory 1st. I am a resident of Nashville, and my occupation is that of editor and publisher of a public journal.

2d. I left the city of Nashville about 9 o'clock on the morning of February 23, just one week after the surrender of Fort Donelson.

3d. General A. Sidney Johnston arrived at Nashville and took quarters in the village of Edgefield, on the opposite bank of the Cumberland River, a few days before the fall of Donelson; the precise date I do not recollect. His forces were left in the rear, and did not reach Nashville until Sunday, February 16, when they passed through the city and marched in the direction of Murfreesborough. I understand that the last brigade passed through the city on Monday. General Floyd's brigade afterwards arrived from Donelson.

4th. The advance of General Buell's forces arrived at Edgefield, opposite Nashville, on Sunday morning, February 23.

5th. The first report of General Buell's expected advance was promulgated in the city on Sunday morning, February 16, accompanied by intelligence of the surrender of our forces at Donelson and the announcement that General Johnston had determined not to make a stand for the defense of Nashville, which was verified during the day by the movement of masses of Confederate troops through the city in a southeasterly direction, on the Murfreesborough turnpike. The proximity of Buell's forces, as reported, however, was discredited during the day. As before stated, the enemy's advance did not reach the Cumberland at Nashville until the 23d.

6th. The citizens of Nashville were startled and confounded by the intelligence, and by the announcement, said to have been made as the opinion of General Johnston, that the gunboats would probably arrive in six hours, accompanied, as it was, by his expressed determination not to make a stand for the defense of the city. Large numbers of citizens had been drilling in companies and squads for several days, with the design of aiding the Confederate forces in making such defense as might be resolved on by the general commanding. They could now do nothing but fly from their homes or submit to the Federal despotism—virtual prisoners within the lines of the enemy, unable to write, speak, or act in any manner not in accordance with the will of their despotic enemies. Thousands chose the former alternative, however hard, and left their beautiful city, "fugitives, without a crime."

7th. I know nothing of the strength of General Buell's army, now at Nashville, but I have heard it estimated, by persons from that vicinity, at 15,000 men.

8th. I do not think that Nashville could have been successfully defended after the surrender of Forts Henry and Donelson, in the incomplete state of the fortifications near the city, and with the rear and flank of General Johnston's forces exposed, in consequence of the enemy having command of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. But I believe that those great disasters might have been prevented by energy and promptness; and, having occurred, that the enemy might have been checked in his advance by a proper demonstration.

No troops ever fought with more gallantry and endurance than the Confederate forces at Donelson, and I have been led to believe that moderate re-enforcements in season would have secured for them the fruits of their valor and patient sacrifices. An early attention to the fortifications on the Tennessee and Cumberland and greater enterprise in planning and perfecting them, I am satisfied, would have insured a different result.

9th. I learned from officers who were with the rear guard of our army at Bowling Green that large amounts of pork and some unopened boxes of Enfield rifles and Colt's navy pistols were left at that point, in consequence of the enemy shelling the town before they could be removed; but they were burned or otherwise destroyed, as best they could be, by General Hardee. Less than \$1,000,000, I was informed, would be the loss of stores at Nashville. General Floyd and Colonel Forrest exhibited extraordinary energy and efficiency in getting off Government stores at that point. Colonel Forrest remained in the city about twenty-four hours, with only 40 men, after the arrival of the enemy at Edgefield. These officers were assisted by the voluntary efforts of several patriotic citizens of Nashville, who rendered them great assistance. Among these I remember Messrs. John Williams, J. J. McCann, H. L. Claiborne, and R. C. McNairy.

## No. 8.

*Memorandum of Col. W. W. Mackall, Assistant Adjutant-General.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON :

GENERAL : I heard you give the order to General Floyd to take command of the city of Nashville. You said :

I give you command of the city. You will remove the stores. My only restriction is, do not fight a battle in the city.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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FEBRUARY 26, 1862.—Scout to Nashville, Tenn.

*Report of Capt. John H. Morgan, Kentucky Cavalry.*

BUCHANAN, TENN., *February 27, 1862.*

SIR : I have the honor to report that on yesterday, the 26th instant, left camp with 12 men for Nashville. About 300 yards this side of last toll-gate towards town I left this pike and crossed through Mr. Trabine's farm to the Lebanon pike. Left one man near pike to bring us intelligence of the enemy if any should come along the pike. We then followed the Lebanon pike until we reached the city. When inside the city limits found the pike covered with water, it having been backed up by the great rise in the river. Just at that point met a farmer, who said he was a Union man. Pressed him in and made him guide us over the backwater. He took us for Federals, as he afterwards told me. We proceeded into the city on Front street as far as the water-works, and there saw a steamboat—the Minna Tonka. She laid about 300 yards out in the vast field which covered the whole valley. She was chained fore and aft to trees. She laid not over 500 yards above the gunboats and their large fleet of transports. Could see the soldiers distinctly sitting upon the boats, and they were full of them. Young Buckner, Warfield, and Garrett took possession of a skiff and made oars of a piece of plank fence; boarded the steamboat; found several men on board who seemed preparing to get up steam to drop down the stream to the gunboats; made the crew leave in a boat, and set fire in several places to the steamer, and reached the shore in safety. The troops in the transports could see what we were doing. My orders were to fire the boat, and then cut her loose and let her drop down stream and set the other boats on fire, but this I found impossible to do, on account of the steamer being so securely moored with chain cables. At least 2,000 citizens gathered around us while we were waiting for the boys to get back from the steamer. They begged us to leave; told us the Federal cavalry were scouring the city; that a large party of cavalry had just passed through the street we were on. Sent all my men but 5 out the pike, with direction to halt at the cemetery. Remained with the 5 men about thirty minutes, until I saw a large body of cavalry going out Murfreesborough pike at a rapid rate; then started after my command. When we were half way through the water that was upon the pike a large body of Federals rode after us until they reached the water, when they halted, much



to my satisfaction. We then retraced our steps back to this pike; reached our man who was standing picket just before sundown. About three minutes before we reached him he said seven officers—and one of them a general—had passed through and stopped at the gate where he was standing, not 20 yards distant. He was in a clump of cedars. When we reached him the officers were not over 700 yards distant. Kept our position about an hour. A Mr. James came out and informed us that there were men encamped at the toll-gate that had refused him a permit to leave the city, but he walked along with them as they came out, and as they were going into camp he passed along. He had just left when another man rode up. I halted him. He asked me if I was one of our pickets. I replied, if he meant Federals, we were. He said that was what he meant. I then asked him for his pass. He pulled out one from General Mitchel, allowing him to pass and repass the lines. He did not want me to keep it, but I told him it might be forgery, and that I wished to take it in and see if it was all right. He has been professing to be a Southern-rights [man]; he is a Lincolnite. Lieutenant West and myself then rode up to the toll-gate. I asked the man who lived there who were those officers who had just passed through. Said he did not know, but that they were looking out for a place to camp. While talking heard a body of cavalry approaching. We fell back to the place where our men were. I waited a few minutes. The night being very dark, could not see more than 50 yards ahead of us. While sitting listening I heard the clink of sabers about 60 yards from us. They had left the pike and were riding on the dirt alongside of the pike to keep their horses from making a noise. We were close to the fence behind cedar trees. They rode up within 50 feet of us and stopped about five minutes. I dismounted and took a shot-gun and started for the fence, where I could easily have killed two or three of them. Just as I was raising to put my gun through the fence they called to each other to fire, which they did and then ran for the city. We returned the fire. One of my men (Peter Atherton) was severely wounded, being shot through the thigh. Reached camp at 12 o'clock last night.

Respectfully,

JOHN H. MORGAN,  
*Commanding Squadron.*

Brig. Gen. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 24 [1862]—1 a. m.*

Captain MORGAN:

General Hardee has information that 200 or 300 Federal cavalry crossed over into Nashville this evening on a steamboat. General Hardee deems it important that the steamboat should be burnt, and wishes you to have it done if it can be done.

Respectfully,

W. D. PICKETT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## MARCH 1, 1862.—Engagement at Pittsburg, Tenn.

## REPORTS, ETC.

No. 1.—Report of Brig. Gen. George W. Cullum, U. S. Army.

No. 2.—Congratulatory order of Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles, C. S. Army.

## No. 1.

*Report of Brig. Gen. George W. Cullum, U. S. Army.*

CAIRO, ILL., March 3, 1862.

Am quite sick, but at office. Made demonstration yesterday afternoon. Too foggy to see much. Will try it again to-morrow in force. Saturday gunboats Tyler and Lexington attacked rebel battery of six guns, supported by two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, at Pittsburg, on Tennessee River. Under cover of the grape and shell of gunboats, some sailors, and two companies of Illinois sharpshooters landed and destroyed house where battery had been placed. The enemy being re-enforced, our men returned to gunboats. Loss, 2 killed, 3 missing, and 6 wounded. Enemy's much greater.

G. W. CULLUM,  
Brigadier-General.

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.*

## No. 2.

*Congratulatory order of Brig. Gen. Daniel Ruggles, C. S. Army.*

GENERAL ORDERS, )	HDQRS. FIRST DIV. C. S. TROOPS,
No. 7. )	SECOND GRAND DIV. ARMY MISS. VALLEY,
	Corinth, Miss., March 8, 1862.

\* \* \* \* \*

II. The brigadier-general commanding the First Corps of the Second Grand Division of the Army of the Mississippi Valley has been requested by General G. T. Beauregard, commanding the forces, to express to Colonel [A.] Mouton, and his Eighteenth Regiment Louisiana Volunteers, his "thanks for their brilliant success on their first encounter with the enemy at Pittsburg, Tenn., on the 28th ultimo [1st instant?], and the hope that it is only the forerunner of still more gallant deeds on the part of the regiment." To this testimonial the brigadier-general commanding adds his grateful acknowledgments to Colonel Mouton and his regiment for zeal and gallantry in the performance of a signal service.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Brigadier-General Ruggles :

R. M. HOOE,  
Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General.

**MARCH 2-3, 1862.**—Columbus, Ky., evacuated by the Confederate and occupied by the Union forces.

#### REPORTS.

No. 1.—Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote, U. S. Navy.

No. 2.—Brig. Gen. George W. Cullum, U. S. Army.

No. 3.—Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. Army.

#### No. 1.

*Report of Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote, U. S. Navy.*

COLUMBUS, KY., March 4, 1862.

SIR: Columbus is in our possession. My armed reconnaissance on the 2d instant caused a hasty evacuation, the rebels leaving quite a number of guns and carriages, ammunition, and a large quantity of shot and shell, a considerable number of anchors, and the remnant of chain lately stretched across the river, with a large number of torpedoes. Most of the huts, tents, and quarters destroyed. The works are of very great strength, consisting of formidable tiers of batteries on the water side and on the land side, surrounded by a ditch and abatis.

General Sherman, with Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, not knowing that the works were last evening occupied by 400 of the Second Illinois Cavalry as a scouting party, sent by General Sherman from Paducah, made a bold dash to the shore under the water batteries, hoisting the American flag on the summit of the bluff, greeted by the hearty cheers of our brave tars and soldiers. The force consisted of six gunboats, four mortar boats, and three transports, having on board two regiments and two battalions of infantry, under command of Colonel Buford and Lieutenant-Colonel Northrop, Majors Sanger and Andrews. Generals Cullum and Sherman, being in command of the troops—the former leaving a sick bed to go ashore—discovered what was evidently a magazine on fire at both extremities, and immediately ordered the train to be cut, and thus saved the lives of the garrison.

While I cannot express too strongly my admiration of the gallantry and wise counsels of the distinguished chief of staff and engineer of General Halleck (General Cullum), I must also add that Commanders Dove, Walke, Stembel, and Lieutenant-Commanders Paulding, Thompson, Shirk, and Phelps—the latter being in command of the mortar division, assisted by Lieutenant Lyford, of the Ordnance Corps of the U. S. Army—nobly performed their duty.

I have my flag aboard the Cincinnati, commanded by the gallant Commander Stembel.

General Sherman remains temporarily in command at Columbus.

A. H. FOOTE,  
*Flag-Officer.*

Hon. GIDEON WELLES,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

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#### No. 2.

*Report of Brig. Gen. George W. Cullum, U. S. Army.*

COLUMBUS, KY., March 4, 1862.

Columbus, the Gibraltar of the West, is ours, and Kentucky is free; thanks to the brilliant strategy of the campaign, by which the enemy's center was pierced at Forts Henry and Donelson, his wings isolated from



each other and turned, compelling thus the evacuation of his strongholds of Bowling Green first and now Columbus.

At 4 o'clock this morning the flotilla, under Flag-Officer Foote, consisting of six gunboats, commanded by Captains Dove, Walke, Stembel, Paulding, Thompson, and Shirk, and four mortar boats, in charge of Captain Phelps, U. S. Navy, assisted by Lieutenant Lyford, Ordnance Corps, U. S. Army, and three transports conveying Colonel Buford's Twenty-seventh Illinois Regiment and battalions of the Fifty-fourth and Seventy-first Ohio and Fifty-fifth Illinois, commanded by Majors Andrews and Sanger, the whole brigade being under Brigadier-General Sherman, who rendered me most valuable and efficient assistance.

On arriving at Columbus it was difficult to say whether the fortifications were occupied by our own cavalry on a scout from Paducah or by the enemy. Every preparation was made for opening fire and landing the infantry, when General Sherman and Captain Phelps, with 30 soldiers, made a dashing reconnaissance with a tug, steaming directly under the water batteries. Satisfied that our troops had possession, they landed, ascended to the summit of the bluff, and together planted the Stars and Stripes amid the heartiest cheers of our brave tars and soldiers. Though rising from a sick bed to go upon the expedition, I could not resist landing to examine the works, which are of immense strength, consisting of tiers upon tiers of batteries on the river front, and a strong parapet and ditch, covered by a thick abatis, on the land side. The fortifications appear to have been evacuated hastily, considerable quantity of ordnance and ordnance stores, a number of anchors, and the remnant of the chain which was once stretched over the river, and a large supply of torpedoes remaining. Desolation was visible everywhere; huts, tents, barracks presented nothing but their blackened remains. Though the town was spared, I discovered what appeared a large magazine smoking from both extremities, and caused the train to be immediately cut. A garrison was left in the work of nearly 2,000 infantry and 400 cavalry, which I will strengthen immediately.

I urged upon Flag-Officer Foote the importance of immediately attacking the batteries of Island No. 10 and New Madrid, but that gallant commodore, after consulting with his brave officers, was of the opinion that two or three days of repairs to the gunboats was indispensable.

G. W. CULLUM,

*Brigadier-General Volunteers, U. S. Army, Chief of Staff.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.*

### No. 3.

*Reports of Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. Army.*

COLUMBUS, KY., March 2, 1862.

The work is done. Columbus gone. Self and staff move in half an hour. Everything secured.

L. POLK.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of War.*

HDQRS. FIRST GRAND DIV., ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Humboldt, Tenn., March 18, 1862.*

On the day of the evacuation of Columbus I telegraphed General Beauregard it was accomplished, and I avail myself of the first leisure I have had to submit my official report.

Upon receipt of instructions from the War Department, through General Beauregard, to evacuate Columbus and select a defensive position below, I proceeded to arrange and organize a plan for the accomplishment of that object, and to execute it with as much celerity as the safety of my command and the security of the public property at risk would allow.

The position below offering most advantages for defensive works, and which it was agreed to adopt, was that embracing Island No. 10, the main-land in Madrid Bend, on the Tennessee shore, and New Madrid. At the two latter places works had been thrown up during the last autumn, and measures were already in progress for increasing their strength by the construction of heavy batteries.

On February 25 I issued orders for the removal of the sick as a preparatory step. Orders were also issued by me for the removal of the commissary and quartermaster's stores; then the ordnance stores of every description, and then the heavy guns. These orders were executed promptly and in the most satisfactory manner.

To Brigadier-General McCown was assigned the command of the river defenses at the position chosen. His division was ordered thither on the 27th. A sufficient number of guns having been placed in battery to make that position secure, all the rest of the troops, excepting the cavalry, moved on the 1st, General Stewart's brigade going by steamer to New Madrid, the remainder marching by land to Union City under General Cheatham.

I remained with my staff and the cavalry to supervise the completion of the work until the following day. The last shipment of articles of special value being made, the quarters and other buildings erected by our troops were consigned to the flames by the cavalry, and at 3 p. m. myself and staff followed our retiring column.

The enemy's cavalry, the first of his forces to arrive after the evacuation, reached Columbus in the afternoon next day, twenty-four hours after the last of our troops had left.

In five days we removed the accumulation of six months, taking with us all our commissary and quartermaster's stores, an amount sufficient to supply my whole command for eight months; all our powder and other ammunition and ordnance stores, excepting a few shot and gun-carriages, and every heavy gun in the fort. Two 32-pounders, in a remote outwork, were the only valuable guns left, and these, with three or four small and indifferent carronades, similarly situated, were spiked and rendered useless.

The whole number of pieces of artillery composing our armament was one hundred and forty.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

Col. THOMAS JORDAN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Jackson, Tenn.*

CORRESPONDENCE, ORDERS, AND RETURNS RELATING TO  
OPERATIONS IN KENTUCKY, TENNESSEE, NORTHERN  
ALABAMA, AND SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA FROM NOVEM-  
BER 19, 1861, TO MARCH 4, 1862.

UNION CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE MISSOURI,  
No. 1. } *Saint Louis, November 19, 1861.*

I. In compliance with General Orders, No. 97, Headquarters of the Army, Washington, November 9, 1861, the undersigned hereby takes the command of the Department of the Missouri, including the States of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River.

II. All reports and returns required by Army Regulations will be made to the headquarters in the city of Saint Louis.

H. W. HALLECK,  
• *Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, KY., *November 19, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Division, Crab Orchard, Ky.:*

SIR: General Buell directs me to say that the orders he has given you in reference to the movement of your command\* contemplate the whole of it, and it will, in consequence, not be necessary to continue the depot from which you are now supplied. You will come upon a line of which Louisville and not Cincinnati will be the main depot.

The general desires to be informed in due season of the time at which you will probably arrive at Liberty, as he intends to have further instructions ready to reach you when you get to that point.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
*Camp Calvert, November 19, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, U. S. A.,  
*Commanding, &c., Crab Orchard:*

GENERAL: I have just received information that the rebels, 5,000 strong, were last night at Flat Lick, 8 miles above Barbourville and 32 miles from this place. The messenger left Barbourville this morning. As I can make no stand at this place without artillery with my force, which consists of only some 2,000 effective men, I shall, on obtaining certain information of the enemy's approach, if possible move in the direction of Somerset.

From our very limited means of transportation I shall probably have to destroy nearly the whole of our rations, as I shall not be able to move more than our camp equipage.

\* See Thomas to Carter, Series I, Vol. IV, p. 361.



Were I sure of your being still at Crab Orchard I should of course fall back on Rock Castle, notwithstanding the almost impassable state of the roads; but as I have been told you had left the Crab Orchard, I must take your advice and retire to Somerset.

I need not say, general, how much I regret the necessity of this move, but I can see no help for it, as this place, without artillery and with so small a force, is altogether indefensible. I have sent out to press all the wagons that can be obtained; but as most of them were taken by General Schoepf's troops, I fear I can obtain but few, if any.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

CINCINNATI, OHIO, *November 20, 1861.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

SIR: Will you allow me to suggest the consideration of a great movement by land and water up the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers?

1st. Would it not allow of water transportation half way to Nashville?

2d. Would it not necessitate the evacuation of Columbus by threatening their railway communication?

3d. Would it not necessitate the retreat of General Buckner by threatening his railway lines?

4th. Is it not the most passable route into Tennessee?

Yours, respectfully, &c.,

CHAS. WHITTLESEY,  
*Colonel, and Chief of Engineer Department.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Crab Orchard, November 20, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. S. P. CARTER,  
*Commanding Camp Calvert:*

GENERAL: Your dispatch [of 19th instant] has just been received. My orders are to move towards Columbia, and therefore am unable to render you any assistance. You must exercise your best judgment as to the best route to retreat, should your information prove correct concerning the approach of the enemy; but from all the information I have I should think the road to Richmond the best and easiest to defend. I will immediately dispatch to General Buell.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Vols., Commanding.*

CAMP CALVERT, EAST TENNESSEE,  
*November 20, 1861.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding, &c., Crab Orchard:*

GENERAL: The news I received and forwarded you last evening seemed to be reliable, and I accordingly forwarded it to you; but from intelligence received to-day through scouts sent to Barboursville I learn

that the rebel force was much exaggerated, as by their statement no more than one regiment was at Flat Lick, and that returned towards the Ford yesterday.

I had made all the preparation in my power to save as many of the public stores as possible, having determined in case of absolute necessity to destroy the rest, and then deal with the rebels as I could.

If the quartermaster can send me more wagons and teams, so as to fill up the number we are entitled to, it will add not only to our convenience, but efficiency, as well as be no small saving to the Government.

Recruits are arriving almost every day from East Tennessee. We have no arms to put into their hands. The Union men coming to us represent the people in East Tennessee as waiting with the utmost anxiety the arrival of the Federal forces. They are all ready to join them and do their part towards the deliverance of their native land. Union camps are already forming in some of the counties, and unless help soon reaches them, as they have but little ammunition, they will be scattered or destroyed.

Will you please send me some rifle powder. I am greatly in want of stationery.

With the hope of soon seeing you here, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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COLUMBIA, KY., November 20, 1861.

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

I am here with my regiment safe in camp. The danger at this place is not now threatening. The enemy has again fallen back to Monroe County. Zollicoffer's forces, under General Lee, have been moving across the mountain towards Jamestown, Tenn., or Camp McGinnis. I have not, however, been able to hear anything from them since they passed through Huntsville, in Scott County. We sent some five of Colonel Wolford's men through Clinton to scout, but they have not yet had time to get in.

If you can get all your forces here with General Boyle's and General Ward's, you can make a movement upon Buckner's flank and successfully turn him. I do not doubt that a forward movement from here would make him retreat from Kentucky precipitately. He is not near so strong as represented. His forces do not exceed 20,000, and a movement upon his flank before he is re-enforced by General Lee would run him from Kentucky. The movements he is making I am persuaded are to cover his weakness and hold in check a forward movement until he can be re-enforced. Such I am now convinced is the cause of all these threatening movements upon Clinton, Wayne, Cumberland, Barren, &c. It is but the trick of a desperate gamester.

I hope to see you soon at this place, and would not be in the least surprised if your movement in this direction does not cause a hasty retreat from Kentucky anyhow; especially if they take up the idea that it is a flank movement, as Buckner will be apt to do.\*

Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE,  
*Colonel First Regiment Infantry, Kentucky Volunteers.*

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\* Some matters of detail omitted.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
Cairo, November 21, 1861.

Capt. J. C. KELTON,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

General Orders, No. 1, of the 19th instant, Department of the Missouri, is just received. During the temporary absence of headquarters from Saint Louis I made a report to Major-General McClellan, and was directed by him to make a full report of all my command, how located, their wants, &c. This has been done, but no requisitions forwarded.

My command embraces the posts of Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point, Mo., Fort Holt, Ky., and Cairo and Mound City, Ill. For strength of each command see tri-monthly report, which will be forwarded in a day or two.

Paducah and Smithland compose a separate district. Since the affair of Belmont, on the 7th instant, quite a number of Northern men have made their escape from the South, not a few of them soldiers. From this source I have got what I believe a reliable statement of the strength of the enemy; the position of his batteries; number of his troops, &c.

There are now at Columbus forty-seven regiments of infantry and cavalry, two companies of light artillery, and over one hundred pieces of heavy ordnance. All the statements I have received corroborate each other. In addition to these there are at Camp Beauregard, on the road about half way between Mayfield and Union City, some 8,000 more, of all arms, under command of Major Bowen, of Camp Jackson notoriety. The position of the camp may have been changed since I last heard from them, but the force is exclusive of those enumerated above.

The enemy are working night and day upon their fortifications, and the greatest consternation has prevailed for the last ten days lest Columbus should be attacked. Finding that they are let alone, they may be induced to act on the offensive if more troops are not sent here soon. A gunboat reached Columbus the night of the 19th instant, and another is expected within a few days.

The condition of this command is bad in every particular except discipline. In this latter I think they will compare favorably with almost any volunteers. There is great deficiency in transportation. I have no ambulances. The clothing received has been almost universally of an inferior quality and deficient in quantity. The arms in the hands of the men are mostly the old flint lock repaired, the "Tower" musket, and others of still more inferior quality.

My cavalry force are none of them properly armed—the best being deficient in sword-belts and having the old pattern carbines. Eight companies are entirely without arms of any description.

The Quartermaster's Department has been carried on here with so little funds that Government credit has become exhausted. I would urgently recommend that relief in this particular be afforded at as early a day as practicable.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

P. S.—The facts relating to arms, clothing, Quartermaster's Department, &c., have been frequently reported and requisitions made.

STANFORD, KY., November 21, 1861.

Capt. J. B. FRY, *A. A. G. and Chief of Staff,*

*Hdqrs. Dept. of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

SIR: Your communication of the 19th has just been received. The roads being in such bad condition I am compelled to move by Danville



and Lebanon to get to Columbia. It is not possible at this season of the year to go by Liberty. I have therefore concluded to halt at this place for the general's instructions; in the mean time measures have been taken to remove all troops from London, and I am in hopes they will be able to start next Saturday, and reach here on Wednesday, the 27th. The roads between Crab Orchard and London are in wretched condition, and the animals very much reduced.

There are a large number of sick at Crab Orchard, which will make it necessary for Colonel Coburn to remain there with his regiment for two weeks or more.

Captain Gillem can give the general any information he may desire in reference to the condition of the troops and means of transportation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

P. S.—I have with me the Seventeenth and Thirty-eighth Ohio Regiments; with General Schoepf, near Lebanon, the two batteries of artillery, the Fourteenth Ohio, and the Second Regiment Kentucky Volunteers. Bramlette's and Wolford's regiments are at Columbia.

GEO. H. THOMAS.

LOUISVILLE, Ky., *November 22, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

MY DEAR FRIEND: The Kentucky regiments are being consolidated, some forty or fifty fragments worked into about twenty-two full regiments, and mustered into service as rapidly as possible, and I shall expect soon to get them somewhat in hand. They are now scattered all over the State for the convenience of recruiting. As near as I can ascertain, some 10,000 stands of arms will be required to complete their armament. Two of the Ohio regiments from Camp Dennison have arrived. The other has been diverted by our officious Governor to Gallipolis, where its colonel is telegraphing mysteriously to unauthorized persons for cavalry for his "expedition to J." The Governor evidently looks upon all Ohio troops as his army. He requires, I am told, morning reports from them, and their quartermasters to forward their returns to him. I shall stop all this sort of thing. But everything here has been done in the most extraordinary manner. Every colonel and brigadier-general has his personal establishment or army. I learned this morning that a company of cavalry, got up by the Governor of Indiana as a body guard to General McCook, had passed through the city without reporting, and reported to its general. It is unnecessary to add that I ordered it forthwith to repair to another place. Then General Mitchel had his body guard, which I have been obliged to interfere with. Following out the idea, the brigade commanders have their cavalry and their batteries, which they tell the division commander he has nothing to do with. I mention these little items to show you what sort of organization and subordination has existed in these remote parts.

And now to come to strategy: Without abandoning any line, I am concentrating somewhat for the purpose of organization and outfit. I am studying the country and our enemy, and I believe I am wasting no time. I shall be prepared to do anything you think best after you hear what I propose to do, and I shall do nothing that you are not willing to assent to. I do not expect to be tardy, but I do not mean to be

disturbed by unreasonable newspaper clamor, and I expect that your confidence in me will not be shaken by that abuse either. I have by no means abandoned the idea which you put forward prominently; on the contrary, I am studying it carefully and preparing for it, for I find some attraction in it; but neither have I determined on it absolutely, unless I am to understand that the Adjutant-General's letter absolutely requires it. If it does, I shall execute it carefully and with all my might. Governor Johnson is here. I have talked freely with him, and I think thus far satisfied him. I believe I shall do so entirely as far as purposes are concerned; but whether the execution will realize all our hopes is a matter for the future to dispose of. For my own part I do not fear to try; neither do I wish to appear overconfident.

The route we had in our eye wins upon me the more I investigate it. I am pretty nearly assured that it has decided advantages over the old one. I do not mention names, for I have an enormous respect for secrecy in military operations, and therefore it is, and also because I want to speak to you freely, that I like that you should allow me to write informally, rather than through official channels, for there is no secret in the Adjutant-General's Office.

Sherman still insists that I require 200,000 men. I am quite content to try with a good many less; but I do not want to abate in the end what you yourself thought desirable, if not necessary. It will be important that Halleck shall strike at the same time that I do, and I think you will agree that his blow should await my preparation.

As for our enemy, I do not find it difficult to ascertain pretty nearly what he is and what he is doing—at least within a certain limit. First, he is fortifying pretty strongly at Bowling Green, and he has some weak batteries on the Cumberland and Tennessee. Second, he can concentrate at Bowling Green in three or four hours some 20,000 or 25,000 men. As for his attacking, though I do not intend to be unprepared for him, yet I should almost as soon expect to see the Army of the Potomac marching up the road.

This is rather a prolix letter for a man who has not much time for light reading, but it has the same advantage—you can put it aside without much loss of your hearing of it.

Cannot you get me on the track of the Fort Randall companies? Please do not let the Departments put off my calls.

If you have any unoccupied brigadiers—not my seniors (?)—send six or eight, even though they should be no better than marked poles.

Sincerely, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, November 22, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. C. F. SMITH,  
*Commanding, &c., at Paducah, Ky.:*

It is reported that General Hardee, with 8,000 men, is about to cross the Ohio between the Wabash and Cumberland, to destroy the Ohio and Mississippi and the Illinois Central Railroad. Others say that he is to be re-enforced by General Polk and attack Paducah. Keep me advised of the enemy's movements.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *November 22, 1861—8.15 p. m.*  
(Received November 23, 1861—8.30 a. m.)

General GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Danville :*

If the regiments at London have not started to move by the time you can communicate with them, order them to remain at London.

By command of General Buell :

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
*Camp Calvert, November 22, 1861.* (Received Nov. 23, 1861.)  
Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Commanding, &c. :*

GENERAL: Your dispatch of 20th [21st?] instant from Stanford, ordering me to break up the camp at London and join you with my command, has just been received.

I shall endeavor, if I can obtain means of transportation, to start the sick and hospital stores forward in the morning, and hope to follow with the rest of my command just as soon as I can press or hire wagons to move the subsistence stores and ammunition now at this place.

Although this brigade has a great dread of the Blue-grass country, and are most desirous of driving the rebels from East Tennessee in the quickest possible time, I trust there will be no difficulty in moving them to any point where there is a prospect of meeting our common enemy.

Owing to the condition of the roads over Rockcastle Hills it is possible that I may, in case I obtain a favorable account of the Somerset road, proceed to join you with those fit for service via that place. Should I do so, I will advise you by special messenger.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, *November 23, 1861.*

General McCLELLAN, *Washington :*

I have a report not yet confirmed that Zollicoffer, 6,000 strong, has crossed the Cumberland at Gainesborough, probably on his way to Bowling Green; also a rumor of the same sort that about the same number have left Bowling Green going north. Neither is improbable.

The burned bridges are being repaired with my consent. I have a letter from the Adjutant-General. Have you seen cause to curtail my discretion? Will write to-night.

D. C. BUELL.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,  
*Paducah, Ky., November 23, 1861.*

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,  
*Hdqrs. Department of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo. :*

SIR: I have just answered General Halleck's telegram\* in relation to Hardee's supposed purpose of crossing the Ohio between the Wabash and the Cumberland. I have said :

My last information was that 2,000 men, with three field guns, were at Princeton, running off hogs—plundering generally. I have sent the gunboat *Conestoga* to gain information and watch the Ohio.

\*Of November 22, p. 444.



One of the three points of attack to be made simultaneously on this place, it has always been understood, is to be by the Tennessee or Cumberland, or both. The idea has military merit. What renders it probable (whenever the attack is to come off) is that the enemy is constructing one or more gunboats far up the Cumberland, and at Sandy Creek, up the Tennessee, some 8 miles beyond the State line, he has been converting river steamers (two or three) into iron-plated gunboats, to be heavily armed. This river side is my weak point.

The inhabitants in the counties east of the Cumberland and bordering on the river are much alarmed, and send messages that a force is coming, &c.; but heretofore it has been marauding parties merely, and latterly the increase of force is, I think, more to sweep the country of provisions without risk than from any idea of crossing the river. They want the means of transportation to do so.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. F. SMITH,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

DANVILLE, KY., November 23, 1861.

Brig. Gen. S. P. CARTER,

*Commanding East Tennessee Brigade:*

GENERAL: The inclosed dispatch\* has just been received. The general commanding directs me to say that the order to break up camp was based upon orders received from department headquarters.

By order of Brig. Gen. G. H. Thomas:

GEO. E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
*Camp Calvert, November 24, 1861.*  
(Received November 27, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding, &c., Danville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: On the 21st instant I sent out upwards of 600 men, with orders to take the old State road and proceed as far as Flat Lick (8 miles this side of Cumberland Ford), and endeavor to gain some certain information as to the force and position of the rebels, and if possible to cut off their cavalry, which I had been informed were in the habit of coming down on thieving expeditions to the vicinity of Barbourville.

The detachment returned this evening, having marched from Barbourville since morning. Lieutenant-Colonel Spears, the officer in command, reports that none of the rebels were at Cumberland Ford, nor have they been below that point for some days. From the best information he could obtain from the citizens there is but a small number of troops at Cumberland Gap, the larger portion of them having moved down Powell's Valley in the direction of Jamestown.

Lieutenant-Colonel Spears represents that subsistence in large quantities can be obtained in Knox County, and that a very small force could occupy a position at or near the Cumberland Ford, and hold it against a greatly superior force.

\* See Fry to Thomas, November 22, p. 445.

We have arrivals every day from East Tennessee. The condition of affairs there is sad beyond description, and if the loyal people who love and cling to the Government are not soon relieved they will be lost.

I have sent forward nearly all the sick and a part of the commissary stores to Crab Orchard, and will leave with the rest of the command as I can obtain means of transportation for our stores. I have had the whole country scoured for wagons, but have not yet been able to obtain a sufficient number.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HDQRS. OF THE ARMY, ADJT. GEN.'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, D. C., November 25, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,  
*Commanding Department of the Ohio :*

GENERAL: Your telegram received.\* I have not seen the letter you allude to from the Adjutant-General.† I instructed him to write to you that I was still firmly impressed with the great necessity of making the movement on Eastern Tennessee with the least possible delay. Eight regiments have been ordered to report to you from Western Virginia, three from Ohio, and whatever was available from Indiana. I hope to place at your disposal early next week two divisions from Missouri, as well as other troops from Illinois. I do not credit the statement that Buckner is in very large force, and I am still convinced that political and strategical considerations render a prompt movement in force on Eastern Tennessee imperative. The object to be gained is to cut the communication between the Mississippi Valley and Eastern Virginia; to protect our Union friends in Tennessee, and re-establish the Government of the Union in the eastern portion of that State. Of course Louisville must be defended, but I think you will be able to do that while you move into Eastern Tennessee. If there are causes which render this course impossible, we must submit to the necessity; but I still feel sure that a movement on Knoxville is absolutely necessary, if it is possible to effect it. Please write to me very fully.

Very truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

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CALHOUN, *November 25, 1861.*

General BUELL :

I wrote you this morning‡ that a rebel force, said to be commanded by Breckinridge, estimated from 4,000 to 6,000, reached Rochester yesterday morning. Since writing, an agent, reliable, is in from Hopkinsville, says all are talking there of a concerted move on Lock No. 1, on Green River. I have ordered Jones' regiment here. Can't you have Steele's, now at Evansville, ordered to Lock No. 1? I have written to Colonel Steele, suggesting the propriety of the movement. The forces at Hopkinsville are estimated at 8,000.

T. L. CRITTENDEN.

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\* November 23.

† Probably that of November 16. See Series I, Vol. IV, p. 358.

‡ Letter not found.

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
*Camp Calvert, November 25, 1861.*

(Received November 29, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, U. S. A.,  
*Commanding, &c., Danville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Yours of the 23d instant, inclosing orders from department headquarters for me to remain at London, has been received.

The sick of First and Second East Tennessee Regiments have been sent on and will probably reach Crab Orchard to-day. As there are good hospital accommodations there, I have directed that they be kept at that place for the present. I have sent to recall the commissary stores which had been forwarded.

The order to remain was received with general satisfaction.

The rebel force at Cumberland Gap is, from the best information I can obtain, so small, that I think we will meet with but little opposition in case it is determined to advance by that pass.

Our desires are to get to East Tennessee as soon as possible, in order that our loyal friends there may be relieved. Many of them have been lying out in the woods to escape their enemies, but as the season advances they will be driven to their houses, and be forced into the rebel ranks or carried to prison. Let us up and help them now, when it will require so little to accomplish this desirable and necessary end.

Will you have the kindness to send the paymaster forward? We have been looking for him for some days, and need funds very much. Do not let him delay a single day.

The greatest part of our lost men have returned. We need arms; if it be possible, send them to us.

I am, general, respectfully and truly, yours,

S. P. CARTER,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, November 26, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. C. F. SMITH,  
*Commanding at Paducah, Ky.:*

GENERAL: The protection of the line of the Ohio between the mouths of the Wabash and Tennessee against any of Hardee's rebel force attempting to cross the river into Illinois to operate upon the rear of Cairo, to isolate you at Paducah or to obtain subsistence from that State, it seems to me will be better secured by concentrating your forces at Paducah, with your bridge-head on the Illinois side of the Ohio held by a strong guard, than by any dispersion of them in posts at Shawneetown, Cave in Rock, and Golconda, as has been strongly urged by the Governor of Illinois. The river, of course, should be carefully watched by the flotilla, and in the event of any attempted crossing, not probable by anything but marauding parties, you have it always in your power to disperse them or cut off their retreat by a suitable force crossing the river at Paducah and falling upon their flank or rear.

Against any apprehended danger from rebel gunboats descending the Tennessee or Cumberland your main reliance will be the activity of your flotilla and your own guns in position at Paducah. Of course you will keep yourself well informed of any projected descent of the enemy.

To break up marauding of the rebels in the country east of the Ten-



nessee, it may be well for you to secure the right bank of the river with strong cavalry scouts. Persons from that part of the country say that hogs are being collected together to be driven off to the rebel army. Would it not be possible for you to capture some of these droves so collected?

You will report your opinion as to the proposed occupation of Shawneetown and Cave in Rock by the Illinois regiments (three) just mustered into service.

The engineer officers under your command will be retained in service until further orders. The same rule will apply to Captain Neustaedter. It is understood that a board will soon be organized for the examination of all volunteer officers of the volunteer service—brigadier-generals included—so that incompetent officers may, if they do not resign, be discharged from the service.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HQRS. DIST. SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
No. —. } *Cairo, Ill., November 26, 1861.*

The commanding officer at Caledonia, Ill., will in future prevent all crossing of citizens and all intercourse between the people of Kentucky and the Illinois shore. All persons known to be engaged in unlawful traffic between the two States will be at once arrested and sent before the provost-marshal in Cairo, with such proof as may be at hand. Whenever any property is known to be for the use of the Southern Army, the commanding officer may seize it, whether on the Illinois or Kentucky side of the river. Particular caution is enjoined, however, in making seizures, to see that no hardship is inflicted upon innocent people. The greatest vigilance will be observed to prevent contraband trade or intercourse between the two States.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

DANVILLE, KY., *November 26, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. ALBIN SCHOEPF, *Commanding, &c.*:

GENERAL: Break up your camp near Broomfield's to-morrow and move on Lebanon, encamping with the Fourteenth Ohio, and await my arrival. Should you have time, please examine the country in the neighborhood, with a view to a large encampment.

Respectfully, &c.,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

[Orders issued same day for Colonel Barnes' regiment, at Irvine, and Colonels Connell's (Seventeenth Ohio) and Bradley's (Thirty-eighth Ohio) to move to Lebanon.]

CALHOUN, *November 26.*

General BUELL:

No news of infantry moving from Hopkinsville. Three or four hundred cavalry from there in Greenville yesterday. I don't think they

mean to attempt the locks. I think I can protect them unless troops come from Bowling Green.

T. L. CRITTENDEN.

NOVEMBER 27, 1861.

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL:

GENERAL: What is the reason for concentration of troops at Louisville? I urge movement at once on Eastern Tennessee, unless it is impossible. No letter from you for several days. Reply. I still trust to your judgment, though urging my own views.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, KY., November 27, 1861.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
*Commanding U. S. Army:*

MY DEAR FRIEND: I have not written you very frequently because I could not write definitely, and because such, perhaps exaggerated, importance do I attach to secrecy in these matters, that I have hesitated to put my own thoughts to paper, and I now ask you to keep them to yourself. It is certainly possible that in the end you may have to observe how far the consummation will have fallen short of my plans.

I hope you have not supposed that the introduction of the re-enforcements through this point has had any reference to a defense of Louisville. That has not entered my mind at all. I assume that to be safe in any event. I do not place high estimate on Buckner's force at Bowling Green, and have no such thought as that he will attempt to advance. His position is purely defensive, and he will be quite content if he can maintain that. I have therefore thought of no such thing as fortifying Louisville. Sherman threw up a little work at the mouth of Salt River. It may have been judicious when he did it. I have not seen the necessity of it since, though it does no harm.

If you will look carefully at the map you will see that Louisville affords the best base that can be taken for land operations from the north upon any part of Tennessee. The railroad to Lebanon curves around to the northeast behind Salt River, giving, besides the Nashville Railroad, three good pike roads, which converge to a point of easy communication for three columns about Glasgow—one by the mouth of Salt River, coming into the railroad at Elizabethtown; one by Bardstons and New Haven, and coming into the direct pike road to Gallatin and Nashville; and one by Lebanon, Shepherdsville, and Greensburg into the same road; while Lebanon Junction, New Haven, and Lebanon form convenient points for the final departure of as many columns. Lebanon also affords a point of departure for a column on east Tennessee as short as any route; for wagon transportation as short as the route from Cincinnati by Lexington, and shorter and less attended with delay by railroad. Nothing could be more convenient. This point has the further advantage of bringing everything under my eye. I could know nothing of what would be done from a base at Cincinnati. These advantages will not fail to impress themselves upon you without going more into detail.

And now for a plan of campaign: Up to the organization of columns behind Salt River all the plans I have in view at present concur.

Beyond that they diverge, and may be stated briefly and candidly thus: First, to establish a sufficient force before Bowling Green to hold Buckner there, while a column moves into East Tennessee by Somerset and the route we had in view; second, to hold him in check while a column moves rapidly past him on Nashville by the turnpike via Gallatin; and, third, holding him in check at Bowling Green and throwing in columns on both the Somerset and Nashville routes. The choice of these must depend on circumstances, which may vary in the mean time or which may not now be clearly perceived. In conjunction with either of these should be the movement of two flotilla columns up the Tennessee and Cumberland, so as at least to land and unite near the State line, and cut off communication between Bowling Green and Columbus, and perhaps run directly into Nashville. A strong demonstration should at the same time be made on Columbus by the Mississippi. The details of all this, such as the destruction of railroads, so as to cut off communication, and a thousand other details, I do not go into, nor is it necessary. You can imagine them all.

All this I hope you will at least say looks plausible; more than that, I hope it is reasonable and believe it is practicable, though I would not like you to forget that circumstances not fully foreseen may mar it in part. For the water movements means are necessary which I have not the control of; that is, gunboats and transports. The troops which you promise from Missouri could be used for the purpose, and ought to move at my signal. I should take the troops from Paducah for one of them, and replace them by those which probably would not be as well disciplined and equipped.

Thus far I have studiously avoided any movements which to the enemy would have the appearance of activity or method. The points occupied are pretty much the same as when I arrived, except that a regiment has now and then been moved into position and Thomas has gradually been closing in upon Lebanon. I shall in a couple of days at most complete the matter of organizing brigades and divisions as the troops come in, and begin to get them into position. We are now "lying around somewhat loose," and I shall not care much if some of our fragments have to look sharply after themselves. We are at the mouth of Salt River, Elizabethtown, Nolin, Columbia, Campbellsville, at the points on the Lebanon Railroad, Somerset, London, Crab Orchard, and Dick Robinson, and on the Lower Green River. The latter force is composed mostly of Kentucky regiments, half organized. I shall probably keep them to make a demonstration on Russellville and Hopkinsville at the proper time. We have occasional stampedes at the outposts, but I do not allow myself to be much troubled about them. Such a one we have now on the Lower Green River, where Breckinridge is said to be advancing with 8,000 men. He may have 2,500 or 3,000. Another at Somerset, where Zollicoffer is said to be crossing with 10,000. He may have 4,000 or 5,000, and he may cross a regiment or two.

As the troops come in they go into camp 5 miles from the city, under Mitchel, who is attentive and subordinate, and where they replenish their worn-out clothes and outfit and go to drilling. Nelson has been in camp a day, and, I am informed, has already got into difficulty with Mitchel; and, if I am rightly informed, has behaved very absurdly. As he is a veteran, some allowance must be made for him.

There are at Indianapolis seven regiments ready for service, but demoralized by the proximity of friends and the want of discipline and instruction. I propose to form them into a reserve and camp of instruc-



tion at Bardstown, which is a convenient place in many respects. I can make no use of them in an advance. The Kentucky regiments are only partially organized, and can be but little used at present.

If I were to go into my affairs I should have the appearance of complaining over difficulties. I am greatly in need of general and staff officers. My own staff force is entirely insufficient, but I have no means of augmenting it with advantage. As for myself, I should pay myself a very high compliment if I hoped to come up to the expectations which you first formed. I am afraid I shall have to ask a little patience.

Very truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

COLUMBIA, KY., *November 27, 1861—2.30 a. m.*

(Received November 29, 1861.)

General THOMAS:

Since writing to you last evening Mr. E. L. Van Winkle has just come in with dispatches from Colonel Hoskins, who says that two regiments of infantry and one of cavalry are preparing and perhaps crossing on a raft at Mill Springs, 12 miles below him, on the Cumberland.

I cannot give full credit to the crossing, but it may be true. I still think they are only preparing to steal what they can in the way of provisions and retire; but they ought to be and could be hemmed in and cut off from here with proper movement and sufficient force. It will not do for the forces here to leave the stores unprotected, for the reason that the rebel pickets have advanced to Edmonton, 20 miles from here, and threaten us with forces coming on.

Although I do not believe they have the forces behind, yet it will not be prudent to weaken this point while the question is one of doubt.

If you will throw forward two or three regiments, with one or two batteries, and give me authority, I can leave enough to protect this place and take enough to knock these scoundrels on the head and stop this eternal annoyance by the raids of these hog-stealers. They are taking mules, hogs, &c., as they go, and, unless driven out and crushed, will desolate the counties of Wayne, Clinton, and Cumberland.

Were there sufficient forces to protect the stores here and let me have what could move from here now, I could get in behind these marauders and cut them entirely off. They report Zollicoffer's forces just behind, but that I think is all humbug.

Lieutenant Nell is sick, and I have no one to work his artillery in his absence. Can't the Ohio batteries be hurried up?

There are ample forces from Lebanon and on this way for all the present needs if they were up this far.

Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE,

*Colonel First Regiment Infantry, Kentucky Volunteers.*

LOUISVILLE, *November 27, 1861.*

General THOMAS, *Lebanon:*

Send General Schoepf, with one section of artillery, Wolford's cavalry, and the nearest regiment of infantry rapidly to Somerset to relieve Hoskins, who is threatened by Zollicoffer. Vary the force if later information makes advisable. Be at all times ready to advance.

D. C. BUELL.

CAMP HOSKINS, PULASKI COUNTY, KY.,  
November 27, 1861. (Received November 28, 1861.)

Brigadier-General THOMAS,  
*Headquarters, Danville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I have received no reliable news from the rebel forces across the river for twenty-four hours. On last evening they came (some 20 in number) across the river opposite our encampment, but a preparation to level the howitzer at them dispersed them immediately.

About the same time my picket guard at the river at Mill Springs, 12 miles below this point, at which their cavalry are encamped, had a skirmish, in which 4 of the rebels were killed in eight shots from our Colt's rifles at a distance of 300 yards; and strange to say, although they fired some hundred shots at our party, they escaped unhurt. I have had all the boats on the river for several miles below and above this point sunk, and as they have but two boats of small capacity at Mill Springs, should they attempt to cross at that point I shall meet and amuse them before they get over a force sufficient to cut us off.

I am now inclined to the belief that their force is strong, whether Zollicoffer be with them or not. Some five negroes (fugitives) from Monticello, Wayne County, report that a strong force is now at and this side Monticello, and as all communication between this and that side the river has been cut off for two days by the main road, I am inclined to the belief that it is true.

All my buck and ball cartridges are now distributed, and I send up the wagon for a supply, which you will oblige us by forwarding as expeditiously as possible.

I shall send a scout to the opposite side of the river, with orders to proceed as far as Monticello, if possible; and on his return I hope to be enabled to give you reliable information of their numbers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. A. HOSKINS,  
*Colonel, Commanding Fourth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers.*

CAMP HOSKINS, PULASKI COUNTY, KY.,  
November 27, 1861. (Received November 29, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Headquarters, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Can you not send us Captain Hewett's battery? If we had him here with his battery I feel confident we could maintain our position at this place.

With a battery we could drive them from their position at Mill Springs, as there is a position on this side the river opposite their encampment which commands it at a range of one-half mile, and as the ground slopes from that elevation to the water's edge with a precipitous bluff on the south side of the river, it is impossible to reach them without artillery. At the same time we are shelling them from that position we could leave a section of the battery at this place to prevent their effecting a crossing at this point should they attempt it, as they in all probability would do if they have the force which they are represented to have.

I am anxious to hold our position, believing as I do that it is due the country from the noble stand which they have taken in favor of the Union, and once they have possessed this point there is no point of advantage for us to impede their march north until we reach the north



side of the Kentucky River, and I find their strength increasing by accession of those who, while we held possession of the counties below this, professed to be good Union men.

Our pickets had a skirmish on last evening with theirs at Mill Springs, in which 4 of their's were killed with the Colt's rifles in eight shots at a distance of 300 yards, and although they fired some hundred shots at our pickets they came off unharmed.

I now have out a strong picket guard to prevent a surprise, and hope on to-morrow to be able to lead some of their party into an ambuscade. I have sunk all the boats for several miles along the river with the exception of two small ones (capable of ferrying 40 men at time); and, as I kept a picket within view of them all the time, should they attempt to cross their whole force, I shall endeavor to be upon them before they can get a force over sufficient to overcome us.

If it is possible for you to send the battery, please do so as soon as possible.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. A. HOSKINS,  
*Colonel, Commanding Post.*

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,

*Camp Calvert, November 27, 1861.*

(Received November 29, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, U. S. A.,

*Commanding, &c., Danville:*

GENERAL: I wrote you this morning rather despairingly.\* I am glad to say that the feeling in camp seems better this evening.

Yours of the 25th instant has been received. So much of its contents as I can make known will have a good effect on officers and men.

In case it shall be necessary to move this force to any point west of this, I would ask that we be permitted to go via Somerset, as all the men and many of the officers have an almost unconquerable aversion to Rockcastle Hills and the whole Crab Orchard road.

I shall hope that the movement into East Tennessee will be direct and speedy, and that you are to be in command. The force at Cumberland Gap is stated to be between 1,500 and 2,000.

News received from Anderson County, East Tennessee, this morning has it that Zollicoffer has gone towards Jamestown, East Tennessee.

I shall make every effort to be ready to move as soon as orders are received. I have before advised you that our means of transportation are very limited. Six wagons (for which a requisition was made some time ago) are still wanting for Second Regiment.

The paymaster's appearance here will have a good effect. I hope he will be hurried on; and as Treasury notes will not answer to send to Tennessee, the soldiers should be paid in gold, in order that they may remit to their families.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

\* Not found.



HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
Cairo, November 28, 1861.Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

I would respectfully report for the consideration of the general commanding the department that on Monday last one of the two gunboats for service at this place was sent to meet two of the new ones then said to be ready to start for Cairo. None of this fleet have yet arrived.

As reported by me, the rebels have one gunboat at Columbus, and are now expecting a fleet of them from New Orleans, under command of Captain Hollins. The arrival of this fleet without the floating means here of competing with them will serve materially to restore the confidence and feeling of security of the enemy, now, from best accounts, much shaken.

I have been much dissatisfied with the progress making upon the gunboats being built at Mound City, and have expressed the fear that the detention upon those being built at Carondelet would prevent their being brought out this winter. In view of the fact that the Mississippi River is usually very low in the month of December, I would respectfully recommend that all the gunboats at Carondelet be brought here as soon as practicable and as light. One point I would ask for information on. Many men, representing themselves as Northern men, who happened to be South at the commencement of our present difficulties and forced to enter their service, are deserting and pass our lines on their way North. Some enlist in our service, but the majority make their way North. Many of them are without the means of paying their passage, and I would ask in such cases if I am authorized to give them free passage to their homes. I am satisfied that in every case that has come under my own observation the desertion has been for the purpose of escape, and not to get within our lines for the purpose of gaining information.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LOUISVILLE, November 28, 1861.

General THOMAS, *Washington:*

I have one regular and nine volunteer batteries. My artillery inspector represents all the volunteer batteries to be in bad condition for service. Seven have been for some time in service; the others are entirely uninstructed. No other batteries are being formed. There should be not less than twenty batteries with this command as now composed.

D. C. BUELL.

LEBANON, November 28, 1861.

General BUELL:

Express from Colonel Bramlette at 2 o'clock this morning. He says the enemy is now in Wayne County, advancing towards the river; some at Monticello and others at Mill Springs; ten regiments strong; one piece of artillery. His scouts have just gotten in from Clinton; they were within 200 yards of the enemy's camp last night; examined well; saw and talked with friends on the road, and reported the facts to him. Will you order the movement of any of the troops here?

J. T. BOYLE.

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
*Camp Calvert, November 28, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, U. S. A.,  
*Commanding, &c., Danville :*

GENERAL: I have directed the quartermasters of different regiments as well as brigade commanders to endeavor to learn how many wagons they can gather in a day's notice. Some 25 to 30 will be needed, in addition to those of the baggage train, to transport the stores and ammunition in case we have to move.

This morning I received a dispatch from Colonel Hoskins, stating that he was threatened with an attack by the rebels, whose forces were estimated at from 3,000 to 10,000, and asking me for assistance; but as my orders are to remain at London, I cannot without authority from headquarters go to his aid.

I have been informed to-day, by a reliable citizen of Knox County, Kentucky, that secessionists in that county have gone South and left from 8,000 to 12,000 bushels of corn standing in their fields—all within from 1 to 7 miles from Barbourville—and 3,000 to 5,000 bushels of wheat. The owners of above property have taken active and open part against the United States Government. There are also numbers of horses, cattle, and hogs. In case our force moves through Knox County, could not the above be used for subsistence of men? In Manchester, Clay County, I am also advised there are 100 barrels of flour, which were ground for the rebels and are ready to be hauled off by them.

I hear that nearly the whole rebel force in East Tennessee has moved to Jamestown, Fentress County, except Rains' and Churchwell's regiments and some 200 cavalry, which are left at Cumberland Gap. The last news is confirmed by prisoners who have within a few days made their escape from the Gap.

The passes in the mountains south of Williamsburg are at this time unoccupied by rebel troops, although they have temporarily closed the roads by rolling rocks and felling timber in them, and it seems to me that through one of those passes we might enter East Tennessee without encountering any opposition.

I have not yet heard anything of the paymaster. His presence here will do much good in more ways than one, as pay is actually needed by both officers and men. I shall be greatly obliged if you will order him up at once, for the men begin to think that they are never to receive any pay.

The arms asked for some time since have not arrived, and, as recruits are coming in daily, they are greatly needed. I would renew my request that in case it should become necessary to move my force to any point West I be permitted to go via Somerset.

If the Sharp's rifles which were in the hands of the cavalry are turned in I hope they will be forwarded to us, with a supply of ammunition, as they were originally intended for the East Tennesseans.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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CAMP HOSKINS, *November 28, 1861—10 a. m.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Headquarters, Lebanon, Ky. :*

GENERAL: My scouts have just returned from Clinton County, and report that the rebels (10,000) are certainly advancing. They report a

transportation train of 140 wagons, but give no account of any artillery. They say that Zollicoffer is with them, which I think probable, as they have not had that number of troops anywhere below this.

If you could send me Hewett's battery to this place, and send in below their crossing at Greasy Creek about six regiments, among the number Wolford's, we might be able to overcome them; at all events we would like to have a force sufficient to make show of resistance at this point.

Please let me know by bearer whether we can hope for any assistance from above, and, if so, what amount, and how soon they will probably be up.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. A. HOSKINS,  
*Colonel, Commanding Post.*

CAMP JERRY BOYLE, *November 28, 1861.*

(Received November 29, 1861.)

General THOMAS :

GENERAL : There is no doubt that Zollicoffer, with 8,000 men, is in Clinton and Wayne, the advance being close [to] the Cumberland River. They will cross the river in a short time and take Somerset, and go on to Danville or Crab Orchard, if not prevented. They are at this time constructing boats to cross the river on. There's no doubt but that the enemy are advancing from Bowling Green; they are at this time, with strong pickets, in 20 miles of this place. The enemy can be whipped at Cumberland River if a force is immediately sent there. Excuse me for urging sufficient force being sent forward to whip them at once.

FRANK WOLFORD.

WASHINGTON, *November 29, 1861.*

General BUELL :

Your letter received. I fully approve of your course and agree in your views.

McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, *Monday night [November 29, 1861].*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville :*

MY DEAR BUELL : Your welcome letter of the 27th [of November, 1861] reached me this evening. I have just telegraphed you, expressing my satisfaction at its contents. I now feel sure that I have a "lieutenant" in whom I can fully rely. Your views are right. You have seized the true strategic base, and from Lebanon can move where you will. Keep up the hearts of the Tennesseans. Make them feel that, far from any intention of deserting them, all will be done to sustain them. Be sure to maintain their ardor, for it will avail you much in the future. I am not, as a general rule, at all disposed to scatter troops. I believe in attacks by concentrated masses, but it seems to me, with the little local knowledge I possess, that you might attempt two movements, one on Eastern Tennessee, say with 15,000 men, and a strong attack on Nashville, as you propose, with, say, 50,000 men.

I think we owe it to our Union friends in Eastern Tennessee to protect them at all hazards. First, secure that; then, if you possess the means, carry Nashville.



If I can ever get the account of the small-arms in our possession I can tell you what you may expect, but with the present Chief of Ordnance I scarcely hope for so simple a result. You can count on one thing, viz, that you shall have all I can give you. You have already been informed that twelve regiments have been ordered to you from West Virginia. I have also ordered thence to you one regular and one excellent volunteer battery; these, with the Randail companies, will give you five batteries equivalent to regulars. Give each of these captains three other batteries, and you will soon have your light artillery in good order. I am informed that large supplies of cavalry arms will arrive this week. Telegraph me what you need and I will try to supply you. Give me by telegraph and letter the statement of your command by regiments and batteries as soon as possible. I have telegraphed to-day to Halleck for information as to his gunboats. You shall have a sufficient number of them to perform the operations you suggest. I will place C. F. Smith under your orders and replace his command by other troops.

Inform me some little time before you are ready to move, so that we may move simultaneously. I have also other heavy blows to strike at the same time. I doubt whether all the movements can be arranged so that the grand blows shall be struck in less than a month or six weeks from the present time.

Make the best use of your time in organizing and drilling your command. Unless circumstances render it necessary, do not strike until I too am ready. Should I be delayed, I will not ask you to wait for me. I will at once take the necessary steps to carry out your views as to the rivers.

In haste, truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, *November 29, 1861.*

General THOMAS:

I have a communication from General Boyle; he will speak to you on the subject.

I don't expect Zollicoffer to cross the Cumberland in force, but he will try by demonstrations to drive us from Somerset, or even attack there if we are not watchful, and he will prepare the means of crossing, so as to threaten our flank if we advance. We will be organized to-day; in the mean time consider yourself in command of everything east of New Haven, but make no important move without referring to me, except to avert immediate danger.

Send intrenching tools rapidly to Somerset. Direct General Schoepf to throw up as rapidly as possible a small closed work for four and six guns which will command the river up and down and the crossing. Captain Prime will go down in the morning to direct it; at the same time Schoepf must watch Zollicoffer, and not only guard against his crossing, but, if possible, prevent him from collecting the means of doing so.

Send five companies of cavalry to Schoepf for scouts, if you think proper. Get your regiments in order as rapidly as possible and be always ready to move. I wish to avoid for the present anything like threatening demonstrations, and only be prepared for emergencies until we are ready to act.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
Lebanon, November 29, 1861.

Col. W. A. HOSKINS,

*Commanding Camp Hoskins, near Somerset, Ky.:*

COLONEL: In the absence of the commanding general I have opened your dispatch of the 28th instant. The general will be here to-day, when your communication will be laid before him.

I will state, however, for your information that General Schoepf is moving towards your camp with nineteen companies of infantry and one battery of Ohio artillery, and will probably reach you as soon, or nearly so, as this communication.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

COLUMBIA, KY., November 29, 1861.

(Received November 30, 1861.)

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

I received a dispatch before day this morning from Burkesville that 200 rebel cavalry were at the ferry on the south side of the river; a few of them crossed over and went to Boles', saw and arranged with him and his partners for the slaughter of hogs, and returned. The courier informed me that the men who are acting for the rebels are killing and packing a large number of hogs at Burkesville, viz, J. B. Alexander, J. R. Ryan, James and Sam. Boles, and Robert Cross.

I have no doubt but steamboats will be up in a few days and carry off the large amount of pork, wheat, &c., the rebels are gathering upon the river. All this could be prevented by a force being stationed at Burkesville with artillery to command the river. The rebels are now in possession of the river from Mill Springs down. I sent out scouts towards Glasgow; they went as far as Edmonton, and returned with a rebel flag, which the rebel cavalry had hoisted there the day before. I have a small number at Lairville, opposite Rowena, seven, including James Ferguson.

On yesterday some 50 rebel cavalry appeared on the southern bank. Ferguson and his squad fired upon them, and after about four rounds the rebels fled, leaving one fine horse wounded in the hind leg, some blankets, &c., which our scouts secured.

I sent Colonel Wolford to the aid of Colonel Hoskins with 500 cavalry, embracing part of Colonel Haggard's command.

As I have before advised, the rebels are at Mill Springs, in force about 8,000, but as yet have not crossed the river, and I do not believe will. I am still unshaken in the conviction that their purpose is to seize all the wheat, corn, fat hogs, mules, &c., they can south of the river and return perhaps by steamboats or other craft; perhaps fall back to their former camps in Tennessee.

It would be an easy matter to hem them in were there sufficient forces to make the movement from here. Two days' easy march would throw us in their rear, so that, with the river in front and around and we in their rear, no escape would be left.

• Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE,  
*Colonel First Regiment Infantry Kentucky Volunteers.*

## HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,

*Cairo, Ill., November 29, 1861.*Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo. :*

I have here two prisoners, arrested as spies, who are undoubtedly guilty of the charge. One of them can be proven to have been engaged in carrying information from sympathizers in Southern Illinois to the troops at Columbus, Ky. As the evidence against these prisoners will be more easily obtained here than in Saint Louis, I would recommend that their trial take place here.

Information from Columbus to-day is to the effect that the rebels have three gunboats. They are small, carrying but four guns each, but I have no information as to their strength. The State of Mississippi has called for 10,000 State troops for sixty days to assist in the defense of Columbus. There seems to be a great effort making throughout the South to make Columbus impregnable. I get this information from the Memphis Appeal of the 28th (yesterday), a copy of which I received this evening. I give the information for what it is worth.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 16. }

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., November 30, 1861.*

The following organization of brigades will be observed until further orders :

*First Brigade.*

Brigadier-General SCHOEPP, commanding.

33d Indiana.  
12th Kentucky.  
17th Ohio.  
38th Ohio.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel MANSON, commanding.

10th Indiana.  
4th Kentucky.  
10th Kentucky.  
14th Ohio.

*Third Brigade.*

Colonel MCCOOK, commanding.

2d Minnesota.  
9th Ohio.  
35th Ohio.  
18th U. S. Infantry.

*Fourth Brigade.*

Brigadier-General ROUSSEAU, commanding.

6th Indiana.  
3d Kentucky.  
1st Ohio.  
15th and 19th U. S. Infantry (battalion).

*Fifth Brigade.*

Brigadier-General WOOD, commanding.

34th Illinois.  
29th Indiana.  
30th Indiana.  
77th Pennsylvania.

*Sixth Brigade.*

Brigadier-General JOHNSON, commanding.

32d Indiana.  
39th Indiana.  
15th Ohio.  
49th Ohio.

*Seventh Brigade.*

Brigadier-General NEGLEY, commanding.

38th Indiana.  
78th Pennsylvania.  
79th Pennsylvania.  
1st Wisconsin.

*Eighth Brigade.*

Colonel TURCHIN, commanding.

19th Illinois.  
24th Illinois.  
37th Indiana.  
18th Ohio.

*Ninth Brigade.*

Colonel SILL, commanding.

3d Ohio.  
21st Ohio.  
33d Ohio.  
10th Wisconsin.

*Tenth Brigade.*

Colonel AMMEN, commanding.

34th Indiana.  
36th Indiana.  
6th Ohio.  
24th Ohio.



*Eleventh Brigade.*

Brigadier-General BOYLE, commanding.

1st Kentucky.  
9th Kentucky.  
2d Ohio.  
59th Ohio.

*Twelfth Brigade.*

Acting Brigadier-General CARTER, commanding.

31st Ohio.  
6th Kentucky.  
1st Tennessee.  
2d Tennessee.

*Thirteenth Brigade.*

Colonel CRUFT, commanding.

31st Indiana.  
44th Indiana.  
17th Kentucky.  
— Kentucky.

By command of Brigadier-General Buell:

*Fourteenth Brigade.*

— — — —, commanding.

42d Indiana.  
43d Indiana.  
11th Kentucky.  
— Kentucky.

*Fifteenth Brigade.*

Colonel HASCALL, commanding.

15th Indiana.  
17th Indiana.  
41st Ohio.  
51st Ohio.

*Sixteenth Brigade.*

— — — —, commanding.

13th Kentucky.  
15th Kentucky.  
9th Michigan.  
3d Minnesota.

[JAMES B. FRY,]

*Assistant Adjutant-General.**Memorandum of regiments under Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas' command,  
November 30, 1861.*

## CAMP DICK ROBINSON.

31st Ohio Infantry.  
Hewett's Battery.

## CRAB ORCHARD.

33d Indiana Infantry.

## COLUMBIA.

1st Kentucky Infantry.  
1st Kentucky Cavalry.

## LONDON.

3d Kentucky Infantry.  
1st East Tennessee Infantry.  
2d East Tennessee Infantry.

## SOMERSET.

— Kentucky Infantry.  
17th Ohio Infantry.  
38th Ohio Infantry.  
Battery B, Ohio Artillery.

## LEBANON.

10th Indiana Infantry.  
2d Kentucky Infantry.  
— Kentucky Infantry (*en route for*).  
— Kentucky Infantry.  
14th Ohio Infantry.  
Battery C, Ohio Artillery.

PADUCAH, KY., *November 30, 1861.*

## ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL:

Enemy, 600 to 1,000 strong, reported in camp at Caseyville, with intention to attack. I have sent three companies and a howitzer to Cave in Rock; also the Conestoga, as circumstances may require.

C. F. SMITH,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,  
*Paducah, Ky., November 30, 1861.*

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,  
*Headquarters Department of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

SIR: A very intelligent person employed by me to obtain intelligence of the movements of the enemy east of the Cumberland returned early

this morning, and states that the troops who were at Princeton (2,000, with two guns) have gone to Hopkinsville; that with the exception of two parties of cavalry, of about 50 men each, who were moving up and down from the Ohio plundering, no troops were between Ford's Ferry and Princeton; that he learned from an old lady, who had a son (a lieutenant) in the rebel army, whom she saw just as he was about marching from Princeton, that his regiment was to go to Muldraugh's Hill, and that the force at Hopkinsville would soon move in the same direction.

Immediately after getting this statement the captain of the steamer Golden Gate, which plies between Evansville and Cairo, came to inform me that his vessel had been forbidden to go to Caseyville by Captain Seaton, of the Twenty-second Illinois Regiment, stationed at Cave in Rock, with about 40 men of his company, on the ground that a party of 600 to 1,000 were at Caseyville (in camp), and intended to take his steamer and cross over.

I have just ordered three full companies of the Eighth Missouri, with a howitzer, under a field officer, to proceed to Cave in Rock, to act as circumstances may require.

As soon as the Conestoga (gunboat) returns from up the Tennessee I will send her up to Caseyville.

I sent the Conestoga up the Tennessee to look after the rebel gunboat, which I understand had been making a reconnaissance below Fort Henry. I imagine this so-called reconnaissance was merely a trial trip. I think it advisable to have another gunboat here as an additional security.

I inclose Captain Seaton's letter to me.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. F. SMITH,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

P. S.—The telegraph wire has not been in working order for the past two days, or I would have sent the substance of the above in that way.

P. P. S.—The Conestoga has returned since writing the above, and will at once go up to Caseyville.

[Inclosure.]

CAMP ALTONA,  
*Cave in Rock, November 29, 1861.*

Brigadier-General SMITH:

DEAR SIR: Send troops up here immediately, as the secessionists are on the point of crossing over into Illinois at Caseyville, 8 miles above here, from 600 to 1,000 strong. They made their appearance at Caseyville late this afternoon, and pitched their tents upon the hill. It is their intention of seizing upon a steamboat and appropriating her for their use in crossing here. Two messengers rowed down to this point in a skiff and two more just arrived on horseback, all giving the same information, one corroborating the other. The first was from Kentucky and the others from this side. Send them immediately.

JOHN SEATON,  
*Captain, Twenty-second Regiment, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
*Cairo, December 1, 1861.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Bishop Major-General Polk's three gunboats made a Sunday excursion up to see us this evening; fired five or six shots when within about

half a mile of range of the nearest point of the camp at Fort Holt, and returned as soon as their fire was replied to. Our gunboats followed them 7 or 8 miles, but could not get near enough to engage them.

I would respectfully submit it to the general commanding the department whether the hospital facilities at this place and at Mound City should not be increased in advance of the demand for more room. The hospitals are sufficiently commodious for all that are sick at present, and have a very suitable supply, with everything required, except, perhaps, blankets. By adding bedsteads and bedding, accommodations can be provided for about 350 more.

I have received invoice and bill of lading of 4,000 stand of French muskets, with accouterments complete, from the East. These, with 4,000 stand of improved arms, which I understand are to be sent for General McClernand's brigade, will supply the command, or nearly so.

There is much difficulty experienced here in finding storage for our commissary supplies. I caused to be rented some months ago a very large and conveniently-arranged wharf-boat for this purpose. It will store conveniently for issue 2,500,000 of rations, with office room and apartments overhead sufficient for the assistant commissary of subsistence and his assistants. This boat could be moved down the river at any time, if required. When the gunboat fleet began to receive their supplies, Commodore Foote made application for this storage room, and obtained an order for it. At that time I looked upon it as necessary for their use. Now, however, they have a large receiving steamer, which in my judgment will accommodate all their stores, and be quite if not more convenient than the wharf-boat. For this reason, and the fact that a large amount of provisions are now on the way or soon will be, I would recommend that the order transferring this boat be rescinded. Otherwise a large portion of the stores to arrive will have to be stored on the landing without shelter. If Commodore Foote was here in person I think he would not object to making the arrangement asked without the issuing of an order.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,  
*Paducah, Ky., December 1, 1861.*

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,  
*Headquarters Department of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

SIR: The letter of the major-general commanding the department, dated on the 26th ultimo, in reference to the defense of the line of the Ohio between the mouths of the Wabash and Tennessee from Hardee's rebel forces attempting to cross into Illinois, &c., was duly received. I concur entirely with the general that the cavalry force he speaks of operating on the north bank of the Ohio would, with an occasional visit of a gunboat, be sufficient.

Our main reliance against the enemy's attempt by gunboats by way of the Tennessee and Cumberland must be by the flotilla, though at present that term is rather a misnomer, since it consists of but the gunboat Conestoga. The two floating batteries (two coal-barges joined), one of which is in position, can scarcely be regarded as part of the flotilla. They were intended to sweep both shores and guard the bridge, but only as against field guns. Alone, they could be run down or destroyed by an enemy's gunboat, properly constructed and armed, easily, though as an auxiliary to gunboats they may do good service. The



bridge is down and the parts sheltered, as I have already reported. I inclose a copy of General McClellan's orders in relation to it. My reports to him on this and other matters were made to him direct, by his orders, during the absence of General Frémont in the West, and until General Halleck's arrival at Saint Louis.

There is no bridge-head, it not being deemed necessary at the moment. The nature of the surface on the opposite shore is such that at this season an enemy could not take up an effective position.

I am not aware of any marauding in the country just east of the Tennessee—i. e., between the Tennessee and the Cumberland—but it has been carried on extensively on the east of the Cumberland. My cavalry force is not adequate to attempt the service of scouring this part of the country and attending to necessary duties here. It consists of four companies of the Second Illinois Cavalry, imperfectly armed. Each company wants 20 sabers. They have no pistols, and only some of them have carbines. I have written several times about the arming of these men, but have not been successful. Of two companies of regular cavalry (neither of which has a single officer belonging to it present), one is weak in numbers—only 54. This is Company C, Second Cavalry. If recruits are received, they will need the usual equipments. Thielemann's company of Chicago cavalry is in full strength, and armed with sabers, though but partially with pistols. General Frémont authorizes it to be converted into a squadron. The second company has one first lieutenant and 70 men. It needs a captain and second lieutenant, which might well be taken by transfer from the other company, and which I recommend. These men need horses and arms.

I think Shawneetown and Cave in Rock might well be occupied by the three regiments spoken of, and from thence patrol the north bank of the Ohio, occasionally crossing and scouring the country east of the Cumberland. This, I think, would stop the plundering.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. F. SMITH,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
*Cairo, December 2, 1861.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Inclosed herewith I send you a letter from Colonel Ross on the subject of winter quarters, change of cavalry, ordering a court-martial, &c.\* I would respectfully call the attention of the general commanding to the subject of winter quarters. I received instructions from General Frémont, whilst he was in command, on the subject. Under the instructions then received, winter quarters for the command here are being rapidly completed. I visited Cape Girardeau and gave such verbal directions as I thought would secure winter quarters for the troops at that place at a very small outlay. The cavalry complained of belong to General Sigel's brigade, and such complaints have been made against them for their marauding propensities that I would recommend mustering them out of service.

There seems to have been no provision made in the acts of Congress organizing our volunteer system for manning our siege batteries, other than to take companies authorized as light-artillery companies. All

\* Not found.

these manifest a great desire to get their batteries, and do not like to remain in fortifications. In view of these facts, I authorized Lieutenant Powell, of the Twentieth Illinois Volunteers, an acting engineer on the works at Cape Girardeau, to raise a siege company out of the Missouri Home Guards that were on duty there. I also authorized the commanding officer of the battalion of Home Guards—Colonel, now Captain, Murdock—to raise another company of cavalry or infantry from the same men, subject to the approval of higher authority. These men were at Cape Girardeau by authority of the commander of the department when I was assigned to this command. Most of them are Missourians, who could not return to their homes, and who could not have remained at home from the first and remained loyal. These companies are about full, and could be filled to the maximum, if authorized, in a very short time. They have never been mustered into the United States service, but are ready to be whenever authority to do so is given. I would respectfully ask to have this act legalized and these troops received. They have already been in service some four or five months as Home Guards and under their present organization.

Since writing the above the J. D. Perry has arrived, having landed at Price's, putting ashore a large amount of freight. I understand that the authority to do so was given by the provost-marshal of Saint Louis. There is great danger of losing our boats by making these landings, and all the Union men of this section of the State have been driven out by Thompson and his band.

I have ordered the captain of the J. D. Perry to disregard all orders to land on the Missouri shore between Cape Girardeau and this place, unless given by the commanding officer of the department or myself. Should it be necessary for freight to go to Charleston, Mo., it can be landed at Bird's Point, and go out by rail more economically than by any other route.

I inclose herewith report of Colonel Oglesby, commanding at Bird's Point, just received.\*

U. S. GRANT,

*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,

*Louisville, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

General S. P. CARTER,

*Commanding Twelfth Brigade:*

SIR: It is the intention of the general commanding to keep your command in front of Cumberland Gap, both for the protection of that section of the country and to operate on that line at a suitable time. At as early a moment as possible a squadron or so of cavalry and at least one section of artillery will be sent you. Your supplies will be drawn from Lexington, through Richmond.

It is desirable, perhaps, that you should take a position at the Cumberland Ford, but you must for the present be the judge of the expediency of moving there now. By throwing up a small field work, it will enable you at any time to hold that position and to operate so as to protect the inhabitants and expel marauders.

It was the wish of the general commanding to join the East Tennessee regiments to the main body of the army which will operate upon Tennessee, but they would perhaps prefer remaining on their present line of

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\* Not found.

operations, their acquaintance with that region rendering them peculiarly suitable for service there. For the present, at least, he deems it advisable to keep them on that line.

Very respectfully, &c.,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

COMMANDING OFFICER,

*Third Regiment Minnesota Volunteers :*

SIR: An order has been issued for your regiment to take post with six companies at Shepherdsville and four at Lebanon Junction. The general commanding places upon you the responsibility of guarding the bridge over Wilson's Creek a few miles in advance of the Junction.\*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

Colonel DUFFIELD,

*Comdg. Ninth Regt. Mich. Vols., Mouth of Salt River :*

SIR: The general commanding assigns you to the command of the post and field work at the mouth of Salt River. It will be your duty to hold the field works at the Salt River crossing and the turnpike towards Elizabethtown and to guard the army supplies which may be at the post.\*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

Col. E. H. HOBSON,

*Comdg. Thirteenth Regt. Ky. Vols., Campbellsville, Ky. :*

SIR: The general commanding assigns you to the command of the post of Lebanon. It will be your duty to guard the army supplies which may be at that place and to look to the safety of the railroad towards New Haven and the turnpike towards Campbellsville.\*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. H. McLEAN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

Col. L. T. MOORE,

*Comdg. Fourteenth Regt. Ky. Vols., Catlettsburg, Ky. :*

SIR: The general commanding directs that you establish your regiment at or near the town of Prestonburg, with a view of giving security

\* Detailed instructions omitted



to the inhabitants in the region of the Big Sandy and of punishing the marauding bands of the enemy who annoy that part of the State. The general expects vigilance, activity, and good order on the part of your command in the important and isolated duty assigned to it.\*

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

Col. CURRAN POPE,  
*Commanding Fifteenth Regiment, Kentucky Volunteers :*

SIR: The general commanding has placed upon you the responsibility of guarding against all injury, whether through neglect or design, the railroad and turnpike bridge at and near New Haven, and also the railroad bridge over the Bushy Fork of Salt River and the turnpike bridge over Rolling Fork in advance of New Haven.\*

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 2, 1861*

Colonel WARNER,  
*Commanding Regiment Kentucky Volunteers :*

SIR: The general commanding has placed upon you the responsibility of guarding the line of railroad from Lexington to Covington.

The headquarters of your regiment will be established at Falmouth, and you will post your companies so as to effectually guard all the important bridges on the line.\*

Very respectfully,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
No. 19. } *Louisville, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

The following organization of divisions will be observed until further orders :

*First Division.*

Brig. Gen. G. H. THOMAS, commanding.  
1st Brigade.  
2d Brigade.  
3d Brigade.  
11th Brigade.  
12th Brigade.  
1st Kentucky Cavalry (Wolford's).  
Battery B, Ohio.  
Battery C, Ohio.  
Hewett's (Kentucky) battery.  
— Indiana Cavalry (squadron).

*Second Division.*

Brig. Gen. A. McD. McCook, commanding.  
4th Brigade.  
5th Brigade.  
6th Brigade.  
7th Brigade.  
2d Kentucky Cavalry (Board's).  
Stone's battery.  
Cotter's battery.  
Mueller's battery.  
Squadron Indiana Cavalry, Captain  
Graham.

\* Detailed instructions omitted.

*Third Division.*

Brig. Gen. O. M. MITCHEL, commanding.

8th Brigade.

9th Brigade.

17th Brigade.

*Fourth Division.*

Brig. Gen. W. NELSON, commanding.

10th Brigade.

15th Brigade.

19th Brigade.

*Fifth Division.*

Brig. Gen. T. L. CRITTENDEN, commanding.

13th Brigade.

14th Brigade.

3d Regiment Kentucky Cavalry (Jackson's).

— Battery.

By command of Brigadier-General Buell :

[JAMES B. FRY,]

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*WASHINGTON, *December 3, 1861.*Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville :*

MY DEAR BUELL : I inclose two letters, which were referred to me by the President and were intended for your eye. I do so, feeling sure that you sympathize with me in my intense regard for the noble Union men of Eastern Tennessee; that you will overlook all mere matters of form, and that you will devote all your energies towards the salvation of men so eminently deserving our protection. I understand your movements and fully concur in their propriety, but I must still urge the occupation of Eastern Tennessee as a duty we owe to our gallant friends there who have not hesitated to espouse our cause.

Please send, then, with the least possible delay, troops enough to protect these men. I still feel sure that the best strategical move in this case will be that dictated by the simple feelings of humanity. We must preserve these noble fellows from harm; everything urges us to do that—faith, interest, and loyalty. For the sake of these Eastern Tennesseans who have taken part with us I would gladly sacrifice mere military advantages; they deserve our protection, and at all hazards they must have it. I know that your nature is noble enough to forget any slurs they may cast upon you. Protect the true men and you have everything to look forward to. In no event allow them to be crushed out.

I have ordered one regular and one excellent volunteer battery to join you. To-day I ordered 10,000 excellent arms to be sent to you at Louisville. I have directed all your requisitions to be filled at once. You may fully rely on my full support in the movement I have so much at heart—the liberation of Eastern Tennessee.

Write to me often, fully, and confidentially. If you gain and retain possession of Eastern Tennessee you will have won brighter laurels than any I hope to gain.

With the utmost confidence and firmest friendship, I am, truly, yours.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

P. S.—This letter has been dictated by no doubt as to your movements and intentions, but only by my feelings for the Union men of Eastern Tennessee.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
*Camp Calvert, near London, Ky., November 21, 1861.*

Hon. HORACE MAYNARD :

DEAR SIR : The copy of Evening Star received this evening assures me you have not forgotten me.

We are still here, together with Third Regiment Kentucky Volunteers. Why all the other forces were withdrawn is a question to be answered at Louisville. By the papers you will have seen that we, too, left on the night of the 13th, by orders of General Schoepf, in company with the Ohio and Indiana troops, as it seemed, by orders which should have been given me that day, but which were not received until two days afterwards, not only unnecessarily, but contrary to General Thomas' directions.

I was intensely mortified at the hesitancy of some of our Tennesseans to move on when they found they had to take the road leading to Crab Orchard. They had got the impression we were returning to Camp Robinson to winter, but after I spoke a few words to them they obeyed the order to march. Many fell out during the night and some deserted. Our losses amount to about 40 to 45. We were without transportation, and were forced to leave almost the entire camp standing and every one of our sick behind. The roads were in a terrible state, and large numbers of men from the various regiments fell out on the way from sheer exhaustion. When I reached Dr. Josslin's I learned for the first time we were to return to this place.

Our men are most anxious to return to Eastern Tennessee, not so much to see their families as to drive the rebels from the country. We are all inclined to think that help will be deferred until it is too late to save our people. This ought not to be so.

Two or three batteries and 10,000 men, provided even with powder and lead for the people, could save Eastern Tennessee at this time. Will help never come?

General Thomas has left Crab Orchard, and we are here to look out for ourselves. To-night I have sent out between 600 and 700 men in the direction of Flat Lick, 8 miles above Barboursville, to try and cut off some of the thieving rebel scouts and to gain correct intelligence of their whereabouts.

I think it probable that we shall in a few days move on Somerset. I have no information as to the plans of General Buell. Can you not get those in power to give us a few more men and permission to make at least an effort to save our people? Do try. They are even now in arms, and must be crushed unless assistance soon reaches them.

Two men came in from Carter this evening who have been nearly six weeks on the way.

With respect, yours, truly,

S. P. CARTER.

[Indorsement.]

DECEMBER 3, 1861.

Please read and consider this letter.

A. L.

[Inclosure—No. 2.]

HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
*Camp Calvert, November 25, 1861.*

Hon. HORACE MAYNARD:

MY DEAR SIR: A day or two after I wrote you I received orders to break up at this place and join General Thomas. I had sent on a portion of our sick to Crab Orchard and a portion of our commissary stores, but fortunately I was unable to obtain wagons enough to move the whole and was detained until this morning, when I received other orders from department headquarters to remain at London. I know not what will be the next move, but hope most sincerely it may be towards Eastern Ten-



nessee. If something is not done, and that speedily, our people will be cut up and ruined. A column should be ordered to move into Eastern Tennessee, one detailed for that purpose and no other, to go without reference to any other movement, with the specific object of relieving our people, simply on account of their loyalty and as though it were entirely disconnected with any military advantages. I intend to say that our people deserve protection and should have it at once, and independently of all outside considerations.

I sent on 21st between 600 and 700 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Spears, to Flat Lick, a point 8 miles below Cumberland Ford, for the purpose of obtaining information of the enemy, and with the hope they would fall in with a portion of them and cut them up. Some of our men went nearly to the Ford. None of the rebels were there. From best information the force at the Gap was only about 2,000. Zollicoffer, with some 6,000, was at Ross, in Anderson County.

If we had a battery I believe we could go into Tennessee, and then, if we could carry arms or even powder and lead to furnish to our people, I believe we could stay there.

Will help ever come? I do not mean contingent aid, but special and direct.

We are getting along well. Most of our men have returned who left on night of 13th, and all are elated at the orders to remain here. If it be possible, have it so arranged that the Eastern Tennesseans shall not again, except in case of urgent and pressing necessity, be ordered back towards Central Kentucky. Many would sooner perish in battle than turn their backs towards the Tennessee line again.

Will you please write me if the President has ever acted on the petition which you forwarded from the officers of the two regiments to commission me as brigadier-general, and, if so, the reason for his non-compliance, as well as what you can learn of his intentions in regard to that matter.

With best wishes, I am, yours, very truly,

S. P. CARTER.

[Indorsement.]

DECEMBER 3, 1861.

Please read and consider this letter.

A. L.

HDQRS. EASTERN DIVISION, DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 3, 1861.*

Col. T. E. BRAMLETTE,  
*Commanding at Columbia, Ky.:*

COLONEL: I have just received yours of the 2d, inclosing Mr. Leverage's statement of the strength of the enemy. I [have] no doubt his information is correct.

It will be a good service to seize the pork at Burkesville if you are sure it is intended for the Confederates.

As soon as General Buell gets the troops organized into brigades I have no doubt one brigade will be posted at Burkesville. In the mean time I wish you to do all in your power to prevent an advance of the enemy via Columbia, as well as the passage of the steamers up the river. Do not run any risk of disaster, and should the enemy attack you at Columbia, hold him in check as long as possible and send me word immediately. Should he dare come to Columbia, we can easily capture him before he can get back to his lines.

I do not think you can get an umbrella tent in Louisville. I will see Captain Webster, who will write you where he purchased his in Cincinnati.

Respectfully,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

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LEBANON, KY., *December 3, 1861—11 p. m.*

General D. C. BUELL,  
*Headquarters, Louisville:*

I have just received a dispatch from General Schoepf. The enemy are opposite Somerset and have commenced cannonading Hoskins' camp. He says the strength of the enemy is estimated, from the best accounts he can get, of the following numbers: At Mill Springs, 2,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry; at Captain Wiatt's farm, 2 miles from Mill Springs, 1,000 infantry; at Steubenville, 2 miles farther west, is 2,000 infantry; and at Monticello, 5 miles from Steubenville, 3,000 infantry. I have sent to Colonels Walker and Van Derveer to march to his relief as rapidly as they can. When these two regiments reach him, he will have five regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

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HEADQUARTERS EASTERN DIVISION, DEPT. OF OHIO.

*Lebanon, Ky., December 3, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. S. P. CARTER,  
*Commanding at London, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Yours of November 28 has been received. The information which we have of the immediate movements of the rebels is to the effect that they are moving towards the west. You did right in declining to march to Somerset without orders.

It is General Buell's intention to keep troops at London for a while yet. As I wrote you a few days since, your regiments, at least the Tennesseans, will move to Somerset, if they are moved west. Encourage your men to remain hopeful, and assure them that the Government will not leave them to their enemies, but will afford relief to East Tennessee as soon as possible. I am not authorized to tell you even what I know, because General Buell is desirous that the enemy be kept profoundly ignorant of our movements.

I will take measures to have arms for your recruits, if they can be had from Louisville, and also some for the East Tennesseans.

Should you need the corn, flour, &c., of those secessionists you mentioned, I would not hesitate to take it. Have statements of the amount of ammunition you have on hand made out and send to Capt. A. Miller, ordnance officer at this place, as soon as the colonels can forward them; also direct them to forward their monthly regimental returns immediately. The paymaster will be with you soon. You may hasten his arrival by sending an escort with a wagon to take charge of his money-chest. Let the escort meet him at Crab Orchard.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
Cairo, December 3, 1861.

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

By orders from the Governor of this State two regiments of troops have been sent to Shawneetown. One of these has been mustered into the service of the United States, and the acting assistant commissary of subsistence, who is now here, represents to me that the State authorities decline rationing them longer. Under these circumstances I have caused to be turned over to the commissary ten days' rations for his regiment. In a few days I understand that the other regiment will be mustered in also, and will probably be calling here for subsistence.

Troops are highly necessary at Shawneetown, not only to protect the citizens from marauding parties of secession troops, who are now collecting hogs and cattle and horses on the opposite side of the river, but will serve to keep open navigation of the Ohio, and to prevent much of the smuggling now going on. Under these circumstances I would respectfully ask if it would not be well to extend the limits of this military district to the Wabash and give it limits north in this State. If this is not done, I would at least recommend that some command be required to take in these troops, where they can look for supplies and so that they may be properly retained.

Constant complaints are coming here from citizens of Crittenden and Union Counties, Kentucky, of depredations that are being committed by troops from Hopkinsville, and as the troops at Shawneetown have a steamer at their command, they may make excursions across the river that might be improper. There are large quantities of stock of all kinds being driven from these counties to the Southern Army, and quite a trade is being carried on in salt, powder, caps, and domestics. I have reported these facts, as far as could well be done in a limited telegraphic dispatch, to General Buell.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

CAMP CALVERT, KY., *December 4, 1861.*

(Received December 6, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding, &c., Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: As I had heard nothing from you since 25th ultimo, I did not until this evening know where you had established your headquarters.

I wrote to the commander of this department on the 2d instant, and advised him that we had already no little difficulty in obtaining necessary forage for our draught animals and that a portion of our stores was nearly exhausted, and in order to be nearer our depot I expected, unless I should receive orders to the contrary, to move towards Somerset. I hope that this step will meet with your approbation.

Another reason which renders a change of camps advisable is the sickness of our men and the increased malignity of disease. We have some rebels in camp from Scott County, East Tennessee; they were brought in yesterday by some Tennesseans and Kentuckians. They have been noted for the bitterness of their enmity to the Union cause and the unrelenting manner in which they have persecuted loyal men. Four of them are said to be members of a rebel company of rangers, one of whom is a sergeant. What shall be done with them?



I await anxiously permission to march to Somerset, where I have just been informed Zollicoffer has been engaging a small Federal force.

Col. J. P. T. Carter left this morning for the headquarters of this department at Louisville, to see if he can obtain arms for the recruits of his regiment.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,

*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS CAMP GOGGIN, *December 4, 1861.*

(Received December 5, 1861—3 a. m.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Eastern Division:*

GENERAL: According to your instructions to keep you informed of the movements of the enemy, I do so now.

From information just received (1 p. m.) from a captain of the Thirty-eighth Ohio, who was on picket west of me, I learned that the enemy, two regiments of infantry and one battery strong, beat the reveille at 3 o'clock this morning; he heard the train moving in a southwesterly direction, and also heard commands given distinctly.

I have no doubt they are moving towards Mill Springs. A negro man who came from the other side this morning informs me that they had constructed a large number of boats on Meadow Creek, opposite Mill Springs, with the intention to cross at that place. Being certain that they are not going to cross here, I ordered the whole battery to Mill Springs. I will order the Thirty-eighth Ohio to-morrow morning to Somerset, to be in readiness to move either to this place or to Mill Springs, where it should be most needed, the distance to either place being only 6 miles.

I will proceed to Mill Springs to-morrow; am only waiting to get more reliable information with regard to their movements here.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,

*Brigadier-General.*

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WASHINGTON, 5th [December, 1861.]

General D. C. BUELL:

MY DEAR BUELL: I have only time before the mail closes to acknowledge yours of the 30th. Give me at once in detail your views as to the number and amount of gunboats necessary for the water movement, the necessary land forces, &c. Would not C. F. Smith be a good man to command that part of the expedition? When should they move?

Pray do not abandon the Pikesville [Piketon] region. I consider it important to hold that line; your supplies can go by water to Prestonsburg. I will also re-enforce the Guyandotte region at once. Let me again urge the necessity of sending something into East Tennessee as promptly as possible. Our friends there have thrown their all into the scale, and we must not desert them. I tell the East Tennessee men here to rest quiet, that you will take care of them and will never desert them. I ordered to-day two fully armed regiments of cavalry to join you from Camp Dennison. Will send you some more infantry from the Northwest in a day or two.

I will try to write more fully to-night. By all means hold Somerset and London. Better intrench both; still better, the crossing of the river nearest these points.

In haste, truly, your friend,

McCLELLAN.

HEADQUARTERS CAMP GOGGIN,

December 5, 1861—8 a. m.

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Eastern Division:*

GENERAL: Colonel Bradley, of the Thirty-eighth Ohio, reported to me that he has only 40 rounds of ammunition. In my position, without ammunition, I could not sustain myself, being almost certain the enemy is going to make the attempt to cross.

I may be wrong, but I ordered the Tennessee brigade under General Carter to join me, he being the nearest.

Mr. Smith, father of one of the officers in Colonel Hoskins' regiment, came from the enemy's camp and confirms all I reported to you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPPF,

*Brigadier-General.*

P. S.—I just now learned from two reliable men that the enemy has been re-enforced by two additional Mississippi rifle regiments; they are represented to be in first-rate order with regard to clothing and arms.

HEADQUARTERS CAMP GOGGIN,

December 5, 1861—12 m.

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Eastern Division:*

GENERAL: I left this place this morning in company with Captain Prime, Engineer Corps, to go to Mill Springs to examine that place and plant a battery; when I arrived at Fishing Creek, I found the Seventeenth Ohio retreating and on this side of the creek; this was owing to disobedience of orders by Captain Dillion, of the First [Ky.] Cavalry, whom I ordered on Monday to proceed to Mill Springs, there encamp, and, if any attempt was made by the enemy to cross the river, to dispatch that fact to me. Instead of obeying, he encamped only 2 miles from Fishing Creek, without even the precaution of throwing out pickets, and the enemy, it is reported, crossed in force to this side last night. In regard to the order sent to Colonel Connell to march to Mill Springs, I inclose you his letter.

I met Captain Dillion on this side of the creek with his company, and on my interrogating him "why he had not obeyed my order," he replied there was danger, and on that account had not proceeded.

I have ordered Colonel Hoskins' regiment down to Fishing Creek, and will try to push on and see what the enemy is doing.

The rumor is that 2,000 of the enemy's cavalry have crossed, but to keep them from crossing in too large a force for my men I have sent for General Carter's Tennessee regiments and the Thirty-third Indiana.

The Thirty-eighth and Seventeenth Ohio are very short of ammu-

dition, which fact was reported to me just yesterday. My position for defense is worse even than at Wild Cat.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPP,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Inclosure.]

CAMP AT FISHING CREEK, *December 5, 1861.*

(Received December 6, 1861.)

General SCHOEPP, *Commanding Camp Goggin:*

GENERAL: On yesterday I moved forward with the artillery to take position at Mill Springs, according to your order, having sent the cavalry the evening before; they however did not proceed more than 2 miles.

I advanced to within  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles of the Ford at Mill Springs with my whole force, and went forward with Captain Ricketts and Lieutenant Fife, of artillery, to the Ford to make a personal reconnaissance. Found their pickets within 100 yards of the Ford, on this side; endeavored to avoid them, and took the woods on the left hand and spent about twenty minutes examining their position, and found it too strong and the enemy too numerous to face with our small force.

You have been misinformed as to the possibility of securing a good position that any small force can hold at that point. The rebel camp completely overlooks the bluffs on this side, and it is impossible to take position upon them without being exposed to their full view and in range of all their arms. Upon attempting by myself to pass to the right bluff near the creek I was fired upon by a body of their cavalry, who were just coming up the hill at the Ford within 50 yards of me. They followed, firing deliberately as I spurred my horse back. In turning a sharp angle my saddle turned, girth broke, and I was thrown within 100 yards of them, and but for the noble conduct and cool bravery of Captain Ricketts I would have been killed or captured. He got off his horse and waited until I ran up to him and gave me his horse, while he escaped into the woods.

I found no tenable position at all between Mill Springs and Fishing Creek, and certainly none at or near Mill Springs or mouth of Meadow Creek.

The rebels have already several boats and cross the Ford with ease. Their cavalry can cross in a few minutes.

Captain Fullerton made diligent inquiry as to their force, and reports to me that he has no doubt that there are twelve regiments at Mill Springs. They have very extensive encampments.

We have not a very strong position here, but it is better than any we can get between here and Mill Springs, and if we had a force to throw across the creek I think we could make a very strong resistance.

Finding ourselves in an exposed condition, where we could in a few minutes be completely surrounded and the rebels beating to arms, with cavalry across the Ford in our front, and night just upon us, my own judgment, supported by the opinion of all the officers of my command, influenced me to fall back, and finding no place where I could make a stand and save my train except this, I moved back here during the night quietly and in good order; my men and teams terribly fatigued with 25 miles' rough marching and counter-marching.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. M. CONNELL,  
*Colonel Seventeenth Ohio Regiment.*



SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
 No. 23. } *Louisville, Ky., December 5, 1861.*  
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X. The Twelfth Brigade is detached from the First Division and will report direct to these headquarters.

XI. The Eleventh Brigade is for the present placed under the command of Brigadier-General Thomas.

By command of Brigadier-General Buell:

OLIVER D. GREENE,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
 No. 24. } *Louisville, Ky., December 5, 1861.*  
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V. The Seventeenth Brigade, consisting of the Fifteenth Kentucky, Third Ohio, Tenth Ohio, Thirteenth Ohio, is assigned to the Third Division, and will assemble at Elizabethtown as soon as equipped and transportation is furnished. The senior officer will take command.

The Kentucky regiment will not move until mustered into United States service.

By command of Brigadier-General Buell:

[JAMES B. FRY],  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Somerset, December 6, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Eastern Division:*

GENERAL: The enemy have crossed the Cumberland, as near as I can learn, with four regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery. As there was no position near the river that could have been held by the small force under me (not 1,900), I deemed it my duty to move back about 3 miles beyond Somerset to a very fine position, that commands the Crab Orchard road and also the road to Stanford, where I now am, and shall await my re-enforcements, and will then move forward.

The position at Fishing Creek was untenable, on account of three roads flanking us, all leading to the different ferries, which rendered it impossible for me to distribute my few men with any hope of success.

The movement of last night was not known to the enemy until this morning.

The enemy had 3,000 encamped about 3 miles west of us, and, as I learned from scouts, they were still crossing and moving down the river banks, where they drove in our pickets and took possession of the ferries at Hudson's and also the one at Patterson's, both of which have roads leading to the main road, about one mile in my rear, which has no place for artillery to operate effectively.

I could have held a position where the enemy is encamped, had it not been for the unpardonable disobedience of Captain Dillion to occupy the point opposite Mill Springs, when I positively ordered him to do so. I have ordered him to report himself to me, when I shall order him in

arrest and send him to Lebanon, hoping that something may be done to prevent such flagrant disobedience in the future.

Our pickets were firing until late in the night, but without any damage to us, our men reporting to have killed a few of the enemy.

Day before yesterday a messenger from you reported to me that he had lost the dispatch you sent by him, and yesterday a gentleman found one on the road, directed to me, containing invoices from the quartermaster, which was also sent by a messenger. The messenger I sent you day before yesterday has also lost my dispatch to you. All of these men belong to Wolford's cavalry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,  
*Brigadier-General.*

CAIRO, ILL., *December 6, 1861.*

Major-General HALLECK:

Telegraphed to General McClellan that there are twelve gunboats, of which three are in commission and nine in the contractors' hands. Three of the latter have guns on board and are kept ready for defense here. If the contractors hand over three of the latter boats by the 18th instant I will have all of them ready for active service in ten days, provided the Department — me additional 1,100 men required to man them.

There is less prospect of an attack from Columbus than I expected when in Saint Louis; still we have two gunboats lying off Fort Holt ready for defense, also the gunboat Saint Louis, yet in the contractors' hands; has her armament on board and is ready for defense. I am still very much embarrassed in getting the boats ready for want of possession of the wharf-boats. The last two gunboats from Saint Louis not yet received.

A. H. FOOTE,  
*Flag-Officer.*

DECEMBER 6, 1861.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MC'CLELLAN,

*Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:*

Efforts are made to secure appointment of certain brigadiers for Kentucky. I would advise you to receive them with great caution. We have enough very poor ones already. Zollicoffer, as I expected, is making demonstrations to stop our blockade of the coal trade on the Cumberland; has opened with his artillery from the other side on the small camp near Somerset. He will do no great harm. I am throwing up a small field work there, which will command the river and make a few companies secure. No other news.

Have you received my two last letters?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LEBANON, KY., *December 6, 1861.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

I have just received a dispatch from General Schoepf. He reports the enemy crossing the Cumberland 6 miles below Somerset. He has with him one battery of artillery, the Seventeenth and Thirty-eighth Ohio,

and Hoskins' regiment; has ordered to his relief the two Tennessee regiments from London and the Thirty-third Indiana, and I have ordered there three days since the Thirty-first and Thirty-eighth Ohio and Hewett's battery of artillery. Shall I go forward with any of my regiments here?

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

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HEADQUARTERS, *December 6, 1861.*

General THOMAS:

Telegraph General Schoepf's letter. Does he ask for re-enforcements? Can the troops at London go directly to Somerset?

D. C. BUELL.

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[DECEMBER 6, 1861.]

General BUELL, *Headquarters:*

The troops at London can go directly to Somersét, as I am informed.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 6, 1861.*  
(Received, Lebanon December 6, 1861.)

General THOMAS:

Send no more re-enforcements to General Schoepf until you report to me; his force was sufficient at first.

Order General Boyle to proceed to Columbia to-morrow and keep his scouts well out towards the Cumberland. Caution all officers to ascertain and report facts, not merely forward rumors. See that no more troops march without ammunition.

Direct General Schoepf to arrest and forward charges against Captain Dillion.\*

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS EAST TENNESSEE BRIGADE,  
*Camp Calvert, Ky., December 6, 1861.*  
(Received December 9, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding, &c., Lebanon:*

GENERAL: The orders received last night from departmental headquarters require me to remain in front of Cumberland Gap, for the purpose, in part, of keeping out marauders and protecting the loyal citizens.

This morning, having learned that Barboursville was threatened by a small force, I ordered the Third Kentucky Regiment to march to its protection. Colonel Garrard was directed to employ some mounted

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\* See Schoepf to Thomas, December 5, 1861, p. 474.



men for scouts and pickets to be used in the direction of Cumberland Ford.

But for the orders received from Louisville the First East Tennessee Regiment would have moved this morning towards Somerset and the Second East Tennessee and Third Kentucky would have followed in the morning. I received about noon a dispatch from Brigadier-General Schoepf, requiring me to join him as soon as possible. If I had no conflicting orders from you I should have gone willingly, but did not think myself at liberty to do so under the circumstances, but wrote him that if he still desired me to join him after knowing what my orders were from headquarters, I should of course go.

I heard to-day, upon what is represented to me as perfectly reliable authority, that three rebel regiments reached Cumberland Gap on the 4th instant. Hampton's Legion arrived there on the 3d, with a large amount of ammunition.

At Morristown, Jefferson County, East Tennessee, report says there were five regiments, whose destination is Kentucky, via the Gap.

The rebel general Crittenden had been at the Gap, but left to bring up his brigade. I fear that we cannot do a great deal towards resisting the force the enemy is accumulating at and about the Gap.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,

*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding East Tennessee Brigade.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIV., DEPT. OF THE OHIO.

No. 39. }

*Lebanon, December 6, 1861.*

I. In compliance with Special Orders, No. 19, from department headquarters, Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas assumes command of the First Division, Department of the Ohio, organized as follows:

*First Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. A. SCHOEPF, commanding.  
33d Indiana Regiment Volunteers, Col. John Coburn.  
17th Ohio Regiment Volunteers, Col. J. M. Connell.  
12th Kentucky Regiment Volunteers, Col. W. A. Hoskins.  
38th Ohio Regiment Volunteers, Col. E. D. Bradley.

*Second Brigade.*

Col. M. D. MANSON, commanding.  
4th Kentucky Regiment Volunteers, Col. S. S. Fry.  
14th Ohio Regiment Volunteers, Col. J. B. Steedman.  
10th Indiana Regiment Volunteers, Col. M. D. Manson.  
10th Kentucky Regiment Volunteers, Col. J. M. Harlan.

*Third Brigade.*

Col. ROBT. L. MCCOOK, commanding.  
18th U. S. Infantry, Colonel Carrington.  
2d Minnesota Regiment Volunteers, Colonel Van Cleave.  
35th Ohio Regiment Volunteers, Col. F. Van Derveer.

9th Ohio Regiment Volunteers, Col. R. L. McCook.

*Twelfth Brigade.*

Actg. Brig. Gen. S. P. CARTER, commanding.

1st East Tennessee Regiment Volunteers, Col. R. K. Byrd.  
2d East Tennessee Regiment Volunteers, Col. J. P. T. Carter.  
6th Kentucky Regiment Volunteers, Col. T. T. Garrard.  
31st Ohio Regiment Volunteers, Col. M. B. Walker.

[*Unattached.*]

1st Regiment Kentucky Cavalry, Col. F. Wolford.  
Squadron Indiana Cavalry, Captain Graham.  
Battery B, 1st Ohio Artillery, Capt. W. E. Standart.  
Battery C, 1st Ohio Artillery, Capt. D. Kenry.  
Battery B, Kentucky Artillery, Capt. J. M. Hewett.  
Maj. W. E. Lawrence commanding artillery.

VII. Until further orders the First Brigade will take post at Somerset, Ky., Second and Third Brigades at Lebanon, and Twelfth Brigade at London.

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XI. Captains Standart's and Hewett's batteries of artillery, Major Lawrence commanding, and the First Kentucky Cavalry, Col. F. Wolford commanding, are temporarily assigned to duty with the First Brigade, and will report to Brigadier-General Schoepf for duty at Somerset, Ky.

XII. The squadron of Indiana cavalry, Captain Graham commanding, and Battery C, First Ohio Artillery, will report for duty at division headquarters.

By order of General Thomas:

GEO. E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

WASHINGTON, *December 7, 1861.*

General D. C. BUELL:

We have just had interviews with the President and General McClellan, and find they concur fully with us in respect to the East Tennessee expedition. Our people are oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest. The Government must come to their relief. We are looking to you with anxious solicitude to move in that direction.

ANDREW JOHNSON.  
HORACE MAYNARD.

DECEMBER 7, 1861.

General McCook, *Camp Nevin*:

Send forward a brigade and a battery to Munfordville, to take a good position and protect the bridge. Move your division up to Bacon Creek, leaving a small guard over the bridge at Nevin. Keep us informed, and be ready at all times to act promptly.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LEBANON, *December 7, 1861.*

Brigadier-General BUELL:

General Schoepf reports that enemy having crossed the Cumberland as near as he could learn with four regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery, and as there was no position near the river that could be held by his small force, he fell back, on the night of the 5th, about 3 miles this side of Somerset to a very fine position, commanding the Crab Orchard and Stanford road, where he would await his re-enforcements and then move forward. Three roads flanking his position on Fishing Creek rendered it untenable. The enemy had 3,000 employed about 3 miles west of his position on Fishing Creek, and his scouts reported them still crossing and moving down the river, driving in his pickets and taking possession of the ferries at Hudson's and Patterson's, from which roads lead to the main road 1 mile in rear of his present position.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 7, 1861.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,

*Asst. Adjt. Gen., U. S. Army, Dept. Hdqrs., Louisville, Ky.:*

CAPTAIN: The present state of affairs in the vicinity of Somerset I think will justify me in sending the Twelfth Brigade\* to that place, without attracting attention. It should be removed from London on account of the extreme difficulty in hauling subsistence over the road from that place to Crab Orchard, and being at Somerset would diminish the distance and labor of supplying the troops in advance one-half.

At present it is exceedingly difficult, with the limited means of transportation we have, to keep the troops supplied. If the general approves, I will direct General Carter to move his brigade to Somerset and concentrate the other two at this point.

General Carter reports having in his camp some rebel prisoners, and Colonel Wolford has sent one to me. Shall I forward them to Louisville?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 7, 1861.*

Brigadier-General SCHOEPEF,

*Commanding, Somerset:*

GENERAL: The Thirty-first Ohio, ordered to march to your relief, was stopped by order of General Buell, and will not probably march, inasmuch as you have the two Tennessee regiments. With your present force you will be able to keep the enemy in check until General Buell's plans are more fully matured.

In the mean time arrest and forward charges against Captain Dillion, and [let] your information in regard to the movements of the enemy be as reliable as possible.

Ammunition for the Seventeenth and Thirty-eighth Regiments will be forwarded to-day.

By order of Brig. Gen. G. H. Thomas:

GEO. E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Somerset, December 7, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Eastern Division:*

GENERAL: In my communication stating that I had ordered the Tennessee regiments to re-enforce me I neglected to say that my order also stated not to come if there were any conflicting orders from you.

As soon as I received the dispatch saying you had sent no re-enforcements I countermanded my previous order to the Tennessee regiments.

Having no reliable cavalymen to carry my dispatches I must have recourse to the mail, as it is more certain.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPEF,  
*Brigadier-General.*

\*See Buell to Thomas, December 9, p. 485.



HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
*Cairo, December 8, 1861.*Capt. J. C. KELTON,  
*Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dept. of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo:*

CAPTAIN: I have just got in a man who spent yesterday in Columbus. He reports the enemy strongly fortified there, with fifty-four pieces of heavy ordnance—less than I have understood heretofore they had. In addition to this they have ten batteries of light artillery, with forty-seven regiments of infantry and cavalry, all armed. There is not the slightest intention of attacking Cairo, but the strongest apprehension exists that Columbus is to be soon attacked. I believe that I have full means of keeping posted as to what is going on south of this point and will keep you fully informed.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *December 8, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

MY DEAR FRIEND: I have received your letter of the —, and thank you very cordially for it. Such encouragement would make a good lieutenant of almost any man, and robs him of all claim to credit, no matter what he may accomplish. A good programme does not always result to our entire satisfaction, but I shall work very hard not to disappoint your confidence altogether.

We are gradually getting into position. As fast as the troops get their outfit they are moving into place, and in a few days all that have arrived will have gone. The quartermaster's department does not quite work up to my exaction, but perhaps I am a little unreasonable. We are greatly in want of staff officers and brigadiers. The latter I am loath to nominate to you until I know the men better. I have been approached in behalf of some who I am satisfied are unfit, and who I understand are now being urged by their friends for appointments. I certainly hope they will have to wait until they are tried. One of them is Colonel Burbridge, a relative of Governor Wright. As for staff officers, quartermasters, &c., I have proposed, in dispatches to the Adjutant General, either that some shall be sent out speedily, or that I may be authorized to appoint, subject to confirmation, and order their pay for the time they serve. This plan seems to have the advantage of affording the opportunity of dropping those who do not turn out well.

The Kentucky troops, which have heretofore been scattered all over the State in innumerable fragments, are gradually getting into regimental organizations, so that I can do something with them, though only a few regiments will probably be in a condition to advance. They will not be useless, however.

I suffer annoyance yet from the officiousness of Governors. They send their staff officers to look after the interest of their troops, exchange their arms without my knowledge, and keep up a communication in other matters which they have no business with. I stop these things when they come to my knowledge, and after a while will be able to correct them entirely.

The return which I sent you yesterday, imperfect as it is, will show you something of us on paper. I look upon it as something of a success to have been able to show anything at all; but you will see that we have not attained yet to the first indication of efficiency—regularity and accuracy in returns. We will be more satisfactory in a few days.

We are beginning to be a little animated. The other night a party of the enemy came within some 10 miles of us and burned a small bridge over Bacon Creek, which will be repaired in three or four days, and I discovered that they designed to destroy the piers of the Green River Bridge, the rebuilding of which is to be commenced in a few days. That would have embarrassed my prospective movements, and so I have had to put aside the inertia which I was anxious to pursue for the present. I have moved McCook's division forward to Bacon Creek, with a brigade in advance at Munfordville. This will stir our neighbors up a little, but it cannot be helped.

Then, again, Zollicoffer's force has crossed near Somerset, it is said, with six regiments and eight guns. I content myself with sending sufficient re-enforcements under Schoepf to check him. I do not mean to be diverted more than is absolutely necessary from what I regard as of the first importance—the organization of my forces, now little better than a mob. I could fritter the whole of it away in a month by pursuing these roving bugbears.

I had a remarkable example of impudence in my neighbor Buckner last night. It was a request that his wife, two other ladies, a Confederate Army surgeon, and the corpse of his child might be allowed to pass to Louisville. I directed McCook to decline his request courteously, and courteously conduct his messenger to the other side of Green River before daylight.

Cannot you do something for Fry? I shall write again very soon. I hear nothing of the Randall companies.

Truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

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DECEMBER, 8, 1861.

Hon. Mr. MAYNARD and Governor JOHNSON, of Tennessee,

*Washington:*

I have received your dispatch.\* I assure you I recognize no more imperative duty and crave no higher honor than that of rescuing our loyal friends in Tennessee, whose sufferings and heroism I think I can appreciate.

I have seen Colonel Carter, and hope he is satisfied of this.

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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DECEMBER 8, 1861.

General THOMAS, *Lebanon:*

What troops are probably with Schoepf now? What others are on the way? Are the Thirty-first Ohio and the Tennessee [regiments] moving? Have you further news from Schoepf?

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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\*Of November 7, p. 480.

LEBANON, *December 8, 1861.*

Brigadier-General BUELL:

The two Tennessee [regiments], armed with muskets; the Seventeenth and Thirty-eighth Ohio Regiments, Thirty-third Indiana, armed with rifle muskets, and the Thirty-fifth Ohio, and Hoskins' regiment are with Schoepf by this time or should be. He has also Standart's Ohio and two sections of Hewett's Kentucky artillery, and some of Wolford's cavalry. The Thirty-first Ohio has not moved since your order to remain at Dick Robinson. It is armed with the rifle musket, caliber .58. This is well supplied with ammunition.

Have not heard from Schoepf since last night. A telegraph to Colonel Walker from you would reach him in three hours from Nicholasville.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Vols.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, December 8, 1861.*

(Received Lebanon, December 8, 1861.)

General THOMAS:

The affairs at Somerset are annoying, but I do not intend to be diverted more than necessary from more important purposes. I [suppose] Schoepf will be able to drive the enemy across the river again.

Keep an eye on Columbia, and be prepared to push a brigade or two rapidly to that point.

Organize and equip your brigades as rapidly as possible. See that they have ammunition.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

WASHINGTON, *December 8, 1861.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

GENERAL: I have your letter of the 23d ultimo.\* The same mail brought other letters, giving me sad accounts of that horrible night march from London.

You are still farther from East Tennessee than when I left you nearly six weeks ago. There is shameful wrong somewhere; I have not yet satisfied myself where. That movement so far has been disgraceful to the country and to all concerned. I feel a sense of personal degradation from my own connection with it greater than from any other part of my public actions. My heart bleeds for these Tennessee troops. I learn they have not yet been paid, and are left without either cavalry or artillery at London, and not permitted to do what is their daily longing—go to the relief of their friends at home. With Nelson and the measles and blue-grass and nakedness and hunger and poverty and home-sickness, the poor fellows have had a bitter experience since they left their homes to serve a Government which as yet has hardly given them a word of kindly recognition. The soldiers of all the other States have a home government to look after them. These have not, and but for Carter, who has been like a father to them, they would have suffered still more severely. That they at times get discouraged and out of heart I do not wonder. My assurances to them have failed so often, that I should be ashamed to look them in the face.

\* Not found.



I have not seen the newspaper strictures you refer to; but I can easily understand their character. Before I left the West I saw articles in the Cincinnati papers of a most mischievous character and tendency, and I thought I had arranged to have the writers hunted out and whipped; but I suppose it was not done. I mentioned the matter to General McClellan one day. Said he, "Why does he not expel them from his camps?" A professed newspaper correspondent is a public nuisance and should be abated accordingly.

I cannot approve your determination simply to "obey orders." The country has conferred upon you high rank in her armies, and she has a right to expect that you will bring all your abilities to her aid in sustaining her flag. You do wrong in allowing personal indignities, come from what quarter they may, to diminish your activity in her service.

With renewed assurance of confidence and sympathy, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HORACE MAYNARD.

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *December 9, 1861.*  
(Received Washington, December 9, 1861.)

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

I wrote you last night; received your two letters to-day. Will write again to-night.

Our ill-timed friends have destroyed the railroad bridge over the Whippoorwill, near Russellville. I tried to stop it, but was too late.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, December 9, 1861.*

General THOMAS:

Will determine in regard to the movement of the Twelfth Brigade, which you suggest, when I hear whether the Tennessee regiments moved on Schoepf's call. Have you heard whether they did? What news from him?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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LOUISA, KY., VIA MAYSVILLE, *December 9, 1861.*

General BUELL, *Commanding:*

I have reliable information that the secessionists are 4,000 strong in Prestonburg, Ky., with a re-enforcement near at hand of 2,000, and six pieces of artillery; Jenkins' 1,200 cavalry composing a part.

In haste, yours,

L. T. MOORE.

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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH BRIGADE,  
*Somerset, Ky., December 9, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Eastern Division, Lebanon:*

GENERAL: We arrived here this afternoon. On the forenoon of the 7th instant I received a dispatch from Brigadier-General Schoepf, telling me he had fallen back 3 miles from Somerset, and requiring me to join him "instantly."

I broke up camp at once and started the First and Second East Tennessee Regiments. A messenger was sent to overtake Colonel Garrard, with orders for him to return, bring forward the remaining public stores, and join me with as little delay as possible.

This morning, when 12 miles from this place, I received another dispatch from Brigadier-General Schoepf, to the effect that Colonel Garrard was to remain at either London or Pittman's. In compliance with it I forwarded orders to Colonel Garrard, requiring him to remain at one of those places.

My brigade is temporarily broken up, and I should like, if consistent with the exigencies of the service, to have it brought together as soon as possible.

From the best information I have had our position is rather a critical one; the force of the enemy—even at the lowest estimate—is nearly double ours, and they are but some 7 miles off. We certainly need reinforcements, and I hope they will be sent forward before we are attacked by such unequal odds.

The road between this and London is passable by wagons. There is much delay at the river and some very steep and rough hills; still they can be passed with moderate loads. Artillery would have some trouble in overcoming some of the hills.

There is another road called the Old Road, which is some 6 miles nearer—37 miles—than the one via Sublimity, but is rough, although, from all I have been able to learn, the hills are not so steep.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,

*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding Twelfth Brigade.*

SOMERSET, KY., *December 9, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Eastern Division, Kentucky:*

GENERAL: Yours of the 7th is at hand. In a hasty note of the 8th I stated to you the state of affairs about Somerset. I have little to communicate in addition to what I then wrote, viz, that the enemy is on this side of the river and within 7 miles of us. His force, from the most reliable information, consists of nine regiments of infantry, 3,500 cavalry, and twelve pieces of artillery.

My force, including the Tennesseans, just arrived, will not amount to more than 5,000. I have no cavalry that can be relied on. I have ten pieces of artillery.

My command is necessarily scattered, having several points to defend, it being uncertain by which of the several approaches to the village the enemy will make his appearance.

From the above you must see the necessity of my being immediately re-enforced. My communications for the last seven or eight days have, I think, fully shown this necessity.

I shall meet the enemy, be the result what it may.

I have ordered Captain Dillion to report to your headquarters in arrest. Charges will be forwarded per next mail.

We received about two days' supply of provisions from Lebanon today. We were entirely out.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Brigade.*

LEBANON, KY., *December 9, 1861.*

Brigadier-General BUELL:

Have not heard from General Schoepf since his fall-back, except that he had countermanded the order for the movement of the Tennessee regiments. He has no confidence in his cavalry, and sent his dispatch by mail.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
*Columbia, Ky., December 9, 1861.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

DEAR SIR: I learn from Judge Green, of Russell, a most reliable citizen and truly loyal, that the rebels under Generals Zollicoffer and Cullom, after crossing the Cumberland, have sent part of their forces on this side the river, in direction of this place. He believes it is the purpose of the enemy to move on this point. I hardly think they will venture by the Somerset and Columbia road to this place. I have thrown out scouts on that road and to two other points on the Cumberland.

General Cullom—Bill Cullom—former Clerk of Congress—joined Zollicoffer last Tuesday or Wednesday with 4,000 men. This is reliable; I have it unmistakably. Mr. Rufus Ingram, brother-in-law of Cullom, informs me of the certainty of it. He says they have 11,000 men, pretty well armed, with eight or twelve guns. Zollicoffer has united with his forces those of General Cullom and Colonel Stanton.

You cannot drive him back with less than 10,000 troops. If you do not prepare to do this, the enemy will be in the center of the State.

Respectfully,

J. T. BOYLE.

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *December 10, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,

*Commanding U. S. Army:*

MY DEAR FRIEND: As I informed you by telegraph, I received your letters of the 3d and 5th. I have by no means been unmindful of your wishes in regard to East Tennessee, and I think I can both appreciate and unite in your sympathy for a people who have shown so much constancy. That constancy will still sustain them until the hour of deliverance. I have no fear of their being crushed. The allegiance of such people to hated rulers, even if it could be enforced for the moment, will only make them the more determined and ready to resist when the hour of rescue comes.

The organization of the division at Lebanon has been with special reference to the object which you have so much at heart, though fortunately it is one which suits any contingencies that can arise. I shall hasten its preparation with all the energy and industry I can bring to bear. The plans which I have in view embrace that fully; but the details and the final determination, while there is yet time to watch the progress of circumstances which might affect our plans vitally, I think I should lack that ordinary discretion by which I hope to retain your confidence if I did not reserve. When the preparation of that division is complete, which I hope will be very soon, if I then see reasons why it should be merged into the general line of operations I will give you the reasons, and you shall be the judge of them; and if you do not see force in them, I assure you I will pursue your views with as much zeal



and hopefulness, and perhaps more energy, than if I entirely concurred in them. You do not know me well yet if you think I cannot do this.

And now for the other side of the field: I feel more anxiety about it than any other, because I have less control over the means that ought to bear on it, and have less knowledge of their details if I had the control. I do not know well—scarcely at all—the description and capacity of the gunboats and transports that are to be used, and I do not know anything about the quality of the troops and officers. I have not seen Smith for seven years, and am afraid to judge him. I have never rated him as highly as some men. The expedition requires nothing more, as matters now stand, than ordinary nerve and good judgment and ability to command men. The troops ought of course to be the best we can command. The object is not to fight great battles and storm impregnable fortifications, but by demonstrations and maneuvering to prevent the enemy from concentrating his scattered forces. In doing this it must be expected there will be some fighting; it may be pretty good fighting. I suppose that 10,000 men, with two batteries, would not be too great an estimate for each of the rivers, if the enemy should do all that he probably can do. The precise manner of conducting the expeditions depends so much on local knowledge that I can hardly venture on its details; but at least the expeditions should go as rapidly as possible to the nearest point to where the road crosses the peninsula; that is, to Dover and Fort Henry. And the first thing there to be done is to destroy the bridges and ferries; then act momentarily on the defensive, unless the weakness of the enemy or a trepidation in his force should give a good opportunity to attack. I think the first serious opposition will be found at Fort Henry and at an island battery 4 or 5 miles below Dover, but my information is not very complete as to the strength of these works. It would probably be necessary to stop there. Fort Henry is said by civilians to be strong. I cannot learn yet the number of guns.

There have been some 7,000 troops there. We will probably find that number there. It is about 6 miles below the railroad bridge. I should not expect to meet any considerable force at Dover, but perhaps 7,000 or 8,000 at Clarksville, where they are fortifying. If they succeed in getting out of Bowling Green, which I believe they will try to do as soon as they see us advancing unless their force and armament are increased, of course the number at Clarksville may be expected to be greater.

The demonstration on Columbus and the Mississippi should at least be on such a scale that it can be converted into a real attack if they destroy anything; better still if it can attack in any event.

You must be patient if you find my letter vague and unsatisfactory. I have had to satisfy a deputation, acting under a joint resolution of the Legislature, that it was hardly necessary or expedient at this time to appoint a certain person "provost-marshal, with all proper power, and giving to him such military force as he may deem essential for a prompt and proper enforcement and execution of the laws and a suppression of all lawless and marauding excursions into Northeastern Kentucky." I believe I succeeded pretty well, and perhaps after that I ought not to have attempted a coherent letter. Your own judgment will satisfy its deficiencies. Please have Rosecrans take care of his revolted subjects along the Big Sandy. We are established at Munfordsville.

Truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

P. S.—It will seem rather wordy for me to say that early action is of the greatest importance when I am myself unable to appoint a day; but not a day should be lost.

LOUISVILLE, *December 10, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

I have not overlooked Prestonburg, but their tardiness in organizing has prevented me from using readily the only troops I have available for that service. One regiment, Colonel Moore's Kentucky, has already been ordered there; is indeed now at Louisa, being mustered in. I shall send another infantry regiment and two or three squadrons of cavalry, that will make a force fully equal to the demand of the people interested in that section.

D. C. BUELL.

*Brigadier-General.*

[DECEMBER 10, 1861.—From McClellan to Halleck, in relation to affairs in Missouri and contemplated co-operation with Buell, see Series I, Vol. VIII.]

HEADQUARTERS, *December 10, 1861,*  
(Received Lebanon, *December 10, 1861.*)

General THOMAS:

Order five companies of Wolford's cavalry to march forthwith to Prestonburg or Picketon, moving by way of Danville, Lexington, and Mount Sterling, the lieutenant-colonel to command.

Take the companies from Campbellsville or Columbia, as you think best.

By command:

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

HDQRS. ELEVENTH BRIGADE, U. S. VOLUNTEERS,  
*Columbia, Ky., December 10, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Headquarters, Lebanon, Ky.:*

SIR: My scouts sent out yesterday at noon, under Captain Owens, of Colonel Wolford's cavalry, have just returned, and report the enemy across the Cumberland on this side. The scouts approached within 6 miles of the enemy's camp. Their camp is 31 miles of this place, near the Columbia and Somerset road.

Captain Owens is a native of Pulaski County, and is thoroughly acquainted with the country and distances and with all the people. He learned from a trustworthy Union citizen in the vicinity of their camp that most if not all of their forces had crossed the Cumberland. They claimed to have others yet to cross. They claimed to have 30,000 men. Captain Owens believes they have from 10,000 to 12,000 men. They effected the crossing by an extensive raft of logs.

The rebels beat up for recruits in Wayne County last week and enlisted over 200 men. Their forces are increasing from recruits of rebels in Kentucky and new forces from Tennessee.

The enemy are between General Schoepf and the forces here. It is believed and understood to be their purpose to hold with part of their force the forces of General Schoepf in check, and with the greater portion of their army move on Columbia, and, cutting us off, join Buckner's

forces or hold this section, and prevent a flank movement on Bowling Green.

Would it not be well to increase the force here, and throw sufficient numbers here to protect the sick and stores, and move on the enemy by the road to Somerset, General Schoepf making a simultaneous movement upon them from the other side? I notify you now that the enemy is in force on this side the Cumberland, and will most probably move in this direction.

The forces here are greatly disabled by sickness. The morning report showed over 1,000 sick and absent, and the strength of the forces here does not exceed 2,500 effective men who could be brought into action, exclusive of some 300 of Wofford's cavalry and including Haggard's cavalry.

The forces here cannot fall back with all their sick and stores. Three of the regiments have no ambulances, and some have no wagons, and only one, the Nineteenth Ohio, is supplied fully with transportation. The sick and the stores here must be protected.

Concentrate your forces here and with General Schoepf and move them simultaneously upon the enemy, and you will effectually cut him off. If this is done, it must be done immediately. I shall expect forces to defend this place and move on the enemy. If you have a brigadier-general of experience, you can place the forces under his command, or I will lead them with such ability as I possess.

Let me hear from you.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. T. BOYLE,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. ELEVENTH BRIGADE, U. S. ARMY,  
*Columbia, Ky., December 10, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Lebanon, Ky.:*

SIR: I inclose you letter from Mr. George Bryan, clerk of Russell County, Kentucky, a man well known to me to be honest, true, and trustworthy. His information confirms and is corroborated by report of my scouts, except as to the number of the enemy's force.

A captain of Tennessee militia, who was notified to draft one-half his command and report to headquarters at Monroe, Overton County, Tennessee, reported here with 44 of his men. He expects 160 more *en route* for these headquarters.

The enemy are drafting the loyal citizens of Clinton and Wayne. Probably the 200 recruits reported as obtained in Wayne were drafted and impressed.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. T. BOYLE,  
*Acting Brigadier-General.*

[Inclosure.]

JAMESTOWN, KY., *December 9, 1861.*

Col. T. E. BRAMLETTE, *Columbia, Ky.:*

DEAR COLONEL: I have the following facts reliable, viz: Zollicoffer's forces are all across Cumberland River, except the Mississippi regiment and about 300 men under Colonel McRea; the latter are camped at Hiram Hall's, in Wayne. The Mississippi regiments are camped at Mill



Springs. There are about 5,000 across in camp on the hill opposite Mill Springs.

This comes from a gentleman just in from Wayne, who lives near Hall's. He says he has been at Mill Springs and saw all that he reports, and knows that it is true. He was there when the scouting party came in that had the brush at Rowena on Sunday; they reported one of their number killed, one horse wounded, and several pistols and guns lost, and some other minor injuries received. They rear and curse and swear vengeance against Rowena.

Yours, &c.,

GEORGE BRYAN.

P. S.—He says nine regiments have gone up to Mill Springs; thinks there are about 6,500 or 7,000 in all Zollicoffer's forces.

CAMP WOOD, *Bacon Creek, December 11, 1861.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff:*

I wish authority to call upon Colonel Turchin's force, if necessary. Seventy-five rebel cavalry came up to Woodsonville at 5 a. m. this morning, got behind a house, and fired a volley. Our pickets returned it. The rebels fled. Hindman encamped at Bear Wallow last night with 4,000 men. I will watch him.

McCOOK.

CAMP NEVIN, *December 11, 1861.*

Capt. OLIVER D. GREENE,

*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

I am all right and safe here. A return would almost be disastrous to my division unless some serious flank movement is taking place. I hope the general will rescind the order. How far shall I fall back?

McCOOK.

LEBANON, *December 11, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL:

Have just received a dispatch from General Boyle. His scouts sent out on the 9th had returned and reported the enemy this side of the Cumberland, within 30 miles of Columbia. Captain Owens, of Wolford's cavalry, is a native of Pulaski. He learned from a trustworthy Union citizen in the vicinity of their camp that most if not all of their forces had crossed the Cumberland. They claimed to have others yet to cross. They claimed to have 30,000 men. Captain Owens believed they had from 10,000 to 12,000. General Boyle asks me for re-enforcements. I have sent a copy of his communication by mail.\* Have not heard from Schoepf. Should have done so by this time.

GEO. H. THOMAS.

HEADQUARTERS, *December 11, 1861.*

(Received Lebanon, December 11, 1861.)

General THOMAS:

Does General Boyle report the enemy advancing on Columbia? At what place or on what road are they? What kind of troops are they composed of?

\* See p. 489.

Order General Boyle to take a strong position where he is and fortify himself.

Order General Ward to move his command forward at once to Green River, so as to be ready to re-enforce Columbia in case of an actual attack.

Be prepared to move promptly in any direction, but keep up the regular duties of your command. Can you not communicate speedily with Schoepf through Liberty? Answer.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LEBANON, *December 11, 1861.*

General D. C. BUELL:

General Boyle believes the enemy will advance on Columbia by the Somerset road. They are infantry, artillery, and cavalry. He believes they will attempt to hold Schoepf in check with a part of their force and advance on Columbia with the main body. Cannot now communicate with Schoepf by Liberty; that road leads through the enemy's lines.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
*Columbia, December 11, 1861.*  
(Received December 12, 1861.)

General THOMAS, U. S. A.,  
*Commanding Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

SIR: I am fully satisfied General Zollicoffer's forces do not exceed 7,500. They are increasing from the drafted recruits from Tennessee and some from Kentucky.

A spy sent to Mill Springs says the force is not over 7,500, and he believes it is about 6,500, though enemy represent it very much larger. He says that only about one-half had crossed the river.

I learn satisfactorily that the force is increased daily by accessions of new recruits, ill-clad and poorly armed, and many without arms.

There is no doubt the enemy expect to furnish supplies up the Cumberland, such as arms, clothing, &c. The enemy have eight pieces of artillery, two large guns, and six 6-pounders.

Wolford has moved the larger part of his forces to Billy Williams' on Green River. The others will move as soon as transportation can be had. I have directed him to report to me daily as to movement of the enemy. He is only 16 miles from this place, in direction in which I have been sending scouts.

I have no quartermaster, no commissary, no blanks of any kind. Can you have them furnished?

Respectfully, &c.,

J. T. BOYLE,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 12, 1861.*

Brigadier-General BUELL:

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I this morning ordered Capt. R. C. Webster, assistant quartermaster, to repair to Somerset and report to Brigadier-General

Schoepf for duty on his staff, directing Captain Webster to hire as many wagons as he could procure in the neighborhood of Nicholasville and Danville, to be used in transporting provisions, ammunition, and other supplies from Nicholasville to Somerset. It will be as much as we can do here, with the means at the disposal of the quartermaster's department, to keep up a supply at Somerset and to enable me to move from here with my command. It is absolutely necessary that the wagons and teams required for by Captain Gillem when in Louisville should be forwarded to this place as rapidly as possible.

I sent dispatches last night to Generals Boyle and Ward immediately after the reception of the telegram from you.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
**GEO. H. THOMAS,**  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Vols.*

HDQRS. ELEVENTH BRIGADE, U. S. VOLUNTEERS,  
*Columbia, Ky., December 12, 1861.*

General THOMAS, U. S. A.,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I have kept scouts in the direction of Glasgow and Edmonton, and yesterday morning my men returned after visiting Edmonton. The enemy had been there the day before with 160 cavalry. They evidently purpose to control or prevent the election for member of the Legislature on Saturday. I have intended to send several hundred cavalry to Edmonton on Saturday morning.

Rev. Mr. Crenshaw, of Louisville, a Methodist circuit rider or elder, is here this evening from Glasgow this morning. He informs me that Colonel Hindman passed up from Bowling Green with 7,000 men, with the view of marching on this place. He was at a place called Horse Well and near Bear Wallow, moving in this direction.

The secessionists at Glasgow expected a collision here to-day and an easy victory. Mr. Crenshaw did not see the infantry forces, but he saw and counted 350 Texas Rangers, or cavalry troops. They were to join Hindman. The rebels at Glasgow understood your forces are in possession of Munfordville and with forces south of Green River.

I have scouts out in direction of Edmonton, Glasgow, and Greensburg, besides toward the Cumberland.

It seems to me that the forces here ought to have accession of at least a battery of artillery. We certainly need such arm of defense here now.

If Hindman shall be found advancing upon us, I will order up the forces from Campbellsville.

Colonel Hobson is now at Green River Bridge, about 13 miles from this place. I think he should locate several miles this side the bridge, leaving a company to guard the bridge until some other takes his place.

Respectfully,

**J. T. BOYLE,**  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. ELEVENTH BRIGADE, U. S. VOLUNTEERS,  
*Columbia, December 12, 1861.*

General THOMAS, U. S. A.  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I directed Colonel Bramlette, with two companies from his regiment and two companies from the Nineteenth Ohio, to proceed on



the Pulaski or Somerset road and take and occupy the most available position of defense, having regard to water, &c., and to take with him Lieutenant Bonter, (?) temporarily on my staff, a fine engineer, to aid him.

After an examination of the grounds, we regard the most available point of defense at and near the crossing of Russell's Creek, on the Somerset road, northeast of and near the town. Such defenses as will be required can soon be formed. With a battery of artillery the place can be held against considerable odds. Can we not be supported with a battery?

The rebel cavalry who crossed the Cumberland into Russell County have, it is reported, killed 50 or 60 of the loyal and defenseless citizens. I ordered part of Wolford's and part of Haggard's cavalry to the relief of the country. Can I at my discretion move one or more regiments to or in the direction of Cumberland, to give protection to the country on the Cumberland and hold the enemy in check?

If General Schoepf is moving on the enemy from the other direction, can I not be ordered up to attack from this side simultaneously, the movement being understood by General Schoepf?

If there is not reason to expect an attack here or a very early movement forward, I desire leave of absence for several days. I have no uniforms, no clothing, and no arms. I have no uniform or arms of any kind. There are other reasons rendering it necessary for me to be absent for some days which I do not give.

Colonel Beatty, of Nineteenth Ohio, was mustered into service August 10, but has no commission yet. Colonel Bramlette's commission is of 10th September, 1861.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. T. BOYLE,  
*Acting Brigadier-General.*

HDQRS. ELEVENTH BRIGADE, U. S. VOLUNTEERS,  
*Columbia, Ky., December 12, 1861.*

Brigadier-General THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division:*

GENERAL: General Boyle directs me to say your dispatch and order of 11th instant is just received and acted upon. A force is detailed to commence the work immediately.

The general further directs me to say that reliable information, obtained from various sources, reports the enemy's cavalry, 500 strong, on this side the Cumberland River, at Creelsborough and Rowena. They have seized many citizens and one sick soldier of Colonel Wolford's command.

On receipt of the news last night the general ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, with a portion of Colonel Wolford's cavalry remaining here and a portion of Haggard's regiment, to march to Creelsborough and Rowena. Colonel Wolford, who had advanced to Williams', according to your orders, was sent down to co-operate with Letcher, and Colonel Haggard, who was conveying a large party of Tennesseans from Burkesville to this place, was also ordered in that direction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN BOYLE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

LEBANON, *December 12, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL:

Dispatch from General Boyle just received. His spy sent to Mill Springs, just returned, reports the enemy not over 7,500 strong, according to their statement. Spy believes they are not over 6,500. He was through their camp. They have but eight pieces of artillery.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HDQRS. ELEVENTH BRIGADE, U. S. VOLUNTEERS,  
*Columbia, Ky., December 12, 1861.*

General WARD,  
*Near Green River Bridge:*

GENERAL: General Boyle directs me to write that your communication is received, and, should occasion demand, notice will be immediately given you of the necessity of the advance of your command.

The rebel cavalry have ravaged the country on this side the Cumberland River in the neighborhood of Jamestown and Rowena in a rapid march, killing some citizens and making prisoners of others. Colonels Wolford and Haggard are in close pursuit.

Scouts report the rebels advancing from Glasgow towards this place and citizens confirm the report. No alarm is felt, however. It is said 7,000 are under Hindman at Bear Wallow and Horse Well.

Advices of all movements of the enemy have been transmitted to division headquarters.

The general requests that you will urge the commanding general of this division to send forward to this point a battery and one or two more well-drilled regiments.

Respectfully, &c., your obedient servant,

JOHN BOYLE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH BRIGADE,  
*Near Somerset, Ky., December 12, 1861.*  
(Received December 16, 1861.)

Capt. GEORGE E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

CAPTAIN: Since my arrival at this place I have received Special Orders, No. 23, detaching the Twelfth Brigade from First Division, and requiring me to report direct to department headquarters.

The consolidated reports of the First and Second East Tennessee and Third Kentucky Regiments were forwarded direct to department headquarters. Is it necessary for me to send duplicates to headquarters First Division?

Reports this afternoon say that the rebel Zollicoffer is throwing up defenses this side the river, near Mill Springs. If this is the case, he could be readily captured by sending a force from Columbia via Jamestown to Monticello and taking him in rear.

Unless there is a prospect of doing something very soon, I wish to return to my position in front of Cumberland Gap.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,  
*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding Twelfth Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Somerset, Ky., December 12, 1861.*  
 (Received December 16, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Division, Lebanon :*

GENERAL : Having obtained much information relative to the face of the adjacent country, its roads, streams, and crossings, together with the ranges and haunts of the enemy, I would respectfully offer the following suggestion :

Let a respectable force move from Columbia along the road leading to Somerset until it reaches the salt-works, at the head of Fishing Creek ; by this time its movements will have attracted the attention of the enemy, now on the river near the mouth of this creek.

At this moment let me cross the river with the principal part of my force at a point due south of Somerset (which I can do). The enemy, on being crowded by the Columbia force, will attempt to recross the river, when, with that force in his rear and mine in front (south side of the river), his capture must be certain.

What do you say to this plan ?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPPF,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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[DECEMBER 12, 1861.—General Orders, No. 24, Department of the Missouri. See Series I, Vol. VIII, p. 431.]

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DECEMBER 13, 1861.

General McCook, *Camp Nevin :*

I shall have a regular pontoon bridge ready for Munfordville to-morrow, but may not send it for the present. Will Johnson's arrangements make a bridge that can be depended on permanently ? I don't want anything done in front that will attract any more attention than can be avoided, but be vigilant and ready, without even letting your command know it. Where is cross-roads ?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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DECEMBER 13, 1861.

General NELSON, *New Haven :*

Get your division in hand at the earliest possible moment, so that if called on it may move at once. Report by telegraph and mail what you require—ammunition, transportation, &c.

Examine at once the roads in front of you in all directions.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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DECEMBER 13, 1861.

General THOMAS, *Lebanon :*

What is your latest news from Schoepf, and what does he say ? Has he changed position ? What is the enemy's position ?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*



HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
*Columbia, Ky., December 13, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Headquarters Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I inclose note from Colonel Haggard. See it; read it. Send me two regiments and at least one battery. We will go to the devil before we retreat from here. We can't retreat. The responsibility be on the proper authorities. Shall we be attacked by Zollicoffer and by Hindman at same time? Send us two regiments and two batteries, in addition to the small force of General Ward, and we will take both and move to Glasgow.

My pickets from direction of Glasgow and Edmonton have not returned this morning. I have no news from that direction. If the enemy crosses the Cumberland, I move the forces under my command and give battle at all hazards.

Send up a battery or section of battery. I see no reason in retaining all means of defense and attack at Lebanon, as they must some time be moved in this section.

If you have the power, I shall expect a battery and re-enforcements.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. T. BOYLE,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

[Inclosure.]

CREELSBOROUGH, *December 13, 1861—1 a. m.*  
(Received December 13, 1861.)

General BOYLE:

DEAR SIR: We reached this place at dark, expecting an attack every moment since our arrival. I placed pickets out upon every road reaching this place.

Our pickets from the Rowena road have just come in, bringing us information that is reliable that 300 men had crossed the river at that point this evening and a large force on the opposite bank were crossing (said to be 3,000 at least). Their pickets came in the hearing of ours and returned towards Rowena.

Had you not better send us all the cavalry under your command in Columbia? They have killed several persons at that point and robbed the citizens of the town. Write me immediately what to do.

D. R. HAGGARD,  
*Colonel Cavalry.*

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HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
*Columbia, December 13, 1861.*  
(Received December 14, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Since I wrote you my scouts have returned, and up to 11 o'clock there is no reliable news of interest. My last contains all up to this writing, 2 o'clock p. m.

There are many rumors of advance of the enemy, but I regard them as unfounded; yet there is a prevailing belief here that we are in danger of an attack.

Colonel Wolford was here this morning. The remainder of his cavalry have gone, with their transportation, to Green River, in Casey County.

Wolford was at Jamestown yesterday. The rebels left between 12 o'clock and daylight, before he reached there. They went up the Cumberland on this side. They came down from opposite Mill Springs and passed down to Rowena, at which place they destroyed the ferry flat-boats and canoes gathered there, and killed several Home Guards and robbed the citizens. They robbed several of the stores and houses in Jamestown and made the women give up the shirts and other clothing of their husbands. Jonathan Williams, an old citizen and many years sheriff of this county, was killed. He was a quiet, inoffensive old man, but true to his country.

Colonel Wolford expresses the belief that the enemy have a considerable cavalry force on this side at Mill Springs and only a small body of infantry.

Respectfully,

J. T. BOYLE.

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HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,

*Columbia, Ky., December 13, 1861.*

(Received December 14, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: The people, even the good Union people, circulate the most devilish lies in regard to the enemy, and our own scouts, without they are selected with care, are not reliable. We have had every form of rumor in the last two days, and nearly the whole of them are false. The rebels were at Rowena, and shot two or three men, but killed none. They wounded old man Williams and took him off. They robbed several stores and houses in Jamestown and took off a good deal of clothing. They took off a number of horses with them, and it is reported took off eleven of the citizens.

The scouts and people from Monroe and Allen Counties say there is no enemy in that direction. I keep scouts out for from 12 to 25 miles and even farther. I think it likely the enemy have 350 Texas Rangers in Metcalfe County to-night. They intend to defeat the election. I had purposed to send more cavalry down to enable the people to hold the election. I may send a force to one precinct in the morning.

Colonel Hindman is still at Bear Wallow, so far as I can learn. I cannot hear of any advance in this direction; he cannot be far from the railroad and not very distant from Mumfordsville. I believe it is a feint, to deceive his men with the idea that they are to fight.

Captain Flynt addressed a note to the colonel of the Fifty-ninth Ohio in regard to their wagons. I ordered the colonel to retain the wagons, and he is in no sense to be blamed. I did it for the reason that they have not the necessary transportation, and that there was reason to believe it would be required here.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. T. BOYLE,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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LEBANON, Ky., *December 14, 1861.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

The five companies of First Kentucky Cavalry have not arrived here yet. General Boyle wrote me day before yesterday that he had sent

Colonel Wolford towards Jamestown to watch the enemy. The whole regiment was absent when the order reached Columbia. I think it likely they will be here by to-morrow or next day.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

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LEBANON, Ky.; *December 14, 1861.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

I have received no letter from General Schoepf since the 10th. An officer was here yesterday direct from the Thirty-fifth Ohio. He left Somerset on the 12th. General Schoepf believed at that time that the enemy was returning across the Cumberland, but he could get no positive information, as he could not rely on his cavalry. Schoepf's position is on Fishing Creek, between Somerset and Mill Springs.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 14, 1861.*

Brigadier-General SCHOEPPF,  
*Commanding at Somerset, Ky.:*

GENERAL: General Boyle writes me from Columbia that the enemy's cavalry came down the Cumberland from Mill Springs as far as Jamestown, doing much damage, but returned between 12 o'clock and daylight on the night [morning] of the 12th. He further says that Colonel Wolford reported to him that there is a considerable force of cavalry encamped on this side of the Cumberland, opposite Mill Springs, and that very few of the infantry have crossed.

I also learn from a man who says he has been into their camp that their force is not over 6,500, if that. They have but eight pieces of artillery. I have written to General Buell about the cavalry, but I am afraid with but little success. He has no cavalry which can be relied on very much, and has ordered five companies of Wolford's cavalry to go to Prestonburg.

Respectfully, &c.,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS, *Somerset, Ky., December 14, 1861.*  
(Received December 18, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Since my last communication things have been quiet about Somerset.

This evening my scouts brought in a contraband—a colored boy, about 26 years of age, who states that he is or was the servant of Lieutenant Allen, of a Tennessee regiment, C. S. Army. This boy was sent out from the enemy's camp about 12 m. to-day with the dinner of his master (Lieutenant Allen), then on picket guard, but, mistaking his road, fell into the hands of our scouts.



This is quite an intelligent boy, and gives the following statement: The enemy are principally on this side the river, fortifying at a point near Mill Springs and expecting an attack from us. His force consists of one Alabama regiment (——); one Mississippi regiment (Newman); one Tennessee regiment (Stanton); one Tennessee regiment (Murray); one Tennessee regiment (Curran); one not known (Shaw); one regiment cavalry (Tennessee), Colonel Bridgman; one regiment cavalry, Tennessee (——); three single companies cavalry, Captains Sanson, Bledsoe, and (——). Major Helveti was shot in the arm, and (with 15 men of the Thirty-fifth Ohio) will be sent to Nashville to-day. They have eight pieces of artillery—two brass 6-pounders, four iron guns, is not certain as to their caliber—and two short brass pieces (howitzers). They have two regiments on the other side of the river (infantry and one company of cavalry), the latter kept as scouts.

What shall I do with the contraband?

Very respectfully, yours,

A. SCHOEPF,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *December 15, 1861—12 p. m.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Captain Prime and a Major Helveti were taken prisoners at Somerset. It was not reported to me until I inquired, seeing it published. We are gradually moving up, and have occasionally a few shots with pickets. We shall in a few days have two bridges over Green River; have one now at Munfordville. I shall commence a general inspection this week.

Zollicoffer, whose force may be 6,000 or 7,000, has gone back to his bridge at Mill Springs. Schoepf is between Somerset and Fishing Creek.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, December 15, 1861.*

(Received, Lebanon, *December 15, 1861.*)

General THOMAS:

I want more frequent and accurate information from Somerset. Direct General Schoepf to communicate with you daily and to ascertain what the enemy are doing.

Require the same of General Boyle.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LEBANON, *December 16, 1861.*

General BUELL:

Latest news from General Schoepf, December 12, just received. Enemy encamped at mouth of Fishing Creek. He thinks they can be captured by sending a force against them from Columbia, whilst he crosses the river at Somerset and gets in their rear.

General Boyle writes from Columbia, December 15, that his scouts can neither hear nor see anything of the enemy in the direction of Glasgow or Burkesville. Will send copy of General Schoepf's communication by mail.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

DECEMBER 16, 1861.

General MITCHEL, *Elizabethtown*:

Send one of your brigades to Bacon Creek in the morning, and move your entire division to the same point as soon as convenient.

Captain Bush's battery will go to that point by the train to-morrow morning, to join your division.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 17, 1861.*Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.*:

Would it interfere with your operations if the valley of the Sandy, west of the Big Sandy, should be placed under General Rosecrans?

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *December 17, 1861—5 p. m.*

LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General, Washington*:

Not directly, but the operations in the valley of the Sandy involve to some extent the central part of Kentucky, which cannot well be separated from my contract. I have just organized a brigade for service in the valley of the Sandy, and am this moment giving instructions to the commander, Colonel Garfield, of the Forty-second Ohio, a promising officer, whom I have called here for that purpose. His regiment is on the Sandy by this time, where it will unite with Moore's Kentucky regiment, now there, and Lindsey's Kentucky regiment, now at Greensburg. The other regiment, the Fortieth Ohio, will be at [?] 11 p. m. to-morrow. A squadron of Ohio cavalry will be on the Sandy by Thursday, and the three squadrons of Wolford's Kentucky cavalry will move up through Mount Sterling. These dispositions will, I think, be sufficient for the occasion. I can strengthen them somewhat, if necessary.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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DECEMBER 17, 1861.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
*U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*:

McCook's division, Munfordville; Mitchel's at Bacon Creek. We are doing pretty well. Zollicoffer is either retiring across the Cumberland or is prepared to do it at the approach of any superior force. Any more formidable demonstrations against him would only harass my troops and derange my plans. I am letting him alone for the present.

McCook reports:

The rebels attacked my pickets in front of the railroad bridge at 2 p. m. to-day. The picket consisted of four companies of the Thirty-second Indiana, Colonel Willich, under Lieutenant-Colonel Von Trebra. Their forces consisted of one regiment Texas Rangers, two regiments infantry, one battery (six guns). Our loss, Lieutenant Sachs and 8 enlisted men killed and 16 wounded. The rebel loss, 33 killed, including Colonel Terry, of Texas, and about 50 wounded. The rebels ingloriously retreated.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. ELEVENTH BRIGADE, DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
Columbia, Ky., December 17, 1861.

Brigadier-General THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky. :*

GENERAL: General Boyle is very unwell, and directs me to inform you that nothing important has occurred lately. A brush took place between our pickets 8 miles out at the forks of the Glasgow and Edmonton roads, and a party of Texan Rangers, who had made a circuit through the woods and came on them from towards Columbia. One man on each side was killed, and Captain Frain, formerly connected with the quartermaster's department in Colonel Grider's regiment, taken prisoner by the rebels. He is a most worthy citizen from Monroe County, and has contributed more to the aid of the Government than any man in this section of the country.

A considerable body of cavalry pursued the marauders, but only succeeded in retaking the stock which had been driven off.

General Boyle directs me to say that he has already been ordered by General Buell to send daily communications to General McCook, to be transmitted to department headquarters. The general suggests that it would be better and more expeditious to communicate by mail, which reaches Lebanon daily at noon and Columbia at night; or, if you prefer it, he will send a messenger daily to meet yours at Campbellsville, at Redmond's Tavern, to exchange messages.

The general suggests whether it would not be better to order Wolford's cavalry to Jamestown, in Russell County, 4 miles this side the Cumberland River, or to Rowena, on that stream. They are better acquainted than any other troops with all the roads and by-paths for many miles in that direction.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN BOYLE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
Columbia, December 17, 1861.

Brigadier-General THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky. :*

GENERAL: General Boyle directs me to say that the pickets from near the Cumberland are in, and report a desperate skirmish and hand to hand fight between two of Colonel Haggard's men and a small party of rebels. The men were in a house when attacked, and succeeded in killing six rebels, with the loss only of two fingers to one man. The affair took place on Marrowbone Creek.

The pickets report that Zollicoffer, with his whole force, has crossed the Cumberland at Fishing Creek and marched toward Somerset. This is corroborated by citizens.

A cannonading was heard during the whole of Monday in the direction of Somerset. No other news.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN BOYLE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

LEBANON, KY., December 17, 1861.

Brigadier-General THOMAS, U. S. A.:

SIR: On Sunday, December 14, 9 o'clock a. m., I left Camp Carroll, on Muldraugh's Hill, with a detachment of 25 men of Company E, Tenth



Indiana Regiment, with instructions to scour the country in the neighborhood of Saloma. (Saloma is situated on the Nashville road, about 2 miles west of the Lebanon and Columbia Turnpike, and is 5½ miles from the top of Muldraugh's Hill.) I reached the little village of Saloma at 11 o'clock a. m. Here I could not find out anything of importance, and concluded to go farther.

Persons whom we met on the road informed me that a party of Confederate soldiers, several hundred strong, had stopped at the house of a certain Dan. Williams, about 9 miles southwest from Saloma, on the Nashville road. These statements were confirmed by some of Williams' own neighbors whom we met, and the number of troops was stated to have been 140 men (Texan Rangers, who had crossed Green River at the mouth of Little Barren River).

I went on and arrived at Williams' house about 4 o'clock p. m. On reaching the premises the inmates, who used very violent language, acknowledged that the rebels had stopped there on the night of Friday, December 12. The road and fence near the house bore unmistakable signs of the late presence of a large body of cavalry. I was further informed that several of General Ward's scouts (Captain Payne) had been captured within a hundred yards of the house but a few weeks ago.

Mr. Mitchell, a neighbor of Williams', told me that Williams was now in the Confederate Army, and that on this account General Ward had confiscated some slaves and horses belonging to Williams. I went to the stables, and found there 3 horses, 3 mules, and 2 colts, which I took.

Having instructions to return the same night, and not deeming it safe to go farther (we had marched about 16 miles), I turned back, and re-joined the force under the command of Captain Carroll, encamped on Muldraugh's Hill, twenty-five minutes after 8 o'clock, and delivered the live stock to him.

Yours, very respectfully,

LEWIS JOHNSON,  
*First Lieutenant Company E, Tenth Indiana.*

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CAMP WILLIAMS, *December 17, 1861.*

General THOMAS :

GENERAL: My pickets report an advance of the enemy on Somerset, and that there was heavy firing of cannon in that direction from about 11 o'clock yesterday until dark. I hope General Schoepf has given them a good whipping.\*

Your obedient servant,

FRANK WOLFORD,  
*Colonel First Kentucky Cavalry.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 35. }

HEADQUARTERS DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 17, 1861.*

\* \* \* \* \*

VII. A brigade is hereby formed for duty in Eastern Kentucky, to be constituted as follows :

*Eighteenth Brigade.*

Colonel GARFIELD, commanding.

42d Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Garfield.

40th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Cranor.

14th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Col. L. T. Moore.

— Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Lindsey.

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\* Some personal matter omitted.

Captain McLaughlin's squadron of Ohio cavalry and three squadrons (six companies) of the First Kentucky Cavalry (Colonel Wolford's) are attached to the brigade

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Brigadier-General Buell:

[JAMES B. FRY,]

\* Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS,  
Somerset, Ky., December 17, 1861.  
(Received December 20, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Dept. of the Ohio, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Since my last nothing of interest has occurred. Colonel Hoskins' regiment, Twelfth Kentucky, reoccupies its former position on the river bank.

I shall move forward at day-light to-morrow with four regiments by three different routes in the direction of the enemy's camp, for the purpose mainly of driving in his pickets, gaining information of his strength and position, and of presenting to him an offensive attitude. It may be that the information thus gained will be of that nature as to induce me to attack him in his fortified position at Mill Springs.

I will report to you on my return to-morrow the result of my reconnaissance.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Brigade.*

P. S.—Major Coffee, with the regimental band of the First Kentucky Cavalry (Wolford's), arrived this evening, in search of his regiment, but I could give him no information on the subject.

DECEMBER 18, 1861.

Major-General McCLELLAN, U. S. A.,

*Washington, D. C.:*

The Western Virginia batteries which you ordered do not come. I hear nothing of the Randall companies.

It is of the greatest importance that I should have more force of a good quality in the quartermaster's department. Our transportation will never be ready. I need also a quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance officer to move with me. Can you give me McFerran for one?

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
Columbia, December 18, 1861.

(Received December 18, 1861.)

Brigadier-General THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: General Boyle directs me to say that Colonel Wolford sent a courier to these headquarters at 1.30 o'clock a. m. with the intel-

ligence of the enemy's advancing towards his position from Jamestown. He did not think the danger threatening enough to ask for re-enforcements.

The general sent out scouts on the various roads leading in that direction, who so far have reported no enemy found. Scouting parties of marauders are scouring the whole country. They even approach within 20 miles of this place and slaughter hogs, to transport to the Cumberland. This is done in the direction of Glasgow. The general desires me to say that Colonel Haggard's cavalry are neither fully mounted nor armed. They have only 330 horses for a full regiment, and are not nearly all supplied with weapons. The general wishes to know if they cannot be armed and mounted, and if they are not to be attached to his brigade. It will be difficult to get horses here, as many have been bought up.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN BOYLE,

*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
*Columbia, December 18, 1861.*

(Received December 19, 1861.)

Brigadier-General THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Department of the Ohio:*

GENERAL: General Boyle directs me to say that the rebels are plundering and devastating the country near Edmonton. They seize all the hogs in the country, slaughter them, and pack them with the salt they force the farmers and country merchants to give them. There is no cavalry force here sufficient to clear the country of the marauders, Colonel Haggard's cavalry not being nearly all armed, and it is too distant to send infantry, before whom the enemy's cavalry will clear the country and immediately reappear when our soldiers have returned to camp.

General Boyle directs me to say that he will march two regiments to Edmonton to correct this evil unless specially ordered to desist.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN BOYLE,

*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Somerset, Ky., December 18, 1861.*

(Received December 20, 1861.)

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Lebanon:*

GENERAL: In my communication of yesterday I suggested that I intended to crowd the enemy to-day.

Accordingly at sunrise this morning I proceeded by two columns, one of three regiments and four pieces of artillery under my immediate command and the other of two regiments and two pieces of artillery under command of General Carter.

Proceeding about 3 miles, the road became impassable for artillery and the pieces were left, while I advanced with the infantry to a point about 6 miles farther and about 2½ miles from the enemy's fortified position near Mill Springs, at which point we came in contact with the



enemy's cavalry, and a few shots were exchanged between them and a small detachment of mine under Major Coffee.

General Carter, advancing on the other road (to the south of my route and nearly parallel), proceeded to within about the same distance of the enemy's position, when he met with about 80 of his cavalry, but having no cavalry, General Carter could only use his artillery at long range across Fishing Creek against him, dispersing his cavalry, however, and causing him to make a hasty retreat.

From my own observation, as well as from reliable information obtained from different sources, it is evident that if the enemy will not come out for a field fight, which he does not seem inclined to do, he can only be taken at the point of the bayonet under many disadvantages, and a probable heavy loss of life on our side.

The country adjacent to his intrenchments is of that broken and hilly nature that it would be difficult to get artillery in a commanding position, and, if got there, would be in great danger of being lost unless we were positively certain of success, a retreat with any degree of promptness being impracticable. If, however, we should drive him from his intrenchments, his next move would be to recross the river, and, if he succeeded in doing so, would instantly shell us out of his works from the commanding cliffs on the opposite side of the river.

Again, if I were to cross the river at Waitsborough some 12 miles above Mill Springs, and place myself in his rear on the cliffs and open on him from that point, he would then push his way unmolested to the north and east, and become a troublesome visitor along the route from Somerset to London and toward Cumberland Gap.

Under these circumstances I hardly know what move is best to be made. With my present force I can hold him in check where he is, and perhaps whip him if I can coax him out, which I shall still try to do.

In a former communication you spoke of Wolford's cavalry joining me. It would be extremely desirable to have at least four companies of good cavalry. The two which I have are poorly clad, and armed with only a musket, wholly unsuited to that arm of service. Can you not give me four of Wolford's best companies, with suitable arms? With this addition to my command I should be in a much better condition for service. Major Coffee could command this battalion, and the two companies now here could join their regiment and provide themselves with clothing and more suitable arms.

I avail myself of the mail facilities between this point and your headquarters, for the reason that I have no horses suitable for express services, and the difference in time being so small that not much would be gained by using express.

Should anything urgent occur, however, I will forward by special express by hiring a horse.

I inclose a note just handed me by Colonel Hoskins, now encamped near the river at Waitsborough.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPP,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Kentucky Brigade.*

[Inclosure.]

HDQRS. TWELFTH REGIMENT KENTUCKY VOLUNTEERS,  
*December 18, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. ALBIN SCHOEPP:

GENERAL: To-day I took six of my companies and one section of Captain Hewett's battery and proceeded in the direction of Waits-

borough, leaving the battery and one company on the bluff. With the remaining five companies I proceeded to Waitsborough, but saw no rebels. I found at the river three ferry-boats, which I rendered unseaworthy before leaving my old camp, but not so much so, however, but that they can be repaired in a few hours, which I should have had attended [to] to-day, but hearing the cannonading at Fishing Creek, I hastened back to camp in anticipation of marching orders.

If it be true, as reported, that there is a rebel force of only two regiments at Mill Springs, and that their whole transportation train is at that point, would it not be well to move three regiments with one of the batteries across the river upon them at Mill Springs, while the remaining force could annoy them in front?

Should we gain possession of Mill Springs, I have no doubt we could shell their fortifications on this side the river, while the loss of their army stores, artillery, and transportation train at Mill Springs, consisting of several hundred wagons, would be a blow from which this division of their army could not recover.

I learn there is also a small boat at a point just above the shoals and one other at Steigall's, making in all five boats, in which the artillery and infantry (without baggage train) could be crossed in a few hours, and make the march to Mill Springs in four or five hours.

I hope you will pardon me for thus obtruding my suggestions upon you.

W. A. HOSKINS,  
*Colonel Twelfth Kentucky Regiment.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
*Cairo, December 18, 1861.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON,

*Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dept. of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

CAPTAIN: A man sent by me to Columbus, Ky., and who spent several days there, and also a man who deserted this morning from the steamer *Grampus*, have been in—one this afternoon, the other this evening. They both confirm the report that three of the gunboats have left for the south, and that a great many of the troops are gone. Three regiments, however, have gone but 8 miles to Camp Burnett, on the Clinton road. Three more have gone to re-enforce Bowen at Feliciana. One reports that he heard that the Federals had taken Fort Jackson. I am not aware that any of our naval expeditions have been out long enough to make this story probable, but give it for what it is worth. It confirms news reported by me a few days since.

The army is reported to be composed of boys, badly disciplined and drilled and badly off for shoes. Clothing is coming in from the country, particularly from Arkansas. Many articles of a soldier's rations are becoming scarce, but corn meal and beef are yet abundant. If salt can be kept out, however, they will have some difficulty in saving their bacon.

There are seven companies of the Forty-Fifth Regiment Illinois Volunteers at Camp Douglas, with improved arms for 1,000 men and clothing for the same, who are anxious to come here. If they could consistently be sent before being mustered into the service of the United States I would be much pleased. This application is made because the desire to come has been expressed by the senior officers of this regiment.

I am, captain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,

Columbia, December 19, 1861.

(Received December 20, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: \* \* \* \* As far as I can ascertain, there is no certainty that Zollicoffer is on the other side of the Cumberland. My information one day is that Zollicoffer's whole force [is] on this side and the next day that his whole force is on the other side. I have received a letter from the Cumberland, informing me that W. G. Brownlow was in Fentress County, Tennessee, advancing this way with 1,500 to 2,500 men. I heard two days ago that Brownlow was certainly in jail in Knoxville, and no doubt felt that he would be hung.

There is no reliable news here of interest, except that Morgan or some other rebel is ravaging the county of Metcalfe and toting off the stock of all kinds. Zollicoffer is sending large trains of wagons both into Tennessee and to Celina on the river to be shipped south.

My messenger returned without meeting the messenger from your headquarters.

Respectfully, &amp;c.,

J. T. BOYLE,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

P. S.—You will do me a personal favor and the public a service if you will see that Bramlette and his field officers are supplied with tents and are left without excuse for not staying in camp.

## HEADQUARTERS,

Somerset, Ky., December 19, 1861.

(Received December 25, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: To-day has passed without anything worthy of note. I have seen nothing and heard nothing of the enemy.

One of my regiments is scouting in the direction of the enemy's camp to-night, and may bring in something of interest by morning.

A party of Colonel Hoskins' men returned this morning from a two days' scout on the south side of the river, bringing nine Belgium rifles and a few blankets and knapsacks, taken in a slight skirmish with the enemy on that side of the river.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPT,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Kentucky Brigade.*SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 37. }HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
Louisville, Ky., December 19, 1861.

\* \* \* \* \*

XII. The Eleventh and Twelfth Brigades (Boyle and Carter) will report direct to this office and receive orders from these headquarters.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Brigadier-General Buell:

OLIVER D. GREENE,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*



WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 20, 1861.*Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Do you need more regiments than are now under your orders; if so, how many?

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General.*

LOUISVILLE, KY., *December 21.*L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General:*

I am not willing to say that I need more regiments. I can use more with decided advantage if they can be sent. There are extravagant rumors and great alarm in regard to an invasion of Eastern Kentucky. I regard the rumors as greatly exaggerated. I have no faith in the reports of very heavy columns, but I have no doubt of demonstrations in that direction, and would like to be able to remove even the apprehension of danger.

My inquiry of the Governor of Ohio in regard to his available regiments, if your dispatch alludes to that, was only precautionary, looking beyond the Cumberland, and regarding the campaign up to it as probably brief. The force to operate in that direction should at least not be reduced by detachments. It ought rather to be increased. I will write by mail.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LEBANON, KY., *December 20, 1861.*Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Nothing additional from Somerset up to 17th instant. General Boyle reports all quiet near Columbia. Citizens near Edmonton report constant depredations by the rebels.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 21, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. ALBIN SCHOFPP,  
*Commanding at Somerset, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Yours of the 18th was received yesterday. When you reported to me some days since the position of Zollicoffer I immediately telegraphed to General Buell, and suggested making a move on the enemy in front whilst you crossed the river and attacked him in the rear, but have received no answer from him.

Under the circumstances I think it will be best to keep a close watch on him, and if you can draw him out or catch him off his guard attack him.

It may be that General Buell wishes him to be detained on the Cumberland until the troops on the line to Nashville are ready to move. He has not communicated any of his plans to me, but requires that I shall keep my troops together and be prepared to move promptly in any direction. I will try to send you two of Colonel Wolford's companies from his camp, but you will find them but little better than those you have.

General Boyle writes me that his scouts report that Zollicoffer is sending a large number of wagons to Celina, on the Cumberland, to be shipped west.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Somerset, Ky., December 21, 1861.*  
(Received December 24, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Since my last nothing of interest has occurred. The enemy remains quietly in the vicinity of Mill Springs, in his fortified position. Our pickets sometimes come in view of each other about mid-way, but I have no information to induce me to think that he meditates an attack, while I have refrained from attacking him for reasons before suggested, namely, nothing would be gained by taking his fortified position, while a certain heavy loss of life on our part must necessarily be sustained.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPP,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Kentucky Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 22, 1861.*

General THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon:*

SIR: Acting Brigadier-General Carter reports that by your orders it is forbidden to receive fugitive slaves into camp, and that occasionally slaves belonging to rebels in East Tennessee make their escape from their owners and apply to him for protection and are employed by officers as servants.

The general directs that exceptions be made in regard to fugitives in such cases.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, December 22, 1861.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

A deserter from the Confederate Army has been in this evening. He reports that the militia from Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana are flowing into Columbus by every boat and every train. They are armed with muskets, shot-guns, and ordinary rifles. He also reports the sinking of submarine batteries, shortness of provisions in Columbus, and discontent among the troops.

It has been reported to me that a trade is being carried on with the South by the way of Jonesborough, in this State, thence to the Missis-

issippi River and through Missouri; also that an armed body of desperadoes infest the Illinois shore where these goods are crossed. I have ordered a company of cavalry, raised in the neighborhood of Jonesborough, to the scene of these infractions of the law, with the hope of breaking up this traffic and this body of men. The cavalry will leave to-morrow, taking with them ten days' rations.\*

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

DECEMBER 23, 1861.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, U. S. A.:

MY DEAR FRIEND: I thought proper to give a more regular direction to my reply to the Adjutant-General's telegraphic inquiry in regard to troops for Kentucky. Depend on my extreme caution, and allow me after all to put it into your hands for such disposition as you may think proper. I am about to start to Lebanon to look into Thomas' division. The little affair in front of Munfordville was really one of the handsomest things of the season. Our neighbors in part begin to show signs of being interested. They are destroying the railroads and receiving some re-enforcements; not, I think, to any great amount yet. A dispatch of the 13th, from Memphis, states that 10,000 have been sent to Bowling Green from Columbus, but I do not hear of their arrival. I shall write you soon.

Truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

P. S.—I wrote at length several days ago, since your letter of the 8th.

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 23, 1861.*

General LORENZO THOMAS,

*Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:*

SIR: Some explanation of the condition of things here will enable the General-in-Chief to decide upon the question submitted in your telegraph as to the necessity of more troops in this department.

Our returns show an aggregate of some 70,000—about 57,000 for duty. In these are included several Kentucky regiments not yet mustered in, but doing duty—at least one regiment of cavalry, that is worthless for the present (the Pennsylvania regiment)—and some ten raw regiments from Indiana and Ohio, that I have taken at the solicitation of their Governors, for the purpose of removing them from the demoralizing influences of home and to put them under some system of discipline. These troops, although unfit at this time for active service, have nevertheless a certain moral effect, and are even practically useful as guards to depots, &c. More Kentucky regiments are being consolidated and organized, but the process is tedious, and they generally lack discipline and preparation more than the other troops.

The efficient force may be set down now at about 50,000. Its condition, as regards discipline, may be inferred from the fact that, although it has greatly improved, there are still 5,500 officers and men absent with leave and 1,100 without leave, and there is not much difference between the two classes.

In coming through Cincinnati from Western Virginia some of the

\* Some personal matter omitted.



Ohio regiments dispersed, and of some that came through to this place officers and soldiers put themselves on the cars and went off in contempt of authority until they were stopped by the provost-guard. But this condition of things, I feel assured, is changing. I have found it necessary to make some summary examples, and have instituted courts-martial and board of examination, which will work some good results at least.

In none of the armies of the Government is there so great a lack of experienced officers in every branch of the service. One of the greatest evils I have to contend with is the ill-judged interference of the State authorities for what they erroneously consider the welfare of their troops. A system of direct communication and administration has been going on between them. Agents of various descriptions are sent among the troops, and the effect is in the last degree ruinous. It originated, perhaps, in a want of the proper means of administration on the part of the Government at first, and will, I have no doubt, soon cease. In fact, I think is already in a fair way of disappearing.

The plan which I propose for the troops here is one of defense on the east and of invasion on the south. For the latter I think it will not be necessary for me to do more than suggest that the force ought to be increased rather than diminished. However, a timely and efficient co-operation from other quarters will materially affect this question. For the former I do not think a large force is necessary. An inroad (I should rather say a raid) is now threatened by the way of Prestonburg and Whitesburg. The numbers are variously estimated by rumor. My supposition is that there may be 3,000 men at Whitesburg, and that there probably are 2,000 near Prestonburg. I have no fear that either of them will make any considerable advance into the State even against a weak opposition, but they depredate upon the frontier counties and produce suffering and alarm.

I have now one squadron of Ohio cavalry and one Ohio and two Kentucky regiments of infantry at the mouth of the Sandy to move on Prestonburg, and three squadrons of Kentucky cavalry and one regiment of Ohio infantry moving in the same direction by the way of Paris and Mount Sterling. My orders, on the return of General Nelson, were for one regiment to remain at Prestonburg, and that at the time was supposed to be sufficient, and perhaps would have been if it had remained there; but it was withdrawn to Louisa by the State authorities, to be mustered in, and recently, on the appearance of the force at Prestonburg, retired to the mouth of the Sandy.

It has been so inconvenient to take extraordinary precautions against invasion from the east that I considered it wiser to trust to the chances that they would not be necessary. If I had the means I would put an efficient brigade to operate towards Whitesburg, though it will probably not be necessary if the operations towards Prestonburg are entirely successful, because that will endanger the rear of the rebel force at Whitesburg.

In the absence of such means as I would wish I do not despair of getting together some force that will answer the purpose in a less satisfactory manner, if necessary. I have a new, but I am told a very good, Ohio regiment at Lexington, which can operate in either direction, and hope soon to have more Kentucky regiments that I can use for the same purpose.

The brigade which I had organized in the Cumberland Gap route has been partially deranged by the unauthorized call of General Schoepf on it to re-enforce Somerset. I shall reinstate it as soon as possible.

It can hardly be necessary for me to add that, unless some considerable success is gained in the operations this winter towards Tennessee, large re-enforcements will be required in the spring.

With regard to the attitude of the people of Kentucky, I believe the mass of them are loyal to the Union; and this is not confined to the old men, as has been asserted. Evidence of it may be found in the fact that some 20,000 troops, composed of the best material in the State, are now being organized, and the number could be largely increased. But there are communities in which the rebel element predominates, and it acts with the greatest boldness, from the fact that many of the loyal men have entered the service of the Government.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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COLUMBIA, KY., *December 23, 1861.*

(Received December 25, 1861.)

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

The enemy is closing in upon us; his pickets are near us in three directions, viz, Grider's Ferry, on the Glasgow road, and Somerset. A skirmish took place this evening at Grider's Ferry between 4 of our cavalry and 1 Home Guard against 15 of the enemy. The firing was across the river; 2 or 3 of the enemy and 1 horse killed; no injury to our men. The enemy fled, but returned with re-enforcements, and I have ordered four companies of cavalry to sustain our men.

In direction of Somerset, about 25 miles from this, 500 of the enemy have been encamped for two days. In direction of Glasgow some 200 have been encamped for several days, 20 miles off.

Haggard's cavalry are not in condition for service. His horses are not shod, and it seems impracticable to get it done here. Wolford's cavalry is too remote for any available use, imbedded in the Green River hills.

Typhoid fever is striking our men a heavy blow; 233 of my regiment now down, and dying daily. My loss is greater here than during all the preceding service. Unless we are moved the regiment will soon become greatly weakened. While marching we never have any sick; when we stop the men sicken and fall like leaves. Safety to human life, aside from the defense of the country, demands our moving. If we cannot get to move upon the enemy, it is our earnest desire that he will move on us, and the sooner the better for us. We would rather die in battle than on a bed of fever.

Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE,  
*Colonel, Commanding Post.*

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HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH BRIGADE,  
*Somerset, December 23, 1861.*

(Received December 25, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Captain Fry, Company F, Second Regiment East Tennessee Volunteers, was detailed for special service in October last, by



your orders, and left for Tennessee in company with my brother, Rev. W. B. Carter. I fear that he has been captured by the rebels, and, if not, that he is so environed by them as to leave but little hope of his being able to return to his regiment. His company is of course still without a captain. I wish your advice as to whether it will or will not be advisable, under the circumstances, to have the position filled by a new appointment. I write at the request of the colonel of the Second Regiment.

We are still lying idle, hoping that some move is in progress from Columbia to get in Zollicoffer's rear. The position he holds is said to be a very strong one, and our force in comparison to his is too weak to justify making a diversion so as to attack on both sides the river at same time or to even assault his works on this side. Such, at all events, seems to be the view held by those who ought to have the means of knowing.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. P. CARTER,

*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding Twelfth Brigade.*

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., FIRST DIV., DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
Somerset, Ky., December 23, 1861.

(Received December 24, 1861.)

Capt. GEORGE E. FLYNT,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division, Lebanon, Ky. :*

CAPTAIN : In reply to your communication of the 22d instant I would beg leave to state that upon the arrival of Captain Prime, on or about the 2d December, I proceeded with him to examine the banks of the Cumberland River, with a view of selecting a location for the closed work ordered in your communication of the 30th November.

After a careful examination of the ground Captain Prime was convinced that the river bank presented no suitable location for a work of this nature within the neighborhood where it was desirable to have it.

The ground immediately on the river was too low, and liable to a plunging fire from the enemy's guns on the opposite bluff, while the bluff on this side the river was too elevated to get a sufficient depression of the gun to make it effective on any part of the river, which facts were stated in a communication from Captain Prime to the general commanding the department direct after being submitted to me for perusal.

On the 4th instant Captain Prime, while reconnoitering the enemy's position some 12 miles lower down the river, was (with Major Helveti, First Kentucky Cavalry) captured by the enemy, and the fact reported to the commander of the division in my communication of the 8th instant, this time being allowed to elapse before reporting the case, in the hope that they were only cut off from their party and would make their way back to camp.

The intrenching tools arrived some ten days since.

I await further orders.

Quiet has prevailed around Somerset for the past three days. My scouts extend to the river on the south and to Fishing Creek on the west, sometimes coming in view of the enemy's scouts on the west side of the creek.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPPF,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Kentucky Brigade.*



GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DIST. SOUTHEAST MISSOURI,  
No. 22. } *Cairo, December 23, 1861.*

In pursuance of Special Orders, No. 78, from headquarters Department of the Missouri, the name of this military district will be known as the District of Cairo, and will include all the southern part of Illinois, that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River, and the southern counties of Missouri south of Cape Girardeau.

The force at Shawneetown will be under the immediate command of Col. T. H. Cavanaugh, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, who will consolidate the reports of his command weekly and forward to these headquarters.

All troops that are or may be stationed along the bank of the Ohio, on both sides of the river, east of Caledonia and to the mouth of the Cumberland, will be included in the command, having headquarters at Paducah, Ky.

Brig. Gen. E. A. Paine is assigned to the command of the forces at Bird's Point, Mo.

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For the information of that portion of this command newly attached the following list of staff officers is published :

Capt. John A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general.

Capt. Clark B. Lagow, aide-de-camp.

Capt. William S. Hillyer, aide-de-camp.

Maj. John Riggin, jr., volunteer aide-de-camp.

Capt. R. B. Hatch, assistant quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers, chief quartermaster.

Capt. W. W. Leland, commissary subsistence U. S. Volunteers, chief commissary.

Capt. W. F. Brinek, ordnance officer.

Surg. James Simons, U. S. Army, medical director.

Asst. Surg. J. F. Taggart, U. S. Army, medical purveyor.

Maj. I. N. Cooke, paymaster.

Col. J. D. Webster, chief of staff and chief of engineers.

By order of U. S. Grant, brigadier-general commanding :

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *December 24, 1861—8 p. m.*

General BUELL,

*Lebanon and Lebanon Junction :*

Nothing reported from Munfordville. McCook this afternoon reported the enemy as having retired beyond Cave City. Enemy's pickets at Bell's, 5 miles below Cave City, and that they were obstructing the turnpike. Also that Floyd, with his brigade, had arrived at Bowling Green. McCook asked authority to work on railroad bridge over Green River.

JAMES B. FRY.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., December 25, 1861.*

Hon. R. C. WICKLIFFE,

*House of Representatives, Washington, D. C. :*

DEAR SIR: I have received your letter of the 19th instant, inclosing the copy of a bill now pending in the Senate for raising 20,000 twelve-months volunteers in Kentucky for the defense of the State. You have

done me the honor to ask my views in regard to the measure. I regret that they must differ from your own and from the high authority of the Military Committee and the vote of the House.

The proposition is open to grave objections. It will not produce efficient troops, and will soon break up the regiments already raised. The existing laws for organizing volunteers are better, and under them any necessary force can easily be raised in Kentucky. The special object of the force will operate against its utility. Troops whose obligations are tacitly confined to a sectional object are not apt to conform efficiently to a control whose object is national. In general terms, the force which the bill proposes to create is open to the objections on the score of efficiency and economy, which apply to all temporary levies; and, in addition, is liable to others growing out of peculiar circumstances. I should deprecate the effect of them on Kentucky herself. The war, I hope and believe, will not long remain within her borders; and while it does it is not necessary that it should have entirely the character of civil war.

There is another objection which, although founded as I believe on weighty reasons, partakes perhaps too much of the nature of a sentiment to appear becomingly in an answer to your inquiry. I deprecate the plan of throwing the defense of a State upon her own people. I would see the national force extending protection to every section and the people of every State uniting for the defense of the nation. The claiming of troops according to States is to my mind fraught with evils of serious magnitude, and at least it certainly does impair their tone and efficiency. The effect of the opposite course is always harmonizing and beneficial.

I can hardly expect that any of these reasons will strike you with all the strength of my convictions, and I submit them with great apprehension, lest I may be considered to have stepped beyond the limits which your letter contemplated for me.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Somerset, Ky., December 25, 1861.*

(Received December 27, 1861.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Division, &c., Lebanon, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Nothing has occurred during the last twenty-four hours to attract attention. Everything remains as at last report in my camp, and as far as I can learn the same may be said of that of the enemy.

I shall make another effort to-morrow to draw him out for a fair fight, but with what success I know not, but will report the result.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPPF,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Kentucky Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, December 26, 1861.*

General D. C. BUELL,  
*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

I inclose you herewith an order defining the limits of my command.\* The object is that you may know its extent and to express to you a

\* See p. 515.

desire to co-operate with you as far as practicable, especially in suppressing the smuggling that is now being carried on along the Ohio to some extent with the enemy. I would respectfully request a copy of such orders as you may have published on this subject.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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COLUMBIA, KY., *December 26, 1861.*

(Received December 27, 1861.)

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

The section of artillery under command of Lieutenant Nell was forwarded this morning, as directed. Lieutenant Nell is not able to accompany his pieces, as you will perceive from inclosed certificate of assistant surgeon. Lieutenant Nell has had an attack of fever and not yet recovered. Although on foot and in the camp, he is very feeble, and I fear about to have a relapse. He will be forward, you may rely upon, fully as soon as he ought to in his condition.

The rumor reached here this evening that General Nelson had reached Glasgow. Heavy cannonading was heard here for some six hours on the 24th, which we understand was about Cave City. The enemy had his scouts near us again last night; ours fired on them 8 miles from here, but did no execution, save run them, so far as known.

Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE.

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PADUCAH, *December 27, 1861.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM and General D. C. BUELL:

The whole force at Camp Beauregard commenced going to Bowling Green on the 25th instant. It consists of Bowen's division, say, eight regiments, 6,000 men, with twelve field guns and 500 horse, ordered to be at Bowling Green by the 29th instant. This is reliable.

C. F. SMITH,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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CAMP BOYLE, *December 27, 1861—9 p. m.*

General THOMAS:

The enemy is at Jamestown, 18 miles from here, some 3,000 strong. He has ascertained the strength and position of Colonel Wolford's camp, and threatens to destroy that before moving farther. He has 1,700 mounted men, armed mostly as infantry. With such force Wolford would be cut off without remedy; I have ordered him under the circumstances of necessity to move up here with his stores and troops, to co-operate with me in an attack upon the enemy, should he move toward Burkesville or this place. I would not be surprised if the whole of Zollicoffer's forces were to be on us in two or three days. They must be retiring from before Somerset, either intending to attack here or move down the river to Burkesville, and thence to join Buckner. In either case we intend here to meet him. Our situation is, however, somewhat critical—no artillery, and threatened on both flanks by superior numbers, and nobody to help us.

We will, however, strike a blow, even if left to ourselves, that shall



terrify the rebel hell-hounds wherever they hear of us. Retreat we will not, and if they come upon us we will fight the fight of desperation to win. We have too much stores here to leave, too many sick to move, and they must and shall be defended with the last life we have to spare; and if we, after the frequent notifications of our position to division and department headquarters, are cut to pieces for the want of the necessary means of defense, the fault will not be ours.

Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE,  
*Colonel, Commanding Post.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Somerset, Ky., December 27, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Division, &c., Lebanon, Ky. :*

GENERAL: I have sent out small parties for the last two days before the enemy's position, but he has made no response so far. I have set a trap for his scouts (about 40 men) to-night; if I succeed, it may induce him to attempt a retaliation, ending in a general fight.

Having reason to believe that he contemplates going into the coal business on the Cumberland, I shall send out a party to-morrow and destroy the boats alongshore to the coal banks.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Kentucky Brigade.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
No. 23( $\frac{1}{2}$ ). } *Louisville, Ky., December 27, 1861.*

The issuing of proclamations or other similar addresses to the public by generals or other subordinate officers in this department is prohibited.

By command of General Buell:

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
No. 26. } *Cairo, December 28, 1861.*

Whereas there are now at Cape Girardeau, Paducah, Smithland, and Cave in Rock, places within this military district, many persons who have been driven from their homes and deprived of the means of subsistence by the acts of disloyal citizens of Kentucky and Missouri, and their substance taken for the support of a rebellion against this Government, humanity dictates that these people should be comfortably supported, and justice demands that the class of persons who have caused their sufferings should bear the expense of the same:

It is ordered, therefore, that at the place named suitable quarters shall be provided and contributions collected for their support, and accounted for in the manner prescribed in General Orders, No. 24, from headquarters Department of the Missouri, with this addition:

Persons of Northern birth and education who are liable to assessment

under this order will be taxed 50 per cent. more than Southern men of their class and means.

The refugees at Cave in Rock will be invited and means of transportation provided to Smithland or Paducah.

These contributions will be collected as far out as the military arm can securely extend, and at these distant points will be assessed and collected without the intervening of time between assessment and collection.

Commanding officers at Paducah, Ky., and Cape Girardeau, Mo., are particularly charged with the execution of this order.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

LEBANON, Ky., *December 28, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Colonel Bramlette writes at 7 [9] p. m. last evening, confirming his report of yesterday, that the enemy are at Jamestown, about 3,000 strong. Shall I move down to Columbia to Bramlette's aid? One brigade might be moved and let supplies follow.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

LOUISVILLE, *December 28, 1861.*  
(Received Lebanon, December 28, 1861.)

General THOMAS, *Lebanon:*

Yes, go on, not to his aid, but to the object we discussed; that is what I want done, and to be entirely successful it must be conducted with secrecy and without any tarrying on the road.

Order supplies to be purchased there as well as sent.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

CAMP BOYLE, *December 28, 1861.*

Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS:

The pickets sent out bring in the news that the rebels have fallen back from Jamestown 7 miles, having been frightened by the picket fight at Jamestown, by the impression that the forces here were near Jamestown and in front of their movement.

They will now most likely recross to the south side of the river at Mill Springs, being in 7 miles of that crossing, which is in their possession. They are evidently greatly disturbed by their position, and I think it very probable will now retire, by the same route they came into Kentucky. That they are retreating or about to do so I am well satisfied from the accounts I get of their recent acts in Clinton. They are now seizing everything they can carry off. The inhabitants are fleeing from before their marauding parties, that devastate as they go. This is an evidence of their retiring, being the course pursued by them as they leave. The forces that were at Jamestown are the same that composed the advance guard when they first invaded Kentucky, viz, Stanton and Murray's regiments, with the addition of McRea's regiment of cavalry

added to the cavalry of Bledsoe. That they purposed passing down the river on the north side is ascertained to be certain, and were deterred by supposing that the Third Kentucky, Haggard's, and Wolford's regiments were intercepting them.

I think it possible they may attempt to pass back through Wayne, Clinton, and Cumberland by Burkesville. I will take steps to watch, and if such movement is attempted, will intercept and thwart it at Burkesville.

You may be assured, general, that while I am in the service obedience to orders will mark my actions. But these devils who infest the country make me very impatient to get after them and amongst them, and I can but give [expression] to my anxiety to move upon the marauding traitors.

Colonel Wolford is still at his camp on Green River and will remain there until otherwise ordered from headquarters. His position is dangerous, if the enemy choose to avail themselves of his isolation. It is the most indefensible position that could be selected in 10 miles of that place, and places him where all escape could be wholly cut off.

Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE,  
*Colonel, Commanding Post.*

DECEMBER 29—7 o'clock.

No change since yesterday. The rebels occupy the same position and are seizing all in their reach.

Respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE.

LOUISVILLE, KY., *December 29, 1861—12 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

I had designed 12,000, but when so much depends on circumstances which may arise while our transportation is getting ready it would be vain to say the enemy is not idle; and, as he travels only by railroad, when he gets started he travels faster. I am writing you to-night. Schoepf is not incompetent, but has not shown much enterprise at Somerset. I must reserve my judgment about him. Loath to recommend any colonels yet.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LOUISVILLE, KY., *December 29, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,  
*Commanding U. S. Army:*

MY DEAR FRIEND: It startles me to think how much time has elapsed since my arrival and to find myself still in Louisville. I certainly have had a good deal to do and have been very busy about it, but I am satisfied that very few men accomplish as much as is possible, and I cannot assume to be an exception. It has taken time to get necessary supplies, but transportation is the great trouble I have to deal with. Swords is physically unequal to the emergency, and he has but few assistants. I telegraphed you last night that it would be necessary to make a change, though I did it with very great regret. Dickerson, I am assured, is capable, and he has at least the merit of physical vigor. I hope the transfer will have been made at once. The shortcomings of subordinates I always regard as the fault of the commander, and so I desire to make no excuse for my tardiness out of these delays.



I have this moment received your dispatch. I intend a column of 12,000 men, with three batteries, for East Tennessee; but, as I have telegraphed you, it is impossible to fix a time for it to be there, so much depends on the circumstances which may arise in the mean time.

My unavoidable advance to Green River has thoroughly startled the enemy and he is strengthening himself in men and positions rapidly. C. F. Smith telegraphs me that two brigades, with twelve guns, say 6,000 men, were ordered from Camp Beauregard to beat Bowling Green yesterday, and I have information that Floyd's division, say 6,000, arrived last Thursday. I have information also of the arrival of 10,000 men from Mississippi; but they may be those that Smith tells me of, though my information is that they came through Nashville, which would make it somewhat doubtful. At all events there are doubtless 30,000 men now at Bowling Green; and, unless checked by strong demonstrations and attacks on Columbus and the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, the number can easily be increased to 50,000 or even 60,000 before I can get there. These facts make the co-operation I have in former letters mentioned as important quite essential now to any great success. It is quite essential, too, that the success should be speedy, or otherwise the enemy will be so strong in West Tennessee and Kentucky from Bowling Green to Columbus as to increase our work vastly.

It is my conviction that all the force that can possibly be collected should be brought to bear on that front of which Columbus and Bowling Green may be said to be the flanks. The center, that is, the Cumberland and Tennessee where the railroad crosses them, is now the most vulnerable point. I regard it as the most important strategical point in the whole field of operations. The possession of it secures their force and gives access through the two rivers to the very center of their power. While they hold it, at least two-thirds of the whole force on that front may safely be considered available for any one point that is threatened. This I am satisfied you have seen, and that you perceive the importance of co-operation against the center and flanks.

The movement on East Tennessee attacks their rear, and, if properly supported, promises great results. The first 12,000 must probably be followed by others, particularly as it will be unsafe, if not absolutely impossible, to carry along the outfit for 10,000 men. With it the column would employ some 1,200 teams of all descriptions and occupy a stretch of road that the troops could not protect, to say nothing of the difficulty of foraging so many animals in a country which affords but scanty supplies. These arms must therefore be taken in by installments, or strongly protected at depots, where the volunteers can be organized to receive them.

In any event I must tell you what I have been unwilling to do all along, that you will require more troops in Kentucky. Don't acknowledge this, however, but act on it.

Let me stop for to-night. It is 3 o'clock, and I have to get up at 5 to go to Green River, where McCook telegraphs me he is threatened by a strong force.

Truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

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DECEMBER 29, 1861.

General McCook, *Munfordsville* :

How far on the other side of the river would it be necessary for you to go to secure a strong position or prevent the enemy from taking one?

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General.*

CAMP WOOD, *December 29, 1861.*

General D. C. BUELL:

The hills rise about 2,000 yards in front of me and continue in succession to Cave City. To resist an attack and secure the bridge I am stronger on this side. Only one hill commands my camp, and it is about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  or 2 miles off. I have not reconnoitered beyond the first range. I can have a beautiful play of artillery on the approach to the bridge.

I can take no position in front that cannot be turned by a superior force. My cavalry pickets extend beyond the upper pike.

McCOOK.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, December 29, 1861.*Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division, Lebanon:*

GENERAL: I send you a sketch of the country about Somerset which shows more of the roads than your map.\* We conversed about the movement upon Zollicoffer through Columbia, and if you remember my idea it is hardly necessary to add anything on the subject.

It is for you to move against his left and endeavor to cut him off from his bridge, while Schoepf, with whom of course you must communicate, attacks in front.

The map will indicate the proper moves for that object. The result should be at least a severe blow to him or a hasty flight across the river. But to effect the former the movement should be made rapidly and secretly, and the blow should be vigorous and decided. There should be no delay after your arrival. It would be better not to have been undertaken if it should result in confining an additional force merely to watching the enemy.

Take such portion of the cavalry from Columbia as you think necessary. Draw all the supplies you can from the country and move as light as possible.

Having accomplished the object, be ready to move promptly in any direction, but wait until you hear from me, unless circumstances should require you to move without delay, as I may want you to proceed from there to the other matter about which we have conversed.

Acknowledge the receipt of this by telegraph and report frequently.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*LEBANON, *December 29, 1861—7.20 p. m.*

General D. C. BUELL:

Have just received a dispatch from Colonel Bramlette, dated to-day. He reports a skirmish between a party of Haggard's cavalry and a large party of the enemy last night at Jamestown, 18 miles east of Columbia. Major Owsley, who commanded the party, reports that he learned from their color bearer, who was mortally wounded, that they were on their way to Burkesville. This is confirmed by a note from a Mr. James McKinstry, a citizen of Jamestown, who reports that the enemy had two regiments, and told him they were on their way to Burkesville.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

\*To appear in Atlas.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, December 29, 1861.*

Brigadier-General SCHOEPF,

*Commanding First Brigade, Somerset, Ky.:*

GENERAL: The commanding general of the division directs me to say that he will leave this place on Tuesday for Columbia, and will, if possible, intercept Zollicoffer, who is reported to be marching in that direction. He desires you to keep a good lookout for him, and, if marching as reported, to push him with your troops in the direction of Columbia.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, December 29, 1861.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

On Thursday night I left here to visit Shawneetown and all other points occupied by troops within this military district on the Ohio River. At Shawneetown I found a regiment of cavalry with but few arms, and five companies of the regiment that have not yet been mustered into the service of the United States; also a regiment of infantry, claiming to number over 800 men, still in the State service, with about 400 muskets, that I had previously sent there from arms that had been turned in by troops here to receive better arms. These troops have a large steamer at their service, for which they seem to have no other use than to send up the river after hay for the cavalry horses. The steamer appears to have been chartered by State authority. As a claim will likely come against the Government for all money paid in this way, I would recommend that the Governor of the State be requested to send a mustering officer to muster these troops into the service of the United States, and I can then supply their wants without keeping a large steamer expressly for that purpose.

At Cave in Rock there are many refugees, who have been driven from their homes in Kentucky, and are now living in the cave in very destitute circumstances. The country on the Kentucky side has been nearly stripped of all supplies, the secessionists receiving hay and the Unionists driven from their homes. This portion of Kentucky is within the Department of the Ohio, but is remote from any of the troops of that department. The citizens are very clamorous for Federal protection. There is an encampment of rebels at Hopkinsville, said to number about 3,000 men, poorly armed and equipped, who, if driven out, would save this portion of the State much annoyance. Camp Beauregard (Pelliciana) has been entirely evacuated, the troops going to Bowling Green. This gives re-enforcements to that point of about 7,000 men.

Finding cavalry much needed both at Paducah and Smithland, I have ordered up five companies from here; also ordered two companies to Cape Girardeau, to replace those ordered to Carondelet.

There is evidently great dissatisfaction among the troops of General Jeff. Thompson. There have been recently between 300 and 400 of his men come into Cape Girardeau and voluntarily applied to take the oath of allegiance to the Government. They express themselves anxious to retire to their homes and live in quiet.

I have had a man in Columbus last week who succeeded in completing



a map of the enemy's works, which I have every reason to believe is as accurate as it is possible to get before Columbus falls into our possession.

The floating battery has been removed to New Madrid. Many of the best-disciplined troops have been removed, and their places supplied by militia. This informant says that he heard a planter remark that many of the troops were now distributed in squads of 20 and over upon the plantations in the South to repress insurrection. Being able to speak the German language, he learned that there are about 1,200 of that nationality who, with some 600 Irish, intend to turn upon the garrison as soon as they feel there is any security in doing so when an attack is made. I am well aware, however, that it will not do to rely upon this sort of support.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 30, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I received your letter of the 29th with the map. Have made arrangements to move as light as possible, and hope to get started to-morrow, although with raw troops and raw mules I fear there will be some difficulty. I have but few wagons over and above the regimental wagons. The provisions will have to be hauled with hired teams until Captain Mackay can have time to break in his raw mules, which I fear will delay us much longer than we should be delayed. I have been told that the country we are going to is very poor, and it will be necessary to pass through speedily should we attempt to penetrate to Knoxville. I will therefore submit for your consideration if it would not be a better move for my main force to go down the river (should we succeed with Zollicoffer) as far as Burkesville, take to that place subsistence enough to last us to Nashville, place the subsistence on flat-boats, and march with a light train in two columns, one on each side of the river; the provisions and extra forage being floated down the river in boats under a strong guard.

The enemy being thus threatened on their rear and right, would greatly aid your advance in their front, and should they make a determined stand at Bowling Green, I might with my column cut off their retreat at Gallatin.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *December 31, 1861.*

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

General McClellan is sick. Are General Buell and yourself in concert? When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being re-enforced from Columbus? A simultaneous movement by you on Columbus might prevent it.

A. LINCOLN.

(Similar dispatch to Buell same date.)

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,  
Somerset, Ky., December 31, 1861.  
(Received January 4, 1862.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Kentucky Division:*

GENERAL: I have received your instructions of 30th instant. Have heard of Zollicoffer's contemplated move to-day, but doubt whether he will move towards Columbia; he not having had the courage to accept the invitation of my small force, would barely place himself in the unsafe position between our combined forces.

I have scouts out on the Harrison road, and as soon as he attempts to move I will be apprised of it in time to act in concert with you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Vols., Commanding First Brigade.*

*Abstract from return of the District of Cairo, commanded by Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, for the month of December, 1861.*

Station.	Present for duty.							Pieces of field artillery.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.		Aggregate.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
Bird's Point, Mo. ....	139	3,228	39	758	9	212	4,385	6
Cairo, Ill. ....	176	3,819	43	874	7	102	5,021	6
Cape Girardeau, Mo. ....	54	1,298	11	250	6	183	1,782	
Fort Holt, Ky. ....	67	1,516	6	149	3	106	1,677	
Mound City, Ill. ....	29	524					553	
Shawneetown, Ill. ....			35	923			956	
Total.....	465	10,215	132	2,964	25	603	14,374	12

*Distribution of troops in the District of Cairo, December 31, 1861.*

BIRD'S POINT, MO.

8th Illinois, Col. R. J. Oglesby.  
11th Illinois, Col. W. H. L. Wallace.  
20th Illinois, Col. C. C. Marsh.  
22d Illinois, Col. H. Daugherty.  
10th Iowa, Col. N. Perczel.  
7th Illinois Cavalry (battalion).  
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery B,  
Capt. Ezra Taylor.  
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery C,  
Capt. Charles Houghtaling.

CAIRO, ILL.

18th Illinois, Col. M. K. Lawler.  
27th Illinois, Col. N. B. Buford.  
29th Illinois, Col. James S. Rearden.  
30th Illinois, Col. P. B. Fonke.  
31st Illinois, Col. John A. Logan.  
48th Illinois, Col. I. N. Haynie.  
4th Illinois Cavalry.  
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery G,  
Capt. A. O'Leary.  
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery E,  
Capt. A. Schwartz.

CAPE GIRARDEAU, MO.

17th Illinois, Col. L. F. Ross.  
11th Missouri, Col. J. B. Plummer.  
7th Illinois Cavalry (detachment).  
Murdock's Mounted Rifles.  
2d Illinois Light Artillery, Battery F,  
Capt. John W. Powell.  
Campbell's Battery.

FORT HOLT, KY.

7th Illinois, Col. John Cook.  
28th Illinois, Col. A. K. Johnson.  
2d Illinois Cavalry (two companies).  
1st Illinois Light Artillery, Battery D,  
Capt. E. McAllister.

MOUND CITY, ILL.

10th Illinois, Col. J. D. Morgan.

SHAWNEETOWN, ILL.

6th Illinois Cavalry, Col. T. H. Canaugh.

WASHINGTON CITY, *January 1, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville:*

General McClellan should not yet be disturbed with business. I think you better get in concert with General Halleck at once. I write you to-night.\* I also telegraph and write Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

LOUISVILLE, KY., *January 1, 1862.*

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President:*

There is no arrangement between General Halleck and myself. I have been informed by General McClellan that he would make suitable disposition for concerted action. There is nothing to prevent Bowling Green being re-enforced from Columbus if a military force is not brought to bear on the latter place.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

WASHINGTON CITY, *January 1, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

General McClellan should not yet be disturbed with business. I think General Buell and yourself should be in communication and concert at once. I write you to-night and also telegraph and write him.

A. LINCOLN.

LOUISVILLE, *January 1, 1862—11 p. m.*

President LINCOLN:

I have already telegraphed General Halleck with a view to arranging a concert of action between us and am momentarily expecting his answer.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, MO., *January 1, 1862.*

To His Excellency ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President:*

I have never received a word from General Buell. I am not ready to co-operate with him. Hope to do so in few weeks. Have written fully on this subject to Major-General McClellan. Too much haste will ruin everything.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Somerset, Ky., January 1, 1862.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

GENERAL: In compliance with your instructions I have advised Captain Fry of the state of things about Somerset to day, which amounts to nothing positive relative to the enemy further than a strong probability that he has no intention of moving from the vicinity of Mill



Springs unless he is crowded, in which case he will probably recross the river. At present, however, it appears evident that he is preparing for winter quarters where he is. Your movement may change his plans.

I am credibly informed that Buckner sent to him very recently requesting a few regiments to re-enforce him, which request was not complied with, Zollicoffer declining to move in that direction either in whole or in part.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Kentucky Brigade.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE.

*January 2, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, U. S. A., *Louisville, Ky.:*

It is represented that the citizens of Union and Crittenden Counties, Kentucky, suffer much from depredations by rebels, and need protection. What do you think of sending two unemployed regiments from Illinois under your orders to be used for their protection? Answer soon.

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, January 2, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

I have had no instructions respecting co-operation. All my available troops are in the field except those at Cairo and Paducah, which are barely sufficient to threaten Columbus, &c. A few weeks hence I hope to be able to render you very material assistance, but now a withdrawal of my troops from this State is almost impossible. Write me fully.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

PADUCAH, KY., *January 2, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM:

A reconnaissance to within a few miles of Camp Beauregard shows that the troops that left for Bowling Green have been replaced by two-months' men from Mississippi. Pillow's division ordered to Bowling Green, but returned, and go in winter quarters.

C. F. SMITH.

[Repeated by General Cullum to General Buell January 3.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

*Washington, January 3, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

*Commanding Department of Missouri:*

GENERAL: It is of the greatest importance that the rebel troops in Western Kentucky be prevented from moving to the support of the force in front of General Buell. To accomplish this an expedition should be sent up the Cumberland River, to act in concert with General Buell's command, of sufficient strength to defeat any force that may be brought

against it. The gunboats should be supported by at least one and perhaps two divisions of your best infantry, taken from Paducah and other points from which they can best be spared. At the same time such a demonstration should be made on Columbus as will prevent the removal of any troops from that place; and, if a sufficient number have already been withdrawn, the place should be taken. It may be well also to make a feint on the Tennessee River, with a command sufficient to prevent disaster under any circumstances.

As our success in Kentucky depends in a great measure on our preventing re-enforcements from joining Buckner and Johnston, not a moment's time should be lost in preparing these expeditions.

I desire that you give me at once your views in full as to the best method of accomplishing our object, at the same time stating the nature and strength of the force that you can use for the purpose and the time necessary to prepare.

Very respectfully,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN, .  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

JANUARY 3, 1862.

General LORENZO THOMAS,

*Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. :*

Two regiments alone could only remain at Caseyville through the inactivity of the superior force of the enemy at Hopkinsville. That is possible; but if it should happen otherwise, it would be inconvenient to re-enforce them. It would not be quite so bad at Uniontown. The frequent presence of a gunboat up the river would have almost as good an effect.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, KY., *January 3, 1862.*

General CULLUM,

*Chief of Staff, Saint Louis, Mo. :*

Do I understand that one division has come to Bowling Green, and that another (Pillow's) was ordered, but countermanded, or that no re-enforcements at all have come from Camp Beauregard? Where does Pillow go into quarters and what is his strength?\*

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, January 3, 1862.*

General H. W. HALLECK, U. S. A.,

*Commanding Department of Missouri :*

MY DEAR GENERAL: I received your dispatch, and with more delay than I meant proceed to the subject of it, in compliance with your request, and I may add also at the wish of the President. I do not under-rate the difficulties in Missouri, but I think it not extravagant to say that the great power of the rebellion in the West is arrayed on a front, the flanks of which are Columbus and Bowling Green and the center about where the railroad between those points crosses the Tennessee

\* See Smith to Cullum, January 2, p. 527.

and Cumberland Rivers, including Nashville and the fortified points below. It is, I have no doubt, within bounds to estimate their force on that line at 80,000 men, including a column about Somerset, Ky. In rear of their right flank it is more. Of this force 40,000 may be set down as at Bowling Green, 20,000 at Columbus, though you doubtless have more information on that point than I have, and 20,000 at the center. Considering the railroad facilities, which enable the enemy to concentrate in a few hours on any single point of this front, you will at once see the importance of a combined attack on its center and flanks, or at least of demonstrations which may be converted into real attacks, and fully occupy the enemy on the whole front. It is probable that you may have given the subject, as far as Columbus and the center are concerned, more attention than I have. With reference to the former at least I can make no more than the general suggestion already expressed, that it should be fully occupied.

The attack upon the center should be by two gunboat expeditions, with, I should say, 20,000 men on the two rivers. They should of course be organized with reference to the depth of water in the rivers, and whether they should be of equal or unequal strength would depend on that and other considerations, and can hardly be determined until the moment of departure. The mode of attack must depend on the strength of the enemy at the several points and the features of the localities. It will be of the first importance to break the railroad communications, and, if possible, that should be done by columns moving rapidly to the bridges over the Cumberland and Tennessee. The former probably would not be reached at first, being some 31 miles above the first principal battery that I know of, at Dover. The other is 18 miles above Fort Henry, the first I know of on the Tennessee.

If the expeditions should not be strong enough to do the work alone, they should establish themselves firmly at the nearest possible point, and remain at least until they ascertained that re-enforcements from my columns or some other source would not reach them. By resisting they could establish themselves permanently under the protection of the gunboats.

I say this much rather to lay the subject before you than to propose any definite plan for your side.

Whatever is done should be done speedily, within a few days. The work will become more difficult every day. Please let me hear from you at once.

Very truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 51. }

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
Louisville, Ky., January 3, 1862.

I. Brigade the Nineteenth is hereby constituted as follows:

Col. W. B. HAZEN, 41st Ohio Volunteers, commanding.

41st Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Hazen.

46th Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Fitch.

47th Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Slack.

6th Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Whitaker.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of General Buell:

[JAMES B. FRY,]  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*



HEADQUARTERS,  
*Saint Louis, January 4, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL:

I have no other information than that sent, which was in the exact words received. General Smith can perhaps give you more particulars.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General, Chief of Staff.*

COLUMBUS, KY., *January 4, 1862.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS:

I send you the inclosed, which has just reached me. It is from one of the most reliable men in Kentucky, cashier of the Branch Bank of Louisville at Burkesville:

The recent rains will raise the river so that Zollicoffer cannot be re-enforced for several days, and by a rapid movement upon him his forces on this side the river might be cut off and captured before aid could be thrown across to him, and then the reinforcements could be met and also cut off or driven back. The rise in the river will temporarily destroy their floating bridge.

In haste, respectfully,

THO. E. BRAMLETTE,  
*Colonel Third Regiment Kentucky Volunteers.*

WASHINGTON, *January 4, 1862.*

General BUELL:

Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee? Please tell me the progress and condition of the movement in that direction. Answer.

A. LINCOLN.

LOUISVILLE, KY., *January 5, 1862.*

To the PRESIDENT:

Arms can only go forward for East Tennessee under the protection of an army. My organization of the troops has had in view two columns with reference to that movement: a division to move from Lebanon and a brigade to operate offensively or defensively, according to circumstances, on the Cumberland Gap route; but it was necessary also to have regard to contingencies which, before the transportation, arms, &c., could be ready, might require a modification of the plan. The time and manner of the movement must still be subject to such contingencies, though I hope to inaugurate it very soon. Our transportation and other preparations have been delayed far beyond my expectations and are still incomplete. The arms—foreign ones, requiring repairs—arrived a week or more ago, and are now being put in order by the ordnance officer.

While my preparations have had this movement constantly in view I will confess to your excellency that I have been bound to it more by my sympathy for the people of East Tennessee and the anxiety with which you and the General-in-Chief have desired it than by my opinion of its wisdom as an unconditional measure. As earnestly as I wish to accom-

plish it, my judgment has from the first been decidedly against it, if it should render at all doubtful the success of a movement against the great power of the rebellion in the West, which is mainly arrayed on the line from Columbus to Bowling Green, and can speedily be concentrated at any point of that line which is attacked singly.

D. C. BUELL.

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[Confidential.]

WASHINGTON, *Monday, January 6, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

MY DEAR GENERAL: You will have learned ere this that Colonel Cross has been ordered to relieve Colonel Swords, and that two or three active young quartermasters from the Regular Army have been ordered to report to you. Two hundred wagons from Philadelphia have been ordered to you, and Meigs is stirring up the country generally to procure means of transportation for you. There are few things I have more at heart than the prompt movement of a strong column into Eastern Tennessee. The political consequences of the delay of this movement will be much more serious than you seem to anticipate. If relief is not soon afforded those people we shall lose them entirely, and with them the power of inflicting the most severe blow upon the secession cause.

I was extremely sorry to learn from your telegram to the President that you had *from the beginning attached little or no importance* to a movement in East Tennessee.\* I had not so understood your views, and it develops a radical difference between your views and my own, which I deeply regret.

My own general plans for the prosecution of the war make the speedy occupation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green and Nashville are in that connection of very secondary importance at the present moment. My own advance cannot, according to my present views, be made until your troops are solidly established in the eastern portion of Tennessee. If that is not possible, a complete and prejudicial change in my own plans at once becomes necessary.

Interesting as Nashville may be to the Louisville interests, it strikes me that its possession is of very secondary importance in comparison with the immense results that would arise from the adherence to our cause of the masses in East Tennessee, West North Carolina, South Carolina, North Georgia, and Alabama, results that I feel assured would ere long flow from the movement I allude to.

Halleck, from his own account, will not soon be in a condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland. Why not make the movement independently of and without waiting for that?

I regret that I have not strength enough to write a fuller and more intelligible letter, but this is my very first effort at writing for somewhat more than two weeks.

In haste, my dear general, very truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

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\* See Buell to McClellan, January 13, 1862, p. 548.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 6, 1862.*

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President of the United States:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of the 1st instant\* on the subject of a concert of action between General Halleck and myself.

I had already written to him on the subject, which, as you rightly suppose, is of the very highest importance.

With very high respect, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 6, 1862.*

To His Excellency the PRESIDENT:

In reply to your excellency's letter of the 1st instant,† I have to state that on receiving your telegram I immediately communicated with General Buell and have since sent him all the information I could obtain of the enemy's movements about Columbus and Camp Beauregard. No considerable force has been sent from those places to Bowling Green. They have about 22,000 men at Columbus, and the place is strongly fortified. I have at Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah only about 15,000, which, after leaving guards at these places, would give me but little over 10,000 men with which to assist General Buell. It would be madness to attempt anything serious with such a force, and I cannot at the present time withdraw any from Missouri without risking the loss of this State. The troops recently raised in other States of this department have without my knowledge been sent to Kentucky and Kansas.

I am satisfied that the authorities at Washington do not appreciate the difficulties with which we have to contend here. The operations of Lane, Jennison, and others have so enraged the people of Missouri, that it is estimated that there is a majority of 80,000 against the Government. We are virtually in an enemy's country. Price and others have a considerable army in the Southwest, against which I am operating with all my available force.

This city and most of the middle and northern counties are insurrectionary—burning bridges, destroying telegraph lines, &c.—and can be kept down only by the presence of troops. A large portion of the foreign troops organized by General Frémont are unreliable; indeed, many of them are already mutinous. They have been tampered with by politicians, and made to believe that if they get up a mutiny and demand Frémont's return the Government will be forced to restore him to duty here. It is believed that some high officers are in the plot. I have already been obliged to disarm several of these organizations and I am daily expecting more serious outbreaks. Another grave difficulty is the want of proper general officers to command the troops and enforce order and discipline, and especially to protect public property from robbery and plunder. Some of the brigadier-generals assigned to this department are entirely ignorant of their duties and unfit for any command. I assure you, Mr. President, it is very difficult to accomplish much with such means. I am in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge with a dull ax, a broken saw, and rotten timber. It is

\* Not found, but see telegram, p. 526.

† See p. 926.



true that I have some very good green timber, which will answer the purpose as soon as I can get it into shape and season it a little.

I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull Run. To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read.

General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

[Indorsement.]

The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done.

JANUARY 10, 1862.

A. LINCOLN.

SAINT LOUIS, *January 6, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I have delayed writing to you for several days in hopes of getting some favorable news from the Southwest. The news received to-day, however, is unfavorable, it being stated that Price is making a stand near Springfield, and that all our available forces will be required to dislodge and drive him out. My advices from Columbus represent that the enemy has about 22,000 men there. I have only about 15,000 at Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and after leaving guards at these places I could not send into the field over 10,000 or 11,000. Moreover, many of these are very imperfectly armed. Under these circumstances it would be madness for me to attempt any serious operation against Camp Beauregard or Columbus. Probably in the course of a few weeks I will be able to send additional troops to Cairo and Paducah to co-operate with you, but at present it is impossible; and it seems to me that if you deem such co-operation necessary to your success your movement on Bowling Green should be delayed. I know nothing of the plan of campaign, never having received any information on the subject; but it strikes me that to operate from Louisville and Paducah or Cairo against an enemy at Bowling Green is a plain case of exterior lines, like that of McDowell and Patterson, which, unless each of the exterior columns is superior to the enemy, leads to disaster ninety-nine times in a hundred.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 6, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Cairo, Ill.:*

I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield and in the direction of Murray. Forces from Paducah and Fort Holt should meet at Mayfield and threaten Camp Beauregard and Murray, letting it be

understood that Dover is the object of your attack. But do not advance far enough to expose your flank and rear to an attack from Columbus, and by all means avoid a serious engagement.

Make a great fuss about moving all your forces towards Nashville, and let it be so reported by the newspapers.

Take proper precaution to deceive your own men as well as the enemy. Let no one, not even a member of your own staff, know the real object. I will send you some forces from this place to increase the deception. Let it be understood that 20,000 or 30,000 men are expected from Missouri, and that your force is merely the advanced guards to the main column of attack. The object is to prevent re-enforcements from being sent to Buckner. Having accomplished this, you will slowly retire to your former positions, but, if possible, keep up the idea of a general advance.

Be very careful, however, to avoid a battle; we are not ready for that; but cut off detached parties and give your men a little experience in skirmishing.

If Commodore Foote can make a gunboat demonstration at the same time it will assist in carrying out the deception.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 6, 1862.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON,

*Asst. Adjt. Gen., Dept. of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

CAPTAIN: From information just received from Columbus the garrison there is now reduced from what it was a few weeks ago by the withdrawal of the sixty-days' men, who are supposed many of them to have gone to Camp Beauregard. This leaves a force of probably thirty regiments in Columbus. General Pillow has resigned and gone to his home, in consequence of being ordered to Bowling Green.

The rebels have a chain across the river about 1 mile above Columbus. It is sustained by flats at intervals, the chain passing through staples placed about the water's edge, the chain passing under the boats. Between each pair of the boats a torpedo is attached to the chain, which is expected to explode by concussion.

An experiment was made with one of these machines about ten days ago by directing a coal-boat against it. The experiment resulted satisfactorily to the enemy. The position of them being so distinctly marked cannot be regarded as much of an obstacle. Others are supposed to be planted in the river above these, not so distinctly located. From information received through a gentleman up from Memphis there are about 600 torpedoes in the river from Columbus to that city.

There are quite a number of soldiers in the guard-house here for desertion, disorderly conduct, &c. I would suggest, in view of the difficulty of getting men for the gunboat service, that these men be transferred to that service; also that authority be given to transfer unruly men hereafter. I have spoken to Commodore Foote on the subject, and I believe it meets with his approval.

If it meets with the approval of the general commanding the department, I would be pleased to visit headquarters on business connected with this command.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *January 7, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

A gentleman called yesterday from Kentucky, stating he had been sent by one of your officers to ask more troops. How many more do you want and of what kind? We are exceedingly anxious to have some result in Kentucky, especially towards East Tennessee.

SIMON CAMERON,  
*Secretary of War.*

LOUISVILLE, *January —, 1862.*

SECRETARY OF WAR:

No person has been sent to ask for more troops. Undoubtedly there ought to be more, and better artillery and better cavalry, but I shall work with what I have, and as soon as possible. Concert of action, by which the enemy may be prevented from concentrating his whole force from Columbus to Bowling Green on one point of attack, would have the same and a better effect than more troops immediately here.

D. C. BUELL.

WASHINGTON, *January 7, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville:*

Please name as early a day as you safely can on or before which you can be ready to move southward in concert with Major-General Halleck. Delay is ruining us, and it is indispensable for me to have something definite. I send a like dispatch to Major-General Halleck.

A. LINCOLN.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 7, 1862—(midnight).*

ABRAHAM LINCOLN, *President, Washington:*

I have asked General Buell to designate a day for a demonstration to assist him. It is all I can do till I get arms. I have no arms. I have sent two unarmed regiments to assist in the feint. I wrote you yesterday and will write again to-night.\*

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
*Columbia, Ky., January 7, 1862.*

General THOMAS:

SIR: A rebel steamboat passed Burkesville yesterday at 12 o'clock, loaded with men and cannon and other arms, clothing, &c.

I send 300 cavalry to heights on this side to intercept it, if possible. I will move with 300 of Third Kentucky and the Nineteenth Ohio to an advantageous position at the mouth of Renick's Creek, 2½ miles above Burkesville, on the Cumberland. I shall move the whole force here to Burkesville. It is only 4 miles farther from Glasgow than Columbia. I am not willing to see the Cumberland surrendered, without a struggle, to Zollicoffer and the rebel invaders. If this movement is wrong, it can

\* Letter not found.



be censured. I know it will be right if we whip the scoundrels and wrong if otherwise. More boats are expected up. If we delay much longer the enemy will have time to bring his re-enforcements from Texas and Louisiana.

We have no cannon, and must rely on our rifles to take off the men from the boats. With one piece of artillery the boats could be torn to atoms or sunk.

Can you not send me a section of a battery? I have ordered your commissary to supply rations to the troops about to move.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. T. BOYLE,  
*Acting Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,  
*Somerset, January 7, 1862.*  
(Received January 8, 1862.)

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Eastern Division:*

GENERAL: I have received your instructions of January 1, 1862, yesterday.

On the 1st I made a sketch of the enemy's position and a statement of my views of an advantageous attack. You having received from General Buell orders how to attack; I send you this now not as a suggestion but as information of the country surrounding the enemy. The position at Somerset, while it may be regarded as a strong position for a force of 7,000 or 10,000 infantry, with one or two batteries, is assailable with a less force, from the fact that there is no one point of sufficient strategic importance upon which the whole force could be concentrated and command the surrounding heights. It is also rendered assailable from the number of approaches to the place, passable roads for infantry, cavalry, and artillery leading into Somerset from every direction.

The same may be said of the position of the rebel forces stationed at Mill Springs, upon the south side of the Cumberland River, and at Beech Grove, upon the north side of the river. At Mill Springs the rebel force is represented as numbering 3,000, at which point they have constructed earth fortifications upon three sides; the north angle of the square being fortified by the precipitous bluffs of the Cumberland River.

The area embraced within said fortifications cannot be less than 400 acres, making a line to be defended of  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles. The fortifications on the north side the river extend across a narrow neck of land between the main Cumberland River and White Oak Creek, and consist of intrenchments about 1 mile in length.

The timber upon the north of the intrenchments for a distance of three-fourths of a mile has been thrown so that there is no approach except by the narrow road in front, while the hope of a flank movement is futile, as the precipitous bluffs of the Cumberland upon the east and those of White Oak Creek upon the west render a flank movement of infantry impossible.

Had we a force of 10,000 men at this place we could then station behind fortifications at the two crossings of Fishing Creek (Hudson's and Salt-works), 2,500 each, while with the remaining force of 5,000 we could cross the Cumberland at Waitsborough upon coal-barges, with which a bridge could soon be constructed, and by a forced march of the 5,000 infantry and two batteries secure the position A, which commands both the Mill Springs and Beech Grove encampments; also the cross-

ing at Mill Springs. Once the fire was opened upon them at Mill Springs, should they attempt to recross, the forces from the north side the Cumberland having only three small flats of capacity insufficient to cross 50 men each and requiring fully one-half hour to cross and recross, the whole force would fall an easy prey to us. They have also a large quantity of army stores collected at Captain West's, consisting of bacon, wheat, corn, &c., while their main transportation train at Mill Springs, consisting of 1,000 wagons, horses, mules, and cattle, is certainly an object of acquisition. Should Zollicoffer not attempt to recross the Cumberland upon our opening fire upon Mill Springs, but remain an idle spectator until that place was reduced, our guns could then be turned upon him, and the distance across to his encampment from point A not exceeding  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles, it would be within range of our guns.

The movement above indicated is preferred from the fact that it will in the first place secure a position which will command both encampments, and at the same time cuts off the retreat of the forces at Mill Springs, while, should Zollicoffer attempt to escape by abandoning his intrenchments and a move north, he would either fall upon our strong position at Fishing Creek or else move in the direction of Jamestown, either of which would prove alike disastrous to him.

I would suggest that the movement should be made without baggage train, and, as position A is distant from Somerset only 18 miles, we might move down to the Cumberland at Waitsborough and make a feint by throwing up fortifications until night-fall, when our boats should descend to that point, the bridge be constructed, and the crossing effected in about four hours.

In the mean time a reliable force, consisting of one or two companies, should be crossed at the north of the South Fork of the Cumberland, and fall into the main road at Weaver's, 7 miles from Waitsborough, returning in the direction of Waitsborough, taking in the rebel pickets as they return, which if accomplished, the position A could be secured by a march of three hours from Waitsborough. I inclose you the sketch referred to in my letter.\*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPP,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 8, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Your instructions of the 6th were received this morning and immediate preparations made for carrying them out. Commodore Foote will be able to co-operate here with three gunboats. Two others will go up the Tennessee, with a transport accompanying, having on board a battalion of infantry and one section of artillery. General C. F. Smith will move upon Mayfield, and the cavalry from here and probably two regiments of infantry will effect a junction with him there. From this point I have instructed General Smith to threaten Camp Beauregard and Murray, but in such a way as to make it appear that the latter and probably Dover [Fort Donelson] are the points in the greatest danger. General Smith is informed that re-enforcements are to arrive from Saint Louis, and that I will occupy the ground from Fort Jefferson to Blandville, and cut off all probability of an attempt to get on his flank or in his rear from

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\* See p. 946.



Columbus. The continuous rains for the last week or more have rendered the roads extremely bad, and will necessarily make our movement slow. This, however, will operate worse upon the enemy, if he should come out to meet us, than upon us.

I will probably send two steamers to a point below Island No. 1, where there is a better road leading directly to Columbus, and one leading into the back country, intersecting other roads leading to the same place. The troops on these steamers will be fully protected by the gunboats, and will not go far from their transports.

I have not prepared instructions for the troops moving from this place, as I will be along and may have to vary from any plan that could now be drawn up. This movement will be commenced to-morrow, and every effort made to carry out your design.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Somerset, Ky., January 8, 1862.*

Capt. GEORGE E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, First Division, Columbia, Ky. :*

CAPTAIN: To-day's work consists in making a reconnaissance with a large force (sent out last night) in front of the enemy's position at Fishing Creek, and the capture of two of his cavalry, with the supposed wounding of several others. My object was to cut off and secure his foraging train, but the bad roads and high water in the creeks prevented my plans being fully carried out.

Heavy firing has been heard during the day in the direction of Mill Springs, but it is supposed to be in honor of the day, as there can be none of our forces in that vicinity.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. S. EVERETT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 4. }

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 8, 1862.*

\* \* \* \* \*

VII. The following organization of brigades will be observed until further orders :

*Twentieth Brigade.*

Colonel FORSYTH, commanding.

64th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Forsyth.  
65th Regiment Ohio Volunteers, Colonel Harker.  
51st Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Streight.  
— Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Landram.

*Twenty-first Brigade.*

Colonel CARR, commanding.

40th Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Wilson.  
57th Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel McMullen.  
58th Regiment Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Carr.  
24th Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Grigsby.

VIII. The Eighth Regiment Kentucky Volunteers (Colonel Barnes) and Lieutenant-Colonel Boone's battalion of Kentucky volunteers are assigned to the Sixteenth Brigade.

IX. Brigadier-General Ward is assigned to the command of the Six-



teenth Brigade and such other troops as may be posted to guard the line in front of Louisville; headquarters at Elizabethtown.

X. The following troops are attached to the Twelfth Brigade, Brigadier-General Carter commanding, and will proceed to London, Ky., viz: The Forty-ninth Indiana Volunteers, Colonel Ray; the Sixteenth Ohio Volunteers, Colonel De Courey; Wetmore's battery of Ohio volunteer artillery, and Major Munday's battalion of Kentucky cavalry.

The Forty-ninth Indiana will march via Springfield, Lebanon, and Danville. The Sixteenth Ohio will march from Lexington direct. The battery and the battalion of cavalry will move by rail to Lebanon and march thence via Danville to London.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Brigadier-General Buell :

[JAMES B. FRY,]  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HDQRS. FIRST BRIG., FIRST DIV., DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
*Somerset, Ky., January 8 [9], 1862.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding Eastern Division :*

GENERAL: The fruits of my reconnaissance, referred to in my note of last night, amounted to only 2 cavalry captured, with the supposed wounding of several others, the bad roads and high water in the creek preventing a more successful result. My men returned without loss and in good spirits, except that they evidently felt that they ought to have accomplished more, but, under the circumstances I believe they did all that could have been expected. When the present storm abates they may make another effort.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPF,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding First Brigade.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 9, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, *Washington :*

GENERAL: Yours of the 3d was received last evening and has received my most careful consideration. I have already written to you and to the President (at his request) in relation to the subject-matter of your letter. I will briefly state what I have done and had proposed doing.

On the 6th instant I wrote the inclosed communication to General Grant,\* and on the 7th telegraphed to General Buell to "designate a day for the demonstration." To assist this I ordered two unarmed regiments from Springfield to General Grant, to receive their arms as soon as we could procure them, and we are arming two regiments at Benton Barracks, to be immediately sent to Cairo. One additional regiment will be withdrawn from the Iron Mountain Railroad and one from the Hannibal and Saint Joseph Railroad, making six in all. As soon as we receive arms two more regiments can be sent from Benton Barracks. The insurrection in the northeast is not yet entirely suppressed. General

\* See p. 533.

Henderson had an engagement yesterday near Mexico, and captured 40 prisoners. He expected another fight this morning. If any of our troops are withdrawn from there at present the scattered insurgents will collect, and again destroy the railroad and telegraph line. We may expect, however, that most of these gangs will be broken up in the course of the next two or three weeks.

Price's army is still near Springfield. His forces are variously estimated from 12,000 to 40,000. About 50 miles farther south it is said there is a force of 18,000 Arkansas, Texan, and Indian troops marching to his assistance. Such is the substance of the telegrams from General Curtis and Colonel Steele. In order to ascertain the truth as to Price's position and numbers as nearly as possible, I sent out the cavalry from Rolla to drive in his pickets and feel his position and strength, intending to move the infantry and artillery to their support. On receiving the President's telegrams I suspended the latter movement, and for several days have heard nothing from Carr's cavalry. If Price should be found to have anything like his reputed forces, it would probably be necessary to send against him also most of the available forces near Sedalia not now absent north of the river pursuing rebel bands and bridge-burners. For the reasons already given, these troops are still held in position.

If the troops at Sedalia and Rolla are not either sent against Price or put in position to keep him in check, he will unquestionably return to the Missouri River, where he will be received by a very large mass of insurgents, who have concealed arms and ammunition. This information comes from so many reliable sources that I cannot doubt its correctness. The question is therefore a very plain one. If a sufficient number of troops are to be withdrawn from Missouri at the present time to constitute an expedition up the Cumberland strong enough to afford any reasonable hope of resisting an attack of the enemy, we must seriously peril the loss of this State. I can make with the gunboats and available troops a pretty formidable demonstration, but no real attack. The gunboats are not yet ready, but probably will be within a week or two. With good luck here, and the receipt of the 11,000 arms ordered by you a month ago, we can by the early part of February throw some 15,000 or 20,000 additional troops on that line. If you insist upon my doing this now, your orders will be obeyed, whatever may be the result in Missouri.

Advices received yesterday from Cairo are to the effect that no large forces have moved from the vicinity of Columbus in the direction of Bowling Green.

Pillow was ordered forward, but, disapproving the order, he resigned and went South.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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CAIRO, ILL., *January 9, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

The fog is so dense that it is impossible to cross the river. This will defer any movement for one day. A steamer is now lying across the channel at Dogtooth Bend, which will prevent re-enforcements arriving by river until she is removed. Have re-enforcements started?

U. S. GRANT.

CAIRO, *January 9, 1862.*

Commodore ANDREW H. FOOTE,  
*Commanding Cairo Flotilla:*

Full directions have been given for the movement of troops on the expedition just fitting out. It will commence this evening by the advance under General McClelland taking position at Fort Jefferson. Will you be kind enough to direct such of the gunboats as you may think it expedient to send to accompany the transports and occupy a position for their protection?

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 9, 1862.*

General JOHN A. McCLELLAND,  
*Commanding, Cairo, Ill.:*

As soon as ready for the move, your command will proceed to Fort Jefferson and encamp for the night. The cavalry, artillery, and transport wagons (empty) will land at Fort Holt, and will proceed from that point to Fort Jefferson. The ammunition may be divided, if necessary, among the accompanying wagons sufficiently to lighten the pieces and caissons to make their transportation practicable. On the arrival of troops from Bird's Point at Fort Jefferson to-morrow morning the advance will be moved to Elliott's Mill. The arrangement of guards is left with the commander of the advance.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 9, 1862.*

General E. A. PAINE,  
*Commanding Second Brigade, Bird's Point, Mo.:*

On the arrival of transports at Bird's Point you will cause the artillery, cavalry, and transport wagons to be ferried to Fort Holt and go into camp for the night immediately below there. Before having the wagons cross move everything aboard the transports that can be dispensed with, leaving sufficient guard from each company on board to look after the company property. In the morning everything crossed to Fort Holt will proceed to Fort Jefferson. As the roads will be heavy, it may be necessary for the artillery to distribute their ammunition among the wagons accompanying. With the balance of your command now under orders you will proceed by transports to the same place and there await further orders.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 9, 1862.*

General C. F. SMITH,  
*Commanding U. S. Forces, Paducah, Ky.:*

Owing to the density of the fog it will be impossible to make any movement here to-day. This will delay your movements also, it being



desirable to effect a junction at Mayfield. As the matter now stands, the column leaving Paducah need not start until Saturday. If there should be future delay, I will telegraph you.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Camp near Columbia, January 9, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. ALBIN SCHOEPP,  
*Commanding at Somerset :*

GENERAL : Your communication of the 7th instant, submitting a plan of the enemy's intrenchments, has been received at the hands of Captain Hall. Your views appear to me excellent, provided the bridge of boats can be secured from freshets. It is General Buell's desire, however, that we should not cross the river unless absolutely necessary. His plan was that by marching from this place I should threaten his left flank whilst you attacked him in front.

Do you consider his position impregnable from attack in front? If so, let me know by messenger as soon as you can. We have had very bad weather since the 1st, and have another obstacle to-day in the rising of the creek near here. I am in hopes, however, that we shall be able to march to-morrow.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Mouth of Abbott's Creek, January 9, 1862.*

Colonel SHELDON, *Commanding Brigade :*

DEAR SIR : We have been here about an hour. We were attacked by the enemy's scouts, who were lying in ambush at Abbott's Gap, 1 mile back. Our boys behaved admirably. The enemy ran; we pursued. Took a musket and a horse, and have put the boys up on a hill in the woods to bivouac. The enemy is encamped 3 miles from here, up Abbott's Creek, at a point called Copperas Lick. Our boys are very weary, but I think we shall move on before daybreak. Their cannon are behind, and they will have a great deal of difficulty in transporting them. We have now a better hope than ever of making them fight. I want you to follow us with every available man that the quartermaster can feed just as soon as you call the men up from their beds and get hard bread in their haversacks. Get everything in good shape as possible, but *hurry, hurry*.

A messenger has just reached me from Major McLaughlin, saying he has sent for re-enforcements. I hope you have sent them already. If any good men are left, send them to me. Now or never we must strike them.

Ever, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

SAINT LOUIS, *January 10, 1862.*

General McCLELLAN:

Do you insist upon my withdrawing troops from Missouri for the purpose indicated in your letter of the 3d instant? If so, it will be done, but in my opinion it involves the defeat of the Union cause in this State. I will write more fully what I have done and can do to assist D. C. Buell.

H. W. HALLECK.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 10, 1862.*Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Troops at Cairo and Paducah are ready for a demonstration on Mayfield, Murray, and Dover. Six additional regiments will be there next week. Fix a day when you wish the demonstration, but put it off as long as possible, in order that I may increase the strength of the force.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *January 10, 1862.*Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Cairo, Ill.:*

Re-enforcements are received [delayed?], and arms. Delay your movement until I telegraph. Let me know when the channel is clear.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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CAIRO, *January 10, 1862.*General C. F. SMITH,  
*Commanding U. S. Forces, Paducah, Ky.:*

A telegraph just received from General Halleck notifies me of a delay in sending re-enforcements from Saint Louis, and directs that no advance be made until further notice from him. If the telegraph is in working order when the notice is received, I will inform you by that uncertain means of communication, if not, by express.

To add to our difficulties, a steamer has got aground about 20 miles above here, where the channel is very narrow, and swung around so as to entirely cut off navigation from here during the present low stage of water or until removed. I have sent a steamer to her relief.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, January 10, 1862.*Brig. Gen. T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Commanding Fifth Division, Calhoun, Ky.:*

SIR: The general commanding directs that you move your division without delay to South Carrollton or near there. Take a strong position on the north side of the river which can be held by a small force.

Take your bridge with you or provide other means of crossing rapidly.  
Leave a regiment at Calhoun to guard the lock.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

CAMP WOOD, *Munfordville, January 10, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL:

Hindman's brigade, about 3,000, are at Bell's. Breckinridge, with his brigade, at Oakland. I know nothing positive in regard to the force at Bowling Green; suppose 35,000 or 40,000.

The railroad is destroyed from Horse Cave for about 3 miles. The tunnel track is torn up and tunnel blasted full of rock, timber cut over the pike, and ditches dug across the road this side of Bell's. None of the other roads have been. I have sent a trusty man by Glasgow to Scottsville. He should be back to-day. The *tête-de-pont* is progressing finely. It will be longer than I expected. I have not yet completed the transfer, but will complete to-morrow. Working the men will prove a great sanitary measure.

I was on the other side when the message came.

A. McD. MCCOOK,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding Division.*

*Abstract from return of the District of Cairo, Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant commanding, for January 10, 1862.*

Stations.	Present for duty.						Pieces of field artillery.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.		
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Bird's Point, Mo. ....	138	3, 231	45	894	10	261	.....
Cairo, Ill. ....	204	4, 143	61	1, 150	11	145	.....
Cape Girardeau, Mo. ....	51	1, 215	11	230	6	183	6
Fort Holt, Ky. ....	72	1, 327	7	152	3	82	.....
Paducah, Ky. ....	248	5, 093	32	841	3	302	12
Smithland, Ky. ....	17	357	3	61	3	82	.....
Total .....	730	15, 366	159	3, 328	41	1, 055	13

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 11, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Cairo, Ill.:*

I can hear nothing from Buell, so fix your own time for the advance. Three regiments will go down on Monday.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*



## ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

*Washington, January 11, 1862.*Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, U. S. A., *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

The following dispatch is from General Buell. Does it meet your views?

Raw troops do not add much to our strength for active operations. Why not send them into garrison at Cairo and Paducah, and let the older troops take the field, as the Confederates are doing? I refer to the Illinois regiments ordered here.

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General*

HEADQUARTERS, *Somerset, Ky., January 11, 1862.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Division, near Columbia, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Yours of the 9th, by Captain Hall, was duly received. You ask whether I consider the position of Zollicoffer impregnable in front. I would not like to say positively that such was the case; but I may safely say that to carry his position must be attended with heavy loss of life on our part.

There is no possible chance of maneuvering with infantry in front of his works, while artillery could be of no use, from the impossibility of securing any point from which it could be used to advantage, with an almost certainty of losing it in the event of our failing to carry the enemy's works at the first onset. If it is deemed not best to cross the river, the next thing to be done is to find some accessible point on the west side of White Oak Creek from which our artillery could be brought to bear with force on his works, in the mean time crowding him in front and flank with our infantry. By this means we may draw him out for a field fight. The immediate occupancy by artillery of one or more suitable points on the river below Mill Springs, for the purpose of stopping his steamers, is a matter which in my opinion should not be overlooked, as, with the present condition of the roads, it is through this channel that he must necessarily draw his supplies. I send you three men to-day who are acquainted with the country west of White Oak Creek, and who can be of service to you as you approach that line. Please keep me advised of your approach and plans, that I may act promptly and in concert with you.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPP,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding at Somerset.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

*Cairo, January 12, 1862.*Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Before the receipt of your telegram directing delay in the demonstration previously ordered, I had commenced by sending a portion of my command immediately under General McClelland to Fort Jefferson. As it would be attended with a good deal of trouble to bring these troops back and have a demoralizing effect on them besides, I have left them there. They occupy a good camp ground, and have Mayfield Creek, a stream not fordable, between them and the enemy.

Yesterday three of the enemy's gunboats came up to reconnoiter, but finding two of ours lying below the camp they did not venture near enough to see our position or for our gunboats to engage them effectually. They placed themselves across the stream at very long range, and by the time Captain Porter and Lieutenant Paulding, commanding the gunboats, weighed anchor and got under headway they were off. Captain Porter chased them under their guns at Columbus, one shot certainly, and he thinks two, taking effect upon one of their boats, disabling her to some extent, if not entirely, for present use. Captain Porter pulled up and brought with him one of their buoys, intended to mark the location of their torpedoes or the channel to navigate to avoid them. Re-enforcements starting from Saint Louis on Monday, as I am advised by your telegram, I will commence the move again on Tuesday.

I have just learned through the Memphis Appeal, and also from a man who has just made his way from New Orleans and who spent Thursday and Friday at Columbus, that seven regiments have left Columbus recently for Bowling Green. I am now inclined to believe that the garrison of Columbus is now weaker than it has been for several months back. It is also probable that the best-armed and best-drilled troops have been taken.

I have placed Captain Hatch, assistant quartermaster, in arrest, and directed him to turn over all public property to Capt. A. S. Baxter, assistant quartermaster. This was done on notice from Washington that charges would be preferred against the former, and, if not already in arrest, he should be so placed at once. Every day develops further evidences of corruption in the quartermaster's department, and that Mr. Dunton, chief clerk, if not chief conspirator, is at least an accomplice. I have ordered his arrest and confinement.

I have telegraphed you requesting that no more vouchers given here by the quartermaster be audited for the present. This was intended to mean those given by Captain Hatch. As his conduct will probably be the subject of legal investigation, I forbear saying all that I fear is true. I address the commanding general in person, deeming this a matter which should only be known to such persons as he may desire should know it. I have directed the books and safe of Captain Hatch to be taken possession of and kept guarded until orders are received disposing of this matter.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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WASHINGTON, *January 12, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL:

How are your transportation preparations progressing?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

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LOUISVILLE, *January 12, 1862.*

General McCLELLAN:

I am sorry to say not as rapidly as the necessity for it. With the present condition of the roads it is by no means sufficient.

D. C. BUELL.

LOUISVILLE, KY., *January 12, 1862—11 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

I have received your letter, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views. Will write to-night.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 13, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio :*

MY DEAR GENERAL: Your telegram asking for six more batteries is received. I have taken measures to have them ordered to you at once, and will endeavor to order two more to you to-morrow. I hope you will ere long receive the two regular companies from Fort Randall.

You have no idea of the pressure brought to bear here upon the Government for a forward movement. It is so strong that it seems absolutely necessary to make the advance on Eastern Tennessee at once. I incline to this as a first step for many reasons. Your possession of the railroad there will surely prevent the main army in my front from being re-enforced and may force Johnston to detach. Its political effect will be very great. Halleck is not yet in condition to afford you the support you need when you undertake the movement on Bowling Green. Meigs has sent to you the 400 wagons for which requisition was made. Should the supply of Government wagons be insufficient, I would recommend hiring private teams. If the people will not freely give them, why, then, seize them. It is no time now to stand on trifles. I think Ohio can now give you five or six new regiments, that can at least guard your communications, and are probably about as good as the mass of the troops opposed to you.

I am now quite well again, only somewhat weak. Hope to be in the saddle in a very few days.

In haste, truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, January 13, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

*Commanding Department of Missouri :*

GENERAL: Your telegram of the 10th would have been replied to ere this but for the fact that my state of health has thus far permitted me to attend only to the most pressing business. I do not think you had read my letter of the 3d with much care when you sent the telegraphic reply. My letter states what I consider it desirable to accomplish, and in conclusion I ask your views and the time necessary to prepare, as well as the force you can use for the purpose. If you can spare no troops it is only necessary to say so, and I must look elsewhere for the means of accomplishing the objects in view. There is nothing in my letter that can reasonably be construed into an order, requiring you to make detachments that will involve the defeat of the Union cause in Missouri.



I have now to request that, if you have not already done so, you will send to me as soon as possible a statement of the numbers, positions, and conditions of the troops in your department, together with the same information in regard to the enemy, as far as you can give it.

I am, very truly, yours,

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

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LOUISVILLE, *January 13, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,  
*Commanding U. S. Army:*

MY DEAR FRIEND: I did not mean to be understood in my dispatch to the President as attaching little importance to the movement on East Tennessee; on the contrary, it is evidently of the highest importance, if thoroughly carried out; but I believe that if the other object were attained the same result would be accomplished quite as promptly and effectually. I have taken no step thus far that has not had that in view also. It is certainly more favorable to its success that my whole attention has seemed to be devoted to Bowling Green, for it has had the effect to withdraw nearly the whole of the enemy's attention from East Tennessee, while an apparent preparation for it on our side would have made its force more formidable. As I told you in my dispatch, I shall now devote myself to it, contenting myself, as far as Bowling Green is concerned, with holding it in check and concealing my design as long as possible.

The presence of Zollicoffer at Mill Springs, although an obstacle, I do not regard as altogether unfortunate, as it affords a reason for sending a considerable force to that point. He has intrenched himself on both sides of the river, which is readily navigable, and affords him facilities for supplying himself from Nashville. I have sent Thomas there, with the remainder of his division, in all some 14,000 men and twenty-six pieces of artillery, and have ordered a brigade and battery to the river at Jamestown, by which I hope to stop Zollicoffer's supplies through that channel. As soon as our means of transportation will permit I will establish a depot at Somerset and commence our movement. At present it is with the greatest difficulty that the troops are supplied, and I am quite sure that I have not let the subject of transportation rest. Colonel Swords is now sick, and has evidently not been able to work. I am afraid Cross will not be much better. The Tennessee arms are being unpacked and put in order and forwarded to Lebanon.

It is not too early to consider some matters connected with this movement. The first column may be from 8,000 to 10,000 strong, but it should be promptly supported and its communications kept open. It will no doubt very soon draw off some of the force now in front of us, but at first we cannot reduce the force on Green River very much. I shall have to take a division from there unless we succeed in destroying Zollicoffer's force entirely, which perhaps is too much to calculate upon.

By the organization of the Kentucky regiments and the introduction of raw regiments from Ohio and Indiana our numerical strength has suddenly risen from 70,000 to 90,000. It is unnecessary to say that a large proportion of this is unfit for active operations. However, it will answer a certain purpose. It is organized into twenty-three bri

gades, and, say, six divisions, with only sixteen batteries. It ought to be increased to eight divisions, and the artillery ought to be nearly doubled, say in all 120,000 men. Then not less than three divisions will be required in front of Bowling Green, not less than three for East Tennessee and its communications, one at Columbia and Jamestown, and one in reserve. The Columbia line is more important than may at first seem to you. It is a turnpike, connecting directly with Lebanon. Monticello, just opposite, is an important point, which I am anxious to seize if I have the force. It is at the foot of the mountains, and controls the route up the Cumberland on that side, besides being in a loyal and productive part of the State.

I need more good staff officers in every department.

I am glad to see you getting up again.

Truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

P. S.—The plan of any colonel, whoever he is, for ending the war by entering East Tennessee with his 5,000 men light—that is, with pack-trains and three batteries of artillery, &c.—while the rest of the army look on, though it has some sensible patent ideas, is in the aggregate simply ridiculous.

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CAMP WOOD, *January 13, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Commanding;*

My man left Bowling Green yesterday morning. He says they are not re-enforcing. They have no guns on Baker's Hill that can be seen. They are not doing any additional work to strengthen their position. Floyd is at Bowling Green. McCulloch is not there. Breckinridge is at Oakland, Hindman's headquarters. At Bell's he gave notice to the people of Cave City to move immediately; that every house that would serve for headquarters or hospital would be burned. There is no obstruction on the roads this side of Bowling Green, save a little this side of Bell's—trees cut and ditches dug. I have had the amount of damage to railroad estimated at about a half mile in all, but in detached places. I have a Louisville Courier of the 11th instant. Extract puts the percentage of sick altogether too large; the number of dead from disease is deplorably great. They are not fortifying at Davis Hill, below Glasgow.

MCCOOK.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,

*Louisville, January 13, 1862.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding First Division;*

GENERAL: On account of the time that would be occupied in preparation and the notice it would attract, it would not be advisable to cross the river as you propose. General Schoepf's suggestion, though it is open to the objection of dividing your force widely, seems plausible, but so much depends on locations and other circumstances which can only be ascertained on the grounds, that it is impossible to decide well without nearer observations. The matter, therefore, must be left to your judgment. Your messenger's description of the ground rather inclines me to my first idea about it, but I must leave it to your own discretion.

I have ordered two more regiments and two batteries to join you: but

if you see an opportunity, lose not a day. The enemy will profit more by it than you will. You will be superior in artillery, at any rate, I suppose.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIV., DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
*Camp near Webb's Cross-Roads, Ky., January 13, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: After two days of the hardest work I have reached this place, 16 miles from Columbia, with the advance brigade of my division; the provision and ammunition train, with a portion of our brigade, is still in the rear, and will probably not reach here to-night.

The road, which has been represented as good, is the worst I ever saw, and the recent rains have made it one continuous quagmire from Columbia to this place.

We are still 17 miles from the position of the enemy by the shortest road, viz, that across the headwaters of the Wolf Creek, leaving Harrison to the left. This road is represented by my scouts as much worse than the roads the command has already passed over.

It is next to impossible to procure either forage or subsistence in the country, and entirely impracticable to haul either over the road at this season of the year. It is therefore necessary to do one of two things—either to go to Jamestown and eventually down the river to Burkesville, thereby cutting off all communication between Mill Springs and Nashville by the river, or work our way by this road to Somerset and join General Schoepf. We can never get supplies in any other way.

Should my division proceed on to Somerset it would be impossible to get down the river by the road on this side during the winter; and as Schoepf's force is sufficient to keep the enemy in check, I would respectfully suggest that the troops now with me proceed at once to Jamestown and eventually to Burkesville, from which point their services can be made available in any operations in the direction of Bowling Green.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General U. S. Army, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIV., DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
*Camp at Webb's Cross-Roads, Ky., January 13, 1862.*

Brigadier-General SCHOEPF,

*Commanding at Somerset:*

GENERAL: I received yours of the 11th to-day, by Captain Hall. When I last wrote you I was in hopes of being near Somerset by this time, but the heavy rains have injured the roads so much that it will be impossible to say now when I can be in your vicinity. We have already been three days in making 16 miles, and our ammunition and provisions are far behind now—probably will not be up by to-morrow night. Should I ever succeed in getting near you, I will send a messenger to let you know. I wrote to General Buell five days since, sub-



mitting your proposition of crossing the river and attacking from the bluffs of Meadow Creek, but have received no reply from him up to this time. As soon as I hear I will write you the result.

I have not had time to converse with the men you sent me fully, but if it be possible to approach the enemy by way of White Oak Creek I should like to have them as guides.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS.

*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 3. }

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO.

*Cairo, January 13, 1862.*

During the absence of the expedition now starting upon soil hitherto occupied almost solely by the rebel army, and where it is a fair inference that every stranger met is our enemy, the following orders will be observed:

Troops in marching will be kept in the ranks, company officers being held strictly accountable for all stragglers from their companies.

No firing will be allowed in camp or on the march not strictly required in the performance of duty.

Whilst in camp no permits will be granted to officers or soldiers to leave their regimental grounds, and all violations of this order must be promptly and summarily punished.

Disrepute having been brought upon our brave soldiers by the bad conduct of some of their numbers, showing on all occasions when marching through territory occupied by sympathizers of the enemy a total disregard of rights of citizens, and being guilty of wanton destruction of private property, the general commanding desires and intends to enforce a change in this respect.

Interpreting confiscation acts by troops themselves has a demoralizing effect, weakens them in exact proportion to the demoralization, and makes open and armed enemies of many who, from opposite treatment, would become friends, or at most non-combatants.

It is ordered, therefore, that the severest punishment be inflicted upon every soldier who is guilty of taking or destroying private property, and any commissioned officer guilty of like conduct, or of countenancing it, shall be deprived of his sword and expelled from the camp, not to be permitted to return.

On the march cavalry advance guards will be well thrown out; also flank guards of cavalry or infantry when practicable.

A rear guard of infantry will be required to see that no teams, baggage, or disabled soldiers are left behind.

It will be the duty of company commanders to see that rolls of their companies are called immediately upon going into camp each day and every member accounted for.

U. S. GRANT.

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO.

*Cairo, January 14, 1862.*

Capt. J. C. KEITON. *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

The troops from Saint Louis expected to-day have not yet arrived. I have, however, commenced the move directed a few days since with-

out them, occupying to-night Blandville, Elliott's Mill, and Fort Jefferson.

Yesterday a reconnoitering party of cavalry, supported by infantry, went within 3 miles of Columbus, driving in the enemy's pickets.

To-day I accompanied Commodore Foote, with the gunboats Essex, St. Louis, and Tyler, to within  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles of the batteries at Columbus. A few shells were thrown around the batteries by the Essex and St. Louis, with what effect I cannot tell. The enemy replied with two or three shots without effect. In making this move I found myself much embarrassed by deficiency in the quartermaster's department. Captain Kountz, who was recently sent here as master of transportation, from his great unpopularity with river men and his wholesale denunciation of everybody connected with the Government here as thieves and cheats, was entirely unable to get crews for the necessary boats. I was compelled to order that boatmen, if they declined serving voluntarily, should be put aboard the boats and made to serve as prisoners. Many expressed a willingness to serve if I said so, but would not work under the captain, and others left the city, as I am informed, solely to avoid the possibility of having to serve under his direction. He seems to have desired to be placed on duty here for no other purpose than to wreak his revenge upon some river men whom he dislikes, and to get into the service of Government a boat in which he has an interest, either as owner or a former proprietorship, not yet settled for. He has caused so much trouble and shown such a disregard for my orders, that I have been compelled to order his arrest. I would respectfully ask that he be ordered to another field of duty. As I shall be off to-morrow morning charges cannot be preferred until my return, and it is embarrassing to the service just at this time to have courts-martial sitting. I respectfully submit this matter to the general commanding the department for his decision.

Colonel Cavanaugh, commanding a regiment of cavalry now stationed at Shawneetown, has received a telegraphic order from Springfield, Ill., to report himself there to organize a brigade, his regiment to form a part, to be reported for orders to General Buell. As his services can be spared for a few days I have given him leave to go to Springfield, but informed him that his regiment cannot be moved without orders coming through headquarters of the department. The colonel desires me to say that he has a decided preference for remaining in this department. This, however, I do not regard, as it is his duty to go where ordered, and where his services can be of the most value.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 14, 1862.*

Col. JOHN COOK,  
*Commanding Forces, Fort Holt, Ky. :*

Your command will march to-morrow to Blandville, leaving Fort Jefferson at 10 o'clock a. m.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 14, 1862.*

General JOHN A. MCCLERNAND,  
*Commanding Advance Forces, Fort Jefferson, Ky.:*

In accordance with previous instructions, encamp at or near Blandville to-night.

To-morrow march with your entire command from 7 to 10 miles, on the most practicable route to Mayfield, probably through Lovelaceville. Next morning start two regiments of infantry and all the cavalry but four companies to join General Smith at Mayfield. At the same time send out a good portion of the cavalry you expect to retain on a reconnaissance towards Columbus, and leave anything but an appearance of an intention to return this way with a portion of your force until you actually start on the return. In the afternoon, say, starting at 12 m., return again to Blandville. You will there find additional forces, and will receive directions for future movements.

Should I not be with you, you may find it necessary to vary the above instructions. It is not expected that the force thrown forward to Mayfield will be sent in the face of a large army or that you will remain off from the balance of the troops and so remote from the base of our line to receive an attack from a superior force.

The arrangement in this respect will have to be left to your judgment, knowing that you will be better able to judge of the feasibility of the plan indicated than any one not present could be.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 14, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. E. A. PAINE,  
*Commanding Forces, Bird's Point, Mo.:*

To-morrow march your command to Blandville, leaving one regiment of infantry and one squadron of cavalry at Fort Jefferson and to guard the road at Elliott's Mill. Have all the approaches from Columbus watched, so as to avoid all chance of surprise. You will receive further instructions at Blandville.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 14, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

General C. F. Smith reports, January 10, that no troops have left Columbus for Bowling Green save the two regiments reported two weeks ago.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General, and Chief of Staff.*



WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 15, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,

*Commanding Department of Missouri, Saint Louis:*

My letter of 3d was not intended to direct or advise you to strip Missouri of troops so as to endanger the safety of the State. It was only to indicate to you the objects in view and to obtain your views, as well as to learn what troops you had disposable for the movement. I wrote on 13th fully. Shall I forward mortars for rafts and how many? Have new arms arrived and how many more do you need?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

*Major-General, Commanding.*HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, *January 15, 1862.*

General THOMAS:

SIR: Colonel Wolford has returned from a scout. He says that he went to Harrison; from there to the Wolf Creek road; then to Logan's; from there 4 miles down the Mill Springs road; then back.

He says that he saw nothing, and could hear nothing, and that there were no pickets on any of the roads over which he went; that there were no horse-tracks on the roads made since the rain. This would seem to indicate that Zollicoffer had departed, if it were not for other reliable news just received by me from one whom I sent out this morning. Old man Foster says that last night the enemy came in very considerable force, some three regiments, on the McLennan Hill, situated between Forbush and Wolf Creek, about 1 mile from the river. This afternoon the whole body took back towards their camp by way of the road between Forbush and White Oak (Robertsport road). They were compelled to go that way on account of the river having risen.

This evening at sundown they were passing toward White Oak Creek, within 8 miles from their camp, whipping and pressing their teams very hard. They are now out of our way, I think. What a nice thing we have missed by not having means of getting news! Now, I hardly think that he could have come out to attack us, or they would not have brought the wagons. This would look as though he had not known of our presence until to-day, and then he took back. I will have my advance and pickets keep a sharp lookout should an attack be contemplated.

If he comes this way we can whip all of them without any trouble in the position we have.

I send you this that you may take such steps as seem proper.

I have no news from the camp of the enemy other than what you are in possession of. I am about satisfied that he has not to exceed 5,000, all told. I will give you the particulars when I see you.

Yours, truly,

R. L. McCOOK.

P. S.—I think we could not intercept the train now, as we would have to go by the Mill Springs road to head them off, a march of 16 miles.

## HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE.

*Somerset, January 15, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,

*Commanding Eastern Division:*

GENERAL: I received yours of the 14th instant, and in reply to your inquiries regarding the practicability of sending boats down the river to Mill Springs I could not take the responsibility of advising it from the knowledge I have of the enemy's position at that place. Please advise me which route you are going to take. If to Somerset, I would advise you to take the road north by Adams' Mill, as the Columbia road is now impassable even for empty wagons.

It would be very important for me to know the strength and disposition of your command in case of a simultaneous attack upon the enemy. We can barely obtain forage, the roads being very bad. Provisions are very scarce, and complaints are made daily of our troops taking them without pay. Grow's train has been taken from our lines and transferred to the London road.

The brigade quartermaster has only a few wagons and fewer mules. It is extremely important that the disbursing officers should be provided with funds, as the inhabitants complain bitterly of having their property taken without compensation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. SCHOEPE.

*Brigadier-General.*

## HEADQUARTERS CAMP IN FIELD.

*O'Neill's Mill, January 16, 1862.*

Col. C. C. MARSH.

*Tenth Kentucky Volunteers, Fort Jefferson, Ky.:*

You will send the accompanying dispatch to Colonel Johnson, at Elliott's Mill, as soon as possible. Let six of your companies of your regiment be got ready and moved as soon as possible to join Colonel Johnson's command at Elliott's Mill, where they will camp for the night, leaving the remaining force to garrison Fort Jefferson. Have three or four cavalymen stationed at Fort Jefferson, to bring any dispatches which may come there for me. If you have no cavalry for the purpose, you can detain the cavalry which carry you this dispatch, if you have no other.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

WM. S. HILLYER.

*Aide-de-Camp.*

[Inclosure.]

## HEADQUARTERS CAMP IN FIELD.

*O'Neill's Mill, January 16, 1862.*

Col. A. K. JOHNSON.

*Commanding U. S. Forces, Elliott's Mill, Ky.:*

You will push out a strong party of cavalry and infantry for reconnaissance on Columbus road for 4 or 5 miles towards Columbus or as far as can be done with security, taking no baggage, and return to camp at your present position to-night. Six companies of Colonel

Marsh's Twentieth Illinois Volunteers will join you at Elliott's Mill to-night.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant :

WM. S. HILLYER,  
*Aide-de-Camp.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 16, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. T. J. Wood,  
*Commanding at Bardstown :*

SIR: The general commanding desires to have the road from Danville to Somerset put into good order, and for this purpose he assigns you to the duty and to the command of the troops to be engaged in it. You will therefore at once proceed to Lebanon, and move with the Twentieth Brigade, Colonel Forsyth, and begin the work from Danville; 1,000 axes, 1,000 picks, 500 shovels, and 500 spades were ordered to Colonel Forsyth from this place to-day, and will reach him to-morrow. The Twenty-first Brigade, Colonel Carr, will be under your command, but remain at Lebanon, unless you find it necessary (which it is hoped will not be the case) to call upon it to aid in the work. Turn over the command at Bardstown to the senior officer, and give him such instructions as may seem to be necessary.

The general directs me to impress upon you the importance of the work proposed, as the supply of our troops depends upon its successful and early completion. The road must be corduroyed and, if necessary, from one end to the other, using for this purpose logs split so as to make a species of puncheon floor, and making the road not less than 16 feet wide. You are aware of the difficulties and dangers to animals in passing over a road of this nature unless it is well made, and the general therefore trusts to your judgment and experience in such matters to accomplish the object he has in view without giving you more detailed instructions. Any demands you may make for tools or appliances will be as promptly complied with as possible. General Thomas has orders to work in like manner on the Somerset end of the same road. It is hoped and presumed this duty will not occupy more than ten days, and your present assignment must be regarded as special and temporary. You will please report progress daily, if practicable, and on the completion of the work report by letter or telegraph for further orders. The general is conscious of the difficulties to be met in the task imposed upon you, but trusts to their being overcome.

Draw your supplies from Lebanon.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

BACON CREEK, *January 16, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL :

The reconnaissance shall be promptly made. All roads are now equally impassable for trains, and must be built as I described. Two wagons broke down between my headquarters and the depot. I will make a wooden road to-morrow.

O. M. MITCHEL,  
*Brigadier-General.*



JANUARY 16, 1862.

General McCook, *Munfordville*:

Can you ascertain anything about the enemy's position at Oakland—the order in which their troops are disposed? Make the effort.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

CAMP WOOD, *January 17, 1862.*

General BUELL:

My latest information was that Breekinridge's headquarters were at Viller's house. His regiments were scattered along the pike. I will do my best. Bell yesterday was blowing up the turnpike below Cave City, and felling trees over old Lexington road, leading from Bell's to Horse Well and Bear Wallow. All well and quiet.

McCOOK.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,  
*In Field, January 17, 1862.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

On Tuesday General McClelland moved from Fort Jefferson to near Blandville with over 6,000 men. On Wednesday his position was occupied by General Paine with a force of about 2,000. General McClelland moving with his brigade toward Milburn, Fort Jefferson and Elliott's Mill being occupied during this time by two infantry regiments and some cavalry and artillery. The bridge at Coathe's Mill was also guarded by one regiment.

On this day (Wednesday) I visited all the different commands except the one at Elliott's Mill, and returned for the night to Coathe's Mill. Written instructions were left with General McClelland to move on to Milburn, and from there send a dispatch across to General Smith (one already prepared), and to return to Blandville by route east of Mayfield Creek. This would take two days, bringing him into Blandville to-night. Reconnaissances were made by our troops to within  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Columbus and to below the town along the railroad. All was quiet, and as yet no skirmish has taken place, unless it was with General McClelland's command, which I do not think likely to-day.

Yesterday, having my forces between me and the enemy, I made a reconnaissance of about 35 miles, taking my staff and one company of cavalry with me. I find that the Mayfield Creek is fordable at but few points from its mouth up as far as I went, and at those points the water is up to the saddle-skirts and the banks very steep.

To-day I have reconnoitered the roads south of the creek and to the Mississippi River at Puntney's Bend. Having ridden hard during the day, and finding that I should be late returning, I sent a note to Captain Porter, of the Navy, requesting him to drop down to Puntney's Bend and for a steamer to accompany him to bring myself and escort up to Fort Jefferson. On turning the point in sight a rebel gunboat was discovered and a cavalry force of probably 100 men on shore. I got in probably twenty minutes after the rebel cavalry had fled.

To-morrow I shall visit all points occupied by the Cairo forces and the next day commence a movement back to old quarters, unless orders

are received requiring a change. I heard from Columbus yesterday. No force has left there for some days. They were strongly apprehensive a few days ago of an attack, but thought most of the forces threatening there had gone to Mayfield.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, January 17, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division:*

GENERAL: I have received your letter of 13th from Webb's Cross-Roads. You will before this have received my letter of same date, sent with your messenger. I hope that letter will have determined your action. It is not sufficient to hold Zollicoffer in check; he must be captured or dispersed. I think his situation offers the opportunity of effecting the former.

If you consider your force insufficient, telegraph me from Somerset. The lines have been extended to that point. It will not be advisable to march your command to Somerset, but rather take a position in front of the enemy, so as to draw your supplies from Somerset and be in a convenient position to move down upon him.

I am assured that you can get an abundance of forage from the country in the direction of Liberty. If you can buy meal, don't haul flour. It is necessary to subsist your command, but it is not necessary that the established ration be followed exactly. I am aware that the roads are in a horrible condition. They must be improved. The only way to do that effectually, where trains are to pass over them several times, is to corduroy or puncheon them 16 feet wide. I have given orders for this to be done on the Danville and Somerset road.

General Schoepf sends a regiment on that duty from Somerset, and General Wood, with three regiments, is to do the same from Danville. See that it is pushed forward energetically from Somerset. It ought to be completed in a few days. Take sure means of informing yourself constantly of the movements of the enemy and apprise me daily by telegraph. You could not march to Burkesville, and it is not desirable that you should be there.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*Calhoun, January 18, 1862.*

J. B. FRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

CAPTAIN: My entire command is now here. The Fourteenth Brigade, under Colonel Jones, and Jackson's cavalry reached here yesterday evening.

On the 16th instant we crossed the river at Calhoun and marched to Sacramento, with all our wagons, bringing nothing but a little forage. The roads of course are bad, but we got there without accident or damage. Colonel Cruft's command was so conducted as to occupy the town before the inhabitants were aware of the approach of troops.

The order to march, though dated the 10th, did not reach me until the 14th. This made me, of course, more anxious to be rapid in my movement. To do this I was forced to cross at Calhoun and march to South Carrollton, on the south side of the river. I considered this movement imprudent unless South Carrollton was first occupied. For this reason Cruff's command was sent by the steamboats and barges, as the only expeditious way of occupying the town. I confess to great anxiety of mind when I saw over 2,000 troops crowded on the boats, and determined that, except on a great emergency, I would not start such another expedition. In the present condition of the road it would have taken me five or six days to reach this place, marching by the north side of the river.

My command is now in South Carrollton, on the south side of the river. This is, I am aware, in violation of General Buell's order, at least the spirit of it. It is impossible to execute the order, there being no strong position on the north side of the river in the vicinity of South Carrollton.

Unless I occupied this place, 1,000 men could have stopped me from crossing at any point where there is a road by which I could march. This is a position of great strength, and my command ought to hold it against 15,000 good troops.

If I must move to the north side of the river, I will be compelled to go at least 2 miles back to find ground high enough to camp on, and it would take me two days to cross the river here if ordered to advance. I consider my command safe here. I assure you I have endeavored to obey orders, and have done so as far as practicable—obeying what I considered most important where all could not be obeyed. I could not have secured a passage across the river at or near this place by occupying any position in the vicinity of South Carrollton, on the north side of the river.

For miles around this place, on the north side of the river, the land is flat, and so low as to overflow when the river is up. If I move over and cross this flat, as I should be compelled to do, and the river should rise, I could not cross at all.

South Carrollton is situated on a hill, rising abruptly from the river, 150 feet high. There are only two ways of approaching the place from the south—one the road by which I came, through a swamp, and which could be defended by a small force; the other through a wooded country and up hill.

Captain Edwards, of the U. S. Army, doubtless known to you as an educated and accomplished soldier, fully concurs in my views as to the strength of the place. With another battery of artillery it seems to me I could hold the place until starved out, and as it is can hold it against any force the enemy can send.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. L. CRITTENDEN.  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS CAMP IN FIELD,  
*January 18, 1862.*

Col. JOHN COOK,

*Commanding U. S. Forces, Elliott's Mill, Ky.:*

You will move your command, if possible, across the creek and to Fort Jefferson, starting early to-morrow morning. If it is not practi-



cable to cross the creek, then move down the bottom to Puntney's Bend, and a steamboat protected by gunboat will be sent to bring you off. Send dispatch with information which route you will take.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant:

WM. S. HILLYER,  
*Aide-de-Camp*

HEADQUARTERS CAMP IN THE FIELD,  
*Near Blandville, January 18, 1862.*

General JOHN A. McCLEARNAND,  
*Commanding Advance Forces:*

The object of the expedition having been accomplished, all the forces will now be withdrawn to their former positions as expeditiously as practicable. A guard will be left at this (O'Neill's) mill and at the bridge above until you have passed, and none of the forces will leave Fort Jefferson until your advance has arrived there. There are some supplies here for a portion of your command, and I should have been glad could you have made this point to-night. If the state of the roads, however, make it impracticable, it will make no material difference.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

JANUARY 19, 1862.

General GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Care of General Schoepf, Somerset:*

The re-enforcements ordered to you were ten pieces of artillery and De Courcy's and Ray's regiments. The latter has since been put under Wood's command, to work on the road. Order it forward if necessary. One of the batteries (Mack's regular) is following on your route. It had better be soon posted.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 19, 1862.*

General E. A. PAINE,  
*Commanding Second Brigade, Fort Jefferson, Ky.:*

You will proceed to Bird's Point as soon as practicable with a portion of your command—as much as can be taken—with their baggage, with the transportation supplied. On your arrival all citizen prisoners against whom you have no charge will be released, and all negroes who have flocked into camp will be permitted to return to their masters.

I learn from Colonel Perczel that there are many of this class now in camp who have flocked there through fear. Some discretion will have to be used in forcing these people out of camp now that they are in. I would require all, however, who have masters in camp to take their negroes with them.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Camp in Field, January 19, 1862.*

Captain PORTER, U. S. N.,  
*Commanding Gunboats off Fort Jefferson, Ky.:*

Colonel Cook being unable to cross Mayfield Creek, it will be necessary for him to march his command to Puntney's Bend to embark. Will you please move down opposite that point for his protection? A steamer will follow about 10 o'clock to take the command on board.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

[JANUARY 20, 1862.—For Halleck to McClellan, referring, in connection with Missouri affairs, to operations on the Mississippi, Cumberland, and Tennessee Rivers, see Series I, Vol. VIII.]

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,  
*Camp at Callaway, Ky., January 22, 1862.*

To the ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,  
*Headquarters District of Cairo, Cairo, Ill.:*

SIR: Finding it would take the greater part of to-day to distribute our stores, I went up in the Lexington to have a look at Fort Henry. As the river is now 14 feet above its very low stage a week since, we took the right-hand (our right) channel of the island, just below the fort, and got about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from it, drawing a single shot from the enemy, which fell, say, half a mile short; this in response to four several shots fired at them. There were evidently from 2,000 to 3,000 men there. The appearance of the work corresponds, as far as could be discovered, with the rough sketch that General Grant has seen in my quarters at Paducah. The hill on the west bank, which commands the fort some 60 feet or so, seems to be covered by a thick growth of timber. Judging by the number of roofs seen in the fort it must cover considerable space.

I think two iron-clad gunboats would make short work of Fort Henry. There is no masked battery at the foot of the island, as was supposed, or, if so, it is now under water. Two stern-wheel steamers were at the fort, but moved away rapidly at our first gun.

The Dunbar, a fast side-wheel steamer, plies up and down, and was chased last evening by the Lexington without effect. She is said to be armed with two 12-pounder rifled guns. The commander of the Lexington thinks she has not been altered in any way.

I shall resume my march at 8 o'clock to-morrow morning, at which time the Lexington and transport Wilson will start for Paducah, carrying some sick men and the mail.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. F. SMITH,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 22, 1862.*

Brigadier-General GRANT, *Cairo:*

All additional forces sent to you will be stationed at Smithfield,

where preparations will be made for a large encampment. You have permission to visit headquarters.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, Ky., January 22, 1862.*

General THOMAS:

My dispatch of yesterday advised you that you were to follow the enemy; whether that shall take you beyond Monticello must depend on your finding him embodied and the ability to supply yourself. You will have to depend very much on the country. At any rate occupy Monticello, which I want to hold.

Take a strong position to secure communication with Somerset and with the river at Jamestown, where a force has been posted to command the river. Strengthen the position at Monticello so that a brigade can hold it. Open communication with Jamestown. Establish a regiment and a battery of rifled guns with time fuses on the neck of Horse Shoe Bend, so as to command the river up and down and guard the road. Let your engineers get up a floating bridge of at least two boats there and at Somerset, and also a substantial pontoon bridge at each. Push these matters with the greatest possible energy. Put the roads in order wherever you go. Observe that you may find some of the enemy about Monticello, and it is not improbable that supplies were on the way to General Zollicoffer by land, which you may be able to capture.

Inform me what force seems to be necessary at Monticello. Study the roads thoroughly and report.

Look out for a strong position on the river to protect the route and depot near Somerset.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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DANVILLE, KY., *January 22, 1862.*

General THOMAS,

*Commanding Headquarters First Division,  
Department of the Ohio:*

GENERAL: The bearer of this note is Mr. J. B. Harned, of Paris, Ky., for whom I vouch as a worthy and loyal man, and to whom I have given this writing, that he may obtain your protection, in case he should stand in need of it, during a trip of necessary business to Somerset, a delay of some days there, and on his return.

He goes to Somerset in order to have an extensive library and other effects, now much exposed there, packed up, and, if possible, removed to this place. He goes by my direction, at the request of my friend the Rev. Dr. R. W. Landis, now in the military service of the country as chaplain to Colonel Merrill's regiment of cavalry, in Missouri, who is the owner of the library, papers, and other effects.

I take leave, in case this note should fall into your hands, to add my congratulations to those of the whole country on the occasion of the victory you have just gained. As yet we know only that the victory is complete. Beyond that we have only innumerable rumors. None of them mention any accident to you or any of your staff. My hope, therefore, is that my son has not only behaved himself well, but



that the good fortune of being one of your victorious column is rendered complete by his passing through his first battle unhurt.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

ROBT. J. BRECKENRIDGE.

JANUARY 23, 1862.

General LORENZO THOMAS,

*Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.:*

Report by mail, of which the following is synopsis:

Infantry present for duty and fit for the field, 41,563; infantry present, raw, not fit for the field, 20,393; cavalry present for duty, fit for the field, 2,549; cavalry present, raw or not organized, 5,251; artillery present for duty and fit for the field, 2,038, 108 guns; artillery present, raw or not organized, 708, 40 guns. In these statements the sick and absent are not included.

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

CAMP WOOD,

*Munfordsville, Thursday, January 23, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL:

Your man is here; goes up in morning train. Twelve thousand infantry and 1,000 cavalry left Bowling Green for Paris, Tennessee River, under Buckner and Floyd. Whole force, 40,000. Three thousand at Russellville, from Tennessee, under Harris, fortifying Nashville. Johnston and Hardee still at Bowling Green. Sixty-four pounders sent back to Nashville. Sixty-days' men all gone home. Provisions plenty. Dying eighteen per day. No troops at Glasgow.

McCOOK.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,

*Somerset, Ky., January 23, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I have positive information that it is almost impossible to subsist a large force at Monticello, and as the roads are now almost impassable, it would be extremely difficult to forage animals at this place for some time. I have every reason to believe that the roads leading into Tennessee are in the same condition as the one over which my division has just passed, and the enemy having passed over those roads, our chances for subsistence and forage would be but poor.

I would therefore again respectfully suggest that I may be permitted to move down the river with my troops, taking our subsistence and forage in flat-boats, and co-operate with the main army against Bowling Green.

Zollicoffer's forces are entirely dispersed; they threw away their arms and disbanded, and should we go into East Tennessee now there would be no enemy to encounter. General Carter's brigade might go to encourage the citizens and to take them arms and ammunition, but I do

not believe that any stronger force will be needed, especially if Middle Tennessee is threatened by my force.

Burkesville is one of the strongest positions on the river, and could be easily fortified so as to prevent all possibility of getting above. To procure forage it is necessary to send for it 15 miles, and the roads are so difficult that by the time the wagons reach here the teams have nearly consumed their loads.

I send Captain Gillem to explain verbally to you the difficulties I have to encounter and what still lies before me if I am required to advance into Tennessee.

Very respectfully,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*South Carrollton, Ky., January 24, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

CAPTAIN: I am, of course, very anxious to hear from department headquarters. I am, I think, strongly posted, and could not, I believe, have crossed the river at any time since my arrival because of the great rise in the waters.

The river still continues very high, and I could not now bridge it with boats. If attacked here, I must win the fight; the low lands are so covered with water that a retreat would be very difficult.

I am informed and believe that a considerable number of troops went from Bowling Green to Riverside the day before yesterday (the 22d). They may have gone farther, but the secessionists at Greenville say they are coming here to attack me. I can't say I expect them, but am preparing to receive them, and, if they come, hope to give them a handsome reception.

Quite a number of persons from different places in this vicinity and one from near Rochester have reported to me to-day that they had heard cannon firing all day in the direction of Bowling Green. This has greatly distressed me. If so, orders for me have miscarried. I cannot believe that I would be left here to do nothing while a battle was being fought at Bowling Green.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

SOMERSET, *January 24, 1862.*  
(Received January 27, 1862.)

General D. C. BUELL, *Commanding:*

My scouts have returned and report the roads from this place to Monticello in an almost impassable condition. The enemy have entirely dispersed and gone to their homes. At Monticello they destroyed the carriages of four guns. General Schoepf starts to-day with his brigade for Monticello. I have left Colonel Manson, with his brigade, at enemy's entrenched camp, collecting the public property, which will require four or five days to accomplish. The engineers have commenced on the fly-

ing bridges at Waitsborough, and will progress with them as rapidly as possible. If I had two engines, the engineers could build two steamers in a short time. They would be of very great importance in our operations on the river.

Very respectfully,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Somerset, Ky., January 24, 1862.*

Surg. D. B. CLIFF:

The general commanding the division grants you permission to accompany the remains of General Zollicoffer and Lieut. Bailie Peyton to Louisville, Ky. Transportation for this purpose will be furnished you from the quartermaster's department. An escort of 1 sergeant and 6 men will be detailed to accompany you as far as Lebanon, Ky., and a transportation pass over the railroad to Louisville.

Upon your arrival at Louisville you will at once report in person to General D. C. Buell, commanding the Department of the Ohio, and, with his consent, can proceed to Nashville with the remains.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. E. FLYNT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Cairo, January 25, 1862.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

I returned this evening to Cairo, leaving the last of the troops from here at Fort Jefferson. They will be brought back to-morrow. The effect of the demonstration made by the troops upon the enemy cannot be positively stated, but there is but little doubt that Columbus was re-enforced, likely from Union City and Camp Beauregard. Several persons came into our lines from Columbus while we were out, and two gentlemen are in to-day from New Orleans. All agree in saying that public confidence in ultimate success is fast on the wane in the South. The expedition, if it had no other effect, served as a fine reconnaissance.

I have nothing official from General Smith, but understand that Camp Beauregard was destroyed. The detachment of troops from Paducah that went up the Tennessee landed 2½ miles from Fort Henry, and General Smith will reach Paducah with all his force to-morrow. I will then prepare a report of the entire expedition, unless the general commanding department shall see fit to permit me to visit headquarters, as I have before desired.

I have this evening issued a circular, calling upon the company and regimental commanders for a list of river and sea-faring men of their respective commands who are willing to transfer to the gunboat service. Men are absolutely necessary before the gunboats, now nearly ready for use, can be used. I contemplate transferring such men as desire it to that service, subject to the approval of the department commander.



I would call the attention of the commanding general to the conduct of an association of engineers in the city of Saint Louis, who are interfering with men of their calling entering the service of the United States. Captain Porter, U. S. Navy, reports a case in point. He says that he sent to Saint Louis for an engineer for the tug Sampson. One was engaged, but, upon being informed by the association that they held a mortgage upon his property and would foreclose it if he accepted such service, was forced to decline.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, January 26, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. S. P. CARTER,  
*Commanding Twelfth Brigade:*

GENERAL: I have ordered your brigade to return to the Cumberland Gap route.

Take four of your best regiments, and perhaps four companies of your cavalry, if it should have come up, and by a prompt movement seize and hold Cumberland Gap, fortifying yourself strongly. Bring two sections of your artillery up to support you, leaving the other section, one company of cavalry, and one regiment of infantry at your depot of supplies, which, until you are surely established, had better remain at London, and afterwards move up perhaps to Barboursville.

I need not advise you how your advance upon the Gap should be conducted. Your baggage and a few days' provisions, protected by five or six companies of infantry, might move up to the fords, so as to be near at hand. From there your main column should move without baggage, except entrenching tools, and five days' rations in haversacks.

Your attack should be by skirmishers on the sides of the mountains, while a strong force in reserve holds and advances on the road. These details must be determined according to the circumstances as you find them.

The great difficulty which we have to contend with is that of supplying troops operating over so long a route, with the roads as bad as they are now at this season.

You must practice the most stringent economy in every article of supplies. Haul nothing that can be procured in the country or that can possibly be dispensed with. Detail a suitable number of trustworthy and efficient officers from your command to establish depots of forage along the route, say about three between Richmond and the Gap. It will be necessary to keep small guards at these depots.

It is difficult to lay down precise rules to govern you in the position which you are expected to take. With your force alone it is hardly to be expected, unless the enemy is weaker than is probable, that you should undertake any extensive operations.

The destruction of the railroad line through Tennessee is always important, but that, if you can attempt it at all, must be done by management or the rapid movement of a small force, rather than by any movement of your main force.

As a matter of policy, if for no other reason, and in order not to excite the rebel authorities to increased persecution of the loyal people

by way of retaliation, you are to refrain from any unnecessarily harsh course towards the former. Restrain your troops from committing outrages upon persons or property, and make no arrests, unless of those who are engaged in war against your command or who are otherwise working actively against its comfort or safety.

Be vigilant, look well to the discipline and instruction of your troops, and report frequently.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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SOMERSET, KY., *Sunday, January 26, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL:

There are no supplies at this place. The road to Stanford will not be finished for ten days. The roads leading into Tennessee are in very bad condition. It is necessary to have the means of crossing the river, which we shall have as soon as we can get the cables from Louisville. I have sent an officer for them to-day. I have already ordered the road up the South Fork to be examined, and expect to know all about it day after to-morrow.

I have not been able to get a more complete list of the number of the killed and wounded than the one telegraphed on 21st. Hope to have it by to-morrow morning. The work of collecting together and securing the property captured has prevented Colonel Manson from handing in his report. He will do so to-morrow. I will then complete and forward my report. Can I send at once all the prisoners to Louisville except the wounded and those detailed to nurse them?

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 26, 1862—7.30 p. m.*

General THOMAS:

Start General Carter's brigade to London, Ky., at once, with at least three days' rations in haversacks and five in wagons. They must move as rapidly as possible, without absolutely forcing their march. Conceal the movement from your captives. Yes; forward the prisoners.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Somerset, January 26, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: The commissary reports to me that he cannot furnish General Carter's brigade with more than two days' rations. The subsistence stores are still behind and come in very slowly. I can forward the prisoners day after to-morrow, and probably Carter's brigade next day.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 27, 1862.*

General LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. :*

SIR : The natural expectation that our success at Somerset would be followed rapidly by other successful operations against the enemy makes it proper that I should state for the information of the General-in-Chief the circumstances which, I fear, must to some extent disappoint that expectation. My order to General Thomas to march and, in conjunction with General Schoepf, attack the enemy at Mill Springs was dated the 29th of last month, and General Thomas accordingly marched from Lebanon on the 1st instant. The roads were then comparatively good, and I hoped that the limited amount of transportation we had been able to get up would enable him to move promptly and accomplish his work completely in ten days. By that time I hoped also that we would have accumulated transportation enough to enable us to act vigorously upon the heels of the success which I calculated upon ; but the bad weather set in the very day of his departure, and instead of ten days to accomplish the whole work it took him eighteen days to get on the ground and eight days' hard work to make the last 40 miles.

Although I had long since, with our present organization of the quartermaster's department, almost despaired of getting on anything like an efficient footing in the matter of transportation for the whole force, yet the result has been even worse than I expected, and the almost impassable condition of the roads has rendered double the allowance necessary. With all the means we have it has been barely possible to keep the force at Somerset from starving, and at times for several days some of them have been on half rations. The country yields but little besides corn, and that in so small a quantity, that it is with difficulty forage can be obtained for the animals. I have now four regiments engaged in corduroying the road to Somerset for a distance of some 40 miles.

Under these circumstances any advance beyond Somerset is as present impossible, though I had instructed General Thomas on going there to be prepared to move into East Tennessee or in any other direction that circumstances might require. I am making every effort to remedy this condition of things, but it is not to be concealed that the difficulties are very great. Colonel Swords has here been assiduous and anxious, but his health has not been equal to the labor, and his assistants have been totally inadequate, both in number and in experience.

The General-in-Chief is advised that in carrying out his views it was my purpose to move upon East Tennessee on two routes. The column on the Cumberland Gap route I have put in motion ; the other is detained by the circumstances I have described. The first alone cannot be expected to penetrate the State, but it will at least encourage the loyal inhabitants and guard Kentucky against invasion by that route.

This is not as favorable a result of our efforts as I should like to present, but they have not been altogether without fruits, and I feel assured that the difficulty of moving large bodies of troops in the winter upon long lines of communication on common dirt roads, and through a country which affords but meager supplies, will be rightly appreciated.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*



HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*South Carrollton, January 27, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

CAPTAIN: I have received information from Hopkinsville that Colonel Forrest, with his cavalry, has it in contemplation to attempt to destroy Lock No. 1 on Green River. They have destroyed all the bridges on Pond River, which would prevent any attempt on my part to cut them off, as that stream is a deep, muddy one, and only fordable in a few places at low water. At present the locks are perfectly safe, as the water is 10 feet deep on them; but should the water fall while the armies are in their present positions, they could easily effect their object before I could possibly assist the small party stationed there.

I do not think I ought to weaken my strength here by sending away permanently a strong detachment, and would most respectfully suggest that 200 or 300 men be sent from Indiana for that purpose. There are some slight fortifications there, and that number of men could defend the place against such cavalry as could be sent against them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*South Carrollton, January 27, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

CAPTAIN: I have heard that a large force from Bowling Green had come under Buckner to Russellville, with a view to intercept me if I advance or come here and attack me if I remain for any length of time where I am.

I am strongly posted, and am making my position stronger by erecting earthworks on the heights for the protection of the men.

I should have no apprehension for the result if attacked by 15,000 men, the reported force of the enemy with which we are threatened, but shall, of course, use every exertion to become still stronger.

If I am to remain here any time a few guns in position would aid me immensely.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, January 28, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Commanding Fifth Division, South Carrollton:*

SIR: It is presumed that you have before this received the general's dispatch of the 24th [26th] instant, directing the return of your division to Calhoun, and the general trusts that you have complied with it.

Your position at South Carrollton (being on the south side of Green River, which is impassable at this time) is a very unsafe one, and you

will lose no time in moving your command to Calhoun and placing yourself on the north side of Green River.

If you should be attacked or too seriously threatened to undertake this move with time to accomplish it, you must, of course, defend yourself to the last extremity in the strongest position you can take, and see that the enemy does not cut your line of communication at or near Calhoun. It is hoped, however, that you will move to Calhoun promptly and without interference.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*South Carrollton, January 28, 1862.*

General BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio:*

GENERAL: Your dispatch of the 26th instant was received before daylight this morning, and the barges and steamboats are now being loaded with commissary stores and forage. I shall get the supplies which I have of these things to Calhoun before night, I hope, and the boat back during the night. I hear of no advance of the enemy, and unless I do, will march back, as soon as I can rid myself of every incumbrance, by the road I came. It is a very bad road, but the best and much the shortest. It would be almost impossible for me to cross the river here, because of the steep and muddy banks and the high water. I shall endeavor to have every possible arrangement made to cross the wagons and troops with dispatch as soon as they arrive opposite to Calhoun.

Owing to the terrible condition of the roads between here and Calhoun I shall send my camp equipage by the boats, so as to have my wagons light as possible. I shall send down at least a regiment in the same way, with instructions to construct a bridge of the boats by the time I arrive with the troops and train, and if the current of the river is too swift for the bridge, to make the best possible arrangements for ferrying.

This evening or to-morrow morning I will send Colonel Jackson, with 500 cavalry, to Greenville, to remain there until I leave here with the column, and then march to Sacramento by the road leading from Greenville to that place.

This, I think, will certainly conceal my movement until I have actually started, and protect me on the only quarter from which I could be surprised and harassed by cavalry. I anticipate, however, no difficulty except from the roads and river, though I will prepare as well as I can for every kind of difficulty.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

N. B.—I cannot send you a telegram, because I cannot spare a boat, and the high water has obstructed the right road to Evansville. I hope this letter will reach Owensborough to-night, and, if so, it will be the quickest way in which I can communicate with you.

Respectfully,

T. L. C.

CLERK'S OFFICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,  
*Frankfort, Ky., January 28, 1862.*

General THOMAS :

DEAR SIR : I have been waiting for some days to read your official report of the great victory obtained over the rebels by the troops under your command on the 19th instant, but I can no longer delay to present you my hearty congratulations on the glorious event, so crushing and complete.

Four States are entitled to the special credit—Wisconsin, Ohio, Indiana, and Kentucky—but your whole army has covered itself with glory.

Very truly, your most obedient servant,

LESLIE COOMBS.

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WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK and Brigadier-General BUELL :

A deserter just in from the rebels says that Beauregard had not left Centreville four days ago, but that as he was going on picket he heard officers say that Beauregard was under order to go to Kentucky with fifteen regiments from the Army of the Potomac.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 30, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
*General-in-Chief of the Army, Washington :*

GENERAL : I inclose herewith a copy of instructions sent this day to General Grant in relation to the expedition up the Tennessee River against Fort Henry. As Fort Henry, Dover [Fort Donelson], &c., are in Tennessee, I respectfully suggest that that State be added to this department.

General Grant has already been re-enforced with eight regiments of infantry, and several others, with three batteries of artillery, are under orders to join him. I will send down every man I can spare. Information is received to-day that Brigadier-General Price, son of the major-general, is again organizing insurgents in Howard and Chariton Counties, and that the rebels are becoming more bold since our troops have been sent south. I therefore think it unsafe to withdraw many more until the State militia can take their place. The militia dare not or will not organize in counties not occupied by our troops. To facilitate this organization it becomes necessary to scatter the volunteers over a very large tract of country. This is unfortunate, but unavoidable.

Fort Henry has a garrison of about 6,600, and is pretty strongly fortified. Possibly re-enforcements may be sent from Columbus as soon as we move. If we can reach the railroad this may be prevented, as the country roads are almost impassable.

The troops from Rolla are advancing in the direction of Springfield, but necessarily move very slowly. Greenville, south of Ironton, is occupied by our cavalry, and an infantry regiment is ordered to re-enforce them. This movement is necessary to break up the rebel organizations in the counties of Wayne and Butler.

The roads south of the Tennessee River are almost impassable. General Smith reported on his recent reconnaissance up that river



"that the road was horrible, and new tracks had to be cut through the woods. It took an entire day for one brigade to move 3 miles."

Permanent crews for the gunboats are being rapidly organized. The mortar boats cannot be used in the Tennessee or Cumberland, and I doubt if they will ever be of much use in the Mississippi. Neither navy nor army officers have much faith in them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 30, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Cairo* :

Your letter of the 28th, in relation to Colonel Cavanaugh's command, is received. You will organize your command into brigades and divisions, or columns, precisely as you may deem best for the public service, and will from time to time change such organizations as you may deem the public service requires, without the slightest regard to political influences or to the orders and instructions you may have heretofore received. In this matter the good of the service, and not the wishes of politico-military officers, is to be consulted.

Get all the troops you can from Illinois, and organize and supply them the best you can when you get them. Don't let any political applications about brigades and divisions trouble you a particle. All such applications and arrangements are sheer nonsense and will not be regarded.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *January 30, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN :

Your telegraph respecting Beauregard is received. General Grant and Commodore Foote will be ordered to immediately advance, and to reduce and hold Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, and also to cut the railroad between Dover and Paris. The roads are in such condition as to render all movements exceedingly slow and difficult.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 30, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
*Commanding U. S. Army:*

MY DEAR FRIEND: I inclose you an extract from a letter I have just received from an intelligent and well-informed person I have at Paducah. I believe his suggestion to be feasible at this time in whole or in part, and I don't hesitate to urge the attempt. It should be done promptly, as the present stage of water in the rivers renders useless all the obstructions that have been placed in them.

The destruction of the bridges and the boats on the Cumberland and

Tennessee Rivers is an object the importance of which cannot be over-rated. It is well worth the risk of losing a gunboat or so.

I have written to General Halleck on this subject, and do not hesitate to recommend it to your prompt consideration.

I have just received your dispatch about Beauregard. I will try to write to-night at length about matters here.

Very truly,

D. C. BUELL.

[Inclosure.]

General Smith reconnoitered Fort Henry. He says two of the new gunboats could go right up and shell it out in two hours. The site of the old masked battery, a few miles below, being about 14 feet under water, the gunboat (on which he was) went within long range of the main work and threw a few shells, one of which burst right over the works, to draw their fire. The fort replied with one shot, which fell far short. General Smith says there must be five acres in the work, and that it is full of houses. The force appears to be not less than 3,000, their tents showing upon the higher ground back of the fort. General S. thinks there are no works on the west side of the river, but I still incline to think there are. He suggests that two new gunboats could run the gauntlet of the fort and destroy the bridge across the river above. No doubt of it; but they might as well shell out the fort, and then tugs could go up to assist the slower gunboats in the ascent, and going to the bridge would do little good without going to Tusculumbia to take the steamboats.

It could all be done with ease on this high tide and with perfect safety. It is altogether probable that the Lexington or Conestoga (old boats) could run up in the backwater to the bridge of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, near Tusculumbia, and destroy it.

Two new gunboats, one old one, and 500 troops on one transport up Tennessee River can shell out Fort Henry, destroy the bridge, run up the river to Tusculumbia, and the troops can land and destroy two or three bridges near the river along there. The expedition would meet no opposition above Fort Henry; and if he will send two or three bomb-barges soon, they can run over the Muscle Shoals on this tide and destroy the long bridges at Decatur and Bridgeport, Ala., closing in Middle Tennessee. I believe the Conestoga or Lexington could at present run over Muscle Shoals. I believe an equal force of gunboats could clear out the Cumberland on the water of the next ten days to the point where General Thomas has possession of it. It would not be necessary for more than one new gunboat to accompany the old one on the Tennessee farther up than Fort Henry.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, Ky., January 30, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  
*Commanding Department of Missouri:*

GENERAL: I venture to inclose to you an extract from a letter I have received from an intelligent and well-informed person at Paducah.\*

I believe his suggestions to be feasible to a considerable extent, if

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\* See inclosure above.

not throughout, and I hope you will see enough in it to give it a prompt trial.

The destruction of the bridges on the Cumberland and Tennessee alone is an object the importance of which cannot well be overrated, and is well worth the risk of losing more than one or two gunboats.

The present condition of the rivers I believe makes it practicable at this time. It requires no unusual preparation, and should be executed promptly.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 30, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

I have ordered an advance of our troops on Fort Henry and Dover. It will be made immediately.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, KY., *January 30, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

Please let me know your plan and force and the time, &c.

BUELL.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 31, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Movement already ordered to take and hold Fort Henry and cut railroad between Columbus and Dover. Force about 15,000; will be re-enforced as soon as possible. Will telegraph the day of investment or attack.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *January 31, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

Do you consider active co-operation essential to your success, because in that case it would be necessary for each to know what the other has to do?

It would be several days before I could seriously engage the enemy, and your operation ought not to fail.

The operation which was suggested in my letter yesterday would be an important preliminary to the next step.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*



## HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

*Cairo, January 31, 1862.*

General C. F. SMITH,

*Commanding U. S. Forces, Paducah, Ky.:*

On Monday next I expect to start from Smithland, Paducah, and this place some 15,000 men for Fort Henry, to take and occupy that position. Full instructions will be received from General Halleck in the morning. At the present I am only in possession of telegraphic orders to take and hold it.

If my instructions contain nothing to change the plan I would adopt, I will want a brigade from Paducah, and all the command from Smithland, except the Fifty-second Illinois, and one battalion to be designated by yourself. These troops will take with them all their baggage, but no baggage train; these being left, to be taken up afterwards.

I do not regard over a squadron of cavalry being necessary for the whole command in taking the position. All that might afterwards be required can be sent from here.

The troops going from your command may take with them such rations as they have on hand at the time of starting, not less than two days' supply, however, preparation being made here for issuing at the place of debarkation. A supply of ammunition will also be taken from here, but every regiment should take with them all they have on hand, and not less than 40 rounds.

Should I not be able to write more definitely by to-morrow's boat, I will telegraph during the day if a change from the above is necessary. But very little preparation is necessary for this move; and, if possible, the troops and community should be kept from knowing anything of the design. I am well aware, however, that this caution is entirely unnecessary to you.

It is impossible to spare a boat just now to run exclusively between Paducah and Smithland; but until one can be sent, the steamer from here can continue her trips to the latter place upon your order as often as necessary.

U. S. GRANT,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

*Cairo, January 31, 1862.*Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Inclosed herewith I send you a communication from General Smith\* containing the latest and most reliable information I have from the Upper Tennessee. I am quietly making preparations for a move, without as yet having created a suspicion even that a movement is to be made. Awaiting your instructions, which we expect in the morning, I have not made definite plans as to my movements, but expect to start Sunday evening, taking 15,000 men. I would move by steamer as far as practicable, taking but little cavalry and but little land transportation, expecting to forward these afterwards. I shall go in person, and take with me either General McClernand or General Smith, to command after my return. I will report from this until Saturday by telegraph.

U. S. GRANT,

*Brigadier-General.*

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\* Not found.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, January 31, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Cairo* :

The Twenty-fifth Indiana Infantry and three batteries leave here on steamer to-morrow morning. The Thirty-second Illinois leave Springfield to-day, and the Forty-ninth Illinois and a battalion of artillery by Sunday or Monday; all for Cairo. Keep me informed by telegram of all your movements.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, January 31, 1862.*

General THOMAS :

The two regiments belong to General Carter's command and must go with it. Inform General Carter that Humphrey Marshall proposes to winter at Whitesburg; tell him his depot at London must be fortified and the command vigilant. Has any force gone to Monticello? What word from the South Fork road, and what do you learn in regard to supplies on the route?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

SOMERSET, KY., *January 31, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL :

I intended to start General Schoepf's brigade yesterday to Monticello, but the roads are in such a condition that supplies did not reach here in time. He will cross the river to-day and start to-morrow, or as soon as the weather will permit. It still continues to rain, keeping the roads as bad as ever.

The man I sent to examine the South Fork road has not yet returned. I shall need an extra regiment to guard this depot when we leave.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, January 31, 1862.*

General THOMAS :

Stop the movement of General Schoepf's brigade until further orders.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 1, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.* :

Co-operation at present not essential. Fort Henry has been re-enforced, but where from I have not learned. The roads are in such horrible condition as to render movements almost impossible on land. Will write you fully my plans as soon as I get your letter of the 30th ultimo. Write me your plans, and I will try to assist you.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, February 1, 1862.*Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Commanding, Cairo:*

GENERAL: You are authorized to withdraw Colonel Ross' regiment, Seventeenth Illinois, from Cape Girardeau for the Tennessee expedition as soon as they are wanted. The remaining forces are sufficient for that place.

Your requisitions for horses, mules, wagons, &c., cannot be filled immediately. By using steamers on the river, and as the troops will not move far from their supplies and water transportation, much of the usual trains can be dispensed with for several weeks. Don't cumber up the expedition with too large a train. The object is to move rapidly and promptly by steamers, and to reduce the place before any large re-enforcements can arrive.

Very respectfully,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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CAIRO, *February 1, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

I will leave here to-morrow night. Force larger than Colonel Meperson supposed could be taken by 3,000.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

*Cairo, February 1, 1862.*General JOHN A. MCCLERNAND,  
*Commanding, Cairo, Ill.:*

The troops of your division will be held in readiness to move by steamer to-morrow, taking with them all their camp and garrison equipage, three days' rations and forage, and not to exceed four teams to each regiment. The necessary instructions in this regard have been given those troops not formerly of your command. One regiment of infantry and Dickey's cavalry will be left to garrison Cairo, for want of transportation.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

*Cairo, February 1, 1862.*General E. A. PAINE,  
*Commanding Bird's Point, Mo.:*

In the assignment of commanders to brigades I have placed you in immediate command of Cairo and dependencies.\*

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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\*Detailed instructions omitted.



HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
Cairo, February 1, 1862.

Brig. Gen. C. F. SMITH,  
*Commanding U. S. Forces, Paducah, Ky.:*

I am instructed by Brigadier-General Grant to say that the preparations for reducing Fort Henry required of you will be the same as stated in his communication of yesterday, with the exception that you will take all the available forces, including cavalry, which can be spared from Paducah and Smithland, leaving only such forces as may be absolutely necessary to hold these places against attack.

[JNO. A. RAWLINS,]  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
No. 5. } Cairo, February 1, 1862.

For the temporary government the forces of this military district will be divided and commanded as follows, to wit:

The First Brigade will consist of the Eighth, Eighteenth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first Regiments of Illinois Volunteers, Schwartz's, and Dresser's batteries, and Stewart's, Dolins', O'Harnett's, and Carmichael's cavalry, Col. R. J. Oglesby, senior colonel of the brigade, commanding.

The Second Brigade will consist of the Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-fifth, and Forty-eighth Illinois Infantry, Fourth Illinois Cavalry, Taylor's and McAllister's artillery (the latter with four siege guns), Col. W. H. L. Wallace commanding.

The First and Second Brigades will constitute the First Division of the District of Cairo, and will be commanded by Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand.

The Third Brigade will consist of the Eighth Wisconsin, Forty-ninth Illinois, Twentieth-fifth Indiana, four companies of artillery, and such troops as are yet to arrive, Brig. Gen. E. A. Paine commanding.

The Fourth Brigade will be composed of the Tenth, Sixteenth, Twenty-second, and Thirty-second Illinois, and Tenth Iowa Infantry, Hough-taling's battery of light artillery, four companies of the Seventh and two companies of the First Illinois Cavalry, Colonel Morgan commanding.

Gen. E. A. Paine is assigned to the command of Cairo and Mound City and Colonel Morgan to the command of Bird's Point.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

SAINT LOUIS, February 2, 1862.

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Yours of the 30th ultimo is just received. At present it is only proposed to take and occupy Fort Henry and Dover [Donelson], and, if possible, cut the railroad from Columbus to Bowling Green. The roads are in such a horrible condition that troops cannot move by land. How far we may venture to send the gunboats up the river will be left for after consideration. The mortar boats are a failure; they cannot be taken up the river, and it remains to be determined whether the gunboats are worth half the money spent on them. Only a portion of

them have yet received crews. The garrison of Fort Henry at last accounts was 6,000. It may be further re-enforced from Columbus.

Keep me informed of your forces and plans, and I will endeavor to assist you as much as possible. If we take Fort Henry and concentrate all available forces there, troops must be withdrawn either from Bowling Green or Columbus to protect the railroads. If the former, you can advance; if the latter, we can take New Madrid and cut off the river communication with Columbus. But it will take some time to get troops ready to advance far south of Fort Henry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

CAIRO, *February 2, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

I leave at Cairo and defenses eight regiments of infantry, six companies of cavalry, two companies of artillery, and the sick of the entire command. More troops should be here soon if a change of commander is expected at Columbus.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 2, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Cairo, Ill.:*

I think a column should move from Smithland between the rivers if the road is practicable. Nearly all your available cavalry could take that route and be supplied, at least partly, by the boats on the river. Make your force as large as possible. I will send more regiments from here in a few days.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
No. 7. } *Cairo, February 2, 1862.*

On the expedition now about starting from Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Bird's Point, and Fort Holt the following orders will be observed:

1. No firing, except when ordered by proper authority, will be allowed.
2. Plundering and disturbing private property is positively prohibited.
3. Company officers will see that all their men are kept within camp, except when on duty.
4. Rolls will be called evening and morning and every man accounted for, and absentees reported to regimental commanders.
5. Company commanders will have special care that rations and ammunition are not wasted or destroyed by carelessness.
6. Troops will take with them three days' rations and forage, all camp and garrison equipage, and not to exceed four teams to each regiment.
7. Regimental commanders will be held strictly accountable for the acts of their regiments, and will in turn hold company commanders accountable for the conduct of their companies.

Capt. W. W. Leland, commissary of subsistence, is appointed chief commissary in the field.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

FEBRUARY 2, 1862.

General GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Somerset*:

What now is the condition of the roads? How soon could you march, and how long do you suppose it would take you to reach Knoxville? Are your supplies accumulating in sufficient quantity for a start? How is the road in advance likely to be affected by the passage of successive trains? What dependence can you place in supplies along it, particularly forage? Do you hear of any organization of a force there? Where is Crittenden? Are the fugitives getting together again? What progress has been made in improving the road to Somerset? Please answer at once.

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, KY., *February 3, 1862.*

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.*:

The destruction of the bridges on the Tennessee and Cumberland by gunboats I believe to be feasible. The gunboats can at this stage of the water run past the batteries at night without great risk. This accomplished, the taking and holding Fort Henry and Dover [Fort Donelson] would be comparatively easy. Without that I should fear the force you name could not hold both points. It will not do to be driven away. You had best count on meeting a re-enforcement of 10,000 from Bowling Green at this time, besides what may arrive from Virginia with Beauregard, who is said to bring fifteen regiments with him. In fact 10,000 men under Buckner and Floyd left Bowling Green on the 22d ultimo to go, it was said, to Paris, though they stopped at Russellville. That may have been because your force went back. I do not hear of the Virginia re-enforcement having started yet.

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, February 3, 1862.*

ANDREW H. FOOTE, *Flag-Officer, Paducah*:

General Grant is authorized to furnish men for temporary gunboat duty by detail. Men will be sent from here as soon as collected. Arrange with General Grant for temporary crews, so that there may be no delay.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*



PADUCAH, *February 3, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

Will be off up the Tennessee at 6 o'clock. Command, twenty-three regiments in all.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Near Fort Henry, Tenn., February 4, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

This morning the debarkation of one division, under General McClelland, took place 3 miles below Fort Henry, nearly in view of the rebel batteries. Not having sufficient transportation for all the troops, the larger portion of the steamers have to return to Paducah for the remainder of the command, under General Smith. I went up on the Essex this morning with Captain Porter, two other iron-clad boats accompanying, to ascertain the range of the rebel guns. From a point about 1 mile above the place afterwards decided on for place of debarkation several shells were thrown, some of them taking effect inside the rebel fort. This drew the enemy's fire, all of which fell far short, except from one rifled gun, which threw a ball through the cabin of the Essex and several near it.

I expect all the troops by 10 a. m. to-morrow. Enemy are represented as having re-enforced rapidly the last few days. General L. Tilghman commands Fort Henry.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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FEBRUARY 4, 1862.

General McCook, *Munfordsville:*

Try to ascertain whether the rebels have made any preparation for defense this side of Bowling Green by throwing up works or felling trees. Learn if they are doing anything in that way around Bell's and Bowling Green.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HDQRS FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Somerset, Ky., February 4, 1862.*

His Excellency DAVID TOD,

*Governor of the State of Ohio, Columbus, Ohio:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the 28th of January, inclosing a copy of the resolution of thanks of the General Assembly of the State of Ohio to myself and Cols. J. A. Garfield, and R. L. McCook, together with the officers and [men] of our command, for recent victories in Kentucky over the enemies of the Union.

It will afford me the greatest pleasure to comply with the request of the General Assembly to publish the resolution of thanks to my division, and I have the honor to request that you will convey to the General Assembly the sincere thanks of the officers and men of my command, as well as myself, for the complimentary manner in which they have ap-

proved our endeavors to reinstate the Constitution and laws over our distressed country.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

WASHINGTON, *February 4, 1862.*

General GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Commanding:*

DEAR GENERAL: You will need no assurance that I was delighted at the intelligence conveyed by your letter of the 22d ultimo,\* more than confirming what had been matter of rumors. During a conference with the Secretary of War the morning after I received it I read it to him. At his request I left it in his hands and he has just returned it after retaining a copy. Hence my delay in replying.

You have undoubtedly fought the great battle of the war. The country is still reverberating the shout of victory. The more we hear of the engagement the greater its magnitude appears.

I was much gratified to learn to-night from Mr. Speed, of Louisville, that you had sent Generals Schoepf and Boyle forward to Monticello with a large force, and that you were yourself actively engaged in pushing forward a column into Eastern Tennessee, for I know well enough that, winter though it is, rough as the ways are, you will not stop until Knoxville is in your possession and that line of railroad in your grip.

The advance into that region will necessarily involve some measures looking to the civil administration of the country. The mails should go simultaneously with the troops, and yet care should be taken that the rebels should not be benefited thereby. Trade, too, will naturally follow, to a limited extent at least; the Union people should as far as practicable be relieved from the inconveniences to which they have been subjected by the double rigors of external circumvallation by the Government and of domestic oppression by the secession domination, but care must be taken that it be not made a medium of contraband operations.

To look after these matters properly you might, I should think, employ with advantage some civilians, particularly some of the residents, being careful to select only persons both intelligent and reliable.

I am exceedingly anxious to be with you, but matters of great moment are just now before Congress, and seeing how partially our part of the country is represented in it, I dislike to leave.

Your own views on these matters would greatly interest me, and I beg you will favor me with them.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
 HORACE MAYNARD.

P. S.—Yesterday the Senate confirmed your nomination as brigadier-general.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Buell, February 4, 1862.*

Col. D. W. LINDSEY,  
*Commanding Twenty-second Kentucky Volunteers:*

You will immediately move your command to Piketon, and select some good place for a temporary camp a short distance away from the

\* Not found.

village, and require all your officers and men to encamp in tents. Direct your surgeon to obtain some appropriate building to be used as a temporary hospital. Your regiment will act as advance guard of the brigade, which will follow you soon.

Aside from the necessary picket service I desire you to use all means in your power to obtain accurate and reliable information of the whereabouts and strength of the enemy, and particularly to ascertain what rebel forces, if any, are occupying the Sounding Gap. Report to me by return of boats the condition of the country so far as you may have found. You are strictly charged to restrain your command from all depredations on private property of citizens. There are said to be marauding bands of the enemy in that locality. Capture or disperse them. There is a large number of loyal citizens who will aid you as scouts till our cavalry can join you.

Respectfully, yours,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

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[FEBRUARY 5, 1862.—McClellan to Buell misplaced. See p. 473.]

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 5, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Gunboats supplied with temporary crews and in the field. Mortar boats of no use at present. Enlistments for regular crews going on rapidly. Bombardment of Fort Henry now going on. Our troops have landed 3 miles below.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 5, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville:*

Our advance column is moving up the Tennessee—twenty-three regiments. More will soon follow. Can't you make a diversion in our favor by threatening Bowling Green?

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, *February 5, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

My position does not admit of diversion. My moves must be real ones, and I shall move at once unless I am restrained by orders concerning other plans. Progress will be slow for me. Must repair the railroad as we advance. It must probably be twelve days before we can be in front of Bowling Green.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 5, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

It is reported that 10,000 men have left Bowling Green by railroad to



re-enforce Fort Henry. Can't you send me some infantry regiments from Ohio? Answer.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., [February] 5—7 p. m.

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Halleck telegraphs that report says 10,000 men left Bowling Green by railroad to re-enforce Fort Henry, and asks for regiments from Ohio. If report true, can you not assist by a demonstration in direction of Bowling Green? Communicate with Halleck and assist him if possible. Please reply.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 5, 1862—7 p. m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Have telegraphed Buell to communicate with you, and suggested demonstration on Bowling Green. Have just moved eight regiments from Ohio into Western Virginia. Cannot well spare more thence from Buell unless absolutely necessary. Please communicate fully with Buell and with me.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, February 5, 1862—12 p. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

I am communicating with him [Halleck]. Bowling Green is secure from any immediate apprehension of attack by being strongly fortified behind a river, by obstructions on the roads for nearly the whole distance between us (40 miles), and by the condition of the roads themselves; can only be threatened with heavy artillery. No demonstration, therefore, is practicable. I will send him a brigade.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LOUISVILLE, February 5, 1862.

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

I will re-enforce your column by a brigade from Green River if you find that you absolutely require it; otherwise I have use for it. Do I understand you are moving up the Tennessee River only? You must not fail.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, February 5, 1862.

To the COMMANDING OFFICER AT PADUCAH, KY.,  
*For General Grant:*

Ten thousand men have left Bowling Green to re-enforce Fort Henry. Order forward all your available troops as rapidly as possible. I send

down the Fourteenth Iowa to-day, the Forty-third Illinois to-morrow, and the Second Iowa in a few days.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 5, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington:*

The delay caused by want of transportation, and when that shall be remedied the insuperable obstacles to the advance of a suitable column into East Tennessee in the present condition of the roads, impel me to proceed at once against Bowling Green, leaving the other to be resumed when it is possible. I am unwilling to seem to swerve from the execution of your plan without advising you of the meaning of it and knowing that you will acquiesce in the necessity for it. Since I commenced this dispatch General Halleck telegraphs me: "Our advance column is moving upon the enemy. Can't you make a diversion in our favor by threatening Bowling Green?" My position does not admit of diversion; my moves must be in earnest, and I propose to move at once. Our progress will not be rapid, for the railroad has to be repaired as we go, but we will try to make it sure. I hope General Halleck has weighed his work well. Please answer.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 5, 1862.*

THOMAS A. SCOTT,  
*Assistant Secretary of War, Indianapolis:*

I want all the infantry regiments at Cairo you can possibly send me there, in order to re-enforce the column now moving up the Tennessee River. Ten thousand men have been detached from Bowling Green by railroad to re-enforce Fort Henry. Send me all the re-enforcements you can, as I wish to cut the enemy's line before Beauregard arrives.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

GEN. FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
No. 1. } *Camp in Field, near Fort Henry, Feb. 5, 1862.*

The First Division, General John A. McClelland commanding, will move at 11 o'clock a. m. to-morrow, under the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, and take a position on the roads from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and Dover.

It will be the special duty of this command to prevent all re-enforcements to Fort Henry or escape from it; also to be held in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm promptly on receipt of orders.

Two brigades of the Second Division, General C. F. Smith commanding, will start at the same hour from the west bank of the river and take and occupy the heights commanding Fort Henry. This point will be held by so much artillery as can be made available and such other troops as in the opinion of the general commanding Second Division may be necessary for its protection.

The Third Brigade, Second Division, will advance up the east bank

of the Tennessee River as fast as it can be securely done, and be in readiness to charge upon the fort or move to the support of the First Division, as may be necessary.

All of the forces on the west bank of the river not required to hold the heights commanding Fort Henry will return to their transports, cross the river, and follow the First Division as rapidly as possible.

The west bank of the Tennessee River not having been reconnoitered, the commanding officer intrusted with taking possession of the enemy's works there will proceed with great caution and such information as can be gathered and such guides as can be found in the time intervening before 11 o'clock to-morrow.

The troops will move with two days' rations of bread and meat in their haversacks.

One company of the Second Division, armed with rifles, will be ordered to report to Flag-Officer Foote as sharpshooters on board the gunboats.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
No. 1. } *Camp near Fort Henry, Tenn., Feb. 6, 1862.*

A. H. Markland, esq., special U. S. mail agent, will take charge of all mail matter from and to the troops composing the present expedition, and make such arrangements as he may be authorized by the Department to make to forward the same.

All Government boats are commanded to carry all mail matter, and such persons as may have charge of the same under directions of Mr. Markland, free of charge to and from all points to which said boats may be plying.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

WASHINGTON, *February 6, 1862.*

General BUELL:

Telegram received. My dispatch of last night will show that you meet my views. Draw in from Ohio and Indiana what you need. I telegraph to the Governors to aid you. I need not urge you to delay the move on East Tennessee as little as possible. I fully appreciate the obstacles. Same thing here. Communicate often.

McCLELLAN.

SAINT LOUIS, *February 6, 1862.*

(Received, Washington, D. C., Feb. 6—6.30 p. m.)

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Fort Henry is largely re-enforced both from Bowling Green and Columbus. They intend to make a stand there. Unless I get more forces I may fail to take it, but the attack must help General Buell to move forward. Our troops landed 3 miles below the fort and the gunboats are bombarding it. I am sending every available man from Mis-



souri. I was not ready to move, but deemed best to anticipate the arrival of Beauregard's forces.

H. W. HALLECK.

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WASHINGTON, *February 6, 1862.*

General BUELL:

Halleck telegraphs that Fort Henry is largely re-enforced from Columbus and Bowling Green. If road so bad in your front, had we not better throw all available force on Forts Henry and Donelson? What think you of making that the main line of operations? Answer quick.

McCLELLAN.

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WASHINGTON, *February 6, 1862.*

General BUELL:

If it becomes necessary to detach largely from your command to support Grant, ought you not to go in person? Reply, and, if yes, I will inform Halleck. Your last dispatch received. What heavy artillery will you eventually need?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 6, 1862.*  
(Received 10 p. m.)

General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

If you can give me, in addition to what I have in this department, 10,000 men, I will take Fort Henry, cut the enemy's line, and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000, and I will threaten Nashville and cut off railroad communication, so as to force the enemy to abandon Bowling Green without a battle.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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WASHINGTON, *February 6, 1862—7 p. m.*

General HALLECK:

Buell telegraphs roads are impassable to Bowling Green. Has sent you a brigade. I have placed nine additional regiments at his disposal to send to the Tennessee River or use himself if he can advance on Bowling Green. Buell will assist you. Is a sudden dash on Columbus practicable if Buell can send the troops? I will push Hitchcock's case. Yours of to-day received.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

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LOUISVILLE, *February 6—12 p. m.*  
(Received February 7, 1862—11.30 a. m.)

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

This whole move, right in its strategical bearing, but commenced by General Halleck without appreciation—preparative or concert—has

now become of vast magnitude. I was myself thinking of a change of the line to support it when I received your dispatch. It will have to be made in the face of 50,000 if not 60,000 men, and is hazardous. I will answer definitely in the morning.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 6, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville :*

The enemy is concentrating his forces on Fort Henry by railroad. It is said that Beauregard arrived there last night, but without his troops. The bombardment is now going on. The boats are in the Tennessee and the troops between that and the Cumberland. From what part of Green River can you advance a brigade to co-operate? If necessary, I can throw a column across the Cumberland to facilitate the movement.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 6, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis :*

I propose to send the brigade by water from the mouth of Green River, to form a junction with you.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 6, 1862—6.30 p. m.*

General HALLECK :

Besides the brigade from Green River I can send you two regiments from Indiana and six from Ohio. Telegraph the Governor of Ohio the point at which you will have his regiments. Those from Indiana I have directed to Cairo, hearing that you want them there. Please let me know what you do. All these troops are raw, you know, and without any brigade organization. For the present I will request the Governor to arrange them in brigades, and direct the senior colonel to take command. Do you require light batteries?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 6, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville :*

Send the brigade up the Cumberland, and I will have a gunboat at Smithland to protect the transports. They can land near Dover and operate on either side, as may be required. If we can reduce Fort Henry the gunboats will proceed up the river to destroy all bridges. I am satisfied that the enemy intend to make a desperate stand at that place, and will re-enforce it from Bowling Green and Columbus.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 6, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

Do you say send the brigade up the Cumberland River to land near Dover? Is not the enemy in possession of the route across from Dover? Please describe Grant's position and the enemy's.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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FEBRUARY 6, 1862.

General GEORGE H. THOMAS, *Somerset:*

Move your division with all possible dispatch back to Lebanon. Further orders will meet you there. Leave one regiment to collect and guard the public property until relieved by one from Wood's brigade, and then join you.

Lose no time. What amount of property and provisions is there on hand? What means have you prepared for crossing the river?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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FEBRUARY 6, 1862—7 p. m.

Gov. DAVID TOD, *Columbus, Ohio:*

General McClellan telegraphs me that you have six regiments subject to my call. Please arrange them in two brigades, so as to place the most capable colonel in command in each as far as relative rank will permit, and move them with all possible dispatch to such points as General Halleck may designate. They should be supplied with ammunition—at least 40 rounds.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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SOMERSET, *February 6, 1862—11 p. m.*

General D. C. BUELL:

Have on hand nearly 100,000 rations of small stores; not more than five days of bread.

Have been able to move but little of the captured property in consequence of the heavy and continuous rains. There are four ferry-boats being built, but none finished. A coal-boat is now used for crossing.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH DIVISION,  
*Calhoun, February 6, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

CAPTAIN: Your telegram ordering my command back to this place also directed me to have Hawkins' brigade in readiness to move to Louisville. I suppose that you intended the Fourteenth Brigade, and wrote Hawkins instead of Jones, who is in command of this brigade.



The country all around is flooded and impassable. The rebels have burned all the bridges on Pond River, a small stream, but deep; fordable when the waters are low at but few places, and not now to be forded at all. Pond River empties into Green River 10 miles below this place, and runs nearly parallel with Green River from its source to its mouth.

If a rebel force should attempt to go to Henderson I could only meet them by going down the river. I am confident that no troops but cavalry would attempt to go to Henderson; but I have been notified several times that the rebel cavalry contemplated this enterprise. In my opinion a single regiment at this place is enough to protect the lock, and twenty regiments here can do no more. If it is not your design to move this column south from some point on this river at an early day, I respectfully suggest that it would be well to send a regiment to Henderson.

I am, general, impatient, of course, at the inactivity of my command, but feel nothing like the spirit of complaint. We were all cheered by the order to advance, and naturally depressed by the order to return. But although my position at South Carrollton was naturally strong and had been strengthened by some field works, yet your order for me to return was not altogether unexpected, and my judgment approved the order, unless you could have sent some re-enforcements to my command.

Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 7, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington:*

Fort Henry is ours. The flag of the Union is re-established on the soil of Tennessee. It will never be removed.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*February 7, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  
*Comdg. Department of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

General McClellan congratulates you on the success of the expedition, and desires that Fort Henry be held at all hazards. Will give further instructions to-day about further movements.

A. V. COLBURN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 7, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Fort Henry will be held at all hazards. It is said that the enemy is concentrating troops by railroad to recover his lost advantage. If General Buell cannot either attack or threaten Bowling Green on

account of the roads, I think every man not required to defend Green River should be sent to the Tennessee River or Cumberland River. We can hold our ground and advance up these rivers. The enemy must abandon Bowling Green. If he does not, he is completely paralyzed. He will concentrate at Dover, Clarksville, or Paris, or fall back on Nashville. In either case Bowling Green will be of little importance. He ought to concentrate at Dover, and attempt to retake Fort Henry. It is the only way he can restore an equilibrium. We should be prepared for this. If you agree with me, send me everything you can spare from General Buell's command or elsewhere. We must hold our ground and cut the enemy's lines. I am sending everything I can rake and scrape together from Missouri.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *February 7, 1862—7.15 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Dispatch received. I congratulate you upon the result of your operations. They have caused the utmost satisfaction here. I would not undertake a dash at Columbus now. Better devote everything towards turning it; first collecting a sufficient force near Forts Henry and Donelson to make success sure.

Either Buell or yourself should soon go to the scene of operations. Why not have Buell take the line of Tennessee and operate on Nashville, while your troops turn Columbus? Those two points gained, a combined movement on Memphis will be next in order. The bridges at Tusculumbia and Decatur should at all hazards be destroyed at once.

Please number telegraphic dispatches and give hour of transmittal. Thank Grant, Foote, and their commands for me.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 7, 1862.*

Brigadier-General GRANT or Flag-Officer FOOTE,  
*Fort Henry:*

Push the gunboats up the river to cut the railroad bridges. Troops to sustain the gunboats can follow in transports.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 7, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Gunboats and cavalry ordered up the Tennessee River to destroy bridges. I think the enemy is collecting forces at Paris to prevent this by threatening our right flank. Paris must be taken. I am throwing in additional forces as rapidly as possible, and want all I can get. Fort Donelson will probably be taken to-morrow. Possibly a dash can be made on Columbus, but I think not. It is very strong. I shall endeavor to cut the railroad at Union City, and if possible occupy New Madrid, so as to cut off supplies by the river; but these move-

ments must depend upon the arrival of troops and the condition of the roads, which are now almost impassable.

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 7, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Fort Henry is ours. The enemy is retreating on Paris, pursued by our cavalry. He has been compelled to abandon a part of his artillery. The gunboats will proceed up the river as far as may be safe. It is believed that the enemy is concentrating his forces at Paris, to operate on our flank. It will require every man we can get to hold him in check there, while a column is sent up the Tennessee or Cumberland, or both, to destroy bridges. We are much in want of artillery. Send down as many light batteries as you can spare. General Grant expects to take Fort Donelson (at Dover) to-morrow. If troops are sent up the Cumberland they will be preceded by gunboats.

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major-General.

FEBRUARY 7, 1862.

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

I congratulate you on your success. Considering the uncertainty of forming a junction, I ordered the brigade from Green River to go up the Tennessee. The boats start to-night to take them on board.

I have no light batteries to send you now.

D. C. BUELL,  
Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 7, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville:*

Your letter of the 5th just received.\* I agree with you entirely. Bowling Green must be given up if we can hold our position. The enemy will concentrate at Nashville, Clarksville, or Paris, or will attempt to regain his lost advantage at Fort Henry or Dover—I think the latter. It is all-important that we hold our position and advance toward Nashville. I fear I may not be able to do this without more troops. If from the condition of the roads you can neither threaten nor attack Bowling Green nor follow him to the Cumberland, I advise the sending of every man not necessary to sustain your line on Green River down the Ohio, to operate up the Cumberland or Tennessee. If we can hold Fort Henry and move up these rivers, you will have no further difficulty about Bowling Green. The enemy must abandon it and fall back. If he moves all his forces against me on the Tennessee I may not be able to resist him, but will do everything in my power. I have only 15,000 men at Fort Henry and Dover. I throw out these suggestions for your consideration. If you can help me still further I know you will do so.

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major-General.

\* See p. 936.



SAINT LOUIS, *February 7, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky. :*

GENERAL: My telegrams of to-day are so full that I have very little to add in answer to your letter of the 5th. You say you regret that we could not have consulted on this move earlier. So do I, most sincerely. I had no idea of commencing the movement before the 15th or the 20th instant till I received General McClellan's telegram about the re-enforcement sent to Tennessee or Kentucky with Beauregard. Although not ready, I deemed it important to move instantly. I believe I was right. We must hold. Fort Henry must be held at all hazards. I am sending there every man I can get hold of, without regard to the consequences of abandoning posts in this State. If the rebels rise, I will put them down afterwards. Grant's force is small—only 15,000. Eight thousand more are on the way to re-enforce him. If we can sustain ourselves and advance up the Cumberland or Tennessee, Bowling Green must be abandoned. I suppose the mud there, as it is here, is too deep for movements outside of railroads and rivers.

The enemy has the railroads, and we must use the rivers—at least for the present. Unfortunately our gunboats are badly disabled. They will be repaired as soon as possible. In the mean time we must push on with infantry and artillery on transports. I have no train, and most of the regiments are without means of transportation on land. I hope you will help us all you can. I deem the holding of Fort Henry of vital importance to both of us.

I write in great haste, but you will understand the purport of what I wish to express.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY, *February 7, 1862—7.15 p. m.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky. :*

Why not take the line of the Tennessee with your command and operate on Nashville, while Halleck turns Union City and Columbus?

I have directed him to destroy bridge at Decatur if possible to reach it.

After carrying Nashville and Columbus a combined attack on Memphis could be made; it would easily fall if bridge at Decatur destroyed.

Call for all available troops in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan.

Please number and give hour of transmittal of telegraphic dispatches.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 7, 1862—9 p. m.*

Major-General MCCLELLAN:

I cannot, on reflection, think a change of my line would be advisable. I shall want eighteen rifled siege guns and four companies of experienced gunners to man them. I hope General Grant will not require further re-enforcements. I will go, if necessary.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

CAIRO, ILL., *February 7, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,

*Comdg. U. S. Forces on Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers:*

By direction of Major-General Halleck I am here with his authority to give any necessary orders in his name to facilitate your very important operations. Do you want any more cavalry? If so, General Halleck can send you a regiment from Saint Louis. I have directed General Paine to send you, as soon as transportation can be provided, the Thirty-second and Forty-ninth Illinois and Twenty-fifth Indiana. The Fifty-seventh Illinois will be here on Wednesday, *en route* to join you. Several regiments are about moving from Saint Louis to add to your forces. Please ask Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson whether he wants intrenching tools or anything else I can supply.

G. W. CULLUM,

*Brig. Gen. Vols., U. S. Army, Chief of Staff.*LOUISVILLE, *February 8, 1862—9 a. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

I am concentrating and preparing, but will not decide definitely yet.

D. C. BUELL,

*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, February 8, 1862.*To the SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington:*

Brigadier-Generals Sherman, Pope, Grant, Curtis, Hurlbut, Sigel, Prentiss, and McClelland, all in this department, are of same date, and each unwilling to serve under the other. If Brig. Gen. E. A. Hitchcock could be made major-general of volunteers and assigned to this department it would satisfy all and reconcile all differences. If it can be done there should be no delay, as an experienced officer of high rank is wanted immediately on the Tennessee line.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, February 8, 1862—12 m.*Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington:*

Yours of the 7th, 8 p. m., is received. I am decidedly of opinion that if General Buell cannot move on Bowling Green, all his available forces not required to guard Green River should be transferred to the Cumberland, to move by water on Nashville. With the enemy in force at Columbus and Bowling Green on my flanks I cannot advance on Nashville without more troops. The enemy would be certain to cut me off from my base. I shall go to Fort Henry on Monday or Tuesday. The disabled gunboats cannot be repaired for some days, giving time for the transfer of what forces can be spared from Kentucky.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 8, 1862.*Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington, D. C.:*

GENERAL: I have considered with due deliberation that part of your telegram of yesterday in relation to General Buell's coming to the Cumberland River and taking command of the expedition against Nashville. General Sherman ranks General Buell, and he is entitled to a command in that direction. I propose, with due deference to your better judgment, the following plan, as calculated to produce unity of action and to avoid any difficulties about rank and command: Create a geographical division, to be called Western Division, or any other suitable name, and to be composed of three departments, viz: Department of the Missouri, including the present Department of Kansas and the States of Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, and Arkansas; Department of the Mississippi, including the remainder of the present Department of the Missouri and West Tennessee; Department of the Ohio, to be the same as at present, with the addition of East Tennessee. If we penetrate into Alabama or Mississippi, they can be assigned according to circumstances. General Buell would then retain his present command, with a small addition; General Hunter could take the new Department of the Missouri, which, I have no doubt, would be more agreeable to him than his present position; and General Hitchcock, if you can get him appointed, could take the new Department of the Mississippi. I have no desire for any larger command than I have now, but it seems to me that this would produce greater concert of action, give more satisfaction to General Hunter, and economize your labor, as all your orders for the West would then go through a single channel. Moreover, where troops of different departments act together, as they must on the Cumberland and Tennessee and on the frontiers of Kansas, Missouri, and Arkansas, they would be under one general head. This would avoid any clashing of interests or difference of plans and policy.

I make these suggestions for your consideration.

If General Hitchcock cannot be appointed, General Sherman could take the Department of the Mississippi. His health is greatly improved.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 8, 1862.*Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,  
*Commanding Fort Henry:*

If possible, destroy the bridge at Clarksville. It is of vital importance, and should be attempted at all hazards. Shovels and picks will be sent you to strengthen Fort Henry. The guns should be transferred and arranged so as to resist an attack by land. The redan on south bank should be arranged for same object. Some of the guns from Fort Holt will be sent up. Re-enforcements will reach you daily. Hold on to Fort Henry at all hazards. Impress slaves of secessionists in vicinity to work on fortifications. It is of vital importance to strengthen your position as rapidly as possible. When slaves are so impressed, they should be kept under guard and not allowed to communicate with the enemy, nor must they be allowed to escape. Where



supplies are taken from Union men, they should be paid for either in money or proper vouchers. Where taken from secessionists, they must be receipted for and duly taken up on the proper returns.

You must cut the enemy's telegraph lines whenever you can. Keep me informed of all you do as often as you can write or telegraph.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 8, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE W. CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill. :*

A brigade sent by Buell is coming down the Ohio to report at Smithland. Order them up the Tennessee to General Grant. Shovels go down to-day for use at Fort Henry. Send up picks from Cairo; also two guns from Fort Holt. All heavy guns in Fort Henry should be transferred to land side, to resist an attack from Bowling Green or Columbus. Push on the telegraph line with all possible dispatch.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Henry, Tenn., February 8, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill. :*

Yours of yesterday's date is received. The cavalry which General Halleck can spare from Saint Louis might be used to advantage after a while, possibly as soon as they could be got ready. At present we are perfectly locked in by high water and bad roads, and prevented from acting offensively, as I should like to do. The banks are higher at the water's edge than farther back, leaving a wide margin of low land to bridge over before anything can be done inland. The bad state of the roads will then prevent the transportation of baggage or artillery. I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day with infantry and cavalry alone, but all my troops may be kept busily engaged in saving what we now have from the rapidly-rising waters.

Yesterday my cavalry went to within a mile of Fort Donelson. All the enemy's pickets were driven in, but no definite information received of the number of the enemy. The force from here, however, had all joined the force at Fort Donelson, and if any re-enforcements were on the way for this place no doubt they have been or will go there also.

All the gunboats are gone from here. Captain Phelps started with the three old boats the evening after the battle, or rather capture I should say, and will no doubt go to the head of navigation. I sent after him a transport, with some infantry, to disable the railroad bridge, but getting off some hours later than the gunboats and finding a rebel force at the bridge, they returned without accomplishing the object. I sent up yesterday the only remaining iron-clad boat, and as she has just made her appearance, I will await her report and finish.

The railroad bridge is disabled. Some commissary stores and quartermaster property were also taken.

The steamer which will carry this will leave in a very short time, so that I will not be able to send any additional report to General Halleck. I would be obliged, therefore, if you would send this, or a copy,

or such portion of it as you think might interest the general commanding the department.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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FEBRUARY 8, 1862—4.30 p. m.

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis :*

I notified you that two Indiana and six Ohio regiments were subject to your call for the Tennessee River. Have you received them? Please tell me from time to time the details of Grant's movements as much as possible, so that I may act to suit the circumstances.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, February 8, 1862.*

General THOMAS :

Do not lose any time, but come on to Lebanon as promptly as possible. I may want you immediately.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 9, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky. :*

The two Indiana regiments are coming by railroad; hear nothing of the six from Ohio. Are these in addition to the brigade spoken of by you as coming down the Ohio? I hear nothing of the brigade. Grant was near Dover yesterday, the 8th; hear nothing more. Mad very deep, and movement slow.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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CAIRO, ILL., *February 9, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo. :*

McPherson has reconnoitered to within  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles of Fort Donelson and had skirmish with pickets. High water and mud prevent transportation of Grant's baggage and artillery. Have taken twelve field guns abandoned by rebels. Telegraph wires between Forts Henry and Donelson pulled down. Trestle from abutments of Tennessee bridge to high land destroyed, but fine bridge left uninjured. Gunboats in pursuit of rebel steamers; understand one burned to escape capture. Will send Forty-eighth Indiana, Thirty-second Illinois, and two heavy guns to-day by Empress, making five regiments sent from here.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brig. Gen. Vols., U. S. Army, Chief of Staff.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 9, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo :*

All additional stores should be sent to Paducah. The First Nebraska leave to-night; the Second Iowa will follow to-morrow night. General

McClellan gives hopes of adopting my plan entire, by sending a part of Buell's army to the Cumberland. If so, look out for lively times. The gunboats should be prepared for the Cumberland with all possible dispatch. Hitchcock is appointed.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 9, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo :*

If three gunboats can be spared from Cairo and made efficient, I wish them sent up the Cumberland to Dover and Clarksville. Consult Commodore Foote and let me know when and how many can go.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

CAIRO, *February 9, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo. :*

I telegraphed you this morning, and find my dispatch not sent at 8 this evening. I have already consulted with Foote, anticipating your orders. He can't send gunboats up Cumberland. Will see him again.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.*

CAIRO, ILL., *February 9, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo. :*

No force at Commerce Point, where all contraband from Illinois is landed for rebels. Four companies of Second Illinois Artillery, 425 men and sixteen guns, sent to north of Fort Holt on high ground, it being the order of General Grant on leaving to retain them here. German recruits may have been recently distributed to regiments. Captain Rodgers, of provost-marshal's department, reports a gang of K. G. C. at Ironton, Randolph County, Illinois. Mortar boats being experimented with. Essex will have to go to Saint Louis for repairs of boiler, &c. Forty-eighth Indiana arrived here with 900 men and but 400 arms. Have directed Colonel Buford to supply them with 500 from 600 altered Harper's Ferry muskets he has on hand, having just been supplied with Enfield rifles.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General and Chief of Staff.*

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }  
No. 3. }

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Henry, February 9, 1862.*

All regimental officers will immediately take up quarters with commands and not board on steamers, as the general commanding regrets to see has been done.

No officer will be allowed to go aboard any steamers except where his duty carries him.

Commanders of regiments will see that this order is properly executed.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant :

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*



GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }  
No. 5. }

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Henry, February 9, 1862.*

The pilfering and marauding disposition shown by some of the men of this command has determined the general commanding to make an example of some one, to fully show his disapprobation of such conduct. Brigade commanders, therefore, will be held accountable for the conduct of their brigades, regimental commanders for their regiments, and company commanders for their companies. If any one is found guilty of plundering or other violation of orders, if the guilty parties are not punished promptly the company officers will be at once arrested, or if they are not known the punishment will have to come upon the regimental or brigade commanders. Every offense will be traced back to a responsible party.

In an enemy's country, where so much more could be done by a manly and humane policy to advance the cause which we all have so deeply at heart, it is astonishing that men can be found so wanton as to destroy, pillage, and burn indiscriminately, without inquiry.

This has been done but to a very limited extent in this command so far, but too much for our credit has already occurred to be allowed to pass without admonition.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding :

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

FEBRUARY 10 [17], 1862—9 a. m.

Major-General McCLELLAN :

It is said that Beauregard is preparing to move from Columbus either on Paducah or Fort Henry. Do send me more troops. It is the crisis of the war in the West. Have you fully considered the advantage which the Cumberland affords to the enemy at Nashville? An immense number of boats have been collected, and the whole Bowling Green force can come down in a day, attack Grant in the rear, and return to Nashville before Buell can get half way there. The bridges are all destroyed and the roads rendered impassable. If Buell must move by land, why not direct him on Clarksville? I can do no more for Grant at present. I must stop the transports at Cairo to observe Beauregard. We are certainly in peril. Telegraph to General Hitchcock officially, informing him of his appointment, and assign him to duty in this department.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 10, 1862—12 m.*

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington :*

Colonel Holt and others say that troops cannot move by land in Kentucky before well into April. If sufficient forces are sent to the Cumberland, we can by that time be in the heart of Tennessee. Give us the means and we are certain to give the enemy a telling blow.

We have just taken Poplar Bluff and Doniphan, capturing Major Jennings and 29 men of the rebel army.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, February 10, 1862.*Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill.:*

Persuade Flag-Officer Foote, if possible, to send gunboats up the Cumberland. Two will answer, if he can send no more. They must precede the transports. I am straining every nerve to send troops to take Dover and Clarksville. Troops are on their way. All we want is gunboats to precede the transports. Show him this.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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## HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,

*Fort Henry, February 10, 1862.*Flag-Officer FOOTE, *Commanding Flotilla:*

I have been waiting very patiently for the return of the gunboats under Commander Phelps, to go around on the Cumberland, whilst I marched my land forces across to make a simultaneous attack upon Fort Donelson. I feel that there should be no delay in this matter, and yet I do not feel justified in going without some of your gunboats to co-operate. Can you not send two boats from Cairo immediately up the Cumberland? To expedite matters, any steamers at Cairo may be taken to tow them. Should you be deficient in men, an artillery company can be detached to serve on the gunboats temporarily.

Please let me know your determination in this matter, and start as soon as you like. I will be ready to co-operate at any moment.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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LOUISVILLE, *February 10, 1862.*Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Just received your dispatch. I ordered six regiments from Ohio, two from Indiana, and the brigade (four regiments) from Green River; in all, twelve regiments. The boats for the Green River brigade left here the night of the day you called for them, and were to ascend the Tennessee River. May have been delayed a little at Green River. The Ohio regiments, it appears, did not understand your call as definite. I dispatched last night to hasten them forward. May I ask what force you leave at Paducah? It is exposed to Columbus, is it not? How many gunboats have you? It may affect my movement.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 10, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT:

If possible destroy the bridge at Clarksville. Run any risk to accomplish this. Strengthen land side of Fort Henry, and transfer guns to resist a land attack. Picks and shovels are sent. Large re-enforcements will soon join you.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 10, 1862.*

General GRANT or Flag-Officer FOOTE:

Push the gunboats up the river to cut the railroad bridges. Troops to sustain the gunboats can follow in transports.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }  
No. 7.

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Henry, February 10, 1862.*

The troops from Forts Henry and Heiman will hold themselves in readiness to move on Wednesday, the 12th instant, at as early an hour as practicable. Neither tents nor baggage will be taken, except such as the troops can carry. Brigade and regimental commanders will see that all their men are supplied with 40 rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes and two days' rations in their haversacks. Three days' additional rations may be put in wagons to follow the expedition, but will not impede the progress of the main column.

Two regiments of infantry will remain at Fort Henry, to be designated from the First Division, and one brigade at Fort Heiman, Ky., to be designated by General Smith, commanding.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General*

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }  
No. 8.

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Henry, February 10, 1862.*

The Seventeenth, Forty-third, and Forty-ninth Regiments Illinois Volunteers, commanded by the senior colonel, will form the Third Brigade, First Division, of the Army in the field.

The Fourteenth Iowa, Twenty-fifth and Fifty-second Indiana Volunteers, Birge's Sharpshooters, and one battalion Curtis' Horse will form the Fourth Brigade, Second Division.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

ORDNANCE DEPOT,

*Louisville, Ky., February 10, 1862.*

General J. W. RIPLEY, *Washington:*

SIR: Ten thousand stand of small-arms are needed to supply the place of defective arms now in the hands of the troops in this department. Please inform me when they can be sent.

Very respectfully,

T. EDSON,  
*Lieutenant of Ordnance.*

FEBRUARY 10, 1862—1.30 p. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,  
*Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:*

My ordnance officer has by my direction made frequent report of the worthless character of certain arms sent here and the necessity for



more. Gets no answer. The muskets sent to Kentucky are unsafe and demoralize the troops. Proposed to alter them, but received no answer. Ought to be replaced at once.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

WASHINGTON, *February 10, 1862—7 p. m.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville :*

Dispatch received. It contains the first intimation I have had of character of arms. I will take immediate steps to remedy the evil. Communicate your wants direct to me. Reports to bureaus are apt to be buried.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Buell, February 10, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General :*

SIR: Your letters of 20th and 24th\* were received on the 4th instant, and on the same day seven companies of Colonel Lindsey's regiment, which had been left at Louisa, moved up the river to Piketon, being joined at this place by three companies already here. At my request Col. J. A. J. Lightburn, of the Fourth Virginia Regiment, stationed at Ceredo, sent two companies to Louisa to protect our stores there, allowing the whole of Colonel Lindsey's command to move together. I have also sent the Fortieth Ohio Infantry and one company of McLaughlin's cavalry forward to Piketon. The Forty-second Ohio and the remaining company of McLaughlin's cavalry will move forward to-morrow.

In order to protect my flank in this forward movement I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, of the First Kentucky Cavalry, with his command, on the 31st ultimo, to West Liberty, with instructions to keep up a series of scouting expeditions in that vicinity and towards Whitesburg and Piketon, and keep me informed of all movements of the enemy in that direction, and also to suppress any uprising in Magoffin and neighboring counties.

I communicated with General Rosecrans to ascertain whether any part of his command was in position to protect my left flank, and whether he had any communication with the Ohio River. In a letter bearing date February 4 he informed me that a detachment of his force is at Raleigh, Va., and he hopes to advance his lines within the next four weeks.

I have left the Fourteenth Kentucky at this point to guard our stores. We have used every available means to bring our supplies up the river, and several hundred tons are now here.

Colonel Marshall, of the Sixteenth Kentucky, reported to me by a special messenger on the 29th ultimo. I ordered him immediately to put his command in readiness to join me. He has not yet reported himself in readiness to move.

From scouts sent out by Colonel Lindsey since he reached Piketon the report is confirmed that at least one of the Virginia regiments has

\* Not found.

gone home. On Monday, the 3d instant, it was at Gladesville, *en route* for Abingdon. Part of the brigade is still in the vicinity of Whitesburg and part is supposed to be holding Pound Gap, which is reported to be strongly fortified.

There are no present indications of Marshall's intention to regain his foothold on East Kentucky. There is a marked change in the feeling of the citizens of Sandy Valley in favor of the Government. Deserters continue to deliver themselves up in greater numbers than ever; 37 from one company of Colonel Williams' regiment have delivered themselves up.

If we are to advance far beyond Piketon it will be imperatively necessary that we be furnished with another squad of cavalry, for, as I intimated in a former report, a part of those under my command are of but little value to the service.

To obtain possession of the Pound Gap I would again suggest the importance of giving me a battery of light howitzers.

The roads beyond Piketon are more tolerable than those this side, and artillery can be made very serviceable in that region.

Yours, truly,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 11, 1862.*

Flag-Officer ANDREW H. FOOTE, *Cairo*:

I think some of the gunboats should be sent up the Cumberland, with the least possible delay, to attack Fort Donelson. Transports will be waiting at Paducah to follow them. It is of vital importance that Fort Donelson be reduced immediately.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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CAIRO, *February 11, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

The gunboats Lexington, Tyler, and Conestoga, under Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, agreeably to my orders, have proceeded up the Tennessee River, and destroyed or captured all the rebel boats, broke up their camps, and made prize of their fine new gunboat. They went up as far as the river was navigable. I move up to-morrow in another direction.

A. H. FOOTE,  
*Flag-Officer.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 11, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM and Flag-Officer FOOTE, *Cairo*:

Push forward the Cumberland expedition with all possible dispatch. In addition to the land forces at Paducah and on their way from Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, I shall send one regiment from here on Thursday, one on Friday, and one on Saturday. Push ahead boldly

and quickly. I will give you plenty of support in a few days. Time now is everything for us. Don't delay one instant.

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major-General.

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FORT HENRY (via CAIRO), *February 11, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

Every effort will be put forth to have Clarksville within a few days. There are no negroes in this part of the country to work on fortifications.

U. S. GRANT,  
Brigadier-General.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 11, 1862.*

Flag-Officer ANDREW H. FOOTE, *Cairo:*

You have gained great distinction by your capture of Fort Henry. Everybody recognizes your services. Make your name famous in history by the capture of Fort Donelson and Clarksville. The taking of these places is a military necessity. Delays add strength to them more than to us. Act quickly, even though only half ready. Troops will soon be ready to support you.

H. W. HALLECK,  
Major-General.

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CAIRO, *February 11, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

I am ready with three gunboats to proceed up the Cumberland River, and shall leave here for that purpose in two hours—8.30 p. m.

A. H. FOOTE,  
Flag-Officer.

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CAIRO, ILL., *February 11, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

One armored gunboat gone from Tennessee to Cumberland and three unarmored to follow. Three armored leave here to-night instead of Thursday for same destination. All the enemy's boats on Tennessee destroyed, camps broken up, and a fine new rebel gunboat captured. General Paine returned. Has secured store-houses at Paducah.

G. W. CULLUM,  
Brig. Gen. Vols., U. S. Army, Chief of Staff.

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CAIRO, *February 11, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

Is General Grant strong enough and quite ready for the Cumberland and Donelson movement? Position is said to be strong, and we should be strong enough to be very certain of success. The news from Lieu-



tenant Phelps in Tennessee is cheering. Victory seems to crown all our efforts.

THOMAS A. SCOTT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 11, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville:*

Three or four gunboats will be ready to ascend the Cumberland by the last of the week and more can soon follow. Get no advices from those up the Tennessee to destroy bridges. Have stopped all transports at Paducah to go up the Cumberland. Paducah is perfectly safe. Can't you come with all your available forces and command the column up the Cumberland? I shall go to the Tennessee this week.

H. W. HALLECK,  
\* *Major-General.*

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }  
No. 9. }

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Henry, February 11, 1862.*

The following changes and additions are made to present brigade organizations:

The Thirty-second Illinois Volunteers will be added to the Third Brigade, First Division; the Fifty-second Indiana will be transferred to Third Brigade, Second Division; and Seventh Iowa from the Third Brigade, Second Division, to the Fourth Brigade, Second Division.

The Second Iowa Regiment will be attached to this brigade immediately upon arrival.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }  
No. 11. }

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Henry, February 11, 1862.*

The troops designated in General Field Orders, No. 7, will move tomorrow, as rapidly as possible, in the following order:

One brigade of the First Division will move by the Telegraph road directly upon Fort Donelson, halting for further orders at a distance of 2 miles from the fort. The other brigades of the First Division will move by the Dover or Ridge road, and halt at the same distance from the fort, and throw out troops so as to form a continuous line between the two wings.

The two brigades of the Second Division now at Fort Henry will follow as rapidly as practicable by the Dover road, and will be followed by the troops from Fort Heiman as fast as they can be ferried across the river.

One brigade of the Second Division should be thrown into Dover to cut off all retreat by the river, if found practicable to do so.

The force of the enemy being so variously reported, it is impossible to give exact details of attack, but the necessary orders will be given on the field.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, } HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
 No. 6. } *Fort Henry, Tenn., February 11, 1862.*

\* \* \* \* \*

2. Brig. Gen. L. Wallace, having been designated to remain behind during the expedition against Fort Donelson, will assume command of all the forces at Fort Heiman and Fort Henry. He will encamp all troops arriving to the best advantage for self-defense.

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By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

FEBRUARY 11, 1862.

General Wood, *Lebanon* :

Trains will be in readiness to transport your division (Twentieth and Twenty-first Brigades) to Bacon Creek, as follows: 10 o'clock a. m., tomorrow (the 12th), two regiments, baggage and train; 3 o'clock a. m. (the 14th), three regiments, &c.; 11 o'clock a. m. (the 13th), two regiments, &c.; total, seven regiments.

The utmost punctuality and order must be observed. The baggage must be on the wagons, ready to be rolled at once on the cars. Under no circumstances must the baggage be thrown on loose, and the cars must be released as soon as they reach their destination.

Encamp your division at Bacon Creek until further orders, and be always ready to move at a moment's notice.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

ORDNANCE OFFICE,  
*Washington, February 11, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.* :

SIR: Your telegram to General McClellan of the 10th instant has been referred to this office. In answer I have to state that on Lieutenant Edson's requisition of November 24, 1861, 10,000 small-arms of the kind designated at Army Headquarters (Austrian rifle muskets) were ordered to be sent to you. These were represented to be good arms. On receipt of information from Lieutenant Edson that they were defective in the cone-seats and required new ones, which he could have fixed to them, he was authorized to have the alteration made. On a recent requisition for 5,000 revolvers and 5,000 carbines the whole of the pistols were ordered, and as many of the carbines as were on hand or could possibly be obtained were ordered to be sent to Louisville, to be followed by the residue of the 5,000 as soon as possible. Although we have out contracts and orders for a large number of carbines, their deliveries are not sufficient to meet the many calls for this kind of arm, and all that can possibly be done is to supply them as fast as received. Those purchased in Europe to meet immediate demands (by Mr. Schuyler) have turned out unserviceable.

All the muskets made at Springfield Armory are ordered to be sent here as fast as finished, and requisitions for other places can only be

filled by arms not made by the Government, of the best kind and quality it is possible to procure by purchase or contract. This Department is desirous of filling all requisitions with the best supplies, and has used and is using all the means within its control to do so. Such supplies are not always to be had on any terms or by any exertions to procure them as rapidly as they are called for.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAS. W. RIPLEY,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 12, 1862.*

THOMAS A. SCOTT,  
*Assistant Secretary of War, Cairo :*

I am re-enforcing General Grant as rapidly as possible. A large force is coming down the Ohio. Where can I communicate with you by letter to-night or to-morrow ?

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *February 12, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis :*

I shall determine on my ultimate movements the moment I have something in regard to your position on the Tennessee River. In the mean time I am advancing in some force on Bowling Green, and preparing the rest of my force for either alternative. It seems to me you cannot well direct your re-enforcements up the Cumberland River. Is it certain that they can form a junction by that route ? They certainly can by the other.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 12, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky. :*

Gunboats have destroyed everything on the Tennessee to Florence, in Alabama. They could not get past the Muscle Shoals. Expedition started up the Cumberland last night, led by three gunboats, under Commodore Foote. It is reported that 40,000 rebels are at Dover and Clarksville. If so, they have all come from Bowling Green. If you conclude to land the column on the Cumberland, come at once, with your spare forces.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, *February 12, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis :*

Your dispatches just received. Will move on the line of the Cumberland River or Tennessee River, but it will take ten days at least to effect the transfer of my troops. They are moving now as fast as possible to the railroad. Why is it necessary to use the Cumberland ?



Where are the re-enforcements to land, where form a junction, and by whom are they commanded? Have you any map of the ground? If so, please send it to me.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 12, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

General Grant has invested Fort Donelson on the land side, but he cannot transport his siege artillery from Fort Henry. Half of the country is under water. Sending the forces around by the Cumberland was a military necessity. There was some risk, but it could not be avoided. We must make the attack before the enemy has time to strengthen their works and increase the armament.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*Washington, February 12, 1862.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War:*

SIR: I have the honor to subjoin a telegraphic dispatch from Flag-Officer Foote, from the tenor of which you will perceive that the matter demands immediate attention.

I am, with high respect, your obedient servant,

G. V. FOX,  
*Assistant Secretary of the Navy.*

CAIRO, ILL., *February 11.*

I trust that the 600 sea-faring men will immediately be sent to us. I am off again to-night with other gunboats, and have to transfer the men again, which causes the greatest dissatisfaction among them, and 30 have run from one steamer to avoid transfer. We suffer for want of men.

A. H. FOOTE,  
*Flag-Officer.*

CAIRO, ILL., *February 12, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT:

Like yourself, I am most too busy to write a word. I am now sending everything up the Cumberland by General Halleck's direction. Flag-Officer Foote left at 9 last night with three armored gunboats, and must now be on the way to Fort Donelson, which, with their aid, I hope to hear you have taken in a few days, and the backbone of secession broken. I am sending re-enforcements up very fast. Let me know your wants. I will write Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson in a short time.

G. W. CULLUM.

FEBRUARY, 13—7.15 p. m.

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville:*

How many batteries have you fully equipped and ready for the field? What number of cavalry, armed, equipped, and mounted? How many infantry?

Watch Fort Donelson closely. I am not too certain as to the result there.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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NEAR FORT DONELSON, *February 13, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

Send all troops to arrive to Fort Henry. They can be transferred here, if required, and there is now appearance that that point is in danger. One gunboat should be there.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS, ETC., *February [13th or 14th], 1862.*

MARKLAND, *Special Mail Agent:*

Send the mail steamers as soon as possible after receiving this.

All is well here, but we have a powerful force [in front of us]. Johnson, Buckner, Floyd, and Pillow are all said to be here.

U. S. GRANT.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 13, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo:*

General W. T. Sherman is assigned to the command at Paducah. One regiment and battery leave here to-day and two more will follow immediately. They will touch at Cairo and Paducah. Stop them, if you fear an attack and want them.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 13, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville:*

The attack will be made on Fort Donelson to-day by the joint land and naval forces, or if not to-day certainly to-morrow. Would it not be possible to make a cavalry demonstration on Bowling Green? A mere feint might help. I have no maps other than the general ones in book-stores. Why not come down and take the immediate command of the Cumberland column yourself? If so, I will transfer Sherman and Grant to the Tennessee column.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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FEBRUARY 13, 1862.

Colonel BRUCE,  
*Commanding Brigade, Bardstown:*

March for Louisville with all the effective men of your brigade to-morrow morning. You must reach here early on Sunday without fail.

Your brigade must have 100 rounds ammunition. If you have not got it, make requisition and send an officer ahead to see to it.

Inform Colonel Lytle of this. Report.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, February 13, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. WILLIAM NELSON,  
*Commanding Division:*

GENERAL: The force under your command will consist of the two brigades of your division now with you, three field batteries, embarking here, and a brigade from Green River, under General Crittenden. The transports for the latter will start down this evening, and take the brigade on board to-morrow. I will instruct him to proceed at once to Smithland, if he is ready before you pass, and there await your arrival, unless he should receive instructions to push forward. The same instructions will be given to the batteries that embark here. Ammunition and supplies for ten days are being put on board here. A regular quartermaster will accompany them and report to you. Keep your transports in company, move with the least possible delay, and inquire at Smithland for instructions for your further movements, in regard to which I have telegraphed General Halleck. If you meet no instructions there, proceed up the Cumberland to the point of debarkation of the other troops, near Fort Donelson, and report to the officer in command.

It is unnecessary to suggest to you to keep boats of the same regiment and brigade together, so that your debarkation may be conducted without confusion.

Another brigade of General Crittenden's division is already there. If circumstances will permit, ask to have it reunited under your command. If you pass Smithland before General Crittenden, leave instructions there for him.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding Department.*

BELL'S TAVERN, KY., *February 13, 1862—3.20 p. m.*

General BUELL:

The Third Division, in compliance with your orders, commenced its march this morning, and at 7 a. m. the advance guard, consisting of Colonel Turchin's brigade, Kennett's cavalry, and Loomis' battery, had passed the bridge at Rowlett's Station. The cavalry are already in advance of this place, and the head of the column of infantry and artillery is just in sight. We camp in this vicinity to-night, and resume the march in the early morning.

The enemy burned the station and platform last night, and all agree that Hindman and all other troops have passed Barren River, and many assert that Bowling Green has been evacuated. The tunnel has not been injured; the mouths north and south are blocked with heavy stones and the rails are torn up. The repairs can be easily made with a



proper force in a single week, and I think and hope it will be commenced immediately. We can neither repair the railroad nor the telegraph line until we shall make a halt of some days. The Engineers and Mechanics have been of the greatest service in clearing fallen timbers from the road. It is now in good condition, and we have met with almost no delay. I send back in the morning supply trains to Green River. Our troops commence their march with songs and shouts, and while I am writing I hear the band of the advance column.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. M. MITCHEL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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FEBRUARY 13, 1862—11 p. m.

General O. M. MITCHEL,  
*On the march:*

I have just received your dispatch, and am gratified, but not surprised, at the spirit with which your troops advance. Be watchful, and be sure of what is ahead and on your flanks. Make good use of your cavalry. The railroad company will commence repairs to-morrow. It may not be advisable to continue them farther than to the tunnel, until it is certain that they might not be as useful against you as for you in some turn of events, which you would have to guard against.

The work on the telegraph will also be commenced to-morrow. The workmen will require protection. Wood will have his division at Munfordsville to-morrow. My instructions mentioned Dripping Springs as the point to which you might advance for the purpose of discovering the movements of the enemy, but that is by no means obligatory on you, if you see cause to stop short of that. It is not intended nor is it advisable that you should be greatly exposed in the present stage of the plan of operations which I have in view.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *February 14, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN,  
*Washington, D. C.:*

Twenty-two light batteries in the field; five light batteries in preparation for the field; two siege batteries, eight pieces, in preparation for the field. Two companies of regular cavalry, aggregate 88, arrived from Leavenworth yesterday, armed, equipped, and mounted. No other cavalry in the department completely armed, equipped, and mounted. Carbines received yesterday for one regiment; nine other regiments are mounted and partially armed; three of them under tolerable discipline, the other six raw and uninstructed. Pistols and carbines are wanted for nearly all. Forty-three thousand three hundred infantry fit for the field and for duty. Seventy-one thousand infantry for duty armed, but raw and uninstructed, though actually in the field.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Major-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 14, 1862—5 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

We have at Cairo and moving south twelve batteries and about sixty guns. Some are without horses, and can be used only in field works at present. Send me all you can. Can't you spare some troops from the Potomac? I am not strong enough if the enemy concentrates on me.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, *February 14, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

Please inform me as soon as possible what re-enforcements have been sent from your command in Kentucky to the expeditions up the Cumberland and Tennessee; also what have been sent by you from other States. Ten thousand muskets have been ordered to Columbus, Ohio.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

LOUISVILLE, *February 14, 1862—6 p. m.*

(Received 4 a. m. February 15.)

Major-General McCLELLAN:

I have sent one brigade from Kentucky and eight regiments from Ohio and Indiana. I have made preparation and start myself on Monday with two divisions, but intelligence from them or from my advance towards Bowling Green in the mean time may affect that matter.

General Grant cannot any longer be in danger. \*From what I have heard within three days, he must have some 30,000 men. The only apprehension I have now is for his gunboats. My advance will be within 15 miles or less of Bowling Green to-night, which was as far as I meant it should go, except for reconnaissance, until matters were closed up a little in the rear; but General Mitchel has information which may carry him farther and affect my movements.

General Halleck telegraphs me that General Grant would attack yesterday or to-day. There is not more than 10 feet in the Cumberland River now. It will take two months or more to prepare the gunboat; by that time I hope the navigation of these rivers or the Ohio River will no longer require that sort of protection; but it is best to be prepared. I believe such boats will be more efficient every way.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

FORT HENRY, *February 14 [12], 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

We start this morning for Fort Donelson in heavy force. Four regiments from Buell's command and two from Saint Louis arrived last night and were sent around by water. I hope to send you a dispatch from Fort Donelson to-morrow.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

NEAR FORT DONELSON, TENN., *February 14, 1862.*

General H. W. HALLECK,

*Comdg. Department of the Missouri, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

GENERAL: Five gunboats and twelve transports arrived this morning and will materially strengthen us. The enemy have been receiving heavy re-enforcements every night since the investment commenced. They are now all driven inside their outer works, which, however, cover an extensive area. It was impossible, in consequence of the high water and deep sloughs, to throw a force in above Dover to cut off their re-enforcements. Any force sent for such a purpose would be entirely away from support from the main body.

Last night was very severe upon the troops. At dusk it commenced raining, and in a short time turned cold and changed to snow and sleet. This morning the thermometer indicated 20° below freezing.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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NEAR FORT DONELSON, *February 14, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

Floyd arrived at Donelson to-day with 4,000 men. Generals Johnson, Buckner, Floyd, and Pillow are said to be there. I have but one gunboat to-day. We have had considerable skirmishing, losing some 10 or 12 killed and about 120 wounded. Rebel loss probably much heavier. I am hourly looking for more gunboats and re-enforcements.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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NEAR DONELSON, *February 14, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

Our troops now invest the works at Fort Donelson. The enemy have been driven into their works at every point. A heavy abatis all around prevents carrying the works by storm at present. I feel every confidence of success and the best feeling prevails among the men.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*In Field, near Fort Donelson, February 14, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill.:*

I hope you will direct Captain Turnley to forward the transportation belonging to the troops here as rapidly as possible. It is now almost impossible to get supplies from the landing to where our troops are. We will soon want ammunition for our 10 and 20 pounder Parrott guns, and already require it for the 24-pounder howitzers. I have directed my ordnance officer to keep a constant watch upon the supply of ammunition, and to take steps in time to avoid a deficiency.

Appearances indicate now that we will have a protracted siege here. The ground is very broken, and the fallen timber extending far out



from the breastworks, I fear the result of an attempt to carry the place by storm with raw troops. I feel great confidence, however, of ultimately reducing the place.

As yet I have had no batteries thrown up, hoping with the aid of the gunboats to obviate the necessity. The present high water has prevented my extending the right to the river.

Colonel Webster is now making a reconnaissance with a view of sending a force above the town of Dover to occupy the river bank.

Please inform General Halleck of the substance of this.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 14, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo:*

Sherman is assigned to command of District of Cairo and Grant to command of District of West Tennessee.\* Arm the Forty-eighth Indiana and let them take the field, reprimanding Lieutenant-Colonel Henry, of the mortar boats. Stop all improper telegrams. Get rid of lame ducks the best way you can. A fine battery leaves here this afternoon. Six hundred sailors are on their way from New York by railroad. Keep Lieutenant Lyford.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, February 14, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  
*Commanding Department of Missouri:*

GENERAL: I have just received your gratifying dispatch that our forces occupy Springfield, and am in hourly expectation of having similar news in regard to Fort Donelson. Your proposition in regard to the formation of a Western Division has one fatal obstacle, viz, that the proposed commander of the new Department of Missouri ranks you. I would be glad to hear from you in detail as to the troops from your department now in the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.

Do you learn anything as to Beauregard's whereabouts and what troops (if any) he took with him?

What disposition do you intend to make of Hitchcock? If you do not go in person to the Tennessee and Cumberland, I shall probably write Buell to take the line of the Tennessee, so far as Nashville is concerned. If his advance on Bowling Green must be done, it may well be necessary to throw a large portion of the troops up the Tennessee, in which case he is entitled to their command.

Burnside has been very successful. All seems to go well.

Very truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

\* By General Orders, No. 37, of same date. See Series I, Vol. VIII, p. 555.

FEBRUARY 14, 1862.

General McCook, *on the march*:

Halt where you are. Mitchel's report from the front indicates that we may be saved our trouble. He says Hindman has destroyed the railroad bridge and told some one the turnpike bridge was to be destroyed last night. Be ready to move in either direction, and ascertain where your transports are.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

Forward to General McCook by special messenger in all haste.

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OPPOSITE BOWLING GREEN, *February 14, 1862—12 m.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL:

Learning by our scouts this morning that there was a chance to save the turnpike bridge, we have moved forward the advance guards at forced marches. We are a little late to save the bridge; it was burned this morning about daylight. We are now shelling the enemy at the depot, where the locomotives, with steam on, are distinctly visible with our glasses. We hope to prevent the enemy from removing their supplies, which are said to be very abundant. Our engineers and mechanics will soon enable us to cross the river, which we will do promptly so soon as the enemy are driven out. We will then commence work on the railroad and telegraph line.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. M. MITCHEL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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LEBANON, *February 14, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

Want of trains is delaying the movement in a most unlooked-for, uncontrollable manner. Regiments have been waiting at the depot for nearly twenty-four hours. Must delay occur by such detention for the want of arrangements in the meeting of trains *en route*? One train with troops of my division was detained two hours at the Junction. Four regiments have gone and the fifth is embarking and will get off, I trust, in a short time. Railway agent says it will be impossible to have transportation ready for remaining two regiments before to-morrow morning. Movement will be conducted as rapidly as transportation is ready.

TH. J. WOOD,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *February 14 [?], 1862.*

General LORENZO THOMAS,

*Adjutant-General, Washington:*

The following is the force in the whole of the late Department of the Ohio, as nearly as can be ascertained at present:

Ninety-two regiments infantry, 60,882 for duty; 79,334 aggregate, present and absent.

Eleven regiments, one battalion, and seven detached companies cavalry, 9,222 for duty; 11,496 aggregate, present and absent.

Twenty-eight field and two siege batteries, 3,368 for duty; 3,953 aggregate, present and absent.

The above figures include battalions of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Regular Infantry, and two companies of Regular Cavalry. Will report more particularly by letter.

The data are found in great detail in last departmental return, except that eight regiments were detached for operations against Fort Donelson, and have not been returned.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 15, 1862—12.15 a. m. [?].*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Mitchel's division, by a forced march, reached the river at Bowling Green to-day, and is making a bridge to cross. The enemy burned the bridge at 1 o'clock in the morning and were evacuating the place when he arrived.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 15, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Everything looks well. Grant says we can keep them in till mortar boats arrive. Commodore Foote will immediately return from Cairo with two more gunboats. Troops are moving very rapidly to Fort Donelson.

H. W. HALLECK.

SAINT LOUIS, *February 15, 1862—11 a. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

I have no definite plan beyond the taking of Fort Donelson and Clarksville. Subsequent movements must depend upon those of the enemy. He is undoubtedly evacuating Bowling Green, but whether to fall back on Nashville or to concentrate on me is uncertain. I have only about 30,000 men in the field, but am pushing forward re-enforcements as rapidly as possible. The siege and bombardment of Fort Donelson are progressing satisfactorily.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 15, 1862—3 p. m.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Garrison of Fort Donelson is 30,000. Enemy has completely evacuated Bowling Green, and is concentrating on the Cumberland. I must have more troops. It is a military necessity.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*



WASHINGTON, *February 15, 1862*—8 p. m.

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis* :

Have telegraphed to Buell to help you by advancing beyond Bowling Green on Nashville; or, if that be too slow, via Cumberland.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 15, 1862*—8 p. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

General Buell telegraphs that he purposes to move from Bowling Green on Nashville. This is bad strategy. Moreover, the roads are very muddy and all the bridges destroyed. His forces should come and help me to take Fort Donelson and Clarksville and move on Florence, Ala., cutting the railroad at Decatur. Nashville would then be abandoned, precisely as Bowling Green has been, without a blow. With troops in mass on the right points the enemy must retire, and Tennessee will be freed, as Kentucky has been; but I have not forces enough to make this new strategic move and at the same time observe Columbus. Give me the forces required, and I will insure complete success. Price is still in retreat, with General Curtis in pursuit.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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FEBRUARY 15—10 p. m.

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis* :

Buell will move in force on Nashville as rapidly as circumstances will permit. If Grant's position renders it absolutely necessary Buell will re-enforce him with three brigades and three batteries to-morrow, but I think them better employed in the direct advance upon Nashville.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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WASHINGTON, *February 15—11 p. m.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis* :

Yours of 8 p. m. received. Your idea is in some respects good. But if Buell can rapidly advance on Nashville he will take it and cut off the enemy who are near Fort Donelson, if they do not retreat immediately. His advance in force beyond Bowling Green will at once relieve Grant. His orders are to re-enforce Grant if he cannot reach Nashville in time. The immediate possession of Nashville is very important. It can best be gained by the movement I have directed. The possession of Decatur will not necessarily cause the rebels to evacuate Nashville; you must also threaten to occupy Stevenson to accomplish that. I do not see that Buell's movement is bad strategy, for it will relieve the pressure upon Grant and lead to results of the first importance. If the destruction of the railroad is so extensive as to make the operation impracticable or very difficult and slow, I have provided for the alternative in my instructions to Buell. Enable Grant to hold his own, and I will see that Buell relieves him. The Decatur movement and one on Memphis are the next steps in my programme.

I am arranging to talk with Buell and yourself over the wires to-morrow morning, and would be glad to have you at the telegraph office when all is ready. Buell will also be in Louisville office, and we can come to a full understanding.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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CAMP NEAR FORT DONELSON, *February 15, 1862.*

ANDREW H. FOOTE,  
*Commanding Officer Gunboat Flotilla :*

If all the gunboats that can will immediately make their appearance to the enemy it may secure us a victory. Otherwise all may be defeated. A terrible conflict ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command, and I think the enemy is much more so. If the gunboats do not show themselves, it will reassure the enemy and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a charge to save appearances. I do not expect the gunboats to go into action, but to make appearance and throw a few shells at long range.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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PADUCAH, *February 15, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

Arrived at Paducah. All quiet. Nothing on the road from Blandville or Mayfield. Nothing new from the Cumberland or Tennessee. I don't think the mortar boats can be brought upstream; the current is too strong. Left Lyford last night hard at work, but making no progress. I think General Tilghman and prisoners had better be sent to Cairo and there offered terms. If officers elect to go on parole to Cincinnati, they could go by rail.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 15, 1862.*

Brigadier-General SHERMAN, *Paducah, Ky. :*

Send up regiment from Smithland, leaving a guard for stores, &c. Use your discretion about one from Paducah. One regiment and two batteries leave here to-morrow. If troops can reach Grant sooner, turn them all up the Tennessee. Consult him on this immediately. I am hurrying off re-enforcements with all possible dispatch. Telegrams about movements should be in cipher.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Camp near Fort Donelson, February 15, 1862.*

General LEW. WALLACE,  
*Commanding Fort Henry, Tenn. :*

Send a company of cavalry on one of the transports up the Tennessee River to destroy railroad bridges, the position of which will be in-

dedicated by Captain Gwin, commander of gunboat Tyler. Charge the officer of the company sent that the district of country into which they are going is strongly Union, and they should be on their good behavior, and disprove the lying reports made against our forces by the secessionists.

I hope to hear a good report from this expedition, not only of the favorable impression made, but work done.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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CAIRO, ILL., *February 15, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Cairo, Ill. :*

General Halleck telegraphs me that you are assigned to the new Military District of West Tennessee, and General W. T. Sherman to relieve you of the charge of this. Another quartermaster will be sent to you in a few days to relieve Captain Baxter.

Capt. W. W. Leland, assistant commissary of subsistence, was ordered by me on the 13th instant to report to you for duty in the field without a moment's delay. Go on as you have commenced in your glorious work. I expect to learn to-morrow that Fort Donelson is ours and the center of the enemy's line is broken and their right and left isolated and in retreat, leaving no hostile foot on the soil of Kentucky. You are in the great strategic line. The telegraphic line is completed and in working order to Smithland, and is being rapidly pushed on to your headquarters.

Tell Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson that his engineers should strengthen the land defenses at Fort Henry and remove his heavy guns there. I have sent two 32-pounders from Fort Holt.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General, and Chief of Staff.*

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CAIRO, ILL., *February 15, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding District of West Tennessee :*

Glad to have your encouraging letter of yesterday, which I will forward to General Halleck. Don't be rash; for, having the place completely invested, you can afford to have a little patience. I have ordered all the transportation I can lay my hands upon. The ammunition you want is not here nor scarce any ordnance stores of any kind. I have sent an urgent telegram to General Halleck. You must not keep the steamers I send up to you, or I'll be deprived of all means of supplying you with troops, ammunition, forage, food, &c. Every boat I have taken and am crowding everything, but there are no steamers now disposable.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General, Chief Staff.*

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LOUISVILLE, *February 15, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

I advised you that I was preparing to go to the Cumberland or Tennessee as a main line of operations, and I should have embarked to-



morrow with two divisions. The evacuation of Bowling Green leaving the way open to Nashville makes it proper to resume my original plan. I shall advance on Nashville with all the speed I can. Three brigades, however, and three batteries, under General Nelson, will embark for the Cumberland to-morrow. I shall recall him if I find Grant is not in danger. General Thomas passes through Lebanon for the advance to-day, and Wood's, a raw division, reaches Green River to-day. Both of these are moving from the Somerset line. McCook will be at Bowling Green day after to-morrow, unless inability to supply him until the railroad is repaired compels him to stop. Carter is at London yet, getting ready to advance. Garfield, by my direction, is resuming his pursuit of Marshall to Whitesburg. Will write to-night.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

WASHINGTON, *February 15, 1862*—8 p. m.

Brigadier-General, BUELL, *Louisville* :

Halleck telegraphs 30,000 rebels in Fort Donelson, and that they are concentrating on the Cumberland; does not say where. He asks for more troops. Can you push on Nashville or Clarksville by way of Bowling Green in time to help him? If not, how soon can you re-enforce Grant? The advance on Nashville appears most decisive. Answer. Communicate with Halleck.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

FEBRUARY 15—10 p. m.

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville* :

Yours of to-day received. The movement on Nashville is exactly right. If Grant's safety renders it absolutely necessary, of course re-enforce him as you propose. But the great object is the occupation of Nashville. If that is gained, or even when your advance from Bowling Green is well marked, they will abandon Donelson, if the way is open for it. Do you need more rolling stock on the railroad and how much?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 15, 1862*—12 p. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN :

It will take a week to repair the road to Bowling Green. No formidable advance can be made until that is done; but I expect my demonstration at an advance to weaken their hold on Clarksville and Donelson unless they can drive Halleck out absolutely, and if they can do it at all they can do it without any great delay. I cannot get as definite information from him as I would like. He must have at least 30,000 men. The division I am sending, which will be there Wednesday, will add 10,000. Is it possible that will not be sufficient? If not, what will be? We need rolling stock greatly. I will ascertain how much. I will try to use Green River for getting present supplies.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 15, 1862.*Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis :*

Our advance reached the river in front of Bowling Green yesterday. The enemy burned the turnpike bridge at 1 o'clock yesterday morning and evacuated the place. Our troops are building a bridge to cross. I had made arrangements to operate up the Cumberland, and would have had two divisions at the river to embark to-morrow and Monday, but this evacuation of Bowling Green makes it proper to resume my original line on Nashville. The only question now is as to General Grant's safety. If he can hold his position a few days the main force of the enemy must fall back from there to protect Nashville. Can he do that? What sort of a position has he and what force? What officers are with him? Are there gunboats on both rivers to protect him? Please answer immediately. It will be several days before I can advance in force beyond Bowling Green, but I shall order a brigade forward as soon as we can cross.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*SAINT LOUIS, *February 15, 1862.*Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky. :*

The forces from Bowling Green are concentrating at Clarksville. The garrison of Fort Donelson is estimated at 30,000. Unless I can have more assistance the attack may fail. The place is completely invested and four sorties have been repulsed. If possible send me more aid. No more troops can be sent from Cairo without danger from Columbus. The gunboats are all at Fort Donelson, but we find great difficulty in getting up the mortar boats against the current.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*LOUISVILLE, *February 15, 1862.*Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis :*

One division (twelve regiments and three batteries), under General Nelson, embark for the Cumberland to-morrow. I should have embarked myself at the same time with two divisions, to make the Cumberland a line of operations, but the evacuation of Bowling Green by the enemy and our own occupation of it yesterday make it proper to direct my whole force through that point.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*SAINT LOUIS, *February 15, 1862.*Maj. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville :*

Your telegram about division relieves me greatly. To move from Bowling Green on Nashville is not good strategy. Come and help me take and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville and move to Florence, cutting the railroad at Decatur, and Nashville must be abandoned precisely as Bowling Green has been. All we want is troops in mass.

Come on the right points, and the enemy is defeated with scarcely a blow; but I have not forces enough to make this new strategic move and at the same time observe Columbus. Come and help me, and all will be right. We can clear Tennessee as we have cleared Kentucky.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

FEBRUARY 15, 1862—5.30 p. m.

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis :*

Dispatch received. Steamers leave here this evening to take a brigade on board at Green River, under command of General Crittenden. To-morrow two brigades and three field batteries will embark 25 miles below here, the whole under the command of General Nelson. Have them instructed at Smithland which river to ascend and where to land.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*February 15, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,  
*Commanding Department of the Ohio :*

GENERAL : The General-in-Chief directs me to inform you that within the past three weeks 5,517 revolvers have been sent to you, together with about 2,000 carbines. Yesterday 10,000 Austrian rifles were sent to the Governor of Ohio. To-day 4,000 single-barreled pistols, 5,000 sabers, 16,000 Prussian muskets, and 5,000 Springfield muskets (as fast as they are manufactured) have been ordered to be sent to you. More goods arms of all kinds will be sent as fast as they are manufactured.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
A. V. COLBURN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Louisville, February 15, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. T. L. CRITTENDEN,  
*Commanding Division :*

GENERAL : My telegraphic instructions will have advised you that you are to embark the effective force of the brigade (four regiments of infantry) now with you for service near Fort Donelson, under the command of General Nelson. Do so as rapidly as possible, and then proceed to Smithland and await the arrival of General Nelson, if he should not have preceded you, unless you receive other orders from General Halleck or the officer in command near Fort Donelson.

General Nelson will ask to have the two brigades of your division reunited, if the circumstances will permit, on your arrival.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding Department.*



FEBRUARY 15, 1862—3 p. m.

General McCook, *Munfordville* :

Try to be at Bowling Green day after to-morrow, leaving whatever assistance may be required for the railroad and telegraph people. Take the whole of your supply train and keep it going. If you cannot keep up your supplies you may stop at the Dripping Springs; leave your batteries at the break in the road, where they can be easier foraged until it is repaired. The three batteries of Nelson's division leave with Wood's division at Munfordville.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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FEBRUARY 15, 1862.

General NELSON, *Elizabethtown* :

Move rapidly to the mouth of Salt River, so as to embark for the Cumberland to-morrow. Take no wagons except your baggage train. Send all others to Munfordville. Your ammunition train will be made up and put on board here, as well as three batteries. If any batteries or other troops are on the road order them back to Munfordville, and report by telegraph what they are, and as well as in regard to your movements.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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FEBRUARY 15, 1862.

General THOMAS, *Lebanon* :

The railroad cannot transport you as rapidly as is necessary; therefore march your whole division, via Bardstown and New Haven, to Green River, so as to get across to the line of the railroad at Munfordville, then forward to Bowling Green. Move as light as possible, replenishing your supplies at Bardstown and New Haven. Take all the quartermaster's train you can with you. Start to-day, and move rapidly. Send forward your quartermaster to procure forage on the road.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, Ky., February 15, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky. :*

GENERAL: Colonel Landram reports to me that all the public property at Mill Springs, except some tobacco, clothing, and wagons, has been removed. I have directed him to send the clothing and tobacco to Somerset and store them subject to your order. I made an arrangement with Mr. A. R. West to collect the wagons and hold them subject to your order.

Colonel Landram asks authority to sell them to the citizens of the adjoining counties, and I have directed him to write you on the sub-

ject. The wagons are of but little use to us and might probably be sold to advantage there. He wishes orders also as to his remaining at Mill Springs with his regiment. He reports that it will be impossible to subsist his regiment there, owing to the condition of the roads and want of transportation, and asks permission to return to Somerset as soon as all the property is removed.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*Washington, February 16, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo. :*

You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside; to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in full co-operation. Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly towards Nashville, breaking up the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meantime Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all South and perhaps from here at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the Upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tenn.? In the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donelson, why could not a gunboat run up and destroy the bridge at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell.

A. LINCOLN.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 16, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington :*

I am perfectly confident that if Buell moves from Bowling Green on Nashville we shall regret it. Think of it before you approve. I am certain that if you were here you would agree with me. If I had any doubts I would not insist. Fort Donelson and Clarksville are the key-points. Since the evacuation of Bowling Green the importance of Nashville has ceased.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, Mo., *February 16, 1862.*

General McCLELLAN :

Hard fighting at Fort Donelson on Thursday, Friday, and Saturday. At 5 p. m. yesterday we carried the upper fort, where the Union flag was flying last night. Telegraph line will reach Fort Henry on Tuesday. I am still decidedly of the opinion that Buell should not advance on Nashville, but come to the Cumberland with his available forces.

United to Grant we can take and hold Fort Donelson and Clarksville, and by another central movement cut off both Columbus and Nashville. Until Columbus is cut off we must retain large forces at Cairo, Bird's Point, Paducah, and Fort Henry. This is too great a loss of force on our side.

Commander Foote cannot return for some days. Four gunboats badly disabled. We have been obliged to break up two artillery companies for the gunboats and mortar boats. Have had no communication from Grant for three days, and cannot give the number of troops that have joined him. It is almost impossible to get the mortar boats up the river; they move very slowly. Can't expect much more aid from the Navy for several days. The mass of the force from Bowling Green are at Fort Donelson and threatening us from Clarksville.

I am also guarding Danville to prevent re-enforcements from Columbus. Have constructed a battery above Fort Donelson on the river to cut off communication with Clarksville and Nashville.

Unless we can take Fort Donelson very soon we shall have the whole force of the enemy on us. Fort Donelson is the turning point of the war, and we must take it at whatever sacrifice. Our men are in excellent spirits and fight bravely.

H. W. HALLECK.

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WASHINGTON, *February 16, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

Your dispatch received. Not too long. I appreciate your difficulties. Have heard that upper battery at Donelson is taken by our forces. Should Donelson fall, you will move on Nashville by either route which may at the time be quickest. A part of the column moving from Bowling Green towards Nashville might relieve Donelson, but the direct move on Nashville is the most important.

McCLELLAN.

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FORT DONELSON (via SMITHLAND), *February 16, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK:

We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod [R.] Johnson; also about 20,000 stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 to 4,000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

GENERAL FIELD ORDERS, }  
No. 13. }

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Donelson, February 16, 1862.*

The Second Division will occupy the right of the works, including Fort Donelson, and will be located to the best advantage for defense and comfort. General Smith, commanding the division, will designate the place for each brigade.

The First Division will occupy grounds at the south end of the works, and will be located by Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand, commanding.



All public property will be collected and turned over to Capt. A. S. Baxter, assistant quartermaster.

Pillaging and appropriating public property to private purposes is positively prohibited. Officers are particularly enjoined to see to the enforcement of this order.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, }  
No. 10.

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF CAIRO,  
*Fort Donelson, Tenn., February 16, 1862.*

1. In order to secure the glorious victory acquired by our arms and to perpetuate it, the general commanding deems it highly important that the utmost vigilance should be observed to guard all points captured. It is ordered, therefore, that General L. Wallace return to Fort Henry, Tenn., with two brigades of his command and Willard's and Bulliss' batteries. Curtis' Horse is attached to the command of General Wallace.

2. Generals McClernand and Smith will each detail from their respective commands 100 men as extra-duty men, to report at once to Capt. A. S. Baxter, assistant quartermaster, for the purpose of collecting and preserving the public property captured at Fort Donelson.

3. All prisoners taken at the surrender of Fort Donelson will be collected as rapidly as practicable near the village of Dover, under their respective company and regimental commanders, or in such manner as may be deemed best by Brig. Gen. S. B. Buckner, and will receive two days' rations, preparatory to embarking for Cairo. Prisoners are to be allowed their clothing, blankets, and such private property as may be carried about their person, and commissioned officers will be allowed their side-arms.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Washington, [February 16 (?), 1862].*

BUELL:

If I can send you motive power and cars to Bowling Green by way of Green River, can you not at once advance on Nashville in force without waiting for repairs of road? Time is now everything. If Nashville is open the men could carry their small rations and bread, driving meat on the hoof. Leave tents and all baggage. If you can occupy Nashville at once it will end the war in Tennessee.

McCLELLAN.

FEBRUARY 16, 1862—11 a. m.

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Give me in detail your situation and that of the enemy. Whither did he go from Bowling Green?

I wish the position of things in full.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

FEBRUARY 16, 1862.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

My dispatch of yesterday gives in detail the position of my troops.\* You will observe that they are converging on Bowling Green, preparatory to an advance on Nashville. I hope to facilitate our progress materially by throwing boats above the broken lock while the river is up, which by transshipment will enable us to get many of our supplies that way, and give us that as well as the railroad.

Boats will start up to-day. The last of the enemy's forces are supposed to have gone to Nashville from Bowling Green. I had no report from Mitchel last night. Will soon have the wires up to him.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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FEBRUARY 16, 1862.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

I have no definite information in regard to Grant's position—Halleck only states that he has completely invested the fort—nor do I know his force. My estimate is that he has at least 30,000. The division I am starting to-day and to-morrow will add 10,000 and three field batteries. I have repeatedly inquired of Halleck for the very information you ask for, but with little or no success.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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CAMP WOOD, *Munfordville, February 16, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL:

A dispatch just in from General Mitchel, dated Bowling Green, February 16, 4.30 a. m. He has now five infantry and one cavalry regiments in Bowling Green. He asks me to forward forage and subsistence. He also recommends a strong and immediate demonstration upon Nashville. I send this at Mitchel's request. Can you not have one of the passenger trains taken off the railroad and send the locomotive here to work. We cannot get any of the engineers of the road to do anything here, and have great reason to doubt the loyalty of some. I will work a regiment per day on the railroad and push matters with all possible haste. The railroad is all right below Bell's.

McCOOK.

SAINT LOUIS, *February 17, 1862—10 a. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

It is said that Beauregard is preparing to move from Columbus either on Paducah or Fort Henry. Do send me more troops. It is the crisis of the war in the West. Have you fully considered the advantage which the Cumberland River affords to the enemy at Nashville? An immense number of boats have been collected, and the whole Bowling Green force can come down in a day, attack Grant in the rear, and

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\* See p. 619.

return to Nashville before Buell can get half way there. The bridges are all destroyed and the roads rendered impassable. If Buell must move by land, why not direct him on Clarksville? I can do no more for Grant at present. I must stop the transports at Cairo to observe Beauregard. We are certainly in peril. Telegraph to General Hitchcock, officially informing him of his appointment, and assign him to duty in this department.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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WASHINGTON, *February 17—10.30 a. m.*

Hon. THOMAS A. SCOTT,  
*Assistant Secretary of War, Saint Louis:*

Please consult Buell about removing engines and cars from Kentucky Central to the Nashville Railway. He has my plans. Better at once have cars and engines altered for five-foot gauge.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

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WASHINGTON, *February 17, 1862—10.30 a. m.*

Major-General HALLECK:

Please give me your reasons more fully for objecting to Buell's plan. Give facts on which your opinion is based.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 17, 1862—1 p. m.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Make Buell, Grant, and Pope major-generals of volunteers, and give me command in the West. I ask this in return for Forts Henry and Donelson.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis February 17, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo:*

Stop all forces required to resist Beauregard.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February —, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill.:*

Find contrabands, and put them at work to pay for food and clothing. I can get no communication with Buell.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 17, 1862.*

Brigadier-General SHERMAN, *Paducah, Ky.:*

All troops from Kentucky will be sent up the Cumberland. All others will be stopped at Paducah to await further orders. Watch Beauregard's movements from Columbus and report by telegram your forces at Paducah; also report all you can stop there. I am not satisfied with present success. We must now prepare for a still more important movement. You will not be forgotten in this.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
 No. 1. } *Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862.*

By virtue of directions from Headquarters Department of the Missouri, dated February 15, 1862, the undersigned has been assigned to the command of the new Military District of West Tennessee; limits not defined.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
 No. 2. } *Fort Donelson, February 17, 1862.*

The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion gained by their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th instant.

For four successive nights, without shelter, during the most inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all times to receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishing by day, resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without conditions.

The victory achieved is not only great in breaking down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in one battle on this continent.

Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the maps of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 17, 1862.*

General McCLELLAN:

I think it will be necessary to issue some of the Tennessee arms. We require them immediately. For what purpose are the 10,000 stand of arms sent to Columbus [Ohio]?

D. C. BUELL.

FEBRUARY 17—7.30 a. m.

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville*:

To arm ten Ohio regiments reported without arms. Make the best use you can of the arms you have. I have ordered 3,500 first-rate rifled arms to you at once, 16,000 good Prussian smooth bores, and the next 5,000 made at Springfield.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, *February 17, 1862.*Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

As the object of the re-enforcements I have been sending you was to assist at Fort Donelson and succor the force there if necessary, and as they are no longer required for that object, we had best consult about further operations, as well for the great object as to determine the disposition to be made of the re-enforcements, which, if they have not gone beyond reach, I have thought it advisable to stop until we understand each other. The object of both our forces is, directly or indirectly, to strike at the power of the rebellion in its most vital point within our field. Nashville appears clearly, I think, to be that point. Now, on your side, Clarksville intervenes. It will probably be pretty strongly fortified towards you, but mainly on this side of the river. It has not heretofore had any defenses on the south side, but it may be expected that at least a strong bridge-head will be thrown up on that side, and perhaps even somewhat extensive works, as the railroad bridge affords them the means of communication, though not a very secure one.

My impression is that the place could be easily invested on that side, so as to cut off their river communication, and without risk of the investing force being disturbed in the rear, the country in that direction being broken and the roads bad. They would still have, however, the railroad via Hadensville and Springfield on the north side. That route is exposed to my attack, and whenever I advance against it, either at Clarksville, Nashville, or any other point, they must fall back, unless succored by a force through Nashville that I cannot beat. It is to be observed also that I should be exposed to a combined resistance both from such a force and most of the Clarksville force, which would not be in great danger from your side of the river.

There can be no doubt that heavy re-enforcements will be thrown into Nashville from all quarters east and south. These considerations seem to require a large force on my line, which in fact is one on which a large force can be employed; the reverse of the case on your side. The difficulty on this side is one of transportation, and it is a very serious one. To depend on wagons at this season for a large force seems out of the question, and I fear it may be two weeks before I can get a bridge over the Barren River, so as to use the railroad beyond. I shall endeavor, however, to make an advance in less or much force before that time. According to this view of the problem, I have thought it would be best for my troops to return. Let me hear your views.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

BOWLING GREEN, *February 17, 1862*—2 a. m.

General D. C. BUELL:

Our scouts have returned this evening, bringing intelligence that the town of Franklin is now clear of the enemy. They are pushing on for Nashville.

A company of Kennett's cavalry advanced upon the turnpike 2½ miles beyond Woodburn, and learned the above facts. Two regiments of the Nineteenth Brigade are now encamped in Bowling Green, having carried on their shoulders their baggage and camp equipage across the river over a temporary foot bridge, constructed upon the ruins of the railroad bridge. They will move forward to-morrow, transporting their baggage upon platform cars on the railroad. The Second Ohio Regiment, Colonel Harris, which was ordered to remain at Bell's, was directed to-day to join the brigade. We are now—11 o'clock p. m.—calking a flat-boat sufficiently large to take over our artillery. It will be used as a ferry-boat. We are also building a floating bridge, but as the current is very swift, I have doubts of its success. The enemy cut down large timber across the road to the ford; a fact we discovered this evening. After completing the ferry we will clean out these obstructions and start another ferry at the ford, using the large flat-boat at the mill.

I hope by Tuesday morning to have passed the entire division, with its baggage, across the river, and intend to throw forward a brigade on the Russellville road, one on the turnpike, and one on the Nashville road some 10 miles from Bowling Green, and within supporting distance of each other. We have no hay, and there is none at Munfordville. We are obtaining a sufficient supply of corn from the country. I ventured to suggest Bowling Green was strongly fortified. There are two lines of natural defenses, which, if properly occupied, will render the position exceedingly strong.

O. M. MITCHEL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

FEBRUARY 17, 1862—8.15 p. m.

General CRITTENDEN, *Calhoun*:

(Care of quartermaster, Evansville; to be forwarded in haste.)

Suspend your movement until further orders, but keep ready to embark, and report by telegraph the position of your command. Detain the boats until you hear further from me.

Is Green River in such a stage that boats can pass over the dams, and have boats started for Bowling Green?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 18, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

You could not have received my telegram of yesterday, No. 20,\* when yours was sent. That gives my reasons for wishing General Buell to move on Clarksville. They are not changed by the taking of Fort Donelson.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

\* See p. 627.



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 18, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Can't you march on Clarksville and then go up the river to Nashville? We ought to be nearer together, so that we can assist each other. Had the enemy thrown his forces rapidly down the river he could have crushed me at Fort Donelson, and have returned to Nashville before you could have reached that place.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 18, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

I have received one dispatch from you of this date, but I infer that it was not written in answer to mine of last night, and therefore wait to hear further from you on the subject. I have telegraphed General Nelson to stop at Smithland until I hear from you. I agree with you as to the importance of our getting nearer each other. The difficulty in marching on Clarksville from Bowling Green is that the road is a common mud one and at this time impassable. That objection might be overcome if I could move light, with the certainty of meeting supplies at a point on the river; as, for example, if the enemy should retire from Clarksville, so that I could find you there. What do you think, if I can get away, of our meeting at Smithland personally, and going up to Grant to study the ground?

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 18, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL,  
*Louisville, Ky.:*

To remove all questions as to rank, I have asked the President to make you a major-general. Come down to the Cumberland and take command. The battle of the West is to be fought in that vicinity. You should be in it as the ranking general in immediate command. Don't hesitate. Come to Clarksville as rapidly as possible. Say that you will come, and I will have everything there for you. Beauregard threatens to attack either Cairo or Paducah. I must be ready for him. Don't stop any troops ordered down the Ohio. We want them all. You shall have them back in a few days. Assistant Secretary of War Scott left here this afternoon to confer with you. He knows my plans and necessities. I am terribly hard pushed. Help me, and I will help you. Hunter has acted nobly, generously, bravely. Without his aid I should have failed before Fort Donelson. Honor to him. We came within an ace of being defeated. If the fragments which I sent down had not reached there on Saturday we should have gone in. A retreat at one time seemed almost inevitable. All right now. Help me to carry it out. Talk freely with Scott. It is evident to me that you and McClellan did not at last accounts appreciate the strait I have been in. I am certain you will when you understand it all. Help me, I beg of

you. Throw all your troops in the direction of the Cumberland. Don't stop any one ordered here. You will not regret it. There will be no battle at Nashville.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 18, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill.:*

Act in my name, and assume command over any and all. A large force passed Memphis four days ago—fifteen steamers, loaded with troops, to re-enforce Columbus. Look out for an attack on Cairo or Paducah. Get ready immediately. Use my name in any order you issue. We must be ready for them. I am collecting and sending every man I can find.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 18, 1862.*

Brigadier-General GRANT, *in the Field:*

Don't let gunboats go higher up than Clarksville. Even there they must limit their operations to the destruction of the bridge and railroad, and return immediately to Cairo, leaving one at Fort Donelson. Mortar boats to be sent back to Cairo as soon as possible.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

General Sherman will send this to General Grant with all possible dispatch.

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GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
No. 3. } *Fort Donelson, February 18, 1862.*

All commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates are prohibited from entering the town of Dover or any houses therein situated without permission in writing of their regimental commanders.

All captured property belongs to the Government, and no officer, non-commissioned officer, or private will be permitted to have or retain possession of captured property of any kind.

Any officer violating the above order will be at once arrested. Any non-commissioned officer or private will be arrested and confined in the guard-house, and all captured property taken from them and turned over to the district quartermaster.

Colonel Leggett is hereby appointed to see to the strict enforcement of the above, using his whole command for that purpose, if necessary.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS.

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GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
No. 4. } *Fort Donelson, February 18, 1862.*

Hereafter, until otherwise ordered, guard duty will be performed as follows:

All the outer guard duty will be performed by the First and Second

Divisions and Colonel McArthur's brigade, which for the present will be attached for orders to the Second Division.

The First Division will guard all roads and passes into the intrenchments from the river above Dover to the road leading west to Fort Henry.

The Second Division, with the brigades attached, will guard from the Fort Henry road to the river below the fort, and furnish the guard for the fort.

The Fourth Division, now organizing, will furnish all other guards, such as for the commissary and quartermaster stores at steamboat landing, hospitals, &c.

Brig. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut will have special charge of the interior police regulations of the camps inside of the grounds occupied by the other division.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 18, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

General O. M. Mitchel reports from Bowling Green yesterday as follows:

We have reliable information that the enemy has fallen back from Clarksville and was concentrating heavy force at Nashville, and justifying the railroad engineers' reports that four days since a fleet of fifteen boats passed Memphis, ascending the river.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

CAMP JOHN Q. ADAMS,  
*February 18, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL:

With incredible labor, in rain and mud, our ferries, two in number, have been established, our roads are completed, our trains and artillery are in motion. I hope to accomplish the crossing of the entire baggage trains, with the artillery, to-day. Forty wagon loads of supplies, giving us two days' rations, will be up this morning. One hundred and twenty additional teams will arrive during to-day, and to-morrow I shall advance the head of the column some 20 miles, leaving this position to be occupied by McCook.

My ammunition, requiring 30 wagons for its transportation, is stored at Green River, under a guard, and I hope may be brought forward by rail. Our cartridge boxes and limber-chests are full.

I learn from reliable source that no enemy can be found short of Clarksville, and very few are there.

I shall await your orders with anxiety as to the final direction you will give my column. Our troops have been worked up to their highest endurance by rapid marches, outpost and fatigue duty, and the rest of a day or two awaiting orders will be of great service.

The turnpike bridge should be rebuilt at the earliest possible moment. I find that our ferry-boats are not to be relied upon for the passage of an army. I have neither time nor material for constructing a better mode of crossing. I trust the railroad and telegraph line will soon be



in working order. Colonel Smith, of the Thirteenth Ohio, reports the locomotive on the track, which was struck by one of our shells, can be repaired in a single day. One or two others I hope may be found worth repairing.

O. M. MITCHEL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, *February 19, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

I have seen message to General Buell. Do you mean that his whole command should go from Bowling Green to Clarksville, or that the general in person should go to the Cumberland and take command of forces now there, his own column from Bowling Green to co-operate with Cumberland column, in such manner as he (Buell) may decide, to clear out the Cumberland, including Nashville? Answer definitely the points as stated in this message. The general desires to meet your views fully. Answer immediately.

THOMAS A. SCOTT,  
*Assistant Secretary of War.*

---

LOUISVILLE, *February 19, 1862.*

General McCLELLAN:

I have arranged to transfer from other roads 9 large engines and 250 cars. Will provide others as needed. Railroad bridge across the Tennessee destroyed by fire. Communication by rail between Columbus and Nashville is entirely destroyed. Buell immediately needs reinforcements. Will they come?

THOMAS A. SCOTT.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 19, 1862.*

N. B. BAKER, *Des Moines, Iowa:*

The Second Iowa Infantry proved themselves the bravest of the brave. They had the honor of heading the column which entered Fort Donelson.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

SAINT LOUIS, *February 19, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL:

Assistant Secretary Scott will explain to you all my views. I will meet you anywhere you may appoint.

H. W. HALLECK  
*Major-General.*

---

SAINT LOUIS, *February 19, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

Re-enforcements have reached Columbus and steamers have fired up for a move against us. Don't stop any of your troops coming down,

but send them on as rapidly as possible. They are bound to attack us somewhere from Columbus. Show this to Scott.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

SAINT LOUIS, *February 19, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo* :

All troops at Smithland or on the Ohio River should come to Paducah or Cairo, as you may deem best. I have authority of Secretary of War for this. If necessary, countermand, in the name of Secretary of War, all orders issued by General Buell or any one else about the troops halting or returning to Kentucky.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

SAINT LOUIS, *February 19, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo* :

Look out for Columbus. Send down boat to reconnoiter. Hold all troops ready for an attack on Paducah or Cairo. Fifteen steamers loaded with troops from New Orleans have reached Columbus.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 19, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. DAVID HUNTER,

*Commanding Department of Kansas, Fort Leavenworth* :

To you more than to any other man out of this department are we indebted for our success at Fort Donelson. In my strait for troops to re-enforce General Grant I appealed to you. You responded nobly and generously, placing your forces at my disposition. This enabled us to win the victory. Receive my most heartfelt thanks.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

SAINT LOUIS, MO., *February 19, 1862—4 p. m.*

General McCLELLAN :

Yours of the 14th just received. Hitchcock will take command here as soon as he gets his orders. I think Hunter will consent to go under me and command the central column. If not, leave him where he is. It was decided in the Mexican war that regulars ranked volunteers, without regard to dates. This decision, if sustained, makes everything right for the Western Division. Give it to me, and I will split secession in twain in one month.

H. W. HALLECK.

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SAINT LOUIS, MO., *February 19, 1862.*

General McCLELLAN :

Columbus has been strongly re-enforced from New Orleans. They have steam up on all their boats ready for a move—probably on Cairo.

This will render it necessary for me to withdraw a part of my force from Forts Henry and Donelson. Do send me more troops. I have sent every organized regiment from Saint Louis. This place is virtually without a garrison. Buell cannot move on Nashville for two or three weeks. Let him help me, and we will cut the line between Columbus and ——\* and paralyze both places.

H. W. HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS, *Saint Louis, February 19, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

Brig. Gen. Charles F. Smith, by his coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson when the battle was against us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You can't get a better one. Honor him for this victory and the whole country will applaud.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 19, 1862.*

THOMAS A. SCOTT,

*Assistant Secretary of War, Louisville, Ky.:*

Have just heard that the railroad bridge at Decatur across the Tennessee is destroyed. Communication between Columbus and Nashville is thus cut off. If General Buell will come down and help me with all possible haste we can end the war in the West in less than a month.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

*SAINT LOUIS, February 19, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN, *Paducah:*

Don't let any troops go north to Kentucky, but hurry them down to Paducah and Cairo. Look out sharp for a movement from Columbus.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, February 19, 1862.*

General G. W. CULLUM,

*Chief of Staff, Department of the Missouri:*

GENERAL: Clarksville is evacuated, and I shall take possession on Friday next, with one division, under General Smith. If it is the desire of the general commanding department, I can have Nashville on Saturday week. To do this I will have to retain transportation as it arrives. Please inform me early of the desire of the general commanding on this point—at as early a day as possible.

As soon as I got possession of Fort Donelson I commenced sending the sick and wounded to Paducah, as seems to have been the desire of

\* Illegible cipher word; probably standing for Nashville.



General Halleck. No distinction has been made between Federal and Confederate sick and wounded. Generally the prisoners have been treated with great kindness, and I believe they appreciate it. Great numbers of Union people have come in to see us, and express great hope for the future. They say secessionists are in great trepidation—some leaving the country, others expressing anxiety to be assured that they will not be molested if they will come in and take the oath.

The amount of supplies captured here is very large—sufficient, probably, for twenty days for all my army. Some articles will be deficient, such as coffee. Of rice I don't know that we will want any more during the war. I think I will send you the tail of the elephant to-night or in the morning at furthest.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, February 19, 1862.*

General W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding District of Cairo, Paducah, Ky.:*

Send all re-enforcements up the Cumberland. I shall occupy Clarksville on Friday and Nashville Saturday week, if it meets the approval of General Halleck. I have written him to that effect.

I feel under many obligations to you for the kind tone of your letter,\* and hope that, should an opportunity occur, you will win for yourself the promotion which you are kind enough to say belongs to me. I care nothing for promotion so long as our arms are successful and no political appointments are made.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, February 19, 1862.*

General C. F. SMITH,  
*Commanding Second Division:*

Hold your command in readiness to take possession of Clarksville and garrison it. I would suggest the propriety of appointing some lieutenant to act as division quartermaster and one to act as division commissary. Ten days' rations should be taken to issue after arrival, besides what the troops may have when they leave here.

There are no Confederate troops at Clarksville at present, but it may be a matter of importance to us to move there as rapidly as possible. You can commence this movement as soon as practicable after transportation can be provided.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 43. }

HDQRS. DEPT. OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 19, 1862.*

The major-general commanding the department congratulates Flag-Officer Foote, Brigadier-General Grant, and the brave officers and men

\* Not found.

under their commands, on the recent brilliant victories on the Tennessee and Cumberland.

But the war is not yet ended. Prepare for new conflicts and new victories. Troops are concentrating from every direction. We shall soon have an army which will be irresistible. The Union flag must be restored everywhere, and the enthralled Union men in the South must be set free. The soldiers and sailors of the Great West are ready and willing to do this. The times and places have been determined on. Victory and glory await the brave.

By command of Major-General Halleck:

N. H. McLEAN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *February 19, 1862—4 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Our news is not very definite. It indicates that the enemy are concentrating at Nashville and fortifying beyond Franklin. They have destroyed everything like a bridge, however small.

Not a large force at Clarksville. The gunboats, backed by General Grant's troops, can, I think, dispose of them easily. I did not succeed in getting boats up Green River, but may on another rise.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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FEBRUARY 19, 1862.

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

I thank you for your friendly offices. Supposing it would not be required in your advance up the Cumberland, and as it is required for an advance from Bowling Green, I this morning ordered Nelson to return with his troops.

On the receipt of your dispatch this moment, inferring that you are in danger, I have countermanded my last order and directed Nelson to receive orders from you at Paducah. I am in doubt about your meaning. Is it that I should come personally and ascend the Cumberland to Clarksville, or that I should bring my troops around that way, or that I should move them toward Clarksville from Bowling Green? I cannot get any more troops to the river to embark in less than six days—say eight or ten days to the Cumberland.

Do you know that the enemy is preparing to make a serious stand at Clarksville? My information, as far as it goes, is that he has but a small force at Clarksville and is concentrating at Nashville. Tell me what reliable information you have about it, and definitely what you want.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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FEBRUARY 19, 1862—5 p. m.

General CRITTENDEN,  
*On Transports at Smithland:*

Your orders to return here are countermanded. Receive orders from General Halleck. Stop all the troops that are with you.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

FEBRUARY 19, 1862—5 p. m.

General NELSON,

*Commanding Division, Evansville:*

Your orders to return here are countermanded. Proceed with your whole force to Paducah, and receive orders from General Halleck.

Intercept and take with you all troops that may have started back.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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FEBRUARY 19, 1862.

General THOMAS, *Lebanon and Bardstown:*

Stop the head of your column and let the rear close up at Bardstown, and halt there until further orders; but be ready to move again at a moment's notice.

Report definitely where your troops are.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 20, 1862.*

General BUELL:

Halleck says Columbus re-enforced from New Orleans, and steam up on their boats ready for move—probably on Cairo. . . .Wishes to withdraw some troops from Donelson. I tell him improbable that rebels re-enforced from New Orleans or attack Cairo. Think [they] will abandon Columbus.

What force have you in Bowling Green, what in advance of it, and where to-day? How soon can you be in front of Nashville, and in what force? What news of the rebels? If the force in West can take Nashville or even hold its own for the present, I hope to have Richmond and Norfolk in from three to four weeks. Answer.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

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WASHINGTON, *February 20, 1862*—9.30 a. m.

Major-General HALLECK:

Dispatch of yesterday received. I doubt purpose of rebels to attack Cairo. More probably intend abandoning Columbus. Have too few troops at New Orleans to spare any.

This army moves very shortly. As soon as I hear from Buell will communicate again. Have sent all arms asked for new regiments in the West. Do not withdraw troops from Donelson until I hear from Buell to-day.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

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WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 20, 1862.*Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Buell has gone to Bowling Green. I will be in communication with him in a few minutes, and we will then arrange. The fall of Clarks-



ville confirms my views. I think Cairo is not in danger, and that we must now direct our efforts on Nashville. The rebels hold firm at Manassas. In less than two weeks I shall move the Army of the Potomac, and hope to be in Richmond soon after you are in Nashville. I think Columbus will be abandoned within a week. We will have a desperate battle on this line.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 20, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo :*

It is absolutely necessary that the gunboats and mortar boats should all be ready for service by Monday morning. Call on Chicago for the mechanics and material required. Use the telegraph. Communicate with William B. Ogden, of Chicago.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

FEBRUARY 20, 1862.

Hon. THOMAS A. SCOTT, *Louisville :*

Telegram received. Increase rolling stock on Nashville Railroad. At present no troops will move from East. Ample occupation for them here. Rebels hold firm at Manassas Junction.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, February 20, 1862—8 p. m.*

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington, D. C. :*

I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May I assume the command? Answer quickly.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, February 20, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill. :*

Get gun and mortar boats ready as soon as possible. Tell Commodore Foote or ranking naval officer to telegraph to Cincinnati for all mechanics they want. They must work day and night. Send all spare gun and mortar boats to make a demonstration on Columbus to-morrow. Let the mortar boats anchor, under the protection of the gunboats, near enough to throw shells into the place, but run no risks. It is reported that they are sending their guns to Memphis. This can be ascertained by a judicious demonstration.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 20, 1862.*

THOMAS A. SCOTT,

*Assistant Secretary of War, Louisville, Ky.:*

I mean that Buell should move on Clarksville with his present column; there unite his Kentucky army and move up the Cumberland, while I act on the Tennessee. We should then be able to co-operate.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 20, 1862—7 p. m.*

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington:*

Your dispatch of this date to General Buell received. He is at Bowling Green to-day; will return on Saturday. He received dispatch from General Halleck last night saying that either Cairo or Paducah was threatened from Columbus. General Buell had no news from Columbus, but hardly thought an advance from that point probable, unless the enemy had more gunboats than we were aware of. He, however, ordered Nelson's division, which had been stopped at Evansville on account of the fall of Fort Donelson, to proceed at once to Smithland, and receive orders from General Halleck.

Mitchel's division, 10,000 fighting men, at Bowling Green, with a brigade advanced towards Nashville—I don't know how far—and a force towards Russellville. McCook's division, 15,000 fighting men, at or near Bowling Green to-night. Large details aiding to repair the railroad. Thomas' division just arriving at Bardstown; will be eight or nine days' march from there to Bowling Green. Wood's division, raw troops, at Munfordville, three or four days' march from Bowling Green.

General Buell does not think he can advance on Nashville in force without the use of the railroad, and he and Colonel Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, have gone to look into and hasten the work upon it. The additional rolling stock has been ordered.

No news from the rebels since General Buell last telegraphed you. He is beyond the reach of telegraph or your message would be forwarded. He is driving the work on railroad and telegraph as rapidly as possible. Will deliver your message for report as soon as he returns or comes within reach.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 20, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

General Buell is at Bowling Green, 40 miles beyond telegraph. Your message I forwarded by telegraph and swift express. He may be back on Saturday.

We have now two divisions, 25,000 fighting men, at Bowling Green. Colonel Scott is with General Buell.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 20, 1862—12 p. m.*

General BUELL, *Bowling Green:*

(To be forwarded by swift messenger.)

The following just received from General Halleck, viz:

We are in possession of Clarksville, in large force, with plenty of supplies. Move to that place rapidly by forced marches and effect a junction. Send all available troops around that can reach there by water sooner than by land. Don't hesitate a moment. If you will come we are sure of Nashville and Columbus, and perhaps Memphis also. Answer yes or no.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

Thomas had one regiment and one battery at Bardstown to-day. I have taken no action on General Halleck's message. General McClellan wanted you at Jeffersonville to-night at 10 o'clock, to talk.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

---

HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, Ky., February 20, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

General Nelson's command has but ten days' supply of provisions. They will depend upon you, as none are sent from here to the Cumberland.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 20, 1862.*

THOMAS A. SCOTT,

*Assistant Secretary of War, Louisville, Ky.:*

Have taken Clarksville, with large supplies. General Curtis has again defeated Price. Am short of steamboat transportation. Send steamers down the Ohio; also stores, if Buell moves on Clarksville. If he will not move I shall try to carry out my plans without him. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity. Can't you assume the responsibility of ordering the move? See my dispatch to him of this evening.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

---

CAIRO, ILL., *February 20, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. U. S. GRANT,

*Commanding District West Tennessee:*

I have received with the highest gratification your reports and letters from Fort Donelson, so gallantly captured under your brilliant leadership. I, in common with the whole country, warmly congratulate you upon this remarkable achievement, which has broken the enemy's center, dispersed the rebels, and given a death-blow to secession. The prisoners by thousands have arrived here, and will be sent off by to-morrow to their respective destinations.



I have directed the 5,000 blankets and 1,000 overcoats to be sent to you. Very few blankets are in this office, General McClelland having taken them all. If none are to be found to supply your wants here—I will order them sent from headquarters.

Supplies of nearly all kinds have been forwarded to you. The teams you wish have been sent. The sick and wounded are well provided for at Paducah, Mound City, and here. If we have too many to look after we will send them to Cincinnati and Saint Louis. Doctors, nurses, and all kinds of assistance and sympathy have been freely and generously offered.

Your letter of the 19th gives glorious news and an earnest of continued success.

We have newspaper reports which state 2,000 Tennesseans have come in to you and laid down their arms.

Again congratulating you and assuring you of my continued esteem, I am, &c.,

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General, &c.*

CAIRO, *February 20, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

Navy officers report it impossible to get gun and mortar boats ready for ten days. Six mortar boats up Cumberland, and of the only four ready here three are aground, and possibly cannot be got off. The river falling fast. Gunboats much damaged in battle. Four up Cumberland, and must have four to watch movements from Columbus. Had spy there Tuesday night, and have scouts near to-night.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General.*

UNITED STATES FLAG STEAMER CONESTOGA,  
*February 20, 1862 (via Cairo, February 21).*

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

We have possession of Clarksville. The citizens being alarmed, two-thirds of them have fled, and having expressed my views and intentions to the mayor and Hon. Cave Johnson, at their request I have issued a proclamation,\* assuring all peaceably-disposed persons that they may with safety resume their business vocations, requiring only the military stores and equipage to be given up, and holding the authorities responsible that this shall be done without reservation.

I left Fort Donelson yesterday with the Conestoga, Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, and Cairo, Lieutenant-Commander Bryant, on an armed reconnaissance, bringing with me Colonel Webster, of the Engineer Corps, and chief of General Grant's staff, who, with Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, took possession of the principal fort and hoisted the Union flag. A Union sentiment manifested itself as we came up the river.

The rebels have retreated to Nashville, having set fire, against the remonstrance of the citizens, to the splendid railroad bridge across the Cumberland River.

\* See p. 423.

I return to Fort Donelson to-day for another gunboat and six or eight mortar boats, with which I propose to proceed up the Cumberland.

The rebels all have a terror of the gunboats. One of them, a short distance above Fort Donelson, had previously fired an iron-rolling mill belonging to Hon. John Bell, which had been used by the rebels.

A. H. FOOTE,

*Flag-Officer Naval Forces.*

(Copy to General Halleck.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 21, 1862—12.30 a. m.*

General G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo* :

Gun and mortar boats must be ready in much less than ten days. Call on Chicago for assistance; we cannot now stand on forms. From two to four gunboats and a few mortar boats would secure evacuation of Columbus. You need have no fear for Cairo if you have a respectable garrison there. The enemy will not attack you.

Ten days to prepare boats is inadmissible; they must be ready by Monday, if you have to take the affair in charge yourself.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 21, 1862—12.30 a. m.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis* :

Buell at Bowling Green knows more of the state of affairs than you at Saint Louis. Until I hear from him I cannot see necessity of giving you entire command.

I expect to hear from Buell in a few minutes. I do not yet see that Buell cannot control his own line. I shall not lay your request before the Secretary until I hear definitely from Buell.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 21, 1862—1 a. m.*

General BUELL :

Telegraph me at least once every day the position of your own troops, that of the rebels, and the state of affairs. Unless I have this detailed information I cannot tell whether it is necessary or not to suspend or abandon my own plans here. Neither Halleck nor yourself give me as much detailed information as is necessary for me. This is the critical period, and I must be constantly informed of the condition of your affairs.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

(Similar dispatch, same date, to Halleck.)

SAINT LOUIS, Mo., *February 21, 1862.*

General McCLELLAN :

Curtis has taken Bentonville, with wagons and baggage and a large flag which was floating on the court-house.

Had he better proceed to Fayetteville or stop and hold the mountain passes, while I send 4,000 men from Ironton and Doniphan to take Pocahontas and Jacksonport and destroy their supplies? I prefer the latter, but Curtis advises an advance to Fayetteville.

One of my scouts was in Columbus. During the night of the 18th some high officer arrived, and immense cheering at railroad depot—said to be for Beauregard. Nineteen steamers in the river. No preparations either for advance or retreat.

Navy officers say they cannot repair the gunboats in less than ten days.

H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 21—7.30 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo. :*

I think you are entirely right in not wishing to push Curtis beyond Bentonville. No necessity for anything more than a party of cavalry at Fayetteville. The true line of advance into Arkansas is by Pocahontas and Jacksonport; there you seriously threaten Memphis. Tomorrow I shall hear definitely from Buell what he can do. I think our next move must be on Nashville with least possible delay. As soon as we can move a column on Humboldt or vicinity Columbus will fall. Hurry repairs of gunboats; work on them day and night. As soon as enough of them are ready to protect mortar boats send latter to shell Columbus.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 21, 1862—9.30 p. m.*

General BUELL:

The advance on Nashville is of the greatest importance. If you can make it by the line of the Cumberland more rapidly than by Bowling Green at once change your line of operations, and I will direct Halleck's troops on Memphis and Columbus.

What is Thomas' division doing at Bardstown? Rapid movements are now necessary. If railroad to Nashville is destroyed, take the line of Cumberland River. I repeat, both Halleck and yourself keep me too much in the dark. Your reports are not sufficiently numerous or explicit.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 21, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

What more have you from Columbus? You do not report either often or fully enough. Unless you keep me fully advised, you must not expect me to abandon my own plans for yours.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.



HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 21, 1862.*Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
*General-in-Chief, Washington :*

GENERAL : For the events of the last two weeks I must refer you to my telegrams, having had no time to write. Our successes on the Tennessee and Cumberland and in the Southwest, together with the stringent measures taken here, have completely crushed out the rebellion in this city and State; no more insurrections, bridge-burnings, and hoisting of rebel flags. This enables me to rapidly increase my force in Tennessee. Nashville and Columbus must soon fall. I am, however, perfectly confident that if you had sent General Buell to the Cumberland to co-operate with me both would have been evacuated by this time.

I cannot possibly be mistaken in the strategy of the campaign. Threatened as I have continually been from Columbus, compelling me to keep a large force at Cairo and Paducah, I was too weak to act with promptness and efficiency on the Tennessee and Cumberland. The enemy made a terrible mistake in not falling back from Bowling Green on Clarksville, driving me out of Fort Henry, re-enforcing Fort Donelson, and connecting again with Columbus. It is true they would thus have exposed Nashville to Buell, but with their river communication they could soon have reoccupied Nashville—much sooner, I think, than Buell could have reached it on muddy roads. They have lost the golden opportunity, and I believe they will fall back from Nashville, without a battle, either on Decatur or Memphis. I certainly should if I were in Johnston's place. If he should not, and General Buell should take the line of the Cumberland, so as to co-operate with me on the Tennessee, the enemy would be cut off and forced to surrender.

In your telegrams you complain of not getting returns from me of the numbers and positions of my troops. Certainly you do not expect to get information from me which I cannot obtain myself. I have worked hard for months, issuing order after order for returns, but the officers of this department are so negligent or ignorant of their duties in this respect that I find it impossible to obtain returns till long after they cease to be of any use, as everything in the mean time has changed. They became so negligent under the Frémont régime of all law, regulations, and orders that it will take time to bring about a reformation. I am doing everything in my power to effect it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 21, 1862—10 p. m.*

Major-General McCLELLAN :

I find it utterly impossible to get returns of either of the regiments arriving or of those sent with prisoners. Moreover, telegraph lines have been defective and many of my messages not received. Have sent staff officers to obtain the information wanted. Have ordered a gunboat reconnaissance to-day of Columbus. Will send you results as soon as I get it.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 21, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo:*

Let me know result of reconnaissance as early as possible. Everything must remain *in statu quo* till to-morrow. I am awaiting messages from Kentucky and Washington. If possible, notify Grant, Phelps, and Commodore Foote to make no further moves till they receive orders.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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SAINT LOUIS, *February 21, 1862.*

THOMAS A. SCOTT,

*Assistant Secretary of War, Louisville:*

Advices just received from Clarksville represent that General A. S. Johnston has fallen back on Columbia, and that there is very little preparation for a stand at Nashville. General Grant and Commodore Foote say the road is now open and are impatient. Can't you come down to the Cumberland and divide the responsibility with me? If so, I will immediately prepare to go ahead. I am tired of waiting for action in Washington. They will not understand the case. It is as plain as daylight to me.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 21, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Your plan of organization has been transmitted to me by Mr. Scott and strikes me very favorably, but on account of the domestic affliction of the President I have not yet been able to submit it to him. The brilliant results of the energetic action in the West fills the Nation with joy.

EDWIN M. STANTON.

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PADUCAH, *February 21, 1862.*

General CULLUM:

General Grant and myself consider this a good time to move on Nashville. Six mortar boats and two iron-clad steamers can precede the troops and shell the forts. We were about moving for this purpose when General Grant, to my astonishment, received a telegram from General Halleck not to let the gunboats go higher than Clarksville. No telegram. The Cumberland is in a good stage of water, and General Grant and I believe that we can take Nashville. Please ask General Halleck if we shall do it. We will talk per telegraph, Captain Phelps representing me in the office.

A. H. FOOTE,  
*Flag-Officer.*

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PADUCAH, *February 21, 1862.*

General CULLUM:

From information gleaned in Clarksville we believe the panic in Nashville is very great, and that the city will be surrendered without

a fight if a force proceeds at once against it. General Johnston is reported to be gathering his scattered forces at Columbia.

S. L. PHELPS.

CAIRO, *February 21, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

Strength at Bird's Point: Infantry, 4,181; cavalry, 1,284; twelve field guns.

Fort Holt: Infantry, 560; cavalry, 420; artillery, sixteen field guns.

Cairo: Infantry, 2,642; artillery, 6 guns; sappers and miners, 75 men, not counting forts.

E. A. PAINE,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,

*Fort Donelson, February 21, 1862.*

General C. F. SMITH,

*Commanding Second Division:*

You will proceed to Clarksville, Tenn., with so much of your command as transportation is now ready for, and occupy ground about the forts on the north bank of the river.

I have no special directions to give that will not naturally suggest themselves to you, such as keeping the men from going into private houses and annoying the citizens generally. There is said to be a large quantity of army stores at Clarksville, which by calling upon the mayor of the city will be given up to our use.

U. S. GRANT,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 6. }

HDQRS. DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,

*Fort Donelson, February 21, 1862.*

Troops in this military district will be brigaded and assigned to divisions in the following order, to wit:

First Division, Brig. Gen. J. A. McClelland, commanding:

First Brigade: Eighth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first Illinois Infantry, Dresser's battery, Dollins', O'Harnett's, and Carmichael's cavalry.

Second Brigade: Eleventh, Eighteenth, Twentieth, and Forty-fifth Illinois Infantry, First Battalion of Fourth Illinois Cavalry, and Taylor's battery.

Third Brigade: Seventeenth, Forty-third, Forty-ninth, and Fifty-second Illinois Infantry, and McAllister's and Schwartz's batteries.

Second Division, Brig. Gen. C. F. Smith commanding:

First Brigade: Second, Seventh, Twelfth, and Fourteenth Iowa Infantry, and Second Battalion of Fourth Illinois Cavalry.

Second Brigade: Ninth and Twelfth Illinois and Thirteenth and Sixteenth Missouri Infantry, Willard's battery, and detachment Regular Cavalry.

Third Brigade: Seventh, Fiftieth, Fifty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth Illinois Infantry, and two companies Second Illinois Cavalry.

The battalion of artillery commanded by Major Cavender will be attached to the Second Division at large.



Third Division, Brig. Gen. L. Wallace, commanding :

First Brigade : Eighth Missouri, Eleventh, Twenty-fourth, and Fifty-second Indiana Infantry, and Bulliss' battery.

Second Brigade : First Nebraska and Fifty-eighth, Sixty-eighth, and Seventy-eighth Ohio Infantry, and four companies of Curtis' Horse.

Third Brigade : Twentieth, Fifty-sixth, and Seventy-sixth Ohio and Twenty-third Indiana Infantry, and the remainder of Curtis' Horse.

Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut, commanding :

First Brigade : Fifteenth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-second, and Forty-first Illinois Infantry, and Burrows' battery of light artillery.

Second Brigade : Twenty-fifth Indiana, Fourteenth, Forty-sixth, and Forty-eighth Illinois Infantry, and Mann's battery of light artillery.

Third Brigade : Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Indiana and Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky Infantry, and Third Battalion Fourth Illinois Cavalry.

The senior colonels of brigades will command them in every instance.

Brigade commanders will select from the regimental quartermasters of their commands one to act as brigade commissary.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
No. 7. } *Fort Donelson, February 21, 1862.*

Division and brigade commanders will take immediate steps to prevent soldiers of their command from passing beyond the limits of the field works of Fort Donelson.

All depredations committed upon citizens must be summarily punished.

Patrols will be sent out daily by division commanders, and all soldiers found outside the works without a pass approved by the division commanders will be brought into camp and punished by regimental commanders.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

WASHINGTON, *February 21, 1862.*

J. B. FRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General, Louisville :*

It will be better for all concerned if you will keep us fully advised about matters in Kentucky. The general is embarrassed all the time for want of definite information from both Generals Halleck and Buell. Your dispatch of to-day was more definite than any yet received from either party since they left Washington. This is strictly private.

A. V. COLBURN.

BOWLING GREEN, *February 21, 1862.*

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis :*

I shall start from here to-morrow, and expect to be opposite or near Nashville to-morrow night. Move up the river with your gunboats, but without exposing them unnecessarily.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*Paducah, February 21, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I arrived here to-day; reported to General Sherman, whom I found in command. Immediately four of my regiments were detached and sent to Cairo, viz: Thirty-fourth, Forty-third, Forty-sixth, Forty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, leaving me here with six regiments of my division, viz: Twenty-fourth Ohio Volunteers, Fifty-first Ohio Volunteers, Thirty-sixth Indiana, Colonel Ammen, and the Forty-first Ohio Volunteers, Sixth Ohio Volunteers, Sixth Kentucky, Colonel Hazen; also I have General Crittenden, with three regiments. One of the regiments sent to Cairo was his, viz, the Forty-third Indiana.

At this rate the Fourth Division of the Ohio will disappear, and I will be without a command.

I have directed the brigadiers to retain the regiments on their reports, remarking that they are detached at Cairo.

It does seem to me that as we were sent here from another department the organization of the brigades and division might have been left intact.

We debark to-morrow morning and go into camp.

There are nearly 1,000 men of Crittenden's brigade yet at Calhoun that are fit for duty. Will you order them to join their regiments?

I sent an order the day before I left Camp Wickliffe to Colonel Wagner, who is on Green River, to return certain men of the Sixth Ohio Volunteers, who were employed repairing arms, to their regiments, in order that they might march with it. This Colonel Wagner failed to do. I inclose a copy of the order, and beg to request that the men whose names are inclosed be ordered to join their regiments.

Very respectfully,

WM. NELSON,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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BOWLING GREEN, *February 21, 1862.*

Captain FRY, *Chief of Staff:*

Order Thomas to Louisville by forced marches, to embark for the Cumberland. In the mean time get the transports ready, so that there shall be no delay. Send all the efficient batteries and Smith's cavalry in the same way. Order my guard forward by railroad to-morrow. Come yourself, with all the officers of the staff that I have intended to accompany us, as soon as possible. Bring the operator employed to accompany me. I will order Wood and Boyle forward. Hurry Bruce forward, and direct him to report to General Wood. Send a boat to take the battery at Calhoun up the Cumberland, to report to General Nelson. I will send orders to Jackson to march across. Have the pontoon bridge sent forward by the first train after the track is laid. Send no more wagons beyond the mouth of Salt River until further orders. Don't let these matters delay the railroad bridge. I send a dispatch for Halleck.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, *Camp near Bardstown, Ky.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Louisville:*

I have sent back to hurry the regiments up, but the roads from Somerset to Lebanon are in such bad condition that I doubt if the last regiment can get up before Sunday.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, *February 22, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Your telegram of yesterday,\* together with Mr. Scott's reports, have this morning been submitted to the President, who, after full consideration of the subject, does not think any change in the organization of the Army or the military departments at present advisable. He desires and expects you and General Buell to co-operate fully and zealously with each other, and would be glad to know whether there has been any failure of co-operation in any particular.

EDWIN M. STANTON,

*Secretary of War.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 22, 1862.*

Major-General McCLELLAN:

General Buell still at Bowling Green. Your messages have been forwarded by telegraph to Munfordville, thence by rail to Cave City, and thence by swift express to Munford Green. Telegraph men promise to open through to Bowling Green to-morrow. McCook's division is not yet at Bowling Green; has large working parties on the railroad. Railroad promises to send train to Barren River on Sunday, but McCook does not think they will succeed. General Thomas' division—10,000 fighting men—is on the march from Somerset, and is moving by Bardstown to keep on the turnpike, dirt roads being impassable.

The division is scattered, and the head of the column is halted at Bardstown, to close up. I telegraphed him to-day that he must hasten his rear regiments. He will move south by Bardstown and New Haven turnpike. I will spur him again. Boyle's brigade, about 2,800 fighting men, is at Glasgow, not assigned to a division.

Bruce's brigade, about 2,000 fighting men, good ones, at Munfordville, not assigned to a division. Mitchel reported yesterday that he would have a brigade at Franklin to-day; he has a small force at Russellville. He has repaired one locomotive and has it running with a few cars from Bowling Green towards Franklin and Russellville. I don't know condition of railroad from Bowling Green down, except that it is but little, if any, injured as far down as our cavalry has been—about Franklin, and perhaps farther. Good to Russellville; have not heard beyond that point. Mitchel's, McCook's, Thomas', and Wood's divisions, and a new division to be formed of Bruce's and Boyle's brigades, give about 50,000 fighting men for Nashville.

There is a turnpike from Bowling Green to Nashville; none from Bowling Green to Clarksville. Buell is so far beyond telegraph station (40 miles), that there is necessarily great delay in his answering your dispatches.

JAMES B. FRY,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

\* See p. 655.



BOWLING GREEN, *February 22, 1862.*

To the COMMANDING OFFICER

*United States Forces, Clarksville:*

SIR: I am marching on Nashville. My advance will probable be within 9 miles of that place to-night. Your gunboats should move forward instantly. I believe they will meet no serious opposition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 22, 1862.*

(Received February 23, 1862.)

General THOMAS, *Bardstown:*

Move for Louisville with your whole division, including the First Ohio Cavalry, now at Bardstown, by forced marches. Transports will be ready for you to embark for the Cumberland. Lose no time.

By command:

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 22, 1862—1 p. m.*

General BUELL, *Bowling Green:*

Nothing new. Thomas' division will be at Bardstown to-morrow. Had he not better push on towards Green River? I have ordered Jackson's cavalry and Behr's battery to march from Calhoun to Bowling Green. Jackson knows the country and will get forage. General McClellan is impatient, as you will see by his messages. I have telegraphed him twice, giving such information as I thought pertinent. Hope you won't go forward without letting me get down.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Louisville, February 22, 1862.*

General THOMAS, *Bardstown:*

I am directed to urge you to use all possible dispatch in closing your division and preparing it for a rapid march.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Camp near Bardstown, Ky., February 22, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY, *Louisville, Ky.:*

I am using every exertion to concentrate my division at this point. It rained two days ago as I never saw it rain before. It has done the same to-day. Nevertheless I hope all the regiments will reach here to-morrow, except, perhaps, Colonel Fry's Fourth Kentucky, which

was left at Somerset to guard the public property until the arrival of Landram's regiment.

If forage is provided for me at New Haven by Monday, I can march my whole division to Munfordville close up by Wednesday afternoon.

GEO. H. THOMAS,

*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FOURTH DIVISION, ARMY OF THE OHIO,  
*Paducah, February 22, 1862.*

General HALLECK, &c., *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

SIR: Under orders from General Buell I came to this point with my division to report to you. Finding General Sherman here, I reported to him.

My division consists of the Tenth Brigade, Army of the Ohio, Col. J. Ammen, commanding: Twenty-fourth Ohio Volunteers, Fifty-first Ohio Volunteers, Thirty-sixth Indiana Volunteers, Thirty-fourth Indiana Volunteers. Nineteenth Brigade, Colonel Hazen, commanding: Forty-fifth Ohio Volunteers, Sixth Kentucky Volunteers, Forty-sixth Indiana Volunteers, Forty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, and the Sixth Ohio Volunteers, attached to Hazen's.

Two brigades of Brigadier-General Crittenden were also assigned to my command, and I was directed to ask they be reunited in my division.

General Crittenden is here, with one of his brigades, consisting of the Forty-second Indiana Volunteers, Forty-third Indiana Volunteers, Eleventh Kentucky Volunteers, Twenty-sixth Kentucky Volunteers, Colonel Jones, commanding. His other brigade is at Fort Donelson.

Immediately upon my arrival here four of these regiments, viz, Thirty-fourth, Forty-sixth, Forty-seventh Indiana, and the Forty-third Indiana, the first three from my division and the last one from Crittenden's, were ordered to Cairo.

I have the honor to request that these regiments be not taken from my division, but that, when the exigencies of the service will permit, they be sent back to me.

I have spent two months' hard labor getting the three regiments of mine that are at Cairo into condition, and now that I am moving into the presence of the enemy it is not pleasant to have them taken from me.

Very respectfully,

WM. NELSON,  
*Brigadier-General.*

P. S.—There are also attached to my division and with me here three batteries of artillery, under Major Race: Battery F, First Ohio Volunteers; Battery 10, Second Indiana Artillery; Battery 8, Second Indiana Artillery; also two companies of Indiana cavalry, commanded by Captain Klein.

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 8. }

HDQRS. DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, February 22, 1862.*

Col. M. D. Leggett, Seventy-eighth Ohio Volunteers, is appointed acting provost-marshal until a suitable person for the position can be designated, and will be obeyed and respected accordingly.

In all cases where it may be deemed necessary to refer to higher authority, Brig. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut, second in authority, will be appealed to.

Tennessee, by her rebellion, having ignored all laws of the United States, no courts will be allowed to sit under State authorities, but all cases coming within reach of the military arm will be adjudicated by the authorities the Government has established within the State.

Martial law is therefore declared to extend over West Tennessee. Whenever a sufficient number of the citizens of the State return to their allegiance to maintain law and order over this territory the military restriction here indicated will be removed.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 23 [21], 1862.*

E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War*:

One whole week has been lost already by hesitation and delay. There was, and I think there still is, a golden opportunity to strike a fatal blow, but I can't do it unless I can control Buell's army. I am perfectly willing to act as General McClellan dictates or to take any amount of responsibility. To succeed we must be prompt. I have explained everything to General McClellan and Assistant Secretary Scott. There is not a moment to be lost. Give me authority, and I will be responsible for results.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 23, 1862.*

Brigadier-General SHERMAN, *Paducah*:  
Flag-Officer FOOTE, *Cairo*:

All available gunboats to be sent to Clarksville, prepared for a movement up the Cumberland. I think mortar boats will be of little use on this expedition. If Commodore Foote agrees with me, let them be sent down for defense of Cairo. I am waiting for telegraphic line to be opened to Fort Henry, to communicate with General Grant. In the mean time tell him that I wish to have about 20,000 men concentrated at Clarksville, including Smith's and Nelson's divisions. Proper garrisons should be detailed for Forts Henry and Donelson. All other forces should be encamped opposite Danville bridge, to await further orders. Cavalry and field artillery to be ready to move between the two rivers. One gunboat to be stationed near Danville bridge. All others not required for defense of Cairo to be at Clarksville, ready for service. Abundant ammunition to be taken along. See to this. There is a great and decisive contest awaiting us. Be ready for it. Answer, and give all you know of present state of affairs. Encouraging news continually coming in from the Southwest.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*



THIRTY-SEVEN MILES FROM NASHVILLE,  
February 23, 1862.

Major-General McCLELLAN:

I have endeavored to keep you quite well informed of my plans and movements. Thomas' division was, as I previously informed you, on its way to Nashville, via Bardstown, that being the only practicable route; but in order to expedite its arrival on Cumberland River and in consequence of subsequent developments I ordered it on the 21st instant to proceed by forced marches to Louisville and embark. I have also ordered some other troops by the same route that could reach Nashville sooner that way than by the land. I am moving with one division (Mitchel's), without baggage, by forced marches, on Nashville. My pickets are now in front of the city, and but for the destruction of the railroad by the heavy rains I should have been there myself to-day with the advance. I expect to reach there to-morrow, and by Tuesday night or Wednesday expect to have the principal part of the division up. Two regiments here, unable to cross the river at Bowling Green in consequence of the flood.

My troops are moving forward everywhere as rapidly as possible. The arrival of a steamer at Bowling Green to-day will enable them to cross the river rapidly and come up to me soon. I would advise that positive instructions be given in regard to the disposition of General Halleck's troops until the work nearest at hand is disposed of. It appears pretty well established that the enemy have mostly retired from Nashville, with the determination of making a stand at Murfreesborough. They have burned the bridge at Nashville.

D. C. BUELL,  
Brigadier-General.

THIRTY-SIX MILES FROM NASHVILLE,  
February 23, 1862.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Nashville all right. Men wearied by excessive marching and toil.

Before Columbus or Memphis is struck the rebel army of over 40,000 men in Middle Tennessee should be crushed. To do this safely a little time must be given. Large detachments we believe, from rumors that reach us, have left Manassas; of the truth of which you of course know.

Generals Buell and Halleck can effect the capture or surrender of Columbus and Memphis as easily as they have secured the other important positions of the enemy. Give them help in the shape of good soldiers and you are certain to achieve great results.

THOMAS A. SCOTT,  
Assistant Secretary of War.

LOUISVILLE, February 23, 1862—2 a. m.

Major-General McCLELLAN, Washington:

General Buell telegraphs General Halleck that he will be opposite or near Nashville to-morrow night, and asks General Halleck to move up the river with his gunboats, but without exposing them unnecessarily. I don't know what force General Buell moves with, but presume it is Mitchel's and McCook's divisions. He has ordered forward Wood's

division and Boyle's and Bruce's brigades. Thomas' division from Bardstown comes to Louisville by forced marches. He should be here in two days, and will embark at once and proceed up the Cumberland. This puts the entire fighting force *en route* for Nashville. I will complete the arrangements and orders for Thomas' division this morning, and with the staff and outfit for the field will join General Buell. He gives me no information with reference to the enemy.

The work on the railroad is not completed, and the general sent to Louisville to-day for material for Barren River bridge. I presume he intends to transfer his operations from the Louisville line to the line of the Cumberland, striking the latter near Nashville instead of at Clarksville.

Thomas should join by the river in six days, provided he moves more rapidly than heretofore.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 23, 1862*—8 p. m.

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington:*

I have heard nothing from General Buell to-day.

The boats are coming in for Thomas' division. He will not be here until Tuesday. Have ordered him to embark Tuesday night. The staff, one company of cavalry, and two companies of Sixteenth United States Infantry move at 12 m. to-morrow on steamer Prioress; four companies of Eighteenth United States Infantry and two companies United States cavalry move at 8 a. m. to-morrow on steamer Fitzhugh. Three field and one rifle siege battery, being in addition to the batteries of divisions, go on board to-morrow. All these will precede Thomas' division, and hope to join General Buell on the Cumberland near Nashville in forty hours.

Railroad repairs between Cave City and Bowling Green progress slowly. It was promised a train should go to Barren River to-day; it cannot be done before Wednesday. Telegraph through to Bowling Green.

One regiment here *en route* to General Halleck, and another coming down between here and Cincinnati.

Captain Greene, assistant adjutant-general, with department records, remains in Louisville.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 23, 1862.*

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

General Buell wants boats to transport a large division up the Cumberland River. Send all the large Ohio River boats from Cairo, Paducah, and Smithland to Louisville, so that they will reach here to-morrow night. Our large boats are all down the river, and we can't move till they come up.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI

*Saint Louis, February 23, 1862.*J. B. FRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General, Louisville, Ky.:*

I cannot understand how you can want boats sent to Louisville to transport troops up the Cumberland. We have no transports to spare. On the contrary, I have asked Assistant Secretary Scott to send down all he can spare from the Ohio.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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CAIRO, *February 23, 1862.*

General BUELL:

Just returned from an armed reconnaissance of Columbus, which is not evacuated. Was within less than 2 miles of river batteries.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,

*Louisville, Ky., February 23, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. GEORGE H. THOMAS,  
*Commanding First Division:*

SIR: The general commanding the department directs that your division move to Louisville by forced marches and embark without delay for the Cumberland River. Colonel Swords, assistant quartermaster-general, is instructed to have boats in readiness for you.

The general directs that you embark your division and form a junction with him near Nashville with all possible dispatch. He is moving by forced marches from Bowling Green.

Major-General Halleck has been requested to send the gunboats up the Cumberland in advance of your arrival, so as to render the river secure. It would be well for you to inform yourself at Fort Donelson and Clarksville in relation to the whereabouts and movements of the gunboats. As the enemy has abandoned Clarksville, it is presumed he has gone to Nashville, and that the river is open to the vicinity of that city. Supplies have been ordered to be put on board your transports.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

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## HEADQUARTERS,

*Louisville, February 23, 1862—10 o'clock.*General THOMAS, *Bardstown:*

Have you received my telegraph of 22d to move to Louisville by forced march? When will you be here? Answer. Let the First Ohio Cavalry come through at once and get aboard.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*



HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, DEPT. OF THE OHIO,  
*Camp near Bardstown, Ky., February 23, 1862—12 m.*

Capt. J. B. FRY, *Louisville, Ky.:*

I have just received your telegram. I will send orders to the First Ohio Cavalry immediately. I will move to-morrow morning, and if the roads are in good order hope to be in Louisville Tuesday by noon, with the whole of my division except Colonel Fry's regiment, which remained at Somerset as a guard, and has not yet got up. He will probably arrive on Wednesday.

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding U. S. Volunteers.*

FEBRUARY 23-25.

*Col. J. Ammen's diary of movement from Paducah, Ky., to Nashville, Tenn.*

[Extracts.]

*February 23.*—Our fleet [at Paducah] has orders to raise steam to follow the Diana, the flag-boat and headquarters of General Nelson; destination not named. Eight a. m. the Diana starts up the Ohio; the other boats follow at intervals. Diana steams up the Cumberland; other boats follow; and now we conclude that this division is bound for Tennessee—Nashville, &c. Pass Fort Donelson in the night; do not stop.

Land at Clarksville, Tenn., about 8 a. m., 24th. Call on my old friend and brave soldier General C. F. Smith, who is in command at Clarksville. In 1837 we were stationed at the same post, lieutenants U. S. Artillery, and have not met since that time until this morning. We both forgot that we are growing old, and met as young lieutenants of the Regular Army.

*February 24.*—About noon the Diana steamed up the Cumberland, and the Woodward followed near; the other boats started in turn. The river is high, the night dark, and the rebels may have batteries on the banks as they had below. We proceed slowly and with caution; one gunboat in advance, just before the Diana. The boats run against the trees in the dark; no serious injury. On we go, and would not be surprised to receive a shot from shore.

*February 25.*—Dawn; something like a battery on the bank a mile or more up the river is observed. The Woodward is signaled to come up to the Diana. General Nelson orders me to land with some companies and make a reconnaissance. When we reached the battery (Fort Zollicoffer, 5 miles below Nashville) the rebels had deserted the place. The fires had not yet completed their work of burning gun-carriages, &c. Twelve large cannon dismounted; four 6-pounders, all spiked; cannon-balls and shells in large quantities and railroad iron; fort leveled. After this examination we proceeded to the city and the Tenth Brigade took position on the public square. General Nelson crossed the river to meet General Buell, Mitchel, &c., and remained absent until towards evening. I was the senior officer in Nashville.

About noon the mayor, &c., called on me to furnish them a pass to General Buell, to enable them to ask for terms of surrender. The rebel forces retired as we entered Nashville. Some of our troops occupied

position; on the suburbs. During the day many persons called on me and professed that they always had been Union men; told who were rebels, &c.; mutually accused each other; and some informed me where Confederate provisions and clothing had been stored. The places were examined, and tons of salt pork were found, flour, forage, &c., but not much clothing. The manufactory for small-arms and the material in the building were taken possession of.

In the evening we marched to a large spring near the Fair Grounds, east side of the city. Troops are crossing the river and taking position on the different roads. There are some good Union men, but many more rebels; not a few that were pressed into the rebel service, as they claim. Hard to believe all they say.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 24, 1862.*

E. M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War, Washington:*

If it is thought that the present arrangement is best for the public service, I have nothing to say. I have done my duty in making the suggestions, and leave it to my superiors to adopt or reject them.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, *February 24, 1862—9 a. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN:

Barren and Green Rivers very high. Boats up to Bowling Green this morning. Telegrams from Bowling Green, from which I learn that General Buell has only General Mitchel's division with him.

McCook finds difficulty in crossing Barren River on account of the high water. Have no reliable news whatever from the enemy.

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

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WASHINGTON, *February 24, 1862—9.30 a. m.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville, Ky.:*

I have requested Halleck to give you all the aid in his power in your operations on Nashville. When we have gained that, where will enemy make his next stand? The possession of railway junctions near Chattanooga would seem to be of next importance. Decatur can probably best be taken by moving up Tennessee River. After we have gained Nashville and can see our way to holding Chattanooga we must get possession of Columbus and Memphis. Cannot Garfield reach the Virginia and Tennessee Railway near Abingdon? We must not lose sight of Eastern Tennessee. Communicate frequently.

GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, February 24, 1862—9.30 a. m.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis*:

General Cullum's telegram in regard to reconnaissance of Columbus received. Buell will be in front of Nashville to-morrow evening. Best co-operate with him to the full extent of your power, to secure Nashville beyond a doubt; then by a combined movement of troops and gunboats seize Decatur. Buell will be directed to occupy and hold in force the railroad junctions in vicinity of Chattanooga and to re-establish the railroads from Nashville to Decatur and Stevenson. This will very nearly isolate A. S. Johnston from Richmond.

The next move should be either a direct march in force upon the rear of Memphis or else first upon the communications and rear of Columbus, depending entirely on the strength and movements of the rebels. In the mean time it would be well to amuse the garrison of Columbus with our mortar boats as soon as a sufficient number of them can be spared, with gunboats, from the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers.

The early possession of Humboldt in force is of importance, but should not be undertaken until Nashville is securely ours.

The possession of Grand Junction will complete the isolation of the rebels. It may be better to occupy Corinth instead of Decatur after Chattanooga is firmly in our possession. Please communicate fully and frequently.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 24, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill.*:

The reason that Cairo has no blanks is that no requisitions have been made. There is a screw loose in that command. It had better be fixed pretty soon, or the command will hear from me. Nashville has been abandoned. General Buell marches in this afternoon without opposition. This enables me to withdraw my column from the Cumberland. I was holding the Cumberland forces to await Buell's movements. All O. K.; and now for a decisive movement. Tell Flag-Officer Foote not to move till I give him further orders. The sending of steamers to General Buell was all wrong. It disconcerted my plans. You should not have done it without my orders. If you can stop them by telegraph, do so, and order them to rendezvous at Paducah. You are too fast at Cairo. Consult me before you order any other movement. I have held everything in check till I could have positive information about the abandonment of Nashville. It is now certain.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION,  
*Steamer Diana, February 24, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *U. S. Volunteers*:

GENERAL: I have the honor to inclose the consolidated morning report of Fourth Division, Army of the Department of the Ohio, for February 2, 1862.



Since this report was made the remaining three companies of the Thirty-fourth Indiana and the remaining three companies of the Forty-sixth Indiana have left the division for Cairo. Four regiments of this division have been detached for duty at Cairo.

The aggregate of infantry present with the division is now 5,947.

I have the honor to inclose a report of the ammunition, &c., with the division.

This report does not include the ammunition train which went to Cairo on boat with troops and has not yet been allowed to return. The circumstances are fully set forth in an accompanying letter.

I have the honor also to inclose lists of the officers under my command.\*

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. NELSON,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,

*Fort Donelson, February 24, 1862.*

General G. W. CULLUM,

*Chief of Staff, Department of the Missouri, Cairo, Ill.:*

GENERAL: Inclosed I send you a dispatch from General Buell, sent through to Clarksville yesterday.† As requested, the gunboats have gone up to Nashville. The mortar boats I am sending back to Cairo, because it would be with great difficulty they could be got to Nashville and could be of no service there. Yesterday a steamer was down from Nashville with quite a delegation of the citizens. Their ostensible object was to bring surgeons to attend their wounded at Clarksville—real object, probably, to have some assurance that their property would be protected. Johnston, with his army, has fallen back to Murfreesborough, first destroying all bridges, commissary stores, and such artillery as could not be carried along. The troops wanted to destroy the city, but were restrained by the citizens and a speech from Pillow.

I have just returned from Clarksville, where I arrived last evening some hours after the departure of the Nashville delegation and gunboat Cairo. General Nelson reported to-day with his division. I forwarded them immediately to Nashville, with verbal instructions, to have the men under wholesome restraint, and written instructions, a copy of which is herewith accompanying.

I have only sent four small regiments to Clarksville, and do not propose sending more until I know the pleasure of General Halleck on the subject. A large garrison is not required.

General C. F. Smith is in command at Clarksville.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,

*Fort Donelson, February 24, 1862.*

General NELSON,

*Commanding Division, Department of the Ohio:*

GENERAL: You will proceed with the division under your command to Nashville, Tenn., keeping in rear of the gunboat Carondelet with all your transports.

\* No inclosures found.

† Not found.

From Nashville you will put yourself in immediate communication with General Buell, and if you find that his command is not within two days' march of you, your command will not debark, but fall back down the river some miles on the transports, and remain to form a junction with General Buell when he does arrive.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Brownlow, Piketon, Ky., February 24, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

DEAR SIR: I arrived here on the 22d instant, having already sent forward the Twenty-second Kentucky, the Fortieth Ohio, most of the Forty-second Ohio, and one company of McLaughlin's squadron of cavalry. The other company of the squadron is water-bound at Prestonburg.

The river was already swollen by the recent rains, and on the morning of the 22d the rain began to fall in torrents and continued all day. Toward evening the river began to rise with great rapidity.

During the night we moved our stores to the highest point in the village. By daylight of the next morning the river had risen nearly 60 feet from its lowest water-mark. Two steamers were riding in the principal streets. The river was rushing with fearful current over the whole village. Our losses have been very serious. The tents and camp equipage of the Fortieth Ohio were nearly all submerged, and many were swept away. A very large quantity of commissary and quartermaster stores were lost and much that was saved was seriously damaged. The citizens here have suffered fearfully.

The steam saw-mill and flour-mill in this place, the only one in the county, was carried away, and I am supplying from the Government stores the few families until they can fall back upon the charities of their neighbors. We have large quantities of stores at Paintville and Louisa, which I fear also have suffered injury. I greatly regret that the Government has suffered the loss of any property in my charge, but I am sure that no ordinary foresight could have provided against it in this instance.

Our stores were 10 feet above the highest floods of the season before we moved them.

Thirty-five years ago the water rose into the village, which was the highest rise ever known in this valley. This flood was several feet higher.

We are now saving all we can from the devastation as the water goes down and are endeavoring to ascertain the extent of our loss.

Colonel Marshall's regiment has reached Ashland, and will move up the river as soon as the water will permit.

On the approach of the brigade to this point the remnant of Marshall's force is reported to have evacuated Whitesburg and retreated through Sounding Gap. There is said to be a considerable force now there on the summit of the Cumberland, where they have fortified themselves.

As soon as I can retrieve our losses by the flood I shall send forward a corps of observation.

Our scouts have already been forward 48 miles and find no enemy. I have left the Fourteenth Kentucky at Paintville to guard stores and protect our communication with the Ohio.

The acting brigade quartermaster is greatly in need of funds. His requisitions were sent to headquarters several weeks ago, but he has not yet received a remittance.

Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

FEBRUARY 25, 1862—4 p. m.

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,  
*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville:*

If it is true that the rebels have abandoned Nashville and have fallen back on Murfreesborough to make a stand, it will be necessary to make our next movement with great caution. Give me the number of troops you can concentrate on Murfreesborough, independently of Halleck's troops. This is necessary, that I may be able to arrange that co-operation between Halleck's troops and your own that is absolutely necessary to insure ultimate success. In this statement give number of guns and cavalry. By all means take steps to hold Nashville securely. What have you from the Knoxville column? I hope soon to hear that it has reached the railroad. Can Garfield also reach the railroad? How long will it take you to be in front of Murfreesborough with all your available force?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

FEBRUARY 25, 1862—4 p. m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

If it is true that the rebels have evacuated Nashville and intend fighting at Murfreesborough, our next movement must be made cautiously. Give me the number of your troops available on that line, independently of any of Buell's troops, stating number of guns and cavalry. Until I receive this statement I cannot decide whether we should turn Murfreesborough by line of Tennessee River or whether we can undertake that simultaneously with a movement to turn Columbus and seize Memphis.

For how long can we count upon the use of the Tennessee River for our gunboats?

I think our mortar boats, well protected by gunboats, should begin to annoy Columbus just as soon as we are ready to advance again. What information have you about Randolph or any other fortified points between Columbus and Memphis?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 25—8 p. m.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

I learn from telegraph of Commodore Foote to the Navy Department that you have ordered that no gunboats go above Nashville. I think



it may greatly facilitate Buell's operations to send a couple, at least, of the lighter ones to Nashville. Captain Maynadier, Tenth Infantry, will be ordered to Commodore Foote, at his request, as his ordnance officer for mortar boats.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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CAIRO, ILL., *February 25, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

If we send four gunboats up the rivers Tennessee and Cumberland, as you direct, and having two to repair, extensively, on the ways, at Mound City, and the Benton not being ready before next week, this, superadded to the rebels planting guns to bear on the mortar boats, if we should shell them now, before the final attack, would seem to render it impracticable to do anything until next week. The new and bad men sent us from the East, with the crippled condition of the gunboats, also render an earlier attack or even demonstration on Columbus, in my judgment, injudicious.

A. H. FOOTE,  
*Flag-Officer.*

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PADUCAH, *February 25, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

Colonel Callender passed down without my seeing him. There are eight unarmed Ohio regiments here. Expect General Sherman back this evening. Have sent your telegraphs to General Grant by steamer Hastings an hour ago, and as well by Conestoga this moment. All fleeing from Weakley County, Tennessee, to escape impressment. Since Governor's message 17 have arrived in Mayfield to-day, making their way to Paducah. They say there are 1,200 Union men in that county. The cavalry force burned everything at Camp Beauregard—private houses as well as their own huts. The trees are all felled across Blandville road, but the bridge is left for their own convenience. They are destroyed on all the other roads. The cars run down to the end of the road, but they blew up the locomotives.

D. STUART,  
*Colonel, Commanding.*

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CAIRO, *February 25, 1862.*

General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

SIR: Our telegraphic wires being down, and being possessed of Memphis papers of the 18th, announcing in emphatic terms an intention to evacuate Columbus, I came down to see General Cullum, that the place should be so watched as to prevent the removal of their heavy ordnance.

I herewith send you these papers, which I had given to Colonel Thom, who was to have gone up this morning, but did not get off. I think these papers will convince you that the intention to evacuate Columbus has been made public. My scouting party went to Mayfield, Milburn, and some 5 miles towards Columbus. At Milburn they encountered a

scout of 15 cavalry, who fled towards Columbus. They heard that a cavalry force was between Milburn and Columbus about 2,000 strong. A man was employed to go into Columbus and to meet a messenger from Paducah to-morrow night. Lieutenant-Colonel Hogg, of the Second Illinois, who commanded the party, is certain that by to-morrow night he will have positive information from Columbus.

I send these papers, that you may adopt such measure as you may think proper to prevent the removal of the guns at Columbus. The road between Paducah and Columbus is very bad, the valley of Mayfield Creek being flooded and bridges destroyed. The Paducah Railroad is destroyed below Little Obion River.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

CAIRO, February 25, 1862.

General HALLECK:

I start for Paducah. I send important newspapers from Memphis by Colonel Thom. On consultation with General Cullum, I shall stop all troops coming down the Ohio at Paducah. Shall proceed to brigade the regiments. My opinion is that General Polk has ordered the evacuation of Columbus, but he is figuring to save his guns. Can anything be done to prevent the removal of the guns by threatening the railroad to his rear in force?

Can you order Captain Dodds, quartermaster at Benton Barracks, to Paducah?

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, February 25, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill.:*

I wrote you that General Nelson's division had been sent to Nashville. Since that I have learned that the head of General Buell's column arrived there on Monday evening. The rebels have fallen back to Chattanooga, instead of Murfreesborough, as stated in a former letter. I shall go to Nashville immediately after the arrival of the next mail, should there be no orders to prevent it.

The soldiers of the Eighth Missouri Volunteers who were disguised and sent to Memphis have just returned. They went by the way of Nashville and Decatur. Saw Beauregard at Decatur sick; he has since gone to Columbus. They were in Fort Donelson before the attack commenced, and say the force was estimated at 40,000.

Since the battle the people through the country are much disposed to return to their allegiance. Orders have been given for the evacuation of Columbus. This I learn not only from the men themselves, but from Memphis papers which they bring with them. I send two of these papers to General Halleck. I am growing anxious to know what the next move is going to be. The Southern papers advise the Columbus forces to fall back on Island No. 10 and to Fort Pillow. The force at Memphis is said to be about 12,000.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, February 25, 1862.*

General WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding District of Cairo, Paducah, Ky.:*

Your letter of the 23d,\* asking what disposition I will have made of large re-enforcements now on their way, is just received. I do not know what work General Halleck intends me to do next, therefore cannot say where it is best to have them. Probably they had better remain at Paducah until further orders are received from headquarters of the department.

Our troops are now occupying Nashville. The rebels have fallen back to Chattanooga, only 3 miles from Georgia State line.

Two soldiers from the Eighth Missouri Regiment, who were sent as spies, have just returned from Memphis. They describe the feelings of the people as much inclined to return to their allegiance.

Orders have been given for the evacuation of Columbus. This I get not only from the men themselves, but from a Memphis paper of the 19th, which they bring with them.

There is a detachment of troops belonging to my command at Henderson, Ky., which there can be no further use of detaining there. If you have an opportunity of having them transported, I would like them to join their regiments.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
 No. 12. } *Fort Donelson, February 25, 1862.*

Soldiers are positively forbid going beyond the line of sentinels outside the intrenchments.

The general commanding is again obliged to call the attention of division, brigade, and regimental commanders to orders restraining their men from committing depredations upon private property.

Such restrictions must be placed upon the actions of the men of this command as to prevent complaints in future of their killing stock or depredating in any manner.

By order of Brigadier-General Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *February 25, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo*, and  
 Brig. Gen. WILLIAM T. SHERMAN,  
*Commanding District of Cairo, Paducah, Ky.:*

The possession of Nashville by General Buell renders it necessary to countermand the order sent to Foote and Sherman yesterday morning, dated 23d. Grant will send no more troops to Clarksville. General Smith's division will come to Fort Henry or a point higher up on the Tennessee River. Transports will also be collected at Paducah and above. All the mortar boats to be immediately brought back to Cairo.

\* Not found.



Two gunboats to be left on the Cumberland, at Clarksville, to precede Nelson's division up the river to Nashville. Having done this, they will return to Cairo. Two gunboats in Tennessee River with General Grant. The latter will immediately have small garrisons detailed for Forts Donelson and Henry and all other forces made ready for the field.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

(Copy to General Grant from General Sherman.)

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 26, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill.:*

Send to Paducah transports sufficient to move Grant's army up either the Cumberland or Tennessee. Accounts of Johnston's movements are very conflicting, and we must be ready for any contingency. As soon as we know positively where he is a movement will be made. Extend the railroad to Bertrand and a wagon road to Sikesville [Sikeston]. General Pope was to occupy the latter place to-day.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
No. 14. } *Fort Donelson, February 26, 1862.*

General Orders, No. 3, of the series of 1861, from headquarters Department of the Missouri, are still in force, and must be observed.

The number of citizens who are applying for permission to pass through the camps to look for their fugitive slaves proves the necessity of the order and its faithful observance. Such permits cannot be granted; therefore the great necessity of keeping out fugitives. Such slaves as were within the lines at the time of the capture of Fort Donelson and such as have been used by the enemy in building the fortifications, or in any way hostile to the Government, will not be released or permitted to return to their masters, but will be employed in the quartermaster's department, for the benefit of Government.

All officers and companies now keeping slaves so captured will immediately report them to the district quartermaster. Regimental commanders will be held accountable for all violations of this order within their respective commands.

By order of Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 26, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

I entered Nashville yesterday with a small force. It is insufficient, the enemy being only 30 miles distant, in greatly superior numbers; but I was compelled to it by the landing of a portion of the troops, contrary to my intentions. I have sent steamers to bring up the troops at

Clarksville, deeming it of vital importance that we should be re-enforced at an earlier day than my own troops can arrive. Steamers coming up should bring a full supply of fuel. None can be had on the river or here. Please let me know at once what your information is of the movements of the enemy. It is stated, on seemingly good authority, that the enemy has evacuated Columbus or is doing so.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 13a. }

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Nashville, Tenn., February 26, 1862.*

The general commanding congratulates his troops that it has been their privilege to restore the national banner to the capital of Tennessee. He believes that thousands of hearts in every part of the State will swell with joy to see that honored flag reinstated in a position from which it was removed in the excitement and folly of an evil hour; that the voice of her own people will soon proclaim its welcome, and that their manhood and patriotism will protect and perpetuate it.

The general does not deem it necessary, though the occasion is a fit one, to remind his troops of the rule of conduct they have hitherto observed and are still to pursue. We are in arms, not for the purpose of invading the rights of our fellow-countrymen anywhere, but to maintain the integrity of the Union and protect the Constitution under which its people have been prosperous and happy. We cannot, therefore, look with indifference on any conduct which is designed to give aid and comfort to those who are endeavoring to defeat these objects; but the action to be taken in such cases rests with certain authorized persons, and is not to be assumed by individual officers or soldiers. Peaceable citizens are not to be molested in their persons or property. Any wrongs to either are to be promptly corrected and the offenders brought to punishment. To this end all persons are desired to make complaint to the immediate commander of officers or soldiers so offending, and if justice be not done promptly, then to the next commander, and so on until the wrong is redressed. If the necessities of the public service should require the use of private property for public purposes, fair compensation is to be allowed. No such appropriation of private property is to be made except by the authority of the highest commander present, and any other officer or soldier who shall presume to exercise such privilege shall be brought to trial. Soldiers are forbidden to enter the residences or grounds of citizens on any plea without authority.

No arrests are to be made without the authority of the commanding general, except in case of actual offense against the authority of the Government; and in all such cases the fact and circumstances will immediately be reported in writing to headquarters through the intermediate commanders.

The general reminds his officers that the most frequent depredations are those which are committed by worthless characters, who straggle from the ranks on the plea of being unable to march; and where the inability really exists, it will be found in most instances that the soldier has overloaded himself with useless and unauthorized articles. The orders already published on this subject must be enforced.

The condition and behavior of a corps are sure indications of the efficiency and fitness of its officers. If any regiment shall be found to disregard that propriety of conduct which belongs to soldiers as well as

citizens, they must not expect to occupy the posts of honor, but may rest assured that they will be placed in positions where they cannot bring shame on their comrades and the cause they are engaged in. The Government supplies with liberality all the wants of the soldier. The occasional deprivations and hardships incident to rapid marches must be borne with patience and fortitude. Any officer who neglects to provide properly for his troops or separates himself from them to seek his own comfort will be held to a rigid accountability.

By command of General Buell:

JAMES B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 27, 1862.*

Brigadier-General SHERMAN, *Paducah*:

I want transports enough in readiness to move General Grant's available forces. I am only waiting to learn the positions of Buell and Johnston. Take forcibly, if necessary.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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PADUCAH, *February 27, 1862.*

General HALLECK:

There is no doubt Buell is at Nashville. It is reported that Sidney Johnston has moved towards Chattanooga. Columbus is still occupied by General Polk. Beauregard at Jackson, Tenn., sick. I have telegraphed to General Cullum for ten boats, and will stop those best adapted to the service till I have in all twenty boats. Ought they not be loaded in part with provisions and forage? I estimate Grant's force at 25,000 men.

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Nashville, February 27, 1862.*

General D. C. BUELL,  
*Commanding Department of the Ohio*:

I have been in the city since an early hour this morning, anxious and expecting to see you. When I first arrived I understood that you were to be over to-day, but it is now growing too late for me to remain longer.

If I could see the necessity of more troops here I would be most happy to supply them. My own impression is, however, that the enemy are not far north of the Tennessee line. I was anxious to know what information you might have on the subject.

General Smith will be here this evening, with probably 2,000 men, as requested by you, and should still more be required, address me at Clarksville. To-night I shall return to Fort Donelson, but will take up my headquarters at Clarksville the next day.

Should you deem the command under General Smith unnecessary to your security, I request that they be ordered back.



I am in daily expectation of orders that will require all my available force.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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NASHVILLE, *February 28, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

By means of the steamers which were got above the broken lock on Green River a bridge has been established at Bowling Green, which will enable the troops to pass without detention, and we shall soon be here in force. McCook's division will begin to reach the Cumberland to-morrow. General Wood's division will be up as fast as we can cross them. Thomas' division, coming up the Cumberland, will, I think, begin to arrive to-night. Our transportation is coming partly by land and partly by water. It will not get up as soon as the troops. Our outposts are some 10 miles out on the Murfreesborough road.

I have a report to-day that the enemy is retreating toward the Tennessee. I shall advance as soon as we can move. In the mean time will determine the manner and direction. It is stated to me quite confidentially that Columbus is being evacuated and the enemy concentrating in the direction of Chattanooga, but I have no means of verifying it.

I have reason to hope that a great change will take place speedily in the attitude of the Tennesseans, in both the manner of the military and political policy to be observed. As a matter of great importance and delicacy, I would advise you to use all the means you have to induce the President to pursue a lenient course, and as far as possible to reconstruct the machinery of the General Government out of material here, of which an abundance can be found that is truly loyal, though for some time overpowered and silenced. Deference to the recommendations of the most reliable Union people here would be advisable.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 28, 1862—9 a. m.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Nashville:*

Nelson's division and two gunboats were ordered up from Clarksville some days ago, and I think they must now be with you. I will immediately order another division. One gunboat should be sent back to escort it up the river. Columbus is not evacuated. It has been re-enforced. They are mounting more guns there and on Island No. 10. I am now turning it by New Madrid. Yours of the 26th just received.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 28, 1862—9.30 a. m.*

Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington:*

I have just received the first dispatch from General Buell for a whole week. It was dated the 26th, saying that he occupied Nashville on the

25th. Two gunboats and Nelson's division have probably reached him by this time. I will send Crittenden's division as soon as a gunboat returns to escort it. Had I not better immediately move General Grant, with cavalry and light artillery, up the Tennessee, and endeavor to destroy the railroad connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt? I require very little cavalry and light artillery for Pope's expedition. They can be easily spared. I have transports all ready at Paducah.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

The enemy is mounting additional guns at Columbus and is fortifying Island No. 10.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Nashville, Tenn., February 28, 1862.*

Mr. A. H. MARKLAND,  
*Special Mail Agent:*

SIR: I am directed by the general commanding to request that you will at once take charge of the post office in this city, and take such means as will open the mails at the earliest possible moment.

Very respectfully,

J. M. WRIGHT,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington City, February 28, 1862.*

To the PRESIDENT:

SIR: I have thought much lately upon the results of our experimental gunboats on the Western rivers. They have done even better than I had hoped, and it appears to me that the experience thus far gained may be made available for important operations.

I have a letter from Mr. Theodore Adams, builder of the Essex and of the mortar boats. I requested him at Cairo to examine the gunboats returned from Fort Donelson, and inquire particularly as to the effect of the fire of the batteries upon the iron plating.

From the newspaper reports and from a letter of Captain Wise, the quartermaster of the Flotilla, and from Mr. Adams' letter, I reached the following conclusions:

The only guns used in these river attacks are the bow guns.

The broadside guns are serviceable as a reserve to replace a disabled bow gun, as in case of the bursting of a rifle on the Carondelet.

No shot heavier than a 32-pounder ball, except a 64-pounder rifle shell, struck the iron plating of the forward bulkhead, which is inclined at an angle of 45 degrees.

The only effect of the shots which did strike the iron plating was to dent it and glance off without injury.

The 64-pounder rifle shell which wounded Captain Foote and killed a pilot passed through the pilot-house, which it struck at a high angle, and which was sheathed with iron only  $1\frac{1}{2}$  inches thick.

The Essex is sheathed on the broadside with  $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch iron only, on heavy timber. Keeping bows on to the battery, the shot which struck

her sides struck of course obliquely and then glanced off without penetrating the  $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch plate.

Should a vessel intended to work in a rapid river, stream, or tide-way be repulsed, she can back out, as the gunboats disabled at Fort Donelson did, still exposing only her bows.

I infer from these results that a boat constructed as sketched below would be very powerful, sufficiently protected, and, drawing little water, able, taking advantage of the tides, to pass through the inland passages on the Southern coast from Fernandina to Charleston, and that three of them, mounting, say, four bow guns each, to be 11-inch, 10-inch shell guns or heavy rifles, old 32 or 42 pounder rifled, would give a battery of 12 guns, able to meet and destroy any hastily-erected battery on the low shores of the Southern inlets; drawing only  $3\frac{1}{2}$  to 4 feet of water, able to visit every town on the coast intersected by an inlet not absolutely bare at half tide.

The 11-inch shells are a most powerful engine of destruction for close quarters, at which these vessels would terminate their fight, but the rifled 32 and 42 pounder shells have a penetrating power enabling them to pass through parapets of light earth of the thickness ordinarily used, and an accuracy of fire enabling them to be thrown into the wide-mouthed embrasures of any earthen battery.

These boats are supposed to be sheathed on the bow, which can be struck only very obliquely, with  $1\frac{1}{2}$ -inch iron or with iron bars, while the bulkhead covering their batteries is of  $2\frac{1}{2}$ -inch iron, as used on the Western rivers. No other armor is necessary.

The weight borne at the widest part of the boats is not very great, and by being well braced, the length can be made sufficient to give buoyancy and preserve a light draught.

There is, if I read the Coast Survey map aright, a channel through which such boats could, removing obstructions, pass into Charleston Harbor above Fort Sumter, and a threat to lay Charleston in ashes would probably procure the evacuation of Sumter, certainly that of Charleston and the blockade of Sumter.

I have spoken with the Secretary of the Navy on this subject, and he authorized me to speak to you about it.

The Western rolling-mills have now practice in preparing this iron, its simple form enabling them to prepare it rapidly and cheaply.

The frames of the vessels could be made in New York and shipped thence. The engines for at least one of them can be bought ready-made, I understand, in Saint Louis, and with proper energy, from the day the plans are completed and the order given, I think that in forty days one at least of these vessels could be afloat at Port Royal.

They should be built at some convenient point in Port Royal Harbor, perhaps at Hilton Head or Beaufort. There is, I believe, inland navigation practicable for them from Charleston to Fernandina, and with favorable weather they could probably finish their cruise in the Saint John's, having taken Fernandina and Jacksonville, Fla.

I respectfully advise the immediate construction of three or four such vessels at Port Royal.

The appropriation for gunboats under the Quartermaster's Department is confined to the Western rivers.

I submit a very hasty sketch of the general plan proposed.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. C. MEIGS,  
*Quartermaster-General, U. S. Army.*



SAINT LOUIS, *March 1, 1862.*Maj. Gen. U. S. GRANT, *Fort Henry:*

Transports will be sent to you as soon as possible to move your column up the Tennessee River. The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that these objects be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments of cavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid movements reach these points from the river without very serious opposition. Avoid any general engagement with strong forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle. This should be strongly impressed upon the officers sent with the expedition from the river. General C. F. Smith, or some very discreet officer, should be selected for such command.

Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as may be practicable, you will return to Danville and move on Paris. Perhaps the troops sent to Jackson and Humboldt can reach Paris as easily by land as to return to the transports. This must depend on the character of the roads and the position of the enemy. All telegraph lines which can be reached must be cut.

The gunboats will accompany the transports for their protection. Any loyal Tennesseans who desire it may be enlisted and supplied with arms.

Competent officers should be left to command the garrisons of Forts Henry and Donelson in your absence. I have indicated in general terms the object of this.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, March 1, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo, Ill.:*

Siege guns and mortars should be sent to Pope by best route. Who sent Smith's division to Nashville? I ordered them across to the Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately. Order them back. What is the reason that no one down there can obey my orders? Send all spare transports to General Grant up the Tennessee.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, March 1, 1862.*

Capt. J. C. KELTON, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

I have informed the general commanding department (generally through the chief of staff) every day since leaving Cairo of my wants, what information was obtained of the movements of the enemy, &c. I will now recapitulate partly my wants. When I left Cairo, for the want of transportation it took two trips of the boats at hand to move the troops, leaving the cavalry to march, and leaving behind all the regimental train but four wagons to each regiment. A number of the regiments sent to re-enforce me came without wagons. Since getting into Fort Donelson I have written to have the wagons left forwarded. None of them have as yet come—I think none. As I have no quartermaster

to look out for these matters, I might be mistaken partly. My command is now suffering from camp dysentery, the result (according to report of surgeons) of being compelled to live on salt meat. I have had this country scoured for miles for beef cattle, but without being able to obtain them. The contractors for supplying fresh beef say that they have the cattle, but are unable to procure transportation. If I am compelled to move suddenly, it will be with a very weak force compared with what the major-general commanding probably expects. The loss in battle and the number who have sickened since reduces my force considerably. I will probably have to leave a garrison at Clarksville, Fort Henry, and at this place.

General Buell ordered General Smith, with the force at Clarksville (five regiments of infantry and some artillery), to join his column at Nashville. Two regiments that were sent as a guard to the prisoners have not yet been returned to me.

I most respectfully lay these matters before the general commanding the department, not to make suggestions, but that my true condition may be known.

There are now two or three cases of small-pox among the men. Every effort has been made to prevent the spread of the disease.

U. S. GRANT,  
*Brigadier-General.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *March 1, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

I am now in sufficient force to feel secure, and this morning sent General Smith back to Clarksville. Thank you for your readiness to assist me. General Johnston is evidently preparing to go towards the Tennessee. Decatur and Chattanooga seem to be the points of rendezvous at present. As soon as I can see my way a little I will propose that we meet somewhere to consult, if agreeable to you.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

CAIRO, *March 1, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Captain Phelps reports Columbus being evacuated now; guns, except from water battery, removed; quarters burned. Large force of cavalry but no infantry visible. Encampment seen Tuesday on bluff gone. Columbus on fire, and stores probably being destroyed. Polk did not send ladies, but proposes sending flag to some point to-morrow at 12 o'clock. Foote will make demonstration to-morrow or Monday.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General.*

NASHVILLE, *March 1, 1862.*

General MITCHEL:

SIR: The general commanding has received your letter of this morning reporting that Captain Wilson, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, was shot while on outpost duty last night. The occurrence and the loss to your command are much regretted. The general suggests that your officers on outpost duty should be cautious and watchful and not expose themselves by becoming separated from their commands and thus render the

murdering of individuals, either by citizens or the enemy, impossible, or at least more difficult.

I am also directed to say that the general is not at this time prepared for a forward movement, and he does not wish you at present to commence it.

It is not deemed advisable at present to administer the oath of allegiance or to arrest persons whose loyalty is only doubtful. The general desires the protection of our forces to be extended with some liberality, and to reach a class of persons who are not hostile to us although not warmly our friends. This, of course, is not applicable to those in arms or who are known to give aid and comfort to the enemy.

The carbines for the Fourth Ohio Cavalry will be furnished as soon as practicable.

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

[JAMES B. FRY,]

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff.*

SAINT LOUIS, *March 2, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL, *Nashville, Tenn.:*

Columbus is nearly turned. The mortar boats will bombard it this afternoon, and General Pope will attack New Madrid to-morrow morning. A part of Jeff. Thompson's force has been captured. Send to Paducah all spare transports; we are greatly in need of them; also one or two of the gunboats. Keep one gunboat in the Cumberland. I will make an appointment to meet you as soon as the Columbus movement is ended.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

CAIRO, *March 2, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

Grant writes from Fort Donelson on 28th just returned from Nashville. Supposed him and army yet at Donelson. Buell ordered Smith's division from Clarksville to Nashville. Sending steamers to report to Sherman to go farther.

Ought they not to go up Cumberland for Grant, and cannot the twenty-five steamers which went up Cumberland yesterday with Buell's forces assist to bring back Grant and thence up Tennessee? Can be done in less time than marching across.

Island and head of promontory opposite New Madrid low and overflowed.

Will it then be necessary to send siege artillery, which will take, Lyford says, a week to get ready, with horses, harness, and ammunition wagons? Must have ten horses for each piece and move slow.

Can't send it to Sikeston by railroad when ready. Sherman just telegraphs has sent ten steamers to Fort Henry.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, March 2, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CULLUM, *Cairo:*

I think the bombardment should commence to-day, if possible. It will greatly assist Pope at New Madrid. If Columbus should be evacu-



ated, the fleet should follow to Hickman or Island No. 10. Send all transports you can spare up the Tennessee River.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

CAIRO, ILL., *March 2, 1862.*

General U. S. GRANT,  
*Through General Sherman, Paducah:*

General Halleck, February 25, telegraphed me:

Grant will send no more forces to Clarksville. General Smith's division will come to Fort Henry or a point higher up the Tennessee River. Transports will also be collected at Paducah. Two gunboats in Tennessee River with General Grant. Grant will immediately have such garrisons detailed for Forts Donelson and Henry and all other forces made ready for the field.

From your letter of the 28th I learn you are at Fort Donelson and General Smith at Nashville, from which I infer you would not have received orders.

Halleck's telegram of last night says:

Who sent Smith's division to Nashville? I ordered it across to the Tennessee, where they are wanted immediately. Order them back. Send all spare transports up Tennessee to General Grant.

Evidently the general supposes you on the Tennessee. I am sending you all the transports I can find for you, reporting to General Sherman for orders to go up Cumberland for you, or if you march across to Fort Henry, then to send them up the Tennessee.

G. W. CULLUM,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Paducah, March 2, 1862—8 p. m.*

General HALLECK:

I wrote you to-day, and since a gentleman named McCormick has come from Columbus. He says Columbus was evacuated yesterday. Some guns left, but the greater part carried off to Island No. 10, above New Madrid. I had a company yesterday at the Blandville bridge, and to-day have sent a cavalry force to enter Columbus, unless the troops from Cairo are already there. The Blandville bridge still stands, but all others are destroyed. The arms have not come for the Ohio regiment, but will be here to-morrow. I went to the town this afternoon and ordered the transfer of the sick and wounded prisoners of war from the Chauteau, which is a very large boat, to the January, which is smaller. The Chauteau will go up the Tennessee at ———, and General Grant will be in possession of twenty good steamboats, capable of carrying 15,000 men and 3,000 horses. A violent thunderstorm has been prevailing all day, interrupting the use of the telegraph, so that I have been unable to report to you.

At Columbus yesterday Mr. McCormick says that they had full accounts of Pope's intended advance from Commerce. It seems to me that the force on the island, if promptly followed, may be captured, or, what may be better, forced to abandon their guns, by General Grant's advance towards Memphis.

I inclose you the Memphis Appeal of February 26, containing Gen-

eral Pillow's account of the battle at Fort Donelson. I write in haste, as the January is about to start for Cairo.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 2, 1862—10 a. m.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Buell thinks the enemy intends uniting behind the Tennessee River, so as to be able to concentrate either on you or Buell. In this case it becomes doubly important, first, to hold Nashville; secondly, next to gain possession of Decatur and the line of road in that vicinity, in order to isolate Johnston from Memphis and Columbus. Having accomplished that, it would seem that Memphis and Columbus must soon fall. Chattanooga is also a point of great importance for us.

Arrange details with Buell.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 2, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Nashville, Tenn.:*

I have telegraphed Halleck that it is important to seize Decatur and thus isolate Johnston from Memphis and Columbus. Of course you must hold Nashville firmly, and Chattanooga is a very important point to gain.

Arrange details with Halleck, co-operate fully together, and give him all the assistance you can. Push Carter forward as rapidly as possible. What is Garfield doing?

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 20. }

HDQRS. DISTRICT WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, March 2, 1862.*

The following changes in General Orders, No. 6 [February 21], brigading and assigning to division the troops of this command, are hereby made:

The Forty-eighth Illinois Volunteers is transferred from the Second Brigade, Fourth Division, to the Second Brigade, First Division; the Eighteenth Illinois Volunteers from the Second Brigade, First Division, to the First Brigade, First Division; and the Fifty-second Illinois Volunteers from the Third Brigade, First Division, to the Second Brigade, Fourth Division.

By command of Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 14. }

HDQRS. DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,  
*Fort Donelson, Tenn., March 2, 1862.*

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2. Two brigades of each the First and Fourth Division will proceed without delay to the Tennessee River by what is known as the Ridge

or Furnace road, and go into camp at the most accessible point for embarking on steamers. Three days' rations will be taken and 40 rounds of ammunition, besides what is contained in cartridge boxes. All weak and disabled soldiers are to be left behind. Camp and garrison equipage is to be taken, but soldiers are to be limited as per General Orders, No. 17. No officer or soldier not entitled to forage will be permitted to ride on horseback or to have a horse with them.

Attention of division, brigade, and regimental commanders is particularly called to the execution of this order.

By order of Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant:

JNO. A. RAWLINS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *March 3 [2], 1862—11.30 [9] p. m.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

No material change in affairs since my dispatch of yesterday.

McCook's division came up last night. Two brigades have crossed to-day. Thomas' division has just arrived by water.

I am organizing depots, &c. We are finding every day large quantities of public provisions, principally bacon. The city is quiet and orderly. The enemy is leaving Murfreesborough and going towards Decatur and Chattanooga, and destroying all bridges as he goes. We will have to rebuild.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *March 3, 1862.*

General McCLELLAN:

Dispatch received. I have four divisions up: three and a half on this side of the river. Those coming by land have arrived without baggage. The crossing is tedious. I can't get exactly at what Halleck is doing, and therefore can't see how to assist him at this moment if he should need it. I have proposed an interview with him and would like you to be present. He has to defer it a few days. I sent Garfield to chase Marshall entirely out of Kentucky. Have not heard from him recently. It will bring him down towards Cumberland Gap, and I will then unite him with Carter, who in the mean time will, I hope, have gained some advantage at the Gap. Use all your persuasion against the appointment of a military governor for Tennessee. It will do incalculable harm. Beg the President to wait.

D. C. BUELL.

SAINT LOUIS, MO., *March 3, [received?] 1862.*

General GEORGE B. McCLELLAN, *Washington, D. C.:*

General Pope will attack New Madrid to-morrow. At the same time there will be a bombardment of Columbus.

I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory,



but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it without any regard to the future. I am worn-out and tired with this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency.

H. W. HALLECK.

WASHINGTON, *March 3, 1862—6 p. m.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, *Saint Louis:*

Your dispatch of last evening received. The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command. You are at liberty to regard this as a positive order if it will smooth your way.

I appreciate the difficulties you have to encounter, and will be glad to relieve you from trouble as far as possible.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, Commanding U. S. Army.*

Approved:

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *March 3, 1862—12 p. m.*

Hon. E. M. STANTON:

General Buell's army is concentrating rapidly at this point, and will be ready for forward movements in a few days. Can General McClellan visit Louisville, and there meet, by appointment, General Halleck and General Buell, for consultation, to determine movements for Western forces.

I believe this to be important.

THOMAS A. SCOTT,  
*Assistant Secretary of War.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., *March 3, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

What can I do to aid your operations against Columbus? Remember I am separated from you by the Tennessee. Johnston is moving towards Decatur and destroying the bridges as he goes. I have only one gunboat; all the others returned at once. I also sent Smith back Saturday last. Spare transports will be dispatched to Paducah.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Cumberland Ford, March 3, 1862.*

Capt. J. B. FRY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Chief of Staff:*

CAPTAIN: On the 1st instant I had succeeded in getting a supply of nearly five days' rations for the command, and as a portion of the

ammunition shipped from Lebanon on the 4th of February last was received that day, I immediately issued orders for a forward movement to take place this morning. The Cumberland was not fordable, but boats had been prepared for crossing. Unfortunately rain commenced falling on the evening of the 2d instant and continued until this morning, causing such a rise in the river and streams between this and the Gap as to render the way impassable. The order for an advance was duly countermanded when it was found that the bridge over Clear Creek was covered and after a portion of one regiment had crossed the river. The road is now impassable for wagons between this and Flat Lick, as a portion of it is under water. Ever since our arrival here we have had daily to encounter difficulties, in roads washed away, bridges destroyed, and almost incessant rains. Never before have I seen roads in such a condition, and unless there comes a favorable change soon in the weather, it will be impossible to transport supplies to our force.

By information received from different sources, and which seems to be reliable, the rebels at the Gap have been re-enforced by a North Carolina regiment, Colonel Vance, a Georgia regiment, and one or two Mississippi regiments. If I had men enough to divide the force and send one portion across the mountains, at, say, Big Creek Gap, to take the enemy in rear, I think that we could capture the whole force, but our effective strength, taking out the guards, &c., is about 3,300. I shall be prevented separating them so far as not to be within supporting distance. If I can do no more, I shall endeavor to protect this portion of the State from any further inroads on the part of the rebels. Much of the time since we have been here men have been on short rations. No ammunition for the Tennessee rifles has arrived.

Respectfully yours, &c.,

S. P. CARTER,

*Acting Brigadier-General, Commanding Twelfth Brigade.*

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH BRIGADE,  
*Camp Brownlow, March 3, 1862.\**

Col. C. A. MARSHALL,

*Commanding Sixteenth Kentucky Volunteers:*

DEAR SIR: In view of the extraordinary fickleness of the Big Sandy, I presume it has been impossible for you to move up this way, as my last order directed. The losses we have sustained require me to delay the forward movement for some time. You will therefore move a part or all of your command to Louisa, to guard that post from any depredations which may be threatened by marauding bands of rebels from the Virginia side, and hold yourself in readiness to move when the time is ripe. I send the paymaster on the first boat, and you will delay any movement till your troops are paid.

The acting assistant adjutant-general will communicate with you in person in reference to our movements. I have reason to hope that we may before very long be able to see a broader field of activity, and I hope I may be permitted to have your fine regiment with me.

Very respectfully,

J. A. GARFIELD,

*Colonel, Commanding Brigade.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, March 4, 1862.*General BUELL, *Nashville, Tenn.:*

If Johnston has destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear he cannot return to attack you. Why not come to the Tennessee and operate with me to cut Johnston's line with Memphis, Randolph, and New Madrid? Columbus has been evacuated and destroyed. Enemy is concentrating at New Madrid and Island No. 10. I am concentrating a force of 20,000 against him. Grant, with all available force, has gone up the Tennessee to destroy connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. Estimated strength of enemy at New Madrid, Randolph, and Memphis is 50,000. It is of vital importance to separate them from Johnston's army. Come over to Savannah or Florence and we can do it. We then can operate either on Decatur or Memphis or on both, as may appear best.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*

## HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,

*Saint Louis, March 4, 1862.*Major-General McCLELLAN, *Washington:*

A rumor has just reached me that since the taking of Fort Donelson General Grant has resumed his former bad habits.\* If so, it will account for his neglect of my often-repeated orders. I do not deem it advisable to arrest him at present, but have placed General Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee. I think Smith will restore order and discipline.

I hear unofficially, but from a reliable source, that our forces took possession of Columbus this morning, the enemy falling back to Island No. 10 and New Madrid. I am expecting official telegram hourly.

H. W. HALLECK,

*Major-General.*COLUMBUS, KY., *March 4, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK:

The battalion of Second Illinois Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hogg, sent from Paducah day before yesterday, reached Columbus yesterday at 6 p. m., the enemy's cavalry having just evacuated. Five gunboats, under Commodore Foote; General Cullum, on board the tug-boat; and the Twenty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Buford; Forty-second Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Northrop; and two battalions, composed of the Fifty-fifth Illinois, Major Sanger, Fifty-fourth and Seventy-first Ohio, under Major Andrews, dropped down this morning, and after some reconnoitering they discovered our flag and came ashore, finding Lieutenant-Colonel Hogg in possession. Have occupied the fort with the infantry. Fort very extensive, and large amount of guns, shot, shell, and stores abandoned by the enemy. Will dispatch for the Tennessee River instantly the Aleck Scott and T. L. McGill.

W. T. SHERMAN,

*Brigadier-General.*

\* See Thomas to Halleck, March 10, and Halleck's reply, March 15, p. 683.



HEADQUARTERS,  
*Saint Louis, March 4, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN:

Our cavalry from Paducah marched into Columbus yesterday at 6 p. m., driving before them the enemy's rear guard. The flag of the Union is flying over the boasted "Gibraltar of the West." Finding himself completely turned on both sides of the Mississippi, the enemy was obliged to evacuate or surrender. Large quantities of artillery and stores were captured.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Adjutant-General's Office, Washington, March 10, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, U. S. A.,  
*Commanding Department of the Mississippi, Saint Louis:*

It has been reported that soon after the battle of Fort Donelson Brigadier-General Grant left his command without leave. By direction of the President the Secretary of War desires you to ascertain and report whether General Grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and, if so, for how long; whether he has made to you proper reports and returns of his force; whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorized or not in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and, if so, what.

L. THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Saint Louis, March 15, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,  
*Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington:*

In accordance with your instructions of the 10th instant I report that General Grant and several officers of high rank in his command, immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson went to Nashville without my authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from investigation, that General Grant did this from good intentions and from a desire to subserve the public interests.

Not being advised of General Buell's movements, and learning that General Buell had ordered Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nashville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. During the absence of General Grant and a part of his general officers numerous irregularities are said to have occurred at Fort Donelson. These were in violation of the orders issued by General Grant before his departure, and probably, under the circumstances, were unavoidable.

General Grant has made the proper explanations, and has been directed to resume his command in the field. As he acted from a praiseworthy although mistaken zeal for the public service in going to Nashville and leaving his command, I respectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it. There never has been any want of military subordination on the part of General Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained as resulting partly from

the failure of colonels of regiments to report to him on their arrival and partly from an interruption of telegraphic communication. All these irregularities have now been remedied.

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

CONFEDERATE CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.

ORDNANCE OFFICE,  
*Nashville, Tenn., November 20, 1861.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Nashville :*

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith, for the information of the general commanding, a copy of telegram received from the Chief of Ordnance, Richmond, under date of 19th instant, in reply to one from this office of same date:

RICHMOND, *November 19, 1861.*

Lieutenant WRIGHT, *Nashville :*

About 5,000 rifles are assigned to General Johnston out of those received. You can have as much money as you want for purchase.

J. GORGAS.

From this I suppose that I will be authorized to purchase good, serviceable arms as required.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
M. H. WRIGHT,  
*First Lieutenant Artillery and Ordnance, C. S. Army.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., November 20, 1861.*

General SAM. D. WEAKLEY, JAMES E. SAUNDERS, and others.  
*Committee, Alabama :*

In reply to your verbal inquiries, I have to say that our position here is of great strength, and that we can hold it against greatly superior numbers of the enemy; but unless we are supported on the flank and rear by forces to strengthen our present column, now at Feliciana, near Union City, the country south of us is open to an advancing column, and by cutting our railroad communication we would be isolated from the country south of this position. If this was done, and the enemy should seize New Madrid (which he can easily do) and fortify it, cutting our river communication, and thus cutting off our supplies by land and water, it is manifest that the force at this place would soon be starved out. Without additional force at this place the same result may take place by a force of 30,000 or 40,000 men investing the place and reducing it by famine. In the event of this place being reduced by this mode, the result would be the same, viz, the loss of the army and all its arms, artillery, &c., the opening of the river to the Gulf of Mexico, and isolating all the country west of the Mississippi, destroying the great valley of the Mississippi, with all its untold wealth. The magnitude of the calamity to the country can be appreciated by those only who know. In regard to the question, Do I con-

sider the Tennessee River safe, I answer unhesitatingly that I do not. The work at Fort Henry is as good as we could construct in the time allowed for it and the means at our hands; but we have received but little assistance from any quarter in the construction of the works on the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland, except from Tennessee, and in guns. The exigencies of the service of the Confederate Government have induced it to take most of the troops raised in Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley to Virginia. She is not strong enough to sustain unaided the great conflict before us. Our sister State South must come to our support. We will furnish the necessary engineers to lay off additional works on Tennessee River and superintend their construction and will provide artillery, if Alabama will provide the labor for construction and the troops to garrison the work, and make that river secure against the enemy. But all troops designed for our support must be armed. We can supply them with ammunition and with rifles and shot-guns, and our troops will defend our strongly-fortified positions as effectually as if they had the musket and bayonet, for the bayonet can never be used in intrenched works. If Alabama will furnish the means of constructing these works and the forces to garrison them, with arms, &c., the troops from that State will be placed in them for the purpose of defending them, thus allowing her to hold the keys of the gate-way into her own territory.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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OKOLONO, TENN., November 20, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,

*Secretary of War, &c., Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: Permit me to make a light draught upon your time, and ask your attention to a few suggestions in reference to the rebellion of East Tennessee. I am a citizen of Carter County, and have been all my life, except a temporary absence, which I spent in the State of Mississippi. In my judgment there is not a Union man in Carter County who was not involved to some extent in the rebellion. Many of them were drawn into it by wicked leaders, and some have heartily repented, but many others will seek the first favorable opportunity to repeat the experiment. Under these circumstances, what can be done to hold them in check in the future? If a Northern army invades the State at any future day, a majority of our population will undoubtedly tear up the railroad, burn the bridges, and destroy the lives and property of Southern men. All, however, are not bad men, but the evil-disposed must be removed from our midst or a sufficient force stationed here to hold them in check. If a force is placed here, it must not be removed again under any circumstances until the end of the war, or we will all be ruined and the railroad torn up. In this opinion I am not mistaken, and hope the Confederate Government will not be deceived by deceptive professions of loyalty.

If the military commander at this point could have a discretionary power, which would enable him to inquire into the character of the rebels and give certain ones the option to join the Confederate service during the war or be sent on for trial for treason, I have no doubt the ends of justice would be attained and much annoyance to the Government avoided. This, perhaps, would be rather a high-handed move-



ment, but the disease is a desperate one, and requires severe and energetic treatment. Every Union man in the county either took up arms or was fully advised of the intention of his party to do so, so they are all principals or accessaries before the fact. If they are all prosecuted, every citizen of East Tennessee must be arraigned before the court or brought up as witnesses. Nearly every rebel in my county could be convicted if all the Southern-rights citizens were brought up as witnesses; but this, perhaps, would look too much like political prosecutions.

Martial law ought to be enforced in every county in East Tennessee to hold these bad men in proper restraint, but our President is very averse to such a policy. But be assured if the Northern despotism succeeds in throwing a strong military force in here we shall have much worse than martial law. Even now our most quiet and law-abiding citizens have been shot down in cold blood from behind coverts by the tories, and the proof can be made that Unionists have been tampering with the slaves.

The mass of the Union party religiously believed that a Northern army of at least 100,000 men was in East Tennessee before they began this rebellious demonstration. The Southern men have all been disarmed, and the tories have apparently disbanded in most of the counties, but really gone home to await the approach of an invading army. If we are invaded, every Southern man will be taken a prisoner or else murdered in the night-time. Our very existence depends on Mr. Lincoln's ability to invade the State. Under these circumstances ought we not to have all the aid in the power of the Government to bestow?

If we are not invaded, a few thousand troops will keep the rebels quiet until they are completely subdued, but a hostile force here will open up a passway for our enemies down through North Carolina, Georgia, and all the Gulf States. Of this I think there can be no sort of doubt. In addition to all this, East Tennessee is full of spies and emissaries. Military law alone, in my judgment, will stop the intercourse of these spies with their collaborators in Kentucky. Men come here under the guise of refugees from Kentucky and Maryland, and thus hold intercourse with our enemies.

Asking your pardon for my boldness and the hasty manner of writing this letter, I am, very respectfully, &c.,

MADISON T. PEOPLES.

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

Wartburg, one mile from Montgomery, November 20, 1861.

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: I am moving as expeditiously as possible, with four and a half infantry regiments, a battalion of cavalry, and Rutledge's artillery, to unite with Stanton's command (his and Murray's regiments and McClellan's cavalry) beyond Jamestown, with a view of taking a strong position on the Cumberland River beyond Monticello. The country is sterile from near Clinton to beyond Jamestown, Tenn. The counties of Wayne and Clinton and the western half of Pulaski, in Kentucky, are, I learn, comparatively good counties for subsistence and forage. If I can find a good position on the Cumberland for butting in winter I hope, by scouring the country on the north bank down to Burkesville occasionally, to command the river, and draw supplies from Nashville

when the roads to Knoxville are bad. From this camp as a base of operations I hope in mild weather to penetrate the country towards London or Danville, or in other directions, and command the approaches to Cumberland Gap or Jacksborough. I hope it may be practicable, by scouring the intervening country occasionally by detachments from both camps, to establish and safely maintain a line of express messengers between General Buckner's outposts and my camp.

My information, when at Knoxville, induces me to believe that the numbers under Clift, in Hamilton County, were greatly exaggerated. I doubt whether he had at any time more than 100 to 200 followers. They are not now to be found, having dispersed. The Tories in Sevier seem also to have retired where as yet our troops are not able to find them. I sent a few men up to Greeneville to arrest Andrew Johnson's sons and son-in-law. Have no late news from Carter and Johnson Counties. By this time I presume General Carroll is at Knoxville, in command, and instructed to make proper dispositions to guard the railroads and crush the tory combinations.

The recent burning of the bridges brought a crisis which I think demonstrates that but comparatively a small proportion of the population will now give countenance to hostile acts against the Confederate Government, and that those who are still hostile are only running upon their own destruction. They should now be dealt very severely with. Leniency and forbearance have gradually won many thousands over who would have been driven to the enemy had our policy been severe two months ago, but those that are yet hostile can only be cured of their folly by severity. They should be made to feel in their persons and their property that their hostile attitude promises to them nothing but destruction.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLIFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

*Abstract from return of Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer's command for November 20, 1861, headquarters Wartburg, Tenn.*

Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present	Aggregate present and absent.
	Officers.	Men.		
16th Alabama (battalion).....	22	303	401	455
15th Mississippi.....	28	515	701	1,051
17th Tennessee.....	26	371	538	938
19th Tennessee.....	28	603	693	939
20th Tennessee.....	43	637	765	961
1st Tennessee Cavalry (battalion).....	13	297	341	376
1st Tennessee Artillery, Company A.....	4	105	126	137
Total.....	164	2,831	3,565	4,857

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., November 21, 1861.*

His Excellency JOHN J. PETTUS,  
*Governor of State of Mississippi:*

To oppose the formidable invasion about to be made by the enemy upon the northern line of Tennessee, with the design to penetrate the



valley of the Mississippi, the Secretary of War has authorized me to call upon your excellency for all the armed men that can be raised in your State.

I therefore call upon you to assist me with every soldier of your militia into whose hands arms can be placed.

From the fact that it is more economical and less inconvenient to the citizen, a volunteer force is more desirable than militia if it can be raised as promptly, but time is now of the first importance to enable me to cover the homes of our people and save them from the suffering always incident to an invasion. I rely on the prompt and earnest efforts of your excellency to furnish as large a force as possible at the earliest day, to be armed and assembled at such convenient rendezvous as you may designate, where proper officers will furnish them supplies. Desirable as it is to have men enlisted for the war, the emergency does not permit the Government to insist, as heretofore, on this condition. I will receive all armed men for a period of twelve months.

Companies will be transported at Government expense from points where organized, and your excellency's order for the movement will be authority to my officers to pay the charges of such transportation.

I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

A duplicate of this letter sent to Governor of Alabama, with exception that it called for troops from Northern Alabama.

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#### PROCLAMATION.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,  
*Jackson, November 21, 1861.*

Whereas the Legislature has, by an act approved this day, authorized and empowered me to receive and muster into the service of the State any number of volunteers, not exceeding 10,000, by companies or squads, or individuals offering themselves, with arms in their hands, to serve in defense of Columbus, Ky., or any other threatened position, for sixty days:

Now, therefore, by virtue of the power thus vested in me, I will receive any company, squad, or individual tendered to me, armed and equipped; double-barreled shot-guns or hunting rifles will be considered efficient arms. It will be necessary for each volunteer to provide his clothing and blankets and cooking utensils of easy transportation, as provision of those articles cannot be made by the quartermaster of the State.

The places of rendezvous are Corinth and Grenada, where officers will be in readiness to receive and organize into companies, battalions, or regiments such volunteers as present themselves. Transportation will be furnished from the depots nearest the place of assembling to the rendezvous for all companies, squads, or individuals.

The commanders of companies and squads are authorized to sign certificates showing the number of men and distance traveled by their respective commands, which certificates will be received as evidence of the indebtedness of the State.

All volunteers should provide themselves with three days' rations. All who have efficient arms I hope will bring them, and if they cannot,



put them in the hands of some able and serviceable man who will bring them to the aid of the State. Volunteers requested to be at places of rendezvous by Monday next, or as soon thereafter as possible.

Generals Reuben Davis and J. L. Alcorn will command the troops thus raised.

JOHN J. PETTUS.

CLARKSVILLE, *November 21, 1861.*

General POLK:

A telegram at 10 p. m. from General Johnston changes my destination. I am ordered to take charge of Forts Henry and Donelson and the region around about. I am very sorry not to be with you.

LLOYD TILGHMAN,

*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

CHATTANOOGA, *November 21, 1861.*

J. P. BENJAMIN,

*Secretary of War:*

General Carroll has gone on to Zollicoffer. Colonel Cook's regiment, partly armed, and the Seventh Alabama Regiment, are here. I have assumed command. Tories now quiet, but not convinced. Executions needed.

S. A. M. WOOD,

*Colonel Seventh Alabama Regiment Volunteers.*

RICHMOND, *November 22, 1861.*

Colonel WOOD,

*Seventh Alabama Regiment, Chattanooga, Tenn.:*

Your dispatch received and also report. Have you reported to Colonel Leadbetter, according to orders? If so, your report should have been addressed to him for transmission to this Department. If not, you will report to him immediately by letter to Jonesborough.

J. P. BENJAMIN,

*Secretary of War.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*Bowling Green, November 22, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK,

*Commanding First Division, Columbus, Ky.:*

I am directed to inform you that 50 barrels of powder went forward yesterday to Memphis for Fort Pillow and 2 tons additional the day before to Columbus.

General Johnston has authorized the organization of a battalion at Grenada, Miss., of which Lieutenant Harcastle will probably be elected the commander, and has ordered it to go to Memphis and report to you.

You will order the monthly payment of such guides as you retain in service by the Quartermaster's Department—Davis, the pay of captain; Faulkner, of lieutenant; and to the other men \$45 per month.

The general has called on the Governors of Tennessee, Mississippi, and North Alabama for every man who can be armed for the defense of our frontier. General Pillow was advised by telegram that Louisiana would send to Fort Pillow every artillerist that could be spared, and also two regiments of infantry, with 100 rounds of ammunition. Your orders should meet them at Memphis.

The general further remarks, Fort Columbus being completed, your force will now be free to maneuver in reference to the movements of the enemy, and to act as a corps of observation to prevent the siege of the place, and should be so handled as to avoid being caught between the enemy and the river and surrounded and cut off from the magazine and re-enforcements.

His efforts have been continuous to bring a force into the field to meet the present emergency (long anticipated), and he trusts they will prove successful. Major Jackson was some time since ordered to put six months' supply of provisions for the *computed* garrison into Fort Columbus. Let this supply be put there from the stores on hand and kept at that level, the garrison and troops without drawing their current supplies from Jackson depot.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Jamestown, Tenn., Nov. 22, 1861.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond:*

SIR: Heavy rains have made the roads slippery and will somewhat retard our progress. Day before yesterday I ordered Colonel Stanton, with his regiment, Colonel Murray's and Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan's cavalry, encamped about 10 miles north of Jamestown, to make a rapid and stealthy forward movement to capture the ferry-boats at four or five crossings of the Cumberland, and, if practicable, the enemy's cavalry said to be on this side of the river. I have not heard whether the movement has been made. I see it stated in the Nashville newspapers that General Ward has 2,000 men at Campbellsville, 1,200 at Columbia, and a regiment at Lebanon. It is reported to Colonel Stanton that the two or three regiments between Somerset and the river have moved towards Columbia, to join other forces there. He communicates also a rumor of the crossing of the Cumberland by a force of the enemy at Green's Ferry; but all these reports seem to be uncertain.

I have no dispatches from Knoxville since I left there, but hear through various scouting parties that the Tories in Lower East Tennessee are dispersed, a number of prisoners taken, a few Lincolnites killed and wounded, and several hundred guns captured. Citizens have turned out in large numbers and assisted the soldiers in scouring the mountains and hunting down the fugitive traitors. They should now be pursued to extermination, if possible.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Similar report to Colonel Mackall.]

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., November 22, 1861.*

ISHAM G. HARRIS,

*Governor of Tennessee, Nashville, Tenn.:*

We know we shall be attacked soon. The enemy's gunboats came down to-day, made a grand flourish, but did not come within reach of our guns. It is impossible to form any correct idea of his movements, but you cannot get up your forces too soon—I fear not soon enough. We can and will hold the position unless we are invested and starved out, and I am exerting every possible effort to get supplies. I have enough now for one month.

GID. J. PILLOW, *General.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., November 22, 1861.*

Maj. W. W. MACKALL,

*U. S. Army, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

We are in great distress in this army for want of money. The supply staff is broken down for want of funds and the credit of the Government very much impaired. The banks of Tennessee have gone as far in meeting our wants as they are able and willing to do. The troops are not paid, and are dissatisfied at not being paid. As yet we have not received one dollar of assistance towards supplying the wants of this army from the Confederate Government. We have borrowed from banks as long as we could, and bought commissary and quartermasters' supplies as long as we have credit to purchase anything on credit. An army cannot be supplied without money. The proper staff officers have made estimates and requisitions again and again, and yet we get no funds. We are unable to sell checks on Richmond for money. The Tennessee banks have put out their circulation in aid of the Government to the limit of their charters or nearly so. Quartermasters' checks upon Richmond are now selling in the market at 15 per cent. discount. This is owing entirely to the fact that the banks are not able to cash the checks and sustain the credit of the Government.

The system of checking upon Richmond transfers the capital of the banks to Richmond, which must, of necessity, be returned in Government Treasury drafts, or the banks will all be utterly prostrate. Tennessee is throwing into the field such a large force, and in equipping and sustaining it (now transferred to the Confederate Government) and since in supplying its wants has advanced over \$3,000,000. The whole of this sum has been advanced by the banks of the State.

You will perceive in these facts the necessity of providing some means of relief for the command. The impression which is extending itself through the army and country that it is neglected has a depressing influence upon all the friends of the Government.

The difficulties of the command, with the large force of the enemy we have to meet, are in themselves embarrassing enough, but add to these the question of bread and all the various wants of an army, and you may understand the embarrassments of my position. I address myself directly to you, that you may have the proper correction applied. I have confidence that you will do so. It will require \$300,000 to relieve the staff of its present debts due all over the country and with the banks for borrowed money. Please place this communication before the general.



The want of money has rendered it impossible for the commissary-general to carry out General Johnston's instructions in regard to a supply of subsistence for the garrison and post at this place. We have on hand about thirty days' rations for the whole force in this command. We did not know until three days since that there were supplies at Jackson. General Polk is still very unwell from the effects of his injury from the explosion. His system is greatly shocked, and there are strong indications of more serious results from it than was at first supposed. I doubt if he will be able to resume command at an early day.

I placed in the hands of General Polk my official report of the battle of Belmont some time since, but he has been so unwell, and having immediately turned over the command to me, I apprehend he has not forwarded it to you. I now, being in command of the department, transmit you a copy of the report.

Respectfully,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding Department.*

COLUMBUS, *November 22, 1861.*

Colonel MACKALL:

I shall want 600 stand—wanted for regiment at Fort Pillow; 600 for Smith's Arkansas regiment at Island No. 10, and 800 for Campbell's regiment at Union City and to supply the deficiency in Merrick's Arkansas regiment, now with Bowen. Please let me have them and as quickly as possible.

I have ordered Williams' regiment forward and Bradford to follow as soon as armed; have telegraphed Governor of Louisiana for help, and he has promised me several regiments. The Governor of Mississippi can send me an armed battalion, and would make it two regiments if he had arms. Commodore Hollins, whose fleet I have asked for of the Secretary of the Navy, is here with one of his boats; the whole, six in number, are expected in the next two or three days.

I am fortifying near Madrid, where I shall place 2,000 men in a few days. The Governor of Mississippi is sending me heavy guns and cannon powder, but we are still short of the force necessary to meet the enemy's. We nevertheless propose, by God's blessing, to give the best account of our command that we can. Have asked you for Scott's Louisiana regiment of cavalry, which I suppose you can grant.

L. POLK.

TUSCUMBIA, ALA., *November 22, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: The undersigned were sent from North Alabama and Northeast Mississippi to the military commander at Columbus, Ky., to inquire if the defenses of the Tennessee River were safe, and to know if we could aid them in any manner. The answer from General Pillow, now commanding there, after conferring with General Polk, was that they were as good as the time allowed and the means afforded would permit, but that they were unsafe, and the force on that flank of the army resting on that river insufficient; that there was danger of the enemy ascending the Tennessee River and burning the railroad bridge

across it just above Fort Henry, and separating our army at Bowling Green from that at Columbus, and of destroying the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston Railroads, for it is only 18 miles from the Big Bend of the Tennessee to their junction at Corinth.

The undersigned then determined to make an effort to improve the works on that river, and send 5,000 volunteers, with their own guns, to garrison them. General Pillow, to facilitate the work, appointed General Weakley, our chairman, a volunteer aide-de-camp, and specially charged him with the organization of the force; Mr. William Dickson, quartermaster, and Mr. John T. Abernathy, commissary, for the force to be raised for this purpose. They are gentlemen of large wealth, patriotic, and energetic. And, moreover, General Pillow authorized Col. Thomas J. Foster to raise a regiment, to be armed with their own guns, for twelve months.

We shall proceed immediately to raise these volunteers. We propose to organize a company of old men, armed, in each county in North Alabama, for forty days. Our reasons for this are that they are not only in the general better marksmen than the generation now growing up, but the very fact of gray-headed men moving to the field will give an impetus to volunteering which we need just now; and, besides, very many of these old men will have their negro men laboring on the works, and their presence would be satisfactory to themselves and useful in furthering them. The volunteers liable to do military duty will be enrolled for twelve months.

From Columbus we requested the Governor of Alabama to ask the Legislature to pass a law for the purchase and impressment of arms similar to the one enacted in the State of Tennessee, and presume it has been done before this time.

General Pillow has instructed Captain Dixon, military engineer, to make a survey to determine a proper location for a new work.

We hope we may have your approval of these arrangements for the public defense. The bonds of Mr. Dickson, as quartermaster, and Mr. Abernathy, as commissary, will be sent, with sureties worth a very large amount, under this date.

Direct, if you please, the proper bureaus in your Department to write immediately to these officers, with such general or special instructions as may be necessary, for we shall need transportation for men and laborers down Tennessee River, some wagons and horses, some tools for rough work, provisions, medicines, &c., and if we have to await the progress of matters through formal channels we may be delayed in accomplishing the work in which we are engaged. Until we hear from the Department, however, we shall not hesitate to take such steps as we would in our private business.

S. D. WEAKLEY,

*Chairman.*

JAMES E. SAUNDERS,

*Secretary of Committee.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 1,  
New Orleans, La., November 23, 1861.

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,

*Commanding Western Division, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

DEAR SIR: I send by steamer Morrison this morning the Thirteenth Louisiana Regiment, Colonel Gibson, over 700 strong, to Columbus.

They are armed with muskets, and have 100 rounds of ammunition per man.

I have recalled from Mississippi Sound the Third Mississippi Regiment, Colonel Deason, over 800 strong, and will send them forward to-morrow as soon as they arrive. This regiment is also armed, and has 100 rounds per man. Both regiments were in the act of receiving their clothing when ordered off; they will leave officers behind to bring it up.

I have sent these regiments to your aid rather hesitatingly, and only because I thought your danger more imminent than mine. This, however, is rather guess-work, for we cannot tell at what hour the enemy may appear off the mouth of our rivers and bayous. I write, therefore, to ask you to order both these regiments back at the very first moment that you think you will be able to replace them by other troops. Arms are being collected and imported which will enable you to equip other men to take the place of those I send. I can ill afford to spare them.

Governor Moore is trying to collect some artillerists to send you, but we find more trouble than we had anticipated. Shall do our best, and send them on by rail at the earliest possible moment.

I learn that there are 90 tons saltpeter at Nashville. I have powder-mills here, but a dearth of saltpeter. Can you spare me 30 tons of that at Nashville? If so, please order it sent by rail, or the mills here will have to stop by the end of next week. I wrote you some days since on this subject.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. LOVELL,  
*Major-General, C. S. Army.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., November 23, 1861.*

SAMUEL P. WALKER, *Memphis, Tenn.:*

Before taking the field it is absolutely necessary that the troops have tents and camp equipage. They cannot live without. To avoid confusion and conflict of authority between Governor Harris and myself it will be necessary that these companies be reported to Governor Harris, and get his authority for their being ordered here, as they will all be embraced in his call. I will advise Governor Harris of this necessity by telegram, and get his authority and advise you.

By order of Brigadier-General Pillow, commanding:

GUS. A. HENRY, JR.,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

TUSCUMBIA, ALA., *November 23, 1861.*

*To our Fellow-Citizens of North Alabama and North Mississippi:*

The undersigned were sent as delegates from a number of counties in North Alabama and Tishomingo County, Mississippi, to the camp at Columbus, Ky., to inquire of the military authorities there if they considered the defenses of the Tennessee River safe; and, if not, to tender material aid to make them so. Have just returned, and report their mission in the form of a circular. (We hope our editors will see the propriety of not publishing it in the papers.)

We had several interviews with General Pillow, now commanding the department, in consequence of an injury to Major-General Polk



from the bursting of a gun. When asked if he considered the defenses of the Tennessee River safe, he answered, without hesitation, he did not. He said they were as good as could be constructed in the time allowed and with the means afforded, and most cheerfully accepted the tender of aid which we were sent to make. Order was sent to Captain Dixon, an able engineer, to project the works required, and we now come to you for several thousand volunteers, to be stationed on the Tennessee River—5,000, if they can be raised, and as many negro men as can be raised.

To give efficiency to our work, General Samuel D. Weakley, our chairman, has been appointed aide-de-camp to the commanding officer of the department, and charged specially with the duty of mustering in the troops and serving as the military head until the corps shall be regularly organized.

We propose to raise a regiment of men past middle life to serve during the emergency, but the younger men will be enrolled for twelve months. The whole force we must arm with shot-guns and rifles, with which a strongly-fortified position can be defended as perfectly as with musket and bayonet, for the bayonet cannot be used there. We have applied to the Governor to have an act passed for the purchase of arms and their compression when necessary, and giving power to impress negro men, when necessary, to labor on the public works.

We have no expectation that force will be necessary, however. We expect a community so patriotic as ours to furnish their private arms for the public service or become volunteers and use them. The impression that many men have that they will be more secure by retaining their arms for their personal defense is a great error. The true policy for Southern people is to keep the enemy at a distance. If he is suffered to penetrate into the interior we shall find our private arms of little benefit, and concerted action for self-defense becomes impracticable. In this hour of our peril the man who loves his family best provides for their safety by meeting the enemy on the threshold of the country.

The enemy is preparing a great expedition by land and water against our forces on the Mississippi River. The position of our army at Columbus is one of great strength, but unless it is properly sustained on its flanks and the communication on its rear preserved, the result might be a disaster involving the loss of our army there, with all its arms, artillery, and munitions, the consequences of which would be the command by the foe of this great river, the destruction of the towns upon it, the loss of immense property, and the isolation of all the States west of the Mississippi from us.

A strong work and competent force on the Tennessee River is considered by every general at Columbus as a measure of great importance, not only to the security of North Alabama and North Mississippi, but of the Memphis and Charleston and Mobile and Ohio Railroads, and also preserving communication between our forces at Bowling Green and Columbus, and that no time is to be lost in occupying the position. We purpose to do so and at once.

William Dickson, of Franklin County, has been appointed quartermaster, and John T. Abernathy, of Lawrence County, commissary, and the plan is fully matured, and the comfort of the volunteers and laborers will be provided for.

If our people at home were convinced, as we are, that a deadly struggle for our homes and property is impending, that the enemy in a few days will put forth his whole strength for our subjugation, they would rally *en masse* for the public defense.

Col. Thomas J. Foster, of Lawrence, is empowered by General Pillow to raise a regiment, and other gentlemen will rapidly follow in the noble work. The volunteers will be sent down the river as they are organized, and we invite the aid of our wives and daughters to prepare clothing and tents for them.

1st. Our young men at Columbus are not only enduring the hardships of the camp and meeting gallantly the hazards of the battle, but laboring in the trenches with spades and shovels now, and who are we that we should be exempt from the burdens imposed for the common defense?

Special orders from General Weakley will be published from time to time, giving direction to the movements.

SAMUEL D. WEAKLEY.  
JAMES E. SAUNDERS.  
THOMAS J. FOSTER.  
DAVID DESHLER.  
WM. DICKSON.  
WM. COOPER.  
B. B. TROUSDALE.

Dated Tuscumbia, Ala., November 23, 1861.

CAMP HARDEE,

*Col. Wirt Adams' Regiment Cavalry, November 23, 1861.*

Major-General HARDEE,

*Commanding First Division, C. S. Army, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to an order received through Colonel Adams from you, I made a scout on this day from Miller's Ferry, on Barren River, to Hendrick's Ferry, on Green River. There I found the ferry-flat sunk. I made the ferryman, Peter Amos, cross over to me in a skiff. He reported a visit from 30 Union men on the night of the 22d instant, under command of John S. Phelps, Simpson, and Niley Emory, men living 10 miles beyond Green River, on the Litchfield road, who sunk his boat, and ordered him to put no one across the river from this side. This party was armed with muskets (percussion locks) with bayonets.

I questioned a man by the name of J. H. Williams, who was taken prisoner by these men, with his wagon, containing dry goods, belonging to Lewis Anderson, both living across Green River. Williams was released by them on taking the oath of allegiance, but the goods were confiscated. Mr. Williams further reported, with much hesitation, that four regiments of the enemy were encamped at a place called Derbin, on the Litchfield road, this side of Blue River, and about 12 miles from Hendrick's Ferry. This report was confirmed by several refugees from the other side of the river, some saying 3,000, some 4,000 men.

Phelps' scout belonged to Hawkins' command. One mile and a half below Hendrick's Ferry is Samuel Young's Ferry, where there are two flats on this side of the river not destroyed, though their destruction is apprehended. These flats are capable, each, of crossing eight horses. Between Young's and Hendrick's Ferries is another larger flat, on the other side of the river, filled with water, which can be used when bailed out. Several refugees reported also that a camp was being formed by the enemy 4 miles beyond Green River from Hendrick's Ferry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

PAUL RAVESIES,

*Capt. Comdg. Scout from Col. Wirt Adams' Regt. Cavalry.*

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Kentucky Line, near Albany, November 24, 1861.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: Colonel Stanton's regiment will probably camp at Monticello to-night; Colonel Murray's about 12 miles distant from Monticello, towards Albany. They have with them five cavalry companies, with which they are ordered to seize the ferry-boats at the crossings of the Cumberland. Captain Sheliha and Captain Estell, engineer officers, have accompanied the cavalry to make reconnaissances. The command with which I left Jacksborough camps here to-night, 8 miles from Albany, through which place we will pass to-morrow. My information is that ferry-boats are used on the Cumberland River at Burkesville; at Creelsborough, 17 miles above Burkesville; at Rowena, 15 miles above Creelsborough; at Horse Shoe Bottom, 8 miles above Rowena; at Dorothea Landing, 16 miles (by land) above Horse Shoe Bottom; at Mill Springs, 8 miles above Dorothea Landing; and at three ferries within  $4\frac{1}{2}$  miles below the forks of the Cumberland; that is, one immediately below the fork, Stegall's Ferry,  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles below, and one just below Waitsborough. I think the ferry at Horse Shoe Bottom is the one called Greene's Ferry, where it is rumored the enemy are probably concentrating.

The enemy have 1,300 men at Camp Goggin, on the north bank of the river, opposite Waitsborough. My information leads me to suppose that there are now no forces of the enemy on this side of the river. Captain Estell, who has made a rapid reconnaissance, reports six pieces of artillery at Camp Goggin.

I have no later information than that alluded to two days ago, of the 2,000 men at Campbellsville, the 1,200 at Columbia, and the regiment at Lebanon. North of the river is to us yet as a *terra incognita*. At Mill Springs and Dorothea Landing the southern bank is bluff and the northern flat and low. At Creelsborough and Rowena this is reversed. At Horse Shoe Bottom the north bank is higher than the south; is timbered; the south bank is cleared. At Rowena the same as to timber. At Creelsborough no timber on either side; same at Burkesville. At Mill Springs no timber between the height on this side and the river. This information Captain Sheliha communicates, and he learns that the surrounding country is fertile and well stocked, and that there is a grist and a saw mill at Mill Springs. It is probable a good position may be found there for winter quarters.

We have the first snow-flakes for the season to-day; the weather cold and stormy for the last two days.

I wrote to Maj. V. K. Stevenson, assistant quartermaster-general, at Nashville, on the 10th, for 500 axes, 300 shovels, 200 picks, and other trenching tools; also for 200 pack-saddles, which are often needed to fit up dashing movements in a mountainous country impassable to wagon trains; but have heard from neither. I do not know how I can dispense with the tools, and fear I shall be seriously embarrassed for want of them.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*



HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Bowling Green, Ky., November 24, 1861.

Brig. Gen. J. C. BRECKINRIDGE,  
Commanding, &c., Russellville :

SIR : General Johnston directs you to return to this place with your brigade. You will leave one company of cavalry in the vicinity of Russellville for five or six days, with orders to gain all possible information of the movements of the enemy after your departure and then march for this place.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
W. W. MACKALL,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
Nashville, Tenn., November 24, 1861.

Lieut. Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
Asst. Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. West. Dept., Bowling Green, Ky. :

SIR : For the information of the commanding general I inclose a copy of a report just received from Lieutenant Joseph Dixon, C. S. Army, in charge of the defenses at Fort Donelson, with a copy of a telegram from General Pillow, commanding First Division, Western Department, ordering Lieutenant Dixon to proceed to Fort Henry, Tennessee River, and perform certain duties at that place, thereby calling him from the direction of the works (much needed) to which I had assigned him at Fort Donelson.

In regard to labor, I would suggest that the batteries at Fort Donelson can be completed sooner by the troops, perhaps, than if an effort were made to collect negroes for the purpose from the surrounding country. With re-enforcements proposed for the garrison the requisite amount of work can well be done by fatigue parties. In imminent danger, the brigadier-general commanding Forts Donelson and Henry might be authorized to press all neighborhood negro labor into service, but under other circumstances I do not think that the labor of troops and slaves can be combined to any advantage.

I must respectfully request that the commanding general will establish the channel through which orders and instructions must pass to all persons in the Western Department employed in the direction and construction of defenses. Except in pressing emergencies they should certainly be given through the chief engineer of the department, and the exceptional cases should be at once reported to that office.

With the least delay possible I will send a civil engineer to Fort Henry, who is familiar with the ground around the place and who has been employed heretofore at that work. The local duties can be intrusted to him (Mr. Hayden) by Lieutenant Dixon, who should certainly give his personal supervision to the defenses of the Lower Cumberland until they are in condition to make a respectable resistance.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
J. F. GILMER,  
Major, and Chief Engineer of Western Department.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

FORT DONELSON, TENN., November 21, 1861.

Major GILMER,  
Chief Engineer, Western Department, Bowling Green, Ky. :

MAJOR : I have the honor to report that I have completed the new

battery on the river, and I am at present preparing to mount the pieces in it. I have also laid out a little work on the ridge about 100 yards back of the encampment, and have mounted the two 9 pounders there. I have had the trees felled around the encampment so as to form a very good abatis. That portion of the old field where the dragoons were encamped when you were here I will cause to be obstructed by digging *trous-de-loup* and dragging small trees over the open space. I wish you would get the general to give an order to press labor, for it cannot be obtained here in any other way.

There are not more than 200 troops here fit for duty; all the rest are sick or on leave of absence.

I have just received a telegraphic order from General Pillow. I would like to know whose orders I am to obey. I send inclosed a copy of General Pillow's order. I will go to Fort Henry and see what is wanting, and return here and await your orders.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH DIXON,

*First Lieutenant, C. S. Army.*

[Inclosure No. 2.]

HQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*Columbus, Ky., November 20, 1861.*

Captain DIXON,

*Engineer, Fort Donelson:*

You will proceed to Fort Henry and make necessary reconnaissances and surveys for an additional work on the Tennessee River.

A large force of slaves, with troops to protect them, from Alabama will report at Danville for this work, the construction of which you will superintend and push to completion as early as possible.

GEO. J. PILLOW,

*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding.*

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C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,

*Nashville, Tenn., November 24, 1861.*

Lieut. JOSEPH DIXON,

*C. S. Army, Fort Donelson:*

SIR: I have just received your letter of the 21st instant, reporting progress on the works at Fort Donelson, and the inclosed copy of a telegraphic order from General Pillow, directing you to repair to Fort Henry, thereby interrupting the progress of the work, I fear, committed to your charge by me at Fort Donelson.

I have just sent copies of your letter to me and of General Pillow's telegram to you to General Johnston, with an earnest request that he will establish at once the channel through which you and all others engaged in the direction and construction of defenses in the Western Department shall receive their instructions. Certainly the chief engineer of the department furnishes the proper channel, and if exceptions be made in cases of emergency the exceptions should be reported forthwith to that officer. I will send Mr. Hayden, civil engineer, to Fort Henry. He can attend to the local duties there, as he has been employed on Fort Henry before, and is now here finishing the draw-bridge for that work. He is called Captain Hayden, having held that commission in the Tennessee service. You will please to give him your

instructions by letter, if possible, and require him to press forward any work you may decide upon as being necessary in addition to those already constructed at Fort Henry. I will have at least one more 32-pounder gun sent to Fort Donelson—if possible, two more. You will therefore prepare extensions of parapet sufficient for them by the time they can reach you.

You say nothing of the progress of Mr. T. J. Glenn, civil engineer, to whom I intrusted the placing of obstructions in the river under the guns of Fort Donelson. Please to supervise his progress and report to me, and have every aid given him that the garrison can afford. You will please report to me what you propose to do additional at Fort Henry.

Your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, C. A. KY.,  
*Oakland, November 24, 1861.*

Lieut. D. G. WHITE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General:*

SIR: I have since my courier left received the following information of the enemy's movements in the direction of Elizabethtown:

His main body is still at Nolin. About 3,000, including infantry, artillery, and cavalry, are at Bacon Creek, under Rousseau. The railroad bridge across Bacon Creek has been rebuilt. The Yankees have there eight ferry-boats and a large quantity of bridge timbers. These they intend moving by railroad to Munfordville, with the view to cross part of their force in the boats and hold this bank of Green River while the bridge is being repaired. This information comes to me from P. H. Gardner, whom I have had heretofore in my employ as a spy. He will bear this letter. He learned from an abolitionist direct from Rousseau's camp that the enemy's loss at Brownsville in the skirmish before reported was 8 killed and 7 or 8 wounded.

Very respectfully,

T. C. HINDMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

KNOXVILLE, TENN., November 25, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

The military authorities in command at this post have determined to try the bridge-burners and other men charged with treason by a court-martial. What shall I do? Answer.

J. C. RAMSAY,  
*C. S. District Attorney for the District of Tennessee.*

RICHMOND, November 25, 1861.

J. C. RAMSAY,  
*District Attorney, Knoxville:*

I am very glad to hear of the action of the military authorities, and



hope to hear they have hung every bridge-burner at the end of the burned bridge.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, November 25, 1861.*

Col. W. B. WOOD, *Knoxville, Tenn.:*

SIR: Your report of the 20th instant\* is received, and I proceed to give you the desired instructions in relation to the prisoners taken by you amongst the traitors in East Tennessee:

1st. All such as can be identified as having been engaged in bridge-burning are to be tried summarily by drum-head court-martial, and, if found guilty, executed on the spot by hanging. It would be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burned bridges.

2d. All such as have not been so engaged are to be treated as prisoners of war, and sent with an armed guard to Tuscaloosa, Ala., there to be kept imprisoned at the depot selected by the Government for prisoners of war. Wherever you can discover that arms are concealed by these traitors you will send out detachments, search for and seize the arms. In no case is one of the men known to have been up in arms against the Government to be released on any pledge or oath of allegiance. The time for such measures is past. They are all to be held as prisoners of war, and held in jail till the end of the war. Such as come in voluntarily, take the oath of allegiance, and surrender their arms are alone to be treated with leniency.

Your vigilant execution of these orders is earnestly urged by the Government.

Your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

P. S.—Judge Patterson, Colonel Pickens, and other ringleaders of the same class must be sent at once to Tuscaloosa to jail as prisoners of war.

[NOTE.—The same letter with a slight verbal alteration of the opening paragraph and the omission of the postscript, was sent at the same time to Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer, Jacksborough, Tenn., and Colonel Leadbetter, Jonesborough, Tenn.]

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, November 25, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. W. H. CARROLL,  
*Chattanooga, Tenn.:*

SIR: Your letter of the 17th instant has been received,† and I have the honor to inform you, in reply, that the course you are pursuing

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\*See "Revolt of Unionists in East Tennessee," Series I, Vol. IV, p. 250.

†See Series I, Vol. IV, p. 245.

towards the traitors in East Tennessee does not meet the approval of this Department.

You will be pleased to observe the following instructions:\*

\* \* \* \* \*

Your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

POUND GAP, November 25, 1861.

S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector-General C. S. A., Richmond, Va.:*

GENERAL: I arrived at Colonel Williams' camp yesterday. I hear, from sources deemed reliable, that the enemy have fallen back, how far I do not know, nor do I know from what cause, but I think it probable they will occupy the State road from the mouth of Sandy to the county seat of Bath (Owingsville), and thence along the mountain's base, which is a considerable contraction of their circle. I have ordered my whole body of cavalry up from Clinch River, to which they had fallen back, and shall start them immediately to the front to ascertain the whereabouts of the enemy, and by their movements to inspire our friends, who are said to be much dispirited by the insolent course of the enemy and their friends. Provisions are cheap on the other side of the mountains and forage in many places is abundant. I shall press forward cautiously, but sufficiently, I hope, to address myself successfully to the mountain people of Kentucky.

My infantry is all undrilled and very badly clad. I have sent my brigade quartermaster, Charles E. Marshall, to Richmond, to urge immediate supplies and to execute his bonds. I commend him to you as a gentleman of high business capacity and sterling integrity. He wants experience in army matters, and any assistance you can render him will be thankfully remembered by me.

I find that some misinformation has been given to you about the companies at Pound Gap destined to form a regiment for Colonel Moore. They were raised by order of General Zollicoffer, with a condition that they were to be kept in Scott and Wise Counties only to defend the mountain passes, and not to leave this State. They are under the command of Major Ward, who raised them at the instance of General Zollicoffer. They are unwilling to be placed in a regiment under Colonel Moore in any event, but especially refuse to be taken from their own officer or to change the term of their service from one special in its character to one which will be general. Colonel Moore has not moved any of his five companies from Abingdon yet. I think it highly probable he never will, and if he is not capable of responding more rapidly than he has done to my orders, it makes little difference if he never does. I have received your order to organize this battalion into a regiment, under Colonel Moore, but under the circumstances I deem it prudent to delay the execution of that order until you are possessed fully of all the facts of the case. Meanwhile the battalion will remain on duty subject to Major Ward. In any event, there will be required a reserve at this point to guard the pass and the line of supply, and these men will do very well for such service. I will cause them to build cabins and so arrange them as to fortify the gap, and it can be made a depot for supply to an army in front.

I have to urge you, general, to cause another battery to be sent for-

\*These instructions were the same as those in Benjamin to Wood, of same date, p. 701.

ward to me to this point. I shall then only have eight pieces of artillery. I have ordered Colonel Trigg to move forward on the Piketon road from his present position. I will communicate with him before he arrives at Piketon, if I am not there in person to receive him. I have several men raising recruits in Kentucky in the mountain counties, and I do think the clothes and the food, the comforts of the soldier, will be indispensable as an auxiliary to this business of organization. You cannot expect men to be contented without blankets or overcoats or shoes in the snow and ice of a high mountain range. The physique overcomes the sentimental. I nominate Dr. Basil C. Duke as chief of the medical staff of this brigade and request his commission. This completes my staff.

I hope the Secretary will recognize the propriety of my request for another regiment, as it is now palpable I have only a part of one, under Colonel Trigg, and it is doubtful if Colonel Moore will ever come forward, or, if he does, that he will only have a battalion, and these all undrilled. It would be of very serious import should I be left with no force to advance, or with only such as to retreat again when a heavier force presents itself. The effect upon the people is of the worst character, and in this matter time is an element of the first consequence.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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CAMP HARDEE, *Bowling Green, November 25, 1861.*

Col. WIRT ADAMS, *Commanding Regiment:*

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of your instructions, I proceeded at an early hour this morning with my company in the direction of Green River, for the purpose of gaining information of the enemy, reported as being in force at Hendrick's Ferry. I visited all the ferries on Green River within a day's march of this post, viz, Young's, Hendrick's, and Hanaker's, without being able to discover any of the enemy's force. From the most authentic information that could be obtained I am satisfied that no greater force than a detachment of 12 or 14 men have been for some time past in the vicinity of any of the ferries above named.

The ferry-boats at Hendrick's and Hanaker's have been destroyed by the enemy, and an attempt was made last night by them to decoy to the other side two boats now at Young's.

The nearest point to Green River from this post being 13 miles, I beg leave to state that, owing to the condition of the roads, the march there and back in the same day cannot be made without serious injury to the horses.

I have to report also that the boat at Van Meter Ferry is in such condition as to make the passage of horses exceedingly dangerous.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

I. F. HARRISON,  
*Captain, Wirt Adams' Regiment Cavalry.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., November 25, 1861.*

Governor HARRIS, *Nashville, Tenn.:*

Fifteen thousand re-enforcements of the enemy had reached Cairo, and others were at Saint Louis, awaiting transportation, on Saturday.



They commenced returning up the river to-day. We have information that General Price is advancing on Saint Louis. This explains the counter-movement, and I think it will prevent the threatened movement on this place until the winter will close in. We have about completed our defenses, making this place impregnable when sustained with gunboat fleet and with forces near Union City. You may now take time to organize your forces, gather your arms, and largely increase the volunteer forces, holding over the country the call for the militia. Many men will volunteer to avoid the odium of being forced into the service. I deem this important information for you to possess, that you may shape your course accordingly.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Knoxville, November 26, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: I have the honor to report that I arrived here on Saturday last, by order of General Zollicoffer, and assumed command of this post on Sunday. I found stationed here Colonel Wood's battalion and several companies of infantry and cavalry. There seemed to be much uneasiness and apprehension felt in reference to the disaffected portion of the population. I have put the city under military rule and have restored peace and security.

I have detailed and sent to the various districts where I had information there were any gatherings of disaffected citizens and had them dispersed, and in many instances the leaders arrested. As soon as possible, I dispatched companies of mounted men to scour the country, with instructions to arrest and send here all persons who were inciting rebellion or were found with arms, resisting the authorities. In all instances where there was no proof of disloyalty I have discharged the prisoners upon their taking the oath of allegiance.

There are now in custody here about 70 persons, many of whom, it is believed, were either directly or indirectly connected with the burning of the railroad bridges. Colonel Wood, who was in command here before my arrival, had in contemplation a court-martial for the trial of those upon whom proof of guilt seemed to be strong. I concurred with him, and ordered the meeting on the 28th. The board will be composed of some of the most intelligent officers within this post, and I have no doubt their action will be prudent and discreet.

It is important that steam-power should be secured for the purpose of driving the machinery necessary in the alteration of arms. I therefore took possession of the printing establishment of Brownlow. The steam-engine and building are suitable for our purposes, and it was the only one that could be procured here. Brownlow has left, and no certain information of his whereabouts can be obtained; it is, however, certain that he is aiding and abetting our enemies. I have assured his sons, who profess to have sold the establishment to a Mr. Baxter, that full indemnity for the use of the establishment would be paid by the Government. I have every assurance that the sale to Baxter was a false one, and feel that Baxter is not reliable in his loyalty to our Government.

In obedience to your instructions, November 22, I have given orders

that all contracts for hogs or cattle made with the agents of the Confederate Government shall be complied with, and have dispatched several armed parties to see that it is properly executed.

There are 1,140 sacks of salt here. I have directed 400 sacks should be delivered to D. Morris & Co. and 400 sacks to Wilson & Johnson. This is sufficient to meet their present wants, and the balance will be returned, to meet such other demands as may arise. I will report to you again soon.

With high respect, your obedient servant,

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

COLUMBUS, November 26, 1861.

W. W. MACKALL:

In reply to telegram as to General PiHow's signature to his letters, I have to say that since the accident to the gun my head has been in such a state I could not attend to duty, and General Pillow was placed in command; that, too, has been reason for not sending report of the battle. My report goes forward to-morrow, and I hope to resume command in a day or two.

L. POLK.

RICHMOND, November 26, 1861.

(Received, Bowling Green, November 27, 1861.)

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

The President desires you to suspend your order to muster out of service the twelve months' unarmed Mississippi troops until Mr. E. L. Acee, of Mississippi, can have a little time to collect and arm a portion of them. Mr. Acee leaves here to-day for Mississippi for this purpose.

S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant-General.*

*Abstract from return of troops at Cumberland Gap, Tenn., Col. William M. Churchwell, Fourth Tennessee Infantry, commanding, for November 26, 1861.*

Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Officers.	Men.		
4th Tennessee Infantry, Colonel Churchwell.....	39	567	731	836
11th Tennessee Infantry, Colonel Rains.....	36	651	793	885
3d East Tennessee Battalion Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Brazelton.....	19	281	300	300
Grand total.....	94	1,499	1,824	2,021

HQDQS. FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, C. A. KY.,  
*Graham's, November 27, 1861.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

SIR: My command has fallen back to this place. My pickets are  
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thrown out at distances of from 5 to 7 miles on the turnpike and roads to Glasgow and Brownsville.

A rumor reached me yesterday, just before leaving Oakland, that the enemy was crossing in large force at Brownsville that morning. I think it probable there were 75 or 100 cavalry sent over to reconnoiter.

I have no information of the movements of the enemy in my front.

The order of to-day, through General Hardee, to destroy railroad if your couriers report the enemy advancing, will be promptly executed.

Very respectfully,

T. C. HINDMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., November 27, 1861.*

Major-General CRITTENDEN,  
*Commanding, Morristown, Tenn.:*

General Johnston directs me to inform you that the territorial limits of your command are as follows: East and Middle Tennessee, bounded on the west by the railroad from Chattanooga to Nashville; thence up the Cumberland River to the Tennessee line, with such portion of Kentucky as you may any time hold.

Your forces will consist of those under the orders of General Zollicoffer and Carroll, the Georgia regiment lately sent into the department, and all volunteers arriving and being mustered in.

If you are satisfied that the late attack upon East Tennessee has failed and is now abandoned by the enemy, as it appears to us, and that his effort will now be made by this more direct route on Nashville, the general wishes you to detach and send to Nashville all the forces you can spare without endangering the safety of your district. The force of the enemy in front far outnumbers us, and his intention to advance no longer admits of a doubt.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Thirteen miles west of Monticello, November 27, 1861.*

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: Two regiments cross the river to-day at Mill Springs to endeavor to cut off 800 of the enemy at Waitsborough, 9 miles above. A mail from Columbia to Monticello has been captured, by which we learn that there are two battalions of cavalry and two regiments of infantry at Columbia. They had heard of my advance and heard my force was 9,000. This they doubt, but think if it is true they will have to retreat for want of numbers. I learn that General Thomas is at Crab Orchard, but have no reliable intelligence of forces other than those at Columbia and Waitsborough. I have sent detachments of cavalry to examine the ferries at Burkesville and Creelsborough, 17 miles above Burkesville; also to get more particular information of the ferries and roads crossing at Dorothea Landing and Horse Shoe Bottom. It is now certain there is no enemy this side of the Cumberland. We have here an abundance



of beef, pork, and corn, at low prices. The better classes of citizens sympathize with us.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Similar report to Lieutenant-Colonel Mackall.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., November 27, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

SIR : Two persons of respectability, both arriving from Louisville, having no knowledge of each other, have last night and to-day made statements to me concerning the enemy which go to show a continued increase of force of the different arms of service. I am assured by one of them that the force in my front has been augmented to thirty-seven regiments and others are expected. I suppose a change of the plan of operations has been made, and that the force intended for East Tennessee will now be combined with the force on this line, making an aggregate strength of probably more than 50,000 men to be arrayed against my force here.

If the forces of the enemy are maneuvered as I think they may be, I may be compelled to retire from this place to cover Nashville, with the aid of the volunteer force now being organized, which could in that way be brought in co-operation.

It is understood that General Halleck, who will command at Columbus, and General Buell, who is in command on this line, will make a simultaneous attack. I doubt if Buell will make a serious attack on my position here. I hope he may. I have requested General Crittenden to send a portion of his force to Nashville, if in his judgment it can be done without weakening his force too much.

A position of so much importance as Fort Pillow should be placed under the command of an able and experienced officer. I hope such a one will be selected and ordered to take command there at once. He should, in reference to the garrison, have at least the grade of brigadier-general.

We still have a great many sick, but the measles, which so afflicted our troops, spreads much more slowly.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

The workmen of the enemy are rebuilding the railroad bridge over Green River.

EN ROUTE FOR BOWLING GREEN,  
*Distant about 25 miles, November 27, 1861—10.30 a. m.*

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green :*

SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt at this moment of the duplicate of your communication of November 24. The original I received late at night on the evening of the 25th, and in obedience to

its instructions commenced my return with my command to Bowling Green on the morning of the 26th, having detached the cavalry company to Russellville, with the proper orders.

Owing to the weather and the condition of the roads the progress of the command is necessarily slow. I hope, however, to reach Bowling Green to-morrow evening.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,

*Brig. Gen., Comdg. 1st Ky. Brig., 2d Div., Central Column.*

COLUMBUS, *November 28, 1861.*

General JOHNSTON:

The following are extracts from dispatches I have received to-day—the first from General Frost, at Saint Louis, the second from a friend in Paducah:

First:

The enemy intend to make an attack on Columbus in twenty days, with a force of from 75,000 to 100,000 men. If you can repulse them, it will have a better effect than a defeat on the Potomac. There has been shipped from Saint Louis to Cairo a large amount of cannon and ammunition. In Saint Louis there [are] eight mortar boats and eight gunboats.

Second extract:

They say when they do move on Columbus they expect to surround you and starve you into submission. I heard a responsible gentleman, who is perfectly acquainted with affairs in Paducah and Cairo, say that it is the calculation publicly expressed among the officers at Cairo.

These extracts shadow forth correctly their plans. Every effort should be made to prepare a strong force to meet him on my right and rear. No time should be lost.

GID. J. PILLOW,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF MISSISSIPPI,  
*Ordinance Office, Jackson, Miss., November 28, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK:

DEAR GENERAL: I have just returned from Vicksburg, where I was ordered to inspect our fortifications and report their condition, and also to recommend the construction of such other works as are necessary for the defense of that point against the threatened descent of our enemy by the river to New Orleans.

I was compelled to report that I think it impossible to defend Vicksburg by any works we can construct on the left bank of the river unaided by fortifications on the Louisiana side. I have therefore written to Governor Moore (by authority of Governor Pettus), indicating the points necessary to be fortified on the right bank.

Unless fortifications are erected on the Arkansas side opposite those on the Tennessee shore, the Yankee armada can descend by Memphis. Batteries on the banks will hardly be able, even with a heavy converging fire from both banks, to arrest the passage of steamers and floating iron-clad batteries without the assistance of booms or other obstructions in the channel to hold them in check and under fire for a considerable length of time.

If we have only twenty-four guns to guard a point on the river, it is best to divide them, and place twelve in position on either side, to make their service more efficient. I do not think it will be possible for you to stop the enemy at Columbus, even if you defend it successfully, unless you have the opposite bank fortified.

With the aid of piles driven in the river, trees lodged against them, and such booms, where the channel is deep, as the Chinese used when they defeated the British at the Tai-Ho forts, making a succession of obstructions extending across the river under your guns, the defense of Vicksburg and New Orleans may be made successfully by you at Columbus.

The plan of the enemy is obvious. Their object is to take New Orleans. If their armada can descend the river, with a land force of 20,000, capture and destroy our steamers and all our means of river transportation, and anchor above New Orleans, they can safely wait for the co-operation of their Gulf force. With the command of Lake Pontchartrain and the Passes and all the avenues of approach to the city, we cannot relieve it even with a force of 100,000 men. I think if they are defeated on land at Columbus, Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, Baton Rouge, and every other point above, they can run the gauntlet of our batteries with their armada down to New Orleans, unless we fortify both banks of the Mississippi at Columbus and the defensible points below.

Pardon the above, which is written under a sense of duty, and with the highest regard for you as a general and as a man.

I, like yourself, have laid aside (almost) my pastoral staff for the sword, deploring this war, and endeavoring to bring it to an end by the Lord's help. Educated for the army, I could not refuse my services as a soldier to my country in her severe trial.

Respectfully, your friend and obedient servant,

EDWARD FONTAINE.

*Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Ordnance, M. A.*

C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
*Nashville, Tenn., November 28, 1861.*

Capt. M. H. WRIGHT,  
*Ordnance Department, Nashville, Tenn.:*

SIR: For the batteries at Fort Donelson and Clarksville, Cumberland River, you will please to make a requisition for the following additional guns, viz:

Four 8-inch columbiads, or, if these cannot be had, then four other guns of long range, four 32-pounder guns; all to be delivered at Clarksville, Tenn., with platforms, chassis, and carriages complete; also 50 rounds of ammunition.

Also for Fort Henry, Tennessee River, the following:

Four 8-inch columbiads, four other heavy guns of long range, four 32-pounder guns. These to be delivered at Tennessee Bridge, 20 miles above Fort Henry, with platforms, chassis, and carriages complete, and 50 rounds of ammunition.

By order of General Johnston:

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*



ENGINEER OFFICE,  
Nashville, November 28, 1861.

Lieut. Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
*Adjt. Gen., Hdqrs. Western Dept., Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: Last evening I received the following telegram from Mr. T. J. Glenn, civil engineer, employed by me in obstructing the Cumberland River, under the guns of Fort Donelson, with trees and timber, viz:

CUMBERLAND CITY, November 27, 1861.

Maj. J. F. GILMER, *Saint Cloud Hotel:*

General Tilghman has ordered me to suspend. Instruct me immediately.

T. J. GLENN.

To which I replied at once as follows:

You will continue the work for obstructing the Cumberland River.

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major of Engineers.*

The obstructing works on which Mr. Glenn is engaged are far advanced, and to be effective must be completed. It will be impossible for me to rely upon any work being done properly if each subordinate brigadier-general be allowed to suspend operations ordered by me. I must therefore earnestly request that the general commanding the Western Department hold Brigadier-General Tilghman responsible for the act now reported, and forbid the repetition of like interference for the future.

Your instructions of the 22d, in reference to requisitions for ordnance by Captain Wright, was not received until the afternoon of the 26th instant.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

JACKSON, [November] 28, 1861.

Maj. Gen. A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

I have ordered troops to assemble at Corinth and Grenada. Considerable armed force now at these rendezvous. Order supplies for them. I am arming the companies called out under your first requisition as fast as possible.

JOHN J. PETTUS.

[NOVEMBER 28 (?), 1861.]

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:\*

GENERAL: In conformity with your order to report to you on the defenses of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers at the time of my taking command in the West, I have to say that those defenses were at that time not included in my command, nor were they until after you assumed the charge of the Western Department. My command up to that time was limited on the north and east by the Tennessee River. Shortly after taking command of the Western Department Lieutenant Dixon, of the Corps of Engineers, was instructed by you to make an examination of the works at Forts Henry and Donelson and to report upon them. These instructions were complied with, and he reported

\* See pp. 923, 924.

that the former fort, which was nearly completed, was built not at the most favorable position, but that it was a strong work, and, instead of abandoning it and building at another place, he advised that it should be completed and other works constructed on the opposite side of the river, on the high lands just above the fort. Measures for the accomplishment of this work were adopted as rapidly as the means at our disposal would allow. A negro force which was offered by planters in Tennessee and North Alabama was employed on the work, and efforts were made to push it to completion as fast as the means at command would allow.

Lieutenant Dixon also made a similar reconnaissance on the Cumberland, and gave it as his opinion that, although a better position might have been chosen for the fortifications on that river, under the circumstances then surrounding our command it would be better to retain and strengthen the position chosen. He accordingly made surveys for additional outworks, and the service of a considerable slave force was obtained to construct them. This work was continued and kept under the supervision of Lieutenant Dixon. Lieutenant Dixon also advised the placing of obstructions in the Cumberland at a certain point below, where there was shoal water, so as to afford protection to the operatives engaged on the fortifications against the enemy's gunboats. This was done, and it operated as a check to the navigation so long as the water continued low.

You are aware that efforts were made to obtain heavy ordnance to arm these forts, but as we had to rely on supplies from the Atlantic sea-coast, they came slowly, and it became necessary to divert a number of pieces intended for Columbus to the service of those forts.

The principal difficulty in the way of a successful defense of the rivers in question was the want of an adequate force—a force of infantry and a force of experienced artillerists. They were applied for by you and also by me, and the appeal was made earnestly to every quarter from whence relief might be hoped for. Why it was not furnished others must say. I believe the chief reason, so far as the infantry was concerned, was the want of arms. As to experienced artillerists, they were not in the country.

When General Tilghman was made brigadier-general he was assigned by you to the command of the defenses on the Tennessee and Cumberland. It was at a time when the operations of the enemy had begun to be active on those rivers, and the difficulty of communicating as rapidly as the exigencies of the service required, through the circuitous route to Columbus, made it expedient for him to place himself in direct communication to the general headquarters. Nevertheless, all the support I could give him in answer to his calls was afforded. He received from Columbus a detachment of artillery officers as instructors of his troops in that arm on two several occasions, and all the infantry at my command that could be spared from the defense of Columbus.

The importance of gunboats as an element of power in our military operations was frequently brought to the attention of the Government. One transport boat, the *Eastport*, was ordered to be purchased, and converted into a gunboat on the Tennessee River, but it was unfortunately too late to be of any service.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
Knoxville, November 28, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

I have received a note from Brownlow, stating that he would come in if I would guarantee no personal violence. He has not been with any armed troops. Will send copy of his letter.

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
Greenville, East Tenn., November 28, 1861.

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond :*

SIR: Since my last, dated at Johnson Station, Carter County, I have placed Captain McClellan, of the Tennessee cavalry, with his company, at Elizabethtown, the county town of Carter County, with a view to preserve order and hold the disaffected in check. He reports an improvement in the aspect of affairs in that neighborhood.

Captain White, of the Third Georgia Battalion, occupies the crossing of the Holston at Union, protecting the county bridge, so necessary since the burning of the other. A part of his company also guards the bridge over the Watauga at Carter Depot, and the remainder of it is at Johnson Station, or Haynesville, where there is a water-tank, now important, and generally a quantity of rolling stock.

The headquarters of the command has been removed to Greeneville, Greene County, hitherto regarded perhaps as the headquarters of insurrection. This county voted for the Union by four to one and continues much disturbed. On the 24th, soon after my arrival here, it was found that a party of 200 or 300 were in arms at a place called Chimney Top, in the northern part of the county, and it was thought advisable to disperse them at once. Stovall's battalion being joined by two companies of Colonel Powell's regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel Arnold) and half a company of Tennessee cavalry (Captain McLin), I marched the command in that direction on the morning of the 24th instant. In the course of the day we learned that a part of the insurgent force had crossed our road in the preceding night, but we kept on, hoping to find the main body. Toward night it was ascertained that it was the whole force which had retreated in the preceding night, and their absence was verified by our cavalry.

On the morning of the 25th we retraced our steps to the line of the insurgents' retreat, when, being ill from weather and water, I turned over the command to Colonel Stovall, with orders to pursue as far as practicable. The cavalry had already been in pursuit since early morning. Colonel Stovall continued the pursuit to the Chucky River, in the neighborhood of Rheatown, where, finding no bridge nor ferry-boat, and a bad ford, he deemed it advisable to return with his immediate command to this place. Captain Yeiser, of the artillery, crossed, however, with his two pieces, and succeeded in capturing two insurgent prisoners, one holding the rank of captain (Waddell) in that body. Lieutenant-Colonel Arnold, having succeeded in mounting most of his two companies, also crossed the Chucky and joined the cavalry. This was on the 25th, and to-day he has sent in for re-enforcements, which have gone to him—something over a hundred men, under Major Rudler.

The insurgents appear to be making for Cocke and Sevier Counties,



where they are said to have many friends. To-day a messenger from Parrottsville, Cocke County, brings intelligence that insurgents were approaching that village this morning, and the inhabitants were in instant expectation of attack. On every hand we hear of similar movements, accounts often exaggerated, but there is really great commotion and hostility.

I think that we have effected something, have done some good; but whenever a foreign force enters this country, be it soon or late, three-fourths of this people will rise in arms to join them. At present they seem indisposed to fight, and the great difficulty is to reach them. Scattering in the mountain paths, they can scarcely be caught; and as their arms are hidden when not in use, it is almost impossible to disarm them. Cavalry, though a bad force for fighting them in case they would fight, is yet the only force which can reach them. It is adequate, too, to disperse and capture them in their present state of *morale*. I am confident that a mounted regiment with two very light guns would do more to quiet this tier of counties than five times the number on foot. We could do something by pressing horses, but they are generally needed for the daily wants of the people. In default of regular mounted troops, 500 horses at least must be impressed, and perhaps 1,000. The people of Greeneville seem to be peaceful enough.

The bridge over Lick Creek, or rather the trestle work, has been finished for some days; that at the Holston is going on favorably. The company had proposed not to trestle the latter, but to rebuild the bridge—a work of some months. I thought it my duty to insist on the trestle work, which can be done in three weeks, at a cost of \$1,500, and which will afford a passage and also be of great service in building the bridge itself. At the Hiwassee trestling is not feasible, owing to the great depth of water, the character of the bottom, and the sudden freshets of the stream. Lieutenant Mason, Virginia Engineers, reports that the work of rebuilding there is going on favorably.

Col. S. A. M. Wood, of the Seventh Alabama, having disposed of a part of his regiment, as directed, for the protection of the bridges between Chattanooga and Knoxville, has his main body near the former place. He appears to have been very zealous and active against the insurgents and has captured some prisoners. He urges the importance of keeping the regiment in that immediate vicinity in order to repress disturbances, which are so prevalent. I understand that troops of Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll are stationed on some parts of the road and are building winter quarters. We are not likely to have too many troops, but I could wish the command to be a unit and not doubtful. I propose to pass over the whole line within a day or two from this date, to learn what dispositions are necessary for the winter. It is presumed that the troops of Generals Zollicoffer and Carroll are intended more especially for operations against the insurgents.

Twenty-two prisoners have been sent to Nashville from Carter County, and we have now in confinement some 5 or 6 known to have been in arms, and who will be sent to Tuscaloosa, under the order of the War Department dated the 25th instant.

Our men are much in want of blankets, the weather varying only from cold and wet to cold and dry. Many cases of pneumonia have already appeared. I am looking anxiously for the North Carolina regiment.

Very respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

D. LEADBETTER,

Colonel, P. A. C. S., Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,  
CENTRAL COLUMN OF KENTUCKY,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., November 28, 1861.*

Capt. JOHN H. MORGAN:

SIR: You will without delay join and take command of your squadron, now at or near Roan's, on Green River. You will receive the two letters of instruction, dated the 26th instant, under which Capt. T. W. Allen is acting, and proceed to carry them out, except as herein altered. You will, should you deem it sufficiently safe, cross Green River, to get the cattle and hogs or to attack the Federal Home Guards' force; but you will avoid carefully any movement which would involve considerable risk or serious delay. It is important that you should return, at furthest, by December 1, and as much earlier as possible.

By order of General Buckner:

G. B. COSBY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Inclosures.]

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,  
CENTRAL ARMY OF KENTUCKY,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., November 26, 1861.*

Capt. T. W. ALLEN,  
*Comdg. Captain Morgan's Cavalry Squadron:*

SIR: You will proceed early to-morrow morning, with all the available force of your command, provided with one day's rations, to the vicinity of George Roan's, on Green River, and find about fifty head of fat cattle and a lot of hogs, belonging to a man in that neighborhood, who will be designated by a guide who will accompany you. You will drive the cattle and hogs into Bowling Green and deliver them to Major Williamson, assistant commissary-general. It is expected that a band of Federals, supposed to number about sixty, have been committing depredations in Roan's neighborhood. You will, should you find, after thorough investigation, your force sufficient to overcome them, endeavor to capture them or their arms, &c., but you will not pursue them farther than is consistent with the safety of your command, and you will remain on this side of Green River. You will collect as much information as possible about the movements of the enemy and the disposition of the citizens. You will return as soon as these orders can be carried into effect. Should you be absent more than one day, you will make full reports by courier daily to these headquarters.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION,  
CENTRAL COLUMN OF KENTUCKY,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., November 26, 1861.*

Capt. T. W. ALLEN,  
*Commanding Morgan's Squadron:*

SIR: I am directed by General Buckner to give you these further instructions: Your absence from here must not exceed two days. If

you cannot return to-morrow (Wednesday night) you must report by couriers. You must not bring the hogs if it will seriously delay your command, but bring the cattle. It is important that your command should return as soon as possible.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

G. B. COSBY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Near Newbury, November 28, 1861.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,  
*Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: I occupy a position midway between Mill Springs and Burkesville for a day or two, to perfect my knowledge of the topography, resources, &c., of the country, before selecting a position for quarters in severe weather and as a basis of action in mild weather this winter.

Mill Springs, 22 miles east, is in a fertile region, with grist and saw mill, wood, water, and capable of easy defense, commanding the ferry. Geographically it is the best position on this side of the river for commanding the approaches to Cumberland Gap and Jacksborough. Burkesville or Creelsborough would better enable me to open the Cumberland and make secure our supply trains. During the winter, when the wagon roads are so bad, it would be far preferable to draw indispensable supplies direct from Nashville instead of Knoxville.

Brought to Gainesborough, between 40 and 50 miles from here, on boats, 50 or 60 miles of wagoning over bad roads would be saved between here and Knoxville. If the country north of the river between Burkesville and Gainesborough can be cleared of the enemy, they might subsequently be brought to the former place. Pork, corn, beef, hay, or fodder, horses, &c., are abundant and cheap here. I think the supply of flour will be good.

This will be handed to you by Maj. Alex. Wynn, who visits you to obtain General Johnston's assent to this arrangement, and, if obtained, to see the proper officers of the quartermaster and commissary departments at Nashville, and perfect the arrangements at as early a day as practicable.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

P. S.—I am not yet aware that Major-General Crittenden has assumed command in this district.

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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CAMP NEAR POUND GAP, WISE COUNTY, VIRGINIA,  
*November 28, 1861.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Bowling Green, Ky.:*

GENERAL: When I was on my way to take command of this column I informed you by letter, with a request for such instructions as you might have to communicate. The President directed two regiments from Virginia and a battery of four pieces to report to me, and directed



me to assume the command of all the troops at Prestonburg and in that vicinity, "for the protection and defense of that frontier."

My appointment, following certain political conversations, was accepted, with an understanding of the scope of what was expected. My authority to accept and raise companies, battalions, and regiments into the service of the Confederate States was made express and unlimited, and my separate command (only under your general direction, as military chief of the department) was assured in terms.

It was then rumored at Richmond that some 2,000 or 2,500 men were in Prestonburg and were being rapidly mustered into the service of the Confederate States, and it was the supposition of the Department of War that, with the two regiments from Virginia, I should have a force to commence my operations with of about 5,000 men or its equivalent. But the regiment of Colonel Trigg (Fifty-fourth Virginia) took the field with only 560 effective men, and the other, under Colonel Moore, of Abingdon, has not yet joined me with one of his wings, nor has that officer, as late as four days since, received his arms; so he reports by letter.

On my arrival here I found a force (which was intended to be joined to the Abingdon battalion, so as to make a regiment) stationed in Pound Gap, 350 strong, under Major Thompson, whereas James Giles was indicated as the person to be made major of Moore's regiment when organized by me, as per order from the Adjutant-General. I found, moreover, that this battalion had been raised by order of Brigadier-General Zollicoffer for twelve months, to answer a special service, to wit, to defend the mountain gaps and to be kept in the counties of Lee, Scott, and Wise, in the State of Virginia, and that the men were not willing to dispense with the condition expressed in their enlistment nor willing to pass into Kentucky.

Under these circumstances I deemed it most prudent not to attempt the organization of Moore's regiment without further orders from the Adjutant-General, whom I advised of the state of facts in the case. I gave Colonel Moore orders to move the Abingdon battalion to this point as early as the 6th of November, and reported them in writing on the 9th of same month. He has not yet come up, for the reason already alluded to—want of arms, clothing, rations, and transportation. He has not reported to me the strength of the force immediately under his command, nor can I estimate it beforehand further than to say I suppose it will be from 350 to 400 men, making the whole Virginia force in this column some 1,200 to 1,300 men, or little more than one regiment, including the special-service men—little less than one full regiment, excluding them.

The infantry force under Col. John S. Williams is reported to me to be 799 or 835 in the aggregate of officers and men, and the mounted force at 400. So that from the best knowledge I have, sir, I will state the total force subject to my orders to be, infantry, 2,100; mounted men, 400; battery, four pieces, 65 men. Yet in this estimate I count 400 under Moore, who have not yet left their homes at Abingdon, but it is reported they will move during this week. Say a total of all arms of 2,500 men, which is just half of the number I expected to take the field with.

The men under Colonel Williams are not yet in their winter clothing, though requisition after requisition has been made. I understand, however, some clothing, probably sufficient for the command, has arrived at Abingdon, and will be brought forward in a few days. This force under Colonel Williams has been so constantly pressed by the superior force of the enemy, that it has not been drilled at all, and is as unskilled in tactics as the common militia of the country. The officers seem well

disposed to learn, and I hope to be able at an early day to make the body effective as a regiment. The regiment under Trigg is tolerably well drilled in the school of the battalion; the mounted force not yet drilled at all. They are generally armed with rifles or muskets or shot-guns. I have no regularly-armed cavalry as yet.

Finding that Colonel Williams was compelled to break up his camp at Prestonburg and was retreating on Pike-ton, I moved Trigg's force as rapidly as I could in the direction of Pike-ton from Wytheville, and ordered Colonel Moore to move to the Pound Gap from Abingdon, intending to offer reinforcements to Colonel Williams, no matter where he might be.

On arriving at Jeffersonville I ascertained by courier from Colonel Williams that he had abandoned Pike-ton and was retreating by a country cross-road to Pound Gap. The road from Sandy to Jeffersonville, to the Salt Works and the Lead Mines, was now entirely open to the enemy, 6,000 strong, at the Kentucky line. There was no defense; for, at 70 miles to my right, when at Jeffersonville, General Floyd was at the moment pressed back from Cotton Hill (the confluence of the Gaudy and New Rivers) and was moving to Raleigh Court-House, on a line perpendicular to the route from Wytheville to Jeffersonville. His force was reported at 4,000, Rosecrans' at 10,000. If Williams was able to reach Pound Gap and Moore should re-enforce him, he should have at the gap 1,800 or 2,000 men. Yet from the Abingdon road to the Tug Fork of Sandy there was not a single soldier except Trigg's regiment of 560 men and Jeffress' battery of four pieces.

In consequence of this I moved Trigg's regiment and the battery to a point 18 miles northwest of Jeffersonville, which covers the roads leading to the Salt Works from Sandy River, as also the roads to Jeffersonville.

Leaving Trigg's regiment there, to be sustained by the militia if necessary (for the brigadier-general in that brigade turned them all out to meet the supposed exigency after I declined to exert that authority) I came over to this point (about 80 miles), to look to the condition of affairs here and to organize the forces here for the defense of Pound Gap, as well as to fortify it, and then it was my intention to return and lead Trigg's regiment on, if sufficiently re-enforced to promise any success.

I am gratified to say that on my arrival here reliable information was obtained that the enemy had retreated. I cannot give you any idea of the reasons which influenced the withdrawal of the enemy's force from Pikeville. Their retreat was precipitate from all directions east of the Olympian Springs, according to rumor, but I have only ascertained satisfactorily that the force has been withdrawn from the upper valley of the Sandy. It may be withdrawn to the lower levels of the country for more pleasant winter quarters. The withdrawal, be it from what cause it may, is eminently fortunate for us, as the provisions for this part of the country are absolutely exhausted, while they are said to be cheap and plenty in Kentucky.

It is my purpose to move my mounted force into Kentucky immediately, and to throw it forward at least as far as West Liberty, and, if possible, as far as the line from Louisa to the Olympian Springs, while my infantry force will be located upon a line from Whitesburg, in Letcher County, to Prestonburg, on the Sandy. There is a passable road from the one point to the other.

Trigg's regiment and the battery will occupy my right flank at Prestonburg, Williams on the head of Beaver Creek, and the regiment



of Moore at Whitesburg, with the special-service men in the Gap. I am not strong enough to go forward thus far to ascertain what the people of Kentucky will do, unless you should find it in your power to let me have two or three regiments, in which case I would propose to cover more of the country, so as to let out the provisions and men of the State. The people of the country are not very well affected, for the same insolent domineering has been carried on in the mountains as elsewhere.

The enemy suffered severely at the battle of Ivy, where 250 of this command were engaged against a column of 1,500 for one hour and ten minutes. We lost 5 killed and 13 wounded; the enemy lost over 300 killed and how many wounded we cannot say. The graves of the enemy are reported at 396. It was a success, brilliant in conception and execution, though the enemy recovered in time to outflank our men, and they in turn withdrew from the ground without loss when their ground could no longer be maintained.

If you find this letter long and its report less formal than you would desire, it is yet the best account I am able now to give of affairs in this section.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, November 29, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith two letters, one from Gov. I. G. Harris, of Tennessee, and the other from Col. B. R. Johnson, late Chief of Engineers of the State.\*

I have to state, in reference to the subject of Governor Harris' letter to me, that a large force may now be expected to respond to his call for 30,000 men, of which I believe he desires all may, if possible, be volunteers. Should a large portion only be volunteers, a number of brigadier-generals will be required to command them.

Governor Harris has mentioned the names of several gentlemen who, in his opinion, are qualified to discharge the duties incidental to that grade, and whose appointment would contribute greatly to the public advantage and to him be a personal gratification. I have no acquaintance with the gentlemen proposed, except very slight with one (Colonel Johnson, whose education qualifies him for the office sought), but on account of the earnest zeal of the Governor for the cause, his courtesy and ready assistance on all occasions in which the public interest may be promoted, it affords me great pleasure to present his wishes with regard to the appointment of these gentlemen for the consideration of his excellency the President.

I have nothing worthy of mention to report since my last letter. We are making every possible effort to meet the force which the enemy will soon array against us, both on this line and at Columbus. Had the exigency for my call for 50,000 men in September been better comprehended and responded to, our preparations for this great emergency would now be complete.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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\*Neither found.



BOWLING GREEN, *November 29, 1861.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL, *Bowling Green:*

I have completed a thorough examination of Henry and Donelson and do not admire the aspect of things. I must have more heavy guns for both places at once, not less than four for each; one also of long range for each, say sixty-fours. Say to the general I have 1,000 un-armed men; no hope for any arms but from him. A message from Paducah and Columbus yesterday indicates a movement this way. Will he not let [me] have 1,000 arms from Nashville? I feel for the first time discouraged, but will not give up. Answer me at Clarksville.

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Knoxville, November 29, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: Herewith please find copy of letter received from Dr. Brownlow, and my reply.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

[Inclosures.]

FRIDAY, *November 22, 1861.*

General W. H. CARROLL:

Having understood that you are to be placed in command of Knoxville in a few days, I desire to make a statement to you, the truth of which I am willing to swear to before any tribunal.

I left home on the 4th of this instant to attend the chancery court at Maryville and to go to Sevierville to collect fees due me for advertising, and I in part succeeded. I have only been in Blount and Sevier Counties. I have not been in any body of armed men or in any way connected with the arming of any man or getting up any force whatever. I left home and have remained away at the earnest and repeated solicitations of my family, who insisted they would be more secure in my absence. Certain troops came daily on my portico and in front of my house, drew out and flourished side-arms, and sometimes presented muskets, threatening my life. I was told that they were under the command of an Alabama officer by the name of Wood, and that he was prejudiced against me. I don't know how this is. As it regards bridge-burning, I never had an intimation of any such purpose from any quarter at any time, and when I heard of the burning of the bridges on the Saturday night after it occurred I was utterly astonished. I condemn the act most unqualifiedly, and regard it as an ill-timed measure, calculated to bring no good to any one or any party, but much harm to innocent men and to the public.

When I, together with fifteen or twenty other men, signed a communication to General Zollicoffer, which was published in all the Tennessee papers, pledging ourselves to advise peace and to oppose all attempts at rebellion and such outrages as bridge-burning, I acted in good faith and I have kept that faith; and had a knowledge of any

purpose to burn the bridges been communicated to me, I should have felt bound in all honor and good conscience to have disclosed the fact to the chief officers of the roads; and if I were at liberty to bring out one issue of my paper I would state all these facts to the public more in detail and more nervous terms. I am willing and ready at any time to stand a trial upon these or any other points before any civil tribunal, but I protest against being turned over to an infuriated mob of armed men, filled with prejudices by my bitterest enemies.

This communication will be handed you by my friend Colonel Williams, who is favorably known to you.

I am, very respectfully, &c.,

W. G. BROWNLOW.

HEADQUARTERS,

Knoxville, November 28, 1861.

Rev. Dr. BROWNLOW:

SIR: It is my business here to afford protection to all citizens who are loyal to the Confederate States, and I shall use all the force at my command to that end. You may be fully assured that you will meet with no personal violence by returning to your home, and if you can establish what you say in your letter of the 22d instant, you shall have every opportunity to do so before the civil tribunal, if necessary, provided you have committed no act that will make it necessary for the military law to take cognizance. I desire that every loyal citizen, regardless of former political opinions, shall be fully protected in all his rights and privileges, to accomplish which I shall bend all my energies, and have no doubt I shall be successful.

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS,

Knoxville, November 29, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond:*

SIR: I am just in receipt of yours of 25th. Your instructions shall be strictly obeyed. I have not heretofore released any against whom there was proof that they had been engaged in any rebellious movements. It was only those who were arrested upon mere suspicion that I permitted to take the oath of allegiance. I telegraphed you to-day that Judge Humphreys had issued writs of *habeas corpus* in the cases of several prisoners who are beyond doubt guilty of burning the railroad bridges, predicated, as I understand, upon the affidavits of Baxter and other lawyers. Your instructions are fully understood and I shall not allow any interference in their execution.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 4. }

HEADQUARTERS,  
Knoxville, November 29, 1861.

The Government of the Confederate States has not nor will it interfere with individuals on account of their political opinions. The Presi-

dent of the Confederate States issued a proclamation, stating that all those who did not fully recognize their allegiance to the Government should dispose of or remove from its limits, with their effects, before October, 1861. Those persons who remained tacitly recognized the Government and are amenable to the laws.

The commanding general at this post will endeavor to fully carry out the policy of the Government. While he will afford ample protection to all citizens who peaceably pursue their ordinary occupations, he will order the arrest of all who may take up arms against the Government or who in any manner may aid or abet its enemies or incite rebellion, in order that they may be tried by military law.

By order of Brig. Gen. W. H. Carroll, commanding post:

G. H. MONSARRAT,

*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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KNOXVILLE, November 29, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,

*Secretary of War:*

General W. H. Carroll, commanding this post, has ordered a general court-martial for the trial by the military authorities of persons charged with burning the bridges in East Tennessee and of the Tories who have been recently captured with arms in their hands against the Government. The question as to the jurisdiction of courts-martial in such cases has been raised in the court, and it is insisted that the civil authorities have some jurisdiction of the persons in such offenses. Please instruct what course to pursue. A court-martial will be much more effective in ferreting out the offenders. Please answer at as early moment as possible, as it is very desirable to put these matters through rapidly. Writs of *habeas corpus* have been and will be issued.

R. F. LOONEY,

*Colonel, and President of Court.*

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KNOXVILLE, TENN., November 29, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,

*Secretary of War, &c.:*

SIR: Your satisfactory favor of the 12th was duly received.\* The rebellion in East Tennessee is nearly smothered, but is far from being extinguished, and would burst forth with increased intensity had the enemy a commissioned Lincoln commander, quartermaster, and paymaster within our borders to form a nucleus around which our malcontent and disloyal people could rally. The stampede from Camp Dick Robinson has given to our Tennessee refugees an opportunity to desert the United States standard there, and many of them have sneaked home and are secreting themselves in the woods. They communicate occasionally with the disaffected of our citizens, and this has had a good effect in quieting some insurgents and those who sympathize in the incendiarism, bridge-burning, &c. I still think, however, that this calm may be only temporary. We need here commanders and officers who

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\* See Series I, Vol. IV, p. 540.



have no sympathies with their Union and disloyal acquaintances and relatives and associates. A stern man from one of the cotton States, who has no knowledge of our people and their past political affinities, would be best able to control the conflicting elements out of which our population is constituted. Our mountain defenses have probably deterred the enemy from further invasion upon our northern border. His next effort may probably be directed through Lee, Russell, and Washington Counties, Virginia. At least there will be a feint there, to keep our East Tennessee forces unemployed, and thus prevent reinforcements being sent from here to aid Zollicoffer or the Lower Cumberland.

I have the honor to be, yours, &c.,

J. G. M. RAMSEY.

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CAMP AT CUMBERLAND GAP, *November 29, 1861.*

S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General:*

GENERAL: Learning that Piketon had been evacuated by Colonel Williams, and that General Floyd had fallen back from Cotton Hill to Raleigh Court-House while I was at Jeffersonville, and that the force of the enemy at Piketon was about 6,000, I deemed it prudent to halt what force I had in hand at a point 18 miles from Jeffersonville, which at once guarded the roads from Sandy River to Jeffersonville and from Sandy to the Salt Works.

It may be as well to note particularly to you that the position at Claypole's, where Trigg's regiment has been posted, is the strongest strategical position in the whole country to cover the approaches from Sandy River to the interior of Virginia. I have studied the country and understand it. The position can only be turned by a force coming from the Gauley or from Cumberland Gap, and there are good roads for retreat from either. At 5 miles from that camp, directly to its rear, you fall into the main State road from Jeffersonville to Lebanon, and this cross-road is practicable for wagons I know, as I passed one over it myself. This cross-road is a gorge the whole way, presenting innumerable points for successful defense which might be used to delay an advancing foe. I mention this in case you should be suddenly called to look to this again.

The brigadier-general of the Tazewell militia turned out his brigade to defend that section. I declined to exert any authority over the militia or to call them out anywhere, preferring to submit my request for re-enforcements to you.

Anxious about the condition of things here, I traveled by Lebanon to this place—distant from Trigg's camp to wit: From Trigg's camp to Lebanon road, 5 miles; thence to Lebanon, 22 miles; Lebanon to Castlewood (Clinch River), 20 miles; Castlewood to Gladesville, 23 miles; Gladesville to Pound, 12 miles; Pound to Pound Gap, 5 miles; total, 87 miles—intending to see to the defenses proper for Pound Gap and to ascertain the exact condition of organization in this force.

I found the mounted corps had fallen back to Castlewood, behind Clinch River, to recruit and forage, there being no forage nearer to Pound Gap. The command was under captains, invested temporarily with the powers of lieutenant-colonel and major, by order of Colonel Williams. I determined to give the mounted force the organization of a battalion, and as it met the wishes both of the captains and the men, I requested that they would indicate their own preference as to who

should be appointed to command the battalion during its term of service. That indication was expressed in the recommendation of Hon. W. E. Simms, and I concurred, of course, in asking the President to issue the commission to him.

I found 800 men here, acting as a regiment of infantry, badly clothed—indeed, miserably clad—very inexperienced in the use of the gun, but brave and good looking. Colonel Williams had detailed Captain May to act as lieutenant-colonel and Captain Hawkins as major. He informed me that he had applied for appointments for them.

I have in a former letter given you the facts touching the force in the Gap. I now inclose a communication from Major Thompson\* on that subject, by which the one condition of enlistment will be apparent. The battalion is very excellent in appearance, though it has gone through the measles. I think it had best be kept where it will be more within the conditions of its enlistment, and its officer I cannot commend as very attentive, energetic, and efficient.

I shall move my whole command into Kentucky within a day or two, and shall occupy the line from Prestonburg to Whitesburg.

I am, &c.,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

I omitted to report that the enemy has withdrawn beyond Prestonburg.

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Fort Donelson, November 29, 1861.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Commanding Western Department:*

SIR: The defenses of both Forts Donelson and Henry demand that a light battery should be prepared at both places with the loss of as little time as possible.

At the former place I need nothing more than the horses to equip the battery completely. At Fort Henry I have but one field gun, but with two spare pieces at Fort Donelson. I shall need only two 12-pounder howitzers to make up the complement.

The absolute necessity of our occupying an eminence on the opposite side of the river from Fort Henry involves not only the erection of a small field work there, with several heavy guns, but also the occupation of an advanced point with a small force, aided by a field battery.

I am informed that the State of Alabama will send a full regiment to this point, with 500 negroes, for building the work. This information reaches me through Colonel Heiman, commanding post. The regiment is intended for the main work on what is called Stewart's Hill, and will arrive in a few days (10 days). The advanced work spoken of was not contemplated when the agent of the State of Alabama was there on the 26th instant. It is essential, and the battalion of 500 men can be easily raised. This will involve the necessity of another light battery of four pieces, all of which will have to be furnished.

To equip these light batteries it will require six horses to each team at Fort Donelson, on account of the roads, and four for Henry and the works last spoken of; in all, 202 horses, at an average cost of \$140, requiring the sum of \$28,280. I deem the necessity so great, that I

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\* Not found.



have appointed agents to purchase, and they are now engaged in procuring horses for the battery at Donelson—Captain Maney's.

If my views on the subject of what I deem necessary meet your approbation, I request the necessary instructions to the ordnance officer at Nashville be issued, and that the quartermaster handing you this (Captain Roberts, of the Fourteenth Tennessee) have his requisition for the funds necessary to carry out the object approved.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, November 29, 1861.*

Maj. J. F. GILMER,  
*Chief Engineer, Nashville:*

General Johnston directs you to select a suitable point in the vicinity of Nashville for the assembling of the militia and volunteer force now arriving. He wishes it to be chosen in reference to the defense of the city, so that, should the army fall back from this point, the militia would be on the line of strength and at a point where they would resist the enemy without maneuvering.

I am further instructed to say that, having settled the point, you will notify it to Governor Harris, who will then be requested to assemble these forces upon it. Any strength you may be able to give to the position by field works should be done at once.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

CAMP BURNAM, *November 30, 1861.*

ALEX. CASSEDAY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, at 4 p. m. 28th instant I took charge of my squadron, that had been ordered to proceed to Roan's, on Green River. When I found it, under command of Captain Allen, they had crossed with a portion of the command and gone into Butler County about 8 miles. They found at one house a Lincoln soldier, who was sick; took possession of an army overcoat and musket. He stated Colonel Hawkins was at Calhoun, with two infantry regiments and Colonel Jackson's regiment of cavalry; he had also two skeleton regiments; he did not intend to move until they were filled. He said there were a great many cases of measles in camp; that in Edmonson County, at a place called Blue Ruin, there was a camp of 300 or 400 men. Captain Allen did not arrest this man, because he was so unwell that he feared it would endanger his life.

About 15 cattle were crossed to Roan's that night. Late that evening I crossed Green River, with about 80 men, and proceeded into the interior of Butler County about 12 miles; found nearly all of the men absent from home; women said they had gone to the Army. Found at some houses 20 women, who were staying together while their husbands were absent. Stopped at a house where there was a sick Lincoln soldier, who died that night. No men being in the neighborhood,



his wife having no person to make a coffin or bury him, I detailed some men, who made a coffin.

The streams were rising so rapidly that my command had to fall back to Green River. Crossed about 40 cattle, which I left in charge of a sergeant and 15 men, who will be in on 1st December. Got no hogs, owing to the high stage of water in all the creeks. Some cattle which had been brought to the river had to be left, owing to the large quantity of drift which was running; could not be forced into the water. Arrived in camp at 5 p. m.

Respectfully,

JOHN H. MORGAN,  
*Commanding Scouting Party.*

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Mill Springs, November 30, 1861.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,  
*Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: I reached this point on the Cumberland River last evening. Recent rains have much swollen the river. Colonel Stanton, who was ordered forward from Camp McGinnis on the 20th, with his and Colonel Morroy's [Murray's] regiment and Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan's cavalry, to seize the ferry-boats at different crossings, failed to secure any of the boats. I am now preparing to provide the means of crossing the river. The lumber and the saw-mill here will materially aid in constructing boats. The enemy's camp, 9 miles above, on the right bank, appears to have been re-enforced, but to what extent I have not been able to ascertain. Our pickets sent up on this side (opposite) to-day were fired on. Colonel Stanton reported to me two days ago that he had secured two ferry-boats, but it appears they have got away. He was ordered to cross the river to endeavor to cut off 800 of the enemy, then at Camp Goggin, 9 miles above. He failed to cross for want of boats. So soon as it is possible I will cross the river in force.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

P. S.—The written report just received from the pickets fired on to-day up the river. The fire was returned. The enemy employed musketry and artillery—a 12 and a 6 pounder. One of our men wounded; one of theirs killed.

Respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

EXCHANGE HOTEL,  
*Richmond, Va., November 30, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va., Present, &c.:*

MY DEAR SIR: The object of the interview which I sought on yesterday, and which was so readily accorded to me by the President and yourself, in reference to affairs in East Tennessee, was to impress your

minds with the importance of dealing justly and generously with the Union element of that section as the best means of securing their affections and loyalty to this Government. The causes which have induced such obstinate adhesion to the Federal Government on the part of so many were frankly stated in our conversation. Until they are made to feel that they will be recognized as citizens, entitled to the same consideration and protection vouchsafed to those entertaining opposite views, they will not yield a willing allegiance or active and efficient support to the Confederate Government. Whilst the Government, therefore, with a steady purpose, inflicts just punishment on actual offenders by due course of law, it is essential that the Union men should be made to feel that they, in common with the adherents of this Government, are the objects of solicitude on the part of this Government, and that they will be protected against arrests for opinions merely, and against lawless exactions and unauthorized impressment of their private property by the soldiery stationed among them. This can be most successfully done by placing the civil and military power of that department in the hands of discreet men, with enlarged, liberal, and just views, who are capable of rising above the influence and demands of local combinations and cliques, with instructions to proceed at once and discharge such prisoners as are now held without sufficient cause (for in my opinion there are quite a number of this character), and to redress the wrongs of citizens whose property has been seized or improperly taken from them by the soldiery.

This policy will tend to repress violence and conciliate favor. By degrees their strong and deeply-seated hostility to this Government can be overcome. Followed by proper efforts, they can be induced to volunteer for active service, and so strongly committed and identified with the South as to render them useful and effective in achieving our independence and preventing the possibility of civil war in the event a Federal force should be able to force its way into East Tennessee.

If there is no good reason of public policy to the contrary, I would be pleased to carry back a passport for Brownlow to leave the country, as well as a copy of the instructions under which the military and civil authorities are required to act, because it is believed that if the spirit of the Government, as manifested by its executive officer, was better understood by the people of East Tennessee, it would exert a salutary influence, and remove some of the apprehensions which are now driving them to desperation and to violence.

It is my purpose to leave in the morning, and with your permission I will call at 2 o'clock to learn your pleasure in the premises.

Respectfully, &c.,

JNO. BAXTER.

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Greeneville, November 30, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

Two insurgents have to-day been tried for bridge-burning, found guilty, and hanged.

D. LEADBETTER,  
*Colonel.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Bowling Green, Ky., November 30, 1861.

Maj. A. J. SMITH,  
Principal Quartermaster :

A large armed force is being assembled at Corinth and Grenada, Miss. Make arrangements for furnishing supplies. I cannot state the number. You must appoint capable agents and give them large discretion.

Time presses. Act at once.

W. W. MACKALL,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

*Abstract from return of the First Division, Western Department, commanded by Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, U. S. Army, for November, 1861.\**

[Headquarters at Columbus, Ky.]

Troops.	Present for duty.						Aggregate present.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.		
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
1st Division.....	199	3,236	19	294	7	173	4,416
2d Division.....	236	3,225	21	257	3	74	4,527
3d Division.....	139	1,989	10	204	6	221	3,162
4th Division.....	179	2,789	9	160	12	212	4,265
Stewart's command.....	283	4,286					5,826
Totals.....	1,036	15,535	59	915	52	1,050	22,196

AGGREGATE PRESENT FOR DUTY.

Infantry .....	16,571
Cavalry .....	974
Artillery .....	1,102
Grand aggregate .....	18,647

*Abstract from return of Division No. 1, Western Department, commanded by Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, U. S. Army, for November, 1861.*

Troops.	Present for duty.						Aggregate present.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.		
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	
Pillow's command.....	545	8 788	53	816	10	155	12,416
Camp Beauregard.....	193	2, 068					3, 713
Union City.....	96	1, 563					1, 705
Fort Pillow.....	32	713			6	145	984
Memphis.....	132	2, 239					2, 362
Trenton.....	48	916					964
Fort Henry.....	48	816					864
Island No. 10.....	4	48					65
Totals.....	1, 098	17, 742	53	816	16	300	23, 073

\* The returns from which this and the following abstract was made seem to be of the same troops and for the same period, but the classification differs, and there is a discrepancy of 1,378 between the two aggregates of "present for duty."



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## AGGREGATE PRESENT FOR DUTY.

Infantry .....	18,840
Cavalry .....	869
Artillery .....	316
Grand aggregate .....	20,025

*Abstract from return of Fourth Division, Western Department, Col. John S. Bowen, First Missouri Infantry, commanding, on November 30, 1861.*

## [Headquarters Camp Beauregard, Ky.]

Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Officers.	Men.		
First Brigade:				
9th Arkansas .....	35	483	611	822
Kentucky Battalion .....	12	267	324	351
22d Mississippi .....	38	597	795	873
Watson battery .....	5	94	111	124
Williams' battery .....	2	43	49	57
Total .....	92	1,484	1,890	2,227
Second Brigade:				
10th Arkansas .....	35	348	649	695
1st Mississippi Valley .....	32	563	742	787
1st Missouri .....	27	531	663	739
Hudson's battery .....	5	75	105	109
Cavalry battalion .....	9	160	211	237
Total .....	108	1,677	2,370	2,567
Grand total .....	200	3,161	4,260	4,794

FORT PILLOW, *December 1, 1861.*

Major-General POLK:

SIR: In obedience to order of Colonel De Russy, received by telegram yesterday, I now report to you conditions of things at this post:

We have in all fifty-eight 32-pounder guns; fifty-seven of them are mounted and ready for use; the remaining one is not mounted, for want of a suitable carriage. Four of these guns are rifled and mounted in battery marked A on your map, in place of the red guns sent to Columbus. Two guns have been recently sent to Memphis to be rifled, and will be mounted in same battery.

We have platforms ready for sixteen guns and room for eighteen more platforms not yet built.

The parapet of entire back line, as laid off on your map, is finished, except a small amount of work on a heavy embankment which crosses the Fulton Road Valley. I had commenced work extending the north end of entrenched line from the top of the hill down to Cold Creek, but the hands were taken to New Madrid and did but little work on it. The remaining work to be done is about one mile of *banquette*, a half mile of clearing of timber, and the dressing up of the entire north or left flank.

The magazine in Battery B is finished; the work on the others was suspended for the want of timber. We now have timber sufficient

to build two, which are at this time being constructed and will be finished in a few days. Two more will be required, which will be built as soon as the timber can be had.

The pile-driving has progressed rather slow, for reasons out of my power to remedy. (My requisitions receive but little attention at Memphis.) I am now driving in the river, and have progressed so far as to feel confident of success in my plan (which was condemned by many), but confess that I am anxiously waiting to witness the effect of high water upon them. I am driving them inclined upstream, and find that the drift, as it lodges, disappears under the water, and seems to remain at the bottom.

If the piles stand, the navigable width of the river will be reduced to about 600 yards, and I think will form as perfect hull-inspectors for boats coming down as do the Mississippi sawyers for boats going up. Now that my men, who were all novices at such work, have got the hang of it, I shall be able to progress very well, if the wind will ever stop blowing. We have but 42 negroes here now and I hear of no more coming. Colonel Williamson is yet absent.

I believe, sir, I have given a correct statement of affairs here, and feel confident that I would be able to give a more flattering one after a second visit to this place by yourself.

It would afford me much pleasure to be engaged mounting a few 32-pounder ship carronades on our rear line, and I understand there are plenty of them at Norfolk.

Most respectfully, &c.,

MONTGOMERY LYNCH,  
*Captain, Corps Engineers.*

CAMP AT POUND GAP, *December 1, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. G. B. CRITTENDEN :

SIR : Since I dispatched yesterday your courier upon his return the Fifty-sixth Regiment of Virginia Volunteers, under Colonel Stuart, has been reported to me as at Abingdon, on its way to join my command. It is said to be 600 strong.

I learned yesterday that the enemy occupies Louisa (45 miles from Prestonburg), with a force of 3,000 men, and had signified his expectation to move back to Piketon whenever I moved in that direction. As my column on the Louisa Fork of Sandy River is in motion, and has been for some days, upon Piketon, I think it will be imprudent to send any force from this place to Nashville, and I have therefore countermanded the order for the regiment of Colonel Williams to march to Abingdon.

I shall move from this place to-day *en route* for Prestonburg, Ky., to which place my orders originally directed me, "to protect and defend that frontier." You are already advised by me that the force present on the frontier consists of—

Williams' regiment .....	800	
Trigg's regiment .....	560	
Mounted battalion .....	400	
Jeffress' battery .....	60	
	—	1, 820
There is ordered up Moore's regiment or battalion, estimated at .....	400	
Stuart's regiment .....	600	
	—	1, 000
Total .....		2, 820

In addition to these count a battalion of men, 350 strong, under Major Thompson, raised for special service of defending the Pound Gap or points in Scott, Lee, and Wise Counties, Virginia, but which cannot be moved beyond the boundary of this State, and we shall have a force in this quarter of 3,000 effective men, which at present constitutes my whole command.

It is the opinion of intelligent officers who have raised the companies belonging to Williams' regiment that the execution of an order to them to march now to Nashville would bring the business of recruiting in the mountainous parts of Kentucky to a full stop, and do great injury to our cause. This opinion, connected with the fact that they are badly clothed—not provided with socks or hats or warm clothing—and that they are not drilled in the school of the battalion, and that the officers are countrymen, who have not studied tactics at all as yet, induced me not to send them west under General Johnston's request, though I at first determined to do so and to leave my own orders unexecuted. Should you feel that the exigency demands me to place my command in risk of another retreat before superior numbers, I leave to your discretion the disposition of Stuart's regiment, Fifty-sixth Virginia, in the direction of General Johnston's call, and have ordered that officer forward, "unless he receives other orders at once from Major-General Crittenden at Knoxville."

It is impossible to occupy this camp any longer. Forage cannot be procured for horses and the country is absolutely "stripped to its ruin" of all provisions. We are relying for flour and meal on hauling 55 miles through the deepest and worse sort of roads, and corn is not to be had for the horses engaged in transportation.

My main object in passing the mountains is, first, to obtain food and forage, which I learn may be had in Kentucky within a line drawn from Pound Gap to Prestonburg; second, to inspire our friends in Kentucky, by resuming the position first occupied by the Kentucky Southern-rights men who fled from the interior of the State and from the unhallowed persecutions of the Federal power and its Kentucky allies.

In the effectuation of these objects my opinion is that there is not a man to be spared, Stuart's regiment included, without risking the ruin of the whole command; still I defer to you upon this state of facts whether the regiment of Fifty-sixth Virginia (Stuart) shall be moved to respond to General Johnston's call. It occurs to me that a telegraphic dispatch might enlighten you upon the point as to whether the exigency will continue to demand that force, and whether only one regiment of 600 would be of such importance to General Johnston as to compensate for the extreme risk to be incurred by its loss in this quarter.

I am much in need of another battery, and I learn there are six guns at Abingdon, but no horses or men. Would it not be well to move and equip that battery and let me have it? I should be greatly obliged for it, and if I make any movement towards the mouth of Sandy, on the frontier under my charge, shall find such addition to my artillery indispensable.

I am, truly, &c.,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*



HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Columbus, Ky., December 2, 1861.

Major-General POLK, *Columbus, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Occupying temporarily the command of your division, which you can resume at pleasure, I feel it my duty in all things relating to important movements of the command to take no action without consulting your judgment. In this view of my position and of the courtesy due to yours, I have deferred to your wishes in regard to an advance upon the enemy's position. If attacked now and his unarmed gunboats captured or destroyed, we can conceive of no movement so important, no victory so pregnant with great results to the cause of the Confederate Government, as that and the capture of Cairo. With Commodore Hollins' fleet of gunboats and our land forces acting together and making simultaneous attacks by water and land we can take Bird's Point and Fort Holt and capture or destroy his unarmed gunboats, and probably Cairo. If we stand still and await the ample preparations he is making and allow him to assail us with shells from fifty gun and mortar boats, and to throw around our position an army of 50,000 or 75,000 men, our position may become difficult to maintain. In other words, in my judgment, our safety, in a great measure, depends upon our attacking him before he is armed for the conflict or ready to move on our position. My convictions of duty in this important matter induces a distinct avowal of the determination, if left to the exercise of my own judgment, to make an early advance on the enemy's position. Time is now of the highest importance; even a delay of five days might hazard the success of the enterprise. Saint Louis papers inform us that four of his unarmed gunboats, seventy-two rifled cannon, and 3,000 loaded shell have arrived at Cairo. These as yet are unarmed, and three other gunboats at Mound City are afloat, but unarmed. Commodore Hollins is confident that with the co-operation of our land forces, attacking his batteries, we can capture and destroy these gunboats and batteries, and may possibly take Cairo itself. A successful attack upon these gunboats and batteries without support by our land forces is simply an impossible thing. I ask your approval of the movement.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

NASHVILLE, TENN., December 2, 1861.

Capt. E. D. BLAKE,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, First Div., West. Dept., Ky.:*

SIR: In obedience to special orders from headquarters Western Department I have assumed command of the defenses of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers on the line of Forts Donelson and Henry and of the country immediately adjacent thereto. You will please say to the major-general commanding division that I have made a thorough examination of the whole line and will report as soon as practicable on the subject. I will state here, however, that it is but too plain that instant and powerful steps must be taken to strengthen not only the two forts in the way of work, but the armament must be increased materially in number of pieces of artillery as well as in weight of metal. I have communicated with General Johnston on the subject and learn

that my wishes will be complied with on that point. I shall require a stronger infantry force also on these points. I will communicate in detail so soon as I return to my headquarters, which for the present I shall make at Fort Donelson.

I would be glad to have the major-general commanding designate the number or style of my brigade, so that my orders and letters may bear some relation and proper designation.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, P. A. C. S., Commanding, &c.*

HDQRS. SECOND DIV., CENTRAL ARMY OF KENTUCKY,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 2, 1861.*

Colonel BIFFLE,  
*Commanding Tennessee Cavalry:*

SIR: I am directed by General Buckner to give you the following instructions:

You will start with your command at dawn of day to-morrow and proceed in the direction of Glasgow. The object of your expedition is to learn definitely whether there are or have been any of the enemy's troops between Glasgow and Scottsville, or between Columbia and Edmonton, or in the neighboring country. It is reported that the enemy have been repairing the roads between the above places. You will be particular to ascertain the truth of this report. You will be governed by the information you receive on your route as to the best course to take to get full information as to the number, locality, and intentions of the enemy. Should you be able to send a courier to the neighborhood of Burkesville without great danger of his being captured, a citizen would be preferable. You will send full reports of the information you may acquire to General Zollicoffer. It is important that he should be fully informed. You will report by daily courier to these headquarters the progress and condition of your command and the information you may acquire. This daily report will be as full as possible.

When you shall have acquired definite and reliable information on these points you will return with your command to this place. You will spare no pains to prevent all lawlessness on the part of your troops, remembering that we can never win Kentucky to our cause by injuries to her people.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

G. B. COSBY,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,  
*Jackson, Miss., December 2, 1861.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: Yours of the 21st ultimo to hand. I am now sending forward every twelve-months' troops that I can arm and calling for troops for less time with arms in their hands. I think I will be able to send you a considerable force. My reason for calling for troops for less time

than twelve months is that I may get arms that I cannot otherwise get.

Yours, very respectfully,

JOHN J. PETTUS.

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, December 2, 1861.*

Hon. A. B. MOORE,  
*Governor of Alabama :*

SIR : I have to request that the military force of North Alabama which may be assembled under your late call for the service of the Confederate States shall be ordered as follows : The portion thereof which may come from the counties convenient to Florence to rendezvous at that place, where they will be mustered into service by companies, battalions, or regiments. As fast as they can be organized, equipped, and mustered in they will be transported down the Tennessee River to Fort Henry, Tenn.

I recommend that the slave laborers shall be sent forward from the same points with the troops in as large parties as can be provided for on their arrival at the works to be built. The appointment of General Sam. D. Weakley, aide-de-camp to General Pillow, as mustering officer, is confirmed, and I will order him to muster the companies, battalions, or regiments into the service of the Confederacy as rapidly as they are organized.

All the forces from North Alabama will be infantry, the companies to be composed of not less than 1 captain, 1 first lieutenant, 2 second lieutenants, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals, 2 musicians, and 64 privates. The remaining force which may not be sent to Florence I request you to order to Nashville, Tenn., where they will be mustered into the Confederate service and receive orders from me.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, U. S. Army.*

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MORRISTOWN, *December 2, 1861.*

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

I must inform you that in several instances the military authorities who are in command of troops and volunteers along the line of our road have taken possession of our road and trains and forced our engines and cars out of the face of regular schedules. This I will not submit to. I have been doing all any man can do to promote the interests of the Government and favor the speedy transportation of troops and army stores along our line.

If this course is persisted in by the military authorities any more, I shall on my part stop all of our engines and cars immediately, and then if the Government wishes to take possession of our road and control it, I shall not object in any way whatever. I think it is my duty to inform you of the facts. If we are permitted to manage and control our road, I think I can do so better than any other parties. Please answer.

JOHN R. BRANNER,  
*President East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad.*



HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Bowling Green, December 4, 1861.

Brigadier-General ZOLLIFFER, *Commanding* :

GENERAL: Your dispatch of November 27 has been received and read by the general, as all heretofore received from you, with great satisfaction. Every move is entirely approved. He now suggests that the most essential route to be guarded on your front is that leading through Somerset and Monticello, as in his opinion more practicable for the enemy; but in this he defers to your better knowledge of the country.

He has directed the quartermaster at Nashville to send such stores as you require by steamer to Gainesborough at any time you may call on him, and notify to him your occupation of that point and such other places as will make the passage secure.

We have a battalion of cavalry at Glasgow observing the country to Columbia and to the right. Our information as to the enemy's force corresponds with your own—less, if anything.

In making your calls on the quartermaster and commissary at Nashville let your quartermaster sign them first and then countersign them yourself.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
No. 127. } Bowling Green [Ky.], December 4, 1861.

The command of the Central Army of Kentucky is devolved upon Major-General Hardee. The district of operations of this army will embrace all that portion of the State of Tennessee lying north of the Cumberland River and all that portion of Kentucky lying west of a line drawn due north from the point where the Cumberland River enters Tennessee on the east and north of the Cumberland River. Officers in command at any points in the district will report direct to General Johnston any sudden movement of the enemy, but all other business will be submitted to the major-general alone.

The major-general will appoint a competent person to examine and decide on the giving of passports, and to examine and report to him upon all persons apprehended on suspicion of aiding and assisting the enemy, under special instructions. He will prescribe the appropriate duties of the provost-marshal and require their performance.

By command of General Johnston :

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
Nashville, Tenn., December 4, 1861.

Lieut. JOSEPH DIXON,

*C. S. Army, Fort Henry, Tennessee River :*

SIR: Your letter of the 1st instant has been received,\* and I hasten to inform you that I will procure the picks, shovels, spades, axes, bars, &c., you need for the intrenchments, if it be possible to do so; also the

\* Not found.

wheelbarrows, and have them forwarded to you at Fort Henry. I would much like to be able to meet you at Fort Henry and aid you in the location of the work or works for the high grounds on the opposite side of the river, but it is out of the question for me to go to the Tennessee now. You will please to exercise your best judgment in the location, bearing in mind that the object is to prevent our enemy from occupying ground dangerous to Fort Henry. Of course no guns designed for fire upon the river will be placed so high. Field guns will probably be sufficient for the armament, with proper provision for using the musket and rifle.

I much regret the interference of General Tilghman with the work trusted to Mr. Glenn. As he has been instructed not to interfere further with our operations, I will expect the agents I employ to execute my orders henceforth. I instructed Mr. Glenn to place the obstructions in the river at a distance of about 1,000 to 1,200 yards from the guns at Fort Donelson. I do not wish them farther away, else the command of them may not be perfect.

It has been decided to send the guns—the 32-pounders—at Clarksville to Donelson and Henry, two to each work. We hope to get other guns for each place at an early day. Please urge the mounting of the guns for commanding the river and have them in place as soon as possible.

I think the intrenchments for defense against a land attack important. It may be well to put a small redoubt for infantry fires on the high point just below Donelson across the creek, to prevent the enemy from occupying it.

Charge Mr. Glenn to get large and heavy anchors for the trees he is placing in the river; I mean heavy stones or other convenient weights. Also, not to quit the work until it is most thoroughly done, if a month more be required. Do not let his operations be interfered with by calling off the steamboat for any other purpose.

Your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

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C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
*Nashville, December 4, 1861.*

Lieut. Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
*Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: Under General Johnston's instructions of the 29th ultimo, I have selected grounds in the city of Nashville for the assembling of a part of the volunteers and militia of the State of Tennessee now organizing. In my search for suitable grounds, reference being had to such a line as we can man a force to defend north of Edgefield, no one point sufficient in extent for encamping a large number of troops has been found. Hence several positions, with ready communications between, have been chosen, each furnishing space for two or three regiments. The first one selected is nearly due east from the center of the town of Edgefield and about 3 miles by a good road from the Chain Bridge over the Cumberland River. Near by is a good spring of water. The second camp proposed is on the Gallatin turnpike, just before reaching the first toll-gate, distant from the Chain Bridge about 2 miles. Water supplied by a brook close at hand. A third position is on the White Creek road, where it ascends from the valley of the Cumberland River. Water fur-



nished by a creek near at hand or by the river. The communication from the city of Nashville to each point selected is by a turnpike road. It will be necessary for the Quartermaster's Department to purchase wood for encampments situated so near this city. To place the troops farther from Nashville will put them in advance of a line having limits that the probable available forces can defend.

The Adjutant-General of the State of Tennessee informs me that there is a favorable position in Maury County, directly on the Tennessee and Alabama Railroad, 36 miles from Nashville. An accommodation train passes twice each day—once in the morning and once in the evening; a through train and freight train daily; that there is a telegraph office at the town of Columbia, which is 10 miles by railroad and 6 miles by turnpike from the point; that there is a large open ground for drill; that the country around can furnish a large quantity of commissary supplies and other supplies for the troops that might be placed there; and that there is wood in proximity from which the camps can supply themselves. It is suggested by the Adjutant-General that the troops from the counties of Maury, Hickman, Lewis, Marshall, and Williamson, amounting to about twenty infantry companies and five cavalry companies, might be assembled at the point referred to with great economy to the Government, and still be at once ready for active service at Nashville or other point north of Nashville. The inconvenience and increased expense of assembling and encamping a very large force in the vicinity of this city induces me to suggest the propriety of establishing the camp in Maury County for the organization and instruction of the troops above named. These troops will be more easily controlled than they would be near a city as large as Nashville or even Edgefield.

I am informed by the Adjutant-General of the State that a part of the new troops have been sent already to Camp Trousdale. I have reported to Governor Harris the position of the camps in this vicinity, chosen with reference to the line of defense, which may be occupied in some strength by such force as may be available. For long-continued occupation the grounds within the line thus limited do not furnish suitable spaces unoccupied by house or private inclosure for encamping a very large force—say not more than six to eight regiments. For health, comfort, and economy, therefore, it may be desirable to encamp all others at points more distant.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,

*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. FIRST DIV., WEST. DEPARTMENT,  
No. 21. } *Columbus, Ky., December 4, 1861.*

The undersigned hereby resumes command of the First Division, Western Department.

L. POLK,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., December 4, 1861.*

General L. TILGHMAN, *Clarksville:*

SIR: In order that the Cumberland Iron Works may complete contracts now on hand with parties working for the Confederate Govern-



ment and continue in efficient operation (these works being the only ones that can now supply the requisite material for the manufacture of small-arms and other munitions of war), it is absolutely indispensable that all the operatives (and wood-choppers), white and black, whose names will be furnished you by the proprietors, should be exempt from all military or militia duty. You will therefore issue such orders as will give effect to this requisite exemption.

As it is desirable that as large a force may be collected as is necessary for the rapid completion of the works now in progress and projected, it is suggested that you extend the limits of the district from which the laborers are to be obtained, in order that the demand may not operate too severely upon the smaller number that will otherwise be required to furnish this working force.

I am, very respectfully,

L. POLK,  
Major-General, Commanding.

*Abstract from a report, December 4, 1861, of the First Division, Central Army of Kentucky commanded by Major-General Hardee, at Bowling Green.*

Troops.	Present for duty.		Total present.	Aggregate present.	Total present and absent.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Officers.	Men.				
Division staff		8		8		8
1st (Hindman's) Brigade	119	1,386	1,827	1,969	2,247	2,404
2d (Cleburne's) Brigade	111	1,688	2,051	2,187	2,853	3,031
3d (Shaver's) Brigade	140	1,424	2,363	2,548	3,378	3,591
Adams' cavalry regiment	29	400	614	650	736	778
Shoup's artillery battalion	8	145	197	206	211	227
Total	407	4,451	7,052	7,568	9,425	10,039

GENERAL ORDERS, } HQRS. CENTRAL ARMY OF KENTUCKY,  
No. 1. } Bowling Green, Ky., December 5, 1861.

In obedience to Special Orders, No. 127, dated Headquarters Western Department, Bowling Green, Ky., December 4, 1861, the undersigned hereby assumes command of the Central Army of Kentucky. The district of operation of this army will embrace all that portion of the State of Tennessee lying north of the Cumberland River and all that portion of Kentucky north of the Cumberland River lying west of a line drawn due north from the point where the Cumberland River enters the State of Tennessee on the east. Officers in command at any point of this district will make full returns of their commands to these headquarters immediately on the receipt of this order.

The following staff is announced, viz: Lieut. D. G. White, acting assistant adjutant-general; Maj. John Pope, chief quartermaster; Capt. W. E. Moore, chief commissary; Maj. F. A. Shoup, chief of artillery; Captain Chambliss, chief of ordnance; Col. St. John R. Liddell, volunteer aide, and Col. Hardin Perkins, volunteer aide.

W. J. HARDEE,  
Major-General.

KNOXVILLE, *December 5, 1861.*

## SECRETARY OF WAR:

I learn that there are 1,250 rifles at Columbus not in use. Can I not get them? I have here 1,700 men, only 400 armed. Will report fully to-night.

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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RICHMOND, *December 5, 1861.*General W. H. CARROLL, *Knoxville:*

The rifles at Columbus are at the disposal of General A. S. Johnston.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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KNOXVILLE, *December 5, 1861.*

## Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR:

The following dispatch received this morning, dated from Bird's Point:

Captain Coker just in with two bridge-burners and other prisoners. Have no news from Colonel Leadbetter. Colonel Powell reports by special messenger that he has seen no gathering. Will hold his position. Will throw my forces over the river in the morning and report.

Dispatch from Morristown says courier in from Monsarrat. Cannonading and musketry at 8 o'clock. Tories have made a stand.

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, December 6, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK,  
*Commanding First Division, Columbus, Ky.:*

General Johnston has provided the means for commencing the building of the gunboat on the Tennessee. As you have been authorized by the War Department to build this boat, he desires you will make requisition in time for the additional funds and the liquidation of the expenditure he has made.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION,  
*Camp Beauregard, Ky., December 6, 1861.*

Capt. E. D. BLAKE,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Columbus:*

SIR: I have the honor to report that the citizens of Calloway County have made application to me to establish a command at Wadesborough or Murray, saying that they have ample surplus of provisions, especially pork, and quantities of forage, to sustain a command, and will sell cheap to the Confederacy—corn, 25 cents per bushel; wheat, 60 cents, &c.

There is a strong position immediately east of Murray (a mile, say),

with plenty of running water. Sixteen miles north and east of Murray is Eggner's Ferry, a fine position on the Tennessee River. No force coming up the Cumberland can cross to the Tennessee and fall in rear of Eggner's without building their road through a country of "ravines," "backbones," and "lime-sinks," unless they go up as high as Dover, on the Cumberland. There is a good road from Murray to Eggner's Ferry not laid down on Colton's map.

By reference to the maps it will be seen that by this disposition we will cover a great deal of the State now unprotected, and at the same time have a strong line of defense from the Mississippi to the Tennessee, covering successfully the left of the other division of the army. Whether it would be advisable to have General Tilghman's command move up to Eggner's Ferry and a brigade stationed at Murray must of course depend upon the disposable force. My position cannot be abandoned without opening the border of Weakley County, Tennessee, to Federal raids, even if it does not weaken Columbus by having the right and rear opened. I have passed through portions of the country alluded to and have endeavored to ascertain correctly all facts bearing upon the question of its occupation.

Very respectfully,

JNO. S. BOWEN,  
*Colonel, Commanding Fourth Division.*

P. S.—I have the honor to herewith inclose an extract from a Cincinnati paper of the 3d.\*

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C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
*Nashville, Tenn., December 6, 1861.*

HUGH MCKREW, Esq., *Nashville, Tenn.:*

SIR: I would impress on you the urgent necessity of procuring immediately laborers for constructing defenses in the vicinity of Nashville. As yet there have been but 7 reported for duty on Cockrill's Hill, and we need at least 300, as with less than that number the work cannot go on with that expedition desired and expected. I would therefore direct that you use every exertion, you having been authorized and appointed by the Governor of Tennessee, to procure forthwith all the laboring force possible to report at Cockrill's Hill Monday morning, December 9, 1861, or as soon thereafter as practicable. You will also direct that laborers living at great distances from the works (Cockrill's Hill) bring with them bed-clothing, eating and cooking utensils. You will direct those living near (Cockrill's Hill), whose masters and owners prefer their returning home at night, to bring their dinners, until preparations can be made for their eating at or near the work. We will want all and every laborer that can be had.

Your obedient servant,

G. O. WATTS,  
*Acting Assistant Engineer.*

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Hopkinsville, December 6, 1861.*

D. V. WOOLEY, Esq., *Bowling Green:*

DEAR SIR: I left Lexington some ten days since and am now *en route* to New Orleans. I left Louisville the night of the 28th ultimo.



Previous to taking my departure I was called on by a gentleman, whom I know to be truthful, who requested me to inform General Buckner that there were already at that time 80,000 Union troops in Kentucky; that Rosecrans, Schenck, and Benham (I think that is the name) were then on the line of march to Kentucky; that it was the aim of the Union generals to unite against and attack General Buckner at Bowling Green with a force of 120,000 troops; that on the 25th ultimo it was decided to make the attack as soon as the Green River Bridge was done. The gentleman who gave me this information stated that I might give his name to General Buckner. His name is John Caperton. He lives in Louisville, and certainly has a fine opportunity of hearing what is going on on the Union side, as he is a son-in-law to Mr. Guthrie.

If my opinion was asked, I would say that I didn't believe the Union army in Kentucky was or could be so large. I will not, however, venture my opinion against Major Caperton's, his advantages for information being much better than mine. I am now in General Clark's room. He says that there will be no such force brought into Kentucky. I do trust that the commanding general at Bowling Green will be prepared against any number.

It was believed by many in Louisville that there would be a simultaneous attack on the Potomac and at Bowling Green. The reasons given were that it would prevent the withdrawing of troops from one post to the other.

I am late in getting this letter to you, but to prevent capture I ran a blockade, which was long and tedious.

I desire you to state these facts to General Buckner, as I was requested to communicate them to him as early as possible.\*

Very respectfully,

WM. A. WELLS.

[Indorsement.]

Respectfully forwarded to General Johnston. Mr. Wells, a very intelligent gentleman, is now in Bowling Green.

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

KNOXVILLE, *December 6, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

W. G. Brownlow arrested to-day for treason by a warrant issued by the Confederate States commissioner and drawn up by myself. Will write you the facts in full that prompted his arrest in a day or two. Hope you will postpone your decision until you hear them.

J. C. RAMSAY.

KNOXVILLE, *December 6, 1861.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL C. S. ARMY :

Will you please send me, without delay, the ten regiments promised by the President whilst I was in Richmond, and I will move into Kentucky at once?

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General, Comdg. Eastern Division, District Kentucky.*

\* Some personal details omitted.

C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
*Nashville, Tenn., December 7, 1861.*

Lieut. Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
*Adjutant-General, Hdqrs. West. Dept., Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: For the information of the commanding general I have to report that the agents employed under the sanction of Governor Harris to engage the services of negroes from their masters to work on the intrenchments for defending the city of Nashville against land approach have failed to procure a force at all adequate to the magnitude of the work contemplated. In fact, the number of hands is insignificant, and the agents report that it will be impracticable to procure them at this time, as the negroes in the vicinity of this city are hired out until the end of this year and not now under the control of their masters. It is not probable, therefore, that any material progress can be made in the construction of the proposed defenses during the present month unless other labor can be applied. It is to be feared, too, that the call for military service has taken so large a proportion of the laboring classes from this community that it will be difficult, if at all possible, to procure white laborers at any price that will be reasonable.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*December 7, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

Having resumed command of my division and surveyed the field of operations immediately before me, as well as the force now coming to my aid, I find I want more general officers. The time at my disposal is short, as I have good reason to believe the enemy will make his contemplated attack on my position between this and the 20th or 30th current.

I nominate General James Trudeau, of the Louisiana Legion, who is now with me in command of part of his force, as a brigadier-general. I have several regiments from Louisiana here and am expecting more. They are entitled to a brigade commander.

I also nominate General Frost, of the Missouri Army, now in my camp, for the office of brigadier-general. General Frost, as you may know, is a graduate of West Point, and served for near ten years in the Army in various arms. He is a man of military attainments, and would, I have reason to believe, fill the office named with ability. He was to have gone to General Price, but General Halleck failed to comply with the engagements made by the general with General Frémont to send him to Price's army, and he was obliged to come here. His services would be valuable to me in the emergency before me.

The State of Arkansas has about twelve regiments in the field, many of them under my command, and is without a brigade commander. I nominate Col. E. W. Gantt as a suitable person for that office. So far as I know, he has more military capacity than any other of those who are in command of her regiments.

The force of my command at this point should not be less than 50,000, if it were at the disposal of the Government.

I am satisfied it is the purpose of the enemy to make a desperate struggle to crush the force concentrated in this division. It is this force that stands directly in his way down the Mississippi. If he is foiled in this, he will be foiled in one of the most cherished of his purposes and wishes. I hope the Government will not fail to see this, and will give us both troops and commanders to meet the emergency.

I am greatly in want of mortar batteries. I hear there is one of fifteen mortars at Pensacola that may be spared with less inconvenience than we can spare it here. Could you not let me have it? If so, it should come at once.

While on the subject of the condition of this army, may I not ask you earnestly to see that my requisition for funds is responded to? We are in great want of money, and shall be more so as the force now concentrating here is increased.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

P. S.—I beg leave also to submit the name of Col. S. F. Marks, who you know personally, and whose natural capacity and military experience (he was in service in Mexico), as well as gallant conduct in the late battle, entitle him to the consideration of the Government and would make him an efficient commander. He is now in command of a brigade.

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KNOXVILLE, *December 7, 1861.*

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR:

Captain Monsarrat has dispersed the tories in Cocke County and captured 30 of the ringleaders.

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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KNOXVILLE, TENN., *December 7, 1861.*

HON. JEFFERSON DAVIS,

*President Confederate States of America:*

SIR: I heartily concur in what is said in the accompanying letter by Dr. Ramsey and Mr. Tibbs, the member-elect to the permanent Congress from the third district of Tennessee. In addition to what is therein stated, I must be permitted to express my utter surprise at the fact that the Secretary of War should have ordered that Brownlow be permitted to leave East Tennessee and identify himself more effectually with the forces of Lincoln in Kentucky. This surprise results more from the fact that but a day or two since I was in Richmond and had a full and frank conversation with Mr. Benjamin in reference to the state of affairs in East Tennessee, and he did in no manner allude to the propriety of granting such a passport to Brownlow.

I have but recently been elected to the permanent Congress from this (second) Congressional district (as Mr. Tibbs has been from the third), and upon my return from Richmond I found the citizens and soldiers almost unanimously indignant at this order in Brownlow's behalf, and to my utter astonishment the report prevailed that I while at Richmond had secured such an order.



My competitor, Mr. Baxter, who received not 500 votes in the district, was at Richmond while I was myself there, and it may be that his counsels prevailed in the matter, and the order for Brownlow's passport was induced by his arguments or persuasions. I certainly advised no such policy.

A word or two more. In one county of East Tennessee (Scott) the Stars and Stripes have been hoisted within a few days past. Our few friends there have been seized and taken into Kentucky by emissaries from the Lincoln camps, and these emissaries were guided and directed by a man who was recently discharged at Nashville by Mr. Benjamin's order, at the instance of Mr. Baxter and others, whose co-operation he was influential enough to secure. Will we never be done with such policy?

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. G. SWAN.

[Inclosure.]

KNOXVILLE, TENN., *December 7, 1861.*

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,

*President Confederate States of America:*

SIR: The Confederate civil authorities here had Mr. Brownlow arrested last evening under a charge of treason. He is now in jail. It is understood that parties in this place are taking, or perhaps have already taken, measures to apply for executive clemency in his behalf, and turn him at large or transfer him under a military escort to the enemy's lines in Kentucky.

To this course we enter our most respectful but decided protest and remonstrance.

During the whole summer and fall the civil and military power of your Government has arrested, tried, convicted, and punished (in some cases capitally, in others with more leniency) the poor and insignificant dupes of Brownlow's treasonable teachings and example. A carload of these ignorant Tories were sent this morning to Tuscaloosa, Ala.; and now the proposition to release the prime mover and instigator of all this rebellion against the South and Tennessee and send him an authorized emissary to the headquarters of the enemy, dignified with an escort of our Tennessee soldiery, has startled this community, embracing in the number citizens and most of the army here. The feeling of indignation at the bare effort for his release is much intensified by the fact, which, as it may not be fully known at Richmond, we take leave to bring to your attention, viz, that the prisoner, shortly before the burning of our railroad bridges and other acts of incendiarism and disloyalty, had left town and visited Blount and Sevier Counties, the residence of the malecontents who are known as the incendiaries, and the suspicion is widely entertained that he prompted and instigated that and other atrocities. This peregrination into the most disloyal and disaffected neighborhoods makes him the more familiar with the extent of the disaffection—their plans, purposes, &c.

A more dangerous and more capable emissary could not be found in the Southern Confederacy to stimulate invasion of Tennessee and advise and carry into effect every kind of mischief. His arrival in Kentucky and Lincolnland generally would be hailed as a greater achievement than the capture of Zollicoffer and his brave troops.

We do not deem it necessary to enlarge further on the subject, but we earnestly advise against the proposed release and transportation to

Kentucky. Let the civil or military law take its course against the criminal leader in this atrocious rebellion, as it has already done to his deluded and ignorant followers.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,  
J. G. M. RAMSEY.  
WM. H. TIBBS.

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ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
Knoxville, Tenn., December 7, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: I telegraphed you last night that I had caused Brownlow to be arrested by a warrant issued from the Confederate States commissioner, and I feel confident, when I inform you the grounds of his arrest, you will approve of my course. I had intended to have him arrested in November last, at the regular term of the Confederate court at this place, but, in consequence of his absence and Judge Humphreys not being here to hold the court, his arrest was postponed. Shortly before the burning of the bridges Brownlow's friends circulated a report that he was confined at home by a bleeding at the lungs. Notwithstanding this (the bridges being burned on Friday night, the 8th of November), he left home the Monday previous, and has remained absent a month or more, during inclement season, in the mountainous parts of the counties of Blount and Sevier, among the most hostile population to the Southern Confederacy that we have in East Tennessee. Information reached me that on his way to the mountains he had made use of expressions that showed he had knowledge of the designs of the enemy to penetrate into East Tennessee and the time the attempt would be made, and I was satisfied, from his well-known character for years for obtaining information, that he was not ignorant that the bridges would be burned. His newspaper has been the great cause of rebellion in this section, and most of those who have been arrested have been deluded by his gross distortion of facts and incited to take up arms by his inflammatory appeals to their passions and infamous libels upon the Confederate States. Under these circumstances it was the general sentiment of our people, and particularly of the military, that it would be great injustice to punish the ignorant men who had been deluded by one more cunning and hypocritical than themselves and suffer the master spirit to escape with impunity. Our soldiers, who have been guarding the mountain passes by night as well as by day, and have endured the hardest service to detect and arrest ignorant men who were straggling over into Kentucky to assist the enemy, the dupes of his teachings, became discouraged, and said they could see no use in such service, when Brownlow, who could do them more harm than a thousand men, was suffered to pass over to the enemy to give them information and incite our enemies to invade our country. So great was their objection to this course, that I understand some of the officers said it would be difficult in such a contingency to restrain their men from laying down their arms and returning home; and I also understand that there were none of the military who did not feel it would be degrading service to escort him to the Kentucky line.

But desiring not to trespass upon your valuable time longer than it is absolutely necessary, I again repeat that it is the general desire of all friends to our cause in East Tennessee that his case should be investigated, to ascertain if he did not possess knowledge of the bridge-

burning and other designs of the enemy. Our most discreet and prudent men, both civil and military, familiar with the character of the man, think it imprudent to send him into the enemy's country, as he is capable of doing us more injury than Johnson and Maynard both combined. I regret that he was not arrested by the military and sent to Tuscaloosa, where many will no doubt be sent not half so guilty as he is; and I urge you to that course now, as being the very best thing under all the circumstances that could be done. His friends cannot complain of his being sent to a more Southern climate, and it is a little singular that with the disease of which he is complaining he should desire to go North at this inclement season. Under all the circumstances I have thought it best for the country that he should be detained for trial or sent to Tuscaloosa. At least he should be detained until you should hear all the facts and circumstances of the case. He was permitted to come home without being arrested, as I understand, upon condition that he was to be answerable to the law for any offense he may have committed, and previous to his being arrested the commissioner had leave to do so from Major-General Crittenden if he thought proper, the general saying he would not interfere.

Again, Brownlow was aware of President Davis' proclamation, giving all that desired to leave the Confederate States forty days to do so. If he desired to go North, he then had an opportunity to do so. He did not avail himself of the law, but remains here after he has done all the injury he can do to our country, and now asks that he be escorted to our enemies, there to give such information to the North as he may desire and inflame the minds of the people more bitterly against us. If that privilege is granted to him, will it not be a precedent for all others that may apply during the war? I fear that the moral effect of such a course will not only be bad in East Tennessee, but may be deleterious in the whole Confederate States.

I have thought proper to present you my view of the case, but will cheerfully conform to your own better judgment.

Yours, truly,

J. C. RAMSAY,  
*C. S. District Attorney for District of Tennessee.*

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RICHMOND, *December 8, 1861.*

Major-General CRITTENDEN, *Knoxville:*

The President desires that you return to Richmond and report to him without delay.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 8, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

I have the honor to state that on the 24th November I transmitted a letter from Captain Lindsay, stationed at Nashville, Tenn., reporting the arrival at that place of a steamer from Louisville, Ky., having on board all the machinery and appliances for spinning cotton, owned and intended to be put in operation at McMinnville, Tenn. He had taken



the crew, vessel, and cargo into his custody, to await instructions from me. I directed him to hold them under his charge until further orders. His letter, with an explanatory indorsement, was then transmitted to you, requesting your decision in the case. In that indorsement I stated that my permission had been solicited, some time previously to the arrival of the vessel, by the parties interested, to bring it up the Cumberland, but that I had refused to authorize the introduction of the vessel, and had referred them for authority to do so to the Department of War. There is much urgency for a decision of the case. On that account, and on the supposition of a miscarriage of Captain Lindsay's letter, I again respectfully submit the subject for your consideration and decision.

The enemy, from the best information I am able to obtain, have made no material change in the disposition of their forces in front or on either flank. Their advance in front is 6 miles north of Bacon Creek, near the Louisville Railroad; a large force at Nolin; and farther north, towards Louisville, they are massed in considerable force at different points convenient for concentrating them. I do not doubt that the Federal Government is augmenting their force in Kentucky in this direction to the extent of their ability.

The inclosed letter\* will serve to show the disposition they are making of different army corps which have been elsewhere employed. As to the estimate of their forces, I suppose it is a gross exaggeration. With the addition of Nelson's and Rosecrans' columns, their force on this immediate line I believe ought not to be estimated over 65,000.

Our returns at this place show a force of between 18,000 and 19,000, of which about 5,000 are sick (about 3,600 at Nashville), and our effective force is under 13,000 men. The volunteers, I hear, are turning out well, but the time taken up in procuring arms has thus far prevented much accession to our force from that source.

I beg leave to remind you of your promise to place a secret-service fund at my disposition. There are now claims upon the Government unliquidated. I suggested that about \$5,000 should be placed to my credit in one of the Nashville banks.

On the night of the 6th instant Captain Morgan, with his cavalry company, Helm's Kentucky regiment, Buckner's division, burned the railroad bridge over Bacon Creek (recently reconstructed by the enemy), 6 miles in advance of the enemy's advance force.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
General, C. S. Army.

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Columbus, Ky., December 8, 1861.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,  
*President Confederate States of America:*

Your letter of November 12,† in reply to mine on the subject of my resignation of the appointment of major-general in the Confederate Army, has been received. I appreciate the confidence you have been pleased to express in me.

After carefully considering all of my responsibilities in the premises and your deliberate judgment as to the necessities of the service, I have concluded to waive the pressing of my application for a release

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\* Not found.

† See Series I, Vol. IV, p. 539.

from further service, and have determined to retain my office so long as I may be of service to our cause.

I remain, faithfully, your friend,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Greenville, Tenn., December 8, 1861.*

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General:*

SIR: At the date of my last letter a part of the force under my command was engaged in the pursuit of a party of insurgents moving from their camp, in the northern part of Greene, towards Cocke County. As usual, their force was dispersed and only some stagglers could be picked up. Among these prisoners were three who had been of the party that burned the Lick Creek Bridge. They were Henry Fry, Jacob M. Henshaw, and Hugh A. Self. All confessed their own and testified to the others' guilt, and also gave, as correctly as they could remember, the names of the whole party engaged in that crime. Fry and Henshaw were tried by drum-head court-martial on the 30th ultimo and executed the same day by hanging. I have thought it my duty to ask of the Department that the punishment of Hugh A. Self be commuted to imprisonment. He is only sixteen years old, not very intelligent, and was led away on that occasion by his father and elder brother, both of whom I learn have now been captured by General Carroll's troops.

Hearing that the insurgents had gathered in force at or near the bend of Chucky River, and thence to the neighborhood of Parrottsville and of Newport, on the French Broad, in Cocke County, I moved the Twenty-ninth North Carolina, with two companies of the Third Georgia Battalion, in that direction on the 3d instant. Hearing that General Carroll had troops on the line of railroad at Morristown, I arranged with them by telegraph to move into the enemy's country at the same time and from opposite directions.

That country consists of a tumultuous mass of steep hills, wooded to the top, with execrable roads winding through the ravines and often occupying the beds of the water-courses. A few of the insurgent scouts were seen, pursued, and fired on. One was desperately wounded and left at a cabin near by.

At the farm houses along the more open valleys no men were to be seen, and it is believed that nearly the whole male population of the country were lurking in the hills on account of disaffection or fear. The women in some cases were greatly alarmed, throwing themselves on the ground and wailing like savages. Indeed, the population is savage.

The expedition lasted four days, and in the course of it we met Colonel Powell's command deep in the mountains, and our guns were responded to at no great distance by a force under Captain Monsarrat.

These people cannot be caught in that manner. As likely to be more effective, I have detached three companies of Colonel Vance's regiment to Parrottsville, with instructions to impress horses from Union men and be active in seizing troublesome men in all directions. They will impress provisions, giving certificates therefor, with assurance that the amounts will be paid if the future loyalty of the sufferer shall

justify the clemency of the Government. The whole country is given to understand that this course will be pursued until quiet shall be restored to these distracted counties, and they can rely upon it that no prisoner will be pardoned so long as any Union men shall remain in arms. Three other companies of Colonel Vance's command are on their way to Warrensburg, on the north side of Chucky, to remain there under similar instructions.

It is believed that we are making progress towards pacification. The Union men are taking the oath in pretty large numbers and arms are beginning to be brought in. Captain McClellan, of the Tennessee cavalry, stationed by me at Elizabethton, reports that Carter County is becoming very quiet, and that, with the aid of a company of infantry, he will enter Johnson County and disarm the people there. I shall send the company without delay.

The execution of the bridge-burners is producing the happiest effect. This, coupled with great kindness towards the inhabitants generally, inclines them to quietude. Insurgents will continue for yet a while in the mountains, but I trust that we have secured the outward obedience of the people.

Very respectfully, &c., your obedient servant,

D. LEADBETTER,  
*Colonel, Commanding.*

FORT PILLOW, *December 8, 1861.*  
(Received, Columbus, December 8, 1861.)

Major-General POLK:

The C. S. floating battery passed at 8 o'clock a. m.

L. M. WALKER.

C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
*Nashville, Tenn., December 9, 1861.*

Lient. Col. W. W. MACKALL,

*Adjutant-General, Western Department, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: On the question of constructing a gunboat for the defense of the Cumberland River, as proposed by Messrs. Shaw & Lawson, and referred to me by indorsement on the letter of Governor Harris, Gov. Neill S. Brown, and General W. G. Harding, I have the honor to report as follows:

If it were practicable to build a gunboat of proper description in the Cumberland it would aid much in the defense of the river, but I much fear that a common steamboat cannot be converted into an efficient one. The boilers and machinery can be but partially protected from shot, and the large side-wheels, having diameters varying from 30 to 34 feet, not at all. One shot striking the partially-protected machinery or the shaft or the large wheels might render such a gunboat totally helpless and place her at the mercy of the enemy, with crew, armament, and supplies.

It is probable the hull of a well-built river boat (and such a one is now laid up at this city) can be made in a measure shot-proof to a line below the water surface by covering her with false timber sides and bulwarks clad with thick iron. Railroad or other bars would have to be used for the purpose, as there is not plate iron in the whole Confed-



eracy sufficient to protect the hundredth part of the surface of one boat. This market will not furnish the requisite heavy timber for strengthening the sides of the boat or for constructing the inclined barricades or bulwarks, as proposed by Messrs. Shaw & Lawson. In course of many weeks it could be obtained, I presume, from forest and saw-mills of the surrounding country. The heavy additions of timber and iron would give the boat a draught too great for navigating the river except during the winter season and early spring.

Considering all the objections that exist to such a gunboat as proposed, the period of time that must elapse before one could be gotten ready for service, and the probable armament of guns we may hope to command, I am forced to the opinion that the best reliance for defense will be batteries ashore, in combination with such obstructions as may be devised in the channel under the guns of the works. I return the letters of Governors Harris and Brown and General Harding.\*

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER.

*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

HEADQUARTERS RIFLE BRIGADE,  
*Knoxville, Tenn., December 9, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. G. B. CRITTENDEN, *Knoxville:*

SIR: I have the honor herewith to submit a report of the strength and condition of all the forces now in East Tennessee for the past few weeks acting under my command, together with their location, field of duty, &c. My immediate command, assigned by the Secretary of War, is as follows:

*Senior (Thirty-eighth) Regiment:* Colonel, Robert F. Looney; lieutenant-colonel, E. J. Golladay; major, D. H. Thrasher. Organized September 23, for twelve months. Stationed at Knoxville. This regiment is but imperfectly armed, having but 250 guns, consisting of rifles, double-barreled shot-guns, and muskets. Of these not more than 50 are perfect. This regiment is now stationed at this place, except one company, which is on detached service at Morristown. Strength of regiment, 988.

*Second (Thirty-ninth) Regiment:*† Colonel, Moses White; lieutenant-colonel, Hunter P. Moffit; major, W. M. Hunt (acting). Organized October 11, 1861, for twelve months. This regiment is also stationed at Knoxville, except one company, which is on detached service at Morristown. The arms of this regiment consist of about 200 rifles, shot-guns, and muskets, mostly unfit for use except in an emergency. Strength of regiment, 771.

In addition to the two regiments above mentioned there are seven companies that have been mustered into service that have heretofore been nominally under the command of Col. W. T. Avery, which were also assigned me by the Secretary of War. These have not yet been organized into a regiment, for the reason that three of them which I left at a camp of instruction at Germantown were ordered to Fort Pillow by General Pillow, commanding at Columbus. The other four companies are in the neighborhood of Knoxville.

I have written to General Pillow, protesting against this interference

\* Not found.

†Appears on Register as Thirty-seventh Regiment.

with my command, and requested him to order the three companies now at Fort Pillow to move immediately to this place. Should he do so, the regiment will be organized at once. Should he not do so, I shall appeal to the Secretary of War.

When I reached Chattanooga with my command, on the march to this point, I was joined by the following regiment:

[*Thirty-second Regiment*]: Colonel, E. C. Cook; lieutenant-colonel, W. P. Moore; major, ——— Brownlow. Organized ———, for twelve months. This regiment is still at Chattanooga, awaiting further orders. It is armed with 500 flint-lock muskets, in good order. Strength of regiment, 850.

When Colonel Cook reported to me he informed me that he was assigned to no command and requested me to attach him to my brigade, which I did until such time as I should receive orders from you. Should it meet your approval, I should be glad to have him continued under my command. I would also suggest that he be ordered to this place, as there is no further necessity for the services of his regiment at the place where it now is, as every indication of a rebellion in that section of country has entirely disappeared.

Col. J. W. Gillespie, of this city, has reported to me the following companies, with the request that they should be organized into a regiment and attached to my brigade, viz:

Capt. A. J. Cawood, stationed at Loudon, partially armed; Capt. S. T. Turner, stationed at Loudon; Capt. L. Guthrie, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. John Goodman, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. D. Neff, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. W. J. Hill, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. A. W. Hodge, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. W. L. Lafferty, stationed at Calhoun; Capt. W. H. McKamy, stationed at Charleston; Capt. J. W. Phillips, stationed at Rogersville.

The strength of this regiment will reach about 850 men. Some of these companies are partially armed with old country rifles and shot-guns. I have ordered all of them to rendezvous at Camp Key, in the vicinity of this city, and will organize them into a regiment early next week.

The following detached companies have also reported to me, viz:

Capt. W. D. Smith, stationed at Charleston; Capt. J. P. Brown, stationed at Madisonville; Capt. J. B. Cook, stationed at Athens; Capt. W. C. Nelson, stationed at Philadelphia; Capt. H. Harris, stationed at Sevierville; Capt. W. G. McCain, stationed at Knoxville.

These companies are also partially armed with such guns as could be secured in the surrounding country. So soon as these companies can be relieved from duty at the places where they are now stationed I will concentrate them at this or some other convenient point and organize them into a regiment.

*Artillery*.—Captain, George H. Monsarrat; first senior lieutenant, E. Baxter; first junior lieutenant, Brian; second senior lieutenant, Freeman; 140 men, 4 guns, 3 caissons, 103 horses.

This company is now stationed near this city; is under the command of one of the most active and efficient officers in the service. It is thoroughly drilled and disciplined. Six more guns will be obtained in a few days and the command increased to 250 men.

*Cavalry*.—The following cavalry companies have reported to me and have been acting under my orders, viz:

Captain McLin, stationed at Lick Creek; Captain Brock, stationed at Knoxville; Capt. J. F. White, stationed at Maryville; Capt. W. L. Brown, stationed at Cleveland; Capt. D. C. Gormus, stationed in

Cooke County; Capt. R. W. McClary, stationed at Cleveland; Capt. F. Eldridge, stationed at Loudon.

The foregoing comprised all the force attached to my immediate command. Other forces, however, have reported to me and acted under my command, consisting of the following:

Col. W. B. Wood's regiment, at present stationed near this place, numbering about 800 men, armed with flint-lock muskets. This regiment is attached to the brigade of Brigadier-General Zollicoffer.

Capt. H. L. W. McClung's battery, consisting of two 6-pounder and two 12-pounder guns, with caissons, horses, &c., numbering about 100 men; Captain Gillespie's cavalry, numbering about 100 men, armed with double-barreled shot-guns. Both these companies belong to the command of General Zollicoffer.

There are other forces stationed at various points in East Tennessee from the commanders of which I have received no official report and have no certain information concerning them. The following is the most reliable I have been able to obtain:

Col. Samuel Powell's regiment, stationed at Greeneville. Of its strength, arms, &c., I have no knowledge, nor do I know to what command it is attached.

Col. S. A. M. Wood's regiment is stationed 10 miles east of Chattanooga: is thoroughly equipped, and with Springfield muskets. This regiment belongs, I understand, to the command of Brigadier-General Bragg, and was sent by him from Pensacola to Chattanooga for temporary service until such time as I could reach there with my command.

Col. R. B. Vance's regiment is stationed at Greeneville; numbers about 800 men, and is efficiently armed. I do not know to what command it is attached.

Col. D. Leadbetter is stationed, with his regiment, somewhere in the neighborhood of Morristown, on the line of the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. I have no other information concerning his command.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stovall's battalion is stationed at Greeneville, numbering 500 men, and is efficiently armed.

The foregoing is all the organized force of which I have any knowledge in East Tennessee, except Colonel Churchwell's regiment, which I understand is a portion of General Zollicoffer's command. I do not know its present location.

Another of General Zollicoffer's regiments, commanded by Colonel Satham, is, I learn, stationed at Cumberland Gap.

There are various companies, I am informed, being organized in the surrounding counties, and should the necessity arise and arms could be procured I have no doubt but an additional force of 4,000 or 5,000 men could easily be brought into the field from East Tennessee.

#### RECAPITULATION.

Strength of my immediate command:

Infantry .....	4, 400
Cavalry .....	450
Artillery .....	150
Total .....	5, 000
Other forces in East Tennessee .....	6, 000
Whole amount of force in East Tennessee .....	11, 000



The foregoing report is as perfect a one as I am able to make with the meager information at present before me. My own command being as yet to a great extent unorganized and stationed in small detachments at so many different points, I have not been able to obtain regular and official reports. But in the main the above statement of its strength, condition, &c., is very nearly accurate in point of numbers, as well as in other particulars.

The other forces to which I have alluded were not under my command, and therefore I had no right to require the official information from them, but have had to rely upon such statements as were reported to me by others.

Respectfully,

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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[DECEMBER 10, 1861.—By an act of the Provisional Congress, Kentucky admitted as a member of the Confederate States of America.]

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 10, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK,  
*Commanding First Division, Columbus, Ky.:*

GENERAL: By direction of the general I give his views of the probable operations of the enemy and suggestions as to the means by which they are to be met and counteracted. He says:

Copies of letters to the Governor of Alabama and to General Weakley have informed you that you may anticipate an important accession to the force at Fort Henry, which I hope, with the force now at Fort Donelson and that under General Clark at Hopkinsville, will make your right secure from the enterprises of the enemy and compel him to divert a large portion of his force. Should he consider it expedient to attempt the reduction of those places or in carrying on operations in your immediate front, enforce upon him the necessity of employing a large force in observation to mask or cover his operations against you. I suppose they will adopt on your front three lines of operations: one from Cape Girardeau or Bird's Point to New Madrid, which may be safely done, as the topography of the country evidently affords a perfect immunity from attack throughout the route. This contingency you are providing against. The force which will probably be sent on the Cape Girardeau route will no doubt be large. Another smaller force, I think, will descend the west bank of the Mississippi to a point below Columbus, establish batteries to cut off your supplies by the river, and co-operate with the force at Madrid. A third will endeavor to throw itself between Columbus and your re-enforcements and supplies, to effect which it will be necessary for them, if the routes should be as impracticable as they are represented at this season of the year, to use the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers for transportation of subsistence and other supplies, at least as far as the ferry, should they adopt the former route below Fort Henry, and thence by the road to Paris. This movement they would probably cover by a demonstration towards Columbus. Fort Columbus, now being completed, cannot, I think, be taken by assault; and, supplied with provisions and other stores for six months, would probably, if enveloped and thrown upon its own resources, hold out some time.

Now, if this be true, your army outside is left free to maneuver in reference to the movements of the enemy, and ought to be so handled as to prevent, by its successive movements, the introduction of the enemy's force into the country in such manner as to deprive you of support and supplies.

Should they deem it important to reduce the force at Columbus before advancing you would have it in your power to go to its relief. Should they, however, decide to prosecute their march into Tennessee, you will have it in your power, if your force should be adequate, to offer them battle on a field of your own choice or impede and harass them as they advance, and as their force must be reduced to keep up their line of communi-

cation, engage them wherever there might be sufficient probability of decisive advantage.

These are suggestions for your consideration, and must be modified as circumstances require.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Beech Grove, Ky., December 10, 1861.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL, *Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: Your two dispatches of the 4th reached me late last night. Inclosed I send copy of letter addressed to you yesterday.\* I infer from yours that I should not have crossed the river, but it is now too late. My means of recrossing is so limited, I could hardly accomplish it in face of the enemy. There are five infantry regiments, perhaps more, and one cavalry regiment at Somerset, 16 miles distant. Their pickets were yesterday within 9 miles. The precise force at Columbia I cannot ascertain. Our cavalry detachments south of the river, at Rowena, were fired upon from this side yesterday and to-day.

This camp is immediately opposite to Mill Springs, 1½ mile, distant. The river protects our rear and flanks. We have about 1,200 yards fighting front to defend, which we are intrenching as rapidly as our few tools will allow; but a supply ordered by Maj. V. K. Stevenson, assistant quartermaster-general at Nashville, on the 10th, have not been heard from. Two hundred pack-saddles, ordered at same time, much needed, have not been heard from. I have relied on a reserve of one battalion of the Sixteenth Alabama Regiment, Colonel Powell's regiment, and Captain McClung's battery, left at Knoxville, and ordered forward soon after I started. I have expected them constantly; have been able to get no intelligence until to-day, and now learn (unofficially) that they are not on the way. This may very greatly endanger our position. I will endeavor to prevent the forces at Columbia and Somerset from uniting. The proximity of the terminus of the railroad at Lebanon would seem to give them the means of rapidly re-enforcing in my front.

The position I occupy north of the river is a fine basis for operations in front. It is a much stronger natural position for defense than that on the south bank. I think it should be held at all hazards, but I ought to have a stronger force. Could any feint by possibility be made upon Columbia from the west, it would probably save me from concentration in front until I could be strengthened. We will work day and night on the necessary defenses. Major-General Crittenden has assumed command, and is, I think, now at Knoxville.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, December 10, 1861.*

J. C. RAMSAY, Esq.,  
*C. S. District Attorney, Knoxville, Tenn.:*

SIR: Your letter of 7th instant is received. I thank you for the in-

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\* See p. 10.

formation it contains, and shall reserve your suggestions for proper consideration.

I should be obliged to you if you would give me an account of the circumstances of Brownlow's arrest, &c., at your earliest convenience.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

KNOXVILLE, *December 10, 1861.*

Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR:

The court-martial has sentenced A. C. Haun, bridge-burner, to be hung. Sentence approved. Ordered to be executed at 12 o'clock to-morrow. Requires the approval of the President. Please telegraph.

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

RICHMOND, *December 10, 1861.*

General W. H. CARROLL, *Knoxville:*

Execute the sentence of your court-martial on the bridge-burners. The law does not require any approval by the President, but he entirely approves my order to hang every bridge-burner you can catch and convict.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, }	ADJT. AND INSP. GENERAL'S OFFICE,
No. 262. }	<i>Richmond, Va., December 10, 1861.</i>

\* \* \* \* \*

12. Brig. Gen. W. H. Carroll, Provisional Army, will immediately proceed, with all the armed men of his brigade, to report for duty to General F. K. Zollicoffer, leaving the unarmed portion of his command at Knoxville, Tenn., under the control of a suitable officer, until arms can be provided.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of the Secretary of War:

JNO. WITHERS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, December 10, [1861].*

Brig. Gen. HUMPHREY MARSHALL,  
*Abingdon, Va.:*

GENERAL: Your letters to General Johnston of November 5\* and 28,† and to Major-General Crittenden of December 1,† have been received. He directs me to reply as follows:

1. The general has received no instructions from the War Depart-

\* See Series I, Vol. IV, p. 518.

† See pp. 715, 729.



ment in relation to the force in East Kentucky (the district of Prestonburg), assigned to you, nor yet in relation to those forces you were authorized to raise. The object of giving you a force was announced to him by the Department, and the scope of your powers was learned from your letters.

2. From the powers with which you are invested and the full conversations you had with the general he presumed that the forces placed at your disposal and the unlimited power to raise additional forces would, as the Department hoped, be fully equal to the execution of the plans you had concerted with the Department.

3. He believed that the general intended you to have a wide discretion as to your movements and entire control over the administration of your forces, leaving to the general a supervisory power, with the authority to combine your movements with corps of the Army when the proper time arrived.

4. So believing, and finding that your force fell not only below your anticipations, but was so small as to render it doubtful whether they would insure the immediate object had in view, viz, the protection of the "frontier of Prestonburg and its vicinity," he saw that the time had not yet arrived when it could be combined in the movement of any other corps of this army, and therefore gave you no orders.

5. He was satisfied that you were making yourself fully acquainted with the field of your operations, and that it would be inexpedient at this distance to make suggestions as to your movements, even had he been as fully advised as you were of the special views of the general as to the precise objects to be reached by it.

6. His order to General Crittenden was not intended to reach your command, nor, until the receipt of your letter last night, was he apprised of the fact that that general had taken your district under his command. He immediately telegraphed to General Carroll, local commander of Knoxville, to return those you had put in march for this place.

7. At this distance your arrangements to place your infantry on the mountain line and cover a trail by the advance of your cavalry for subsistence seems judicious.\*

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS BRIGADE,

*Camp Recovery, 1 mile from Prestonburg, Ky., Dec. 10, 1861.*

S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond:*

GENERAL: I have the pleasure to inform you that I have been located here for several days, and to report to you that I have in camp Williams' regiment, which is gradually being filled, and that Trigg's regiment, with Jeffress' battery, will arrive at Prestonburg to-day, they having advanced from the Richlands by the Louisa Fork of the Sandy and by the way of Piketon. I came by Whitesburg, in Letcher County, through the corner of Posey County, and so far through Floyd. I think I have established friends for the Confederate States on a sound basis wherever I have been. My effort has been to conciliate the people, and to teach them by example that the Army of the Confederate

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\* See Marshall to Johnston, December 22, p. 40.

States comes not to maraud and oppress, but to protect and to respect the constitutional rights of the people: The Army of the United States, invited here to defend this people, halted at no excess. They burned and ravaged the towns, insulted females and violated their persons, stole wearing apparel, and killed stock, and frequently deprived poor people of the means of subsistence. I have sought to impress all that this course on their part was a true representation of the despotic principles their master seeks to establish on a permanent basis, while the respect I and my men pay to persons and property, without regard to mere opinion, is the reflex of the principles we represent. The effect has been exceedingly favorable, for the contrast is striking and visible to the commonest man in the community.

I found prisoners at Pound Gap arrested for their active pursuit of their opinions. I released them and sent them home after explaining to them the principles I advocate. They said the veil had been removed from their eyes, and I afterwards found them well disposed and active in getting recruits for my command.

I have advanced my cavalry to West Liberty, in Morgan County—not to station it, but to pass through the county, inspire our friends, and to prevent the enemy from stripping the country of its stock.

I hear that Colonel Moore, with his Abingdon battalion, has actually started, but is making only 5 or 6 miles per day. This augurs badly for his efficiency in the future, but I will not despair. Colonel Stuart, at last advised, was waiting at Abingdon for transportation. Intelligence has reached me from various quarters that six field pieces are at Abingdon intended for this command, but I have received no dispatch informing me that such was its destination nor the amount of ammunition accompanying it. I have a hope that you will inform me, so that, if the battery is to be sent to me, it may be manned and equipped and moved at once, before the ice gathers, so as to make the mountains impassable.

I have a detachment making salt for the use of my command, and I also have possession of the Salt Works at Brashearsville, on the North Fork of the Kentucky River, 20 miles below Whitesburg. I hope through these to make 35 or 40 bushels of salt per week, so as not only to supply my current demand, but to enable me to pack as much meat ration as will serve this army for future purposes. The prices here and at Bristol for pork are as  $4\frac{1}{2}$  to 5 is to 9 to 10, which you see is a vast difference.

I have seen several men from the interior of Kentucky, and I have secured a line of intelligence from my camp to Lexington. I shall in future know pretty well what is going on to the very center of the enemy's operations in Kentucky, and will be perfectly guarded against surprise. I learn that the young men in the interior are beginning to learn my whereabouts and are moving. May I beg of the Government, if it is possible, to let me have good arms to put in their hands when they come to me. They have no arms; they can't get them. Their rifles and shot-guns have been taken away from them by the Lincolnites. I think Mr. Benjamin should let me have at least the percussion muskets I turned over to him through Governor Letcher. I am gratified to say to you that my movement here altogether looks auspicious of good, and I have high hopes that the future may realize our hopes.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*

C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
*Nashville, Tenn., December 11, 1861.*

His Excellency ISHAM G. HARRIS,  
*Governor of the State of Tennessee, Nashville :*

SIR : The agents heretofore employed to procure a laboring force for building fortifications for defending the approaches to this city have failed to get any more than a few negroes ; a number quite insignificant when compared with the works to be undertaken. With a hope that a large force of negroes may yet be obtained by an appeal to the citizens of the vicinity and neighboring counties, I have prepared the form for the call upon them, which I submit for your indorsement. Having your indorsement, I have thought it might be advisable to have a number of copies printed and placed in the hands of some officers, say sheriffs and constables, with instructions to apply to every citizen within reach, and urge the necessity of a prompt compliance with the call.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

[Inclosure.]

C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
*Nashville, Tenn., December 11, 1861.*

It has been decided by the general commanding the Western Department to fortify the approaches to the city of Nashville, the better to protect your capital and State against the contingency of invasion by our relentless enemy. To this end a call is now made upon all citizens to contribute a part of the labor which they control to aid in the erection of the necessary works. It is necessary that each negro sent from a distance be furnished by his master with blankets or other bed-clothing sufficient to make him comfortable ; also with cooking and messing utensils. It is essential that the number be assembled with the least practicable delay at Cockrill's Hill and Foster's Hill, near and north of the town of Edgefield, on the Goodlettsville turnpike. The force employed will be lodged at night either in tents or frame huts in the vicinity of the work, and as a care more satisfactory to the owners may be secured to their hands by placing them under the charge of some person or persons known in the neighborhood or county from which the negroes are sent, it is desired that this plan, by agreement among the citizens, be adopted. If subsistence be furnished by the owner, \$1 per day for each hand will be paid by the Confederate States ; if supplied by the Government, then 70 cents per day. Nothing but a great necessity causes this additional call upon the patriotism of the citizens, and a prompt response will the better insure protection to your property and your homes.

By direction and authority of General A. S. Johnston, commanding the Western Department:

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

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JACKSON, MISS., *December 11, 1861.*

Major-General POLK:

I have ordered 3,000 troops to Union City. They need some tents



and ammunition and caps for shot-guns and rifles. Could you not order supply from Nashville?

JOHN J. PETTUS.

COLUMBUS, *December 11, 1861.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL:

General Polk has assumed command, but under your instructions to give you information of the movements of the enemy I feel it my duty to say that my opinion is that the enemy are preparing to move up the Tennessee River in force. I think they will simply make a demonstration against this position to hold the force here. Will use their large water power to capture Fort Henry and pass up and take possession of Tennessee bridge and separate your command and General Polk's, and will then advance down that railroad on Memphis.

For a week their fortresses have been sealed, and their boats are running up the Ohio in the night-time alone. I may be wrong in my views, but such is my opinion of their purpose.

GID. J. PILLOW.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, C. A. KENTUCKY,  
*December 11, 1861.*

General HARDEE:

SIR: The following is a copy of part of a private letter written from Woodlawn on the 8th instant to a lady and handed to me. I transcribe it for the information of General Hardee:

\* \* \* I think this one of the most important points now left open in the State. It is a point though which Tennessee might be invaded at the most dangerous point—Knoxville, the home of Brownlow & Co. If such a thing should happen, the same scenes may be enacted there as are enacted in Western Virginia. The road by here on to Columbia, and the road down Mockeson and by Beebe's, leading to the same point, are the principal passways through which the tide flows from Tennessee to camp at Columbia and Campbellsville. They are passing daily, almost hourly. If this gap could be stopped it would check a host from joining the Lincoln Army. \* \* \*

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

[Indorsement.]

Respectfully referred to General Johnston. The within goes to sustain the importance of occupying Columbia by our forces.

W. J. HARDEE,  
*Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS CENTRAL ARMY KENTUCKY,  
*Bowling Green, December 11, 1861.*

Colonel W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Western Department:*

COLONEL: In view of the arrival of a regiment of infantry last night and the certainty of an additional re-enforcement of 3,000 or 6,000 men within a few days, I beg to submit for your consideration the following movements against the enemy:

General Hindman was at Horse Well last night, which is within one day's march of Woodsonville. He has with him 1,100<sup>+</sup> infantry, four pieces of artillery, and 500 cavalry. With this force he can keep the

enemy in check at Munfordville, and for this purpose can be ordered to take post at Woodsonville, with instructions to defend the passage of the river and to keep the enemy at bay.

With General Buckner's division I propose to attack the forces of the enemy now at Columbia, and for this purpose would respectfully suggest the following dispositions of that division: On any day, as, say, the 13th instant, let one brigade of that division, together with the body of the cavalry, move to the position now occupied by General Hindman at Horse Well, arriving on the evening of the 14th.

On the morning of the 14th let the remainder of the division move from this point towards Glasgow, arriving on the evening of the 15th, when it should be joined by the brigade at Horse Well, except the cavalry, which should remain at that point until the next day. Measures should be taken to give the troops moving to Horse Well to understand that General Hindman is threatened in front, and that they are intended to sustain him. This impression would probably be reported to the enemy, and cause him to suspect that we intended to cross or defend the river in his front at Munfordville, and thus serve in some measure to blind our real movement against Columbia. The advance of General H. to Woodsonville would confirm him in this impression.

From Glasgow our forces should move with the greatest possible celerity upon the enemy at Columbia, while the cavalry at Horse Well should be instructed to move towards Greensburg on the 16th and ascertain the strength and character of the enemy at that point, and, if found to be inconsiderable, to disperse them, and then gain a position to act with the main body certainly by the evening of the 17th. If such a force be found at Greensburg as to render it inexpedient to risk an attack a small force should be left to observe it, while the remainder hastens to support the main body in its attack on Columbia.

If the enemy should attempt to retire from Columbia, the cavalry could harass him and probably cause him to take a position and give battle.

The greatest care should be taken to prevent the enemy from gaining information of the movement, and for that purpose all persons should be intercepted going in that direction.

If we can gain possession of this point, I think General Zollicoffer should be instructed to move to and hold it. We should thus gain a large district of country, filled with grain and provisions, of which we are much in need. In the mean time I think I risk nothing in undertaking to defend this place with the troops remaining from any attack of the enemy.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. J. HARDEE,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS RIFLE BRIGADE,  
*Knoxville, December 11, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: In pursuance of your instructions by telegraph of yesterday, the sentence of death pronounced by court-martial upon A. C. Haun, the bridge burner, was executed by hanging at 12 o'clock to-day. The court-martial is still in session, engaged in the trial of a number of others charged with complicity in the same crime. I am not advised of the nature or extent of the proof that can be brought against them,



but should it be sufficient and the court find them guilty, the sentence, whatever it may be, will be promptly executed, unless otherwise directed by you. In addition to those suspected of burning the bridges I have now in confinement about 150 more prisoners, charged with taking up arms, giving aid and assistance to the enemy, inciting rebellion, &c. Those among them who have been proven guilty of the offenses alleged against them I shall send to Tuscaloosa, in accordance with your instructions by letter of November 23. I have already sent there 48, to be held as prisoners of war.

I have been greatly annoyed by the interference of the civil authorities with what I conceive the proper and faithful discharge of the duties incumbent upon me in my capacity of military commander of this portion of East Tennessee. Several attempts have been made to take offenders out of my hands by judicial process to be tried by the civil tribunals, which trials I am satisfied would in many instances have resulted in the release of those who are guilty and should be punished. In order to avoid these embarrassments, I felt myself justified in placing the city under martial law until such time as all the prisoners charged with military offenses now in my custody can be tried by a military tribunal. If after this is done any should remain whose offenses come legitimately under the jurisdiction of the civil courts, I will turn them over to the proper officers to be disposed of in that way. I have only been prompted to venture upon this stringent course by strong conviction that the public good imperatively demanded it.

The traitorous conspiracy recently so extensive and formidable in East Tennessee is, I think, well-nigh broken up, as there is at present but little or no indication of another outbreak. I have small detachments of my force out in every direction, suppressing any rebellious spirit that may be manifested and arresting those who are known to have been in arms against the Government. I am daily receiving the most encouraging evidences that the people are beginning to return to a sense of duty and patriotism, as many of those who were heretofore unfriendly towards us are coming forward and giving every assurance of future fealty.

For a detailed account of the operations of my command since taking the field I respectfully invite your attention to my official report, this day forwarded to the Adjutant and Inspector General.

I have the honor to be, yours, respectfully,

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Inclosure.]

#### PROCLAMATION.

HEADQUARTERS RIFLE BRIGADE,  
*Knoxville, Tenn., December 11, 1861.*

The exigencies of the time requiring, as is believed, the adoption of the sternest measures of military policy, the commanding general feels called upon to suspend for a time the functions of the civil tribunals:

Now, therefore, be it known that I, William H. Carroll, brigadier-general in the Confederate Army, and commander of the post at Knoxville, do hereby proclaim martial law to exist in the city of Knoxville and the surrounding country to the distance of 1 mile from the corporate limits of said city.

By order of Brig. Gen. William H. Carroll :

H. C. YOUNG,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*



HEADQUARTERS,  
*Cave City, Ky., December 12, 1861—12 m.*

Lieut. D. G. WHITE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General :*

SIR: Yesterday morning information reached me, through Southern-rights men of Woodsonville and vicinity, that the enemy at Munfordville had commenced repairing the ferry-boat which had been sunk by Captain Morgan, and that parties of their mounted men had been seen trying the depth of the river at different points within a distance of half a mile above and below.

About the same time a spy, whom I had sent to Greensburg, returned with the report that Colonel Hobson was at that place with 600 men (500 infantry, 50 cavalry, and two pieces of artillery), and that all or nearly all the troops had left Campbellsville for Camp Nevin, near Nolin, the reason assigned being the intended advance upon Bowling Green by way of Munfordville.

Scouts sent to the burnt bridge, the point where the Glasgow and Bardstown road strikes the river, reported that a scouting party from Bacon Creek, between 30 and 50 strong, had appeared there, but without crossing. At 10 o'clock I sent a small party of Colonel Terry's Rangers towards Munfordville, instructed to ascend Summerseat's Knob, and observe the position and movements of the enemy. From that eminence, which overlooks Munfordville, they counted 150 Sibley tents, and saw smoke of camp-fires ascending from behind ridge which hid the tents there from view. The distance from Summerseat to Munfordville is about 2 miles; not more. The tents were counted by the use of a glass, and the number may have been a few more or less. No movement was observed; everything seemingly inactive.

At 1 p. m. I went in person, with a party of 10 men, to Rowlett's Station, distant from Munfordville between half and three-quarters of a mile, intending to ascend Rowlett's Knob and observe the enemy's camp from that position. Before reaching there it became evident that that knob was occupied by Federal pickets. I distinctly saw 4 men on the projection which looks towards Horse Well. A good deal of time was lost in an unsuccessful attempt to cut them off, and the ascent of the knob was not made. I reached Rowlett's Station at sunset. It is situated on the ridge that connects Somerset [?] and Rowlett's Knobs, and which is most depressed where the railroad intersects it, forming, however, a bluff 100 feet higher than the level strip between its edge and the river. This intervening strip of level ground is about half a mile wide, and is heavily timbered next to the river, hiding all view of the opposite side, except the top of the knobs behind Munfordville. I ascertained that the ferry-boat had been completed. We had the pleasure of hearing Hail Columbia and Yankee Doodle played by General Johnson's band during some half hour or more.

Going towards Munfordville I traveled the Greensburg road, which is exceedingly rough, and in several places almost, if not quite, impassable for wagons. Cavalry may pass over it without difficulty. After leaving the vicinity of Horse Cave it winds along the hollow through which the railroad passes, and which becomes more and more narrow towards the river, knobs confining it on both sides.

Returning, I came upon this turnpike, which passes by the place and crosses the knob just above Woodland, about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from here. For a distance of 3 or 4 miles, coming in this direction, it is macadamized; the remainder is a good dirt road; an army might pass over it easily.

I returned to Horse Well about 10 o'clock last night. General Har-

dee's communication of yesterday reached me at 2 this morning. I have moved my command to this place as being a better position. The Texas Rangers are encamped at Woodland; the infantry half a mile this side; Swett's artillery in wood at Middleton's, and Phifer's battalion in wood on Mammoth Cave road, just below this place. I have parties out in the direction of Mammoth Cave, Bear Wallow, and Frederick, to protect the agents of Bruce & Co. in collecting beeves, &c., and to collect and drive in what they may overlook. I find it difficult to get more forage than is necessary for my own command without using infantry for that purpose, which would scatter my force too much. I keep a party of observation constantly thrown out towards the enemy, and think I will certainly be apprised of any attempt to cross in force. Any such attempt might be successfully resisted if my force was upon the ridge at Rowlett's Station, and I will probably be able to march them up in time from here. This is a much better region for forage and nearer to our supplies.

Very respectfully,

T. C. HINDMAN,  
Brigadier-General, Commanding Advance.

*Abstract from return of Western Department, commanded by General A. S. Johnston, for December 12, 1861, as given by the latest returns.*

Stations.	Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
		Officers.	Men.		
Columbus, Ky.....	Polk's command.....	1, 143	16, 659	21, 831	24, 968
Bowling Green, Ky., and vicinity..	Hardee's division.....	318	3, 395	5, 890	9, 531
	Buckner's division.....	391	6, 007	7, 987	9, 536
	Harper's artillery.....	4	52	74	77
	Cavalry* (two regiments).....	24	282	455	1, 339
Hopkinsville, Ky.....	Clark's command†.....				3, 500
Prestonburg, Ky.....	Marshall's command†.....				2, 500
Wartburg, Tenn.....	Zollicoffer's division.....	273	4, 428	5, 702	5, 930
Nashville, Tenn.†.....					100
Memphis, Tenn.†.....					160
Camp Johnston, Ark.....	McCulloch's division.....	127	4, 849	5, 568	6, 767
	Troops en route†.....				1, 500
Various camps in Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, and Tennessee.	Volunteers exclusive of militia.†.....				12, 000
	Total.....	2, 280	35, 672	47, 507	77, 908

\*No return from one regiment, and its aggregate present and absent estimated in original at 800.

†No returns. Estimated in the original as above.

[HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,]

Bowling Green, December 13, 1861.

Gov. J. G. SHORTER, Montgomery, Ala.:

I beg you will send all the troops you may have assembled under my late call upon your excellency with dispatch to this place.

I except from this number all you may have ordered to Fort Henry or the Tennessee River. I have ordered the Seventh Alabama from

Chattanooga to this place, and will thank you to order one of the new regiments to take its place at Chattanooga to guard the railway.

Please inform me what number of troops I may expect to receive from my late call on North Alabama.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

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RICHMOND, *December 13, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

SIR: I arrived at Knoxville about the 1st day of December, assumed command, and established my headquarters there. At that time Mr. W. G. Brownlow was absent from Knoxville, where he resides. Very soon some friend or friends of his approached me on the subject of his return to Knoxville, and I had several interviews with the son of Mr. Brownlow, who was interceding and acting for his father in the premises. During several days Mr. Brownlow's son was very importunate in calling upon me and making solicitations in behalf of his father of some sort or another. In the beginning, the letter of Mr. Brownlow to General Carroll, dated November 22, and received about the time of my arrival, was handed to me and discussed between myself and the son of Mr. Brownlow. In this letter Mr. Brownlow stated that he was willing and ready at any time to stand a trial upon any points before any civil tribunal, but sought protection from troops and armed men on a return to Knoxville, denying at the same time having had any connection with arming men or with armed bodies of men or with bridge-burners or bridge-burning. General Carroll also handed to me his reply to this letter.

In the several interviews between the son of Mr. Brownlow and one or more of his friends and myself Mr. Brownlow's innocence of any treasonable conduct was vouched as the basis of any disposition to be made towards him, and I stated to Mr. Brownlow's son, who was acting for his father, that if he came to Knoxville he must submit to the civil authorities.

Finally, about the 4th or 5th of December, I think, Mr. Baxter, a friend of Mr. Brownlow, together with his son, called upon me, and Mr. Baxter delivered to me an open letter from yourself, brought by him, dated November 20, and referring to Mr. Brownlow's departure beyond our lines. Thereupon, and on the solicitations made to me in behalf of Mr. Brownlow, I directed my assistant adjutant-general to inform Mr. Brownlow in writing that if he would come to Knoxville within a given time I would give him a passport and send him with an escort beyond our lines. I designed this escort to convey him directly through our lines, so that he could see nothing of our forces and fortifications. At the given time Mr. Brownlow came, and I made arrangements with him as to the time and manner of his departure, which were satisfactory to him. I designed sending him off the next day, but he desired to stay over a day, and on that day, before his departure, was arrested with a warrant by the civil authorities on a charge of treason.

Mr. Brownlow addressed a note to me, stating his arrest, and that he had come home upon my invitation, and claimed to be under my protection. As I had stated explicitly to Mr. Brownlow's son, who acted for his father, and who went after and did conduct his father into town, that if he came he must submit to the civil authorities, and as his innocence of any treasonable conduct was considered in the arrange-



ments for him, I directed one of my aides to reply to his note to the effect that, in view of all the facts, I could not interfere with the civil authorities so as to protect him from an investigation by them of charges made in their tribunals against him, which I clearly understood from himself and his friends he would not seek to avoid.

Of course, if the civil authorities release Mr. Brownlow, I shall proceed at once to give him a passport and send him with an escort beyond our lines.

I remain, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
Major-General, C. S. Army.

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
December 13, 1861.

Major-General CRITTENDEN, *Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: In accordance with the verbal instructions communicated to you by the President, you will proceed to Kentucky and assume command of all the forces now commanded by General Zollicoffer, including Carroll's brigade and the different posts established by General Zollicoffer at Cumberland Gap and other mountain passes. You will report directly to General A. S. Johnston by letter. Unless otherwise ordered by General Johnston, your command will not include Eastern Tennessee, Colonel Leadbetter having been specially assigned by the President to the duty of maintaining the communications through that district of country, and ordered to assume the command of the troops necessary for guarding the line and dispersing the insurrectionists and bridge-burners; nor will your command include the forces under General Marshall, who has been ordered to report to General Johnston, unless this latter shall so direct.

If by chance you shall, however, be thrown into command in any part of East Tennessee, you will understand the policy of the Government to be to show no further clemency to rebels in arms. All actually engaged in bridge-burning should be tried summarily, and executed, if convicted, by military authority. All others captured with arms or proven to have taken up arms against the Government are to be sent to Tuscaloosa as prisoners of war. All such inhabitants as are known to have been in league with the traitors may be pardoned if they promptly deliver up their arms and take the oath of allegiance to this Government. In such event they are to be protected in their persons and property; otherwise they should be arrested wherever found and treated as prisoners of war, and especially should care be taken to allow none of them to remain armed. These are the instructions substantially that have been given to Colonel Leadbetter, under which he has been acting.

Your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
Secretary of War.

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
Knoxville, Tenn., December 13, 1861.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
Secretary of War, *Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: Your order to me of the 10th instant to join General Zollicoffer immediately with all my armed force reached me last night. I imme-

diately set about making the necessary arrangements to carry the same into effect, as indeed I had been doing for some days previous, under instructions from General Zollicoffer himself. A portion if not all of my command would now have been on the march for General Zollicoffer's present position but for the unsettled condition of affairs in East Tennessee, together with other obstacles that I have been utterly unable to overcome, though I have made every possible exertion to that effect, but as yet without success.

In justice to myself I feel that I may very properly lay before you the nature and extent of the embarrassments under which I have labored ever since I assumed my present command. When the President did me the honor to appoint me a brigadier-general in the Provisional Army I confidently expected to have had my entire brigade thoroughly armed within twenty days at furthest from that time, as I have taken every precaution to secure sufficient arms for that purpose while raising and organizing the regiments which I now have the honor to command. Early in the month of September I procured about 2,000 ordinary country rifles, and placed them in the Government armories at Memphis, Nashville, and Murfreesborough, in order to have them altered—made of uniform length and caliber, and fitted with a sword-bayonet. At that time I was assured by the armory officers at those places that these guns would be repaired and ready for use by the middle of October. On the 26th of that month you telegraphed to them to lay aside all other guns and put their whole force at work upon mine. This they informed me they did; but when I received your orders of the 3d of November to advance to this place and report to General Zollicoffer not a single gun had been completed.

The indications of an extensive outbreak in East Tennessee at that time were so alarming, that I deemed it unsafe to move my command through that country wholly unarmed. I therefore made application in every direction for guns of any description, to serve me until my own should be ready for use. I finally, after much annoyance, succeeded in getting from the arsenal at Memphis about 400 flint-lock muskets, rifles, and double-barreled shot-guns. With these, imperfect and almost worthless as they were, I advanced to Chattanooga, and halted my forces for a few days, for the purpose of dispersing the different bands of traitors who were gathering in that vicinity. This object being accomplished, I moved on to this point. When I reached here I found a general feeling of alarm and uneasiness prevailing throughout the surrounding country. Information every day reached me from all points that recreant Tennesseans, with a few miscreants from other States, were organizing themselves into predatory bands in the counties of Blount, Sevier, Cocke, Hancock, Scott, Campbell, and other counties bordering on the North Carolina and Kentucky line. I immediately sent out scouting parties of cavalry, together with such small detachments of infantry as I could arm, to protect and assist the loyal citizens of these counties in driving these base ingrates from their midst. These various parties have succeeded in arresting many of the rebellious and disaffected, and bringing them to this place for trial. Out of the number thus arrested I have sent and will send about 100, as prisoners of war, to Tuscaloosa. I have for some days past been receiving information, from sources entitled to much credit, that a considerable force of the enemy were threatening a descent from the Kentucky border upon the counties of Campbell and Scott, by way of a small pass in the mountains above Cumberland Gap.



To-day I am in receipt of information, which apparently admits of no doubt, that a body of the enemy, some 500 strong, had attacked the town of Huntsville, and captured a company of cavalry stationed at that place. Other less reliable reports place the number of the enemy at 2,000. I have therefore made arrangements to dispatch Colonel White there with all the armed force I can command, with orders to attack them if not too strong, and if the numbers are too great to fall back until I can re-enforce him. The country abounds in mountain passes and ravines, and a position well selected can be easily held against largely superior numbers. This movement will not delay the prompt execution of your order, as the place mentioned is near my line of march to join General Zollicoffer. During the time I have been here I have continued my exertions to procure arms from every source where they were likely to be obtained, though almost entirely without success. A few days ago I dispatched one of my officers to General Johnston, at Bowling Green, with a statement of my condition, and an urgent appeal for arms of some description, if he should have any at his disposal; but he dispatches me that none are to be had. I have also sent a competent armory officer to Memphis upon a similar mission. From him I learn that 500 of my rifles will be ready by Monday next. These will be forwarded immediately. He further informs me that the remainder will soon be repaired and sent on, as they are being pushed forward as rapidly as possible. Two hundred of those left at Nashville were sent me some days ago, but so imperfectly repaired as to be wholly unfit for use, as you will see from the inclosed report from the ordnance officer at this place. The repairs on these I am having completed here, and will have them finished as soon as possible.

I have here now three regiments fully organized and another in process of formation, besides seven companies of cavalry, amounting in all to about 4,000 men, who could be brought immediately into the field if I could only supply them with arms. Out of my entire force I could not muster more than 300 men efficiently armed. A few hundred more have old hunting guns, but they are of little or no service in their present condition. I still hope that all my guns will be ready in a very short time. I send to Richmond Lieut. Col. E. J. Golladay, one of my best-informed and most discreet officers, to represent to you more fully the true condition of my command. His suggestions may perhaps be of service in shaping the policy proper to pursue in the region of country of which I have spoken.

For a detailed statement of the operations of my command since taking the field, together with an account of all the other forces now in East Tennessee, I beg to call your attention to my report made to Maj. Gen. G. B. Crittenden on the 9th instant, and by him forwarded to the office of the Adjutant and Inspector General. Colonel Golladay can also give you much valuable information of the strength, condition, &c., of the different commands in this portion of the State, together with the state of public feeling and real condition of the country here.

I have the honor to be, yours, respectfully,

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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KNOXVILLE, *December 13, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. W. H. CARROLL:

SIR: I have to report that the rifles, about 200 in number, which were left with me to have the bayonets attached are unfit for duty, for



the following reasons: They are different size bore, which renders it impossible to get ammunition suitable. Many of the locks are in bad order; some entirely worthless; some without rammers, and none of them fit for use. The springs upon the bayonets are worthless, being made of iron, when they ought to be steel. They will have to be almost entirely refitted.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. H. WARREN,  
*Ordnance Officer.*

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PRESTONBURG, Ky., *December 13, 1861.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to report to you that I have arrived at this place, now some days since, and have encamped in this vicinity with the small command under my charge. I stated in my first letter to you that it was the design of the Department of War, in giving me this command, that it should be a separate command, subject only to your own orders, and that I was instructed to report to you for instructions. Subsequently I received from Major-General Crittenden a brief notification that he assumed command of these forces, &c. I applied through a friend to the Department to know if the understanding with me was so soon set aside, and I learn in reply that—

It was not the instruction of the Department to assign your (my) district to the command of Major-General Crittenden. You (I) were to report to General A. S. Johnston, to be subject to his orders, and to the orders of no other general, unless they came through or from him. \* \* \* You are to obey no orders from any other officer of superior rank except Johnston, unless first notified by the Department of your being put under his command. I am informed by Mr. Benjamin that the appointment of Major-General Crittenden was not intended to interfere with your sphere of duty or efficiency in accomplishing your object. It is the wish of the Department that you (I) should strengthen your column to the utmost of your ability, &c.

The foregoing extracts are from a letter to me written by Hon. A. H. Stephens, Vice-President, as the result of his conversations with the Secretary of War touching my position here and the conditions under which I was placed here. I may as well remark here, general, that had I been offered a commission of brigadier in a column of Major-General Crittenden I should not have accepted it; and my entry was upon the basis that I was to have the conduct of a column subject to your orders, which subalternship was perfectly agreeable to me.

I hope with this frank explanation that it will be agreeable to you to permit me to increase the capacity of this column to the utmost of my ability, assured that it will always afford me satisfaction to co-operate with Major-General Crittenden, or any other officer having charge of the public interest, in promoting the welfare of the service.

I received, through Major-General Crittenden, your telegram asking for all the men I could spare without stripping the command to its ruin, and I placed the Fifty-sixth Virginia Regiment at the discretion of General Crittenden, though in extreme risk of ruining the command, whether it is actually employed or not, and to the utter prevention of any large enterprise on my part. I have now only about 1,250 men with me. Moore's regiment has not yet passed Clinch River, and it is said will not unless the men are first paid. I think it is a great pity that I have not strength enough to penetrate to Mount Sterling and hold it. It would at once call off from your line a much larger number of men than I employ. If you can let Colonel Stuart's regiment return I

will be much obliged to you for it, and also for any other regiments you can spare to aid me in developing this column.

I am, truly, &c.,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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KNOXVILLE, TENN., *December 13, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of War:*

DEAR SIR: My letter to you of the 3d instant was hastily and inconsiderately written, and I regret the strong and intemperate language used; and inasmuch as no exceptions, except the most mild and gentlemanly terms, have been taken to that letter, I feel myself under the more obligations to make an apology.

I have been peculiarly situated here in East Tennessee. My fight with the Lincolnites for the last eight months has been as severe a conflict as any this war will record. I have not only held possession of the East Tennessee and Georgia Road against the will of the Lincoln portion of my stockholders, and for a long time guarded our bridges with troops in our own pay, but I have worked the road all the time in the face of this violent and threatening opposition, and never once failed to carry through both troops and munitions and provisions without delay. Moreover, when the East Tennessee and Virginia completely broke down, I did not hesitate to shoulder that responsibility, and by superhuman efforts operated it also, to what advantage to the Army you are aware. Under all these circumstances, worn down by excitement and labor, I am sometimes thrown off my guard. When the Hessians burned my bridges, Colonel Myers immediately wrote me to know what aid I needed. Not wanting to tax any one with my work, I answered promptly, "None other than to send me funds due for work done for the Confederate States." Colonel Ashe came along; I gave him the same answer, and he assured me our money should be paid, and on his arrival at Richmond telegraphed me to send McClung immediately for our money. I sent McClung, and was astonished to receive by telegraph from him the news that Colonel Myers not only repudiated Ashe's contract with the roads, but it would be days before he would be able to send me money. This, in addition to the fact that captains, majors, colonels, &c., were ordering our trains in and out, hazarding life and property, and leaving me no control of either road or ferries, and then the order from Richmond to guard Brownlow, the prince of bridge-burning Lincolnites, over the mountains in safety, all conspired to put out of humor much more even-tempered men than myself. The truth is I felt that under such circumstances I would retire and let others take my place. So you see I have some excuse for my bad letter.

I regret that I have had hard thoughts towards Colonel Myers, for I will say that he has all the time treated me with great kindness and courtesy.

I will not bore you further. Suffice it to say that I am all right again, and at your service in any honorable way my poor abilities can be used.

In two weeks I will have a better bridge than the one destroyed.

Truly, yours,

C. WALLACE.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 16, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of War:*

SIR: Our force has been augmented to-day by the arrival of 2,000 sixty-days' men from Mississippi, under the command of General R. Davis, making our force about 15,500 effective men.

The enemy have rebuilt Bacon Creek Bridge, and their trains now come to Green River, where a large number of workmen are employed in rebuilding the railroad bridge.

Our pickets are pushed forward to the river. Hindman, with about 1,200 men, and Terry's cavalry are at Cave City, covering the collection of cattle and forage. The enemy in considerable force occupy the north bank of Green River, but show no disposition to cross yet. They will, I think, await the completion of the bridge. They are also concentrating at Greensburg and Columbia. Terry's scouts yesterday, near Mumfordsville, captured 3 men of the enemy's pickets, wounding 2 severely.

Governor Harris was here yesterday. He informed me that there are now organized in the vicinity of Nashville about seven regiments ready to take the field, but some delay will occur in arming them, on account of the condition of the arms which have been collected in the country. I will send him all the gunsmiths I can find in our ranks.

I desire to know if the Government will pay \$8,000 per month for a continuation of leaders in two influential journals at Louisville opposing the emancipation of slaves. It is suggested that this arrangement may be accomplished. It may be worth the trial. Answer yes or no by telegram. I keep no copy of this.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., December 16, 1861.*

[General POLK?]:

GENERAL: In compliance with your instructions to report the knowledge I possess of troops lying in the country to our rear I report as follows:

Three companies of cavalry, commanded by Major Clinton, Grenada, Miss.; Captain Stock's company of cavalry, Paris, Tenn.; Captain Clay's company of cavalry, ordered by me to Union City, Tenn.; Captain Robertson's company of cavalry, in Brownsville; three thousand infantry at Grenada, Miss., reported to me as armed and equipped; several thousand in North Alabama. General Samuel D. Weakley, the mustering officer, appointed by myself and approved by General Johnston, or Colonel Foster, can give the force. His (Weakley's) address is Florence or Tuscumbia, Ala.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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KNOXVILLE, *December 16, 1861.*

S. COOPER, *Adjutant and Inspector General:*

General Zollicoffer is threatened by a much superior force in front and one nearly equal on his left flank. He has been ordered by me to



recess the river. He asks for six pieces, 24-pounders or 8-inch howitzers. Colonel Powell's regiment has been ordered from the railroad to join Zollicoffer immediately, and Colonel Leadbetter informed, so that he can replace the guard it withdraws. To make General Carroll's brigade effective it is necessary to obtain 800 muskets, which are known to be in ordnance office at Memphis. Please order William R. Hunt, ordnance officer at that point, to forward them immediately to this place, subject to my order.\*

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., December 16, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: I am directed by the major-general commanding to say that he wishes to know what action he shall take with regard to the Branch Bank of Kentucky at this place. He has caused a statement of the affairs of the bank to be made to him by the cashier, and there is at this time in the vaults of the bank, in coin and bank notes, nearly \$50,000. The State of Kentucky owns one-fourth of the stock of the bank, and to that extent, even had the stockholders taken no action, the assets of the bank would have been subject to the law applicable to alien enemies; but the bank itself, as you, perhaps, are aware, [advanced?] \$5,000,000 to carry on the Lincoln war. The general, under these circumstances, desires instructions from the Department, and would be pleased to have them by telegraph.

By command of Major-General Polk:

W. B. RICHMOND,  
*Aide-de-Camp, U. S. Army.*

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MONTGOMERY, *December 16, 1861.*

J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of War:*

General A. S. Johnston has made requisition on Alabama for troops, which can be armed with rifles or shot-guns. State arms exhausted. Our people won't give up private arms without compensation, which we have no authority to make. Will Confederate Government make such compensation? How and when paid?

JNO. GILL SHORTER.

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RICHMOND, VA., *December 16, 1861.*

Governor SHORTER, *Montgomery, Ala.:*

This Government will pay for all small-arms, rifles, and shot-guns that may be brought into service at fair valuations, made by our ordnance officers, on the delivery of the arms or on the muster of the troops into service for the war. We will not pay for arms for twelve-months' men.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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\* So ordered same day.

GRENADA, MISS., *December 16, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK:

Whole force, 1,850 infantry, 56 cavalry, mostly armed with double-barrel guns, but few cartridge-boxes, haversacks, or knapsacks; poorly supplied with ammunition; some guns out of order, but have a smith. One regiment now at Union City. Confederate commissary refuses to subsist them; start another regiment with cavalry to-morrow; another next day, if I succeed in getting tents and transportation. Will you direct the subsistence of my command at Union City. This must be done at once, as the regiment there have no means.

J. L. ALCORN,  
[*Brigadier-General, Army of Mississippi.*]

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, C. A. KY.,  
No. 273. } *Bowling Green, December 17, 1861.*

During the temporary absence of General S. B. Buckner General J. C. Breckinridge assumes command of this division.

JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,  
*Brigadier-General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, December 17, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. W. H. CARROLL, *Knoxville, Tenn.:*

SIR: Your letter of the 13th instant, containing an account of the difficulties which have hitherto prevented the movement of your brigade, has been handed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Golladay. The principal difficulty seems to be that your regiments are unarmed, and I am unable to discover from your statements that you are much nearer a capacity for movement now than you were two months ago. Your troops are enlisted but for twelve months, and to such troops we never furnish arms. At least one-fourth of the term of your men has passed away, and nearly the entire expenditure of the Government is a dead loss up to the present time. It is impossible for us to carry on a war at such an enormous expenditure as is involved in receiving twelve-months' men without arms. I will allow you till the 10th of January to complete the armament of your regiments, and at that date I shall order all unarmed companies and regiments to be disbanded. Lieutenant-Colonel Golladay has inquired of me in relation to obtaining arms from this Government, but we give none whatever to any but troops enlisted for the war. If your men will now enlist for the war they will be entitled to receive the bounty of \$50 allowed by Congress, and I will endeavor to aid in arming them; but, if not, all that are unarmed must be disbanded on the 10th of January.

Your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Knoxville, Tenn., December 17, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: I received your letter dated the 10th, and would have answered it sooner, but have been waiting until I received a statement from

Colonel Toole, which came to hand to-day, which I inclose to you. Colonel Toole is a gentleman of high standing, and his statement can be fully relied upon. It will be seen from his note to me that the conversation was had with Brownlow on the first Monday of November, and that was before the bridges were burned. It also shows that he must have had some knowledge of the intention of the enemy to invade Tennessee. I also send you a copy of his paper of May 21, with the article marked. You will see from reading it that if certain things are done he advises that the railroads should be destroyed. I think he was the first man in East Tennessee that made the suggestion in regard to the destruction of the railroads. I also send you the last paper he issued, with the article marked. You will see from his editorial that he retracts nothing he has said, but indorses all that he heretofore had written. I also inclose you the Republican Banner, marked, containing a letter written after he stopped the publication of his paper. You will see from this letter that he has gone to Blount, Sevier, Cocke, and Granger Counties, for the purpose of collecting accounts, when in point of fact he only went into Blount and Sevier, and there remained with the most disloyal citizens until after the bridges were burned, and did not return until the rebellion was to a great extent crushed out. So far as I have been able to learn his arrest has been approved of by the public, and in my opinion it has had a good effect. As an index to public sentiment I send you the Knoxville Register, containing extracts from other papers about his arrest. I still think (as I stated to you in my last letter) that it would be proper that he should be sent to Tuscaloosa, but will cheerfully dispose of the case according to your own better judgment. You will please return the newspapers when you are done with them.

Yours, truly,

J. C. RAMSAY,  
C. S. District Attorney

[Inclosure.]

MARYVILLE, *December 17, 1861.*

General J. C. RAMSAY :

DEAR SIR: At your request I state that in conversation with William G. Brownlow, on the first Monday of November, at the ford of Little River, in Blount County, I asked him for the news at Knoxville. He remarked that his son John had just returned from Nashville, and that the Federals had entire possession of Missouri; that Jeff. Thompson was in Memphis; that they (the Federals) would soon have possession of Nashville and Clarksville, and Knoxville would be destroyed. The above is the purport, and, as well as I now recollect, the language used.

Your friend,

JAS. M. TOOLE.

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Beech Grove, Ky., December 17, 1861.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: Your messenger was started back on the 13th instant, via Burkesville and Glasgow, with an escort of 60 cavalymen, directed to go to the latter place. He bore a dispatch giving you a list of 33 prisoners I send to Nashville, to be disposed of as General Johnston may



direct. I have no advices from Major Wynn, but suppose the steamer to arrive at Waitsborough on the 18th will be freighted with stores for us. Have sent a large train of wagons and made ample arrangements for a guard. Ten of the prisoners captured were taken on the 11th instant by an expedition I sent down to Louisville, on the north side of the river, and about 30 miles from here. Our party killed 3 others. The enemy had posted a small body of men there behind a breastwork and with a flag flying, who had annoyed our cavalry across the river at Rowena when patrolling in that direction. Louisville is 15 miles from Columbia. Our only loss was one man accidentally drowned.

The river is now low and fordable in many places. There are now known to be seven infantry regiments at Somerset. The enemy has advanced strong posts to Fishing Creek, and their scouting parties approach to within a few miles of our camp. The stage of the river and the value of our supply trains render it necessary, in my opinion, to keep two regiments on the Mill Springs side of the river. I therefore have but four and a half regiments on this bank. Had the reserve of Powell's regiment, Wood's battalion, and McClung's battery been sent on, as I ordered, I could have advanced. But I can hear nothing official from Knoxville of them. For a day or two past my information leads to the suspicion that the enemy contemplate an early attack upon this position.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, December 18, 1861.*

Major-General HARDEE,  
*Commanding Central Army of Kentucky:*

GENERAL: General Johnston resumes the immediate military command of this army. The administration is devolved on the commanders of divisions.

Please make a return of the troops as they stand to-day.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

NOTE.—The formal order will be issued. You will please notify General Buckner.

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, December 18, 1861.*

General POLK, *Columbus:*

Send to this place 5,000 of your best infantry by rail direct. If it will facilitate, send a portion by Nashville. Telegraph to Nashville and Memphis for transportation. Answer.

A. S. JOHNSTON.

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COLUMBUS, KY., *December —, 1861.*

General JOHNSTON:

I have barely 12,000 men at this post. I have been working day and night to put it in a condition to enable me to hold it against the heavy

force now concentrated at Cairo and threatening to attack me in the next four days. I have information to that effect just from Cairo within the last hour. I was on the eve of calling upon you to send me 3,000 men immediately to enable [me] to hold my position. It will take that to make the position safe. I am fully posted as to the strength of the enemy. To send the force ordered would be to sacrifice this command and to throw open the valley of the Mississippi. Generals Pillow, Cheatham, and McCown are all present and unite with me in this opinion. Answer.

L. POLK.

BOWLING GREEN, *December 19, 1861.*

General POLK:

Your dispatch received. My order to you is revoked. Acknowledge.  
A. S. JOHNSTON.

C. S. ENGINEER OFFICE,  
*Bowling Green, December 19, 1861.*

Lieut. Col. W. W. MACKALL,  
*Adjutant-General, Western Department, Bowling Green:*

SIR: In compliance with General Johnston's verbal orders to determine what would be a proper strength for the garrisons of the works at this place and report the same to him I have to propose the following for the works, viz:

	Men.		Men.
On College Hill.....	1,000	On Price's Hill.....	50
On Baker's Hill.....	700	On Buckner's Hill.....	100
On Webb's Hill.....	300	On ——— Hill.....	75
On Vinegar Hill.....	150	For a reserve.....	1,475
On Grider's Hill.....	75		
On Underwood's Hill.....	75	Making a total of.....	4,000

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

KNOXVILLE, *December 19, 1861.*

S. COOPER, *Adjutant and Inspector-General:*

On inspecting the arms of White's regiment of Carroll's brigade, preparatory to its marching, more than half were found wholly unserviceable and most of the remainder unfit for service. This was the first regiment ordered forward, and consequently cannot go.

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General.*

ATTORNEY-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Knoxville, Tenn., December 19, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: Since I last wrote you I have received a letter from J. G. Wallace, esq., of Blount County, in regard to Brownlow's recent trip.

I consider the letter of importance, and have thought it proper to send it to you. Mr. Wallace is a gentleman of high standing, and his statements can be fully relied upon.

Yours, truly,

J. C. RAMSAY,  
*C. S. District Attorney.*

[Inclosure.]

MARYVILLE, *December 18, 1861.*

General J. C. RAMSAY:

DEAR SIR: I take occasion now to answer the inquiries contained in your letter of the 14th instant.

After Brownlow came to this county we availed ourselves of every opportunity to find out about his sayings and doings, but he so covered over his trail that we have been able to ascertain but little concerning him. On the first Monday of November, the Monday immediately preceding the bridge-burning, some 300 to 500 persons were in town, most all of whom were Union men. It was the day of our quorum county court, at which not more than a score or two of persons usually attend. We did not understand the occasion of so many persons, and especially Union men, assembling, and at first supposed they had mistaken the day Baxter was to speak, and had come to hear him. Upon making inquiry, we found that that was not the case; that they knew he was to speak the next day, and, furthermore, we learned for the first time that they were not going to vote for Baxter, but still we could not ascertain on what business or for what purpose they had all come to town.

About 11 o'clock Brownlow and old Parson Cummings came in and put up at Rev. Mr. Dowell's. Immediately after their arrival there was a general going to see them at Dowell's by the Unionites. Caucuses and private conferences were the order of that day and night. We could learn nothing that Brownlow was saying. His companion (Cummings), however, in the course of the day told a friend of his, a Union man and a brother in the church, that the Federal Army would be at Knoxville the last of that week; that Brownlow had left Knoxville until its arrival, and that as soon as the Army reached there he was going back and resume the publication of his paper. He assured his friend that this might be relied on; that he had received it from a reliable source, and there was no doubt of it. Whatever might have been the occasion of the assemblage, we discovered very clearly that there was something going on that pleased the Union men exceedingly. They seemed in very good spirits, and more confident and defiant than they had been for months.

The next morning the news was brought to town—at least we Southern men heard it then for the first time—that the Federal Army was at Jamestown, 12,000 strong, and coming on to Knoxville. About 10 o'clock that morning Brownlow and Cummings and a man by the name of Mainis left town for the mountains. They went that night to Snider's, in Tuckaleeche Cove. The next day they went into Weir's Cove, in Sevier County. There they parted, Brownlow remaining in the cove, and Cummings and Mainis going over toward Waldron's Creek. On that day Mainis told a man by the name of Waters substantially the same thing Cummings had told Jennings. I have no doubt they told the same thing to many others, but we have tried them long enough in



similar cases to know that the Union men will give no evidence against each other, and especially against their leaders.

On the Monday morning after the bridges were burned the news was circulated in our town. Shortly thereafter Dowell, at whose house Brownlow had staid, left for the coves, and the next day or the day after Mainis, who in the mean time had returned, left also. He afterward sent back after his family, and has never returned. One remarkable fact and coincidence is that very many of those who were in town the day Brownlow was here were engaged in the raid to Sevier County on the Monday and Tuesday after the burning of the bridges.

Another circumstance I will mention. On the Monday morning the news was circulating in town of the bridges being burned a Mr. Sesler, a respectable citizen of the place, was telling the news in his family. A servant girl, a white woman, living in his family, instantly remarked, "La me! Phœbe Smith told me at the spring last Wednesday that the bridges were to be burned Friday night, but I didn't believe it." Upon inquiry of Mr. Sesler she related the following facts: She was at the spring on the Wednesday before the bridges were burned. There she met Phœbe Smith, a white servant girl living in Mr. Dowell's family. Phœbe remarked, "They were all going to the mountains shortly." "What for?" "The Northern Army is coming." "How do you know?" "Mr. Brownlow and Mr. Cummings and some other gentlemen were at our house the other day, and Mr. Dowell had some papers in his hand, and asked me to go out of the room. I went out, and they locked the door. I went back and put my ear to the key-hole, and heard Mr. Dowell reading something about the Federal Army coming and about the bridges going to be burned Friday night."

Mr. Sesler came back up in town and very foolishly made these facts public. In a short time Dowell came down the street and gave notice that the girl Phœbe Smith denied having made any such statement, and in an hour or two Dowell left town, as before stated. The girl Phœbe has since been seen and talked to on the subject. She continues to deny the truth of the statement of the girl at Sesler's, the latter, however, still asserting most positively that they did have such a conversation. The characters of the two girls are equally good. They are both obscure, and nothing much ever having been known or said about either, neither one of them, I presume, could be impeached. Whether there is truth in the statement it is not necessary for me to express an opinion. It is very difficult to imagine how an ignorant servant girl could instantly manufacture such a tale, and make, as it were, a spontaneous expression of it upon hearing the news Sesler was telling, while we might imagine how the other girl could be procured or induced to make a denial of it. I believe that the sentiment of our community is that the girl at Sesler's tells the facts as they occurred. The matter is in just such a fix that no legal evidence can be made of it, as I doubt not but that Dowell's girl will deny it upon oath.

This is about all the information I can give you on the subjects of your inquiries. We have tried to get facts out of the Union men, but they will not divulge, and I do not believe they would tell anything prejudicial to Brownlow on oath. They seem to understand the object of all inquiries addressed to them, and they also seem determined to screen their leaders.

Very respectfully,

JESSE G. WALLACE.

HEADQUARTERS CARROLL'S BRIGADE,  
*Knoxville, Tenn., December 19, 1861.*

Hon. D. M. CURRIN, *Richmond, Va.:*

DEAR SIR: I regret to trouble you with this communication, but feel myself called upon to do so by a sense of duty both to the Confederate Government and to the people of East Tennessee. It might, perhaps, have been more properly done by some one higher in authority than myself. At the instance, however, of a number of leading citizens, together with many officers of the Army, I have concluded to undertake the task of laying truthfully before some one connected with the administration of the Government a fair and truthful statement of the present unhappy condition of affairs in this portion of the State, believing as I do that when laid properly before the heads of the Government it will induce a thorough and most salutary change in the policy now being pursued in reference to that deluded portion of our people who have heretofore been unfriendly to the present revolution.

There are some very important facts connected with the recent political history of East Tennessee which apparently have not yet come to the knowledge of the Government or have been entirely overlooked, while others of less importance have been greatly exaggerated. To these I beg to call your attention. In the beginning of the present contest between the North and South the attitude assumed by East Tennessee was a very doubtful one, and it was deemed best by those fully acquainted with the temper and sentiment of the people to pursue a conciliatory policy towards them. Mr. Davis himself, I believe, adopted this view of the case, and for a time pursued the mild course thus indicated. The result was a very great change in the public mind touching questions at issue between the Northern and Southern Governments.

In September Major-General Polk sent General W. H. Carroll here for the purpose of endeavoring to bring the people over to the support of the Confederate Government and to enlist one or more regiments for the Army. General Carroll succeeded beyond his expectations, raising and organizing in a very short time a full regiment—coming, too, mostly from those counties where in June the heaviest vote had been polled against the separation of Tennessee from the Federal Government. Subsequently about thirty companies more have reported and joined his command from the same section, and composed principally of the same class of people; so that now we have in all nearly 10,000 [?] effective soldiers in the field that in June were almost unanimous in opposition to us. This gratifying result I am satisfied is attributable almost entirely to the liberal and conciliatory policy of which I have spoken; but notwithstanding this large accession to our Army, and the still greater number who had been converted from enemies into friends and allies, there were still left a few leading miscreants and a handful of ignorant and deluded followers, who were wicked enough for the commission of any crime, however detestable. By these, and these alone, were the bridges burned and other depredations committed, while the mass of the people were entirely ignorant of their designs and utterly opposed to any such wickedness and folly. The numbers engaged in these outrages have, I know, been greatly overestimated, as facts have been developed in the investigations that have been made by the court-martial now in session at this place, which satisfy me beyond doubt that there were not, at the time the bridges were burned, 500 men in all East Tennessee who knew anything of it, or who contemplated any organized opposition to the Government.



The excitement arising from this circumstance created more alarm among the Union men than among those who were loyal to the South, for they very justly supposed that it would be a signal for the advance of a large Southern army in their midst, and in the first paroxysm of fear which these apprehensions induced hundreds fled hastily from their homes, some taking refuge in the mountains and others going into Kentucky. Colonels Leadbetter and Vance moved their commands into that portion of the State bordering on the Virginia and Kentucky line, while General Carroll and Colonel Wood moved from the west in the direction of Chattanooga and Knoxville. Scouting parties were sent out in every direction, who arrested hundreds suspected of disloyalty, and incarcerated them in prison, until almost every jail in the eastern end of the State was filled with poor, ignorant, and for the most part harmless men, who had been guilty of no crime save that of lending a too credulous ear to the corrupt demagogues whose counsels have led them astray. Among those thus captured were a number of bridge-burners. These latter were tried and promptly executed.

The rigorous measures adopted by the military commanders here struck still greater terror into those who had before been Union men, and to avoid arrest and, as they thought, subsequent punishment, concealed themselves, thus giving the semblance of guilt to actions innocent in fact, and entirely natural under the circumstances which surrounded them. About 400 of the poor victims of designing leaders have been sent to Tuscaloosa as prisoners of war, leaving in many instances their families in a helpless and destitute condition. The greatest distress prevails throughout the entire country in consequence of the various arrests that have been made, together with the facts that the horses and the other property of the parties that have been arrested have been seized by the soldiers, and in many cases appropriated to personal uses or wantonly destroyed.

Old political animosities and private grudges have been revived, and bad men among our friends are availing themselves of the opportunity afforded them by bringing Southern men to hunt down with the ferocity of bloodhounds all those against whom they entertain any feeling of dislike. The officers in command here have used every effort to restrain the soldiery from all acts of lawless violence. The scattered and distracted nature of the service in a great measure neutralizes their efforts. My position in the Army enables me to speak advisedly of these things, and I venture to say that if assurances of safety were given to those persons who have fled from their homes under apprehensions of danger they would return and be good and loyal citizens. The wretched condition of these unfortunate people appeals to the sympathy and commiseration of every humane man. When in Richmond a short time since I was present at an interview with the President, and feel assured that he has no disposition to exercise any unnecessary severity towards these deluded dupes. Those best acquainted with affairs here are fully impressed with the belief that if the proper course were pursued all East Tennessee could be united in support of the Confederate Government. Strong appeals have been made from all sections to General Carroll to release those now in prison here and the return of those sent to Tuscaloosa; but, under the instructions from the Secretary of War, by which he is governed, he does not feel at liberty to do so. My first intention was to have addressed this letter to the Secretary of War, but on reflection concluded that a representation from you would have far more influence; besides, as I am an



officer in the Army, it would perhaps not be proper for me to make any suggestions to Mr. Benjamin unless they should be called for.

Col. H. R. Austin visits Richmond for the purpose of impressing these views upon the President. Col. Landon C. Haynes will follow in a few days for the same purpose. These gentlemen can inform you more fully touching the subject of which I have written. I beg you to give them every assistance you can in bringing this important matter before the President and Secretary of War.

Respectfully, your friend,

H. C. YOUNG.

BOWLING GREEN, *December 20, 1861.*

J. P. BENJAMIN:

The enemy are crossing Green River at many points in overwhelming numbers. Their bridges are laid. I cannot meet them with more than 10,000 men between Green River and Nashville. Can Floyd be sent on here? Answer by telegraph.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

RICHMOND, *December 20, 1861.*

General JOHNSTON:

General Floyd's command will reach you by Christmas, but there are only about 2,500 men left in it. The Southern troops were sent to General Lee at Charleston, where the enemy are moving with heavy force.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

[HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,]  
*Bowling Green, December 20, [1861].*

Governor HARRIS, *Nashville:*

The enemy in overwhelming numbers are crossing Green River. Their bridges are now laid or being laid. Every exertion, Governor, to get your regiments put into the field is now a necessity.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. CENTRAL ARMY KENTUCKY,  
No. 42. } *Bowling Green, December 20, 1861.*

I. General Davis, Mississippi Volunteers, is hereby assigned to the command of the fortifications in and about the town of Bowling Green. He will assign garrisons to the several works as follows:

To College Hill, 1,000 men; Baker's Hill, 500 men; Webb's Hill, 250 men; Underwood's Hill, one company; works on Vinegar Hill, one company each; Buckner's Hill, two companies; Price's Hill, one company.

The remainder of his forces will be held in reserve near Vinegar Hill. If he should not at present have a sufficient number of troops to furnish the garrisons as above, he will distribute his forces, as near as may be, according to the ratio indicated. Biffle's cavalry, Captain Graves' and

Captain Eldridge's batteries are assigned to General Davis' command. General Davis will prosecute to completion the work still unfinished.

II. Captain Graves is appointed chief of the artillery under the command of General Davis. He is charged with the control of all ordnance and ordnance stores in the several works in and about this post. He will organize and instruct artillerists from General Davis' command for the efficient service of the artillery in the fortifications. He will hold his own battery in reserve, to be placed as occasion may require. He will take immediate measures to place ammunition and all necessary artillery stores in the above fortifications.

By order of Major-General Hardee:

D. G. WHITE,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, December 20, 1861.*

NATHAN ROSS, Esq., *Springfield, Tenn.:*

SIR: Your letter of the 13th is received. The Government would gladly supply the needed arms if possible, but it is not in our power to do so at present; but the Government will pay for all arms furnished by troops, upon inspection and valuation by a Government officer, when the troops are mustered into service. The Department hopes that your efforts in enlisting troops in Kentucky may not necessarily be impeded by this difficulty, and will lend every encouragement in its power to promote your success.

Respectfully,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

KNOXVILLE, *December 20, 1861.*

S. COOPER, *Adjutant and Inspector-General:*

SIR: Various applications are made to me for information as to the acceptance of troops (infantry) from East Tennessee. I wish to inquire how many regiments of infantry the Government will receive.

There are here and near here seven independent companies of cavalry which have been mustered into service—Captains White's, McLin's, Gormus', Brown's, McLary's, McKenzie's, and Brock's. These are now and have been doing service in East Tennessee. Would it not be well to organize these into a battalion, and am I to consider them as belonging to my command.

On yesterday I inspected the arms of White's regiment, of Carroll's brigade, which I had ordered to join Zollicoffer, and found its arms in such condition that I could not let it go. The men had some old flint-lock muskets, some squirrel rifles with saber-bayonets and some without, and some shot-guns, almost all out of fix and wholly unfit for service. I telegraphed you to this effect. This regiment of the brigade I had ordered to move first. Colonel Powell's regiment, of Zollicoffer's brigade, goes forward to-morrow. General Zollicoffer has not been heard from for the past three days.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 21, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

SIR: The movements of the enemy indicate the design to turn my right by the turnpike road from Glasgow, through Scottsville to Gallatin and Nashville. They are concentrating in great force at Munfordville, on Green River, and at Columbia are rapidly increasing the number of their regiments.

Breckinridge's brigade, of Buckner's division, stationed on the railroad towards Munfordville, at Oakland, and Dripping Springs, will march to-morrow (22d) through Rocky Hill Village to Skegg's Creek, where the Glasgow road to Nashville crosses it, 23 miles.

General Buckner will also to-morrow march with the remainder of his division to the crossing of the Great Barren River, and take a position on the west side of the bridge,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles southwest of Skegg's Creek, passing *en route* through Rocky Hill Village (33 miles from this place to Skegg's Creek).

Major-General Hardee will march to-morrow with one of his brigades to the Great Barren River Bridge, leaving here on the route on the west side of the Great Barren River and passing through Scottsville (35 miles from this place to the bridge).

These movements will be completed in less than two days.

General Hindman's brigade, of Hardee's division, will continue to occupy his present position at Cave City until obliged by the superior force of the enemy to retire; he will then march through Rocky Hill Village to unite his brigade with the division. Rocky Hill is 18 miles from Cave City, which is 9 miles from Munfordville.

The Texas cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison (Colonel Lubbock is ill with typhoid fever at Nashville), and Phifer's battalion of cavalry cover Hindman's front.

Helm's regiment of cavalry keeps the country under observation towards Columbia from Glasgow.

Our forces of all arms, when concentrated on the Glasgow and Nashville turnpike road, will make an aggregate of 11,200 men.

The garrison I shall leave here is 4,160 men, composed of the Mississippi sixty days' men and one of Hardee's brigades, under the command of Maj. Gen. R. Davis.

The day after to-morrow (23d) two Tennessee regiments from Camp Trousdale will re-enforce the garrison of this place, and on the 24th another is promised. These troops are uninstructed, but can be soon prepared for service.

The weather has been very fine for some weeks and the roads of every kind are excellent. I think a change is about to take place. It is now cold and cloudy, and snow and rain we hope will soon make the country roads very difficult to travel over, which would be greatly to our advantage. A slight rise of the Barren River would make the line of the Barren one of great strength.

I have made every effort to gain time to strengthen our defenses here and increase my force; in a few days more my force may be materially increased by the arrival of General Floyd's command and from other sources.

The enemy threaten an immediate move on Hopkinsville from Calhoun, on Green River, on the road from Owensborough to Hopkinsville; our force there is insufficient, but General Clark can, if beaten at Hop-



kinsville, retire to Clarksville, where defensive works are being constructed.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
General, C. S. Army.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, December 21, 1861.*

Major-General HARDEE, *Commanding*:

General Johnston directs you to move Brigadier-General Breckinridge's brigade to-day through Rocky Hill Village (10 miles east of Rocky Hill Station) to Skegg's Creek, and post it on the Scottsville and Glasgow road, on the Scottsville side of the creek,  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the bridge over the Barren.

Send General Buckner with the rest of his division through Rocky Hill Village by the point where the Scottsville and Glasgow road crosses Skegg's Creek, and thence to the bridge on the Barren, on the road where he will take post.

Order General Hindman, if forced to retire by superior forces, to retreat through Rocky Hill Village, where the Glasgow and Scottsville road crosses Skegg's Creek. Order him (Hindman) to send pickets at once in front of Brownsville, to relieve General Breckinridge's pickets, and order General Breckinridge not to relieve his pickets in front of Brownsville till they are replaced by Hindman.

Notify Hindman of the new position taken by Breckinridge and Buckner. Major-General Hardee will march with Claiborne's [Cleburne?] brigade to the crossing of the Scottsville and Glasgow pike over the Barren. The route will be by the Drake's Creek Bridge direct to Scottsville.

The movement of Generals Hardee and Buckner will take place at daylight to-morrow.

By command of General Johnston:

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS MISSISSIPPI BRIGADE,  
*Columbus, Ky., December 21, 1861.*

Maj. GEORGE WILLIAMSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Columbus, Ky.:*

SIR: On or about the 1st instant Brig. Gen. G. J. Pillow, C. S. Army, then temporarily in command of this department of the Confederate Army, dispatched his excellency the Governor of the State of Mississippi, urging speedy re-enforcements to be sent from Mississippi in support of your position, then supposed to be threatened by an attack from the enemy gathering in force at Cairo and Paducah. Mississippi had already sent to the battle-field 25,000 of her brave sons, mostly armed and equipped by herself. She was but a few days since promptly responding to a call of General A. S. Johnston upon her for an additional 2,000 twelve-months' volunteers, to be armed by the Confederate Government. These troops were being disbanded by order of General Johnston, for want of arms, at the very moment the intelligence here referred to was received.

The intelligence of the call was promptly communicated by the Governor to the Legislature, then in session, when that authority as promptly made an appropriation of \$500,000 in money, and authorized the Governor, with the means provided, to call 10,000 volunteers to the field, bringing with them their own arms, their own blankets and cooking utensils, for a service of sixty days. The same act authorized the Governor to appoint generals to command the forces thus called out.

The military board of Mississippi, then sitting, ordered the troops to rendezvous at Grenada and at Corinth, Miss. Those rendezvousing at Corinth were placed by the Governor under the command of General Reuben Davis; those at Grenada under the command of the undersigned. I had organized three regiments, numbered by me First, Second, and Third, when I was ordered to report to you at Union City and subsequently at this place. I am now here in obedience to that order. I have with me the three regiments mentioned, the First under the command of Colonel Percy, the Second under command of Colonel Bartlett, and the Third under command of Colonel Rozell. I have, in addition, a company of mounted men, commanded by Capt. C. McLawner; also two other companies of infantry; and expect the arrival within the next five days of volunteers in numbers sufficient to organize a fourth regiment of infantry.

My command is mostly armed with double-barrel sporting pieces of a good class. I have ammunition for two-thirds of the command, and expect soon to be supplied. Shall ask a small requisition of ammunition and a few tents from the Confederate Government, but ask it only as a loan, to be replaced within a few days. I shall endeavor to ask nothing of the Confederate Government but subsistence for my troops, hospitals for my sick, lumber to protect my men from the chilling earth, and the privilege of fighting as a Mississippi brigade with its general officer, who shall, with the command, be subject alone to the orders of the major-general commanding. I have a brigade quartermaster (Capt. R. W. T. Daniel), who will make requisitions, signed by myself, for the wants of the command, and endeavor so to keep his accounts as to avoid complication. The troops will be paid by the State of Mississippi, the accounts being left for future adjustment between the Confederate Government and the State.

I have on hand a supply of subsistence stores, which, with your permission, I will order turned over to the Confederate Government, and draw my supplies as other troops. My brigade surgeon, Major Compton, is well supplied with drugs, but should he require any requisitions of the medical director of this post we will account for the same.

I refer you to the certified report of my adjutant, Maj. J. N. Davis (now being prepared), for the strength of my command, its officers, &c.

Awaiting your orders, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. L. ALCORN,

*Brigadier-General, Army of Mississippi.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
Richmond, December 22, 1861.

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letters of the 4th, 8th, and 16th instant.

1st. In relation to the horses of the artillery company of Captain



Harper: By law the horses of artillery companies are paid for by the Government. No allowance is made for their use and risk, as in the case of cavalry. These horses are therefore to be paid for as ordered by you, and they thus become the property of the Government. This payment is to be made to those who furnished them, as borne on the muster rolls, according to the valuation. The amount paid by the Governor of Mississippi will form the subject of settlement between that State and the General Government, although in strictness the payment, having been erroneously made by the Governor, does not constitute a legal claim against the Confederacy.

2d. The sum of \$5,000 has been placed to your credit in Nashville for secret-service money, as requested in your letter of the 8th instant.

3d. I shall to-morrow order you a further remittance of \$16,000 for secret service. You will thus have it in your power to make the arrangements you suggest about having leading articles inserted in certain influential journals. Of the propriety of making this expenditure I leave you to judge at your discretion. I know you will use the money to the best of your judgment for the public service, and I will not undertake to advise you at this distance, confident as I am that your own judgment is much more likely to be correct than any that I could form.

I have been very much puzzled by a dispatch received from you on the 20th instant in these words:

The enemy are crossing Green River at many points in overwhelming numbers. Their bridges are laid. I cannot meet them with more than 10,000 men between Green River and Nashville. Can Floyd be sent on here?

I contented myself with responding by telegraph that Floyd would be with you by the 25th, but I cannot for my life understand the statement about your force. Your letter of the 16th announced your effective force to be 15,500. Your return to the Adjutant-General, dated the 12th, I think (I have not the paper before me), stated your forces under Hardee, Buckner, Clark, and others, not including any of Polk's or Zollicoffer's command, at about 17,000 present, and this was prior to the arrival of the Mississippians under General R. Davis. There must surely be an error in the dispatch, but it has made me very uneasy, and the President and General Cooper are equally at a loss to make out how the matter stands.

Zollicoffer reports himself in almost undisputed possession of the banks of the Cumberland from the fork near Somerset all the way down to the Tennessee line and seems able to guard your right flank, so that your front alone appears to be seriously threatened, and I have hoped that you had sufficient force in your intrenched line to defy almost any front attack.

I have not, unfortunately, another musket to send you. We have an immensely valuable cargo of arms and powder in Nassau, blockaded there by a Yankee gunboat, that I am trying to get out, but if we succeed it will be too late for your present needs, and in the interval we must put our trust in our just cause and such means as we have in hand. We know that whatever can be done will be done by you, and rest content.

Yours, &c.,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*



CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,  
*War Department, Richmond, December 22, 1861.*

J. C. RAMSAY, Esq.,

*C. S. District Attorney, Knoxville:*

SIR: Your letters of the 17th and 19th instant have been received. In relation to Brownlow's case the facts are simply these: Brownlow, being concealed somewhere in the mountains, made application to General Crittenden for protection against what he called a military mob or military tribunal if he came to Knoxville, professing his willingness to undergo a civil trial, *i. e.*, a trial before a civil court, as distinguished from court-martial, and, as I understand, General Crittenden promised to protect him from any violence and from any trial before a military tribunal.

In the mean time Mr. Baxter came here and represented that Brownlow, who was entirely beyond our power and so concealed that no one could get possession of his person, was willing to leave the country and go into exile, to avoid any further trouble in East Tennessee, and proffered that Brownlow would come in and deliver himself up to be conveyed out of East Tennessee if the Government would agree to let him do so and to protect him in his exit. If Brownlow had been in our hands we might not have accepted this proposition, but deeming it better to have him as an open enemy on the other side of the line than a secret enemy within the lines, authority was given to General Crittenden to assure him of protection across the border if he came into Knoxville. It was not in our power, nor that of any one else, to prevent his being taken by process of law, and I confess it did not occur to me that any attempt would be made to take him out of the hands of the military authority. This has been done, however, and it is only regretted in one point of view—that is, color is given to the suspicion that Brownlow has been entrapped and has given himself up under promise of protection which has not been firmly kept. General Crittenden feels sensitive on this point and I share his feeling. Better than any, the most dangerous enemy, however criminal, should escape, than that the honor and good faith of the Government should be impugned or even suspected. General Crittenden gave his word only that Brownlow should not be tried by the court-martial, and I gave authority to promise him protection if he would surrender, to be conveyed across the border. We have both kept our words as far as was in our power, but every one must see that Brownlow would now be safe and at large if he had not supposed that his reliance on the promises made him would insure his safe departure from East Tennessee.

Under all the circumstances, therefore, if Brownlow is exposed to harm from his arrest, I shall deem the honor of the Government so far compromised as to consider it my duty to urge on the President a pardon for any offense of which he may be found guilty, and I repeat the expression of my regret that he was prosecuted, however evident may be his guilt.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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ORDNANCE OFFICE,  
*Nashville, Tenn., December 23, 1861.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: I have the honor to report to the general commanding the.

department the entire loss of my office and store-house, in which were all the supplies of equipments, &c., of the ordnance department in this city, together with all my papers, books, and vouchers. The cash-book and vouchers are saved in a damaged condition from the safe.

The fire originated about 3.30 o'clock this morning, but how or exactly where I have not yet been able to ascertain. I had a sentinel at either door—house fronted on both streets—and a private watch inside. The watch inside reports that the first he knew of it the house was in flames, shortly after which an explosion occurred of some caps and friction primers and case of rockets, showing conclusively to my mind that it was the work of an incendiary. I have ordered the arrest of both sentinels and watch for an investigation.

The loss is very heavy—between 400 and 600 sets of artillery harness, 10,000 to 12,000 sets of accouterments and equipments, 300 cavalry saddles, 2,000,000 percussion caps, 6,000 friction primers, besides numerous articles of supplies, which will be enumerated in as accurate detail as possible in another report.

I have the honor to request that the general appoint a board of survey to investigate the case.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. H. WRIGHT,

*First Lieutenant, Artillery and Ordnance.*

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,

*Beech Grove, Ky., December 23, 1861.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: I feel it my duty frankly to say that the failure to receive the reserves and supplies I ordered up a month ago, and upon which in part the plan of campaign was predicated, has given and is likely to give serious embarrassment. I now receive no responses to communications addressed to Knoxville connected with the most important details. I have five regiments north of the river and two south. The strength of the enemy is unknown, but it is reported by the country people to be very large. There are now, I learn, in East Tennessee, besides the force at Cumberland Gap, eight full regiments and the Georgia battalion, a battery of artillery, and eight cavalry companies. I beg respectfully to say that it cannot be that half this force is required there. On the other hand, were this column strengthened properly, the enemy could not venture to pass London to attack Cumberland Gap. We could open the Cumberland and drive the enemy from Somerset and Columbia.

I trouble you with these suggestions, about which I feel the deepest concern, because I learn that Major-General Crittenden has gone to Richmond.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,

*Brigadier-General.*

P. S.—Inclosed I send copies of a general order\* and a proclamation I have deemed it expedient to print and circulate.

\* Order not found.

[Inclosure.]

BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Beech Grove, Ky., December 16, 1861.*

*To the People of Southeastern Kentucky:*

The brigade I have the honor to command is here for no purpose of war upon Kentuckians, but to repel those Northern hordes who, with arms in their hands, are attempting the subjugation of a sister Southern State. They have closed your rivers, embargoed your railroads, cut off your natural and proper markets, left your stock and produce on hand almost valueless, and thereby almost destroyed the value of your lands and labor. We have come to open again your rivers, to restore the ancient markets for your produce, and thereby to return to you the accustomed value of your lands and labor. They have represented us as murderers and outlaws. We have come to convince you that we truly respect the laws, revere justice, and mean to give security to your personal and property rights. They have forced many of you to take up arms against us. We come to take you by the hand as heretofore—as friends and brothers. Their Government has laid heavy taxes on you to carry on this unnatural war, one object of which is openly avowed to be to set at liberty your slaves, and the ensuing steps in which will be to put arms in their hands and give them political and social equality with yourselves. We saw these things in the beginning, and are offering our heart's blood to avert those dreadful evils which we saw the abolition leaders had deliberately planned for the South. "All men must have the *ballot* or none; all men must have the *bullet* or none," said Mr. Seward, the present Federal Secretary of State.

How long will Kentuckians close their eyes to the contemplated ruin of their present structure of society? How long will they continue to raise their arms against brothers of the South struggling for those rights and for that independence common to us all, and which was guaranteed to all by the Constitution of 1787? For many long years we remonstrated against the encroachments on the rights and the insecurity to that property thus guaranteed, which these Northern hordes so remorselessly inflicted upon us. They became deaf to our remonstrances, because they believed they had the power and felt in every fiber the will to "whip us in." We have disappointed them. We have broken their columns in almost every conflict. We have early acquired a prestige of success which has stricken terror into the Northern heart. Their "grand armies" have been held in check by comparatively few but stern-hearted men, and now they would invoke Kentucky valor to aid them in beating down the true sons of the South who have stood the shock, and in bringing common ruin upon Kentucky and her kindred people. Will you play this unnatural part, Kentuckians? Heaven forbid! The memories of the past forbid! The honor of your wives and daughters, your past renown, and the fair name of your posterity forbid that you should strike for Lincoln and the abolition of slavery against those struggling for the rights and independence of your kindred race. Strike with us for independence and the preservation of your property, and those Northern invaders of your soil will soon be driven across the Ohio.

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*



HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 24, 1861.*

His Excellency JOHN J. PETTUS,  
*Governor of Mississippi :*

SIR: On assuming command of this department it was my chief object to collect a sufficient force to shield the valley of the Mississippi from the enemy and assure its safety. Calls were made by me upon the Governor of Mississippi and other States of the Confederacy for troops, but, notwithstanding the patriotic efforts of the Governors, the response has not been such as the emergency demands, and in consequence there is not now a force at my disposition equal to the exigency of my situation.

It was apprehended by me that the enemy [would] attempt to assail the South not only by boats and troops moving down the river, to be assembled during the fall and winter, but by columns marching inland, threatening Tennessee by endeavoring to burn the defenses at Columbus. Further observation confirms me in this opinion, but I think the means employed for the defense of the river will probably render it comparatively secure.

The enemy will energetically push towards Nashville the heavy masses of troops now assembled between Louisville and this place.

The general position of Bowling Green is good and commanding, but the peculiar topography of the place and the length of the line of the Barren River as a line of defense, though strong, requires a large force to defend it.

There is no equally defensible position as this place, nor line of defense as the Barren River, between the Barren and the Cumberland, at Nashville, so that this place cannot be abandoned without exposing Tennessee and giving vastly the vantage ground to the enemy.

It is manifest that the Northern generals appreciate this, and by withdrawing their forces from Western Virginia and Eastern Kentucky they have managed to add them to the new levies from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and to concentrate a force in front of me variously estimated at from 60,000 to 100,000 men and which I believe will number 75,000.

To maintain my position I have only about 17,000 men in this neighborhood. It is impossible for me to obtain additions to my strength from Columbus. The generals in command of that quarter consider that it would imperil that point to diminish their force and open Tennessee to the enemy.

General Zollicoffer cannot join me, as he guards the Cumberland and prevents the invasion and possible revolt of East Tennessee. Notwithstanding these adverse circumstances, relying upon the firm purpose that animates the hearts of my troops to maintain the cause of the country, I will not relinquish my position without a battle, and your excellency can well conceive the momentous importance of my situation. If troops are given to me, if the people can be made to feel how much suffering and calamity would be avoided by the presence now in my camp of 10,000 on 15,000 more brave men, so that I could attack the enemy, and not from a disparity of force be compelled to await it, it seems to me that the same generous ardor that induced them to embark in the great struggle for our independence would give me such success that victory would be certain. I therefore ask that for the coming struggle every man should be sent forward. A decisive battle will probably be fought on this line, and a company on that day will be more than a regiment next year. If the enemy does not attack, the North, embarrassed at home and menaced with war by England, will shrink, foiled,

from the conflict, and the freedom of the South will be forever established. If, however, the battle of independence is to be fought here, the history of Mississippi and the character of her gallant people compel me to believe that they would be among the first and staunchest to stand by their brethren in arms.

I have intrusted this letter to the care of the honorable the chief justice of your State, Judge Smith, to deliver, with my request to inform your excellency of all such details as are of importance, and to urge upon you the necessity of sending forward to this place every armed man that can be spared from Mississippi at the earliest moment.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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NAVY DEPARTMENT,  
*Richmond, December 24, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK,  
*Commanding Forces at Columbus, Ky.:*

SIR: The completion of the iron-clad gunboats at Memphis by Mr. Shirly is regarded as highly important to the defenses of the Mississippi. One of them at Columbus would have enabled you to complete the annihilation of the enemy. Had I not supposed that every facility for obtaining carpenters from the army near Memphis would have been extended to the enterprise, I would not have felt authorized to have commenced their construction there, as it was evident that ruinous delays must ensue if deprived of obtaining mechanics in this way. These vessels will be armed with very heavy guns and will be iron-clad, and with such aid as mechanics under your command can afford they may be completed, I am assured, in sixty days. May I ask, therefore, that you will extend to this Department the necessary aid? The men may be furloughed for this special service, and the highest current wages will be paid them.

The Department, to induce the construction of the boats, has to be in advance to Mr. Shirly, and the Government may be said to be exclusively interested in their speedy completion.

I have also to ask that, if practicable, a guard be assigned to protect these vessels. Though Mr. Shirly stands in the light of a contractor, he seems to have been guided alone by patriotism and an unselfish desire to do all in his power to serve us, and has undertaken to construct the vessels at our own estimates.

Unless mechanics can be obtained from the forces under your command the completion of these vessels will be a matter of uncertainty, and the Government will lose their services and sustain all the pecuniary loss.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. R. MALLORY,  
*Secretary of the Navy.*

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COLUMBUS, KY., *December 24, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

It has been several months since a large portion of this army has received any pay, and a number of regiments have never received a dollar since entering the service. They are getting very sore under

this state of affairs, and I respectfully entreat that the necessary funds to pay this army be at once forwarded or placed to my credit at the earliest practicable moment.

L. POLK.

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COLUMBUS, *December 24, 1861.*

General JOHNSTON:

Do you still want support? Answer.

L. POLK.

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[DECEMBER 24, 1861.]

[LEONIDAS POLK:]

Yes. Ten thousand or more, if possible, without delay of a day.

[A. S. JOHNSTON.]

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COLUMBUS, *December 24, 1861.*

General JOHNSTON:

I have resolved to send you Bowen's command of infantry, about 5,000 strong, and have to-day issued orders to him to move at once. He will divide his force into two parts; one-half will go by wagons to Paris, the other half via Union City and Humboldt. I retain his cavalry and two batteries of artillery, and will replace his forces at Feliciana by four regiments sixty-days' men from Mississippi.

I keep the cavalry and artillery because I suppose you do not want them.

L. POLK.

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BOWLING GREEN, *December 24, 1861.*

General POLK, *Columbus*:

Order the troops to this place. Send the troops first; send the wagon transportation as soon as possible after them. If you can spare artillery, send it.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, December 24, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. G. B. CRITTENDEN, *Knoxville*:

SIR: Your letter of 20th instant has been received. You are authorized to organize into a battalion the seven companies of cavalry mentioned in your letter, and you are requested to have the muster rolls forwarded to this Department, and to recommend proper officers for lieutenant-colonel and major of the battalion, and to attach it to your command. You are further authorized to receive and muster into the Confederate service all the troops that are tendered in East Tennessee for the war, as well as all twelve-months' men that furnish their own arms. You are requested to advise the Department of all troops received and to forward muster rolls as fast as possible, taking care to receive into the service no unarmed twelve-months' volunteers.

Your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*



HEADQUARTERS,  
*Knoxville, Tenn., December 24, 1861.*

To the ADJUTANT AND INSPECTOR GENERAL C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: Upon a conference with Colonel Leadbetter I have become satisfied that the unorganized companies serving in East Tennessee form a part of my command. I have therefore deemed it advisable, in anticipation of a reply to the letter I wrote to the Department some days since, to order them to rendezvous at Knoxville, Tenn., in order that they may be organized. I believe that under existing circumstances the President appoints the field officers, &c. Colonel Leadbetter and I concur in the opinion that in their present unorganized and to a great extent irresponsible condition they are doing as much harm as good to the service. Therefore their being ordered to rendezvous here will work no injury to the service in any event; that is to say, whether they belong to my command or that of Colonel Leadbetter.

Colonel Powell's regiment marched to-day for Brigadier-General Zollicoffer's headquarters. Brigadier-General Carroll's will march to-morrow and next day. I myself will leave to-morrow.

I have been much embarrassed by the difficulty of procuring serviceable arms and the necessary transportation for General Carroll's brigade.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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KNOXVILLE, TENN., *December 24, 1861.*

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector-General, Richmond:*

SIR: I inclose slip from the Knoxville Register of this date, the substance of which has been confirmed to me in conversation by Dr. Abernathy. He states that these emissaries were surprised at night, and their clothes were captured, consisting of the Regular United States uniform. That they are emissaries from Kentucky and the enemy cannot be doubted.

I am now disposing the troops of my command along the railroad throughout, so as to protect the important bridges, and the Department is aware that the number of men is none too great for that especial service. In the northern counties—such as Scott, Morgan, and Campbell—disturbances are frequent, and Southern men are much exposed. Notwithstanding the favorable aspect of things generally in East Tennessee the country is held by a slight tenure, and the approach of an enemy would lead to prompt insurrection of an aggravated character. It should be constantly kept in awe by the presence of a respectable force.

I understand my command to embrace only the railroad line and that portion of the country adjacent from which it is or may be threatened by insurgent bands.

My headquarters are now at Knoxville.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,

D. LEADBETTER,  
*Colonel, Commanding.*

[Inclosure.]

FROM LOUDON.—Dr. Abernathy, surgeon of the post at Loudon, arrived in town last night, and reports that a party of three of Byrd's men had been seen near that place, and that on Saturday night a party of citizens attempted to capture them, but did not succeed. They succeeded, however, in getting their guns, bayonets, &c., which they threw away, after firing on the attacking party, to facilitate their flight. The citizens returned the fire, but "nobody was hurt on either side." The Lincolnites told a supposed friend that they were off on detailed duty, to be ready to burn bridges, &c., as soon as the grand Union Army makes its appearance in East Tennessee, which they say Colonel Byrd assured them it would surely do, 50,000 strong, in two weeks at furthest, and he bade them tell the Unionists here "to be of good cheer, and take the oath as often as required of them." They also state that their party consists of 100 men. Our military authorities would do well to look to this matter.

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BOWLING GREEN, *December 25, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

Let nothing prevent Floyd's brigade from coming here immediately.  
A. S. JOHNSTON.

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 25, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War C. S.:*

SIR: The recent movements of the enemy and the concentration of heavy masses of troops indicated an early advance, and the weather, which has been unusually fine, resembling the fall rather than winter, rendered it probable that a battle would be fought in this vicinity.

Information from various sources shows that every effort has been made by General Buell to concentrate all his strength for a movement upon Tennessee through Central Kentucky, and that not less than 75,000 men are assembled in front of me, while I have not more than 17,000 men for active operations. After a careful examination I have found the line of the Barren River the only good defensible one between Green River and Nashville. Bowling Green from its topography is naturally a strong position, and gives command over Central Kentucky south of Green River, and has easy communication by railroad to Clarksville and by rail and turnpike to Nashville. Its local advantages for defense are good, though requiring a large force for that purpose, as it is situated in an amphitheater of some extent. The place has been strengthened by good defensive works, requiring about 4,000 men for their defense and to be supported by a large force. I have as a further precaution ordered intrenchments to be thrown up under the direction of the chief engineer, Major Gilmer, at Nashville. These arrangements are such that they perhaps double the efficiency of my force for the defense of this line.

The enemy have recently reconstructed the bridges between Louisville and Green River, and have thrown forward a strong advance to

Woodsonville, with which Terry's cavalry had a successful encounter on the 17th instant, in which we had the misfortune to lose the gallant leader of it. Their forces in heavy masses are stationed at Woodsonville, Bacon Creek, Nolin, &c. There is also a corps of about 6,000 men at Columbia, which is being rapidly re-enforced. There is another considerable force at Lebanon, at the terminus of the Louisville Railroad, and another at Somerset. The banks of the Green River from Munfordville down are unoccupied, as the country is quite rugged, except by a force under General T. [L.] Crittenden. These dispositions of their troops are in accordance with information received from several sources, and lead to the belief that a forward movement will very soon be made in this direction, but at present I can only conjecture whether they will make their attack here or turn my right, or, relying upon their superiority of numbers, attempt both at the same time.

If Floyd's brigade, from Virginia, and Bowen's division, *en route* from Columbus, reach here, as I expect, in a few days, they will be compelled to attack me here. With my force thus considerably increased I do not think they will attempt to turn my position.

General Hindman, with his brigade of Hardee's division, is at Bell's, on the railroad and pike, with Swett's battery. His front is covered with the Texas and Arkansas cavalry. Breckinridge, with his brigade of Buckner's division, is at Oakland, 10 miles in rear of Hindman, with Morgan's cavalry in the direction of Brownsville. Helm, with his regiment of Kentucky cavalry, has been ordered back to Skegg's Creek Bridge and the Barren Bridge, on the route from Scottsville to Glasgow. His scouts keep the country under observation towards Woodsonville and Columbia. Should the enemy move in force on this route, the bridges across the Barren and other streams towards Glasgow will be burned. The remainder of the divisions of Hardee and Buckner, and the sixty days' State troops of Mississippi, recently arrived, under the command of Maj. Gen. R. Davis, are stationed here, my whole force amounting, as before remarked, to 17,000 men. A brigade under General Clark is posted at Hopkinsville to guard against the movements of the enemy on Lower Green River, towards Clarksville, and to follow their movement should they attempt to co-operate with the movements of the enemy in my front. His force should be much greater for these purposes.

The measures adopted at Columbus render that place comparatively secure from any immediate attempt of the enemy. The position of General Zollicoffer on the Cumberland holds in check the meditated invasion and hoped-for revolt in East Tennessee, but I can neither order Zollicoffer to join me here nor withdraw any more force from Columbus without imperiling our communications towards Richmond or endangering Tennessee and the Mississippi Valley. This I have resolved not to do, but have chosen, on the contrary, to post my inadequate force in such a manner as to hold the enemy in check, guard the frontier, and hold the Barren till the winter terminates the campaign, or, if any fault in their movements is committed or his lines become exposed when his force is developed, to attack him as opportunity offers. If the campaign closes without any striking success to their arms and without any impression on our territory, the North must shrink disheartened from the contest, and, with embarrassed relations, if not hostile attitude, towards England, the first great step towards our independence is gained. The contest here must be relinquished for the winter by the enemy or a decisive blow soon struck; to make the latter is their true policy.



Efforts have been incessantly made by me for the last four months to augment my force in the different army corps to an adequate degree of strength, but while the Governors of States have seconded my appeals, the response has been feeble, perhaps because the people did not feel or understand the great exigency that exists. I have again to-day urged most earnestly the Governors of Mississippi and Tennessee to send me re-enforcements, for a company now is worth a regiment next year, and if our force can be increased to one-half of that of the enemy the frontier of Tennessee will be safe and shall be successfully defended here.

In conclusion, I would respectfully request that the Government will earnestly and zealously aid me in my efforts to procure additional re-enforcements by communications addressed to the Governors of Tennessee and Mississippi and elsewhere, and that every influence should be brought to bear to convince them and their gallant people that a decisive battle must probably be fought here for the freedom of the South, and that every man sent forward here is of importance to the Confederacy.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 25, 1861.*

His Excellency ISHAM G. HARRIS,  
*Governor of Tennessee:*

SIR: The present situation of affairs is such that I deem it necessary to call the attention of your excellency to it in connection with the movements which the enemy meditate towards Tennessee. My information continues to convince me that a heavy concentration of force on this line has been made to invade Tennessee on the route to Nashville.

The troops of Western Virginia and Eastern Kentucky have been withdrawn and ordered upon the line in my front. These regiments, with large re-enforcements from Ohio, Indiana, and other Northwestern States, have been assembled, and the estimates from the most reliable sources show that General Buell has about 75,000 men, probably more, at his disposition, while the effective force here at my command does not exceed 17,000 men. In order to render these equal to the duty of preserving our frontier and protecting Nashville, I have used every precaution, and feel sanguine that by the dispositions of the last few months they can be made to hold in check double their number. Bowling Green, naturally strong, has been well intrenched. Columbus Fort, with its garrison and troops on that front guarding the Mississippi, renders the lower valley comparatively secure, and General Zollicoffer, on the Cumberland, protects East Tennessee from invasion and possible revolt, which would destroy our communications between the Mississippi and Atlantic States and inflict great injury.

These dispositions will foil the designs of the enemy on East Tennessee and defeat or retard his design to descend the Mississippi this winter. The vulnerable point is by the line from Louisville towards Nashville, and the Northern generals are evidently aware of it. In order to obtain additional strength I ordered Major Gilmer, my chief engineer, to go to Nashville and arrange defensive works for its protec-

tion, and have provided a sufficient armament. I will endeavor to render them unnecessary by defending Nashville here, but a proper forecast should induce all to join in their immediate construction, and I therefore ask you to have them completed or take effective measures to furnish the necessary labor for their execution as soon as possible. The country between this place and Nashville offers no good defensible line, and the works I have ordered should not be neglected.

Such being the situation of affairs, the enemy will be compelled to move against Tennessee by this route or submit to the humiliation of closing a campaign without result or impression upon us in this quarter.

The news from Europe, as well as the dissatisfaction in the North, force them to advance now or admit the independence of the Confederacy virtually established. The disparity of my force is very great, and exposes our cause to a hazard that it is most unwise to continue to incur. Ten or fifteen thousand additional troops would make me feel assured of victory. With this additional force I could avail myself of every fault of their movements. Without them, I must be a spectator, without power to seize the opportunities. Foreseeing all this, for the last four months I have endeavored to obtain additional forces from Tennessee and other States, but notwithstanding the efforts of your excellency and other governors, the response has been feeble and the forces inadequate to the momentous interests involved.

If the people could be properly impressed with the vast exigency all would be safe, the designs of the enemy thwarted, and the Northern mind become dispirited and anxious for peace. A company now is worth to the South a regiment next year.

Under these circumstances, I once more invoke your excellency to impress upon your people these views and solicit you to forward to me here every man at your disposition. If well re-enforced now, Tennessee, the valley of the Mississippi, and the Confederacy is safe.

Returning to your excellency my sincere thanks for the energetic and efficient co-operation which I have received from you and Tennessee since I assumed command, I have the honor to subscribe myself, with great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

Five thousand men, Bowen's division, will leave Columbus for this place to-day.

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RICHMOND, *December 25, 1861.*

Maj. W. R. HUNT, *Memphis, Tenn.:*

Arms belonging to the Government cannot be issued to twelve-months' volunteers until the volunteers for the war are first supplied. There are war regiments now waiting to be armed, and if there are Government arms at Memphis for issue, unarmed war regiments will be sent to Tennessee to receive them. This restriction is not intended to apply to the arms belonging to the twelve-months' regiments waiting repair or alteration which can be made at the armories; and such was the case in respect to General Carroll's arms, which were sent to Memphis to be put in order.

S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General.*



RICHMOND, *December 26, 1861.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green, Ky.:*

Floyd's brigade started in part yesterday; rest leaves to-day and to-morrow.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

RICHMOND, VA., *December 26, 1861.*

General LEONIDAS POLK, *Columbus, Ky.:*

The funds in the Branch Bank of Kentucky are to be held by you subject to the orders of Governor Johnson, of Kentucky.\*

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

RICHMOND, VA., *December 26, 1861.*

General LEONIDAS POLK, *Columbus:*

I am using every exertion to get the pay forwarded to your army. Hope to have it on the way to you to-morrow or next day.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, December 26, 1861.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: In making provision for the subsistence of the Army in your department great difficulties exist, arising from the indisposition of many parties in the border States to receive the Treasury notes or bonds of the Government in payment for supplies. This is a war for national existence, and the Army must be fed, and it is impossible to pay for its food otherwise than in our national currency. True friends to our cause will nowhere refuse to receive that currency, and our enemies, whom, under the laws of war we have a right to lay under contribution, cannot, of course, be listened to when they ask that our currency be sold at a heavy discount in order to pay them in gold. Major Jackson, your chief commissary, informs the Department that in some cases parties have succeeded in extorting a discount of 40 per cent. You will at once perceive that a submission to such demands is equivalent to laying down our arms. I have, therefore, to request that you give orders in your department that all subsistence stores and supplies be paid for in the currency of the Government, and that, if prices are advanced for the purpose of covering any discount, you allow to parties from whom purchases are made only such price as would be the fair value in gold of what they sell. In other words, let the necessary supplies be impressed, if not otherwise attainable, and paid for at their cash coin value in Confederate notes. I inclose you extract of a letter written to Major Jackson by the Commissary-General some six weeks ago, in which the same view is taken. I see no other resource.

Your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

\* See Richmond to Benjamin, December 16, p. 770.



COLUMBUS, *December 26, 1861.*

General JOHNSTON:

In the opinion expressed in General Polk's dispatch, early last week, I concurred. Since then the forces in our front are known to have been reduced to 15,000 men. Now we could spare, until your conflict is over, 3,000 men, to be promptly returned. The forces in our front have gone against Price. This is my opinion, under the altered condition of the enemy's force.

GID. J. PILLOW.

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BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Beech Grove, Ky., December 26, 1861.*

Lieutenant-Colonel MACKALL,  
*Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: I sent to Gainesborough two trains of wagons, amounting to about 150, to receive army stores brought by the boats. I infer from what is reported to me that 80 or 100 more wagon loads remain on board. I cannot spare more wagons now. The river being very low, the boats did not get higher than Carthage. The trains will probably not return before the last of the month.

I desire very much to bring one of the boats up to this point; it would contribute much to our security in more than one way, and if it can be brought up with its freight will save us much wagoning.

This morning I sent down on the north side of the river 650 cavalrymen, under Lieutenant-Colonels McNairy, Branner, and McClellan, with instructions to observe the enemy at and near Columbia and descend to Burkesville by to-morrow evening, giving me by express messenger information of all they saw and heard. They are instructed to send forward a detachment to communicate with the boat at Celina, and the boat is ordered to steam up to Celina by the evening of the 28th, to receive the news to be communicated by the cavalry. If deemed safe, the boat is ordered to ascend to Mill Springs and the cavalry is instructed to return on the north bank in such way as to give it security. If my information seems to make it necessary, I will make with infantry and artillery such demonstration towards Jamestown, Ky., and Columbia as will tend to keep the enemy away from the river. I doubt the success of the enterprise, but I consider it so desirable to bring the boat up, that I will spare no effort to accomplish it.

Colonel Wood's battalion and Captain McClung's battery have arrived, and I am advised that Colonel Powell's regiment has been ordered to follow.

Letters from Major-General Crittenden and Brigadier-General Carroll, of 15th, 17th, and 18th instant, have just been received, by which I am advised that they will be here in a few days, and that a part of General Carroll's brigade is ready to march to this point.

I have deemed it proper within the last few days to permit the forces to commence building huts, to shield them from the rigors of winter. I have not yet completed and still work daily some force on the earth-work defenses in front of the position occupied. No pickets of the enemy have crossed Fishing Creek for some days. I have no recent reliable information of their movements, but suppose they are not likely to attack me in the strong position I hold. For a few days at least I will not be prepared to hunt them up.

Very respectfully,

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

COLUMBUS, KY., *December 27, 1861.*

General COOPER:

I am informed that you instructed the ordnance officer at Memphis to issue no arms to twelve-months' volunteers. I have eight or ten regiments of that description of troops now at hand and not one for the war. These troops both General Johnston and myself are in pressing need of. Cannot the exigency authorize the suspension of your rule? Please answer immediately.

L. POLK.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., December 27, 1861.*

To the PRESIDENT:

SIR: The bearers, Captains Townsend and Montgomery, come to me most highly recommended, and from the character of their indorsers I am induced to place great confidence in their judgment and full reliance in their statements.

The nature of their proposed enterprise I leave to their verbal communication for a better development and more perfect understanding. In view, however, of the immense flotilla of gunboats and mortar batteries, so thoroughly armed and equipped and so perfect in all its appointments, with which the enemy are prepared to descend the Mississippi, I deem it highly important that we should resort to any and every scheme that is at all feasible to thwart their purposes and defeat their designs.

Such is the emergency in which I find myself at this time placed that I can but advise the careful consideration of any enterprise which purposes for its end our relief from their force afloat.

With the enemy in possession of the river the injury we shall sustain is incalculable, and I can conceive no men more capable of coping with such a force than the boatmen of the Mississippi.

With your knowledge of the daring and bravery of the captains, pilots, and men that live on this river, I think you will sustain me in this opinion. These gentlemen propose to organize a considerable force of these people, and with such material to execute their designs I think most favorable results can be anticipated.

Their views in regard to an independent organization and action, in order to give greater efficiency to the undertaking, has impressed me very strongly, and I can but urge the reasonableness of their demand and the adoption of their views in this respect.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,

*Major-General, Commanding.*KNOXVILLE, *December 27, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

Ramsay entered a *nolle prosequi* in Brownlow's case. I hold him in custody by advice of Colonel Leadbetter, to be sent beyond our lines or otherwise, as you may instruct.

G. H. MONSARRAT,

*Captain Artillery, Commanding Post.*

Approved:

D. LEADBETTER,

*Colonel, P. A. C. S.*

[Received War Department, December 28, 1861.]

President DAVIS:

SIR: At the request of many of our most reliable friends in East Tennessee I have come to Richmond, to lay before you a faithful account of East Tennessee matters.

The conflicting views of your friends in that quarter have been calculated to perplex your mind in regard to the policy best adapted to the peculiar condition of East Tennessee.

Regarding the conversion of East Tennessee to our cause an object of vast importance, I have for the last four months devoted my efforts chiefly to that end; and the statements of facts to which I ask your attention are founded on my personal observation and investigation, unbiassed by party prejudices or personal animosities, which have done more than everything else to keep alive in East Tennessee the prejudices of the people against the Confederate Government.

It is the opinion of the best informed and most reliable men in East Tennessee that all the Confederate troops now employed in guarding the railroads and suppressing rebellion in East Tennessee, except one regiment, might be safely sent to other points, where troops are really needed; and that if proper measures were immediately adopted to bring back to their families all innocent men who have been carried or frightened away from their homes, it would restore peace and a sense of security to the people, and put an end to all appearances of disloyalty to the Confederate Government in East Tennessee. And I believe that the wrongs they have suffered, if properly explained and promptly relieved, will afford an occasion for a striking display of the justice, wisdom, and power of the Confederate Government, which will do more to insure the fidelity of the people of East Tennessee than all the severity of punishment advised by the violent partisans of that section, who have provoked the prejudices of the people against themselves, and consequently against the Government, of which they were supposed to be the true exponents.

Respectfully, &c.,

H. R. AUSTIN.

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KNOXVILLE, TENN., *December 28, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Richmond, Va.:*

DEAR SIR: Your letter of the 22d instant, addressed to J. C. Ramsay, esq., Confederate States district attorney, in relation to Brownlow's case, which appears in the Knoxville Register of this morning, may make an erroneous impression on the public mind as to the part which I took in procuring a passport for him. The careless reader may suppose that the Government intended to arrest him, and abandoned the purpose and consented to his leaving the Confederate States on the ground of my representation that he was so concealed as to be entirely beyond its power. So far as I knew or believed no officer of the Government at Richmond contemplated his arrest. The application for him to leave was promptly assented to by you, and in answer to an objection by President Davis that it appeared to be discriminating in favor of Brownlow, conferring upon him a privilege not accorded to others, &c., you replied that you were willing for all to go that wanted to, and you spoke of making a proclamation to this effect, showing conclusively that you were not controlled in your action upon this matter by the belief that Brownlow was beyond your power.

These impressions, which may be made from a casual reading of



your letter—though I presume it was not so intended—are calculated to do me injustice, and I would beg you to set me right in reference to these particulars. I acted in good faith to the Government and to everybody concerned, and I am willing to take upon myself all the responsibility which properly attaches to my acts or declarations. Your decision in the premises I consider wise, just, and magnanimous, and it is capable of a full and complete vindication. The results which will follow his departure from East Tennessee will be ample for this purpose; but I am unwilling to be placed before the country in the attitude of having induced the Government to abandon any intention of arresting Brownlow, by representing that he was concealed and entirely beyond its power. Such was probably not the fact. What I stated was substantially this: "That from fear of personal violence Brownlow had left home; was supposed to be concealed in the mountains of Sevier or Blount; that I had not seen him; had no authority from him to act for him; but that his wife had informed me that he desired to quit the Confederate States, and that she desired me to procure a passport for him if one could be obtained." Upon this statement your letter to General Crittenden was prepared. It was not imperative. The question was referred to General Crittenden to decide whether he should go or not. He was here on the ground; knew all the facts; was cognizant of the views and wishes of the Government; had the means of determining whether Brownlow was beyond the reach of the Government or not, and this question he decided for himself, uninfluenced by any suggestion of mine whatever.

You will pardon me, I hope, for adding that there is no necessity for the Government to apologize for this official act. It disappointed some persons who thirsted for his blood, and who had cherished the hope that he would fall a victim to this revolution, and they excited some feeling among the soldiery here. But the more enlightened, liberal, and brave Southern men among us take a different view. When the revolution is over you will have no occasion to regret the course which you have pursued in reference to Brownlow's case.

Respectfully, yours,

JNO. BAXTER.

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Kelly's Station, Tenn., December 28, 1861.*

THE ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL,  
*Headquarters Department of the West, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: Your telegram reached me two days out from Knoxville, on my way to General Zollicoffer's headquarters, and for that reason I am compelled to confine myself to an informal statement of the troops under my command.

There are two regiments of infantry at Cumberland Gap and Brazelton's battalion of cavalry, two companies of which are serving with Zollicoffer. The command numbers 1,500 men for duty; aggregate, a little over 2,000.

General Carroll's brigade consists of two regiments at Knoxville or vicinity, one armed and on the road to General Zollicoffer, one unarmed still in Knoxville, and Colonel Avery's regiment (incomplete) at Bowling Green. Captain Monsarrat's battery, consisting of ten pieces, is also attached to the brigade, but the company is not yet filled up, the intention being to augment it to 250 men. Colonel Gillespie's regiment, lately organized, is at Knoxville, but as yet assigned to no brigade,

and I do not know whether it is to be considered under my command or not.

In addition to the forces mentioned there are seven independent companies (mounted), which have been serving in East Tennessee, collecting arms, suppressing insurrections, &c. I have ordered them all to Knoxville (considering them under my command) for the purpose of their more complete organization, and have written to that effect to the Adjutant-General, it being my opinion that under existing circumstances the President has the power on their organization into a battalion to appoint the field officers.

In conclusion, this report excludes General Zollicoffer's immediate command. As soon as possible after my arrival in Kentucky I will furnish a full and detailed account of my entire command.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. CRITTENDEN.

*Major-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*Bowling Green, December 29, 1861.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK, *Columbus:*

If in your opinion you can now spare more troops than you have ordered, they will be very useful if only sent as far as Clarksville.

Report says the transportation for Bowen, Campbell, and Reynolds has been detained. Transportation is limited here, and the wagon transportation should be sent here as soon as possible.

By order of General Johnston:

W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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BOWLING GREEN, KY., *December 29, 1861.*

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,

*President of the Confederate States of America:*

SIR: The suggestions contained in the inclosed letter of the Hon. William Preston are in my opinion eminently wise, and I urged him to communicate them to Your Excellency, with the hope that you would concur and issue a proclamation, which must spread dismay among the troops of various States now arrayed against us in the State of Kentucky.

With great regard, I remain, your obedient servant,

GEORGE W. JOHNSON.

[Inclosure.]

BOWLING GREEN, KY., *December 28, 1861.*

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,

*President of the Confederate States of America:*

SIR: Recent events in Congress show that the extreme Republican party will force the administration to confiscate or enfranchise the slaves, and that New England will compel the Government to adopt her policy or abandon the war. Since the report of Mr. Cameron and the message of Mr. Lincoln great discontents have been manifested among the Union men in Kentucky. The Louisville Journal, the Dem-



ocrat, and all the other journals of the State, denounced the policy in bitter terms, but now are awed and silenced by the Government. Universal dissatisfaction prevails, and information from various sources proves that the Kentucky troops in the Federal service are discontented and distrusted. The officers have been invoked to resign in such an event by the press, and many have announced their intention to do so if the anti-slavery measures before Congress should pass. Major Phifer, who bore a flag of truce from General Hindman to General Johnson, now commanding the advanced corps of the Federals, after the skirmish in which Terry fell, told me that General Johnson, who is a Kentuckian and former comrade, said openly that an avowal of such a policy would cause him and others instantly to resign and abandon the Federal service. It is said that Generals Ward, Rousseau, and Crittenden are discontented and distrusted; that Ward has resigned, Rousseau has been ordered from the advance to the rear, and that Crittenden is no longer in command at Calhoun. Colonel Jackson, a member of Congress, has expressed his intention to resist any attempt at anti-slavery legislation, and the resolution before the Legislature at Frankfort shows that in the Union party there is a vast majority determined to oppose all plans of emancipation by Congress.

Under these circumstances it seems to me that it is a matter of great importance to augment to the utmost this dissatisfaction. The chief obstacle to the redemption of Kentucky is the fear of the leaders who have adhered to Lincoln that they have gone so far that in the event of Southern success they will be forever proscribed and persecuted. There are now some 20,000 troops from Kentucky in the Federal service. The legislators and officers tremble before the changing opinions of the people, who have been deceived by their illusory promises that the war was conducted in no spirit of hostility to the institution of slavery. The mask is laid aside and the true character of the contest is revealed.

In this posture of affairs I venture to suggest the expediency of holding out every inducement to the discontented to abandon the cause of the North and to fraternize with the South. In my judgment a proclamation containing a guarantee from Your Excellency that they would be welcomed and received as brethren, that their organizations would be recognized, and that their officers would be assured the same rank, pay, and command would exercise a most powerful effect and induce many to abandon the service of the North, or engender such distrust between the Southern and Northern troops and officers as to paralyze their confidence and impair fatally their efficiency. The proclamation would be in accordance with the order setting forth the reasons for entering Kentucky, and could hold out the strongest reasons to induce men of honor and patriots to resist the contemplated destruction of their rights by the Federal Government, the forfeiture of its promises, and the humiliation of Kentucky by an abolition Congress. Such a paper emanating from you would produce a great and salutary effect. It cannot come from any other quarter carrying with it such influence. The leading men attached to the South in Kentucky are few in number and powerless to tempt the ambitious into the path of honor and patriotism.

I trust that you will pardon me for taking up your time, but these suggestions are offered from the belief that a golden opportunity exists, which may induce many to act with us hereafter and to unsettle and perplex our enemies in this quarter for the present.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

W. PRESTON.



## HEADQUARTERS,

*Camp Beauregard, December 29, 1861—9 p. m.*

Maj. GEORGE WILLIAMSON,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Columbus, Ky.:*

SIR: I have information that the enemy are advancing on this post and are now 5 miles south of Mayfield. I have taken the liberty of sending a courier to Moscow, requesting the officer in command to give me support, leaving a guard at his encampment.

The information of which I am possessed runs as follows:

Courier from Major King at 7 o'clock p. m.:

Enemy's cavalry, reported 200 strong, now at Mayfield.

Eight o'clock:

Enemy 5 miles this side of Mayfield. Road blockaded with wagons in rear. Cavalry supposed to be accompanied by infantry. Force not known.

I have sent forward 250 cavalry to meet the enemy, with orders to advance with caution, and if enemy is in large force to skirmish with and retard their progress. My command, you are aware, is weak, ill-prepared for a battle. Re-enforcements may be necessary. Two pieces of my artillery (the two howitzers) are without ammunition. The lieutenant commanding states that he has often applied for the ammunition, but it has not been furnished. I have been somewhat disappointed in the supposed fortifications at this place. A few rifle pits, full of water, which I am having leveled down, and a lot of fallen timber, compose the defenses. Should the enemy attack us, we are in feeble condition, but the best defense of which we are capable will be made. I leave the subject of my re-enforcement with you, but would suggest my early re-enforcement. I am busy in preparation.

Your obedient servant,

J. L. ALCORN,

*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

## HEADQUARTERS,

*Knoxville, December 29, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,

*Secretary of War:*

SIR: In accordance with your letter of instructions Mr. Ramsay, the district attorney, entered a *nol. pros.* in Brownlow's case. As commander of this post, in order that your future instructions might be complied with, I caused Brownlow to be remanded to prison. This measure was necessary even for his own safety and in order that the public peace might not be violated. I infer from your letter to the district attorney that Brownlow is entitled to a safe-conduct beyond our lines, and with reference to this I await your further instructions.

I have just been appointed commandant of this post, and have already discovered numberless abuses that should be corrected. Marauding bands of armed men go through the country, representing themselves to be the authorized agents of the State or Confederate Government; they "impress" into "service" horses and men; they plunder the helpless, and especially the *quondam* supporters of Johnson, Maynard, and Brownlow; they force men to enlist by the representation that otherwise they will be incarcerated at Tuscaloosa; they force the people to feed and care for themselves and horses without compensation. I would

gladly have instructions as to the mode of correcting these abuses and the character of punishment to be inflicted upon those guilty of such offenses.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. H. MONSARRAT,  
*Captain Artillery, Commanding Post.*

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Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,\*

*President of the Confederate States of America :*

The undersigned begs leave to lay before Your Excellency the following statement and accompanying documents :

He had, for reasons that need not here be stated, opposed the secession of Tennessee, and was, while the question was pending and undecided before the people of the State, a zealous advocate of the Union ; but after the ordinance of secession had been confirmed by the vote of the citizens of the State, and the permanent Constitution of the Confederate States had in like manner been adopted, the undersigned, with others who had become prominent by reason of their opposition to those measures, voluntarily addressed a communication to Brigadier-General Zollicoffer, in which they pledged themselves to use whatever influence they might possess to promote the peace of East Tennessee and obedience to the constituted authorities, State and Confederate, on the part of her people. That pledge was made with a sincere determination, so far as the undersigned was concerned, to fulfill it according to its letter and spirit, and he has done so ; and while General Zollicoffer remained at Knoxville with his command the undersigned and all other law-abiding citizens were protected ; but after his departure he soon became convinced that the undersigned and his family were in danger of violence from the soldiers stationed at that place, under the command of Col. William B. Wood. Certain of those soldiers were in the daily habit of coming to the residence of the undersigned, flourishing their knives, pointing their muskets at the windows, and uttering threats to take his life. The undersigned firmly believes that the soldiers were incited to act in that manner by his bitter personal enemies, who sought to make the military the instruments of their private revenge. However this may be, he and his family believed that his life was in danger, and that his presence at home imperiled instead of securing the safety of his wife and children. He therefore yielded to the entreaties of his friends to leave home for a time, and he consented to do so the more readily as he had business in adjoining counties which needed his attention. He accordingly left his home, and during his absence heard of the late burning of the bridges on the railroads in East Tennessee, and also heard about the same time that he was charged with complicity in that crime and outrage. The undersigned knew that the most intense excitement prevailed in the country ; that the passions of the citizens and soldiery were fully aroused, and his knowledge of the history of mankind in the past taught him that in such seasons of high excitement the innocent and the guilty would suffer together. Prudence, therefore, dictated that he should for a time—until the passions of men should have time to cool and reason to reassume her sway—conceal himself, that no occasion should occur for violence to his person.

The undersigned asserts his entire innocence of the several charges

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\* Without date, indorsed "Received January 2, 1862."

which have been invented by his enemies. He has not since the date of the letter to General Zellicoffer, before referred to, done aught inconsistent with the pledge it contains. He has not furnished guns to men in arms against the Confederate States, as has been untruly charged by some of the newspapers in the country. He had no knowledge of the project to burn the bridges whatever, and here declares that had such a design been communicated to him he would at once have given information of it to the proper parties. In a word, he has done nothing which malice itself could strain into a crime against the laws of Tennessee or of the Confederate States. Nevertheless he did, for the reason before stated, secrete himself where he believes he was perfectly secure from discovery. While he was thus safely concealed he was informed that John Baxter, esq., who was on a visit to the city of Richmond, applied to the War Department for permission to the undersigned to leave the territory of the Confederate States.

He is informed further that, after an interview with Your Excellency and the Secretary of War, a letter was written by the latter to Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden, a correct copy of which is submitted herewith, marked A, and thereupon General Crittenden directed a letter to be sent to the undersigned, a correct copy of which, marked B, accompanies this statement. The undersigned, relying upon the promise of a passport into Kentucky and the protection of a military escort which it contains, and trusting to the good faith of Your Excellency, the Secretary of War, and General Crittenden, immediately upon its reception left his place of concealment, returned to Knoxville, and within the time appointed called at headquarters, and obtained a renewal of the promise of the passport and escort. This occurred on the afternoon of the 5th instant. The morning of the 7th was fixed upon for the departure of the undersigned from Knoxville. Before that time arrived he was arrested upon a warrant for treason, issued by R. B. Reynolds, commissioner, &c., a correct copy of which, marked C, is herewith submitted, and, bail and an examination having been refused, was confined in the common jail of the county.

The undersigned has been always opposed in politics to Your Excellency; has resisted with his whole strength the revolution which Your Excellency is now conducting, but at no time has political prejudice or party feeling caused him to believe that you will sanction what he is compelled to denounce as a gross breach of faith. He has not permitted himself to believe that you would direct the military authorities to make a promise, and after that promise had been accepted and acted upon would permit another set of authorities to violate it. He appeals to you as the executive of a Government representing twelve millions of people to protect the honor of that Government against so foul a stain. This application is the last resource left to the undersigned. Immediately after his arrest he addressed the note marked D to General Crittenden, and received in reply the note marked E.

It is unnecessary to add that the warrant issued by the commissioner contains no charge of treason. The publication of a newspaper, however objectionable its matter might be, cannot amount to treason. The undersigned has therefore no reason to fear the result of a judicial investigation of his conduct; but bail, though offered for any amount, has been refused him. He has been subjected to close confinement in an uncomfortable jail while in weak health, and, in fact, suffering from hemorrhage of the lungs. Until very recently he has intended to continue a citizen of the Confederate States, but the events of the last three weeks have convinced him that the laws can afford no protection to



himself or family. He now desires to withdraw himself and family from the jurisdiction of those States. He makes this application, not as a petitioner for any grace or favor, but as a demand of right, and with full confidence that the public faith will in the premises be observed.

Respectfully, &c.,

W. G. BROWNLOW.

[Inclosure A.]

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, November 20, 1861.*

Major-General CRITTENDEN, *Cumberland Gap:*

DEAR SIR: I have been asked to grant a passport for Mr. Brownlow to leave the State of Tennessee. He is said to have secreted himself, fearing violence to his person, and to be anxious to depart from the State. I cannot give him a formal passport, though I would greatly prefer seeing him on the other side of our lines as an avowed enemy. I wish, however, to say that I would be glad to learn that he has left Tennessee, and have no objection to interpose to his leaving if you are willing to let him pass.

Yours, truly,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

[Inclosure B.]

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Knoxville, Tenn., December 4, 1861.*

W. G. BROWNLOW, Esq.:

SIR: The major-general commanding directs me to say that upon calling at his headquarters within twenty-four hours you can get a passport to go into Kentucky, accompanied by a military escort, the route to be designated by General Crittenden.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. S. CUNNINGHAM,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Inclosure C.]

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,  
*District of Tennessee:*

To the MARSHAL OF SAID DISTRICT:

J. C. Ramsay, Confederate States district attorney for said district, having made oath before me that he is informed and believes that William G. Brownlow, a citizen of said district and owing allegiance and fidelity to the Confederate States, but being moved and seduced by the instigation of the devil and not having the fear of God before his eyes, did, willfully, knowingly, and with malice aforethought and feloniously, commit the crime of treason against the Confederate States by then and there, within said district and since the 10th day of June last, publishing a weekly and tri-weekly paper known as Brownlow's Knoxville Whig; said paper had a large circulation in said district and also circulated in the United States, and contained weekly divers of editorials written by the said Brownlow, which said editorials were treasonable against the Confederate States of America, and did then and there commit treason and prompt others to commit treason, by speech

as well as publication did as aforesaid commit treason, and did give aid and comfort to the United States, both of said Governments being in a state of war with each other. You are therefore commanded to arrest the said Brownlow and bring him before me, to be dealt with as the law directs.

R. B. REYNOLDS,  
*Commissioner, &c.*

DECEMBER 6, 1861.

[Inclosure D.]

KNOXVILLE, *December 6, 1861.*

Major-General CRITTENDEN:

I am now under an arrest, upon a warrant signed by Messrs. Reynolds and Ramsay, upon a charge of treason, founded upon sundry articles published in the Knoxville Whig since June last. I am here upon your invitation and promise of passports, and claiming your protection, as I do, I shall await your early response.

Very respectfully,

W. G. BROWNLOW.

[Inclosure E.]

KNOXVILLE, *December 7, 1861.*

W. G. BROWNLOW:

SIR: Your note stating that you were under an arrest upon a warrant upon a charge of treason, &c., has been handed to General Crittenden. He desires me to say in reply that in view of all the facts of the case (which need not be recapitulated here, for you are familiar with them), he does not consider that you are here upon his invitation in such manner as to claim his protection from an investigation by the civil authorities of the charges against you, which he clearly understood from yourself and your friends you would not seek to avoid.

Respectfully, yours, &c.,

HARRY I. THORNTON,  
*Aide-de-Camp.*

RICHMOND, *December 30, 1861.*

General LEONIDAS POLK, *Columbus, Ky.:*

We have a plenty of war men who could be sent to you, and for whom we have no arms. Pray cease accepting unarmed twelve-months' men, who are immensely expensive and utterly useless.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

BOWLING GREEN (*via CHATTANOOGA*), *December 30, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

The citizens of Nashville believe, and so represent, that the city is in danger from incendiaries sent in by the Federalists or engaged from the disloyal of their own citizens. They wish a strong military police under a general officer, and recommend General R. C. Foster, from his knowledge of the city, the people, his firmness, and experience, as the

most proper person. In this representation and recommendation the Governor concurs and in the recommendation I also concur, and hope it will receive attention.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
General.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Columbus, Ky., December 30, 1861.

General JOHNSTON,  
C. S. Army, Bowling Green:

GENERAL: I have sent forward to you all of the infantry of Colonel Bowen's command, as also Colonel Reynolds' regiment. I also ordered Colonel Campbell's regiment to go forward, but find he is very deficient in arms, and am waiting a day or two to see if he cannot be supplied. He will be sent if you desire it. I have also ordered Hudson's battery, a very fine one. This has gone forward. I also ordered to-day Beltzhoover's (Watson\*) to follow. These I supposed—for it has been very difficult to get accurate returns—would make the force about 5,000. I wish I could make it 10,000. I shall be obliged in consequence of this movement to break up Camp Beauregard, and remove the Mississippi sixty-day troops from there to Union City. I shall substitute for this force a cavalry force on the Tennessee and Kentucky lines as the best and only thing left me. They will guard that line and operate freely in both Kentucky and Tennessee, and will keep down the Union feeling in both States.

I am informed by the gentleman who takes this, and an officer of his army, that General McCulloch's force in Arkansas is 10,000 strong, and is in winter quarters. It is certain now that no movement will be made by the enemy in Southwestern Missouri until spring. I beg leave respectfully to submit that in that case this force might with great, very great, advantage be employed in Southeastern Missouri during the emergency immediately before us, and therefore ask that it may be ordered to the defense of New Madrid and the region round about. Those forces there have all disbanded, and I have no reason to hope that they can again be enlisted in [a] very short time. This leaves me to provide force for the defense of New Madrid, and my resources for that purpose are very limited. I have had a fort constructed there, and armed it strongly with heavy guns. I have placed for its defense two Arkansas regiments, under Colonel Gantt, one of these imperfectly armed, but I should [prefer] that side of the river have a much stronger force, and I know not where it is to come from, if not from General McCulloch's force.

I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS CAMP DESHA,  
Moscow, Ky., December 30, 1861—4 a. m.

Major-General POLK,

C. S. Army, Commanding, Columbus, Ky.:

GENERAL: I have this moment received the following note from General Alcorn:

SIR: I have information that the enemy are advancing on this post and are now 5

\*The Watson Battery.



miles south of Mayfield. I have no authority to order you, but would like to have you march in haste to my support with such strength as you can command, leaving a guard in support of your camp.

Very respectfully,

J. L. ALCORN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

I will move with all my force towards Mayfield, supposing it will be right, and will of course obey any order you may send me.

Respectfully,

J. H. MILLER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Post.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., December 30, 1861.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch of the 22d instant.

The enemy have made no forward movement since my last communication, nor have I any information of any change in the position of their troops since then. The positions of our troops as heretofore indicated remain unchanged, except the substitution of Bifle's battalion of Tennessee cavalry for the Eighth Regiment Texas Cavalry (late Terry's), which it was necessary to withdraw to rest and improve the condition of their horses and put the regiment in a better condition. They have been reduced to less than half their original number by deaths, sickness, &c. Their ranks at their new camp, 10 miles south of this, will fill up rapidly by the men returning to duty from the hospital.

I have this morning received the Treasurer's draft for \$16,000, in addition to \$5,000 heretofore received.

In explanation of the ambiguous telegram received by you, I have to say that the number of troops mentioned were intended to indicate all that could possibly be available for any movement against the enemy after leaving a force for the defense of this place, about 5,000, which, from the extended circuit of our works, is too small. They require a large force to support them. The troops from Columbus are beginning to arrive, viz: Colonel Martin's First Mississippi,\* 493 aggregate; Colonel Williams' Twenty-seventh Tennessee, 580 aggregate; Colonel Schaller's Twenty-second Mississippi, 519 aggregate; Major Hardesty's Mississippi battalion, three companies, 235 aggregate; Captain Miller's company (I), artillery, 70 aggregate; Captain Brien's company, 120 aggregate; Captain Hunt's company, 79; 2,699 total aggregate. These troops are now encamped here. My force is about 19,000, of all arms.

I inclose to you, I do not doubt, an accurate statement of the troops under General Buell's command, brought to me the day before yesterday from Louisville. It was much defaced, but the most important matter is legible. I also inclose copy of telegram from General Clark, stationed at Hopkinsville, reporting a conflict between a detachment of Colonel Forrest's cavalry and a cavalry force of the enemy on the 28th instant, which resulted in the defeat of the enemy, as detailed in the telegram.†

\* Probably Twenty-fifth Mississippi, afterwards known as the Second Confederate Regiment.

† Not found, but see p. 64.

Colonel Bowen has just arrived with part of his own regiment, the First Missouri. The remainder of his regiment and division (Ninth and Tenth Arkansas Regiments) will arrive by to-morrow night.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
General, C. S. Army.

[Inclosure A.]

*Memorandum of the number and name of regiments arrived and to arrive in this department.*

Thirty-third Indiana, Seventeenth Ohio, Twelfth Kentucky, Thirty-eighth Ohio, Fourth Kentucky, Fourteenth Ohio, Tenth Indiana, Tenth Kentucky, Eighteenth U. S. Infantry, Second Minnesota, Thirty-fifth and Ninth Ohio, Sixth Indiana, First Ohio, Fifth Kentucky, Fifteenth and Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, Twenty-ninth and Thirtieth Indiana, Thirty-fourth Illinois, Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth, and Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania, Thirty-ninth and Thirty-second Indiana, Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio, Thirty-eighth Indiana, First Wisconsin, Nineteenth Illinois, First Michigan, Fifteenth and Thirteenth Kentucky, Tenth and Eighteenth Ohio, Twenty-fourth Illinois, Thirty-seventh Indiana, Thirty-third Ohio, Tenth Wisconsin, Twenty-first, Third, and Sixth Ohio, Thirty-sixth Indiana, Twenty-fourth Ohio, Thirty-fourth Indiana, Second and Fifty-ninth Ohio, Ninth and First Kentucky, First and Second Tennessee, Sixth Kentucky, Thirty-first Ohio, Thirty-first Indiana, Seventeenth Kentucky, Forty-fourth, Forty-second, and Forty-third Indiana, Eleventh Kentucky, Seventeenth and Fifteenth Indiana, Forty-first and Fifth Ohio, Third Minnesota, Fourteenth Kentucky, Forty-ninth Indiana, and Eleventh Michigan.

The above are already here.

To arrive:

Forty-sixth, Forty-seventh, Fiftieth, and Thirty-fifth Indiana, Forty-eighth, Forty-fourth, Sixteenth, Fortieth (in Lexington), and Forty-second Ohio, Fifty-first Indiana, First and Fourth Ohio Cavalry, Forty-first Indiana, and six regiments and squadrons of cavalry, one battery (six pieces), thirteen battalions of artillery, and about five or six more Kentucky regiments not yet consolidated will make three or five full regiments.

Arrived since above was taken from General Buell's books:

Sixty-fourth Ohio (ordered to Paris), Fifty-second Ohio, Second and Fifth Ohio Cavalry, and First Ohio Battery.

We consider the effective force of the Department of the Cumberland to amount to 75,000 men.

DEAR ———: The above has been written by a friend under my supervision, and you can depend upon the information, as the bearer can tell you how it was obtained, and from my association and acquaintance I think I can give you almost any information you want at any time. If you receive any communications signed Rex they will be reliable.

Our cause is steadily gaining here, and we feel very sanguine as to the success of your division. There is a great deal of sickness among Federal soldiers—some little small-pox, though not much; mostly diarrhea, typhoid fever, and measles. There are seventeen hospitals here, and about 3,000 patients in them. While writing, the Sixty-fifth Ohio passes down street—about 610 men, besides officers. The hospitals are

so full here they are sending a great many sick to Cincinnati. Your family and friends are well. I will try and send you a paper very often. There are eight regiments at Lebanon and six at Columbia. Manson moves to-day, 20th December, to Glasgow (this is certainly reliable) with 25,000 men. It is thought by best-informed friends here that Zollicoffer should be heavily re-enforced, so as to break their backbone. Watch Big Hatchie and Obion Bridges, on Memphis Branch. Men left Cincinnati last night for the avowed purpose of burning them. This and all I write is reliable, as Charley Johnson can tell, from whom he borrowed a vest on mail-boat. \* \* \* It is said that 25,000 or 30,000 reserve forces are in Washington that could be thrown into Kentucky\* \* \* \*

[Indorsement.]

HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, CENTRAL ARMY,  
*Bowling Green, December 30, 1861.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

This information was obtained from the books of General Buell. As relates to the number and names of regiments it is beyond a doubt reliable. Since receiving it, I have had occasion to compare the list with partial lists contained in the letters of various correspondents of the Northern papers in reference to the troops at Columbia; at Crab Orchard, in the command of General Schoepf; at Lexington, and in General Nelson's force. In every instance I have found the regiments alluded to in those letters mentioned in the inclosed list.

Respectfully,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding Second Division.*

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EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,  
*Nashville, Tenn., December 31, 1861.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

DEAR SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of a letter of 25th instant. Upon its receipt I immediately appointed energetic agents to collect laborers in this and adjoining counties to construct the fortifications near Nashville, but I must say that the response to my appeal for laborers has not thus far been as flattering as I had wanted and expected. I shall have within a very few days some 200 negro men at this work, and hope soon to increase this number to 500 or 600. Telegraphed you the same day your letter came to hand, asking how many laborers you thought necessary, about what length of time they would be employed, and what engineer would supervise and control the work, answers to which would have aided me in securing the laborers, but have as yet received no reply.

I fully appreciate the exigencies by which you are surrounded, and, as I have heretofore, I shall continue to use every effort within my power and all resources at my command to strengthen your position and to secure the country from invasion. In order, however, that the present resources of the State may not be overestimated, it is proper that I give you at least an approximate idea of them and some of the difficulties which I encounter at every step.

Tennessee has now organized and in the field, in addition to some independent companies, fifty-two infantry regiments and one battalion,

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\* The stars represent illegible portions of the original.



nine battalions of cavalry, and two regiments of artillery. Volunteer companies are now in camp, under orders to move to rendezvous, sufficient to form six additional infantry regiments and two battalions of cavalry, making the whole force about sixty-six regiments. This force, large as it is, is drawn almost entirely from two divisions from the State, the unfortunate political dissensions in East Tennessee, with near one-third of the voting population of the State, having almost paralyzed that section, but I am pleased to state that these divisions and dissensions are rapidly disappearing, and I hope soon to see a united people in Tennessee, when we may reasonably expect re-enforcements from that section; but with the immense tax upon the population of Middle and West Tennessee to make up the force already referred to I do not hope for any considerable number of volunteers from either of these divisions, unless it be upon pressing emergency, when I feel assured that a patriotic response will be made by almost our whole people to meet such emergency.

But the difficulty is not, nor has it been, in obtaining men. The inadequate supply of arms has been and is the chief obstacle which I encounter in promptly furnishing to you any reasonable number of re-enforcements. With the greatest possible energy it takes time to collect and repair the private arms of the country, and this is the only means I have of arming the force now called to the field. I have spared neither effort, pains, nor expense in expediting the work, and yet it has been and is impossible to proceed with it rapidly.

In furnishing arms to the large force above referred to the State has heretofore drawn from the hands of her citizens their most effective private arms. Almost every gun that we get at this time must necessarily pass through the hands of the smiths before it is fit for service, and in this connection it is well to remark that Tennessee, less fortunate than some of her sister States, had no United States arsenal or depository of arms within her limits from which her troops might have been supplied; that but comparatively a small number of her force have been armed independent of the State, and that upon assuming connection with the Confederate States all of her contracts for the manufacture of arms and other materials of war were assigned and transferred to the Confederate Government.

I am sure, general, you will appreciate and make due allowance for the difficulties that lie in my way in the work of arming the forces of Tennessee under these circumstances. I trust I shall be able, with the inferior arms of the country, to arm the volunteers now in, and that many will hereafter come into camp.

Very respectfully,

ISHAM G. HARRIS.

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HEADQUARTERS,

*Camp Beauregard, December 31, 1861.*

Colonel MILLER,

*Commanding at Moscow:*

DEAR SIR: A courier just arrived says the enemy, under General Paine, with cavalry, 500; artillery, several pieces; and infantry in considerable numbers, are now south of Mayfield, and will be here early to-morrow morning to make an attack upon me. I presume there can be no doubt of the truth that the enemy are in numbers south of Mayfield and that they have considerable artillery. I therefore ask you to come to my support without delay, for I assure you that if half

what is said in relation to the enemy's force is true I shall need you by the time you can reach me.

Yours, very truly and respectfully,

J. L. ALCORN,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

I have sent courier to Columbus and urged permanent re-enforcements. I have but 1,700 infantry and cavalry combined ready for duty. I should not be left in this exposed condition.

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Camp Beauregard, December 31, 1861—10 p. m.*

Maj. GEORGE WILLIAMSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Columbus, Ky. :*

SIR: S. M. Kennedy looks to be, and is said to be, a reliable Southern man; has this moment paid me a most hurried visit, and states, as a fact beyond a question, that the enemy are now south of Mayfield, with 500 cavalry, several pieces of artillery, and a force of infantry, number not known; have made a forced march to-day, and hope to be here by sunrise to-morrow to make an attack upon me. I urge that you shall send to re-enforce me. I think the report cannot be untrue, but it may be exaggerated. I have by my [returns] to-day 1,700 privates, including infantry and cavalry, ready for duty. This force of inexperienced shot-gun militia is not sufficient to hold this place against the number which daily threatens it. The scouting and picket duty is necessarily so heavy, in order to prevent a surprise, that we are kept worn down.

I have sent to Colonel Miller again to-night; hope he will respond. We will seek to discharge our duty, but are in bad plight for a heavy fight. I hope the courier now sent will have a more speedy journey than the one sent a few days since.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. L. ALCORN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

*Abstract from return of Western Department, General A. S. Johnston, commanding.*

[Date about December 31, 1861.\*]

Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.	Remarks.
	Officers.	Men.			
Polk's command, Columbus, Ky....	1, 275	19, 717	25, 709	28, 531	Major-General Hardee.
Central Army of Kentucky, Bowling Green.	1, 530	21, 110	30, 799	38, 943	
Floyd's brigade, Bowling Green .....					No returns.
Bowen's brigade, Bowling Green .....					Do.
Clark's brigade, Hopkinsville.....					Do.
East Tennessee Army.....	298	5, 078	6, 292	7, 732	Major-General Crittenden.
Carroll's brigade .....				4, 015	Aggregate only reported.
Arkansas Army, Fort Smith.....	127	4, 849	5, 568	6, 767	Major-General Van Dorn.
Volunteers in camp in Tennessee.....				6, 000	
Total.....	3, 250	50, 754	68, 368	91, 988	

\* The original return not dated and otherwise imperfect.

*Abstract from consolidated report of the Central Army of Kentucky, Major-General Hardee, C. S. Army, commanding, for December 31, 1861.*

## (BOWLING GREEN, KY.)

Troops.	Present for duty.						Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.			
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
1st (Hardee's) Division.....	412	5,537	52	544	19	395	6,959	11,429
2d (Buckner's) Division.....	407	5,972	53	655	37	688	7,112	11,761
4th (Bowen's) Division.....	203	3,493	.....	.....	.....	.....	3,696	4,706
Clark's brigade.....	145	1,617	38	495	.....	.....	2,295	3,550
Davis' brigade (sixty-days' volunteers).....	53	1,164	.....	.....	.....	.....	1,217	1,636
Miscellaneous.....	17	257	.....	.....	.....	.....	274	615
Total .....	1,237	18,040	143	1,694	56	1,083	22,272	33,816

## AGGREGATE PRESENT FOR DUTY.

Infantry.....	19,277
Cavalry.....	1,837
Artillery.....	1,139
Grand aggregate.....	22,253

*Abstract from the weekly return of the troops commanded by Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer, C. S. Army, for December 31, 1861.*

## (BEECH GROVE, KY.)

Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present and absent.	Number of guns.
	Officers.	Men.		
Infantry*.....	238	4,515	6,550	.....
Cavalry†.....	70	1,095	1,644	.....
Artillery‡.....	10	226	267	14
Total.....	318	5,836	8,451	14

\* The Sixteenth Alabama, Fifteenth Mississippi, and Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-fifth, and Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiments.

† The First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Tennessee Battalions, and two independent companies.

‡ McClung's and Rutledge's batteries.

### HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, Bowling Green, January 1, 1862.

Major-General HARDEE, *Commanding* :

GENERAL : General Johnston directs that notice be given to the residents of this city that a conflict is to be expected here, and advise that they remove from the scene.

You will further have notice given to all persons residing within



range of the guns of our works to remove at once, as their houses will be used as a part of the defense or removed to make the defense more perfect.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, *Knoxville, January 1, 1862.*

S. COOPER, *Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: My brigade is composed partly of companies organized in East Tennessee and in part of West Tennesseans. Colonel White's regiment, composed exclusively of East Tennesseans, is well equipped, having muskets. This regiment is very near General Zollicoffer's encampment in Southeastern Kentucky. Another regiment, four companies of which were organized by myself, and ordered to Fort Pillow, on the Mississippi, below Columbus, by order of General Pillow, are well armed. Colonel Looney's regiment, made up of Eastern and Western Tennessee companies, is at this post, under orders to march on to-morrow to join General Zollicoffer. Many of this regiment are on the sick list. I have arms enough for all who are able to march.

When I organized these regiments I advised the War Department that I had 1,620 Tennessee rifles, and requested an order upon the ordnance departments of Nashville and Memphis to have these weapons remodeled. Of these guns, upon the orders issued in September last, I have received 520 with the saber bayonet attached. I have in addition to the above 200 muskets. These will complete the equipment of Colonel Looney's regiment, which has orders to move on, as before stated. I will have enough guns to equip Colonel Gillespie's regiment within thirty days.

I have assurances from Colonel Hunt, of the Memphis ordnance department, that my guns shall be forwarded as rapidly as possible. The Government shops in this place are now actively employed in repairing the guns collected at this post.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. CARROLL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

RICHMOND, *January 1, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant-General C. S. Army:*

SIR: As suggested by you in a conversation on yesterday, I briefly commit to writing the views then presented by me touching General H. Marshall's command in Eastern Kentucky.

The forces present and expected of General Marshall are about as follows:

Battalion Kentucky mounted men .....	450
Col. John S. Williams' Kentucky infantry .....	900
Colonel Trigg's Virginia infantry regiment .....	750
Battery artillery, four pieces, 60 men .....	60
In the field at Paintsville .....	00

On Sandy .....

2,160

This force was located as follows when I left headquarters on the 20th December:

Captain Cardell's company, Williams' Kentucky infantry, 135 men, at Whitesburg, Letcher County, on North Fork Kentucky River.

Captain Worsham's company, Williams' Kentucky infantry, 100 men, at Prestonburg.

Two hundred Kentucky cavalry, under command of Captain Shawsan (?), at Salyersville and West Liberty, about 40 miles in advance of General Marshall's headquarters at Paintsville.

Our base of supplies is Abingdon, Va., or Wytheville, the former about 130 and the latter 150 miles from Prestonburg.

The operations of our army may be viewed as defensive, offensive, or both :

First. As a force to defend the mountain passes against inroads upon the railroad at Wytheville or Abingdon or forays on the northwest of Virginia we have very ample forces.

Second. As an assailing force our army is too weak, except by means of sudden and rapid marches of cavalry, acting in concert with our friends in Bourbon, Fayette, Harrison, Montgomery, Bath, and other contiguous counties. We hear of no enemy nearer than mouth of Sandy, at Catlettsburg, and Paris, Bourbon County, Kentucky.

These may be stated as the bases of the operations of the enemy : Catlettsburg, 60 or 70 miles from our headquarters, and Paris, on the Covington and Lexington Railroad, about 80 or 90 miles.

If we advance with our small force into Bath, Montgomery, and Bourbon, the railroad would in two or three days enable the enemy to concentrate an overwhelming force to meet us. The transportation on Sandy River by steamboats from Catlettsburg is only available to the enemy in high water.

The only offensive operations we could effect would be by rapid marches of cavalry, in concert with our friends, into Bath, Montgomery, Bourbon, and Harrison ; first, burning the bridges on the Covington and Lexington Railroad ; second, opening the way for our friends to join our army and giving us civil and political strength ; third, in opening a road for the fat hogs, bacon, and fat cattle of Kentucky.

It is my deliberate judgment, from a pretty accurate knowledge of the topography of the country and the party strength of our friends in front of our army, that with the prompt aid of 1,000 cavalry trained to mountain service we could accomplish the important objects above stated. But the work can only be done by the utmost expenditure.

When I left camp on the 20th the thing was certain if we had the force. I believe now it is practicable, but in a month from this time it would be unavailable.

The actual or threatened movement above indicated, even if it failed, would attract and engage a very large force of the enemy, and if we were faced by a superior force we could make good our stand and defense in the mountains of Sandy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. HAWES,  
*Major, and Brig. Commissary C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Camp Beauregard, January 2, 1862.*

Maj. GEORGE WILLIAMSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

SIR: I obey the dispatch received last evening, and will start my march towards Union City this evening. I delayed yesterday after

learning that Colonel Russell's command intended to march to this place, feeling quite sure that if the most exaggerated reports were true I could nevertheless hold the place until the re-enforcements would come up. I regret that I am to leave here and regret to go to Union City, and most respectfully beg to have my command disbanded. The troops have but thirty days more to serve, and I do not suppose that there exists a probability of our services being required at Union City within the period of enlistment. If, however, you prefer that I shall remain, I shall yield a prompt obedience; in truth I yield the obedience without further communication, and make a suggestion which would personally oblige me, and I think would not injure the public.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. L. ALCORN.

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Fort Donelson, January 2, 1862.*

Maj. GEORGE WILLIAMSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Columbus:*

SIR: In transmitting weekly report (ending 31st) of the troops under my command I am happy to be able to report a favorable progress in all matters connected with the command. The large difference in the weekly report between "Present for duty" and "Total present and absent" will, I hope, be cured in a few days.

The regiments of Colonels Bailey and Stacker have only just organized, and freed now somewhat from feeling themselves bound to court the good-will of their men in order to secure their election, aided by a positive order against granting any furloughs, I hope to be able to restore matters to a more wholesome status.

I have still near 2,000 unarmed men in my command. I have not men enough armed at this post to man one-half the lines within the fortification, much less to effect anything at points which command my whole work. I beg you to call the attention of the general commanding division to this unvarnished state of things.

A most satisfactory progress has been made in the main fortification, an inclosed work. A very few more days will close up the gap and give us a very good work.

The heavy batteries are progressing rapidly and will be very efficient. I shall be ready to place all the guns in position as fast as they arrive. I am straining a point to make the armament sufficient to answer the aim we have in view. I look for some of the heavy guns to-morrow. My entire command is now comfortably housed for the winter. The houses are admirably built, well situated, and present an appearance of real comfort that will compare favorably with any command in the field.

On yesterday I reviewed and inspected the entire command at Fort Henry, and am gratified at being able to report the entire command in a most admirable state of efficiency. Everything will be ready to receive the additional armament now on its way. A heavy rifled gun (82-pounder) arrived at the fort on yesterday and will be in place to-day.

As shown by weekly report, I have had an addition to the force at Fort Henry in the Alabama troops; seven companies are now on the ground; the remaining three will be in place on Saturday. The companies are tolerably armed. Five of them only were inspected, the others arriving this morning. These troops are, as I understand it, for the work south of the Tennessee River.



The negro force (500) will be here in a few days. I have had no instructions on this point, and desire to know fully the views of the general commanding. I have conversed with Major Gilmer once on the subject, but deem it prudent to ask for further instructions.

I will present to the general commanding division a statement of advantages to arise to the Government from the covering of the immense rolling-mills owned by Hillman & Bro., below this place. These mills have become an absolute necessity to the whole country. I hope he may find it practicable to protect it, and shall examine the river just below the mills with a view to this object and report.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding.*

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BOWLING GREEN, *January 2, 1862.*

Maj. A. J. SMITH, *Post Quartermaster, &c.:*

DEAR SIR: I will leave Bowling Green to-morrow, to be absent on indispensable business for a few days.

Before going, I take occasion to represent to you the present demands for transportation on the roads now in my charge, their capacity, and to make suggestions as to their future workings, which are respectfully commended to your careful consideration, and through you, if necessary, to General Johnston.

We have in running order ten engines, all of which are of limited or ordinary capacity, only four of which are new and reliable for continuous service. These four are the property of the Memphis, Clarksville and Louisville Railroad.

We have in all, box cars, 120; flat cars, 55; total number of cars, 175. These cars include all owned by the Louisville and Nashville, Memphis Branch, and Memphis, Clarksville and Louisville Roads.

The whole length of road operated by this machinery, including the road north of Bowling Green up to Glasgow Junction, is 225 miles.

The ordinary quatum of equipment for such a length of railroad would be, engines, 22; cars, 300. Deficit in engines, 10; deficit in cars, 125.

Within ten days we depend on having three more engines ready for service, but then we will need seven more.

The equipment we have will afford one train daily northward from Bowling Green, capable of moving ten car loads of corn, &c.; one freight train daily, each way, between Nashville and Bowling Green, carrying thirteen cars each way; one freight train daily between Paris and Bowling Green with twelve cars; one passenger train each way on the main stem and Memphis Branch. This is the maximum capacity of the roads. Should there be any extraordinary demand upon both stems at the same time, both will require help from other roads. If made on one stem, the regular business of the other must stop to meet it.

The present demand is, as I now understand, for the army alone, from Paris, 800,000 pounds; from Clarksville, 1,000,000 pounds; from Nashville, 1,500,000 pounds.

In addition to the above, at every station there is a large accumulation of freight, consisting of hogs, corn, flour, &c. The passenger travel is also large. In addition to all, troops move in great numbers. In a word, the entire road is crowded with business to an extent unprecedented in the history of any branch of it.

I suggest that the superintendent may be allowed to establish a sched-

ule best adapted for the speedy, safe, and certain final accomplishment of all work, and that the public shall be notified that this schedule shall remain undisturbed, save under the requisition of some one officer of the army, or that a requisition shall be made upon other roads for the amount of machinery required to meet the business.

Should this course be adopted, the funds now in hands, the earnings of the main stem and branch, will pay a large proportion of the value of machinery required, and perhaps the Memphis, Clarksville and Louisville Railroad Company would make an advance sufficient to pay the balance. This property might—would largely increase the earnings of the road, and at the same time meet the difficulties before us. I know of no remedy better than the last suggested, but without this the first plan suggested is the only one under which I can promise to do justice to the army, the stockholders, or myself.

Very respectfully, &c.,

G. B. FLEECE,  
*Superintendent.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va., January 3, 1862.*

Capt. G. H. MONSARRAT, *Knorrville, Tenn.:*

SIR: In reply to your letter of the 29th ultimo, the Secretary of War directs me to say that Brownlow is to be escorted out of the country by a military force sufficient to protect him from violence, in accordance with the pledge given by General Crittenden.

In relation to the abuses mentioned, the Secretary expects you to be vigilant and energetic in suppressing them. Colonel Leadbetter, who commands on the line of the railroad and the adjacent country, will give you particular instructions.

Respectfully,

A. T. BLEDSOE,  
*Chief Bureau of War.*

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BOWLING GREEN, KY., *January 4, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK, *Columbus, Ky.:*

SIR: Your letter in relation to the Branch Bank of Kentucky, in which you say that you hold possession under seal of the assets of said bank, and ask me to indicate the manner in which you shall proceed to turn the same over to the civil authorities of Kentucky, was delivered to me by Mr. Owens, the cashier.

The Provisional Government have some time since directed me to take possession of all the banks within our lines, with the intention to hold the assets for future disposition by the Government, as justice to all parties might demand. I wish you to continue your possession in our name until I write you. If the president, directors, and cashier will enter into such legal and moral obligation to me as will insure through them the continued safe possession of the assets, I will place the bank in their control; otherwise not.

With great respect,

GEORGE W. JOHNSON.

P. S.—SIR: Since writing the within I have come to a conclusion with Mr. Owens, the basis of which will be shown you by him. Mr.



Owens will, however, return to this place in a week or ten days, and until we conclude our arrangements as to the assets of the bank, I wish you to hold possession of them in the name of the Provisional Government of Kentucky.

With great respect,

GEORGE W. JOHNSON.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., January 5, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th ultimo.

The positions of the enemy's forces and those of the Confederacy stand relatively as reported in my last letter. Since then the force here has been re-enforced by the arrival of the remainder of General Floyd's brigade (except the batteries and two regiments which are at Nashville), and my whole force here may now be estimated at 23,000. I hope after a while, when the officers shall have the opportunity to learn their duties, to be able to send accurate returns as often as may be desirable.

I desire to ask your attention to the vast and methodized preparation of the Northern Government to carry on the war against the Confederacy with a purpose as inflexible as malignant. Their large and well-appointed army, only now held back till the highest point of efficiency is attained by instruction and discipline, must make every patriot contemplate its forward movement with apprehension for the safety of the country, unless, awakened to the peril which menaces it, we make a corresponding effort to meet their force and beat them back by an immediate development and application of all the military resources of the country, both of material and men, to that purpose. The rapid and energetic concentration of the power of the country to meet the mighty exigencies of the present moment must be brought to bear to sustain our cause, which every one feels will justify every sacrifice for its attainment.

In the great question of liberty and national existence the magnitude of them will I hope suggest to the wisdom of the representatives (of the people) the necessity of augmenting the executive authority sufficiently to meet the occasion which now urgently calls for its exercise.

If necessary, let us convert our country into one vast camp of instruction for the field of every man able to bear arms, and fix our military establishment upon a permanent basis. Whenever a people will make the necessary sacrifices to maintain their liberty they need have no fear of losing it.

General Polk asks to be re-enforced by McCulloch's command, which he thinks is necessary to replace Thompson's force at New Madrid, which he says is disbanded. He says McCulloch's force is 10,000 men, now in winter quarters. I have been unable to obtain any reports from that command, and do not know its number and condition, and therefore, instead of giving any orders myself, request (presuming the Department informed) that, if McCulloch's force cannot be employed in co-operation with General Price's, which the severity of the winter in North Missouri would probably prevent, one-half of the force be ordered to New Madrid.

The occupation of New Madrid by the enemy would enable him to turn our defenses at Island No. 10, &c., a movement which could be



made by them with perfect security from Cape Girardeau, on account of the peculiar topography of the country, the route being on a ridge nearly the whole way, bounded on the sides by large and impassable swamps; it is also intersected by the railroad from Bird's Point.

General Polk's force is now reduced to about 13,000 men, as he reports, by sending Bowen's division here, the Third Mississippi to the coast (asked for by General Lovell, who, I may say, loaned this and a Louisiana regiment for the defense of Columbus last month), and the disbanding of Thompson's command. On account of these reductions it would be judicious to re-enforce him.

Instructions with regard to the purchase of supplies for the commissary and quartermaster's department have been given in conformity to your orders. The prices asked for beef are more moderate than they have been. Major Jackson informs me that at Hopkinsville and Gallatin it may be had at  $3\frac{3}{4}$  to 4 cents. The price for corn is 40 cents. We have not been able to accumulate a sufficiency of corn for the supply of this place on account of the difficulty of bringing it in from the country, our means of transportation being not much more than is needed for the troops.

Apprehending that there might, notwithstanding the efforts of the quartermasters, be a deficiency, I have ordered the quartermaster at Nashville to send up 50,000 bushels. The price there is 60 cents, but I could not permit a sufficiency of supply to remain a matter of doubt.

For the same reason I have ordered the Government agents to kill and pack here from 5,000 to 8,000 hogs, besides salt beef and pork to be brought from Nashville and Clarksville, to make a supply for four months.

There has been among these people a great disinclination to take the Confederate currency, and this may have been the result of a hostile feeling towards the Confederacy, but at no time has this distrust been greater or different from that which always manifests itself among a rural population on the introduction of a paper currency of the value of which they have but limited means of acquainting themselves. They are certainly not responsible for the sudden fall of the currency, and I presume have not asked a greater discount than was established in our own cities.

The discount on the State and Confederate money may be presumed to have in a great measure been produced by the competition of our agents for purchasing meat in the buying of gold in Charleston, Savannah, Richmond, and New Orleans, in which cities it rose from November to 20th December from 15 to 38 per cent. It then fell to 22.

I beg leave to represent that the good policy of impressing supplies is not sustained by custom or experience. Whether among friends or foes it has always resulted prejudicially to the public interests. In an enemy's country they would place their supplies beyond reach or destroy them. To levy contributions in an enemy's country and purchase from the people at customary rates I should think the better course. Whenever the raising of supplies among our friends by impressment has been attempted it has always resulted in indiscriminate robbery by pretended agents of the Government. The pork purchased by Government agents has cost largely above the ordinary rates, and it is hoped they have secured an adequate supply. The high price offered by exciting the cupidity of those who are awaiting the result of the contest to take sides has induced them both within and beyond our lines to fatten their hogs and bring them to market, which they would not have done for the customary rates.

The fine weather which prevailed till within two or three days past has been succeeded by rain, which usually falls here in sufficient quantities when the winter sets in to make the unpaved roads difficult and for large trains impassable.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
General, C. S. Army.

JANUARY 5, 1862.

Major-General POLK, *Columbus* :

You need not send forward Campbell's regiment, if in your opinion it is at all necessary to retain it.

I have asked for half of McCulloch's force to be sent to you.

A. S. JOHNSTON.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., January 6, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond* :

I respectfully refer to you two papers, marked 1 and 2, which will explain themselves. The paper marked 3 I desire to call your attention to. It refers to the law of promotion in the artillery corps in the State of Tennessee, and is a paper from Lieutenant-Colonel Haynes, of that corps.\*

The law of Tennessee, you will see, in the case of that corps, placed the power of appointment originally and the power to fill vacancies in the hands of the Governor of the State.

The question is, Does the transfer of that army to the Confederate Government transfer the power of the Governor to the President? I suppose it does, but to avoid complication I prefer to submit the question to the War Department. If it does, then it becomes necessary that the offices of colonel and major of that corps should be filled, and the exigencies of the service require this to be done without delay.

My opinion is that it would be best to make two corps of these companies, the number being too great to be comprised in one with advantage; there would thus be a brigade of artillery.

A large part of this force is under my command at Columbus and at other forts in my immediate division. At this point chiefly, where I have in fixed and field guns of various caliber 150 in different positions, you will at once see that the control of this large armament and its efficiency of condition demand a specific supervision. It should be under the direction of a single mind, of adequate capacity, resources, and energy. This is indispensable to make that arm tell as it should in our combinations for defense. It was for that service chiefly I nominated James Trudeau, of Louisiana, as brigadier-general. General Trudeau, who you know to be in command of the Louisiana Legion, is a highly accomplished artillery officer, educated in France, and has devoted special attention to the artillery branch of military service. He has been with me now for the last month, aiding in placing the guns and arranging generally all the details necessary for putting this position in its present effective condition. A better appointment could not be made, and the services of such an officer are required to make the

\* Inclosures omitted as of no present importance.

most of our resources. I hope the Government may see no reason for declining this appointment.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NO. 1,  
*New Orleans, La., January 7, 1862.*

Major-General POLK,  
*Commanding, Columbus, &c.:*

SIR: I was somewhat surprised to receive notice at this late hour of your intention not to send me the troops which were ordered to join you some weeks since at your pressing call. When these men were sent I distinctly notified General Johnston and yourself that when the enemy made his appearance here I should require them to be returned, and the two regiments were received by you with that implied understanding. If not, you should have given me notice at the time, and I should have made other provisions against an emergency. I did not expect that when I called for them the matter would be referred to the Secretary of War. The Third Mississippi Regiment is composed largely of men born and bred on the coast, thoroughly acquainted with all the inlets, bayous, and soundings of that peculiar country, and are absolutely necessary to me. They cannot be replaced by any other men that can be sent, and I must be permitted to insist that they be returned here. Many of them are fishermen and residents of the coast, and left their families there unprovided and unprotected, with the understanding that when the enemy should make his appearance I would recall them. They were lent you with that understanding, and it would reflect unjustly upon me if they were retained, to say nothing of the prejudice to the public service by retaining at Columbus (when other troops would do as well) a regiment peculiarly adapted and indeed raised mainly for the defense of the intricate coast of Mississippi Sound.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. LOVELL,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, January 7, 1862.*

His Excellency JOHN J. PETTUS,  
*Governor of Mississippi, Jackson:*

Your excellency's telegram, asking me to send all companies now in Mississippi, raised under your (my) call, to report to General Lovell for Mississippi sea-coast defenses, has been received.

Most solicitous for the safety of our coast and always anxious, Governor, to meet your wishes in the prompt manner in which you have always responded to mine, it is with regret I must here hesitate in complying, and for the following reasons, viz:

1. The circumstances making my call a necessity for the defense of this frontier are unchanged, and here the most dangerous attack can be made on Mississippi, and here the stoutest resistance should be opposed to it.

2. I have sent to General Lovell more than the troops he has asked, in view of the landing on your coast.



3. I do not feel at liberty, so long as he is on the ground, fully advised of the movements of the enemy and acquainted with his means of resistance, to anticipate his wants, were this possible.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

*Abstract from return of troops at Columbus, Ky., for the week ending January 7, 1862,  
Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, commanding.*

Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Officers.	Men.		
1st Division.....	295	3,963	4,258	6,519
2d Division.....	252	2,984	3,236	5,149
3d Division.....	203	2,752	2,955	4,589
Fort Columbus.....	119	1,462	1,581	2,418
Total.....	869	11,161	12,030	18,675

*Weekly return of the command of Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollicoffer, Camp Beech Grove, Ky.*

Troops.	Officers present for duty.	Rank and file present for duty.	Aggregate present and absent.
Col. W. B. Wood, Sixteenth Alabama Regiment.....	22	356	880
Col. W. S. Statham, Fifteenth Mississippi Regiment.....	34	820	1,025
Col. T. W. Newman, Seventeenth Tennessee Regiment.....	31	307	920
Col. D. H. Cummings, Nineteenth Tennessee Regiment.....	31	645	973
Col. S. A. Battle, Twentieth Tennessee Regiment.....	32	662	916
Col. S. S. Stanton, Twenty-fifth Tennessee Regiment.....	30	653	949
Col. S. Powell, Twenty-ninth Tennessee Regiment.....	31	462	854
Col. J. P. Murray, Twenty-eighth Tennessee Regiment.....	44	704	892
Lieutenant-Colonel McNairy, First Battalion Tennessee.....	15	197	329
Lieutenant-Colonel Brazelton, two companies of Third Battalion Tennessee.....	6	133	169
Lieutenant-Colonel Branner, Fourth Battalion Tennessee.....	22	314	580
Lieutenant-Colonel McClellan, five companies Fifth Tennessee.....	18	297	469
Capt. T. C. Sanders' independent cavalry company.....	4	67	101
Capt. W. S. Bledsoe's independent cavalry company.....	4	80	97
Capt. A. M. Rutledge's artillery company.....	5	135	157
Capt. H. L. W. McClung's artillery company.....	4	79	106
	383	6,111	9,417

For the week ending January 7, 1862.

F. K. ZOLLICOFFER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., January 8, 1862.*  
(Received January 15, 1862.)

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: The calls made upon the Government from every assailable point on our frontier for additional force would make me hesitate to add to your embarrassment by asking for re-enforcements, were the

gravity of the occasion less which urges me to press upon your attention the effort about to be made by the Federal Government, with a large army (estimated on reliable data at not less than 80,000), to invade the Confederacy through Central Kentucky towards Tennessee. They have justly comprehended that the seat of vitality of the Confederacy, if to be reached at all, is by this route. It is now palpable that all the resources of that Government will, if necessary, be employed to assure success on this line. The line of the Barren affords the means of a strong defense, but my force is not sufficient to enable me to avail myself of it (23,000). I do not ask that my force shall be made equal to that of the enemy, but, if possible, it should be raised to 50,000 men.

I have hoped to be able to raise an adequate force by the aid of the Governors of the several States of this department, but notwithstanding zealous efforts on their part, thus far I have been able to draw to this place only a force which, when compared in number to the enemy, must be regarded as insufficient. There are three or four regiments still to come forward from Tennessee, armed with arms collected from the people, and some others waiting for their arms. These men are reaching us too late for instruction, and liable to measles, &c. They are as likely to be an element of weakness as of strength.

If the public service would permit, I beg leave to suggest that a few regiments might be detached from the several armies in the field and ordered here, to be replaced by new levies. No doubt the strongest attack the enemy is capable of making will be made against this place, and we ought not surely to put in jeopardy the result by failing to meet it with a force sufficient to place success beyond hazard.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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[HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT.]

*January 8, 1862.*

Brigadier-General CARROLL, *Knoxville* :

Send forward at once to this place all the men who [are] armed and ready for duty of the regiments of Colonels Looney and Gillespie. If they are part of your brigade, and it is not inconsistent with orders in East Tennessee, you will accompany the regiments here.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., January 11, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green, Ky.* :

GENERAL: I herewith send you by express the return of this division for the month of December as complete as it can be made at present.

My available force is greatly reduced by sickness and absences. I have resisted all applications for leaves and furloughs as strongly as possible and have issued orders to bring back all absentees.

There are many regiments in my division who are without arms and several poorly armed. The unarmed regiments are stationed at Forts Pillow, Donelson, and Henry, at Trenton, Union City, and Henderson Station.

In my return you will find embraced the brigade of Brigadier-General Alcorn. His men are sixty-days' troops from Mississippi, who are armed with every variety of weapon. They are sick with measles, raw, and undisciplined. This brigade cannot be expected to be very effective.

I also send you a weekly report of the troops at this post,\* and am sorry to remark that they have been much reduced by sickness.

My effective force is now, as you will see, only about 12,000.

I have the honor to be, general, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
Major-General, Commanding.

[Inclosure.]

*Abstract from return of the First Division, Western Department, Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. Army, commanding, for December, 1861.*

Troops.	Present for duty.						Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.			
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
1st Division, Columbus.....	277	4,370	.....	.....	7	186	5,702	6,519
2d Division, Columbus.....	222	3,063	21	266	5	107	4,602	5,147
3d Division, Columbus.....	166	2,601	15	244	14	355	4,292	4,589
Stewart's command, Columbus.....	88	1,259	.....	.....	27	431	2,266	2,418
Fort Pillow, Henderson, and Trenton.....	205	3,014	.....	.....	.....	.....	3,870	4,357
Fort Henry.....	59	1,136	5	100	3	69	1,655	1,820
Fort Thompson.....	30	418	.....	.....	7	129	817	931
Camp Beauregard.....	134	1,540	31	429	.....	.....	2,577	2,831
Total.....	1,181	17,401	72	1,039	63	1,277	25,781	28,612

#### AGGREGATE PRESENT FOR DUTY.

Infantry.....	18,582
Cavalry.....	1,111
Artillery.....	1,340
Grand aggregate.....	21,033

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Richmond, January 12, 1862.

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: I have the honor of acknowledging receipt of your letter of 5th instant.

I refrain from answering it in detail, because our views will be fully disclosed to Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn, just assigned to the command of the Trans-Mississippi District, of your department, with orders to report to you in person on his way to the West.

He will give you information relative to the condition of the army of General McCulloch, and will of course receive your orders in relation to the movement of forces to New Madrid, as suggested in your letter.

Your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
Secretary of War.

\* Not found.



HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, January 12, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: Adjutant-General Whitthorne, of Tennessee, has inclosed to me a copy of the order issued by Acting Assistant Adjutant-General Groner, directing that no twelve-months' volunteer company, battalion, or regiment shall be mustered into the service of the Confederate States unless armed, and also giving notice that General Carroll had been directed to muster out of service Colonel Gillespie's regiment.

Believing as I do that the public interest requires that the department over which you preside should fully comprehend the practical operation of this order, I beg leave to state the facts in the midst of which I have had to discharge the duties of a commander in raising forces to repel the threatened invasion.

Tennessee is generally sparsely populated. For this reason it is often impracticable to raise even whole companies in the same neighborhood; hence squads have sometimes to be transported to some common point to form a company. The people, too, are both unwilling and often unable to subsist themselves at their own expense after they have left their homes as volunteers and are awaiting organization and arms; nor will volunteers long remain together unless put under the control of law. This fact is attested by the experience of every one who has commanded volunteers.

For these reasons it was sometimes necessary to transport, subsist, and muster into service volunteers as they presented themselves. Neither the Confederate Government nor the State of Tennessee were in possession of public arms to put in the hands of the men, so as to make the arming and mustering-in coincident. Indeed, in the great scarcity of public arms, the Legislature of Tennessee found it necessary to pass an act by which the private arms in the State could be impressed and afterwards paid for. The Governor of that State and myself conferred together upon the subject, and both concluded there was but one mode by which it was possible to get the volunteers and arm them, and I am happy to say that both the Governor and the Legislature of Tennessee have most zealously and patriotically co-operated with me.

These arms have been and still are being gathered in from the people. Those fit for use are at once put in the hands of organized volunteers, and those arms requiring repairs have been and are being repaired with all possible dispatch. Whilst this was going on the volunteers were being collected at the rendezvous for the purpose of being organized and armed.

These squads, companies, and battalions were not brought together as independent organizations, but with the distinct understanding and for the express purpose of consolidation, organization, and arming.

The Government thus secured their services; otherwise they could not have been procured, and the time between mustering in and arming was profitably employed in giving the men all practicable instructions in their duties as soldiers. This it will readily be perceived was quite as necessary to their efficiency in the field as placing arms in their hands.

If the mustering-in of these volunteers had been postponed in every instance till arms were ready to be placed in their hands or such regiments as had been mustered in without arms had been on that account mustered out of service and disbanded, we would to-day have been with-

out a force to check the advance of the enemy, and our borders would have been open to the invaders.

In reference to Colonel Gillespie's regiment it is proper to state that General Carroll had reported it to me as armed and I had ordered it to this place, and it is earnestly hoped that neither this or any other regiment will be ordered to be disbanded for the reason that they have not at the day of mustering arms in their hands.

The Governor of Tennessee is using every exertion to arm all the men who volunteer, and he informs me that he has every prospect of success.

In view, therefore, of these facts and that the enemy are immediately in my front in great numbers and that we need every man it is possible to get, I reiterate a respectful but earnest hope that the order will not be enforced by the department.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, January 12, 1862.*

Col. W. S. STATHAM,  
*Comdg. Fifteenth Regt. Miss. Vols.,*  
*Hdqrs. Gen. Zollicoffer, Upper Cumberland :*

COLONEL: Your application for the removal of your regiment to this place has been received by General Johnston.

Fully appreciating both the past hardships of your regiment and the motives which induced the application he cannot comply at this time.

The position of General Zollicoffer is too important and too exposed to permit of any reduction of force, particularly so great a reduction as the removal of your regiment would be.

The general is satisfied that you will soon have an opportunity under General Z. of contributing to turn back the invaders of the South.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., January 12, 1862.*

HIS EXCELLENCY JEFFERSON DAVIS :

The time for the enemy's attack on this post, for which he has been making such formidable preparations, is at hand. I have reason to believe he will attack by land and water in a few days. His flotilla is composed of the gunboats, mortar boats, and transports enumerated in the accompanying slip. This is taken from one of their own publications and verified substantially by other information.

This flotilla is to be supported by a land force. Of the number composing this force we have no certain information, but we have reason to believe it will reach from 30,000 to 50,000.

Since taking possession of this place in September I have been actively engaged in putting it in so complete a condition of defense as the means at my disposal would allow. These means have been far less than I desired. The work, however, is one of decided strength, and it will offer a stern resistance to any attack that may be made upon it.

I regret to say that my force is much below what is required for the

work before it. I inclose a return\* just furnished by the adjutant-general, so far as this post is concerned. I have only three regiments—Mississippi sixty-days' men—that might be looked to for support. These are at Union City, under the command of Brigadier-General Alcorn, armed with every description of fire-arms.

I within the last fortnight, under a call from General Johnston, felt obliged to send him between 4,000 and 5,000 men, which I could not well spare. I have called upon the Governors of the States below us for aid. The aid has not been furnished as the necessities of my position demand it. We shall, however, make the best defense our circumstances will allow.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*Columbus, Ky., January 12, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,

*Commanding Western Department, Bowling Green, Ky. :*

GENERAL: I think it proper to say to you that the preparations of the enemy which have been so long on foot for an attack on this place seem now to have been completed, and I am advised of his purpose to make that attack in the next three or four days.

Of the character of his preparations for an attack by water you will judge by the report of his force contained in the accompanying slip, which I am advised is reliable. I am also advised that he has concentrated a large force at and around Cairo for a land attack. This force is made up chiefly of that which has been occupied with General Price in Missouri, and which, since he has fallen back on Arkansas, they feel at liberty to withdraw. This land force is estimated at 40,000.

My information is that they intend to move on New Madrid with one column, on Union City, via Feliciana, with another, and on this place with a third; landing his troops in Puntney's Bend, on this side the river. This information I believe is reliable.

As to the force at my disposal I have kept you constantly advised. I have not failed to use every exertion practicable to have it strengthened by calls upon the Governors of the States below us and upon the General Government.

I regret to say that these calls have not been responded to as I desired or as the necessities of my position demanded; especially as it became necessary to detach a portion of my force to aid you in your recent emergency. As things now stand I have two regiments of infantry and two companies of artillery posted in a well-constructed closed work at New Madrid, mounting twelve guns. They are Arkansas troops.

Thompson's men have been disbanded and not yet re-enlisted. At Camp Beauregard I have about 1,000 cavalry; at Union City three regiments of sixty-days' men, under General Alcorn.

My own force at this place, you will see, amounts to about 12,800 men ready for duty. You will see we require support. If you could give it, it would be timely and acceptable.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

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\* Not found.



[Inclosure.]

Enemy's flotilla, under command of Commodore Foote: Thirty-eight mortar boats, with one 13-inch mortar each; twenty-eight transports; twelve gunboats, fifteen guns, 32 and 48 pounders, except the Benton, which has an armament of eighteen guns, two of which are 9-inch Dahlgren's, the others 32 and 48 pounders.

The armament is distributed to fire on either side, three in the bow and two at the stern.

The mortar boats have no propelling power, but are towed into position by small tug-boats.

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Columbus, Ky., January 12, 1862.

Maj. A. C. MYERS,

*Quartermaster-General, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 17, and in regard to it have to say that as there appears to be, from your communication to the Secretary of War, some misconception of the circumstances under which the amount passed to my credit, viz, \$390,010, was expended, that an explanation in regard to it should at this time be made.

It has so happened at various times that the quartermaster at Memphis, Major Anderson, was without funds, and was by the department prohibited from borrowing. In consequence of the failure of the quartermaster's department at Memphis to meet its obligations purchases necessary for the support and efficiency of this army could not be made on a promise to pay. My division quartermasters and commissaries could not carry on their respective departments without funds, and under these circumstances I did not hesitate to call on the banks of Memphis for aid. They responded to that call to the amount of \$200,000, \$100,000 of which was placed in the hands of Quartermaster J. G. Finnie, whose receipt therefor is herewith inclosed, and who will account for the disbursement thereof to your department. The other \$100,000 was placed in the hands of Maj. W. W. Guy, commissary, whose receipt is also inclosed. The remaining \$190,010 was, as you justly remarked to Mr. Benjamin, expended by quartermaster Maj. Thomas Peters previous to the arrival of Major Anderson at Memphis. Vouchers for this amount he has, and I will, with the necessary statement of its expenditure, forward them to you as soon as it can be made out, which will be now in the course of a very few days.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

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CAMP NEAR BARREN RIVER,  
January 12, 1862.

Major-General HARDEE,

*Commanding Confederate Army, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

GENERAL: The scouting party sent out under Lieutenant-Colonel Woodward have returned to Glasgow. The enemy are not advancing in this direction; they, however, report that several regiments have left Columbia for Burkesville. I have also learned from another reliable source that from 2,500 to 3,000 of the enemy have left Colum-

bia for Burkesville; that two or three more regiments have left the same place, under Colonel Bramlette, with the intention of marching to some point on the Cumberland River above the position occupied by General Zollicoffer.

I understand that General Zollicoffer's force is at Mill Creek, about 5 miles above Creelsborough and 20 miles above Burkesville. If such is the case, the enemy have gone to Burkesville for the purpose of cutting off his supplies up the Cumberland River. The force left at Columbia is small.

I have this morning employed a good man as a spy.

I am, with respect, your obedient servant,

B. H. HELM,  
*Colonel, Commanding First Regiment Kentucky Cavalry.*

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[HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,]  
*Bowling Green, January 13, 1862.*

Maj. V. K. STEVENSON,  
*Quartermaster, Nashville:*

From information just received the enemy are perhaps advancing on Burkesville. Don't let a steamboat go above Gainesborough.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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CAMP BEAUREGARD, *January 14, 1862—6 a. m.*

Maj. GEORGE WILLIAMSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

My scouts have reported the enemy 6,000 strong at Mayfield. The locomotive is at Fulton, entirely out of order. My transportation is limited.

R. H. BREWER,  
*Major, Commanding.*

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FORT HENRY, *January 14, 1862—(via Danville).*

General POLK:

A messenger reached here just now from Paducah with information, from a reliable source, that a division of 60,000 men, supported by eleven gunboats and thirty mortar boats, carrying not less than 160 guns, will move up Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers on next Thursday. I sent copy of letter by mail.

A. HEIMAN,  
*Colonel, Commanding Fort Henry.*

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BOWLING GREEN, *January 14, 1862.*

General POLK, *Columbus:*

Have received information this morning that great preparations are making to attack Columbus. All the gunboats ordered to Cairo. One of General Polk's men deserted, and now at Paducah. They say Pillow has resigned, and that the bulk of your force has left for this place.

Force at Paducah ordered to be ready to move.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*Abstract from weekly report of the Central Army of Kentucky, Major-General Hardee, commanding, for January 14, 1862.*

[Headquarters Bowling Green, Ky.]

Troops.	Present for duty.						Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.			
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
1st (Hardee's) Division .....	453	5,887	27	321	10	216	6,914	11,135
2d (Buckner's) Division .....	467	6,990	45	477	20	325	8,324	12,390
3d (Floyd's) Division .....	94	1,536			9	152	1,791	3,436
Bowen's brigade .....	203	3,210			13	219	3,645	5,229
Clark's brigade .....	127	1,377	33	504	6	158	2,205	3,712
Lewis' brigade .....	100	1,134					1,234	1,692
Total .....	1,444	20,134	105	1,302	58	1,070	24,113	37,592

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Columbus, Ky., January 15, 1862.

Major-General LOVELL, *New Orleans* :

SIR: I am in receipt of your letter of the 7th, on the subject of the return of the Third Mississippi Regiment Volunteers and the Thirteenth Louisiana, and I regret very much to find that events have placed both myself and you in a very embarrassing position in regard to them. In your letter of the 23d of November you expressed a wish that as soon as you (I) are able to replace these regiments by others you will return them in pursuance of that wish. I have not failed to attempt a compliance with that request, and had General Johnston not felt himself so pressed as to make it necessary to draw on me for re-enforcements (about 5,000), I could have sent these regiments to you. Having no reason to believe at the time that force was sent forward that I should be called on very soon, perhaps not at all, for these regiments, I thought it proper to count on retaining them, at least until I could get relief elsewhere; therefore I regret to say I have been disappointed. My force, when the re-enforcement was sent to General Johnston, was reduced to a minimum, and it has not since been increased. The enemy in the mean time is within three hours of my position; has been concentrating a large force for an attack upon it, and, as my information is, has now about completed his plans of preparations for that purpose. To-day and to-morrow are the days fixed upon for that attack. I trust, therefore, that my call upon the Secretary of War to know if he could not relieve you by sending you other regiments will not be construed into the least indisposition on my part to restore them to your command, but only an effort through the proper department to secure relief to our common cause all around.

I have to say, in conclusion, that the first moment I can do so with safety to my position I will send this force to you with pleasure.

I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
Major-General, Commanding.



HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., January 15, 1862.*

Brigadier-General TILGHMAN,  
*Commanding Forts Henry and Donelson:*

GENERAL: Your letter of January 14 has been received.\* The information is most important. The general desires me to say that we now require vigilance and energy, and he is satisfied that in these you will not fail. He hopes to stop the movement for some time on this line, and that Generals Polk and Tilghman will delay them on the others.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, January 16, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK, *Columbus, Ky.:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge your favors of 5th, 6th, and 8th instant, the last offering to the Department, as your contribution to its trophies, a flag captured at the glorious battle of Belmont. Please accept my most grateful thanks, and be assured that it occupies already the conspicuous place in the adornment of the office of the head of the Department which is eminently due to the memories associated with it.

I now revert to the details of business presented in your letters.

I. I would take great pleasure in acceding to the request of Colonel Burch in relation to his proposed method of raising a regiment if I had the power by law. My views entirely coincide with yours and his, but the present state of legislation does not permit me to yield to his wishes. I am happy, however, to say that a bill is now pending in Congress, and, if passed, as I hope, I shall be able to do what Colonel Burch desires.

II. I have, as requested by you, ordered the promotion of Captain Finnie to the rank of quartermaster of brigade, with grade of major.

III. The questions presented by the organization of the Corps of Artillery in Tennessee are complicated and embarrassing, owing to the condition of the legislation of Congress on the subject. I have brought the matter to the attention of that body in my report at the commencement of the present session, and am told that in a day or two a law will be passed authorizing promotions in that arm of the service, for which at present there seems to be no warrant. I have not now the time to point out the difficulties which lie in the way of adopting the course suggested by Lieutenant-Colonel Haynes, and hope that by the passage of the law just referred to I may be able to do all that he desires. I will simply suggest, as the first of all difficulties, that there is no law authorizing or recognizing any organization of artillery in the Provisional Army or in the volunteer forces other than by regiments and battalions.

IV. I shall order the necessary funds forwarded at once for the East-port.

V. The whole of the difficulties in the Western (Trans-Mississippi) Department will now, I trust, be at an end, as General Earl Van Dorn has been assigned to its command, and is now on his way to report to Gen-

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\* Not found.

eral A. S. Johnston. This renders unnecessary any response to your communications to the President and myself relative to the aid required from the troops now in Arkansas.

I am, yours, very respectfully,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va., January 16, 1862.*

General W. C. WHITTHORNE, *Nashville, Tenn.:*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 8th instant. You are right in supposing that I was not aware of the facts in relation to the regiment of Colonel Gillespie when I ordered it to be disbanded, and I am gratified that you retained the order without execution till you could hear from me. I thought the regiment was one raised by Colonel Gillespie and tendered directly to the Confederate States, and my orders had been so explicit and unconditional that he could receive no unarmed twelve-months' men, that I at once directed it to be disbanded. If I had been aware that it was raised by Governor Harris, and that he had undertaken to arm it within a reasonable time, I should certainly have been satisfied with his assurance, and would never have been guilty of the discourtesy of evincing any doubt of his intention to arm the regiment by requiring that the arms should be given in advance. Pray present this apology to Governor Harris, and tell him that if he knew the incessant and ingenious attempts to force by indirection the acceptance of twelve-months' unarmed men against the steady refusal of the Department, he would not be surprised at any effort to repress promptly such disingenuous practices.

I am, respectfully,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

FORT DONELSON, *January 16, 1862.*

Major WILLIAMSON:

The following telegram received:

Colonel QUARLES, *Commanding at Clarksville:*

Information has just reached me, from a source that I consider reliable, that the enemy at Calhoun intend to move most of its force to the Ohio; thence by boat up the Cumberland to Canton; thence on you at Donelson, and General Clark at Hopkinsville. The force to move from Calhoun to be 12,000 strong. The movement to be made from Calhoun on Saturday next.

This information is from a wealthy gentleman who lives near Trenton, Ky., and who at his own expense keeps up a system of espionage on the enemy at Calhoun. He sends me word by his courier that he is in communication with an officer of high rank in the enemy's camp at that place.

POWHATAN ELLIS, JR.,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

FORT DONELSON, *January 16, 1862.*

Brigadier-General TILGHMAN, *Fort Henry:*

DEAR SIR: All orders have been promptly obeyed. There was no delay that I am advised of in executing order in regard to ammunition. All things are ready. I have thrown out pickets below; have had

them stationed so as to give us the earliest possible information. I have had the whole command turned out and put to cutting timber and preparing rifle pits, so as to protect the approaches. Everything will be done that can be accomplished by energy and industry. The men are cool and determined. Most of the sick were sent off yesterday.

Respectfully, yours, &c.,

J. M. HEAD,  
*Colonel, Commanding Post.*

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COLUMBUS, KY., *January 17, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

The enemy has commenced his movement on Columbus. I require strong re-enforcements. I will send the Third Mississippi forward so soon as the relief you promised shall arrive.

L. POLK.

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, January 17, 1862—7 p. m.*

General POLK, *Columbus:*

General Johnston places under your command the two regiments at Henderson Station; one is armed, the other will be in a few days. They will probably be needed at Fort Henry.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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FORT HENRY, *January 17, 1862—4 a. m.*

Major WILLIAMSON:

We have four gunboats, one transport, and I think one mortar boat just below us. I am prepared for this much. Will report further.

LLOYD TILGHMAN,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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FORT HENRY, *January 17, 1862—9.30 a. m.*

Colonel WILLIAMSON:

Three of the gunboats have opened on us out of their own range. I have not returned the fire, but proceed with my preparations. Men very cool.

TILGHMAN.

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HEADQUARTERS FORT DONELSON,  
*January 17, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. LLOYD TILGHMAN:

SIR: Eight boxes of guns arrived here yesterday and two the day before. Seven of them were sent down to the fort this morning, and Colonel Head has been informed that the other three are in the ordnance office. Knapsacks, haversacks, and canteens also arrived, and a great proportion of them distributed. Upon information that it was wanted, have telegraphed Captain Wright to send 50 shell for the 8-inch howitzer and different ammunition for small-arms. I also tele-



graphed Governor Harris, asking him, if possible, to send two unarmed companies to assist in working heavy guns; have also instructed Major Jones to telegraph for tarpaulins to cover ammunition. No indications of approach of the enemy as yet. All of the guns mounted, and plenty of ammunition for all, with the exception of the shells alluded to above. Ten days' provisions and forage will be sent into camp to-morrow. Captain Dixon and Colonel Head both report that every preparation to meet an attack has progressed favorably to-day. The military board promised Dr. Maxwell the male college as a hospital for our sick, but to-night they telegraph that Dr. Lyles insists upon taking it for sick that he expected from Hopkinsville. I have telegraphed the facts in the case to Colonel Mackall and asked him to instruct the military board what to do. The sick left here this morning on the General Anderson. I instructed Major Jones to telegraph Major Stevenson for the horses and mules due on his requisition of December 24 and for three ambulances and thirty litters.

Very respectfully,

POWHATAN ELLIS, JR.,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Moscow, *January 17, 1862.*

Major-General POLK:

My night scouts have just returned from Clinton and report 15,000 of the enemy at Milburn, and they are waiting for others to come up.

T. H. LOGWOOD,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.*

CAMP DESHA, *Moscow, January 17, 1862—6 p. m.*

Major-General POLK:

The bridge on Obion, between Clinton and Milburn, was destroyed last night. I took my command to that point; learned the enemy had left Milburn going east, whether to Camp Beauregard or to Paducah I could not learn, but think the latter. All safe here. Other scouts will report to you to-night.

J. H. MILLER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Post.*

BOWLING GREEN, KY., *January 17, 1862.*

General CLARK, *Hopkinsville:*

Dispatches for you sent this morning. In no event allow the enemy to anticipate you at Clarksville. Make arrangements accordingly. Confidential.

W. J. HARDEE,  
*Major-General.*

COLUMBUS, KY., *January 17, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

I have in my camp a regiment without a gun. I understand that a

quantity of the arms from the Gladiator have been brought in. Will you not send me a sufficient number to arm this regiment?

L. POLK.

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, January 17, 1862.*

W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

I write for the information of the general to say that the enemy is in motion to attack this place, as I have already advised. He is concentrating a force at Milburn, made up of that from Paducah and a force from Cairo, and my scouts bring the intelligence that it is now 15,000 strong and awaiting accessions. A force also is being concentrated on Mayfield Creek above, to compose another column.

My effective force, as you will see by the return sent you yesterday, is a fraction less than 13,000.

The plan of the enemy, from information received, is to make a demonstration with the former force, and draw out so much of my command as they may induce to leave my defenses, then to drop down their flotilla and shell the post heavily, so as to demoralize it as much as possible; then to make an assault with the column from Mayfield Creek. Their whole force is reported to be 40,000.

In view of the paramount importance of holding this position, which is the key to the whole Mississippi Valley, it has appeared to me that my first duty was to make everything bend to the accomplishment of that object. This will require me to take no risk which may involve its loss.

To comply with the enemy's programme, as above indicated, would in my judgment be to take that risk. In view, then, of the smallness of my force, I see nothing left me but to strengthen my position and await his coming, making only such diversions as may be attempted with safety, throwing the responsibility of taking care of such force as we cannot dispose of on the War Department and the people of the States around us generally.

It is an alternative I should gladly have avoided, but the inadequacy of the force at my disposal leaves me none other. The soundness of this position, in my judgment, cannot be disputed, especially as I have provisions enough in store within my lines to last a force of 25,000 men one hundred and twenty days.

I have resolved, therefore, to stand a siege, and look to the general for such aid as the War Department and the country may afford him for relief. We will, in maintaining our position, of course hope that the support required will be furnished as early as practicable.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

P. S.—These views are submitted as the result of my reflections on the facts as now presented. You will of course be advised from day to day.

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BOWLING GREEN, *January 18, 1862.*

Captain WRIGHT, *Ordnance, Nashville:*

General Tilghman telegraphs from Fort Henry that he wants ammunition, large and small. He gives the following statement of his arma-

ment, viz: Nine 32s and one rifled 24-pounder, one smooth-bore 24-pounder, one 12-pounder, one 10-inch, with no ammunition and no loading fixtures.

If you have requisitions of General Tilghman fill them; if you have none, see from the above statement and your books what is necessary and send it. Answer.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

NASHVILLE, *January 18, 1862.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL:

Complete set of implements went with 10-inch columbiad to Henry and 100 rounds ammunition for same sent two days ago. They have there 782 rounds complete for 32-pounders; 274 12-pounder, fixed; 300 for 6-pounder, fixed; 100 rounds for 24-pounder rifled gun; 150,000 small-arm ammunition, besides lead, powder, and caps. At Donelson 904 rounds complete for 32-pounder; 165 12-pounder; 100 10-inch columbiad; 250 12-pounder howitzer; 190 6-pounder; 72,000 small-arm; besides lead, powder, and caps.

M. H. WRIGHT,  
*Captain, Artillery, Ordnance Officer.*

BOWLING GREEN, *January 18, 1862.*

Col. W. R. SMITH, *Tuscumbia, Ala.:*

COLONEL: Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, is attacked. General Johnston directs you to move all the efficient men of your regiment by railway to the crossing of the Tennessee and thence to Fort Henry. Answer.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

HDQRS. FIRST REGIMENT KENTUCKY CAVALRY,  
*Camp at Skegg's Creek, January 18, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUCKNER,

*Commanding Second Division, Bowling Green:*

GENERAL: I am satisfied that the enemy are concentrating a large force to attack General Zollicoffer. From the best information I can get not less than fifteen regiments have passed through Columbia. Lieutenant-Colonel Woodward will hand you this dispatch; he went in command of a scouting party within 15 miles of Columbia, and can give you information about the movements of the enemy on General Zollicoffer.

I fear that the enemy do not intend to attack the army at Bowling Green, but will quietly send forces in the direction of General Zollicoffer, both above and below him, on the Cumberland River, and by that means get a large force into East Tennessee. I do not know the strength of General Zollicoffer's division, and I fear the enemy are moving on him in such numbers as to overwhelm him. It seems to me that if we permit the enemy to get into East Tennessee it will be a serious blow to our cause.



I understand that Major Hays is ordered to draw money to pay the soldiers of your division from the 1st of November. Two companies of my regiment have pay due them from the 1st of October and several from the 5th of October. Can you not alter the order so that Major Hays will pay my regiment from the 1st of October?

I am, truly, yours,

B. H. HELM,  
*Colonel, Commanding First Regiment Kentucky Cavalry.*

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BOWLING GREEN, KY., *January 19, 1862.*

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

I desire the Government, if it be possible, to send a strong force to Nashville and another to Memphis. The movements of the enemy indicate his intention to turn General Polk's right by the Memphis and Ohio Railroad. Their preparations to attack General Polk in front and on his flank seem to be of immense magnitude. Since my last report the enemy have established themselves on my right at Burkesville, about 40 miles below General Zollicoffer, on the Cumberland. This Burkesville force is estimated from 2,500 to 3,000.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, January 19, 1862.*

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond :*

SIR: On the 17th Fort Henry, on Tennessee, was attacked by three gunboats, accompanied by transports. They did not approach near enough for their shot to reach; our batteries, though ready, did not reply. They have certainly landed troops and wagons from their transports a few miles below the fort, on the west side of the river.

Reports from Paris last night report a mixed column of 6,000 men 8 miles west of Murray, marching on Fort Henry, and a column of 2,000 marching on Murray from a point on the Tennessee north and east of Murray.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, January 19, 1862.*

Major-General POLK, *Columbus :*

GENERAL: Did you receive my letters of December 10? General Johnston wishes to know.

The enemy are advanced near Murray; Paris their probable destination. The general calls your attention to the suggestions made in that letter.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

CAMP NEWBERN,  
Greene County, Alabama, January 19, 1862.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: Since addressing you a few days ago I have been credibly informed that another company of Union men are secretly organizing, and have elected their officers, in adjoining county to the one where the 300 are encamped I wrote you about, which it is supposed are intended to act in concert with them. They are avowed Union men, and have never declared what their intentions were. The superintendent of the military institution at Tuscaloosa is inclined to believe their intentions are to secure the prisoners at Tuscaloosa. I have the promise of one field piece and can get another and half the State Cadets, if necessary, to disperse them, if it is your order to do so. I am having their movements closely watched, and will keep you advised of them if you think it necessary. I am satisfied something serious is intended from all I can gather. The Governor does not feel authorized to issue orders to me, as we are intended for the Confederacy, but is willing for half the Cadets to act with me. I would be pleased to have an order to co-operate with any other troops that might be ordered there.

I am having the shot-gun and country rifle altered so as to carry the Minié ball with as much precision and effect as the true Minié rifle, and a few will excel it in accuracy and range. I am succeeding very well with my battalion; have good quarters, and getting them pretty well drilled. I am trying to induce them to re-enlist for the war, and think I will succeed after a while. Be glad you would send me authority under your hand to receive them for the war. I am giving all my attention to these matters.

Yours, with great respect,

ROBT. P. BLOUNT,  
*Commanding Battalion.*

P. S.—The officers are getting anxious about their commissions. I have accepted and mustered the three companies I sent you according to the law in your circular. The other companies have not the legal number to be mustered yet.

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COLUMBUS, KY., [January] 19, 1862—4 p. m.

General TILGHMAN:

Your dispatch of 18th, 11 p. m., received. Am informed column [of] 4,000 infantry, 600 cavalry, and two batteries of artillery were moving from Farmington towards Murray. Have sent 1,000 cavalry to attack their column in rear and to harass them; will send also two regiments infantry from the rear [as] soon as they can be put in motion. Keep me advised.

L. POLK.

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Bowling Green, January 20, 1862.

Major-General HARDEE,  
*Commanding Central Army of Kentucky:*

GENERAL: I am instructed by General Johnston to say you will detach from the corps at this place a body of 8,000 men (due proportions of the three arms), consisting of General Floyd's brigade and so much of Buckner's as will bring the number up to 8,000.

This command will proceed to Russellville, the infantry and its baggage by rail and the artillery guns, the cavalry and artillery horses marching together.

General Floyd will receive all information you have in relation to the enemy on Green River; be instructed to protect our line from this point by rail to Clarksville.

He must judge from after information whether he shall march straight upon the enemy, now reported at South Carrollton, or wait for further developments of his intentions.

It is sufficient to say he must get the best information of the movements of the enemy southward from the river, and beat them at the earliest possible opportunity.

Respectfully, &c.,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Camp Beauregard, January 21, 1862—7 o'clock.*

Major-General POLK,  
*Commanding C. S. Army, Western Department:*

GENERAL: The accompanying dispatches\* you will read with painful interest. My command is mostly in; but few of our wagons have arrived. We are now here for the winter, as the roads are almost impassable. Our arrangements should be made accordingly. Can nothing, general, be done to stop the invader? It will be a dark day when the soil of Tennessee is polluted by his footstep. O, for a brigade now here to fall upon him! My command is distressingly small, as our late scouting and moving through sleet, snow, and ice has sickened men and crippled unshod horses.

I will do what I can to harass and cripple the enemy. Cannot two good regiments of infantry be called from below somewhere and placed here under a practical, judicious brigade officer? With them and the advantage of the roads and season (which is equal to two regiments) we can stop the ruthless invader. You must devise, and subordinates execute. I will keep you constantly advised of the movements of the enemy and will try to do my duty.

Yours, most respectfully,

J. H. MILLER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Post.*

P. S.—I have no pen, ink, or envelopes. Please send the post-boy.

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CLARKSVILLE, *January 21, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. W. J. HARDEE, *Bowling Green:*

MY DEAR SIR: Our forts are still in an unfinished condition, and will remain so, unless the 2,000 men who are now here are ordered to work on them immediately; if necessary, night and day. As yet no work has been done by the soldiers, and if half we hear is true we have no time to lose. There is a great deal of work done on the forts, but they are unfinished, and in the present condition do no earthly good, and are no more effective for defense than if they were in their original condition before a spade of dirt was removed. More energy must be infused into the work of preparation here for defense, or we

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\* Not found. .



will be unprepared, if the enemy should pass Fort Donelson and march around it. We hear the enemy are in force 6,000 strong at Murray, about 25 miles north of Paris. We don't know the truth of this report, but the people of Paris are in a great state of excitement about it. They believe the report to be true.

I understand the authorities here have again sent out over the country to collect in the negroes to finish these forts. This will necessarily produce delay, though none could be finished before the negro force can be assembled if the soldiers were detailed for the work. Last night twelve companies arrived here from Nashville, and we have now here two regiments, one under Colonel Quarles, and the other under the command of Colonel Voorhies.

I need not apologize for my urgency, for I cannot and ought not, in the position I occupy, to stand still in such a moment as this.

Ever your friend and obedient servant,

GUS. A. HENRY.

[Indorsement.]

ENGINEER'S OFFICE,  
January 25, 1862.

I have just received a telegraphic report from Mr. Edward B. Sayer, assistant engineer at Clarksville, in which he says "work progressing very well now; 200 slaves and 50 soldiers at work; 24-pounders mounted; one 12-pounder also mounted."

I have directed him to mount the 32s in the water battery at mouth of Red River.

[J. F. GILMER,]  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
Knoxville, Tenn., January 21, 1862.

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: The troops under my command are now stationed as follows:

Of the Georgia Third Battalion, one company is at Union, where the bridge over the Holston River is being rebuilt; one company guarding the bridge at Carter's Station; one company at Elizabethton, the county seat of Carter County; and four companies, much reduced by sickness, are at Greeneville.

The North Carolina Twenty-ninth, Colonel Vance, are distributed thus: One company at Midway; one at Lick Creek Bridge; one at Morristown; one at Strawberry Plains; one at Flat Creek; two at London; one at Charleston, Tenn., and two at Chattanooga.

Outwardly the country remains sufficiently quiet, but it is filled with Union men, who continue to talk sedition, and who are evidently waiting only for a safe opportunity to act out their rebellious sentiments. If such men are arrested by the military, the Confederate and State courts take them by writ of habeas corpus, and they are released under bond to keep the peace; all which is satisfactory in a theoretical point of view, but practically fatal to the influence of military authority and to the peace of the country. It seems not unlikely that every prisoner now in our hands might or will be thus released by the Confederate court, even after being condemned by court-martial to be held as prisoners of war.

It is reported to-day that several fragmentary companies recruiting in different counties ostensibly for the service of the Confederate States have suddenly disappeared; gone to Kentucky.

It is confidently hoped that the bridge over the Holston at Union will be completed in the current month.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,  
D. LEADBETTER,  
Colonel, Commanding.

Extract from weekly report of troops stationed at Forts Donelson and Henry (Fourth Division, Western Department), under command of Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, C. S. Army.

RECAPITULATION.			
Station.	Present for duty.		Remarks.
	Officers.	Men.	
Fort Henry.....	102	2, 037	2, 188
Add Colonel Stacker ..	38	461	847
Fort Donelson .....	89	1, 103	2, 175
Grand total.....	229	3, 601	5, 210

POWHATAN ELLIS, JR.,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

FORT DONELSON, January 21, 1862.

Maj. GEORGE WILLIAMSON:

SIR: General Tilghman is absent at Fort Henry. General Bushrod R. Johnson is in command of this post. This morning, after the above report was made out, Lieutenant Clayton, who reported here this morning, was sent over to Fort Henry with a 12-pounder brass howitzer and a detachment of 15 men from Captain Maney's light battery. Thirteen guns were fired on the Tennessee River this afternoon, supposed to be at or near Fort Henry.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
POWHATAN ELLIS, JR.,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Abstract from weekly return of the command at Cumberland Gap, commanded by Col. James E. Rains, for January 21, 1862.

Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present and absent.
	Officers.	Men.	
4th Tennessee Infantry, Colonel Churchwell.....	25	496	756
11th Tennessee Infantry, Colonel Rains.....	29	685	875
Mileham's independent company infantry .....	4	79	83
3d East Tennessee Battalion Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Brazelton .....	12	207	283
Burroughs' artillery company .....	2	54	72
Engineer Corps.....	2	2	4
Grand total.....	74	1, 523	2, 073

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., January 22, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector-General :*

SIR: I have ordered Major-General Hardee to detach 8,000 troops, of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, to Russellville, and the movement is now going on. The infantry and artillery, with baggage, camp equipage, subsistence, &c., by railroad. The wagon train unloaded and artillery horses, guarded by the cavalry, will move on the common road.

The enemy have moved from Calhoun and Rumsey, on Green River, to South Carrollton, and General Smith, commanding enemy's forces on the Tennessee, turned yesterday from Murray towards Pine Bluff, on Tennessee River, 10 miles below Fort Henry.

General Polk had ordered a movement of 1,000 cavalry and two regiments of infantry towards the rear of the enemy. The badness of the roads on the route to Paris and the movement on his rear has made him relinquish his march to the railroad at Paris, which it is presumed he desired to cut before investing Forts Henry and Donelson.

The roads can only be traveled over with great difficulty in most localities on account of the great quantity of rain which has fallen, but should the ground freeze, the force which is going to Russellville will seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the enemy at South Carrollton, unless a movement in force up the Cumberland should make it necessary to go to the support of Clarksville. At Russellville, 28 miles hence, they will be in a position to act effectively in either direction.

I will send to Tilghman at Fort Henry two regiments of volunteers from Henderson Station, 15 miles from Jackson, Tenn. (on the route from Humboldt to Corinth), so soon as they receive their arms, which are now ready for them at Jackson.

If the Burnside expedition goes elsewhere than New Orleans or on the coast of that region, troops may temporarily be spared from New Orleans. General Lovell and the Governor, I understand in that event, would be willing to send them. I hear of no movement of the enemy on my front here.

I have just received a telegram from General Hindman, commanding the advance from this position, announcing the defeat and death of General Zollicoffer at Webb's Cross-Roads, on the road from his position to Columbia. I inclose a copy of the telegram. If my right is thus broken as stated, East Tennessee is open to invasion, or if the plan of the enemy be a combined movement upon Nashville, it is in jeopardy, unless a force can be placed to oppose a movement from Burkesville (100 miles from Nashville) towards Nashville. Movements on my left, threatening Forts Henry, Donelson, and Clarksville, have, I do not doubt, for their ultimate object the occupation of Nashville. I have already detached 8,000 men to make Clarksville secure and drive the enemy back, with the aid of the force at Clarksville and Hopkinsville. But to make another large detachment towards my right would leave this place untenable. The road through this place is indispensable to the enemy to enable them to advance with their main body. They must have river or railroad means of transportation to invade with a large force. While it is of vital importance to keep back the main body, it is palpable this great object cannot be accomplished if detachments can turn my position and attack and occupy Nashville and the interior of the State, which it is the special object to defend.

A reserve at Nashville seems now absolutely necessary to enable me to maintain this position. A successful movement of the enemy on my



right would carry with it all the consequences which could be expected by the enemy here if they could break through my defenses. If I had the forces to prevent a flank movement they would be compelled [to] attack this position, which we doubt not can make a successful defense.

If force cannot be spared from other army corps the country must now be roused to make the greatest effort that they will be called upon to make during the contest. No matter what the sacrifice may be, it must be made, and without loss of time. Our people do not comprehend the magnitude of the danger that threatens. Let it be impressed upon them.

The enemy will probably undertake no active operations in Missouri, and may be content to hold our force fast in their position on the Potomac for the remainder of the winter; but to suppose with the facilities of movement by water which the well-filled rivers of the Ohio, Cumberland, and Tennessee give for active operations, that they will suspend them in Tennessee and Kentucky during the winter months is a delusion.

All the resources of the Confederacy are now needed for the defense of Tennessee.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

[Inclosure.]

[A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *General, C. S. Army*.]

Louisville Democrat of 21st instant, just brought down by Captain Morgan, from Rowlett's, contains account of fight between Zollicoffer and Thomas and Zollicoffer's defeat and death. It says:

Zollicoffer, learning from his spies that Thomas was marching down from Columbia with between 5,000 and 6,000 men, determined to take him by surprise, and, attacking him with a superior force, cut him off before re-enforcements reached him. Taking 10,000 men, he marched out of his intrenchments and at 6 o'clock Sunday morning commenced the fight. Battle raged hotly and furiously until about noon, when the rebel forces were put to flight in disorder, leaving 200 killed and wounded on the field. Among the killed was Baillie Peyton, jr., on Zollicoffer's staff, and among the wounded, who shortly afterwards died, was Zollicoffer himself, found in a wagon. The loss of Federal side estimated at 70 killed and wounded—probably more. Rebel force fled to their intrenchments, and Thomas waited until Monday morning to attack and capture or cut them to pieces, but rebels had crossed the Cumberland during the night, leaving everything behind them, without even destroying anything.

The fight is reported as having occurred at Webb's Cross-Roads. The first news received at Louisville was by dispatch from General Thomas himself. The number of the enemy engaged is not stated, but among the others were the Ninth Ohio, Tenth Indiana, and Nineteenth Regulars. Will send you paper by train this evening.

T. C. HINDMAN.

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, January 22, [1862].*

Governor HARRIS, *Nashville*:

General Tilgham telegraphs that enemy is marching from Murray to Pine Bluff at 2 p. m. yesterday. Bad roads and Polk's movements upon his rear, with 1,000 cavalry and some regiments infantry, have changed enemy's course. Arm the two regiments at Henderson Station. Lieutenant Wright will furnish ammunition and powder-horns, if he has them. They will receive orders as soon as I am notified that this is done.

A. S. JOHNSTON.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Columbus, Ky., January 22, 1862.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: The movement in regard to the re-enlistment of troops for the war is one which must impress us all with its paramount importance, and I have already taken measures to inaugurate that movement in this division.

The attention of my army is now being fixed in this direction, and I earnestly hope that no impediment will be permitted to remain in the way of its successful consummation. As the tide of patriotic feeling rises it should be promptly met by the Government. There is but one way in which this can be done. In the very incipency of this movement I should be placed in possession of a sufficient amount of funds with which to discharge the bounty claims of those re-enlisting. This rising feeling should not be permitted to cool, and I beg leave respectfully to ask that I be immediately so pecuniarily placed as to enable me to secure for the war the services of those who are now ready to re-enlist, as well as those who are daily manifesting a desire to do so.

You will from your knowledge of the strength of the force at my command judge of the amount that should be remitted.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Columbus, Ky., January 22, 1862.

His Excellency Governor PETTUS:

GOVERNOR: I am in receipt of your dispatch promising me such support as you can afford. It is of the utmost importance that the South, the whole South, should put forth its strength at this juncture in Kentucky. A strong, bold, and determined effort now will go far towards settling our future for us. I have developed my views to General Alcorn very fully, and beg to refer you to him for them. We have the men to do the work demanded, but I am profoundly impressed with the fact that our people are not alive to the critical condition of things before us and around us. We should have, and *must* have, an additional force of at least 30,000 men to put the Kentucky frontier in a condition of effectual defense. If we can have this aid shortly we can settle this war, and I hope we who are bearing the burden of the common defense will be sustained by our countrymen in the States around us.

Referring you to General Alcorn for the details of my views, I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Bowling Green, January 23, 1862.

Major-General LOVELL, *New Orleans:*

I am out of lead. Crittenden defeated and falling back. Send a supply by passenger train to Captain Wright, Nashville, if possible.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, January 24, 1862.*

W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant-General:*

I have kept you advised by telegraph of the condition of things and the course of events here since the enemy made his late demonstration.

What the particular object of it was has not clearly transpired. That it was intended to make a demonstration on Tennessee River seems the only thing which has been made plain. I am advised also that General Grant, who was with the column above Mayfield Creek, stated that they (his column) returned because the support he expected from Saint Louis was prevented from reaching him by the ice.

I have been constantly advised of the position and movements of the enemy and the condition of his troops. General Smith moved from Paducah to Mayfield with a column of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, in all about 5,000; thence to Murray, where he turned part of his force towards Tennessee River. My last information is (up to yesterday) that the rest of his force was moving "west," which means, I suppose, towards Mayfield.

I have ordered Crain's field battery and Gee's Arkansas regiment from Memphis to Tennessee River Bridge; also Lea's regiment from Henderson Station; also Browder's, from the same station to the same point, so soon as armed. I also ordered about 1,000 cavalry to move upon his flank. These are of my immediate command. I am perfectly satisfied that to do the work before us as it should be done we ought to have an additional force between this and the Tennessee River of at least 40,000 men, and the sooner we get this force and get it in position the better; and now is the time to make the preparation necessary. Let it not be postponed until we shall have them to deal with, but do it beforehand.

I hope the measures necessary to prepare this force may be inaugurated as early as possible. We have the men and the resources, and they should be employed.

I am continuing to strengthen the defenses of this post.

I remain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, January 24, 1862.*

Captain M. H. WRIGHT,  
*Ordinance, C. S. Army, Nashville:*

SIR: You will send to General Crittenden, by the Cumberland River, for Monsarrat's battery, composed of three 6-pounders smooth bore and one 8-pounder rifled cannon, a supply of spherical case for 6s and shell for the rifled gun. I understand there is no deficiency except in these particulars.

There will be also needed a full supply of ammunition for 4,000 muskets—about 2,500 Harper's Ferry percussion and 1,500 flint-lock, old pattern, and perhaps some small supply for shot-guns.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*



*Abstract from weekly report, January 25, 1862, of troops at Columbus, Ky., Major-General Polk, commanding.*

Troops.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Officers.	Men.		
1st Division .....	269	4,034	4,303	5,675
2d Division .....	283	4,456	4,739	6,002
3d Division .....	209	3,241	3,450	4,718
General Stewart's command .....	136	1,446	1,582	2,448
Captain Wood's company .....	4	54	58	76
Total .....	901	13,231	14,132	18,919

HEADQUARTERS,  
Knoxville, January 26, 1862.

General S. COOPER.

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: It is thought here that the fugitives from General Crittenden's army may not exceed a thousand total. The general is understood to have fallen back on Livingston, and thence to be in communication with Nashville, through Gainesborough and the river. In this case we can readily restore to him, via Nashville, some 200 fugitives already arrived at this place. If re-enforced there by General Floyd, as rumored, he will effectually threaten the enemy's flank, and if in sufficient force, will doubtless prevent an advance on Knoxville; but the people here are anxious lest the two regiments of East Tennessee known to be with the enemy should enter the northern counties of Scott, Campbell, &c., all disloyal, raise those counties in more open rebellion, destroy the bridges, and inaugurate a civil war. Those regiments, broken up into companies, might move from Somerset without commissariat, and through the mountain paths, as they always have done in the opposite direction. The moment they get into the State they are surrounded by friends, and the railroad line and the Government packing establishments are endangered.

We have on the line of the road a regiment and a battalion, four or five companies of which might possibly be spared for field service. At Knoxville is Gillespie's regiment, not well armed, and scarcely more than sufficient to guard the Government establishments. Two battalions are also here unarmed, unorganized, and not fusible into a regiment.

Just before the defeat of General Crittenden's army I had dispatched all the cavalry available, some 400, to Scott County, under orders to destroy the rebels in arms there, and they had only reached Montgomery when the fugitives of the army were met. I have directed them to report for orders to General Crittenden, and, if not needed by him, to carry out their original instructions.

The Department is well aware of my opinion as to the political condition of East Tennessee. Only a little aid and comfort are needed to place it in open hostility to the Government.

If troops can by possibility be spared, two or three additional regiments should be held disposable here, or be so placed as to hold the northern counties in check.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. LEADBETTER,

Colonel, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Bowling Green, January 27, 1862.

Colonel GORGAS, *Chief of Ordnance, Richmond, Va.:*

Wanted at once for Fort Henry, Tennessee River, two 10-inch columbiads, with carriages, chassis, and implements complete.

For defense of Nashville, as soon as practicable: Three field batteries, of Anderson's guns, if possible; twenty-five 12-pounders, siege carriages; twenty 18-pounders, siege carriages; twenty 24-pounders, siege carriages; six columbiads, 10-inch or 8-inch, and six 32-pounder guns, with barbette carriages, chassis, and implements complete for all.

For defense of Clarksville, Tenn.: Two columbiads, 10 or 8 inch, and two 32-pounders, with barbette carriages, and all complete; one field battery, six 12-pounders, six 18-pounders, and four 24-pounders, with siege carriages, complete; a field battery of Anderson guns to fill the place of those lost by General Crittenden.

Can you supply carriages for the eight 24-pounder carronades sent to Nashville and for the five 42-pounders sent to Clarksville, Tenn.?

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
General.

KNOXVILLE, TENN., January 27, 1862.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS,  
*President Confederate States of America:*

SIR: The Army of the Cumberland is utterly routed and demoralized. The result is regarded with the profoundest solicitude. Confidence is gone in the ranks and among the people. It must be restored. I am confident it cannot be done under Generals Crittenden and Carroll. There is now no impediment whatever but bad roads and natural obstacles to prevent the enemy from entering East Tennessee and destroying the railroads and putting East Tennessee in a flame of revolution.

Nothing but the appointment to the command of a brave, skillful, and able general, who has the popular confidence, will restore tone and discipline to the army, and confidence to the people. I do not propose to inquire whether the loss of public confidence in Generals Crittenden and Carroll is ill or well founded. It is sufficient that all is lost.

General Humphrey Marshall, General Floyd, General Pillow, General Smith, or General Loring would restore tone to the army and inspire the public confidence. I must think, as everybody else does, that there has been a great mistake made. Every movement is important. Can not you, Mr. President, right the wrong by the immediate presence of a new and able man?

Yours, truly,

LANDON C. HAYNES.

NASHVILLE, January 27, 1862.

J. D. C. ATKINS, *Member Congress:*

Crittenden can never rally troops [in] East Tennessee. Some other general must be sent there. Federals advanced from Murray on Fort Henry. Before reaching Henry they retreated back to Paducah. All safe in that country.

ISHAM G. HARRIS.



HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., January 28, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va. :*

I send to you Mr. N. R. Jennings, of this army, for the purpose of placing before you certain facts with regard to the condition of the defenses of that part of our frontier with which I am charged.

Since I have been in command I have not ceased to press upon the State and Confederate Government the inadequacy of the force at my disposal for the service assigned me. These repeated representations have been met by occasional spasmodic efforts, which have fallen far short of our necessities. I have made use of the force at my command in placing this post in a condition of strong defense, by that means endeavoring to compensate for the want of numbers, but strong as it confessedly is, it will require troops to hold it, and these troops must be in numbers proportionate to the force to be brought against it. The enemy regard it as the main obstacle to their reduction of the Mississippi Valley, and are making preparations for that purpose proportionate to the importance of that object. We must have more force to enable us to hold it, and more force to enable us to take care of our flanks. I have fully discussed our wants with Mr. N. R. Jennings, who is perfectly master of the whole subject, and to whom I beg leave respectfully to refer you for particulars.

Whatever is done must be done quickly and must be done effectually.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK.

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va., January 30, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Bowling Green, Ky. :*

SIR : Some painful rumors have reached the Department attributing the disaster to our arms at Somerset to the intemperance of General Crittenden, the commander of the army.

The President can scarcely believe these rumors to be well founded ; but we are at too great a distance to inquire into facts. Many letters are also received here, by members of Congress and others, representing that the army under General Crittenden and the people of East Tennessee have lost confidence in him, and that the *morale* of the army will be utterly destroyed by his remaining in command.

All such rumors are frequent in case of disaster, and for the most part unjust and unfounded ; but the public service requires that they should at all times be sufficiently investigated to ascertain what foundation exists for them. I have therefore to request that you will institute such inquiry into the facts and into the condition of that part of your command as may suffice to guide your own judgment ; and, if the necessity exists, that you assign some other general to the command of the army under General Crittenden, relieving him from his present duties and making such further orders in relation to him as in your judgment shall seem advisable for the good of the service.

Your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*



HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Columbus, Ky., January 31, 1862.*

His Excellency Gov. ISHAM G. HARRIS:

I send to you and to the Legislature of Tennessee General Cheatham, for the purpose of placing before you certain facts with regard to the condition of defenses of that part of the frontier with which I am charged. Since I have been in command I have not ceased to press upon the State and Confederate Governments the insufficiency of the force at my disposal for the service assigned me. These repeated representations have been met by occasional spasmodic efforts, which have fallen far short of our necessities.

I have made use of the force at my command in placing this post in a condition of strong defense, thereby endeavoring to compensate for the lack of numbers. But strong as it confessedly is, it will require troops to hold it, and these troops must be in numbers proportionate to the force to be brought against it. The enemy regard it as the main obstacle to their reduction of the Mississippi Valley, and are making preparations commensurate with the importance of that object. There need not be any undue solicitude in regard to the ultimate result. I regard this position in the condition of defense in which it has been placed as well-nigh impregnable, but we need a strong supporting force to take care of our center as it should be cared for, and to protect our flanks. It is entirely within the power of the General Government and of the States immediately interested to supply this force, and in numbers sufficient to enable us to defy effectually every assault. I have fully discussed our wants with General Cheatham, who is perfectly master of the whole subject, and to whom I beg leave to refer you.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,

*Major-General, Commanding.*

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE, *Jackson, Miss., Jan. 31, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green:*

SIR: I have to-day, in virtue of an act of the Legislature approved on the 29th instant, issued my proclamation, calling for 10,000 volunteers to serve for the term of two years. I trust that it will be promptly responded to. The act authorizes me to designate the times and places of rendezvous within the limits of the State.

Owing to the fact that the account between the State of Mississippi and the Confederate Government remains unadjusted, and that other resources have been exhausted, I am without the means of subsisting the troops which may respond to my proclamation.

I desire to know immediately whether you will not furnish provisions from the time they arrive at the places of rendezvous, of the designation of which you will be hereafter informed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours,

JOHN J. PETTUS.

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BOWLING GREEN, *January 31, 1862.*

Captain MONSARRAT, *Knorrville:*

Use every effort to bring together the stragglers from General Crittenden's command, officers and men. Send them to Nashville to report to Captain Lindsay for orders.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*Abstract from return of the Central Army of Kentucky, Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee, commanding, for January, 1862.*

[Headquarters Bowling Green, Ky.]

Troops.	Present for duty.						Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.			
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
1st (Hardee's) Division .....	430	5,485	102	1,190	19	413	7,639	12,412
2d (Buckner's) Division .....	399	6,649	50	686	16	300	8,100	12,425
Floyd's division .....	147	2,064	.....	.....	8	153	2,381	4,355
Bowen's brigade.....	197	3,004	.....	.....	21	376	3,604	5,220
Clark's brigade.....	146	1,558	34	932	8	161	2,850	5,136
Total .....	1,319	18,760	186	2,808	72	1,406	*24,574	39,548

\*Another return of these forces for the same period gives an "Aggregate present" of 30,781.

*Organization of the Central Army of Kentucky, Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee, commanding, January 31, 1862.*

#### FIRST DIVISION.

Maj. Gen. WILLIAM J. HARDEE.

##### *First Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. T. C. HINDMAN.

1st Arkansas.  
2d Arkansas.  
6th Arkansas.  
1st Arkansas Cavalry, battalion.  
Kentucky cavalry (Morgan's).  
8th Texas Cavalry.  
Swett's battery.

##### *Second Brigade.*

Col. P. R. CLEBURNE, 15th Arkansas.

15th Arkansas.  
6th Mississippi.  
23d Tennessee.  
24th Tennessee.  
35th Tennessee.

##### *Third Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. S. A. M. WOOD.

7th Alabama.  
5th Arkansas.  
7th Arkansas.  
8th Arkansas.  
9th Arkansas, battalion.  
3d Mississippi, battalion.  
44th Tennessee.

##### *Not Brigaded.*

Arkansas battalion, artillery.  
1st Mississippi Cavalry.

#### SECOND DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. SIMON B. BUCKNER.

##### *First Brigade.*

Brig. Gen. JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE.

2d Kentucky.  
3d Kentucky.  
4th Kentucky.  
5th Kentucky.  
6th Kentucky.  
2d Tennessee Cavalry, battalion.

##### *Second Brigade.*

Col. W. E. BALDWIN, 14th Mississippi.

14th Mississippi.  
26th Mississippi.  
26th Tennessee.  
41st Tennessee.

*Third Brigade.*

Col. J. C. BROWN, 3d Tennessee.  
3d Tennessee.  
18th Tennessee.  
32d Tennessee.

*Not Brigaded.*

1st Kentucky Cavalry.  
1st Louisiana Cavalry.

FLOYD'S DIVISION.

Brig. Gen. JOHN B. FLOYD.

20th Mississippi.  
36th Virginia.  
50th Virginia.

51st Virginia.  
56th Virginia.  
Guy's (Virginia) battery.

BOWEN'S BRIGADE.

Col. JOHN S. BOWEN, 1st Missouri.

9th Arkansas.  
10th Arkansas.  
22d Mississippi.  
25th Mississippi.  
1st Missouri.  
27th Tennessee.

Eldridge's battery.  
Hart's battery.  
Hudson's battery.  
Lyon's battery.  
Miller's battery.

CLARK'S BRIGADE.

Brig. Gen. CHARLES CLARK.

8th Kentucky.  
1st Mississippi.  
3d Mississippi.  
42d Tennessee.  
7th Texas.  
Tennessee cavalry (Forrest's).

8th Tennessee Cavalry, battalion.  
Huey's cavalry (one company).  
Wilcox's cavalry (one company).  
Williams' cavalry (one company).  
Green's (Tennessee) battery.  
Maury's battery.

*Abstract from return of the First Division, Western Department, Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, commanding, for January, 1862.*

[Headquarters Columbus, Ky.]

Troops.	Present for duty.						Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.			
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
1st Division.....	215	3,329			7	73	*4,267	4,797
2d Division.....	288	4,193	2	70	21	354	6,167	6,813
3d Division.....	159	2,526	13	234	19	358	4,262	4,667
Columbus garrison.....	87	1,035			30	429	2,225	2,429
Miscellaneous†.....	205	2,560	72	1,048	6	90	5,140	6,077
Total†.....	954	13,643	87	1,352	83	1,304	22,061	24,783

\* Including General Polk's staff.

† At Camp Beauregard, Fort Pillow, Island No. 10, Moscow, New Madrid, Paris, and Trenton.

‡ A return of the troops of the Western Department, commanded by Major-General Polk, for the same period, gives the following "recapitulation:"

Stations.	Effective total.		
	Infantry.	Artillery.	Cavalry.
Columbus.....	12,061	1,260	367
Fort Pillow.....	1,064		
Island No 10.....	207		
Trenton.....	458		
New Madrid.....	1,036	120	
Paris.....			1,093
Total.....	14,826	1,380	1,460



*Organization of the First Division, Western Department, commanded by Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, C. S. Army, January, 1862.\**

## FIRST DIVISION.

2d Tennessee.  
12th Tennessee.  
13th Tennessee.  
15th Tennessee.  
21st Tennessee.  
22d Tennessee.  
Jackson's battery.

## SECOND DIVISION.

13th Arkansas.  
7th Kentucky.  
13th Louisiana.  
Mississippi regiment (Blythe's).  
6th Tennessee.  
9th Tennessee.  
33d Tennessee.  
154th (senior) Tennessee.  
Montgomery's cavalry.  
Polk's battery.  
Rucker's artillery company.  
Smith's battery.  
Stanford's battery.  
Williams' battery.

## THIRD DIVISION.

5th Louisiana battalion.  
11th Louisiana.  
12th Louisiana.  
4th Tennessee.  
31st Tennessee.  
Haywood's cavalry (one company).  
Hudson's squadron.  
Neely's company (cavalry).  
Bankhead's battalion light artillery.  
Stewart's battery.  
Johnson's siege battery.

## STEWART'S BRIGADE.

Brig. Gen. A. P. STEWART, commanding.

4th Arkansas, battalion.  
5th Tennessee.  
West Tennessee battalion.  
Heavy artillery.  
Stewart's artillery company.  
Upton's artillery company.

## FORT PILLOW.

1st Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee.  
40th Tennessee.

## ISLAND NO. 10.

46th Tennessee.

## TRENTON, TENN.

47th Tennessee.

## NEW MADRID.

11th Arkansas.  
12th Arkansas.

## PARIS, TENN.

Brewer's battalion (cavalry).  
King's Kentucky battalion (cavalry).  
1st Mississippi Battalion (cavalry).  
Captain Stock's company (cavalry).  
6th Tennessee Battalion (cavalry).

\* Commanders of divisions not given on the return. The First, Second, and Third Divisions and Stewart's brigade were stationed at Columbus, Ky.

*Abstract from weekly report of the Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, commanding, for January 31, 1862.*

Stations.	Present for duty.		Aggregate present and absent.
	Officers.	Men.	
Fort Henry.....	188	2,845	3,959
Fort Donelson.....	161	1,795	3,546
Total .....	349	4,640	7,465

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS,  
Gainesborough, Tenn., February 1, 1862.

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Commanding Department of the West:*

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that I am unable as yet to make out and transmit to you my detailed report of the engagement on the 19th of January. This delay is owing to the delay of the officers of the command in sending up their reports.

I would suggest that this command be re-enforced by several well-drilled regiments at an early day.

Inclosed I send you a sketch of the section of the country.\* You will see that this position of Gainesborough can be turned by the enemy, and in many respects it is an unfavorable point. I cannot occupy Livingston or any point on the road from Livingston to the Walton road for want of transportation to carry supplies to the camp from the river.

I submit to you, then, the propriety of occupying Chestnut Mound. To that point supplies can be easily hauled from river landings, and it is connected with Nashville, and also with Carthage, by a turnpike. Supplies of corn are abundant on Caney Fork, and could be brought down to a landing on the turnpike near to Chestnut Mound.

I feel some embarrassment with regard to the course to be pursued towards those privates absent without leave from this command. The non-commissioned officers absent without leave I shall reduce to the ranks, and I will have the officers so absent proceeded against with the utmost rigor.

Captain Morgan, a volunteer aide on my staff, bears this to you. He also bears an order from me, for publication in the journals of Nashville and Knoxville, commanding all absent from this command without leave to report themselves at these headquarters immediately.

Being fully aware of the charges which have been made against me by fugitives from this command I have demanded a court of inquiry, and feel satisfied that an investigation will establish the facts that the battle of Fishing Creek and the subsequent movement were military necessities, for which I am not responsible. I feel assured that I shall have no difficulty in defending my conduct throughout these affairs.

I remain, yours, &c.,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

\* Not found.

FEBRUARY 2, 1862.

Brigadier-General HINDMAN:

I have the honor to report that on the morning of the 31st ultimo I proceeded, in obedience to your orders, to a point on Green River known as Camp Lynn, which is 6 miles above the Burned Bridge, where the Glasgow and Louisville turnpike crosses Green River.

I reached Camp Lynn at 7 o'clock p. m. on the evening of the 31st, and the next morning commenced the work of felling trees and constructing the raft.

When I endeavored to procure assistance from the people in the vicinity I found that they had taken the alarm, and that most of them (whites and negroes) had concealed themselves.

The river during the previous night had fallen so much that the islands were beginning to appear, and the drift which had been running was lodging upon them and upon the banks. Fearing, therefore, that during the time which would elapse while a raft of sufficient breadth to lodge, as was desired, was building, the water would become too low to float it the required distance, I turned the timber loose into the stream.

I left the neighborhood at 2 o'clock p. m. February 1, and proceeded to the Burned Bridge, where I had learned that Federal pickets were stationed.

Having gotten within a short distance of the southern bank of the river I discovered 6 or 8 men in blue uniforms standing upon and near the abutment on the farther side. When fired upon they retreated in considerable confusion, but shortly rallied and commenced a spirited fire in return; the effect of which myself and party under my charge did not remain to observe after hearing the rattling of the artillery, which was hurried towards the bridge immediately upon the commencement of the firing.

On the morning of the 2d instant I went by the Burkesville and Woodsonville road towards the latter place. When within a mile and a quarter of Woodsonville some soldiers (either pickets or stragglers visiting the houses of the neighborhood) discovered us and ran towards camp. After moving cautiously along the road for perhaps a mile farther I came in sight of 2 cavalry pickets; in a few minutes they were joined by 8 or 10 footmen and about the same number made their appearance in the wood upon each side. Thinking it impossible to avoid these men and get closer to the camp I ordered the party I commanded to fire upon them, and drew several shots from them in return.

I returned to camp through Horse Cave, and could discern no Federals in that vicinity.

Very respectfully,

B. W. DUKE,  
*Lieutenant, Commanding Detail.*

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[FEBRUARY 2, 1862.—Requisitions made by the Confederate Government for eleven "war regiments" from Alabama, twelve from Georgia, seven from Mississippi, and thirty-two from Tennessee.\*]

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\* Requisition will be found in Series IV, Vol. I.



WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
Richmond, Va., February 3, 1862.

G. W. JOHNSON,  
*Governor of Kentucky, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

SIR: Congress has recently passed a law entitled "An act to authorize the President to call upon the several States for troops, to serve for three years or during the war." In accordance with its provisions I have been instructed by the President to make a call on the several States for a number of men, to be enlisted for the war, sufficient to fill up a quota equal to 6 per cent. of the entire white population.

Under these instructions the number of troops required from your State would be about 46,000 men, or about fifty-eight regiments, averaging 800 men each. Under the peculiar circumstances in which Kentucky is placed and the difficulties which embarrass her authorities I cannot hope that you will be able at present to meet this call, which it is, however, my duty to make. I therefore respectfully call upon Your Excellency to have raised and mustered into the Confederate service the above-named number of regiments or as many thereof as may be possible for you to obtain.

These regiments, as formed, will be mustered into the Confederate service, and will report, as fast as mustered, to General A. S. Johnston, at his headquarters. They will be clothed, subsisted, and armed at the expense of the Confederate States, and each man will be entitled, when his company is mustered into service, to receive a bounty of \$50 and transportation from his home to the place of rendezvous.

It is earnestly hoped that Your Excellency will spare no pains to have your troops ready for the field as promptly as possible. They will be joined by large re-enforcements from your sister States, and it is confidently believed that but a short period will elapse ere the soil of Kentucky will be freed from the oppression of the invader, and your whole people will be enabled to unite in a common effort for securing the blessings of peace and independence.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 17. }

HDQRS. FIRST DIV., WEST. DEPT.,  
*Columbus, Ky., February 3, 1862.*

I. Colonel Wickliffe, Seventh Regiment Kentucky Volunteers, is hereby relieved from duty as military governor of the town of Columbus, and will report, with his regiment, to Colonel Stephens, commanding Second Brigade of the Second Division.

II. Lieut. Col. M. J. Wright, of the One hundred and fifty-fourth Senior Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, is hereby appointed military governor of Columbus, and he will be obeyed accordingly.

III. Lieut. Col. M. J. Wright is hereby vested with the power to adopt such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary for the preservation of the good order of Columbus as a military post, subject to the approval of the major-general commanding, and on making public these rules and regulations they must be obeyed and enforced.

IV. Lieutenant-Colonel Wright will adopt such measures as he may deem necessary to prevent the egress and ingress of citizens and other persons not belonging to the army at this post and will issue orders accordingly.

V. The commanding officer of the Second Division will furnish the military governor with such details for guard duty as he may require. Other details that may become necessary will be made from these headquarters on the application of the military governor.

VI. Daily reports will be made to general headquarters by the military governor, giving a list of arrests and prisoners, together with such remarks as may show the condition of the police of the town.

VII. All steamboats arriving at Columbus, before discharging their freights or permitting any of their passengers to land, shall furnish the military governor with a list of passengers for this post and with their manifests. All steamboat captains will be held to a strict accountability for any infraction of this order.

VIII. No citizens or soldiers belonging to other armies shall be permitted to leave Columbus without a passport from the military governor, and all persons not belonging to this army, on their arrival at Columbus, shall register their names and places of residence at the office of the military governor, and obtain from him a permission to remain in town.

IX. Capt. W. J. Whitsitt, of Company A, One hundred and fifty-fourth Senior Regiment Tennessee Volunteers, is hereby appointed provost-marshal of this post, and will immediately report for duty and instructions to Lieut. Col. M. J. Wright.

By command of Major-General Polk :

R. N. SNOWDEN,  
*Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.*

FORT HENRY, *February 4, 1862—5 p. m.*  
(Received Columbus, February 5, 1862.)

General POLK :

The enemy is landing troops in large forces on this side of the river, within 3 miles of the fort. Their advance cavalry is at Boyd's, 3 miles from here.

I have sent the Dunbar to the mouth of Sandy after the two regiments there and the Appleton Belle is gone to the bridge after the remaining companies. There are eight gunboats and nine transports in the river. I have three pieces of light battery and two companies in a good position at the outer works on the Dover road, with directions to move one of the pieces, if necessary, to Major Garvin's position. They are not landing on the opposite bank, and it will perhaps be prudent to bring some of the troops over here, but I will await your orders, or, what I would more desire, your presence. Come not without a large escort. I have sent Milton company to meet you, should you come this evening.

Above dispatch received from A. Heiman.

TILGHMAN.

FORT HENRY, *February 5, 1862—11 a. m.*  
(Received February 6.)

Colonel MACKALL :

If you can re-enforce strongly and quickly we have a glorious chance to overwhelm the enemy. Move by Clarksville to Donelson and across, and to Danville, where transports will be ready.

Enemy said to be entrenching below.

My plans are to concentrate closely in and under Henry.

TILGHMAN.

FORT HENRY, *February 6—12 m.*

General POLK:

Your dispatches of 5th instant to hand.\* Thank you for cavalry, but had rather have disciplined infantry. I must have two regiments, thoroughly armed and equipped, from you. Enemy strong 3 miles below, fortifying. They were re-enforced yesterday. Scouting parties engaged enemy's pickets yesterday and our cavalry retired; lost one man. I re-enforced, and enemy retired.

Don't trust to Johnston's re-enforcing me; we need all. I don't want raw troops who are just organized; they are in my way. Act promptly, and don't trust to any one.

TILGHMAN.

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HDQRS. SECOND DIVISION, C. A. KENTUCKY,  
*Russellville, Ky., February 6, 1862.*

Captain DERRICK,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

SIR: In accordance with the order received this morning, Captain Porter's battery has been selected to report to General Pillow. It is my duty, however, to call the attention of the commanding general to the following facts:

My division consists of three large brigades, one of which, with a battery attached (except one large regiment which is with me), is in advance of Bowling Green. Another battery has been detached to serve in the fortifications at Bowling Green.

I have with me at this place two brigades of infantry and a large regiment of another brigade—in all eight regiments, or more than 5,000 infantry. The absence of Porter's battery will leave one brigade without a battery, there being only two batteries with me, including Porter's, while I understand there are three or four batteries attached to the division of General Floyd at this place, constituting only about half the strength of the infantry of my division now here. I therefore respectfully request that the detail of Captain Porter's battery be replaced by a detail of one of the batteries of the other division.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding Second Division.*

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CLARKSVILLE, *February 6, 1862,*  
(Received Bowling Green, February 6, 1862.)

Capt. W. D. PICKETT:

I have gone around and examined the works in front of this place. None of them are completed.

The only work with good command of the river will be submerged by a full river. This rise will probably put it under. But four heavy guns here and not one ready for use. No ammunition for any of the guns.

General Clark left Hopkinsville this morning. No news to-day from below; river full and rising rapidly.

Orders should go to Nashville to meet my requisitions promptly by

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\* Not found.



telegraph. General Johnston may rely upon my doing all that is possible. No artillerists here. Say to General Johnston that it is of the highest importance for defense of this place that he order Capt. W. H. Jackson's battery here, and exchange with me some of the old regiments at Columbus of my division.

Information of constant fighting going on at Fort Donelson. We hear firing to this place constantly. I am about dispatching special couriers.

It would be well, I think, to order to this place as promptly as possible additional force. If Donelson should be overcome, we can make no successful stand without larger force.

Clark cannot reach here before 12 to-morrow, and will then be broken down by march.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Gainesborough, Tenn., February 6, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Department of the West:*

SIR: I had the honor some days since to address you a communication by my volunteer aide, Captain Morgan, suggesting the removal of my command from this point to Chestnut Mound. Besides being a bad position in a military point of view, Gainesborough is exceedingly unhealthy and an uncomfortable camping place, with no ground for drilling the troops.

I have now the honor to inform you that, anticipating your orders on the subject, I am moving the division to Chestnut Mound. That is an elevated, healthy, and well-watered locality, where there is ground for drilling the regiments, of which they are very much in need. It is near to landings on the Cumberland River and Caney Fork, and connected with them by turnpike roads, and it connects with Livingston by a good ridge road.

I leave for a few days the regiments of Colonels Murray and Stanton at this place with supplies for one month, and after a few days I shall order these regiments to Livingston, where, with supplies drawn from this point, they may be subsisted. I have ordered McNairy's cavalry battalion to proceed to-morrow to Livingston and to remain there. I had left Captain McHenry's cavalry company at Livingston to picket and guard the roads leading from Kentucky, and to-day received information from Captain McHenry that two companies of Federal cavalry were on the Kentucky side Obey River.

I will have the stores, except those to be left for the regiments of Murray and Stanton, removed from this point to the most convenient landing for the camp at Chestnut Mound by steamboat.

My headquarters will henceforth be at Chestnut Mound.

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

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NASHVILLE, *February 7, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

Fort Henry fell yesterday. Memphis and Clarksville Railroad bridge over Tennessee destroyed. Lost all the artillery and stores at Henry.

General Tilghman, Major Gilmer, and about 80 men taken prisoners; balance of force fell back to Fort Donelson, on Cumberland River.

A large increase of force to defend this [State] from Cumberland Gap to Columbus is an absolute and imperative necessity. If not successfully defended the injury is irreparable.

ISHAM G. HARRIS.

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BOWLING GREEN, KY., *February 7, 1862.*

General POLK:

[You] will destroy the railroad bridges from Paris to Humboldt as far as practicable.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

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BOWLING GREEN, KY., *February 7, 1862.*

[Memorandum.]

At a meeting held to-day at my quarters (Covington House) by Generals Johnston, Hardee, and myself (Colonel Mackall being present part of the time) it was determined that, Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, having fallen yesterday into the hands of the enemy, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland River, not being long tenable, preparations should at once be made for the removal of this army to Nashville, in rear of the Cumberland River, a strong point some miles below that city being fortified forthwith, to defend the river from the passage of gunboats and transports.

The troops at present at Clarksville should cross over to the south side of that river, leaving only a sufficient force in that town to protect the manufactories and other property, in the saving of which the Confederate Government is interested.

From Nashville, should any further retrograde movement become necessary, it will be made to Stevenson, and thence according to circumstances.

It was also determined that the possession of the Tennessee River by the enemy, resulting from the fall of Fort Henry, separates the army at Bowling Green from the one at Columbus, Ky., which must henceforth act independently of each other until they can again be brought together, the first one having for object the defense of the State of Tennessee, along its line of operation, as already stated; and the other one of that part of the State lying between the Tennessee River and the Mississippi. But as the possession of the former river by the enemy renders the lines of communication of the army at Columbus liable to be cut off at any time from the Tennessee River as a base by an overpowering force of the enemy rapidly concentrated from various points on the Ohio, it becomes necessary, to prevent such a calamity, that the main body of that army should fall back to Humboldt; and thence, if necessary, to Grand Junction, so as to protect Memphis from either point, and still have a line of retreat to the latter place or to Grenada, Miss., and, if necessary, to Jackson, Miss.

At Columbus, Ky., will be left only a sufficient garrison for the defense of the works there, assisted by Hollins' gunboats, for the purpose of making a desperate defense of the river at that point. A sufficient number of transports will be kept near that place for the removal of the



garrison therefrom when no longer tenable in the opinion of the commanding officer. Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow will likewise be defended to the last extremity, aided also by Hollins' gunboats, which will then retire to the vicinity of Memphis, where another bold stand will be made.

G. T. BEAUREGARD,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

W. J. HARDEE, *Major-General.*

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[FEBRUARY 8, 1862.—For Benjamin to Bragg and Lovell in reference to re-enforcements for General A. S. Johnston, see Series I, Vol. VI, pp. 823, 824.]

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WAR DEPARTMENT,  
*Richmond, February 8, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Bowling Green:*

SIR: The condition of your department in consequence of the largely superior forces of the enemy has filled us with solicitude, and we have used every possible exertion to organize some means for your relief.

With this view the following orders have been issued to-day and the following measures adopted:

1st. We have ordered to Knoxville three Tennessee regiments—Vaughn's, Maney's, and Bate's—the First Georgia Regiment and four regiments from General Bragg's command to be forwarded by him. This will give you in East Tennessee the following force, viz: As above, eight regiments. Add Gillespie's Tennessee, one regiment; Vaughn's North Carolina, one regiment;\* one regiment cavalry; Stovall's battalion and another from North Carolina, together one regiment—total, twelve regiments, besides Churchwell's command at Cumberland Gap, the other forces stationed at different passes by General Zollicoffer, and a number of independent companies.

The whole force in East Tennessee will thus amount, as we think, to at least fifteen regiments, and the President desires that you assign the command to General Buckner.

2d. The formation of this new army for Eastern Tennessee will leave General Crittenden's army (augmented by Chalmers' regiment and two or three batteries of field pieces already sent to him) free to act with your center.

Colonel Chalmers will be nominated to-morrow brigadier-general. You might assign a brigade to him at once.

The President thinks it best to break up the army of General Crittenden, demoralized by its defeat, and that you should distribute the forces composing it among other troops. You can form a new command for General Crittenden, connected with your own corps, in such manner as you may deem best.

General Crittenden has demanded a court of inquiry, and it has been ordered; but from all the accounts which now reach us we have no reason to doubt his skill or conduct in his recent movements, and feel

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\* The records show no Vaughn's North Carolina regiment. Probably R. B. Vance's Twenty-ninth North Carolina.



convinced that it is not to any fault of his that the disaster at Somerset is to be attributed.

3d. To aid General Beauregard at Columbus I send orders to General Lovell to forward to him at once five or six regiments of his best troops at New Orleans.

4th. I have sent to Memphis arms for Looney's regiment; to Knoxville 800 percussion muskets; to Colonel Chalmers 800 Enfield rifles for his regiment, and to you 1,200 Enfield rifles. The Enfield rifles will be accompanied by a full supply of fixed ammunition. They form part of a small cargo recently received by us, and of the whole number (6,000) one-third is thus sent to you, besides which we send 1,600 to Van Dorn.

5th. We have called on all the States for a levy of men for the war, and think that in very few weeks we shall be able to give you heavy re-enforcements, although we may not be able to arm them with good weapons. But we have another small cargo of Enfield rifles close by, and hope to have some 10,000 or 12,000 safe in port within the next two or three weeks.

I forgot to say that the rifles already received may not reach you for eight or ten days, as they were introduced at a port quite far south.

I am, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Bowling Green, Ky., February 8, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War:*

SIR: No reliable particulars of the loss of Fort Henry have yet reached me. This much, however, is known, that nearly all of the force at Fort Henry retreated to Fort Donelson, and it is said that General Tilghman and about 80 officers and men surrendered in the fort.

The capture of that fort by the enemy gives them the control of the navigation of the Tennessee River, and their gunboats are now ascending the river to Florence. Operations against Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, are about to be commenced, and that work will soon be attacked. The slight resistance at Fort Henry indicates that the best open earthworks are not reliable to meet successfully a vigorous attack of iron-clad gunboats, and, although now supported by a considerable force, I think the gunboats of the enemy will probably take Fort Donelson without the necessity of employing their land force in co-operation, as seems to have been done at Fort Henry.

Our force at Fort Donelson, including the force from Fort Henry and three regiments of General Floyd's command, is about 7,000 men, not well armed or drilled, except Heiman's regiment and the regiments of Floyd's command. General Floyd's command and the force from Hopkinsville is arriving at Clarksville, and can, if necessary, reach Donelson in four hours by steamers which are there.

Should Fort Donelson be taken, it will open the route to the enemy to Nashville, giving them the means of breaking the bridges and destroying the ferry-boats on the river as far as navigable.

The occurrence of the misfortune of losing the fort will cut off the communication of the force here under General Hardee from the south bank of the Cumberland. To avoid the disastrous consequences of such

an event I ordered General Hardee yesterday to make, as promptly as it could be done, preparations to fall back to Nashville and cross the river.

The movements of the enemy on my right flank would have made a retrograde in that direction to confront the enemy indispensable in a short time. But the probability of having the ferriage of this army corps across the Cumberland intercepted by the gunboats of the enemy admits of no delay in making the movement.

Generals Beauregard and Hardee are, equally with myself, impressed with the necessity of withdrawing our force from this line at once.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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BOWLING GREEN, *February 8, 1862.*

General POLK:

Destroy every bridge and trestle on the railroad from Tennessee Crossing to Paris. Send all telegrams by way of Montgomery and not via Florence.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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PARIS, TENN., *February 8, 1862—11 p. m.*

Major-General POLK:

No further news from Donelson. Three of our steamers, viz, the Orr, Appleton Belle, and Lynn Boyd, were burned yesterday morning by our men to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy; all on board escaped safely. Five hundred Federal infantry and three transport boats are at the bridge, burning and destroying all the houses this side of the river. The bridge is now on fire. The condition of the roads prevented our bringing but few tents, without flies, but few cooking utensils, no extra clothing. The lives and health of the men require that we should have some more necessities if we are to remain here long. We leave in the morning and will camp a few miles east of this place, and will scout continually towards the river. The rolling stock on the railroad all safe.

J. H. MILLER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel.*

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RUSSELLVILLE, *February 8, 1862—12 p. m.*

Capt. W. D. PICKETT:

In a communication from Green River to 12 o'clock yesterday no troops on this side; many deserters daily; troops considerably demoralized; about 300 men supposed to have gone to Henderson; remainder in vicinity of Calhoun.

Messenger just in from Louisville. Opinion there that expedition up Cumberland and Tennessee chiefly a diversion, derived from opinion of a member of Buell's staff. A reliable person, whose source of information is from clerk of Cairo and Evansville boats, says entire fleet has left Cairo; that five gunboats have gone up Tennessee River, and that the remaining gunboats and transports, to the number of sixteen, up the Cumber-

land, and that the entire land force on the two rivers was estimated at 12,000.

Trains arriving from Clarksville. Hope to get all my troops to Clarksville by daylight.

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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CLARKSVILLE, *February 8, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

SIR: I received your order after night of the 6th and succeeded in getting nearly the whole command here by daylight this morning.

A large proportion of the force has been sent forward to Fort Donelson, and the balance intended for that place are going there as fast as they arrive.

I will take every possible means at my command to ascertain the general plan of approach of the enemy; but we may not hope for much information upon that point beyond what can be gathered from general deduction.

If the best information I can gather about these iron-clad boats be true they are nearly invulnerable, and therefore they can probably go wherever sufficient fuel and depth of water can be found, unless met by opposing gunboats.

Unless I am misinformed as to these boats, the enemy will attempt to come up this river and destroy the towns upon its banks and every bridge across it. They can, to be sure, be kept confined to the rivers, but this will be done at heavy cost and inconvenience with the obstructed transportation we will have.

I have ordered the large supplies of pork and other Government stores at this point to be sent to Nashville and deposited far enough from the river to be safe.

The defenses here amount to about nothing. I think they have mistaken the location of the work upon the river hill about 200 yards, whilst the one in the bottom is nearly submerged. I think the works should be strengthened here. This place is capable of being made very strong indeed.

I wish it was convenient to send here at once a good engineer officer and a sufficient supply of intrenching tools.

I wish, if possible, you would come down here, if it were only for a single day. I think in that time you might determine the policy and lines of defense. I will, however, do the best I can and all I can with the means at hand.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

P. S.—I send you the inclosed copy of a communication from the engineer in charge,\* that you may see the state of things in the work on the river hill.

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CORINTH, *February 8, 1862.*

General POLK:

Have just arrived here. News from Iuka since I passed that two gunboats were landing troops at the mouth of Bear Creek. I have

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\* Not found.



sent Colonel Chalmers up; he has but 200 guns. I cannot reach Columbus until to-morrow evening. Three o'clock the gunboats in sight of Florence.

B. F. CHEATHAM,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

GLADESVILLE, WISE COUNTY, VIRGINIA,  
*February 8, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General C. S. Army:*

GENERAL: In obedience to your orders my force has fallen back to Pound Gap from the points selected by me on the Kentucky River for occupation.

This country is more difficult than the Kentucky side of the mountains. Corn is at this village hauled 30 miles for common uses, and is selling at \$2 per bushel, or \$10 per barrel. I have therefore suffered the two Virginia regiments to pass behind Clinch River, and have directed Colonel Simms to forage his mounted battalion in the county of Scott or Lee, some 30 miles from this place. The Kentucky regiment of Colonel Williams and Ratcliffe's company I have directed to come no farther in this direction than the Pound (4 miles this side of Pound Gap), and I have given liberty to the colonel, should he prefer it, to occupy the Kentucky side of the mountains, in Letcher, Harlan, or Pike, keeping these two points in view: 1st, subsistence, its possibility and cheapness; 2d, the protection of Pound Gap and Stone Gap. The head of the Poor Fork of the Cumberland is just against the Stone Gap on the other side. The Pound River flows from this side of the same point. I learn that wagons pass from that part of the Cumberland through here to the Salt Works near Abingdon.

In fact, general, each day opens to me a more minute acquaintance with the frontier, and persuades me that I must examine it far more critically than has yet been done by any one to determine accurately what is required for its military defense. I shall improve the time during which I shall be detained in this vicinity by putting a substantial defense at Pound Gap. With little comparative expense a fortification to hold 2,000 men can be established there. I will visit Stone Gap and make careful reconnaissances of the position. I will observe, though, that this country, like all mountainous countries, has much more feasibility for military passages than unskilled men give it credit for. I have seen no position from this to Paintsville (unless it shall prove so on the Cumberland Range) that cannot be turned within 10 miles of its center.

Major Bonner is preparing accurate maps of this section so far as we have gathered knowledge, which I trust will be very acceptable to you, and which I hope to bring with me to the Department.

I have understood my official dispatch containing an account of the battle at the fork of Middle Creek never reached you. Is this true?

I hear the enemy is plying upon London, Ky. I mention it lest it may not come to you from Cumberland Gap, but do not vouch for any accuracy in the rumor.

I am, very respectfully, &c.,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

RICHMOND, *February 9, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Bowling Green:*

Large re-enforcements have been ordered to join you, and 5,000 men have been ordered up from New Orleans to Columbus. I write you in full by to-day's mail.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

RICHMOND, *February 9, 1862.*

G. B. BEVINE, *Huntsville, Ala.:*

Your dispatch received.\* Chalmers' regiment, two field batteries, and part of Looney's regiment have been ordered to Tuscumbia. Unite with them all who with their own arms will go to meet the enemy.

The number of men who can have been transported by four gunboats should never be allowed to tread upon our soil and return. I hope you may also capture the gunboats.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

COLUMBUS, *February 9, 1862.*

General POLK:

Mr. Powers, the operator at Tuscumbia, informs me that the enemy took possession of the telegraph office in Florence and found out nearly everything that was passing over the line before he was informed of their having landed. He then immediately disconnected the Florence line from his office and cut them off. They had operators and instruments with them. They informed the citizens of Florence that it was their intention to return in a day or so with a force sufficiently large to take and hold their position at that place; that it was not their intention to harm the citizens who would willingly submit and to those who were loyal to the United States.

Respectfully,

W. P. JOHNSON,  
*Operator.*

RUSSELLVILLE, *February 9, 1862.*

General JOHNSTON:

Following message just received of Major Casseday, at Clarksville:

A messenger, sent by reliable men at Lexington, Ky., brings a dispatch, dated 29th ultimo, which says that 900 wagons are being loaded with guns, army stores, &c., at Lexington, and sent to London, Ky. They learn movement into East Tennessee to be made with large force through London.

All our troops here have gone on to Donelson by boats.

S. B. BUCKNER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 1. }

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Dover, Tenn., February 9, 1862.*

Brigadier-General Pillow assumes command of the forces at this place. He relies with confidence upon the courage and fidelity of the

brave officers and men under his command to maintain the post. Drive back the ruthless invader from our soil and again raise the Confederate flag over Fort Henry. He expects every man to do his duty. With God's help we will accomplish our purpose. Our battle cry, "Liberty or death."

By order of Brigadier-General Pillow:

GUS. A. HENRY, JR.,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } · HDQRS. ARMY AT FORT DONELSON,  
No. 1. } *February 9, 1862.*

The forces at this post are for the present arranged as follows:

General Buckner's division will retain its present organization and be commanded by him.

The regiments of Colonels Head, Bailey, and Sugg will form a brigade, and be commanded by Colonel Head. It will occupy its present position for the protection of the river batteries. In the event of an attack on these batteries these regiments will take shelter under the faces of the wall or outer works on the eastern side. The regiments of Colonels Heiman, Voorhies, and Hughes will constitute a brigade, and be commanded by Colonel Heiman.

The regiments of Colonels Davidson, Simonton, Gregg, and Major Henry's battalion and the field battery of Captain Ross will form a brigade, and be commanded by Colonel Davidson.

Captain Maney will occupy, with his field battery, the hollow through which the main Fort Henry road passes.

Captain Culbertson will take command of the main battery on the river side, and Captain Stankieuriz will take command of the three-gun battery.

The regiments of Colonel Drake and Gee will constitute a brigade, and be commanded by Colonel Drake.

The Fifty-first and Fifty-sixth Virginia Regiments will constitute a brigade, and be commanded by Colonel Wharton.

Captain Dixon, of the Engineer Corps, will remain in charge of the works, and report to these headquarters, [as] directed by Major Gilmer, of General Johnston's staff, while he remains here.

Maj. J. W. Jones is assigned to duty as post quartermaster, and will report to these headquarters.

Major Dallam is assigned to duty as commissary of the post, and will report to these headquarters.

The brigades commanded by Colonels Heiman, Davidson, and Drake will form a division, and be under the command of Brigadier-General Johnson.

By command of Brigadier-General G. J. Pillow:

GUS A. HENRY, JR.,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

RICHMOND, *February 9, 1862.*  
(Received Columbus, February 10, 1862.)

General LEONIDAS POLK:

Your dispatch received. Five thousand troops have been ordered



up to re-enforce you from New Orleans. Other re-enforcements have been sent to General Johnston and to Eastern Tennessee.

J. P. BENJAMIN.

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[FEBRUARY 10, 1862.—For Bragg to Benjamin, in reference to re-enforcements for General A. S. Johnston, see Series I, Vol. VI, p. 424.]

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NASHVILLE, *February 10, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

We need for immediate service 10,000 muskets, with bayonets, if possible to furnish them. The men can be put in the field instantly; without them Nashville is in great danger.

ISHAM G. HARRIS,  
*Governor.*

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FORT DONELSON, *February 10, 1862.*

Col. W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

The attack expected here is a combined one; gunboats by water and a land force in the rear.

The greatest danger, in my opinion, is from the gunboats, which appear to be well protected from our shot. The effect of our shot at Fort Henry was not sufficient to disable them, or any one of them, so far as I have been able to ascertain. This was due, I think, in a great measure, to the want of skill in the men who served the guns, and not to the invulnerability of the boats themselves.

I saw five gunboats during the attack on Fort Henry, each firing three heavy guns from ports in the bow. It has been reported from various sources that there were seven boats in the Tennessee River at the time of the attack. Only five were engaged at any one time, in my opinion.

With the preparations that are now being made here I feel much confidence that we can make a successful resistance against a land attack. The attack by water will be more difficult to meet; still I hope for success here also.

The force landed by the enemy on the right bank of the Tennessee River is probably a large one, consisting in part of forces driven from Cairo, Fort Holt, and Bird's Point by high water. General Pillow has information to this effect from a person recently from Smithland. I do not think it practicable to establish a boom across the Cumberland River during the freshet that now exists.

If Captain Nocquet has no employment for Captain Cox, he may be discharged. I think he might well be employed assisting Mr. Crump in completing the map of Bowling Green and the vicinity.

We are making herculean efforts to strengthen our parapets—making narrow embrasures with sand bags, and if we can have ten days we hope to make bomb-proofs over the guns.

J. F. GILMER,  
*Major, and Chief Engineer Western Department.*

The river has now commenced falling, and often falls from 5 to 6 feet in twenty-four hours. If it runs down rapidly, as I hope it will from the cold weather, we will not be attacked this rise; before another rise I will have the works safe. This position can be made stronger than Columbus now by water if we had more heavy artillery; the great advantage it has is in the narrowness of the stream and the necessity of the boats approaching our works by straight and narrow channel for  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles. No more than three boats could possibly bring their guns to act upon our position at once. This makes the field of fire required for the guns so very narrow, that it admits of the construction of very narrow embrasures, which we are now constructing. We ought to have two more heavy guns; the works are ready for them, and if the enemy gives me time I will order two 42-pounder guns from Clarksville, with the approval of General Johnston.

I refer to my letter to General Floyd for fuller information.

Respectfully,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS FORT DONELSON,  
*February 10, 1862.*

General FLOYD:

I am apprehensive, from the large accumulations of the enemy's forces in the neighborhood of Fort Henry, that he will attempt to cross the country south of my position and cut my communication by river, thus depriving me of supplies from above. The country south of me is exceedingly broken and rugged, so much so as to be nearly impracticable for a march, but they may possibly make it passable. His difficulty will be in procuring supplies for his forces, which is one almost, if not altogether, insurmountable. I think that is my safety.

The conflict yesterday between our cavalry and that of the enemy resulted in 3 of ours wounded and 20 taken prisoners by being thrown from their horses and in 3 of the enemy killed and 6 mortally wounded. Three of their gunboats have gone up Tennessee River above the bridge. The steamer Eastport, which we were converting into a gunboat, was burned and sunk, as was the steamer Sam. Orr, by our friends, to keep them from falling into the hands of the enemy. They have destroyed the high trestle work on the west bank of Tennessee River, but have not damaged the bridge.

I am pushing the work on my river batteries day and night; also on my field works and defensive line in the rear. In a week's time, if I am allowed that much, I will try very hard to make my batteries bomb-proof. I am now raising the parapets and strengthening them. I got my heavy rifle gun, 32-pounder, and my 10-inch columbiad in position to-day, and tried them and the other guns in battery. The trial was most satisfactory. I need two additional heavy guns very much, and if I am not engaged by the enemy in three or four days I shall apply for the 42-pounders at Clarksville.

It is certain that if I cannot hold this place, the two 42-pounders at Clarksville will not arrest his movement by Clarksville. Upon one thing you may rest assured, viz, that I will never surrender the position, and with God's help I mean to maintain it.

I send up the Hillman for a boat load of flour and meat. Let her bring a full load. You will please give orders accordingly to the com-

missary of your post. I shall continue to draw supplies of subsistence to this place until I have a heavy store on hand.

I have established a line of vedettes on the east bank of the Cumberland to within 8 miles of Smithland, so that I will be posted as to the movements and advance of the enemy.

I hope you will order forward at once the tents and baggage of the troops of General Buckner's command, as they are suffering very much for most of them this cold weather.

I must request that you will forward this letter after reading it to General Johnston. My engagements and duties press me so much that I cannot address you both and, knowing his anxiety, I am anxious to place before him the intelligence contained in this letter.

With great respect,

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

CAMP SIX MILES EAST OF PARIS,  
*February 10, 1862.*

Major-General POLK:

Your dispatch to destroy the bridges and trestle between Paris and Danville is just received. The bridge across the Tennessee River is not destroyed. Do you still order to destroy the bridges and trestle work? I do not yet think it is necessary.

J. H. MILLER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.*

CAMP TWELVE MILES EAST OF PARIS,  
*February 10, 1862—1 p. m.*

Major-General POLK:

SIR: One hundred feet of the trestle work on each side of the bridge over the Tennessee River has been destroyed by the enemy. Heavy firing has been heard this morning in the direction of Fort Donelson. I am now on my way to execute your orders in respect to the bridges and trestle work between Paris and the river. I still think it unnecessary, as we could destroy it at any moment. A large quantity of wheat and flour can yet be gotten away, and the people are relying upon the railroad to remove their things. Please reply immediately.

J. H. MILLER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } ADJT. AND INSP. GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
No. 33. } *Richmond, February 10, 1862.*

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II. On the application of Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden, a court of inquiry, to consist of three members and a recorder, to be detailed by General A. S. Johnston, commanding Department No. 2, will assemble at such time and place as in the judgment of that commander the interests of the service will permit, to examine into all the circumstances relating to the battle of Fishing Creek and the movements subsequent to that event.



The court will report the facts, together with their opinion, for the information of the President.\*

By command of the Secretary of War:

JNO. WITHERS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, } HDQRS. DEPT. OF ALA. AND W. FLA.,  
No. 31. } *Mobile, Ala., February 10, 1862.*

II. Brig. Gen. L. P. Walker, P. A., is assigned to the command of the troops in North Alabama, whither he will immediately proceed and assume the control of military operations. He will call to his assistance all the resources of the country, with a view of preserving our important railroad connections, now threatened by the enemy.

By command of Major-General Bragg:

FRANCIS S. PARKER, JR.,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

RICHMOND, *February 11, 1862.*

Gov. ISHAM G. HARRIS, *Nashville:*

I have sent 800 muskets to Looney's regiment, 800 more to Knoxville, 800 Enfield rifles to Chalmers' regiment, and 1,200 Enfield rifles to General A. S. Johnston, making 3,600 stand of arms.

I have also sent a fine regiment to Decatur from Pensacola, and have ordered three Tennessee regiments and one Georgia regiment from Virginia to Knoxville.

I will try and send more arms. Do your best and we will spare no effort.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

GLADESVILLE, VA., *February 11, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjt. and Insp. Gen. C. S. Army, Richmond, Va.:*

GENERAL: I have reliable information that the enemy has moved several thousand men (estimated at 6,000 to 7,000) to Piketon within a few days past. He is moving supplies for sixty to seventy-five days by boat up the Sandy to same point for a very large force. It is supposed he has 6,000 men in Piketon by this time. Forage for horses, wagons, harness, shelled corn, and oats, hay, &c., are all brought forward, and he has ordered 50 flat-boats to be built so as to transport by water when the tide in the Sandy abates.

One of my informants is from Louisa; the other from Prestonburg. The former has two sons in Colonel Williams' regiment; the latter is said by his acquaintances to be very reliable. They say six or seven steamers of larger size than usually ply on the Sandy are daily running up to Prestonburg and Piketon, and that the officer commanding at Paintsville says "he is complained of as being slow on his line, but

\* Report not found.

it takes time to move a heavy force." This looks like a combined move and correspondence with some other column.

I have a rumor that Theophilus T. Garrard, with a heavy force, is moving up the Poor Fork of Cumberland River. This may be the movement with which Colonel Garfield expects to combine his advance, and it portends a heavy and immediate assault upon Pound Gap, for it is but 37 miles from Piketon to Pound Gap, and the road from the Stone Gap, over which one travels to the Poor Fork of Cumberland debouches into the road from Pound Gap to Gladesville directly at the Pound, 4 miles on this side of the Gap. Thus a move from Piketon on one side of the range and from Stone Gap on the other side of the range assails Pound Gap in front and rear. This can only be prevented by holding Stone Gap, and preventing a force from that direction from coming out of the valley of the Cumberland. It may be that Garrard is at Cumberland Ford only to press on Cumberland Gap. That is beyond the jurisdiction of my command, and I offer no suggestions about its defense, but I mention only that I hear that forces are plying in front of it. They become of interest to me because a lateral movement will precipitate them upon me. It is about 75 miles from the Pound to Cumberland Ford, and I hear of Olinger's Gap and Crank's Gap, between Stone Gap and Cumberland Gap, through either of which cavalry and infantry can pass. Mule trains will enable a force to move rapidly and to pass any of these gaps. So there are several passes between Pound Gap and Piketon.

You informed me that the Department could not re-enforce me at present. You are advised by me that Colonel Trigg and Colonel Moore have fallen back to Clinch River for supplies. You are advised that my battalion of mounted men has fallen off 55 miles from Pound Gap to obtain food and forage. I have now at Pound Gap Major Thompson, with 350 "special-service" men, and at the Pound Colonel Williams, with about 500 men fit for duty, and the enemy has from 5,000 to 6,000 within 37 miles of me, and he gives out that he means to take Pound Gap and then afterwards to come into Virginia.

You are now advised that there is not a soldier between Pound Gap and the Louisa Fork, or even to the mouth of the Gauley, and that large public interests which exists between those points is to-day solely relying for defense upon such of its inhabitants as remain at their own homes.

I have no remark to offer upon this condition of affairs, but I must observe that I have no force which can successfully resist or repel the masses which propose to concentrate, and how speedily I cannot tell, upon this frontier. I have no quartermaster to this brigade; I never have had one. My commissary of brigade is an old man sixty-four years of age, now sick in bed, and has resigned at that, and I am in a country where there is nothing to eat, and where one cannot supply a force without the greatest energy and at the largest expense. In these circumstances what is to be done?

My advice is to send here at least 10,000 men, and to move instantly so as to destroy the force at Piketon, break up that column, and drive it into the Ohio River, so as to free your frontier and cripple the enemy before he cripples you. My advice is to do this swiftly, and you can then restore the regiments to their places at other points. My advice is, if nothing else can be done, that this force shall destroy everything within 20 miles of the Sandy River and drive off all the people who are not our friends; that the sequestration law shall be put into active force against our enemies, and that our friends may be compelled to



join the Army, so the war may be hurried to the banks of the Ohio. It cannot rest here with any safety to us.

I hope you will telegraph me what you can do—what you will do. My advice is emphatic and earnest to you to hold Pound Gap and Stone Gap at any expense of men and means. If you do not, expeditions will be formed behind the mountains which will constantly threaten the very heart of the Confederacy; if you do not, Kentucky must pass from your hands in all probability. If you do, she can never be safe in their hands, and your expeditions may be prepared here and move into Kentucky at any time and season that will suit your convenience.

I hope the Department will weigh well these suggestions, and that some mode will be adopted without delay to enable me to take a decisive stand. In my letters I write freely because I feel earnestly. I think the existing condition of things should not be tolerated. I have asked several questions from time to time without eliciting a reply:

1st. Have I, as brigadier-general of the Confederate States Army, a right, without direction from the Department, to call out the militia of the neighborhood or surrounding States when, in my judgment, the emergency demands it?

2d. Have I the right to prevent supplies which are necessary to my army from passing out of the country I occupy by exchange or sale between private persons?

3d. Have I the right to prevent individuals professing friendship to the Southern Confederacy from passing into Virginia from Kentucky, or *vice versa*, now that Kentucky is one of the Confederate States?

I await your reply, general, and am ready to obey your orders.

Meanwhile I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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CAMP NEAR CARTHAGE, TENN.,  
*February 11, 1862.*

Capt. A. J. LINDSAY:

SIR: I have duly received your note with Assistant Adjutant-General Mackall's dispatch. You will please telegraph General Johnston that I am encamped between Chestnut Mound and Carthage, having two regiments, Stanton's and Murray's, with a company of cavalry at Gainesborough, with orders to take post at Stanton [Livingston] immediately. Should this disposition not suit the general's views, he will inform me. I will take position a few miles back, at Chestnut Mound, on to-morrow.

I have no news of the enemy that can be relied on. It is reported that two or three companies of the enemy's cavalry made their appearance on the north bank of Obey River a few days since. This may not be true. I will keep the general duly informed as far as practicable of the enemy's movements.

In haste, yours,

G. B. CRITTENDEN,  
*Major-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS NEAR CARTHAGE,  
*Division Commissary Office, February 11, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

GENERAL: At the time of leaving Mill Springs, on the 19th of January, the army under your command was entirely destitute of supplies



except in the article of beef cattle. Those on hand were driven ahead of the troops by my order; agents were also sent ahead in the direction of the intended march to engage and purchase every article of subsistence that could be procured. No pains were spared, no endeavors left unmade.

Without means of transportation, however, only those supplies could be procured which were immediately contiguous to the line of retreat; but I can safely say that there was nothing along that line which could be purchased which was not.

I furnished Major Holland, acting commissary of subsistence to General Carroll's brigade, on the night of the 19th, and on simple memorandum, with \$5,000, to enable him to procure at once everything that he might meet with, while my immediate agents were also ahead, and upon each side, for the same purpose and with full authority.

The army suffered much, notwithstanding all endeavors, until it reached Obey River, on Thursday, January 23.

During the intervening time about 60 head of cattle, the same number of sheep, and perhaps 20 head of hogs, with what bacon, flour, meal, &c., could be procured along the route, were the main subsistence of the troops, so far as my utmost endeavors could effect.

About 6 miles west of Obey River I received a lot of 90 head of cattle which had been stopped there by my agents, and also in the same vicinity as large a supply of meal and flour as the limited transportation facilities of the various regiments would allow of being brought to camp. The freest latitude was given to regimental commissaries to purchase whatever was necessary, it being one of those exigencies where I felt at liberty to entirely overstep rules and formalities, and trust to the future liberality of the Department to sanction and approve my action.

The army spent Saturday, 25th, near Livingston. At that place I purchased in addition about 13,000 pounds net of fresh beef and 225 head of hogs, estimated at upwards of 39,000 pounds net; distributing to each regiment what it desired, together with all the bacon, meal, flour, potatoes, &c., that could be procured there, and also a liberal supply of salt, and had the remainder of the cattle on hand (nearly 80 head of beef and all the hogs) driven with the army the next day towards New Columbus, 3 miles east of Gainesborough.

The head of the column arrived at New Columbus late on Sunday evening, January 26, and the rest of the army the next day. I fortunately found there a large supply of flour, rice, and molasses. Directions were at once given to the brigade commissaries to take from that store whatever they deemed sufficient and necessary, receipting for the same to a commissary sergeant placed temporarily in charge. The entire drove of cattle and hogs was at the same time turned over to them, with the advice to kill the latter and salt down temporarily what was not at once issued. These directions were fully complied with, commissaries of all grades receiving at once, without formality of requisition or anything but a pencil memorandum or receipt, whatever they chose to demand.

On Tuesday, 28th January, the steamer Charter arrived at Gainesborough, with supplies of jowls, coffee, rye, sugar, candles, soap, salt, molasses, and vinegar, Lieutenant Jackson having been, at my suggestion, detailed to take charge of these stores at the landing as post commissary. The next day the steamer Commerce arrived, with upwards of 600 barrels of flour, followed by the steamer Umpire, on the 1st instant, with a large supply of corn meal and mess beef.

Advantage was taken of this latter steamer going to Nashville with the sick, and having taken from her nearly half her corn meal, and placed on board about 200 barrels of flour and 130 barrels of molasses, pork, and vinegar, she was sent, by order of General Crittenden, first to Carthage, to land her stores there, as a depot for the troops in their future camps between Chestnut Mound and that place.

The steamer *Charter*, on her arrival, was ordered to New Columbus to unload, but only partially did so, the entire absence of any unoccupied shed there and the rapid rise of the river rendering such unloading wasteful and dangerous, while the removal of the army from New Columbus, on the east side of Roaring River, to Gainesborough and its vicinity, on its west side, on Wednesday and Thursday, January 29 and 30th, rendered it unnecessary.

The further fact that constant working parties had to be detailed at both landings to roll stores up endangered by the rapid rise of the water will show the difficulty and hazard that an immediate landing of the stores would have caused.

At Gainesborough, situated more than a mile back from the river, it was impossible to procure a store-house. The only one not used by the sick was occupied by the quartermaster, while the division commissary was glad to occupy, for such portions of his stores as were light and most perishable, a portion of a small log cabin, used for hospital stores, and a small smoke-house of a private citizen. Every building, house, and cabin seemed to be filled with the sick and wounded.

The warehouse at the landing had been taken possession of and filled with stores by my direction, and the steamers having been detained, by order of General Crittenden, to furnish transportation for the sick to Nashville, advantage was taken of their presence, and they were made temporary depots and store-houses for issuance of supplies to the troops. In the mean time and immediately upon notice of the arrival of the supplies word had been sent to the brigade commissaries of their presence, with request for immediate requisitions for stores, and instructions given simultaneously to Lieutenant Jackson, in charge of the Gainesborough depot, and to Sergeant Landers, in charge of the New Columbus depot, to deliver and issue, without formality, anything asked for upon simple receipt of brigade or regimental commissaries.

These instructions were carried out in their full spirit and with great zeal and fidelity by those officers. Unsheltered and almost unfed, in rain and mud, without the means of making the transaction of business pleasant or even comfortable, they performed their duty, and, I believe and understand, to the entire satisfaction of every officer and man with whom they came in contact.

With regard to the single article of sugar there may have been some delay in issuance, but the fault does not lie at the door of this office or its agents. Without weights, scales, or measures, I could only issue in bulk, and had to request brigade commissaries to take their sugar by the hogshead and divide it afterwards by flour-barrels full among the regiments. There were no means, no room, no shelter to do otherwise. It may be possible that for a day or two some one or more regiments may not have obtained their proper share of that article; but I hold the full receipts of brigade and regimental commissaries for whatever they asked for in the articles of flour, rice, salt, and molasses, besides fresh beef and pork, on the 27th and 28th January (Monday and Tuesday), and for those articles and all the other stores brought by the steamer *Commerce* from the 29th, inclusive, onwards.

As soon as possible after the arrival of the army at Gainesborough I



sought to introduce some degree of system in the issuance of supplies. At Gainesborough, at different times between January 29 and February 5, I issued rations to both brigades up to and inclusive of February 10, neither requiring nor receiving, however, regular requisitions or formal receipts; contenting myself in the exigency of the case with undergoing the trouble, labor, and responsibility of putting things in shape afterwards. An honest and an ardent desire to feed the army, and a willingness to overlook formalities in the attempt, must be my justification, or rather excuse.

On the 7th instant (February) I shipped on board steamer Commerce supplies for that portion of General Crittenden's division *en route* for Chestnut Mound, which were landed in good order at the mouth of Caney Fork River. The army is stationed within from 2 to 6 miles of that point. These stores, with those at Carthage, will be fully adequate to support the army to March 10, with the exception of some few articles, for which I have to-day drawn on Captain Shaaft, at Nashville, and with the exception also of the articles of fresh beef and corn meal, for the purchase of which and all other necessities I have ample funds.

I left at Gainesborough on the 8th instant, by order of General Crittenden, rations for the two regiments stationed there for thirty days, with the exception of the articles of fresh beef, bacon, and meal, for the purchase of which, on the requisition of Colonel Murray, commanding, and at his suggestion, I handed over to the commissaries of those regiments the sum of \$5,600, Colonel Murray representing that those articles could be purchased there more cheaply than they could be sent there, and that the sum mentioned would be entirely sufficient.

In what I have done I feel that I have worked with an honest heart and an open and active hand for the sustenance of this command. Nor have I left undone aught, either myself or through any agencies, I could procure that would have been for its benefit. The only fear I have had is that the Government would hold me to too rigid an accountability for matters of unavoidable waste, expenditure, or spoliation arising from the entire absence of any facility to transact business with its accustomed and rightful formalities. Without office appliances, blanks, stationery, or forms, I have supposed that the necessity of the case had to carve out its own rules; nor have I been willing to allow the slightest appearance of "*red-tapism*" to interfere with the prompt supplying of the wants of the soldiers of their country.

I have never heard in the army of the slightest complaint made of any failure to issue supplies on hand, nor do I believe there was any such failure. There was in some cases an entire absence from their posts of commissaries. This may have caused some delay in regiments or companies receiving their supplies; but even of this no word has come to my ears, while I am confident there has not been one hour's delay on the part of this office or any of its agents in filling any requisitions, however informal, or in filling any order without a requisition from brigade or regimental commissary, commissioned or acting, or from any one representing them; taking simply the receipt of the party applying. A greater liberality in doing business, besides further exposing myself to censure, would have also exposed the Government to still greater loss. I should not have been so minute in this report or embarrassed it with circumstantial details, but I have learned from Captain Claiborne, inspector-general, that vague reports had reached Bowling Green of an unnecessary delay in the issuance of stores received.



So far as relates to commissary stores any reports of that character are entirely untrue; every application for stores, informal or otherwise, having been at once complied with, and the stores unissued having been kept on board the steamboats instead of being immediately landed for wise and good reasons, and under the orders of General Crittenden.

Respectfully submitted.

GILES M. HILLYER,  
*Major, and A. C. S., General Crittenden's Division.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT No. 1,  
*New Orleans, February 12, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

DEAR SIR: I received your dispatch indicating your desire that I should send one regiment to Iuka and four to Memphis. Unless there are some controlling reasons to the contrary, I would beg leave to suggest that the whole brigade be sent to Corinth, Miss., as at that point it would be available for any emergency likely to arise. Mobile, New Orleans, Bowling Green, Columbus, and, more remotely, Memphis, are at this moment objective points in the enemy's plan of offensive operations. The first four are all directly threatened at this moment, and each can be re-enforced from Corinth by rail in about the same time. I can ill afford to spare these troops at this particular juncture, not only on my own account, but because I expected to lend a hand to General Bragg at Mobile, whose danger I consider to be more imminent than my own. The necessities of the case, however, seem to require that these troops should be sent from here, and I therefore put them in motion, simply suggesting that, if you do not require them for immediate active operations, you place them in some central position where they may be available for the greatest number of purposes. Corinth is, in my judgment, an important strategical point, as it is not only connected by rail with all the places above indicated, but is only a day's march from the Tennessee River. This latter fact, taken in connection with the enemy's command of the water, would, however, suggest that the troops there should form an intrenched camp to prevent disaster from a sudden dash.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. LOVELL,  
*Major-General, Commanding.*

[FEBRUARY 12, 1862.—For Lovell to Benjamin, in reference to reinforcements for Columbus, Ky., see Series I, Vol. VI, p. 825.]

NASHVILLE, *February 13, 1862.*

J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of War*:

The following telegram from General Floyd contains the latest information from Fort Donelson:

FEBRUARY 13.

The day is closed, and we have maintained ourselves fully by land and water. The cannonade at one time was quite sharp. The attack on our trenches was not very

severe. The gunboats, after two assaults, retired at an early hour in the evening. I presume battle will be fought to-morrow. We will endeavor to hold our position if we are capable of doing so. Our casualties are not great; the enemy's, I have no doubt, are much greater.

JOHN B. FLOYD,  
*Brigadier-General.*

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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GLADESVILLE, *February 13, 1862.*

General COOPER:

GENERAL: I have no news to communicate particularly. The country people say the enemy has certainly 6,000 men at Picketon.

I have ordered Captain Witcher to take his company over to the Louisa Fork of Sandy, and to watch the country between Grundy and Picketon, and to give me information should the enemy undertake to advance into Virginia.

I have directed Captain Jeffress to bring the horses of his battery forward, and to take the field pieces (six in number) from Pound Gap behind Clinch River. They have no company to man them, no horses to draw them, and there they are exposed to danger without the possibility of doing service. I propose to transport, if possible, all the public stores behind Clinch River, yet to hold Pound Gap as long as possible with the force now there. It is as much as I shall be able to do to subsist the men. My commissary being ill with typhoid fever, I have taken the responsibility myself of sending out agents to make purchases of supplies in the counties below me. If I can weather the storm for a few days I shall hope to have supplies on hand. I have requested Jefferson Higginbottom, esq., of Tazewell County, Virginia, resident at Liberty Hill, to permit me to nominate him for Major Hawes' place as commissary of brigade, but have not heard from him as yet. I expect the return of my courier every hour.

I regret to say the exposure incident to my late march in Kentucky is telling strongly upon my men. Lieutenant Tribble, of Stoner's company, died a few days since. Private Shawhaw and several others of the mounted battalion have died. Colonel Trigg has lost 5 and Colonel Moore 2. Colonel Williams has lost 10 men, of disease. I have in hospital here now 119.

I am, &c.,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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NASHVILLE, *February 14, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

Your dispatch of 8th instant received. General Buckner was engaged with enemy yesterday; is in his presence to-day, and most probably engaged. I cannot detach him. General Chalmers is in command of troops between Memphis and Tennessee River, and cannot be spared now. I hope you will send a suitable commander for East Tennessee from the East.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

EDGEFIELD, *February 14, [1862].*General FLOYD, *Fort Donelson:*

If you lose the fort, bring your troops to Nashville if possible.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*NASHVILLE, TENN., *February 14, 1862.*Col. R. A. PRYOR, *Richmond, Va.:*

DEAR COLONEL: Your favor of the 9th instant has been received.\* I regret much that you did not come on from Lynchburg, for the rumors that you refer to were all unfounded, and the matters General Johnston and myself had to communicate through you to the Government were of great importance, being to provide for the very unfortunate contingency now existing here. Moreover I desired you to see for yourself and others the exact condition of things here in justice to my own self, for I am taking the helm when the ship is already in the breakers and with but few sailors to man it. How it is to be extricated from its present perilous condition Providence alone can determine, and unless with its aid I can accomplish but little. My health, moreover, has failed me completely lately. I was confined to my room by a wretched cold all the time I was at Bowling Green. It is the most unfortunate thing that could have happened to me, for the loss of one or two weeks now is or may be most fatal to us. However, I am better now, and am hurrying on to my post as fast as possible. We must defeat the enemy somewhere to give confidence to our friends. Large depots of provisions, ammunition, &c., ought to be provided for at Atlanta, Montgomery, and Jackson, Miss., &c., without loss of time, for future contingencies. We must give up some minor points and concentrate our forces to save the most important ones, or we will lose all of them in succession. The loss of Fort Donelson (God grant it may not fall) would be followed by consequences too lamentable to be now alluded to.

General Johnston is doing his best, but what can he do against such tremendous odds? Come what may, however, we must present a bold front and stout hearts to the invaders of our country.

In haste, yours, truly and sincerely,

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

NASHVILLE, *February 14, 1862.*

General POLK:

The following dispatch just received from Fort Donelson:

We have just had the fiercest fight on record between our guns and two gunboats, which lasted two hours. They reached within less than 200 yards of our batteries. We drove them back, damaging two of them badly and crippled a third very badly. No damage done to our battery and not a man killed.

GEO. J. PILLOW,  
*Commander.*N. WICKLIFFE,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

\*Not found.



HEADQUARTERS,  
*Nashville, February 14, 1862.*

To the COMMANDANT OF THE POST AT CLARKSVILLE, TENN.:

You will at once take proper steps to have the railroad bridges over Elk Fork and Whippoorwill, between State Line and Russellville, burned up. Let no delay occur.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Edgefield, February 14, 1862.*

Major-General HARDEE, *Commanding*:

I inclose copies of dispatches from General Floyd. You will perceive the necessity of hastening your march as much as possible. It must be continued day and night until the army crosses the Cumberland. Let it be known that the object is to secure the crossing of the Cumberland and no apprehension of the enemy in rear. You will thus preserve their *morale*. This order must be communicated to the rear of the column, and cavalry must be left in rear to assist the sick and bring up stragglers.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Edgefield, February 14, 1862.*

Major-General HARDEE, *Bowling Green, Ky.*:

The general regards it important that the column should be concentrated here as rapidly as is consistent with an orderly march, and hopes that your arrangements will be such that the troops longest held at Bowling Green to forward supplies may reach this place as early as their baggage wagons. He wishes you to guard against accident by putting two days' provisions for them in the train.

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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WOODBURN, KY., *February 14, 1862—10 p. m.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON:

I left Bowling Green to-day at 3.30. At 12 m. the enemy appeared with artillery, three pieces, I think, on Baker's Hill, and opened fire on the town, and especially the depot. We were compelled to abandon the depot, which was subsequently burned. We retired at once and in perfect order. I shall move on as rapidly as possible. I particularly desire that you send a train to Franklin to receive my sick and extra baggage to-morrow morning. It should be there at 6 a. m. The enemy has crossed the Barren, supposed on pontoon bridge; force not known. Have cavalry, artillery, and infantry.

W. J. HARDEE,  
*Major-General.*

[Indorsement.]

The operator at Franklin informs me there are three empty trains there.

OPERATOR, *Nashville.*

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Edgefield, February 14, 1862.

Major-General CRITTENDEN, C. S. A.,  
Commanding Chestnut Mound :

The general requires that every exertion be made, day and night, until you have ascertained the position and the strength and the direction of the march of General Thomas, U. S. Army. Report by the promptest means in your power.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
Edgefield, Tenn., February 14, 1862.

Major-General CRITTENDEN,  
Commanding Chestnut Mound, Tenn.:

GENERAL: General Johnston orders you to move without delay on Nashville, halting within 10 miles of the city and reporting. Leave a rear guard of cavalry to protect the stores that you cannot move with your command. Let them get information of the enemy.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,  
Assistant Adjutant-General.

FRANKLIN, February 14, 1862.

General JOHNSTON:

Enemy have Baker's Hill, throwing shell all over town. General Hardee will probably be down on the train which follows the train I came on. Had no notice of their approach till shells exploded at depot. They were reported to be 3,000 infantry, 260 cavalry. They are supposed to be the three regiments infantry, battalion cavalry, with artillery, that were reported as approaching via Tompkinsville three days ago. Shells about 10 inches diameter.

MARSHALL.

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 1. }

HEADQUARTERS C. S. TROOPS,  
Iuka, Miss., February 14, 1862.

In pursuance of an order this day received from General A. S. Johnston, commanding Western Department, Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers assumes command of all the Confederate States troops between Memphis and Tennessee River.

JAMES R. CHALMERS,  
Brigadier-General.

[FEBRUARY 15, 1862.—For Bragg to Benjamin, in reference to operations in Kentucky, &c., see Series I, Vol. VI, p. 826.]

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,  
Nashville, Tenn., February 15, 1862.

General JOHNSTON:

MY DEAR SIR: General Pillow's dispatch after the battle of to-day shows that the enemy is being re-enforced and will probably attack us again. (A copy of this dispatch the operator informs me he sent to you.)

Will you pardon me, my dear sir, for suggesting and respectfully urging the immediate re-enforcement of our gallant and glorious little army there to the extent of our ability. A few thousand men thrown to their aid immediately may turn the scale and make our victory complete and triumphant.

If there is anything that State authorities can do to aid this or any other matter they are at your command.

Respectfully,

ISHAM G. HARRIS.

EDGEFIELD, TENN., February 15, 1862.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

I learn 15,000 arms have run the blockade on the steamship Victoria at New Orleans. I request that they may be immediately sent to me at Murfreesborough, Tenn., where there will be an agent to receive them, suggesting that they may be placed in charge of special messenger, with power to impress all passenger locomotives on the railroads, by which means they can be sent in less than half the time that freight engines would deliver them. I also wish to ascertain what kind of guns they are, their caliber and character, so as to have proper ammunition prepared here at Nashville by the time they arrive. The men to use them can be found, and in the present emergency they may be of vital importance.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
General, C. S. Army.

EDGEFIELD, February 15, 1862—11.30 p. m.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN:

I earnestly request that the arms may be immediately sent from New Orleans which I mentioned in my dispatch this evening.

A. S. JOHNSTON.

GLADESVILLE, VA., February 15, 1862.

General S. COOPER,

Adjutant and Inspector General:

GENERAL: I have information now which renders it certain that the enemy contemplates a movement into Virginia by assailing the line of the mountains in several places simultaneously. In the execution of this purpose he is busy, using the navigation of the Sandy for the purpose of collecting supplies at Piketon, and is pressing his troops there as rapidly as he can. I hear from the scouts that only 1,600 had arrived at Piketon at the first of this week, and that other corps are at Prestonburg, Paintsville, Louisa, and Catlettsburg; that the column intended to be employed is 12,000; and that the Pound Gap and the



Wytheville road are designed to be the paths of the invasion. Of course the Salt Works and the railroad are the objects of the enemy.

I send you a letter received by Colonel Williams yesterday from Pike-ton, as he says, "one part written by a lady and the other by a gentleman, both reliable;" also Major Thompson's report as from a scout belonging to Williams' regiment. You can form an opinion from these as to the intent and state of preparation of the enemy and as to the absolute necessity of sending forward men and supplies.

I have had great delicacy in ordering anything since I recrossed the mountains. I suppose my force is in the geographical district of some other commander, and that it is proper that the regulations proper to be prescribed for the intercourse of the people in Virginia and Kentucky with each other over the lines of the mountains should come from the commanding officer. It is true Piketon and Pound Gap are both on that indefinite frontier to which I was assigned with a separate command, yet indeed I am ignorant of the extent of territory over which, under the orders, I should attempt control. I am satisfied the enemy should be driven to the Ohio River and out of the Kentucky mountains, but I cannot add emphasis to what I have already written on that point.

As to supplies, they can be had by bringing them 50 miles in sufficient quantity to subsist 5,000 or 10,000 infantry until 1st May, for the latter, say, 12,000 bushels of corn and 5,000 bushels of wheat, and this will cost at the point of purchase, say, \$15,000 or \$16,000; also some 500,000 pounds of meat, besides fresh beef, &c. The transportation should be put at the minimum. The organization of an effective column of resistance should be begun at once, and the lines should be manned so as to mask our intentions until we are ready to strike, unless he strikes first.

This matter has to be attended to sooner or later. Is it not best it should be done on my plan? Behind Clinch River supplies could easily reach a camp of preparation, which can be located so as to cover both roads and the Salt Works, should you be unable to send forward men to do the work immediately. Between Piketon and Cumberland Gap you must have a division. If we can go down into Kentucky we can get men. I am sure of it, and I am so informed; I cannot be mistaken; but we must open the ways for them to come out to me or they cannot come; and when we go we must have arms to give them or be able to send them to a point where they can be supplied with arms.

I presume you have seen Col. R. C. Trigg, of the Fifty-fourth Virginia Volunteers, as he left his camp when his regiment crossed Clinch River and it is said has gone to Richmond. His object was to obtain clothing for his men, though he left without my leave. I have no hope of preserving any Virginia regiment in this difficult and unwelcome service after the success of the Fifty-sixth Regiment in getting away from it. I do think, however, when the frontier of Virginia herself is the line of contest, her sons had as well take the snows of her mountains as any other troops. A good many of Colonel Williams' men have deserted rather than cross the Cumberland Range and come out of Kentucky.

I have prohibited the disbursing officers of this command from giving more than 75 cents per bushel for corn, 40 cents for shelled oats, \$1 for wheat, rye, or barley. I have directed that where there is a surplus beyond the wants of the farmer, that surplus shall be taken, if not sold, at the prices above stated, and a certificate left of the amount taken, so that the Department or Congress may fix the rate of "just compen-

sation" to which the party may be entitled. This must be done or we must submit to extortion.

Men feeding cattle near the road to Pound Gap I have directed to take their stock elsewhere, and I have levied on all their hay, grass, and small grain, which public animals will want on our line of march. There are men feeding hogs and cattle yet in Scott and Lee Counties under the hope of realizing high prices in the spring and summer for these from the Army. If I had the command, I would seize and bacon all their hogs and beef, or I would make them carry it south of the railroad. They are getting all the supplies out of our way under the hope of future private gain and they should be stopped at once. There are neighborhoods between this and Piketon as unsound as any part of Northwest Virginia. They must be thrown behind declared lines, and indeed if the able-bodied men do not enlist they should be drafted or compelled to go south of the railroad. The enemy must not find guides and spies here as he did in Kentucky, or he will have all advantages, and will advance with confidence if not success.

The snow is now 6 inches deep here and yet falling rapidly.

I presume my letters reach your regularly: if not, please advise me. I hope you will take the condition of affairs in this quarter into instant consideration. I am ready to do all an officer can do, but I cannot resist an army unless I have force to act with. Colonels Trigg and Moore and Captain Jeffress are all farther from me than the enemy is. I shall order them to return as soon as I can collect here supplies to feed them, which duty now engages my attention, as I have neither quartermaster nor commissary in the field for duty.

Your obedient servant,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

[Inclosure No. 1.]

CAMP AT THE POUND,  
*February 14, 1862.*

General HUMPHREY MARSHALL, *Gladesville:*

GENERAL: I send you inclosed a letter that I have received from Piketon. It was written on last Tuesday at Piketon. One part was written by a lady and the other by a gentleman living in Piketon. I know them both and they are both reliable.

Yours, truly,

JNO. S. WILLIAMS,  
*Colonel, &c.*

[Subinclosure.]

DEAR FRIEND: I received your note to-day, and was glad to hear from you. The Union men are here. They have a force of three regiments: they are increasing daily. They are going to the Pound Gap. Tell father and brother Harrison to stay away from here, to stay out of this State, for they are scouting all the time. Tell father mother is well and treated well. Tell father not to be uneasy about us, but take care of himself and not stay up there anywhere. Show this to him.

Your friend,

[Not signed.]

From all we can find out they are going to the Pound Gap with a large force, and they think that the Southern soldiers have only volunteered for six months, and then they will not join any more, and then

our forces will be so weak that they can march in. They intend attacking several points at the same time. They have forces all the [way] from the Ohio River here. They have provisions—any amount. The steamboats are running; four and five; are very large.

[Not signed.]

[Inclosure No. 2.]

POUND GAP, WISE COUNTY, VA.,  
February 14, 1862.

Brig. Gen. HUMPHREY MARSHALL,  
*Headquarters, Gladesville, Wise County, Va.:*

SIR: I have the honor to report from reliable source, one of Colonel Williams' men, who just came from near Prestonburg, states the enemy about 1,600 at Piketon and 3,000 at Paintsville and Prestonburg. They intend to concentrate a large force at Piketon to enter Virginia by the Louisa route and this point. They have brought large supplies to all of those points; the number they intend for the column is 12,000. Their design is to destroy the Salt Works and the railroad; the cavalry is on the Rockhouse.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. THOMPSON,  
*Major, Virginia Volunteers.*

[FEBRUARY 16, 1862.—For Benjamin to Lovell, in reference to arms and re-enforcements for Kentucky, &c., see Series I, Vol. VI, p. 827.]

RICHMOND, February 16, 1862.

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Nashville:*

I know not what arms are on the Victoria. I have ordered General Lovell to forward them all to Grand Junction, subject to your order, under care of a special agent, and to inform you by telegraph of all particulars.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

EDGEFIELD, February 16, 1862.

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

Do not send me the arms I requested yesterday until I name some other place.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

FEBRUARY 16, 1862.

Capt. D. P. BUCKNER, *Clarksville:*

Do not destroy the railroad bridge. Do not destroy the army stores, &c., if their destruction will endanger the city. If you can burn the army stores, &c., without destroying the city, do it.

A. S. JOHNSTON.



EXECUTIVE HEADQUARTERS,  
*Nashville, Tenn., February 16, 1862.*

Colonel CLAIBORNE :

You will call out the entire force under your command and apply to the military storekeeper at the capital for arms. When armed, call upon the ordnance officer at Nashville for ammunition and accoutrements, and hold your command subject to the orders of General Johnston.

Impress upon your soldiery that the Revolution of '76 was won by the Tennessee rifle, and that we fight in defense of our homes and all that we hold dear.

By order of Isham G. Harris, Governor, &c. :

W. C. WHITTHORNE,  
*Adjutant-General.*

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PARIS, *February 16, 1862—5 p. m.*

Major-General POLK :

Your dispatches ordering me to destroy the bridges and trestle between Paris and Tennessee River have been received and shall be executed. Your order to destroy the bridge on Tennessee River has also been received.

The enemy burnt that bridge last night. There is no mistake of this. I will execute your orders fully.

J. H. MILLER,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Edgefield, February 16, 1862—5.35 a. m.*

Colonel BOWEN,

*Commanding Head of Column :*

General Johnston orders the march to be resumed in the order in which the troops left Bowling Green. News from our flank makes this advisable. Pass this order on to the brigades in rear till it reaches General Hardee.

Respectfully,

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

Provisions are at Manscoe Creek. Let it be known to the brigades in rear of you.

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HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF NORTH ALABAMA,  
*Tuscumbia, February 16, 1862.*

Maj. W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General, Dept. of General A. S. Johnston :*

MAJOR : On the 14th I addressed you a communication and directed it to Bowling Green, not having then heard of its evacuation by General Johnston. Fearing that it may not reach you, I repeat substantially its contents. General Bragg, commanding the Department of West Florida and Alabama, has created this district and assigned me to its command. The object of General Bragg in sending me here was to

defend the Upper Tennessee and the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and its connections; but with the district as now organized it is impossible to adopt any system of defenses at all commensurate with the magnitude of the interests involved. It is not only the Tennessee River up to this point which is threatened, but also the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and the Mobile and Ohio Road, which intersects the Memphis and Charleston Road at Corinth, Miss. These roads constitute the vertebræ of the Confederacy, but with this district as now limited I have no control of that portion of Mississippi and Tennessee through which these roads run, nor of that portion of Tennessee lying on the Tennessee River from which these roads may be approached. The portions of Mississippi and Tennessee referred to lie within the department of General Johnston. I therefore respectfully and urgently suggest that the counties of Tishomingo and Tippah, in Mississippi, and the counties of Wayne, Hardin, and McNairy, in Tennessee, be added to my district, so that I may be able to direct and control the military operations in those counties.

A large proportion of the population of the counties of Hardin and Wayne is in sympathy with the enemy, and either Savannah or Hamburg, in Tennessee, or Eastport, in Mississippi, will be made the base of his operations.

The only troops so far assigned to me by General Bragg are one regiment of infantry and one regiment of cavalry. The inadequacy of this force is patent to observation, and I trust that General Johnston, appreciating, as I doubt not he does, the importance of this position, will at once send me an additional force; and in this connection I would respectfully request that an engineer officer of experience and ability be sent to me.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. P. WALKER,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

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RICHMOND, *February 16, 1862.*

Colonel LEADBETTER, *Knoxville, Tenn.:*

Proceed to Cumberland Gap with all the force which can be spared from guarding the railroad to re-enforce Colonel Rains. Forces are on the way to Knoxville from here, care of Colonel Vance, commanding Knoxville.

S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General.*

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RICHMOND, *February 16, 1862.*

Col. R. B. VANCE, *Knoxville, Tenn.:*

Send all the troops you can, without delay, to re-enforce Colonel Rains. Other regiments are on their way to Knoxville, and you will have large re-enforcements within a few days. Keep only the smallest guard consistent with safety at Knoxville, and send the rest by forced marches to re-enforce Rains.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

COLUMBUS, KY., *February 17, 1862.*

Brigadier-General RUGGLES:

I am aware of the order you have received from General Johnston. My information is such that I know there is no danger of attack from any point on the Tennessee River.

General Johnston is reported to have abandoned Nashville and to be retreating to Chattanooga.

I am just in receipt of a dispatch from General Beauregard, who has not yet assumed command here, that you ought not to go to Nashville. I therefore order you to move to this post with all possible dispatch.

A copy of this dispatch will be sent to General Johnston and General Beauregard. Answer.

L. POLK,  
*Major-General.*

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JACKSON, TENN., *February 17, 1862.*

DANIEL RUGGLES,

*Commanding Louisiana Volunteers, Corinth, Miss.:*

Please report to General Polk. The general [Beauregard] is unable to assume command.

THOMAS JORDAN,  
*Adjutant-General.*

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TUSCUMBIA, ALA., *February 17, 1862.*

J. P. BENJAMIN:

The Kentucky line of defenses has been lost, with a large part of our army. The line from Memphis to Virginia must now be defended at all hazards. To do this we must have armies at Corinth and Knoxville. To supply these armies, what remains of Johnston's forces, Columbus, the Gulf, the seaboard, and Virginia must be drawn; better lose the seaboard than this line. The Memphis and Charleston Road is the vertebrae of the Confederacy, and there are no troops for its defense. In a week the enemy can threaten it from Eastport, within 8 miles, and Hamburg, within 22 miles, with 50,000 men, unless large forces are immediately sent to its protection. The people will abandon the country to the occupation of the enemy.

With great respect I suggest these views, and urgently ask for immediate action.

L. P. WALKER,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Edgefield, February [17, 1862].*

Major-General CRITTENDEN,

*Commanding Chestnut Mound:*

General Johnston directs you to move your command to Murfreesborough (instead of Nashville) without delay. Press all the wagons you need. Fort Donelson has fallen, and General Floyd's army is captured after a gallant defense.

Respectfully,

W. W. MACKALL.



[FEBRUARY 18, 1862.—For Benjamin to Bragg, in reference to operations in Kentucky, &c., see Series I, Vol. VI, pp. 827, 828.]

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RICHMOND, VA., *February 18, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Nashville:*

Send such information of your present condition and intended movements as will enable us to give you all the aid in our power. Send further details of the affair at Fort Donelson.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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NASHVILLE, *February 18, 1862.*  
(Via Chattanooga, 19th.)

President DAVIS:

General Johnston left to-day for Murfreesborough. The army in retreat for that place. I will send your dispatch to him by special courier. Moving our stores from this place.

W. J. HARDEE,  
*Major-General.*

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JACKSON, TENN., *February 18, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:*

Columbus, with present defensive resources, must meet the fate of Fort Donelson, with the loss of the entire army, as all ways of retreat by rail and river can be cut off by the enemy's superior force from Tennessee River; a hazard contrary to the art of war. Therefore should now decide whether to hold Columbus to the last extremity, with its garrison (say 3,500 men), withdrawing other forces for subsequent use, or the evacuation of the place and new defensive positions taken. My health is too feeble to authorize me to assume command, but I shall advise with General Polk.

G. T. B.

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HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, LOUISIANA VOLUNTEERS,  
*Corinth, Miss., February 18, 1862.*

Major-General POLK, *Columbus, Ky.:*

Your dispatch of 17th received a few moments since. The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Louisiana Volunteers will be halted at the Grand Junction, ready to proceed to Columbus, Ky. The Sixteenth and Nineteenth Louisiana Volunteers will be in readiness to proceed from this point.

The latest intelligence from Nashville is annexed for your information.

If General Johnston does not cover the Tennessee River the enemy will get into possession of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, with open communication to Mobile, Memphis, and New Orleans.

Shall I intrench and defend the crossings at Florence and Decatur or join you at once? Please answer.

DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding Troops.*

[To accompany telegram to Major-General Polk.]

I have not had Nashville operator to-day. Stevenson says he heard him this morning; they were expecting Federals every hour. General Johnston's army all this side river.

Pillow and Floyd were at Nashville yesterday, and good many of our Fort Donelson men had reached there.

We had about 5,000 men surrendered at Fort Donelson with General Buckner.

TUSCUMBIA OPERATOR.

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HDQRS. FIRST BRIGADE, LOUISIANA VOLUNTEERS,  
*Corinth, Miss., February 18, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Murfreesborough, Tenn.:*

I reported yesterday my arrival. Two regiments of troops had then arrived and two more are near at hand.

I have received orders from General Polk to proceed to Columbus, Ky., as General Beauregard is unable to assume command.

The general (Polk) is not aware of your movements, and I am desirous to know your instructions respecting my brigade, as there may be time before I can move.

If the enemy reaches the Charleston and Memphis Railroad he can move on Mobile, Memphis, and New Orleans. Please answer.

DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding Brigade.*

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CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS C. S. TROOPS,  
*Iuka, Miss., February 18, 1862.*

The general commanding has been deeply mortified to hear from the citizens that we came to protect complaints that some of the troops of this command had been guilty of the most disgraceful plundering of private property; that chickens had been stolen, hogs had been killed, a horse wantonly stabbed, private gardens robbed. Such conduct is disgraceful in itself, unworthy of Southern soldiers, and only equaled by the marauding hordes that are invading our soil. It is hoped that such things may not occur again in future, but if ever they should, it is enjoined not only upon all officers, but upon all good men also, to ferret out and expose to ignominy and punishment the guilty parties, whose conduct when unexposed brings down common disgrace upon all. The patriot soldier who has left all the comforts and luxuries of home to battle for his country's rights will be exposed to suspicion and must bear his portion of the common disgrace. It therefore behooves him above all others to assist in detecting the guilty.

By order of Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers:

ADDISON CRAFT,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

RICHMOND, VA., *February 19, 1862.*

General G. T. BEAUREGARD, *Jackson, Tenn.:*

Your dispatch to General Cooper received. Evacuation decided on. Select defensive position below. Look to safety of artillery and munitions. A fleet of boats should promptly be sent from Memphis or other point to aid the movement.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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NASHVILLE, [*February*] 19, 1862.

General JOHNSTON:

The enemy landed at Clarksville from three gunboats at half-past four o'clock to-day.

JOHN B. FLOYD,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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RICHMOND, *February 19, 1862.*

Col. D. LEADBETTER, *Knoxville, Tenn.:*

Move the regiment to a point on the railroad convenient for marching to the Gap, and hold them there unless re-enforcements are required at the Gap. An agent was sent from here on the 13th to attend to the matter of bacon at Knoxville. We wait to receive his report.

S. COOPER,  
*Adjutant and Inspector General.*

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GLADESVILLE, *February 19, 1862.*

[General S. COOPER,]

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:*

GENERAL: I send you the reports received this morning just before day. Yesterday it was said the enemy had all left Piketon to go down the river, and I requested a friend in Richmond to say so to you. I did not then credit that report, and a day brings forth this most unsatisfactory solution of his movements.

You see Colonel Williams says two of his companies have gone to the head of the Cumberland. They are hunting corn to feed upon. All the horses broken down and distempered were sent off a week since to feed and be recruited, and are now near 40 miles from the wagons. I am scouring this country to-day to press horses to bring away the wagons, intending to concentrate my forces behind Clinch River if they can whip me at Osborne's Gap, which I think is not unlikely at all. I have ordered Colonels Trigg and Moore to move in this direction, taking provisions on pack-horses, and I have ordered Williams to resist the occupancy of Osborne's Gap with his regiment, and if he has to retreat, to move by the way of the Crane's Nest back on Guest's Station, where it is to be hoped Trigg and Moore will join the forces retreating from Pound Gap.

I feel, sir, that my task is as onerous as it is unwelcome, and I mourn that impending disasters should be the fate awaiting my administration of this command.

I am, &c.,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General.*



[Inclosures.]

CAMP NEAR THE POUND, *February 18, 1862.*[General HUMPHREY MARSHALL,] *Gladesville:*

GENERAL: I send you Major Thompson's note. I have not a day's supply of bread.

Two of my companies are on head of Cumberland. The scout of Major Thompson is here; he says the 1,400 mentioned in the note came up Elkhorn, and that the main force is coming up Shelby, with their wagons, &c.

[WILLIAMS.]

POUND GAP, *February 18, 1862.*

Colonel WILLIAMS:

The enemy stays 6 miles below Osborne's to-night. My scouts just came in and gave me the news. They aim to take Osborne's Gap to-morrow. Send an express to General Marshall; I have not a horse, or I would.

Yours, truly,

JOHN B. THOMPSON,  
*Major, Virginia Volunteers.*

The number below Osborne is 1,400; they expect to meet the main body at Shelby Gap. Be on the alert.

JOHN B. THOMPSON.

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va., February 20, 1862.*Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK, *Columbus, Ky.:*

SIR: I have received your several communications from Captain Williams, and he has been detained a day or two, to enable us to obtain such information of the late engagement at Fort Donelson and the movement of our troops as would authorize a definite decision as to our future movements. We have been disappointed in receiving reliable dispatches; but yesterday a telegram arrived from General Beauregard to the following effect:

Columbus, with present defensive resources, must meet the fate of Fort Donelson, with loss of entire army, as all ways of retreat by rail and river can be cut off by the enemy's superior forces from Tennessee; a hazard contrary to art of war. Therefore should now decide whether to hold Columbus to the last extremity with its garrison (say 3,500 men), withdrawing other forces for subsequent use, or the evacuation of the place and new defensive positions taken. My health is too feeble to authorize me to assume command, but I shall advise with General Polk.

To this dispatch, communicated to us in cipher, I replied, by the President's instructions:

Evacuation decided on. Select defensive position below. Look to safety of artillery and munitions. A fleet of boats should promptly be sent from Memphis to aid the movement.

This correspondence, which has probably been communicated to you by General Beauregard, will no doubt have already caused you to commence the movement, and I have nothing to add. I have only to request that you will, as promptly as possible, use every endeavor to save the cannon and munitions of war, which we cannot replace and

cannot afford to lose. Heavy re-enforcements from the South will reach you, and I suppose four or five regiments from New Orleans must already be in Tennessee, as well as four regiments from General Bragg's command, to be further increased by four regiments from this neighborhood. Some 10,000 additional veteran troops will be thrown forward from the South, and no effort will be spared to save the line of communication between Memphis and Bristol, so vital to our defense.

We have no accurate knowledge of the events at Fort Donelson, but are satisfied that the resistance was glorious. The reverse was, unfortunately, the case at Roanoke Island.

I am, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

MURFREESBOROUGH, *February 20, 1862.*

General JOHNSTON:

The gunboats landed at Clarksville yesterday at 3 o'clock. The bridges here were destroyed this morning. I am still attempting to get trains off, but the difficulties are immense. The troops will all leave here to-day.

JOHN B. FLOYD,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 1. }

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Corinth, Miss., February 20, 1862.*

By authority from Major-General Polk the undersigned assumes command of all the Confederate forces on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad as far as Decatur and in its vicinity, north and south.

DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

CORINTH, MISS., *February 20, 1862—5.30 p. m.*

Brigadier-General CHALMERS,  
*Commanding at Iuka, Miss.:*

One gunboat passed Hamburg, Tennessee River, this morning at 10 o'clock, for Florence, it is reliably reported. The people on board state that another boat, with transports, will pass up to-morrow.

Take immediate measures to protect Florence, if you have the means to do so. If not, inform me at once.

Have you a field battery ready for service? Have you any heavy guns? What quantity of powder have you? Answer.

DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army, Commanding Brigade.*

CORINTH, MISS., *February 20, 1862—6. p. m.*

Major-General LOVELL, *New Orleans, La.:*

I am ordered to command the district embracing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. One gunboat has just passed Hamburg for Flor-

ence, and reports that another will go up to-morrow, with transports. I am in want of Semmes' battery. Can you send it to me? I hope that you will send me the Fourth Regiment. The Nineteenth has not a cart-ridge, and I can't get any from Memphis or Nashville. The Seventeenth Regiment is expected to-night. Answer.

DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 12. }

HEADQUARTERS C. S. TROOPS,  
*Iuka, Miss., February 20, 1862.*

Major Baskerville will take two companies of his command and proceed at once to Eastport, keep in view of the gunboat of the enemy reported in sight by his scouts, and watch the enemy, keeping his command without the range of the enemy's guns, not exposing his command in any way, but keep informed as to his movements, and act with due discretion, and report, as the exigency may require, to these headquarters.

By order of Brig. Gen. James R. Chalmers:

WM. M. STRICKLAND,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

JACKSON, TENN., *February 21, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:*

GENERAL: I regret profoundly to have to acquaint the War Department that my ill health has made it improper for me as yet to assume the command assigned me.

In accordance with instructions, I repaired with as little delay as practicable to Bowling Green, Ky., and reported to General A. S. Johnston, commanding the department, on the night of the 4th instant. After several interviews with him and the fall of Fort Henry, an informal conference was held at my lodgings on the 7th instant, at which General Johnston, Major-General Hardee, and myself were present, for the consideration of the military exigency. On that occasion it was determined that, Fort Henry having fallen and Fort Donelson not being long tenable, preparations should be made at once for the removal of the army on that line in rear of the Cumberland River at Nashville, while a strong point on that river some few miles below the city should be fortified forthwith against the approach by that way of gunboats and transports.

The troops then at Clarksville were to be thrown across to the southern bank of the Cumberland, leaving only a sufficient force in the town to protect the manufactories and other property in which the Confederate Government was interested.

In the event of a further retrograde movement becoming inevitable, Stevenson was chosen as a suitable point for a stand, and subsequent movements were to be determined by circumstances.

It was likewise determined that the possession of the Tennessee River by the enemy, consequent upon the capitulation of Fort Henry, must break the direct communication between the army at Bowling Green and the one at Columbus, which henceforward must act inde-



pendently of each other until they can again be brought together. Meantime the first must defend the State of Tennessee along the line already indicated; the second that part of the State included between the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers. But as the possession of the Tennessee River by the enemy had also rendered the communications of the army at Columbus liable to be cut off at any time from that river by an overflowing force of the enemy rapidly concentrated from the various points of the Ohio, it had become further necessary to guard and provide against such a calamity, to which end it was decided that the main force in occupation of Columbus should fall back upon Humboldt, and thence, if need be, to Grand Junction, so as to protect Memphis from either point and still secure a line of retreat to the latter place or Grenada, Miss., or even to Jackson, of that State.

Finally, at Columbus, left with a sufficient garrison for the defense of the works there, assisted by Hollins' gunboats, a desperate defense of the river was to be made. But at the same time transports were to be collected and held near by for the prompt removal of the entire garrison when the position was no longer tenable in the opinion of the commanding officer. Meanwhile Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow would be fortified for defense to the last extremity, assisted by the naval gunboats, which as a last resort would retire to the vicinity of Memphis, where another resolute stand should be made.

Five days later, in view of existing conditions, I addressed to General Johnston a paper, a copy of which I now transmit for the information of the War Department.

On reaching here I received information that confirmed my views in great part as set forth in that letter, and satisfied me that to attempt to hold Columbus with any force now at my disposition could only result in an early fate like that of Fort Donelson and the loss of the Mississippi Valley as a necessary consequence. Unfit physically to visit Columbus, I requested General Polk and Governor Harris to meet me here. They did so. Meantime your reply to my telegraphic dispatch touching the further occupation of Columbus had been received. Arrangements were made for the prompt defense of Island No. 10, a position naturally of great strength, and New Madrid; for the early evacuation of the position at Columbus, and removal of the large stores of supplies and munitions now there in such way as to avoid publicity. These new lines can be made of great strength with a garrison of about 5,000 men, thus leaving free my main force for maneuver and "defensive, active" operations against the enemy as he shall penetrate the country by the avenues now unfortunately in his possession.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,  
*General, U. S. Army.*

[Inclosure.]

BOWLING GREEN, KY., *February 12, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,

*Commanding Western Department, Bowling Green, Ky.:*

GENERAL: By the fall of Fort Henry the enemy, having possession of the Tennessee River, which is navigable for their gunboats and transports to Florence, it becomes evident that the forces under your immediate command and those under General Polk, separated unfortunately by that river, can no longer act in concert, and will be unable to support each other until the fortune of war shall have restored the Ten-

nessee River to our possession or combined the movements of the two armies in rear of it.

It also becomes evident that by the possession of that river the enemy can concentrate rapidly by means of his innumerable transports all his disposable forces on any point along its banks, either to attack Nashville in rear or cut off the communications of Columbus by the river with Memphis and by the railroads with the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

Should the enemy determine on the former plan of operations, your army, threatened in front and on right flanks by Buell's large army, will be in a very critical condition, and may be forced to take refuge on the south side of the Tennessee River, in Alabama and Georgia or Eastern Tennessee. But should Halleck adopt the second plan referred to, the position at Columbus will then become no longer tenable for an army inferior in strength to that of the enemy, and it must fall back to some central point, where it can guard the two main railroads to Memphis, *i. e.*, from Louisville and from Charleston. Jackson, Tenn., would probably be the best position for such an object, with strong detachments at Humboldt and Corinth and with the necessary advance guards. The Memphis and Charleston Road, so important on account of its extension through Eastern Tennessee and Virginia, must be properly guarded from Iuka to Tusculum, and even to Decatur, if practicable.

Columbus must either be left to be defended to the last extremity by its proper garrison, assisted by Hollins' fleet of gunboats, and provided with provisions and ammunition for several months, or abandoned altogether, its armament and garrison being transferred, if practicable, to Fort Pillow, which, I am informed, is a naturally and artificially strong position, about 100 miles above Memphis. Island No. 10, near New Madrid, could also be held by its garrison, assisted by Hollins' fleet, until the possession of New Madrid by the enemy would also compel that position to be evacuated.

I am clearly of the opinion that to attempt at present to hold so advanced a position as Columbus with the movable army under General Polk, when its communication can be so readily cut off by a superior force acting from the Tennessee River as a new base, would be to jeopardize not only the safety of that army, but necessarily of the whole Mississippi Valley. Hence I desire, as far as practicable, specific instructions as to the future movements of the army of which I am about to assume the command. If it be necessary for the safety of the country to make with all my forces a desperate stand at Columbus, I am ready to do so.

I regret much that illness has prevented me from being already at my post, but during my stay here I believe I have made myself as well acquainted with your general views and intentions as circumstances have permitted, and which I will always be happy to carry into effect to the best of my abilities.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,  
G. T. BEAUREGARD,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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CAMP DESHA, *February 21, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. LEONIDAS POLK:

DEAR SIR: At 5 o'clock this evening I returned from the expedition over to Camp Beauregard and vicinity. Owing to the heavy rains I



could not get to Viola, but I have destroyed the railroads as well as possible from within 5 miles south of Mayfield back to Fulton Station. All the bridges are destroyed as far as Viola, Major King and others having done that on the Obion and other creeks some time ago.

I destroyed the engine and some of the cars. Those I did not destroy were full of provisions and other stores belonging to the Government. The depot building and cars at Fulton Station are all full to overflowing with provisions, &c., and if they are not speedily moved will be materially damaged. As soon as they can be removed the cars will be destroyed. I had a large lot of flour and other provisions, some wagons, &c., moved from Camp Beauregard to Fulton Station, and there, as directed by you, I set fire to that camp.

I learned from Judge Campbell, of Paducah, that the enemy admit that they lost 5,000 men in killed and wounded in the battles at Fort Donelson.

Hoping, general, that our work may be satisfactory to you, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant

T. H. LOGWOOD,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Post.*

GLADESVILLE, VA., *February 21, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:*

GENERAL: I received dispatch in the night last night from Colonel Williams, whose regiment I had ordered to occupy Osborne's Gap. He says the enemy has gone back to Piketon; had been up to the head of Marrowbone, but that his force is exaggerated. I ordered Trigg's and Moore's regiments forward. They came promptly through rain, snow, and mud, the former making 16 miles yesterday and the front 9 by 12 to-day. I permit them to return to their position on the Clinch.

I did hope ere this to hear from you. Something should be done, general, to enable the officer in command of this country to remove the bad and unsound men from those neighborhoods where they can and do daily communicate with the enemy.

Hoping that the Department will answer my letters, and especially that which asks leave to visit Richmond for a few days, I remain, your obedient servant,

H. MARSHALL,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

[FEBRUARY 22, 1862.—For Bragg to Benjamin, in reference to reinforcements for Kentucky, &c., see Series I, Vol. VI, p. 829.]

RICHMOND, VA., *February 23, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Murfreesborough, Tenn.:*

General M. Lovell has sent four regiments to Corinth, Miss. Give your orders whether they are to join you or General Polk.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*



JACKSON, TENN., *February 23, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond :*

GENERAL: I have to submit herewith a copy of a circular I have felt called upon to address to the Governors respectively of the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Alabama, which I hope may meet the sanction of the War Department. I shall be pleased to receive the instructions and views of the Department as soon as practicable.

It is presumed that the troops thus called into the field may be raised without difficulty or much delay, especially if I am authorized at once to receive them as parts of the quotas due from the several States mentioned.

In connection with the letter of Major-General Van Dorn, I beg leave to submit that all operations in States bordering on the Mississippi River should be made subordinate to the secure possession of that river, which, if lost, would involve the complete isolation and destruction of any army west of it.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,

*General, C. S. Army.*

[Inclosure No. 1.]

CONFIDENTIAL CIRCULAR.]

JACKSON, TENN., *February 21, 1862.*

DEAR SIR: As you are aware, heavy disasters have recently befallen our arms on the Kentucky border. The Tennessee River is in possession of the enemy since the capture of Fort Henry. The evacuation of Bowling Green and subsequent fall of Fort Donelson, with large loss of officers, men, arms, and munitions, have so weakened us on that line that Nashville can only be held by superhuman energy, determination, and courage. At the same time the direct communications of the forces at Columbus with those under General A. S. Johnston are broken, and the two armies effectually isolated from each other. With the enemy in command of the Tennessee River the position at Columbus is so endangered from a land approach from that river by a greatly superior force, that its fall must be regarded as certain unless extraordinary efforts are made to re-enforce its present small army of occupation. I need not dwell upon the consequences of such a disaster. Suffice it to say it would involve the immediate loss to the Confederate States of the Mississippi River and Valley.

In view of the palpable situation, I am instructed to evacuate Columbus and take up less vulnerable positions on and in the vicinity of Island No. 10 and at New Madrid. In the execution of this measure, however, much will depend on the energy with which our enemy may follow up his late successes, and whether he will give us time to withdraw and receive his onset elsewhere.

Coming to this command at such a crisis, I have been filled with a profound anxiety and sense of the necessity for a prompt, resolute encounter with the exigency in time to prevent an irrevocable defeat. Columbus is now occupied by but about 12,000 men of all arms. At Island No. 10 and New Madrid are some 4,000 more, to which add Rugles' brigade, and are under General Chalmers at Iuka, say, 5,000 more. Thus you will perceive I have a force at my disposition of but 21,000. If we remain supine and unaroused to the dangers accumulating day

by day, awaiting the advance of the enemy, he will assemble such a force as to insure his success and a repetition of the late disasters only with more desolating consequences.

Hence I have thought I would submit for the consideration of the Governors of the Mississippi Valley States a plan which I deem most practicable for the recovery of our losses and defense of this river, and call upon them for the means of execution.

I propose that the Governors of the States of Tennessee, Mississippi, and Alabama and your excellency shall each furnish me with from 5,000 to 10,000 men, armed and equipped, with the utmost possible celerity, for time is precious and dispatch essential to success. I shall call on General Van Dorn to unite his forces with mine, and leaving a suitable garrison at Columbus, with troops to guard and hold my rear at Island No. 10, I would then take the field with at least 40,000 men, march on Paducah, seize and close the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers; aided by gunboats, I could also successfully assail Cairo, and threaten, if not indeed take, Saint Louis itself.

In this way be assured we may most certainly and speedily recover our losses and insure the defense of the valley of the Mississippi, and every man you may send me will really be placed in the best possible position for the defense of his own home and hearth-stone.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,  
General, C. S. Army.

This confidential circular was sent by special messengers to the Governors of Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the rendezvous of the troops furnished to be as follows: Those from Tennessee, at Jackson, Tenn.; from Alabama, at Corinth; from Mississippi, at Grand Junction; from Louisiana, at Jackson, Tenn., if by railroad, and at Columbus, Ky., if by water.

G. T. B.

[Inclosure No. 2.]

JACKSON, TENN., *February 21, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. EARL VAN DORN,

*Commanding, &c., Pacahontas, Ark.:*

MY DEAR GENERAL: By the fall of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers the forces under General Polk (now to be under me) are entirely cut off from those under General A. S. Johnston, and must now depend upon themselves alone for the defense of the Mississippi River and contiguous States. The fall of Columbus and of Island No. 10 must necessarily be followed immediately by the loss of the whole Mississippi Valley to the mouth of the Mississippi River. The fate of Missouri necessarily depends on the successful defense of Columbus and of Island No. 10; hence we must, if possible, combine our operations not only to defend those positions, but also to take the offensive as soon as practicable to recover some of our lost ground. I have just called on the Governors of Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi for 5,000 men from each State. I have 15,000 disposable for the field. If you could certainly join me, via New Madrid or Columbus, with 10,000 more, we could thus take the field with 40,000 men; take Cairo, Paducah, the mouths of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, and most probably be able to take also Saint Louis by the river. What say you to this brilliant programme, which I know is fully practicable if we can

get the forces? At all events we must do something or die in the attempt; otherwise all will be shortly lost.

Yours, truly and sincerely,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

P. S.—I expect also the co-operation of twelve gunboats from New Orleans. I will inform you of the Governors' answers as soon as received.

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RICHMOND, VA., *February 23, 1862.*

Hon. OTHO R. SINGLETON, *Richmond:*

DEAR SIR: Your proffered kindness touching my personal advancement induces me to the liberty of requesting your aid in making known to the War Department certain reasons, seeming to me proper, for removing to Tennessee, as a field of service, the Seventh and Fourteenth Tennessee Regiments, and also in calling attention of the Department to some views deemed worthy of consideration in respect to the importance of our immediately possessing, by whatever force is necessary, the sections of Southern Kentucky and all Tennessee.

First, with regard to the troops mentioned, they, with my own regiment, have for some time past composed a brigade under my command, and I have every reason to believe if they be sent to Tennessee they can be forthwith re-enlisted almost in mass; and, if not sent, I fear they may hesitate to do so. I must say, in justice to myself, I do not undertake to justify this spirit in the troops, but only mention it as an existing fact to be dealt with in the prudence of the Department. The condition of going to Tennessee can be offered and the re-enlistments secured before the troops are moved, and I think this course advisable. They are troops inured to the service, and the advantage of re-engaging such, armed and prepared for the war, is doubtless appreciated by the Department.

With respect to the territory mentioned, I am impressed that, well considered, its relative importance to the Confederacy will induce the speediest possible concentration there of sufficient forces to dispute its possession with the enemy, even if this can only be done by temporarily weakening other positions less vital in importance; for to allow the enemy possession is at once the abandonment of our most reliable cereal region, important besides for its manufacturing resources, and the section most populous with material for soldiers. Such a condition will induce many who would otherwise stand bravely in arms for us to succumb under despair of successful resistance and the hope of being unmolested in person and property. But, further, Middle and West Tennessee constitute a field for operations the possession of which will in all military respects be as positively advantageous to the enemy as its loss would be disadvantageous to us. For, first, it is a country capable of sustaining a large army; secondly, with the enemy's advantage of us in capability of manufacturing machinery for transportation and motive power by land and water, his fleets of gunboats on the Mississippi River will make safe the right flank of his army occupying the country and the Cumberland Mountains will do the same for his left, for there is no road through these mountains of sufficient capacity to transport the most necessary supplies of an army which would be adequate to seriously affect his rear. In direct terms, the position is one which, once fairly in possession of the enemy, cannot be turned. Afford-



ing to us but a front exposure, with to him available lines of transportation in rear, both of railroad and navigable waters, extending to his sources of supply of all war material, a soldier will not fail to appreciate a position presenting but a front exposure to his enemy. Besides all this, does not the enemy's possession of the field in question bring him almost upon our States of sparse white and dense black population, and perhaps to some extent even threaten the rear of our army on the Potomac?

These views, it seems to me, will warrant the assertion that our immediate possession of the field in question is to us a military necessity.

I believe if we have one distinctly peculiar advantage in this war it is position; that is to say (the affirmative of the war being with the enemy), the power of making him attack us in such positions as we may select. If the enemy has one advantage peculiar, and I acknowledge it a great one, it is the inequality of results of battle between us. If we beat him, while his facilities of trade with the arms markets of the world exist, and his own to manufacture them, results to us are limited to the destruction of an army. But if he beat us, we lose what we can worse spare than an army—arms. It was, perhaps, in substance the application of these two propositions which gave us the victory at Manassas, and prevented our hazarding pursuit of the foe across the Potomac. Deeply impressed with these views of our relations to the enemy (acknowledging exceptions to the rule), I have felt it was our general policy in this war to prudently avoid unnecessary hazards, and in the main compel him to yield us the advantage of position in engagements; but I do not realize that a vigorous, even an attacking, resistance for the rescue and possession of the field in question and adopted speedily as possible, will at all violate the rule of policy stated. If it be with us a necessity to repossess these sections, and we allow the enemy to hold them until he can intrench or even examine the country sufficiently to establish for himself the best line of defense, when we shall undertake to drive him will we not find our peculiar advantage—position—has been transferred to him without diminishing his peculiar one, the inequality of the results of battle?

What, then, is our capacity and true policy? I believe 50,000 troops can be promptly concentrated in Tennessee without seriously risking any other position at all equaling this in importance and that it should be done. There, from the nature of their probably attacking duties, should be, if practicable, our best troops; for, taking it that courage is common to all our army, raw troops will more nearly equal the efficiency of trained ones in defending intrenched positions than in general field service and active operations. With this number of such troops the enemy may be resisted, harassed, or even under favorable circumstances attacked in main force, though his numbers double ours; for it is not certain, and is even greatly to be doubted, if there is amongst their generals the ability to combine and use in battle more than with this number we might oppose to them. Suppose them to have double our numbers, and yet their commander be unable to make available a larger number than we oppose to him, may not his surplus become a military fungus, in that while it cannot be appropriated against, it yet may be panic-stricken or stampeded by us? On full consideration, may it not be, when armies too large to be conveniently wielded are brought in conflict, that the chances of victory are in favor of the lesser one, especially if it have advantage in spirit, training, or in being better commanded.

The advantages to us in the general economy and those of greater

secrecy and security in our marches and maneuvers which would accrue from our being amongst a friendly population would be worth something to our Army; but the advantage, if not necessity, to our cause of encouraging and holding the people firm in the resolve never to submit, which the pressure with them of an active army would give, is of momentous importance. Let the people be kept aroused; let them not adopt the blighting fallacy of argument, what our Army cannot do it is hopeless for us to undertake; but, on the contrary, let them be encouraged to resist and inspired with the determination never to yield, and then for us time becomes a position which neither gunboats can successfully assault nor numbers flank. Against it both are impotent. Under its pressure the enemy must go down in hopeless bankruptcy or disband his armies, perhaps do both. Either affords us the independence worth all our sacrifice and which must be won. It may be considerations touching our foreign relations, and of which I am wholly ignorant, suffice in wisdom to detract from the importance, or even directly conflict with the immediate adoption, of the views here advanced. Speedy armed intervention from abroad may be confidently relied on, or possibly pressing necessity to hold inviolate our capital, to the end of securing our recognition by foreign powers, may enhance its value politically, if not for the present give to it an essentiality even beyond what pertains to it in any strictly military sense, such as being a point strategic, strong, or otherwise important. These considerations I have not embraced, but gone upon the assumption we were alone and unaided to fight our battle out. You must take my views as a soldier, not a statesman.

In conclusion, it is my hope I am not biased by any personal or geographical circumstances. I know myself sincere in the belief that if I thought any other part of my country more immediately important to the whole than the sections mentioned I would say make all efforts to first hold that part.

The views I have expressed are the earnest convictions of one whose fortune, life, and every worldly hope have been cheerfully and without a single regret staked upon the issue of the pending contest. They are not urged with the insolence of demand or uttered with the murmur of complaint, but submitted respectfully, and with unwavering confidence in the courage, wisdom, and virtue of the Chief Magistrate directing the country.

Very truly, your friend,

GEO. MANEY.

ORDERS, }  
No. 3. }

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 23, 1862.*

Under great necessity temporary possession may be taken of wagons, teams, and other property of our citizens for the use of the army; but this authority can be exercised by chiefs of the army alone.

It is positively prohibited to any officer to seize, take, or impress property of any kind except by written order of the commanding general or division commander, and this authority must be exhibited to the party from whom the property is taken.

Officers or soldiers violating this order will be arrested, proceeded against, and punished as plunderers and marauders.

By command of General Johnston:

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

ORDERS, }      HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
 No. 4. }      Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 23, 1862.  
 The Central Army is reorganized as follows, viz :

FIRST DIVISION.

Major-General HARDEE.

*First Brigade.*

Brigadier-General HINDMAN.

2d Arkansas, Colonel Govan.  
 5th Arkansas, Colonel Cross.  
 6th Arkansas, Colonel Hawthorn.  
 7th Arkansas, Colonel Shaver.  
 3d Confederate, Colonel Marmaduke.  
 Miller's battery.  
 Swett's battery.  
 1st Arkansas Cavalry (five companies),  
 Captain Chrisman.  
 Bennett's cavalry.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel CLEBURNE.

1st Arkansas, Colonel Patton.  
 6th Mississippi, Colonel Thornton.  
 5th Tennessee, Colonel Hill.  
 23d Tennessee, Colonel Neill.  
 24th Tennessee, Colonel Allison.  
 Watson Battery.

ATTACHED.

Adams' cavalry.  
 Bifle's cavalry.  
 Shoup's artillery battalion.

SECOND DIVISION.

Major-General CRITTENDEN.

*First Brigade.*

Brigadier-General CARROLL.

17th Tennessee, Colonel Newman.  
 — Tennessee, Colonel Stanton.  
 29th Tennessee, Colonel Powell.  
 37th Tennessee, Colonel White.  
 Hawkins' battalion.  
 Baker's battery.  
 Monsarrat's battery.  
 Gordon's cavalry.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel STATHAM.

15th Mississippi, Major Brantley.  
 22d Mississippi, Lieutenant-Col. Schaller.  
 19th Tennessee, Colonel Cummings.  
 20th Tennessee, Colonel Battle.  
 — Tennessee, Colonel Murray.  
 45th Tennessee, Colonel Lytle.  
 Rutledge's battery.

THIRD DIVISION.

Brigadier-General PILLOW.

*First Brigade.*

Brigadier-General WOOD.

7th Alabama, Colonel Coltart.  
 16th Alabama, Colonel Wood.  
 8th Arkansas, Colonel Patterson.  
 9th Arkansas Battalion, Major Kelly.  
 Mississippi Battalion, Major Hardecastle.  
 27th Tennessee, Colonel Williams.  
 44th Tennessee, Colonel McDaniel.  
 55th Tennessee, Colonel McKorn.  
 Byrne's battery.  
 Harper's battery.  
 Avery's cavalry company.

*Second Brigade.*

Colonel BOWEN.

9th Arkansas, Colonel Dunlop.  
 10th Arkansas, Colonel Merrick.  
 2d Confederate, Colonel Martin.  
 1st Missouri, Colonel Bowen.  
 Merrick's battery.  
 Scott's cavalry.



## RESERVE.

Brigadier-General BRECKINRIDGE's brigade.

3d Kentucky, Colonel Thompson.  
 4th Kentucky, Colonel Trabue.  
 5th Kentucky, Colonel Hunt.  
 6th Kentucky, Colonel Lewis.  
 Colonel Crew's regiment.

Clifton's battalion.  
 Hale's battalion.  
 Helm's cavalry battalion.  
 Morgan's cavalry.  
 Nelson's cavalry.  
 Lyon's battery.

## UNATTACHED.

Colonel Forrest's cavalry.  
 Colonel Wharton's (8th Texas) cavalry.

General Johnston assumes command of the army.

By command of General Johnston:

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
 No. 4. }

HEADQUARTERS C. S. FORCES,  
 Corinth, Miss., February 23, 1862.

In conformity with orders from General Bragg the undersigned assumes command of the District of North Alabama.

DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

MURFREESBOROUGH, [February] 24, 1862.

His Excellency JEFFERSON DAVIS:

My movements have been delayed by a storm on the 22d washing away pike and railroad bridge at this place. Floyd, 2,500 strong, will march for Chattanooga to-morrow to defend the central line. This army will move on 26th, by Decatur, for the valley of Mississippi; is in good condition and increasing in numbers.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

JACKSON, TENN., February 24, 1862.

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond:*

GENERAL: AS I had anticipated before leaving Centreville, I find that the troops at Columbus have not been regularly organized according to long-recognized military usage, founded on experience, in all services.

It is true there is a nominal organization into "divisions," formed of other subdivisions called "brigades," but upon no regular basis. For example, General McCown commands one of these so-called divisions of but five regiments of infantry; that is more properly a brigade. Another of these divisions consists of two brigades of three regiments each, Brigadier-General Cheatham commanding the division. The other division, so called, really has had no division commander since the departure of Brigadier-General Pillow. It consists of some eight

regiments, which form two brigades, I believe, commanded by their senior colonels, respectively

Brig. Gen. A. P. Stewart commands an independent brigade of three regiments and the heavy artillery, and is in immediate command of the works.

In addition there are quite 1,400 cavalry, over whom there should be some competent commander.

These twenty-two regiments really ought to be subdivided into five brigades, two of them of four regiments and two of five regiments each, taking the weakest regiment for the latter. Larger brigades of volunteers cannot be well handled in action, and I should prefer on that account brigades of but four regiments. I regard the divisional organization as absolutely essential. My experience fully confirms the military practice in European services in this connection. Volunteers need these subdivisions even more than regular troops.

As reported in a previous communication, I have called upon the Governors of Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Alabama for additional troops. To-day I hear by telegraph that they will be furnished with the utmost alacrity and dispatch. For their prompt organization brigade commanders will be wanted.

At present the general officers at Columbus are Major-General Polk, Brigadier-Generals Cheatham, McCown, and A. P. Stewart.

Under these circumstances I must respectfully recall the attention of the Department to my letter written just as I was leaving Centre-ville, touching the organization of this army. I would, however, so qualify that letter as to say that officers serving now with the troops at Columbus, who may have been recommended by Generals Polk and Johnston for the command of brigades, should justly have precedence over those indicated by me as suitable for such commands. But some, at least, of those I recommended for division and brigade commands I shall need at an early day for the organization and command of the new levies, and I trust the President may be pleased to appoint and send them to report to me with as little delay as practicable.

The services of Colonel Mackall as a division commander I consider indispensable at this critical juncture. My health is such as to make it essential for me to have as many trained, experienced officers to aid me as practicable.

Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,  
*General, C. S. Army.*

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JACKSON, TENN., *February 24, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Commanding, &c., Corinth, Miss.:*

DEAR GENERAL: The movements of the enemy in front of and in vicinity of Columbus and in the Tennessee River (it is removed as far as Savannah) make it necessary to watch him at once with the utmost vigilance. Therefore, although I have not assumed command formally, I shall advise the following, to save the time it would take to communicate with and through General Polk.

1st. Hold Hamburg, on the Tennessee River, in strict observation from Corinth.

2d. Place a battalion of your command at Henderson Station, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and assume command of the local troops

already there, consisting of a regiment of infantry, 400 effectives, some 200 of whom only are armed with double-barrel shot-guns, and 140 cavalry, armed with double-barrel shot-guns and knives.

3d. Place another battalion at McNairy's Station, and hold in observation a road leading through Purdy to Savannah, on Tennessee River.

4th. Send a howitzer, if practicable, with each battalion.

5th. Hold in observation the landing on Tennessee River opposite a place called Waterloo.

6th. The cavalry now at Henderson must be used to all possible advantage as outposts and vedettes and in procuring information of the movements of the enemy on the river.

There is another cavalry company at Bolivar which was offered, armed with shot-guns, which may be taken into active service at once.

There is at Henderson no ammunition for the infantry now there, I hear from Colonel Lea, commanding there.

I would further advise you to order up to Corinth the rest of your brigade from Grand Junction, and to hold all your command ready for any emergency, including Brigadier-General Chalmers' brigade.

Yours, very truly,

G. T. BEAUREGARD,  
*General C. S. Army.*

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CORINTH, MISS., *February 24, 1862.*

GENERAL RUGGLES:

SIR: There are five bridges between Corinth and Memphis, and guarded as follows:

Cypress Creek, about 14 miles west of Corinth, 150 to 200 feet long; two watchmen at night and one by day.

Tuscumbia River, about 16 miles, 150 to 200 feet long; four men at night and one by day.

Hatchie River, about 18 miles, 150 to 200 feet long; two men at night and one by day.

Wolf River, 55 miles west, 150 to 175 feet long; one man at night and one by day.

Grisson's Creek, 58 miles west, about 100 feet long; one watchman by night and section-house in sight.

Muddy Creek, an iron trestle, 20 miles west, about 100 feet long; no guard.

A trestle, 150 to 200 feet long, between Tuscumbia and Hatchie Rivers; no guard.

Mr. Williams thinks those bridges sufficiently guarded; the men are well armed.

Respectfully,

JNO. W. GOODWIN.

SPECIAL ORDERS, }  
No. 61. }

HDQRS. ALABAMA AND WEST FLORIDA,  
*Mobile, Ala., February 24, 1862.*

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II. Brig. Gen. J. K. Jackson, P. A., will proceed to Chattanooga, Tenn., and there assume command of the troops sent to that point from



this department, and report to General A. S. Johnston, commanding Department of the West, for further orders.

\* \* \* \* \*

By command of Major-General Bragg:

FRANCIS S. PARKER, JR.,  
*Acting Assistant Adjutant-General.*

JACKSON, TENN., *February 25, 1862.*

General S. COOPER, *Adjutant:*

Scouts report heavy re-enforcements received at Cairo and Paducah, detailed from Federal Army of the Potomac. Appearance of early attack on Columbus. Need more general officers for the proper organization of the troops at Columbus and for new levies. No proper subdivision of the troops at Columbus has been or can be made without more general officers. Time is pressing.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Murfreesborough, February 25, 1862.*

The commanders of brigades are reminded that the citizens must not be stripped of every means of support, even for the necessities of the army; and on the appeal of any citizen that his means are reduced to the wants of his family, they will at once, by authority of General Johnston, order an investigation, and if the complaint is verified, they will give the former a safeguard.

By command of General Johnston:

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SPECIAL ORDERS, } ADJT. AND INSPECTOR GENERAL'S OFFICE.  
No. 45. } *Richmond, February 25, 1862.*

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XX. Maj. Gen. E. K. Smith will proceed to Knoxville, and assume command of the troops in East Tennessee, reporting by letter to General A. S. Johnston, at Murfreesborough, Tenn.

By command of the Secretary of War:

JNO. WITHERS,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[FEBRUARY 26, 1862.—For Governor of Louisiana to Secretary of War, in reference to re-enforcements for Beauregard's command, see Series I, Vol. VI, p. 830.]

MEMPHIS, *February 26, 1862.*  
(Received Richmond, February 27, 1862.)

J. P. BENJAMIN:

Great excitement here and depression in public mind. To correct misapprehension and explain necessity which compelled capitula-

tion at Donelson I have had my official report published. My judgment is that there is but one remedy for existing condition of things; that is, abandon sea-coast defenses except New Orleans; concentrate all the forces in Tennessee; drive the enemy north of the Ohio River, and press invasion of Ohio, Indiana. That means will draw enemy's forces back and relieve the heart of country, and give up control of interior rivers until we can get power on water-courses. Enemy can inflict no great calamity on sea-coast.

If we do not relieve heart of the country, Mississippi River will be opened, and then cause of South is desperate.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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HEADQUARTERS C. S. FORCES,  
*Corinth, Miss., February 26, 1862.*

General G. T. BEAUREGARD,  
*Commanding, Jackson, Tenn.:*

DEAR GENERAL: I had the honor to receive yesterday your letter of the 24th instant, and have acted upon your suggestions on such points as have not been anticipated.

1st. I have held the Tennessee River from Pittsburg to Florence under observation for some days past. I have stationed Colonel Clanton's regiment Alabama cavalry at Florence, to scout and draw supplies from the north side of the river. I have sent two 24-pounder guns, with munitions, to the Florence Bridge, with instructions to Brig. Gen. L. P. Walker to establish a battery on the south bank, at or near a point indicated, covering the bridge approaches and landing. I have sent Colonel Mouton, Eighteenth Louisiana Volunteers, with Captain Gibson's field battery and a detachment of cavalry, to Pittsburg and vicinity, to hold the country and river under close observation, and to attack the enemy's gunboats and transports in the event of his appearance and scout down the river valley. The intermediate portion of the river is also held under close observation. I have ordered Major Baskerville and two companies of Mississippi cavalry to the vicinity of Purdy's, opposite Savannah, under the orders of Colonel Mouton. I have also communicated instructions to Colonel Lea, at Henderson Station, and propose, as soon as possible, to give that district my personal attention.

2d. I have ordered the bridges guarded between this and Tusculumbia, and am about to do so *en route* to Memphis and on some of the branch roads.

3d. I have issued instructions regulating the telegraph, protecting the public dispatches against publicity, and hold the railroad trains under some measure of security.

4th. I have obtained some ordnance stores and expect more, and commenced repairing arms.

5th. I have instructed the depot commissary to obtain 10,000 rations for thirty days at this station, and propose doing the same at Decatur or some suitable point on that extension of my line.

6th I have directed the issue of fresh beef five days in seven when practicable.

7th. I have sent one officer to bring me full information about Columbia, Tenn., and the condition of our communications with Nashville. &c.

8th. I have endeavored to hold my transports well in hand, ready for prompt action and movement for service on either flank.

9th. My entire brigade has been concentrated here for some days, and with General Chalmers and Walker in readiness for any emergency.

I am, general, very truly, yours,

DANIEL RUGGLES,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

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HDQRS. FIFTY-SECOND REGT. TENNESSEE VOLUNTEERS,  
*Henderson Station, February 26, 1862.*

General DANIEL RUGGLES:

Your note of yesterday was carried by here and returned by train last night, else would have been sooner answered.

I cannot report with certainty whether there are any cavalry on the Tennessee River. I shall learn with certainty to-day. On yesterday morning I sent men to Clifton, Saltillo, Savannah, and Hamburg. I have 100 cavalry reconnoitering in the neighborhood of those places. From the best information I can gather I think they have a few infantry at Clifton, Saltillo, and Savannah, who have pressed horses into service and are scouring the country. If the report be true, I should be in a bad condition to meet them, having only 100 available or rather effective shot-guns; still if there be not more than 500 I shall try them. I shall keep you advised.

Respectfully,

B. J. LEA,  
*Colonel, Commanding.*

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HDQRS. FIFTY-SECOND REGT. TENNESSEE VOLUNTEERS,  
*Henderson Station, February 26, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. DANIEL RUGGLES:

DEAR SIR: Yours of this date received. In answer I have to say that I have under my command the Fifty-second Tennessee Regiment, of which I am colonel, numbering 760 men, of which 260 are sick; we have no arms except 100 double-barrel shot-guns; Capt. C. S. Robertson's cavalry company, numbering 140 men, rank and file, armed with double-barrel shot-guns and sabers; about 251 of the Fifty-first Tennessee Regiment, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Chester, for whom he has secured about 100 common sporting rifles, repaired and cleaned. They are all stationed at this place. I send out Captain Robertson's cavalry every few days to scout the country from Clifton to Savannah. From scouts returned this evening I am reliably informed that no Federal cavalry has been landed on the Tennessee River above Clifton. The gunboat which was up passed down Saturday evening. I have also been sending guards in the direction of Savannah by Purdy.

Any suggestions you may make or commands to give will be gladly received and promptly executed. Can you by any possible means secure for me the musket or rifle with bayonet?

Very respectfully,

B. J. LEA,  
*Colonel, C. S. Army, Commanding.*



[FEBRUARY 27, 1862.—For Bragg to Benjamin, in reference to re-enforcements to Beauregard, see Series I, Vol. VI, p. 834; and to Beauregard, see p. 836.]

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 27, 1862.*

HON. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War, Richmond, Va.:*

SIR: The army supplies and stores which were forwarded to this place having all been sent forward to Chattanooga, except what may be needed for the immediate use of the army at Huntsville and Decatur and points farther on towards Memphis, this command will commence the march to-morrow towards Decatur.

The enemy are in possession of Nashville in force, the advance of which is 8 miles on this side of the city.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General, U. S. Army.*

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SPECIAL ORDERS, ) HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
No. 39. ) *Murfreesborough, February 27, 1862.*

\* \* \* \* \*

2. The army will move to-morrow morning at sunrise for Shelbyville.

3. The order of march and the marches will be as follows:

1st. Hindman's brigade to or near Shelbyville, establishing cavalry scouts on the turnpike from Shelbyville toward Nashville.

2d. Wood's brigade, sappers and miners, 15 miles on Shelbyville road.

3d. Crittenden's division, 12 miles on the same road.

4th. Breckinridge and Texas Rangers, 7 miles to Hindman's first encampment.

5th. Hardee, with Bowen's brigade, will cross the bridge over Stone's Creek.

6th. All unattached companies, battalions, or regiments will be put in march by Major-General Hardee in advance of Bowen.

7th. The colonels of regiments will place all spare wagons at the disposal of the chief quartermaster.

8th. The brigadiers and colonels will restrict their officers and men to the smallest possible amount of baggage, and turn over surplus transportation to the chief quartermaster.

9th. Major-General Hardee will assume command of all the cavalry in rear of the army, prescribe the time and manner of their movement, and direct them to destroy all the bridges after they pass over.

10th. The chief quartermaster will turn over all surplus transportation to Major-General Hardee.

[By command of General Johnston:

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*]

MOSCOW, *February 27, 1862.*

Major-General POLK:

My scouts just in from Baltimore, and report 500 Federal cavalry at sunset this evening advancing from Baltimore towards Clinton. I have about 150 men here for duty after guarding bridges. If you will send a full force to meet me at Clinton soon, on to-morrow morning I can capture them. Please send me all the cavalry you can spare. Please answer.

T. H. LOGWOOD.

JACKSON, TENN., *February 28, 1862.*

General S. COOPER,

*Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:*

I am in despair about my health—nervous affection of throat. Bragg ought to be sent here at once. I will, when well enough, serve under him rather than not have him here. Re-enforcements are arriving.

G. T. BEAUREGARD.

CIRCULAR.]

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,

*Murfreesborough, February 28, 1862.*

The columns will resume the march to-morrow morning in the same order, and continue it from day to day by Shelbyville and Fayetteville to Decatur.

The marches will be so arranged as to make about 15 miles a day so long as the roads permit.

By command of General Johnston:

W. W. MACKALL,

*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

*Abstract from return of the First Division, Western Department, Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, commanding, for February, 1862.*

[Headquarters Columbus, Ky.]

Commands.	Present for duty.						Aggregate present.	Aggregate present and absent.
	Infantry.		Cavalry.		Artillery.			
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.		
1st Division.....	215	3,329			7	75	4,252	4,782
2d Division.....	288	4,193	2	70	21	354	6,167	6,813
3d Division.....	159	2,526	13	234	*19	*358	4,262	4,667
Stewart's brigade.....	87	1,035			130	1429	2,225	2,429
Miscellaneous.....	205	2,560	72	1,048	6	90	5,140	6,077
Total .....	954	13,643	87	1,352	83	1,306	22,046	24,768

\* Including Johnson's siege artillery.

† Heavy artillery.

‡ Commands at Trenton, Fort Pillow, Moscow, Camp Beauregard, Paris, Island No. 10, and New Madrid.

RICHMOND, VA., *March 1, 1862.*

Major MONSARRAT, *Knoxville:*

You are authorized to send Brownlow out of Tennessee by the Cumberland Mountains or any safe road.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

JACKSON, TENN., *March 2, 1862.*

General G. T. BEAUREGARD:

GENERAL: In obedience to your order of the 21st ultimo to proceed at once to Montgomery, Ala., and deliver to Gov. J. G. Shorter a letter, with instructions, which you handed me, I started early the following morning, but owing to the disorganized condition of the different railroads I missed every connection, and did not arrive in Montgomery until the afternoon of the 25th ultimo. I immediately called upon the Governor and delivered your letter to him. He made an appointment for me to meet him, with his Adjutant-General, at 8 p. m. He then informed me that he highly approved of your plan and would give you every assistance in his power, but he feared that, owing to the want of arms and the recent call for twelve new regiments made by the General Government, he could not issue another proclamation until those regiments were raised.

I endeavored to persuade him to select one general officer and a certain number of colonels, and inform them, if they would collect together a force of armed men, that they should be ordered to join you immediately. In reply he said his hands at present were tied, and although he did not doubt that upon such terms a large number of men could be raised, still he was first bound to fill the requisition of the President, but that he would write and telegraph to Richmond to obtain permission from the Secretary of War to send you the first five regiments of his new levies. He also informed me that there were four regiments and one battalion in North Alabama, guarding bridges, &c. These troops he thought would be of more service with you, and he would intercede with General Bragg to have them ordered to report to you immediately. He at once telegraphed (copy attached) to General Bragg. Owing to the heavy rains the wires were down and he could get no reply.

The following morning I called by appointment and requested him to give me the attached memorandum as his reply for your perusal. As he was making every effort to arm and have the new levies sent to you, I left your letter in his hands. He also gave me a letter to General Bragg (a copy which is attached).

At 3 p. m. I left Montgomery by steamer and arrived at Mobile on the 28th ultimo. The railroad being washed away in many places, I could not come by the most expeditious route.

I immediately called upon General Bragg and handed him a copy of your letter to Governor Shorter, with the one from the Governor to him. To my surprise and joy I found the general intended leaving the following day to join you, and that he would have ten regiments, besides those in North Alabama, which were *en route* and would follow him. I returned with him to this place, arriving here this morning.

In making this report I would respectfully state that, unless some military control is exercised in the management of the different rail-



roads over which I traveled to Montgomery, when required for military purposes, some serious accident will surely take place.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. R. CHISOLM,

*First Lieutenant and Aide-de-Camp.*

P. S.—In addition to the within-named regiments General Bragg will join you with three batteries of light artillery.

[Inclosure No. 1.]

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *February 25, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. BRAXTON BRAGG, *Mobile, [Ala.]*:

General Beauregard has sent a special messenger to me for troops. We can defend the bridge at Decatur and North Alabama with militia. Cannot all the forces under General Walker be sent him? His need is urgent and the movement of the highest importance to us all. He wants them to rendezvous at Corinth. Answer as soon as possible.

JNO. GILL SHORTER.

[Inclosure No. 2.]

MONTGOMERY, ALA., *February 26, 1862.*

Under my proclamation calling for twelve regiments I have no doubt there will be forty companies in camp in two weeks from this date, but the State has no means of arming them. Private arms it would take time to collect, either by purchase or impressment. I could not at this time or in the next two weeks arm 500 men. I will write to Richmond, urging the necessity of arming the new levies and sending them to Corinth by companies as rapidly as possible.

JNO. GILL SHORTER.

[Inclosure No. 3.]

PRIVATE.]

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,

*Montgomery, Ala., February, 26, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. BRAXTON BRAGG,

*Headquarters Alabama and West Florida, Mobile:*

SIR: I dispatched you last night, but could not communicate details, which you will receive by Captain Chisolm, who bears a copy of the letter of General Beauregard to myself.\*

Unless we can retrieve the disasters on the Tennessee and Cumberland and carry the war into the enemy's country the whole Mississippi Valley will be overrun. Why should not the troops under Brig. Gen. L. P. Walker be sent forward at once to Corinth, to join the forces being collected by General B. for the onward movement he suggests? The gunboats of the enemy cannot get over the Muscle Shoals or reach the bridge at Decatur, near 40 miles above.

The militia in that region now organized could, most likely, defend that position if assailed by a marauding force. But the movement of General B., in my opinion, is of first importance. General Walker has near 3,000 troops, all told. Say—

Mississippi regiment.....	700
Georgia regiment.....	600
Clanton's cavalry.....	800
Blount's twelve companies.....	1,000
	3,100

\* See inclosure No. 1 to Beauregard to Cooper, February 23, p. 899.

I have three other armed cavalry companies to go at an early day.

Can't you order General Walker to report at Corinth to General B.?

I am this morning in receipt of your favors of 21st and 22d, and delighted at all you have done.

Yours, most respectfully,

JNO. GILL SHORTER.

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[Memorandums.]

JACKSON, TENN., *March 3, 1862.*

1. Island No. 10 and New Madrid are fully prepared according to means and circumstances.

2. Brigadier-General Withers, with First, Second, and Twenty-first Alabama Regiments to go forthwith to Fort Pillow, with proper ammunition. About fifteen guns from Columbus are ordered to Fort Pillow, where twenty-two guns are already in position, said fifteen guns not probably provided with carriages, but platforms are in position. Ten shell guns from Pensacola, complete, are also ordered to Fort Pillow; also one company of sappers and miners from New Orleans.

Troops from Island No. 10 and New Madrid to fall back, in case of necessity, to Fort Pillow; can be re-enforced by railroad from Humboldt to Memphis, and the military road from Mason's Depot, 28 miles from Fort Pillow. (Other road best.)

3. The main body of General Polk's [army] is to be at Humboldt, which is central to Memphis, Jackson, Grand Junction, Henderson, Corinth, and Fort Pillow.

4. A rear guard of two regiments and 500 cavalry to be stationed at Union City.

5. A battalion of infantry to be stationed at Paris from Humboldt, with, say, 500 cavalry, which, together with the other cavalry, will guard all avenues of approach from the Tennessee to the Mississippi River, in front of Paris and Union City.

6. All of the above-named forces and positions to be under the command of Major-General Polk, and to be called the First Grand Division.

7. The balance of the cavalry, say 200 men, to report at these headquarters.

8. Two regiments of infantry (Fourth Louisiana and Seventh Mississippi) at present here to remain, ready to move.

9. The balance of new troops from Louisiana and Mississippi to rendezvous at Grand Junction.

10. Ruggles' brigade, with troops from Alabama, to rendezvous at Corinth.

11. Chalmers to rendezvous at Iuka.

12. Troops from Tennessee (new levies) to rendezvous at Henderson and Bethel Stations, with proper advance guards along Tennessee River.

13. Columbus and Grenada, Miss., to be grand depots of supplies of all kinds for this army.

14. All heavy baggage, &c., to be sent to said depots forthwith.

15. One regiment of unarmed troops (except with lances) to be sent to Memphis, as a guard to that city.

16. The Governor of Mississippi to send unarmed troops to Columbus and Grenada, Miss., as a rendezvous.

17. All troops of this army not included in General Polk's command, as above named, to be under the command of Major-General Bragg, under the denomination of Second Grand Division. He will resume, in addition thereto, the command of his former department.

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FORT PILLOW, *March 3, 1862.*

General POLK:

We have at this post the following ordnance stores: 604 32-pounder cartridges, 3,300 pounds cannon powder, 400 quill cannon primers, 200 friction tubes, 32 bridge barrels, 150 port-fires, 146 canister, 164 — balls, 104 Read balls, 174 shells for 32-pounders, 4,560 32-pounder balls. Guns: Six 32-pounder rifle guns, and ten smooth-bore 32-pounders on river and four 32-pounders on back line, all mounted. Quartermaster's stores: 170 second-hand tents, without ropes. Amount of rations at Fort Pillow: 10,000 rations of rice, 10,000 rations of beans, 10,000 rations of molasses, 30,000 rations of salt, 15,000 rations of flour, 10,000 rations of candles, 4,000 rations of meal, 30,000 rations of vinegar, 40,000 rations of soap, 60,000 rations of coffee, 30,000 rations of sugar, 6,000 rations of bacon.

Shall I mount the guns that may come here?

MONTGOMERY LYNCH,  
*Captain, Engineer Corps.*

[Indorsement.]

Captain M. LYNCH, *Fort Pillow:*

Mount the guns that arrive. What number of effective men have you? Answer immediately.

GEORGE WILLIAMSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS,  
*Huntsville, Ala., March 3, 1862.*

Major-General POLK, *Columbus, Ky.:*

My fight with the gunboats at Donelson proved that they could not withstand heavy metal. To fight them successfully I suggest, as the result of experience, the importance of holding your fire for point-blank range; also the importance of having all your shot and shell for rifle well greased with tallow to avoid the danger of bursting the gun. I did it under long and continued fire with perfect safety. The Federal officers admitted at Donelson that their gunboats could not stand the fire of heavy metal. I disabled four of the five whose fire I returned.

GID. J. PILLOW,  
*Brigadier-General, C. S. Army.*

ORDERS, }  
No. 8. }

HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Shelbyville, March 3, 1862.*

At 7 a. m. to-morrow the march will be resumed by Brigadier-General Wood, Major-General Crittenden, and Brigadier-General Breckin-



ridge, on the Fayetteville road to Decatur, each command advancing from 12 to 15 miles, sending staff officers in advance to select encampments and provide forage.

By command of General Johnston :

W. W. MACKALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

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HEADQUARTERS, *Knoxville, March 3, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of War:*

SIR: Your telegraphic order [of 1st instant] to transmit Dr. Brownlow out of Tennessee by "Cumberland Mountains or any safe road" was received on Saturday. This morning I sent Dr. Brownlow, in charge of Colonel Young, of General Carroll's staff, with a guard of 10 men, to Nashville, and thence to Kentucky. I did not deem it safe to send by any of the mountain passes.

With great respect, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,  
G. H. MONSARRAT,  
*Captain, Commanding Post.*

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RICHMOND, VA., *March 4, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON, *Fayetteville, Tenn.:*

Your messenger with dispatches of February 18 only arrived yesterday. We have no official report of the disaster at Fort Donelson, and Congress is very impatient for it. I hear that General Pillow has committed the offense of publishing his report. We have nothing from you or General Floyd. I will send you written dispatches by express to-morrow. In [the] mean time send us your plans, condition, and purposes.

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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SHELBYVILLE, *March 4, 1862.*

J. P. BENJAMIN, *Secretary of War:*

My army will move beyond this to-day on the road to Decatur. One brigade remains here to protect the stores until they are shipped south. I will be at the telegraph office at Fayetteville to-morrow morning to receive any communications.

A. S. JOHNSTON,  
*General.*

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WAR DEPARTMENT, C. S. A.,  
*Richmond, Va., March 4, 1862.*

General G. T. BEAUREGARD, *Jackson, Tenn.:*

SIR: Your letters of the 21st, 23d, and 24th ultimo, addressed to General Cooper, have been received, as well as your cipher dispatch of the — instant. I receive with great concern the news of your continued ill health, and trust that services so valuable to our country as yours may be spared to us at this crisis and that your health will be restored before any serious movement of the enemy can endanger your

command. In the mean time I have news that General Bragg has left his department to join you, and I trust that his presence, by relieving you in part from the anxiety and responsibility which must weigh upon you, will contribute to your restoration to active service.

You will no doubt have learned ere this that General Bragg does not come alone to aid you, but brings valuable re-enforcements of disciplined troops, though in what number we are not yet advised.

Your call upon the Governors of the States in the Mississippi Valley for re-enforcements is fully approved, and both Governor Moore, of Louisiana, and Governor Pettus, of Mississippi, have been advised by telegraph that they may accept troops enlisted for twelve months for your re-enforcement, provided the troops are armed. The policy of the Government has never been to reject any armed men; but where unarmed men were offered for twelve months we have refused them, because we have "war" men enough to receive all the arms we can possibly procure.

The President has nominated to-day as brigadier-general Adjutant-General Mackall. He was not willing to raise him at once to the rank of major-general. Several others of the officers recommended by you have been nominated, as, for instance, Col. A. P. Hill, Colonel Winder, Colonel Stevenson; but General J. E. Johnston is so reluctant to allow any of his officers to be withdrawn from his command that I scarcely know who can be sent to you.

Your telegraphic recommendation of Colonel Gantt was received, but not acceded to, as we were aware you did not know the officer personally, and others were presented who appeared to possess higher merit. Colonel Churchill, of Arkansas, has been nominated, but is not, I fear, in your command. In order to insure you such general officers as you need it is thought best to wait until you get your re-enforcements from General Bragg, and then that you, with Generals Bragg and Polk, select from your own command your most promising officers, so as to avoid the bad feeling that always seems to attend the withdrawal of officers from one command to another.

I am, your obedient servant,

J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War.*

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JACKSON, TENN., *March 4, 1862.*

*Beauregard's confidential notes of reference.*

Provisions, grain, &c., in Western Tennessee to be collected as rapidly as possible and sent to Columbus and Grenada, keeping on hand provisions and forage as follows, viz:

At Union City, for 1,500 men, about three weeks.

At Humboldt, for 5,000 men, about three weeks.

At Jackson, for 900 infantry, about three weeks.

At Jackson, for 400 cavalry, about three weeks.

At Corinth, for 15,000 men, for four weeks.

At Henderson, for 800 men, for two weeks.

At Iuka, for 2,500 men, for two weeks.

At Grand Junction, for 10,000 men, for four weeks.

The regiment now at Trenton to be ordered forthwith by General Polk to Fort Pillow via Memphis. Captain Robertson's cavalry to remain at Henderson; the remainder of troops now there, viz, Lea's and

Browder's regiments and stragglers collected, to be ordered by General Polk to report to General Ruggles at Cerinth forthwith. The Seventh Mississippi Regiment, now at Jackson, Tenn., to be ordered by General Bragg to Henderson.

#### ORGANIZATION.

Three or more regiments, or about 2,500 effective men, to a brigade; two brigades to a division; to each brigade one battery of six guns, either four smooth-bores and two howitzers, four rifles and two howitzers, or six rifle guns.

Each grand division should have a reserve battery as large as practicable. There should be a chief of artillery for light batteries on the general-in-chief's staff.

#### AMMUNITION.

Depots to be established at Columbus and Grenada, Miss. Ammunition for distribution: 100 rounds per man for infantry and cavalry with each regiment; 200 rounds per piece with each company of artillery. The requisite amount in the same ratio for an army of 35,000 men to be held in depot at Grand Junction ready for shipment at a moment's notice.

#### ORDNANCE.

One chief of ordnance, Captain Oladowski; ordnance officer at Columbus, Mr. W. R. Hunt.

Ordnance officer at Grenada, Captain Gibbs.

Ordnance officer at Grand Junction, Mr. Tonneau.

Powder manufactory to be established at Meridian, and sulphur, &c., to be collected there.

Percussion cap manufactory to be established at Columbus, and, if possible, at Grenada.

Prisoners of war now at Memphis to be removed to Tuscaloosa, Ala.

Troops to be prepared for active operations in the field; their baggage to be reduced to a minimum.

Transportation shall be from 10 to 15 wagons per regiment, if practicable.

Rear guards must, as they retire, destroy bridges behind them, especially on ordinary roads, by felling trees, &c., if practicable. For this purpose they must be provided with axes.

Each fort and light battery must be provided forthwith with an ample supply of rat-tail files. General Polk will please issue necessary orders to that effect.

The Fourth Louisiana Regiment at Jackson will report to Major-General Bragg for orders.

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UNION CITY, *March 4, 1862.*

General LEONIDAS POLK:

All is right at Hickman. No gunboats have been seen. I expect to send down a locomotive this evening.

I will have your orders carried out as far as possible.

B. F. CHEATHAM,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Army.*



MOSCOW, *March 4, 1862.*

Maj. GEORGE WILLIAMSON,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General:*

The railroad bridge and highway bridge across Obion Creek, and the railroad bridge and highway bridges across Bayou de Chien at this place, and the bridges south of town across Little Bayou de Chien are not destroyed.

HENDERSON,  
*Operator.*

MOSCOW, *March 4, 1862.*

(Received Jackson, March 4, 1862.)

Major-General POLK:

General Cheatham has sent me four orders from you to establish a line, with relays of men every 5 miles, to Island 10; also a line to Union City and Hickman; also to send out officers to press in 500 negroes for work at Island 10; also to scout towards Columbus and Clinton. I have only 180 men under my command. The Federal cavalry, reported 1,000 strong, are within 6 miles of me, and I expect an attack to-night or in the morning.

Colonel Miller says his force has been divided, and those with him are not subject to my orders. It is impossible for me to execute all these orders in as prompt a manner as you desire and protect myself. Will you direct that Colonel Miller assist me? But in this event it will take our entire commands to meet the Federal cavalry if we are attacked.

Four gunboats passed down the river to-day. If you will let us go to Union City, the lines, &c., can be established at once; or if you will let all the cavalry remain here, we will whip their cavalry.

Our rations are out, and there is no commissariat to draw from, as no cars run here.

T. H. LOGWOOD,  
*Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Post.*

FORT PILLOW, *March 4, 1862—1 a. m.*

Major-General POLK:

Colonel Jordan has just left here on steamer H. D. Mears for Memphis. There are here two small artillery companies, perfectly green; no laborers or tools. All sent to Island No. 10. If we had some men could hold position some time. Have no one to mount guns except these two companies, but will do my best with them. No guns as yet. Only four guns on rear intrenchment. Mississippi within two feet of high-water marks.

MONTGOMERY LYNCH,  
*Captain, Engineers.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 1. }

JACKSON, TENN.,  
*March 4, 1862.*

Under the orders of the general commanding the Army of the Mississippi Valley Major-General Bragg resumes his former command of

the Department of Alabama and West Florida, and, in addition thereto, assumes that of the troops in North Mississippi and south of this point in West Tennessee; the whole to be designated as the Second Grand Division of the Army of the Mississippi Valley, headquarters for the present at Jackson, Tenn.

II. The following staff officers are announced as attached to the headquarters of the division:

1. Maj. George G. Garner, assistant adjutant-general.
2. First Lieut. Towson Ellis and
3. S. Parker, jr., aides-de-camp.
4. Col. J. E. Slaughter, P. A., acting inspector-general.
5. Col. J. B. Villepigne, P. A., chief of engineers and artillery.
6. Capt. H. Oladowski, C. S. artillery, chief of ordnance.
7. Maj. J. J. Walker, assistant commissary of subsistence.
8. Capt. L. V. Johnston, assistant quartermaster.
9. Surg. A. J. Foard, medical director.
10. First Lieut. H. W. Walter, Ninth Mississippi Volunteers, acting assistant adjutant-general and judge-advocate.

BRAXTON BRAGG,  
*Major-General, P. A.*

OFFICE OF CLERK OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
*March 10, 1862.*

Hon. J. P. BENJAMIN,  
*Secretary of War :*

SIR: The House of Representatives this day passed the following resolution, to wit:

*Resolved*, That the Secretary of War be requested to give information to this House on the following points, viz:

At what period was it that the Confederate forces under General Johnston first established themselves in the city of Bowling Green, and what was our force at that time and within the period of a week?

What was the force of the enemy at that period between Bowling Green and the Ohio River, and where located?

What prevented General Johnston at that time from making a forward movement towards the Ohio River? Was he restrained by instructions from the War Department or was he left to his own discretion in the matter?

What forces, if any, were sent from Bowling Green to Fort Donelson previous to the first battle at that place and under whose command?

What number of forces did General Johnston retain at Bowling Green up to the time of its evacuation?

Did General Johnston re-enforce or attempt to re-enforce the Confederate Army at Fort Donelson during the progress of the conflicts at that place? Is it within the knowledge of the War Department that any applications were made by the commanders of our forces at Fort Donelson for re-enforcements previous to ordering the conflicts of that place?

Was General Johnston restrained by orders from the War Department from sending re-enforcements or was he left to his own discretion in that regard?

What means of transportation had General Johnston at Bowling Green to enable him to re-enforce Fort Donelson during the contests had he been disposed to do so? When were the fortifications at Fort Donelson and Fort Henry respectively constructed, and in what mode?

Was there any military reconnaissance along the banks of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, with the view to judicious selections of places for fortifications, before the sites for Forts Henry and Donelson were selected?

Did General Johnston fall back from Bowling Green in accordance with instructions from the War Department or was he left to his own discretion in the matter?

Why was Nashville surrendered to the enemy?

Did General Johnston proceed upon his own discretion or under instructions from the War Department in regard to the act of surrendering that city into the hands of the enemy?



When General Johnston, about the 1st of October last, made a call upon several of the States of the Southwest, including the State of Tennessee, for large numbers of troops, why was that call revoked? Was the act of revocation in pursuance of an order from the War Department or upon his own judgment merely?

Has the Department received any official reports of the affair at Fort Henry or Fort Donelson or touching the surrender of Nashville? If so, communicate the same.

ROBT. E. DIXON,  
*Clerk House of Representatives.*

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HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT,  
*Decatur, Ala., March 17, 1862.*

SIR: In answer to certain interrogatories addressed to me by the chairman of the special committee of the House of Representatives, dated "Richmond, Va., March 10, 1862," I have the honor to submit the following:

I. After being placed in command of the Confederate forces in the Western Department I proceeded to Columbus, Ky., to confer with Major-General Polk. I left Columbus on the 13th and arrived at Bowling Green, Ky., on the 14th of October. At the time of my arrival Brigadier-General Buckner's effective force (General B. was then in command there) was about 5,000 men, effective. Major-General Hardee's army corps was by my order arriving at that time from the West. This force increased the army at Bowling Green about 6,000 men. On the 28th of October, the date that I assumed the immediate command of the army, my effective force at Bowling Green was, say, 12,000 men.

II. The number of the enemy's force at that time between Bowling Green and the Ohio River, in my immediate front, was estimated by me at 20,000, but, in addition to this force, he had large auxiliary forces on either flank, and his army was being rapidly re-enforced from the States of Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Kentucky.

III. Bowling Green was fortified for the reason that, in my judgment and that of my generals, it was the most defensible point that could be selected to cover Nashville and our southern line of operations, extending from Cumberland Gap to the Mississippi River. It is naturally strong; a salient point on the railways and turnpike roads passing through Kentucky; was difficult to turn by an aggressive enemy, and was the most eligible depot and base of operations for an advancing army. It is proper to say that at the time fortifications were commenced at Bowling Green I had hopes that my army would be sufficiently augmented to enable me to make an advance against the enemy. Finding, however, that his forces were increasing very much more rapidly than my own, additional and strong defenses were erected at Bowling Green to prevent the position being carried by the overwhelming numbers of the enemy.

IV. At the time of the fall of Fort Henry my effective force at Bowling Green, say February 7, was 22,000 men. I immediately detached 8,000 of this force, under Brigadiers Floyd and Buckner, to re-enforce Fort Donelson, in addition to 4,000 ordered from Hopkinsville and Clarksville to the same point, thus making the force at Fort Donelson on the 13th, the first day of the conflict there, 17,000 men.

V. I received no dispatches from the commanding or other general at Donelson asking for re-enforcements either before or during the conflict.

[A. S. JOHNSTON.]



HDQRS. FIRST CORPS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,  
*Corinth, Miss., April 1, 1862.*

General A. SIDNEY JOHNSTON,  
*Commanding Army of the Mississippi, Corinth, Miss.:*

GENERAL: In conformity with your order to report to you on the defenses of the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers at the time of my taking command at the West, I have to say that those defenses were at that time not included in my command, nor were they until after you assumed the charge of the Western Department. My command up to that time was limited on the north and east by the Tennessee River.

Shortly after you took command of the Western Department Lieutenant Dixon, of the Corps of Engineers, was instructed by you to make an examination of the works at Forts Henry and Donelson and to report upon them.

These instructions were complied with, and he reported that the former fort, which was nearly completed, was built not at the most favorable position, but that it was a strong work, and, instead of abandoning it and building at another place, he advised that it should be completed and other works constructed on the high lands just above the fort on the opposite side of the river.

Measures for the accomplishment of this were adopted as rapidly as the means at our disposal would allow. A negro force which was offered by planters on the Tennessee River in North Alabama was employed on the work, and efforts were made to push it to completion as fast as the means at command would allow.

Lieutenant Dixon made also a similar reconnaissance on the Cumberland, and gave it as his opinion that although a better position might have been chosen for the fortifications on that river, yet, under the circumstances then surrounding our command, it would be better to retain and strengthen the position chosen.

He accordingly made surveys for additional outworks, and the service of a considerable slave force was obtained to construct them. This work was continued and kept under the supervision of Lieutenant Dixon. Lieutenant Dixon also advised the placing of obstructions in the Cumberland at a certain point below, where there was shoal water, so as to afford protection to the operatives engaged on the fortifications against the enemy's gunboats. This was done, and it operated as a check to the navigation so long as the water continued low.

You are aware that efforts were made to obtain heavy ordnance to arm these forts, but as we had to rely on supplies from the Atlantic sea-coast, they came slowly, and it became necessary to divert a number of pieces intended for Columbus to the service of those forts.

The principal difficulty in the way of a successful defense of the rivers in question was the want of an adequate force—a force of infantry and a force of experienced artillerymen. They were applied for by you and also by me, and the appeal was made earnestly to every quarter from whence relief might be hoped for. Why it was not furnished others must say. I believe that the chief reason, so far as the infantry was concerned, was the want of arms. As to experienced artillerymen, they were not in the country, or at least to be spared from other points.

When General Tilghman was made brigadier-general he was assigned by you to the command of the defenses on the Tennessee and Cumberland. It was at a time when the operations of the enemy had begun to be active on these rivers, and the difficulty of communicating

as rapidly as the exigencies of the service required, through the circuitous route to Columbus, made it expedient for him to place himself in direct communication with general headquarters. Nevertheless, all the support I could give him in answer to his calls was afforded. He received from Columbus a detachment of artillery officers as instructors of his troops on two several occasions, and all the infantry at my command that could be spared from the defense of Columbus.

The importance of gunboats as an element of power in our military operations was frequently brought to the attention of the Government. One transport boat, the Eastport, was ordered to be purchased and converted into a gunboat on the Tennessee River, but it was unfortunately too late to be of any service.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. POLK,  
*Major-General, Commanding.\**

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\*This letter accidentally duplicated on pp. 710, 711.

# APPENDIX.

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Embracing communications received too late for insertion in proper sequence.

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WASHINGTON, *December 5, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL:

I have again telegraphed Major-General Halleck for information as to his gunboats and disposable troops. As soon as I receive reply will arrange details with you. Send me draught of water in Cumberland River to Nashville and in Tennessee River. Your letter of 30th received.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, U. S. Army.*

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HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO.  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 16, 1861.*

Brigadier-General BUELL:

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Lieutenant-Colonel Letcher, First Kentucky Cavalry, reached this place to-day, with five companies of his regiment, on his way to Piketon. The additional company ordered by you yesterday will probably reach here to-morrow. I have directed Colonel Letcher to take 80 rounds per man, which will be enough until his supplies reach him from your headquarters. I find it a difficult matter to keep the troops at Somerset and Columbia supplied from this department with the limited means of transportation at my command. Neither Colonel Dudley's nor Colonel Hobson's regiments have wagons, and the Eighteenth Infantry and Colonel Barnes' regiment are also without wagons. We have very few wagons for the brigade and division trains, and although requisitions have been made frequently none have been received. It is absolutely necessary that we should have them as soon as possible.

I have 4 prisoners in camp: 3 of them are Confederate soldiers; the other is a Dr. Jackson, who shot the soldier of the Minnesota regiment on last Friday night. From the report made by the men I am inclined to think the shooting was entirely unprovoked, and the prisoner, from his avowed secession sentiments, should be kept in confinement in some one of the military prisons.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers.*



HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Lebanon, Ky., December 17, 1861.*

Brigadier General BUELL,  
*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: Lieutenant-Colonel Henderson, Thirty-third Indiana, reports to me that it will be impossible for him to send the sick of his regiment to Camp Dick Robinson without taking the well men also to take care of them. He thinks by encamping the regiment in the neighborhood of Crab Orchard that the sick will be much better cared for there than if removed to Camp Robinson. He reports the arrival of three surgeons from Indiana to assist in the hospitals, and that the condition of the sick is much improved. He also reports that Colonel Coburn is at Lexington, very dangerously ill with typhoid fever.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

HEADQUARTERS,  
*Washington, D. C., December 29, 1861.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville:*

Johnson, Maynard, &c., are again becoming frantic, and have President Lincoln's sympathy excited. Political considerations would make it advisable to get the arms and troops into Eastern Tennessee at a very early day; you are, however, the best judge. Can you tell me about when and in what force you will be in Eastern Tennessee? Is Schoepf competent? Do you wish any promotions made from your colonels? Better get the Eastern Tennessee arms and clothing into position for distribution as soon as possible. I will write you fully as soon as I am well enough. Please answer by telegraph.

GEO. B. McCLELLAN,  
*Major-General, U. S. Army.*

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *Washington, January 1, 1862.*

MY DEAR GENERAL HALLECK: General McClellan is not dangerously ill, as I hope, but would better not to be disturbed with business. I am very anxious that, in case of General Buell's moving toward Nashville, the enemy shall not be greatly re-enforced, and I think there is danger he will be from Columbus. It seems to me that a real or feigned attack upon Columbus from up-river at the same time would either prevent this or compensate for it by throwing Columbus into our hands. I wrote General Buell a letter similar to this, meaning that he and you shall communicate and act in concert, unless it be your judgment and his that there is no necessity for it. You and he will understand much better than I how to do it. Please do not lose time in this matter.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
*Camp near Campbellsville, Ky., January 1, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,  
*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: When I wrote you that I should start on Tuesday (yes-

terday) with my command I was under the impression that sufficient teams could be procured in the neighborhood of Lebanon to place 100,000 rations in Columbia at once. I find, however, that it cannot be done since leaving Lebanon, and have therefore halted at this place, and will send back to-morrow all the regimental teams (except four to each regiment) for a load of subsistence, which will enable me to place in Columbia over 100,000 rations by Sunday. To effect this will only delay me two days at most, for were I to go direct to Columbia I should be compelled to halt there for rations to arrive before I could advance, as it is extremely difficult to procure supplies on the road between Columbia and Somerset. Moreover, as there is considerable excitement here about a threatened advance of the enemy on Greensburg, my halt here will have the effect of misleading the people as to the prime object of the move. After getting the supplies into Columbia I shall be ready to move without delay.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. H. THOMAS,  
*Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers.*

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HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH BRIGADE,  
*Columbia, Ky., January 3, 1862.*

General BUELL,

*Commanding Department of the Ohio, Louisville, Ky. :*

SIR: General Zollicoffer has received re-enforcements to amount of six regiments—about 4,000 men. I learn this reliably. Zollicoffer has sent a force down on this side the Cumberland as far as Wolf Creek, with teams, to forage the country. A considerable cavalry force has been in Jamestown.

I am informed to-day that a part of Zollicoffer's force is at the mouth of Greasy Creek, 6 miles beyond Jamestown, in Russell County. They are preparing to fortify themselves at mouth of Greasy Creek, on the Cumberland. If time is given them they will soon be fortified so as not to be dislodged without great loss. If prompt action was taken they could be prevented taking and holding the position. As soon as they secure the point they will take Burkesville. They will now have possession of the Cumberland River. They have six or seven little steamboats at Celina ready to come up with clothing, commissary stores, &c. They will ravage and devastate the whole country along the river, feeding their people and leaving ours to starve.

I will be obliged to you to send Captain Gilbert here, and that you immediately telegraph the President to appoint Captain Gilbert brigadier-general in my place.

I will write you fully on this subject on to-morrow. If it be the purpose of the President to appoint me, of which I am not advised, I think I ought to decline the appointment in favor of Captain Gilbert or any really qualified man.

My letter will explain itself.

Respectfully, &c.,

J. T. BOYLE,  
*Acting Brigadier-General.*

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EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, January 6, 1862.

Brigadier-General BUELL :

MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatch of yesterday has been received, and it



disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to General McClellan, who says he will write you to-day. I am not competent to criticise your views, and therefore what I offer is merely in justification of myself. Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville—first, because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication, which Nashville does not; and, secondly, because it is in the midst of loyal people, who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. Again, I cannot see why the movement on East Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor rather than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement toward Nashville is the main object.

But my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South. My dispatch, to which yours is an answer, was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard, of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know the answer, which I cannot safely show them. They would despair, possibly resign, to go and save their families somehow or die with them.

I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely, as intimated before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

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EXECUTIVE MANSION,  
*Washington, January 13, 1862.*

Brigadier-General BUELL:

MY DEAR SIR: Your dispatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, "I have received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote all my efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares I have not seen nor asked to see General McClellan's letter to you. For my own views, I have not offered, and do not now offer them, as orders; and while I am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty in regard to them better than I do.

With this preliminary I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much.

To illustrate: Suppose last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had foreborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. I mention this to illustrate and not to criticise. I did not lose confidence in McDowell, and I think less harshly of Patterson than some others seem to. In application of the general rule I am suggesting every particular case will have its modifying circumstances, among which the most constantly present and most difficult to meet will be the want of perfect knowledge of the enemy's movements.



This had its part in the Bull Run case; but worse in that case was the expiration of the terms of the three-months' men.

Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down-river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both, left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road.

Yours, very truly,

A. LINCOLN.

[Indorsement.]

JANUARY 13, 1862.

Having to-day written General Buell a letter, it occurs to me to send General Halleck a copy of it.

A. LINCOLN.

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SAINT LOUIS, *January 15, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. LORENZO THOMAS,

*Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington :*

GENERAL: I am fully satisfied, from the inquiries made of officers of confidence who visited Paducah, that there are no real grounds of complaint against General Smith; certainly not sufficient to justify his withdrawal. His command is reported in the best discipline and order of any one in the department.

An attempt has been made for several months to injure General Smith by newspaper attacks. This was done for the purpose of having him removed to give place for another aspirant, who, by all accounts, is totally unfit for any command. General Smith applied some weeks ago for a court of inquiry to examine into the conduct of certain officers of his command, which application was forwarded to your office for the action of the President, but received no reply.

Under these circumstances I sent General Cullum, General Sturgis, Colonel Totten, and others to Paducah on inspecting duty, to report on the condition of the command. In order to leave these officers free from all prejudice in the matter, I did not inform them of any particular subject of examination till they returned. I then asked them directly as to the difficulty between General Smith and some of the officers of his command, and each one has answered that in his opinion the blame should rest, not on General Smith, but on others. Such, I am informed, is also the opinion of General Grant, who now commands the district.

I was not aware that any formal report on this matter was expected of me or I should have reported some time ago. That part of General McClellan's orders to place General Grant in command of the district was executed, but the part relating to the withdrawal of General Smith was suspended.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

SAINT LOUIS, *January 24, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. C. F. SMITH,  
*Commanding, &c., Paducah :*

GENERAL: Please send me at your earliest convenience a full description of the road and country from Smithland to Dover and Fort Henry; also of the road south of the Tennessee to Fort Henry, and the means of crossing the river at different points above Paducah. This report should be as much in detail as your means of information will allow. I particularly wish to know the character of the country between these roads and the rivers, and whether it is such that troops can sustain or be sustained by the gunboats; also a description of the roads and country east of the Cumberland, and its character with regard to military movements of an enemy.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

JANUARY 27, 1862.

Lieutenant-Colonel COLBURN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington; D. C. :*

General Thomas had orders to pursue the enemy with all possible vigor, but the difficulty of crossing the river delayed the pursuit, which now would perhaps be fruitless, as all information goes to show that they are entirely dispersed. General Schoepf, however, is, I suppose, in Monticello to-day, where, there being no enemy to pursue, he will remain until further orders. The rest of the division is at Mill Springs and Somerset, collecting captured property and repairing the road, which is nearly impassable. I have four regiments at work corduroying it entirely for a distance of about 40 miles. It will not otherwise be possible to carry trains over it. Even now it is with the greatest difficulty that the troops there are imperfectly supplied with provisions.

The principal part of General Carter's brigade has been at Somerset. I have ordered it back to the Cumberland Gap route to advance on the Gap. When I ordered Thomas forward to attack Zollicoffer I expected by the time that was accomplished to be able to advance him at once into East Tennessee; but want of transportation and the condition of the roads have thus far rendered it impossible.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  
*Saint Louis :*

MY DEAR GENERAL: I have recommended A. J. Smith for brigadier-general, as you requested, and when his name is acted upon will assign him to duty with you. I have also recommended General Hitchcock, as you desire. Your welcome letter in regard to future operations is received. I will reply in full in a day or two. In the mean time get your force in hand and study the ground. I will try to-day to send you some more infantry arms. Cavalry arms are terribly scarce. I have had to take to lances here to supply deficiencies. I like your views as to the

future. They fully agree with my own ideas from the beginning, which has ever been against a movement in force down the Mississippi itself. The news from the Burnside expedition is by no means so unfavorable as the telegram reports. He had terrible gales while crowded in a small harbor. The only real evil of consequence is the delay.

I will try to devote this afternoon to you and Buell, to give you my views and intentions in full.

Can you spare Stanley to Buell as chief of cavalry, or shall I look elsewhere to get him one? He (Buell) has not asked for him, but I know him to be a first-rate officer.

I am very sorry that you have been so ill, but sincerely hope that you are now quite well again.

While I think of it, do you not think that it would be well to try one of those mortar floats thoroughly with 50 or 100 discharges before arming them all? *Je m'en doute un peu.* It is very desirable to move all along the line by the 22d February, if possible.

In haste, sincerely, your friend,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

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LOUISVILLE, KY.,

February 1, 1862.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,

*Commanding U. S. Army:*

MY DEAR GENERAL: Since my reply to your last letter I have directed my efforts to the object you had in view. The obstacles I have had to fight against are the want of transportation and the condition of the roads. The former alone has been an insuperable obstacle to an advance into East Tennessee, and when that is overcome I feel it my duty to tell you, with the light of the experience we are now having, that the latter will effectually bar our progress in that direction on a footing which will promise anything but failure. I will give you my reasons; you can judge what they are worth:

It is 200 miles or thereabouts from our depots (at the terminus of the railroad) to Knoxville or the nearest point on the Tennessee Railroad. At the best supplies are meager along the whole route, and if they suffice for a trip or two must by that time be entirely exhausted for any distance that we can reach along both sides of the road.

From Somerset to Jacksborough we will scarcely find any at all. East Tennessee is almost entirely stripped of wheat by the enemy. In the productive region there is still a small surplus of corn and wheat. We must supply two-thirds of the ration from our depots here, and we must of course depend on them also for our ordnance and other stores. It will take 1,000 wagons constantly going to supply 10,000 men. We can judge of the effect of that amount of hauling on the dirt roads of this country by the experience we have already had. Forty of the 80 miles from Lebanon to Somerset are of that sort of road, and it is evident that it would soon become impassable, to obviate which I have five regiments now engaged in corduroying it throughout; but it is a tedious work, too much so to be undertaken on the whole route to East Tennessee. If the number of troops and consequently the amount of hauling is increased the difficulty is increased in a greater proportion. The limited amount of forage on the route will be speedily exhausted, as besides provisions for our men we must have forage for our animals; a thing that is not to be thought of.



In my previous letter I set down three divisions (say 30,000 effective men) as the force that would be required for East Tennessee, two to penetrate the country and one to keep open communications. I believe that is the least force that will suffice, and it ought to be able to establish itself promptly before it can be anticipated by a force of the enemy sufficient to make the result doubtful. With railroads converging from the east, west, and south, it ought not to be difficult for them to get a pretty formidable force in that country in ten days. The people of East Tennessee are loyal, and will remain so, though submitting to the power that has subjugated them. They will rise whenever they can see themselves properly supported and we can put arms in their hands, but not before in any efficient manner. It would be cruel to induce them to do so on any other conditions.

For the reasons I have stated I have been forced reluctantly to the conviction that an advance into East Tennessee is impracticable at this time on any scale which will be sufficient. I have ordered General Carter's brigade to move on the Gap, but I fear very much that even that will be compelled to fall back for supplies, such is the condition of the roads over which they have to be hauled.

Having stated to you candidly the difficulties in the way of the object you have so much at heart, you will naturally expect to know what I propose to do in the mean time. It is to move at once against Bowling Green, in combination with an attack up the Tennessee and Cumberland and an effective demonstration against Columbus, each in sufficient force to do its work with the enemy's force divided. Any operations which depend on celerity with the roads in their present condition are out of the question. The object must be accomplished by hard knocks. The enemy is strongly fortified at Bowling Green and is daily increasing his strength along the whole front, of which that place and Columbus are the flanks. It is dangerous to allow him to continue the work of preparation. I believe he will rate the importance of his positions along his front in this order: First, the rivers, including Nashville; second, Bowling Green; third, Columbus. His center is now the most vulnerable point, as it is also the most decisive. The attack on it should be made by an adequate force, and should be determined and persistent. Twenty thousand men might commence it, and these should probably be increased very soon to 30,000. The first object should be to carry Fort Henry, Dover, and Clarksville, destroying the bridges; in fact the latter ought to be effected by the gunboats by surprise while the rivers are swollen, as suggested in my letter yesterday. These objects accomplished and Nashville in danger, the resistance at Bowling Green will give way; otherwise the struggle at that point will be protracted and difficult. An examination of the accompanying map, made up from the best information we can obtain, will satisfy you of this.\* Besides being strongly fortified, the river in front is a formidable barrier. You are aware that by means of locks it is navigable for steamers to the city; above that it is fordable in low water, but not now. You will see from this that the attack must commence and be carried on to a considerable extent with heavy artillery. As far as that goes, inequality of numbers will not matter much; but after a while the river must be crossed, and then if they are allowed to swell their force, as they can do if not occupied at other points, we might have more than we could attend to. It is possible also that we may have to fight before we get possession of the heights that will enable us to use heavy artillery. I have certain notions as to the plan of attack, but so much depends on

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\* Not found.

the ground that it would be useless to state them in detail; besides, the circumstances may change in the mean time. We shall be dependent on the railroad, which must be repaired as we advance. It will take ten days or more to reach their position from Green River.

I am not unconscious of the magnitude of the work I propose, but it has to be done, and the sooner we can do it the better.

While you were sick, by direction of the President I proposed to Halleck some concert of action between us. He answered, "I can do nothing; name a day for a demonstration." Night before last I received a dispatch from him, saying, "I have ordered an advance on Fort Henry and Dover. It will be made immediately." I protest against such prompt proceedings, as though I had nothing to do but command "Commence firing" when he starts off. However he telegraphs me to-night that co-operation is not essential now.

Truly, yours,

D. C. BUELL.

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HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*February 1, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  
*Commanding Department of the Missouri :*

GENERAL: General McClellan directs me to inclose you an extract from the report of a man sent South by him. The man has been in the general's employ for the past six or seven months, and he thinks the statement perfectly reliable as far as it goes.

The general has ordered the Chief of Ordnance to send the following arms to you immediately. He hopes to be able to send you at least 10,000 more very soon: One thousand and thirty-six Vincennes rifles, 750 short Enfield rifles with sword bayonets (without the bayonets these will answer for cavalry until other arms can be supplied), 1,500 revolvers, and 5,000 sabers. These are all the arms at present on hand which can be supplied. He will be glad to have you make a statement of what arms you require.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. V. COLBURN,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

[Inclosure.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
*Washington, D. C., January 31, 1862.*

At Lynchburg, on the 9th January, six crowded cars, loaded with soldiers, were taken into the train, bound for Bowling Green. These were a part of Floyd's and Wise's commands from Western Virginia, under orders for Richmond, but order countermanded at Lynchburg.

During the day of the 10th, operative, being at Abingdon, Va., saw a part of Floyd's and Wise's commands (a cavalry regiment—about 700, including two pieces of artillery manned). These, too, were *en route* for Richmond from Western Virginia, but were ordered back to Western Virginia from Abingdon. The cavalry was armed principally with breech-loading rifles, made in Baltimore; also each with Colt's revolvers, navy size, and several with heavy, large shot-guns for buck-shot, each having saber; artillery, two 6-pounders, iron, one smooth, one rifled.

Question asked, "Why going back?" Answer. "To hold the Yankees in check in Western Virginia, as they were coming and destroying



everything." Soldiers said, "Forage in Western Virginia nearly all consumed, and what to do on returning they did not see." Soldiers further said the roads in Western Virginia were horrible; the men were mostly farmers and looked hearty; horses nearly worn-out.

Morning of 17th January operative left Abingdon, Va., *en route* for Nashville; reached Knoxville same evening; laid over during night, as trains do not run nights for fear of Union men throwing off trains, &c.; on the way—at Uniontown—bridge across the river at that place entirely destroyed some weeks before, when "bridge-burning" was general. Passengers at Union Station have to leave cars and walk around about 1½ miles, over wagon-road bridge, which latter was sought to be destroyed, but not accomplished.

At Union Station was one company of infantry, stationed to guard materials, on which 30 men were employed building the bridge anew. At Jonesborough, Tenn., was stationed a company of infantry, to guard railroad and check uprising of Union men; at Greenville, two companies of infantry and two pieces of light artillery, for the same purpose; at Russellville, Tenn., one company of infantry, same purpose; another at Mossy Creek; at all railroad bridges, large and small, guards stationed.

At Knoxville, stationed one regiment of infantry and four pieces of artillery. A lieutenant at Knoxville stated that they were not half armed, but well dressed; stated further that if the soldiers were removed the Union men would be as bad as ever in twenty four hours, and that he did not believe there were ten good Southern men in Knoxville, and he thought best to hang them all, as it cost more to keep them down than all East Tennessee was worth; had he his way he would "hang old Brownlow that night." Brownlow had been in prison, but was allowed home on account of his being very sick, and was then expected to die every day. Provisions at Knoxville plenty; business nothing, except tanneries.

Left Knoxville, Tenn., 12th January; 150 soldiers left on train for Bowling Green, composed of infantry, not of those stationed at Knoxville; at Loudon, Tenn., stationed one company of infantry to guard railroad; at Mouse Creek another, same purpose; at Cleveland, Tenn., another, same purpose.

Arrived at Chattanooga the 12th, at night, going immediately on toward Nashville, reaching that place the next morning.

January 13th, the cars run at night west of Chattanooga; all bridges between Chattanooga and Knoxville guarded the same as east of Knoxville, the small as well as the large ones.

At Nashville are two regiments of infantry; one stationed on Fair Grounds, about 1 mile southeast of Nashville; the other stationed across Cumberland River, over from Nashville, at a short distance from the river; all comfortably but coarsely dressed; all armed with percussion muskets.

About 1 mile below Nashville, on Cumberland River, as told by the landlord of the City Hotel, the rebels were building two fortifications, earthworks, one on each side of the river, to keep any boats from coming up; the work was performed entirely by slaves.

Railroad bridge at Nashville, over the Cumberland, as well as a suspension bridge, guarded by soldiers.

Near the Bowling Green and Nashville Railroad depot are three very large buildings, now used as hospitals and full of sick; seemed well cared for, but so crowded that the stench coming from the outside doors was almost unbearable.



Percussion caps are made at Nashville; employ about 11 hands.

Sunday, the 14th January, operative left for Bowling Green from Nashville; about 18 miles from Nashville switch turned, supposed purposely; seven passenger cars, 300 soldiers; engine ran off at the beginning of a "fill," turning clean over, smashing the baggage car and partly one passenger car. Only one or two hurt. The conductor spoke of three engines thus entirely lost or ruined, and said they would at that rate be out of engines.

No bridges guarded between Bowling Green and Nashville; streams all small; all rivers high on all the routes, from heavy and long-continued rains.

Monday, January 15, operative, with horse and buggy (having a pass from the provost-marshal), visited the First Arkansas Regiment, Colonel Cleburne, stationed about 3 miles northwest from Bowling Green. On the way out he counted thirty-eight regiments of infantry, including those at Bowling Green; saw seven field batteries; some of four, some of six, guns; range 6 to 12 pounders; part smooth, part rifled; part brass and part iron; one battery, all brass, supposed the same as had Major Bragg in Mexico.

About northwest by north one about a mile, another  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Bowling Green, were being built one eight gun battery and one of four guns; the largest nearest to the town and nearly completed; two guns already mounted.

One regiment of cavalry was stationed near the largest battery, and another at the edge of a timber, about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  miles from Bowling Green and just north of the First Arkansas Regiment. There are two which claim to be the First Arkansas Regiment, the one near Bowling Green and another at Dumfries, Va.

The number of regiments stationed at and around Bowling Green and between that place and Cave City, as stated by Major Harris, of the First Arkansas, to my operative, while dining in his tent, was eighty, all told.

Major Harris, who is a brother of the Governor of Tennessee, further stated to my operative that of these eighty regiments six or seven were cavalry regiments; that one of these was known as one of Ben. McCulloch's Texan Rangers; Major Harris did not know how many field batteries were with these eighty regiments, but upon counting over between himself and Colonel Claiborne they concluded that there were between 80 and 90 guns in field batteries.

Major Harris and others in the First Arkansas, speaking of the time of their enlistment being up in May, said that they were going home anyhow when their time had expired, and would make those who had not yet enlisted fill the ranks; but that if Virginia passed the proposed law now before her legislature, compelling the regiments which had been made up from one year's enlistments to continue service during the war, the whole force of one year's enlistment would refuse to serve beyond the termination of their enlistment.

Major Harris also stated that Colonel Hindman had been made brigadier-general, and was then engaged in destroying the tunnel north of Cave City, on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, having already also burned every building in Cave City.

The clothing of the troops at and about Bowling Green is poor and wearing out, and so far as talked with Major Harris said they were getting tired of the war, especially of its inactivity.

The First Arkansas Regiment was in log tents, but very many of the regiments were comfortless in canvas tents.

The roads were very bad, so bad that in returning from the First Arkansas Regiment to Bowling Green my operative was compelled several times to lift his buggy wheels to enable the horse to draw it out of deep mud.

A very large mountain or hill, one-half mile high, rises, with its base on the east side of the town of Bowling Green. Half a mile from base to summit; nearly as steep as the roof of a house, or quarter pitch, on the top of which, at or near the very summit, is a heavy earthwork, mounted with very heavy guns, said to be the largest in that region. Operative met guard half way up the mountain, who stopped him from going up to examine the fort.

Forage was getting very scarce at Bowling Green, and was then brought from 10 to 12 miles. Eight Texan Rangers rode into Bowling Green. The arms used by that force were large buck-shot double-barreled guns and Colt's navy revolvers.

Not over sixty regiments at Bowling Green in the opinion of my operative, who thinks the statement of Major Harris exaggerated. A. Sidney Johnston is in command of that division, and is at Bowling Green in person. General Hardee, of Hardee's Tactics, was also there.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,  
Louisville, Ky., February 5, 1862.

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,  
*Commanding Department of Missouri :*

GENERAL: My plan of operations was sketched in the letter which I wrote you on the — ultimo. You have, I learn from your letter and dispatches, entered upon what would have concerned it on your side, and that is a very important part of it. I regret that we could not have consulted upon it earlier, because my work must at first be slow. Besides, since I wrote you those plans have been changed, or at least suspended, in consequence of the diversion of a large part of my efficient force for other objects, which the General-in-Chief urged as of primary importance, namely, our advance into East Tennessee. I have, however, in consequence of the want of transportation, and, more than all, the impassable condition of the roads, urged him to allow me to resume my original plan, and, if I am not restricted, shall enter upon its execution at once. My troops have, however, been thrown somewhat out of position, and it will take some days to get them into place. My progress, too, must be slow, for we are dependent upon the railroad for supplies, and that we must repair as we go, the enemy having very much damaged it between Green River and Bowling Green, 40 miles. That will take ten or twelve days. I must go provided with a siege train, because the enemy is strongly intrenched with heavy artillery behind a river, and the condition of the roads will, I fear, effectually bar any plan of attack which will depend on celerity of movement.

I think it is quite plain that the center of the enemy's line—that part which you are now moving against—is the decisive point of his whole front, as it is also the most vulnerable. If it is held, or even the bridges on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers destroyed and your force maintains itself near those points, Bowling Green will speedily fall and Columbus will soon follow. The work which you have undertaken is therefore of the very highest importance, without reference to the injurious effects of a failure. There is not in the whole field of operations

a point at which every man you can raise can be employed with more effect or with the prospect of as important results.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,  
*Washington, February 6, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK:

MY DEAR GENERAL: I received your letters in regard to Sigel and at once showed them to Secretary Stanton, who requests me to say to you from him that you can rely upon his full and cordial support. He thinks that the power of the Germans by no means equals their wishes, and that you will find means to keep order. You may rely upon it that you have the confidence of all here; I need not repeat to you that you have mine.

The roads being impassable between Buell and his opponents, it now becomes a question whether we cannot throw all our available force by the two rivers upon Nashville. Can we move them now in that manner?

I will try to-night to write you my views more fully.

In great haste, truly, yours,

GEO. B. McCLELLAN.

SAINT LOUIS, *February 6, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. G. W. CULLUM, *Chief of Staff:*

GENERAL: On your arrival at Cairo you will proceed to carry out the verbal instructions which I have given to you, issuing in my name such orders as may be necessary for that purpose.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,  
*Major-General.*

LOUISVILLE, *February 8, 1862—10 p. m.*  
(Received February 9, 1862, 9 p. m.)

Major-General HALLECK, *Saint Louis, Mo.:*

Your position on the Tennessee involves two questions in which I am concerned: First, a new plan of campaign; second, the rescue of your column, if it should come to that. The first I have had in my mind, and may depend very much on your further success. The second will leave me no option but to use every man not necessary for defense here to effect the object, if possible. If General Grant should be beleaguered so as to be in danger, you will of course inform me of it.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

(Copy to McClellan February 9, 1862, 9 a. m.)

WASHINGTON, *February 9, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. D. C. BUELL, *Louisville:*

The President directs me to say that he has read your communication to Maj. Gen. G. B. McClellan, dated the 1st and mailed the 6th of



this month, and that he approves the operations you propose therein, and believes, if vigorously prosecuted, they cannot fail. He desires you and Major-General Halleck to co-operate as far as possible, and says that your two heads together will succeed.

EDWIN M. STANTON,  
*Secretary of War.*

FEBRUARY 12, 1862—7.30 p. m.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. McCLELLAN,  
*Commanding U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.:*

I will advance up the Tennessee or Cumberland with a portion of my force, leaving the rest to operate against Bowling Green. They are closing on that point now, but, as I wrote you, an attack on it of itself must be tedious. The movement to the Tennessee is difficult, but promises great results. It should be thoroughly supported. It will probably require transports fitted up with some view to defense against sudden attack, and the rivers must be made absolutely secure by gunboats against any attempt to occupy them in force. There ought to be five gunboats to each river. The present gunboats cannot run in low water either there or in the Ohio. Broader ones, drawing not more than 3 feet, ought to be got up at once. Paducah should be held by not less than 10,000 men as long as the enemy occupies Columbus in force. Let me suggest to you to be prepared any day to throw strong re-enforcements into these movements. The enemy will do it, and it will probably be necessary for us at any rate, as we must be divided and he is fortified at so many points.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

FEBRUARY 13, 1862.

General McCook, *Munfordsville:*

We will have to give up the plan of moving you by railroad.

March to the mouth of Salt River and get there Sunday. Take your supply of ammunition with you in an ammunition train, independent of the one hundred wagons for supply train. Start with five days' rations. Has Negley's brigade moved?

The three batteries other than yours that have been with you are all Nelson's.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI,  
*Saint Louis, February 14, 1862.*

Brig. Gen. D. C. BUELL,  
*Louisville, Ky.:*

GENERAL: I inclose herewith a sketch of a portion of the Cumberland River and the position of the enemy's batteries. The number of guns marked is merely fancy, as we have no positive information of their present strength. It has been much increased since our spies were there. You will see the positions indicated for the mortar boats to shell them out. The armored gunboats will probably be able to approach

much nearer. Can you send me by mail a good map of Tennessee. I can get none here.

Yours, truly,

H. W. HALLECK.

FEBRUARY 15, 1862.

General McCLELLAN :

I fear the accumulation of rolling stock by the way of Green River would be slow, but may be important and worth the effort. I will look into it.

The gauge of this road is different from that of most of the roads in the West. I know the importance of time, and shall try not to waste any. We are certainly busy now. I am moving nearly my whole force on Bowling Green, because that is a point from which we can move to any position of the enemy in advance, and because it possesses more facilities for the formation of a depot than any other inland. My troops are disposed as follows: Mitchel's division at Bowling Green; McCook's division will be there Wednesday, unless it shall be found necessary to stop him this side for supplies; Wood's division at Munfordville, just having concentrated there from the Somerset line; Thomas' division is now passing through Lebanon from Somerset toward Bowling Green via Bardstown and New Haven; Boyle's brigade, moving from Columbia, will be at Edmonton to-night on the way to Glasgow. My cavalry is mostly on Green River. It cannot at present go beyond reach of the railroad. The whole country in advance is a waste.

Carter's column, consisting of six regiments of infantry, one battery (six pieces), and five companies of cavalry at London, should in a few days be advancing on Cumberland Gap. Garfield's brigade, consisting of five regiments of infantry and eight companies of cavalry, is on the Sandy at Piketon, and moving to drive Marshall's thinned ranks away from the headwaters of Kentucky River at Whitesburg. He reports the most favorable change in the disposition of the people in the region where he is. The people give evidence of loyalty. Large parties of deserters from Marshall's ranks are returning in penitence and destitution to their homes.

The above shows the disposition of the main or available force. The rest, in small commands, occupies various points on routes, thus: One regiment at Somerset; one regiment and two sections of artillery at Jamestown, on the Cumberland; one at Columbia, and others distributed to guard bridges, &c. I shall very soon concentrate these somewhat as we move forward and take new positions. I have not included the re-enforcements I have sent to Halleck, that is, in all, twenty-four regiments and three batteries, including Nelson's division just going off and eight regiments from Ohio and Indiana. You know, though the people do not seem to, that armies with the appliances which are necessary to make them successful cannot move over dirt roads in the winter with quite as much facility as a man takes the cars at Washington and goes to Baltimore. We hope, and I may even say expect, to get to Nashville, and the more speedily we can do it the better.

You may, and I think will, have to send more troops, in assuming, what is probable, that the enemy will do so; but that does not apply to my present plans. I will write you soon more definitely about that. I look now, as I have said, to Nashville as the first point to be aimed for, but while we are preparing circumstances in Grant's position may make it necessary to move upon Clarksville. Of that it is not possible to

decide at this moment. The same great result would be expected to follow, though perhaps in a less direct way. I suspect you would like to be released, and that I am inflicting more upon you than you bargained for.

D. C. BUELL.

CAIRO, ILL., *February 17, 1862.*

MY DEAR HALLECK: I have telegraphed to-day pretty much all the glorious news of the surrender of Fort Donelson.

I presume your telegram to "Stop all forces required to resist Beauregard" has reference to a possible movement from Columbus on this point which he might make, thinking us stripped of the troops for the Cumberland. I have anticipated it, but was willing to trust to luck a little to strengthen Grant. Now that Fort Donelson has fallen I won't be so generous till all danger has passed. I have had cavalry scouts constantly out on both sides of the Mississippi, and to-day have sent a gunboat and steamer armed with infantry to look along the river, but not to fight.

For our defense I think we have a force that will give the little Frenchman a warm reception.

At this point (Cairo) we have nearly three regiments and a company of artillery to serve the guns in the fort. At Bird's Point we have four small regiments and some cavalry, and at and above Fort Holt say 250 artillery, with sixteen field guns, and 150 cavalry.

Besides the land forces we have two of the disabled gunboats from Fort Donelson—more than capable to encounter any of the rebel gunboats, and two others out of order and with no power of locomotion, but can use their batteries, for which I will supply infantry details.

In consequence of their sending up a rebel steamer this morning to reconnoiter I have this afternoon returned the compliment. I have given special instructions to Colonel Buford and Captain Phelps, who go on the expedition, to carefully observe whether Beauregard or Polk has an accumulation of transportation, or whether, as is possible, they are about to evacuate the place.

I thought it important to push gunboats and the mortar flats to Clarksville, which bars our way to Nashville.

Though I suppose I am no longer necessary here for the present, with three other generals ranking me in the district, yet I will not return till you think I can be spared. As I made provision but for a short stay, if of no special necessity here I would like to return to Saint Louis to bring up arrears and prepare for any forward move you propose. I think I have made ample provision for the wounded at Paducah and Mound City.

Yours, truly,

G. W. CULLUM.

LOUISVILLE, *February 18 [17], 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK,  
*Saint Louis, Mo.:*

As the object of the re-enforcements I have been sending you was to assist at Fort Donelson and succor the force there if necessary, and as they are no longer required for that object, we had best consult about further operations, as well for the great object as to determine the dis-



position to be made of the re-enforcements, which, if they have not gone beyond reach, I have thought it advisable to stop until we understand each other. The object of both of our forces is directly or indirectly to strike at the power of the rebellion in its most vital point within our field. Nashville appears clearly, I think, to be that point now. On your side Clarksville intervenes. It will probably be pretty strongly fortified toward you, but mainly on this side of the river. It has not heretofore had any defenses on the south side, but it may be expected that at least a strong bridge-head will be thrown up on that side, and perhaps even somewhat extensive works, as the railroad bridge affords them the means of communication, though not a very secure one. My impression is that the place could be easily invested on that side so as to cut off their river communications, and without risk to the investing force of being disturbed in rear, the country in that direction being broken and the roads bad. They would still, however, have the railroad via Hadensville and Springfield on the north side. That route is exposed to my attack, and whenever I advance against it, either at Clarksville or any other point, they must fall back, unless succored by a force through Nashville that I cannot beat. It is to be observed, also, that I should be exposed to a continued resistance both from such a force and most of the Clarksville force, which would not be in great danger from your side of the river. There can be no doubt that heavy re-enforcements will be thrown into Nashville from all quarters east and south.

These considerations seem to require a large force on my line, which, in fact, is one on which a large force can be employed; the reverse of the case on your side. The difficulty on this side is one of transportation, and it is a very serious one. To depend on wagons at this season for a large force seems out of the question, and I fear it may be two weeks before I can get a bridge over the Barren River, so as to use the railroad beyond. I shall endeavor, however, to make an advance in much less force before that time. According to this view of the position, I have thought it would be best for my troops to return. Let me hear your views.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

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LOUISVILLE, KY., *February 19, 1862.*

Major-General HALLECK,

*Commanding Department of the West, Saint Louis, Mo.:*

DEAR SIR: I arrived here this morning at 8 o'clock, and have had several interviews with General Buell. He is concentrating forces at Bowling Green with a view of forward movement upon Nashville. It is not possible for him as yet to decide what point on the Cumberland he can move his army to; he may be able to move a large portion of it to Clarksville or to a point about midway between Clarksville and Nashville—possibly to Nashville direct. The country is being examined now with a view to determine the routes upon which his army can move. He is desirous of having your co-operation in the movement upon Nashville, with a portion of your forces and four good gunboats and about six mortars. His own force available for absolute movement upon the city will be about 40,000, which includes Nelson's division, sent to Smithland; this, being a good army in itself, may not require a very large column of your forces.

It is now believed that the railroad will be completed to near Bowling Green by Saturday night or Sunday at the furthest, unless the weather should hold very bad. The bridge at Bowling Green across the Barren River may require two weeks' time; hence the desire of the general for high water in the Green River to get steam transports over the dam at the damaged lock to enable him to get full supplies for his army by water at Bowling Green. He will make a simple transfer at the damaged lock in case the water gets low, keeping boats on each side of the lock.

I shall go with the general to-night at Bowling Green, and there he will determine, from the information received, as to the condition of roads, what he will do in the way of movement upon Nashville, and about the time at which he expects to make the blow.\* The general has information which he believes reliable to the effect that a large part of their forces have been moved from Clarksville to Nashville, and that the defense made at Clarksville will be comparatively light, and will be for purposes of causing delay in movements up the river. A number of small fortifications are erected on the river between Clarksville and Nashville.\* By Saturday or Sunday you may receive definite information as to the plans for movement.

I have explained very fully to General Buell your ideas of a movement up the Tennessee and south thereof, all of which are deemed good, if proper re-enforcements are had from the East.

I find here an intensely bitter feeling against Buckner, and do not think it safe to send him to this point. Many threats are made of lynching him if he is brought into Kentucky. It appears that he was indicted for treason some time since at Louisville, and after his capture at Donelson a writ was issued by the superior court and an officer dispatched for Cairo to bring him here for trial. Fearing trouble, by the advice of some of our Union friends I telegraphed you this morning to hold him in military custody and send him to Ohio or any point you might select until the Secretary of War could be advised. I telegraphed him the purport of my telegraph to you.

Savannah is ours; Norfolk will be in a few days. We then hope for Nashville, Columbus, Memphis, and the cities farther South.

Very truly, yours,

THOMAS A. SCOTT,  
*Assistant Secretary of War.*

P. S.—General Buell showed me your message to him of yesterday's date, which I did not clearly comprehend, and therefore telegraphed you in regard to two points. We leave in a few hours for Bowling Green.

THOMAS A. SCOTT.

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CAIRO, ILL., *February 19, 1862.*

Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK:

MY DEAR GENERAL: It is mighty hard to play everything from corporal to general and to perform the functions of several staff departments almost unaided, as I have done the past two weeks. I hardly get time to eat very much or to sleep. However, I am ready for every and any amount of duty I can stagger under if it will crown

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\* Of these points General Grant must satisfy himself by proper examination before acting.—T. A. S.

the great and masterly work you have so propitiously initiated. I take responsibilities to any extent, and have assumed here command of Army and Navy.

Flag-Officer Foote ordered two more gunboats to the Cumberland, which I have countermanded. I have made the best possible arrangements for defense. I have to-night three serviceable gunboats below Fort Holt, and a fourth without power of locomotion, but serving as a battery.

I have given detailed verbal orders to General Steele to have everything ready to repulse the enemy at Bird's Point and to be on the alert. He has five regiments of infantry, one and a half of cavalry, two field batteries, and his heavy guns. At Cairo we have four regiments of infantry, two batteries of field artillery, and the fort well armed. On the Kentucky shore we have but sixteen field pieces, with 200 artillerymen, 150 cavalry, and two heavy guns in Fort Holt. With these preparations I think we will give the little Frenchman a warm reception. Last night my spy, who goes to report to you at Saint Louis, was in Columbus. He says they have 30,000 men, but dejected by the loss of Fort Donelson; that there are nineteen steamers and gunboats in the river; that Jeff. Thompson is there, with all the garrison of New Madrid (probably not all); that they talk of receiving re-enforcements from Bowling Green, and that on the arrival of a train in the night there was much cheering. His opinion is, though not entitled to much credit, that the boats are there to evacuate the place, and that Polk has no thought of attacking this place. I have not been able to communicate with Sherman to-day, who has had no accession of force since I last wrote. A scout went to Blandville and Lovelaceville; reports all quiet and nothing to be seen of an enemy. I ordered General Hamilton to go to-day to Commerce with a steamer having a squadron of cavalry and, I think, three companies of infantry, but on receiving your telegrams countermanded the order. I have not seen him since; so that possibly he may have got off before receiving my note.

My spy came in this afternoon from Commerce. He reports camping ground dry and sandy; wood near; plenty of water; vacant houses for two regiments; stables and cooper-shop for 75 horses; road good to Benton for the season; rebel cavalry, 40 men; scouts about, having arrested last Sunday Mr. Brown about 6 miles from there, and Mr. Lemly two days ago within  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles of the place, and that 20 horses have been stolen in the last ten days. Little hay about; but 10,000 bushels of corn 3 to 8 miles below town, along the river bottom, and few horses or cattle, nearly all having been stolen. Has not been to New Madrid for some time, but says the road from Benton to New Madrid, through sandy woods and Sikeston, is good, except possibly 2 miles of embankment over swamps near New Madrid. A better road leads from a point 6 miles from New Madrid to Hatcher's house, about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  miles from the town.

Fort Thompson, he says, is now garrisoned with two small Arkansas infantry regiments, in all about 1,000 men, and 400 cavalry, commanded by Major Saul Kitchen, and that the armament is five columbiads, commanding the approach by the river from above, and a battery of six field pieces, sweeping the roads leading from the northwest. We have provided for all the sick and wounded thus far without sending any to Cincinnati, for which we have no steamer to spare. There are 1,400 at Paducah and 1,200 at Mound City, and but few here. Volunteer surgeons and nurses have supplied all my wants, and many more are constantly offering. Hordes of brothers, fathers, mothers, sisters, cousins,



&c., have reached here to find the dead and see the wounded, but I have had to refuse passes to all, as they would fill all our steamers, eat our rations, and be of no service to the wounded. By some strange accident several of your telegrams did not come into my hands till after I had telegraphed urgently to you to-day to know the disposition of the prisoners. All but 1,500 had then gone up the Mississippi, being nearly 10,000. Of the remaining, 1,000 went well guarded to-night and 500 will follow in the morning to Camp Douglas.

For want of steamer and guards I was compelled to send officers as well as men, but had them separated, and have instructed the commanding officer at Camp Douglas to continue to keep them apart. The officers came down with pistols and side-arms, saying it was so agreed by General Grant. I have disarmed them, sending their swords and pistols to the commanding officer at Camp Douglas, to be governed by your instructions in the matter. I have telegraphed to Smithland if any more came down the Cumberland to send them up the Ohio to Jeffersonville, Ind., to go thence by railroad to Indianapolis. I have stopped all forces here, but the telegraph wire broke before my order went to Smithland to send the troops from up the Ohio to Cairo. If the line is not repaired to-morrow I will send by steamer the order by authority of the Secretary of War. Buell telegraphed from Louisville yesterday to Smithland to General Nelson—

Stop your whole command at Smithland, and remain on your transports until further orders are received.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*

I do not think it wise to supersede Paine in command; though he is somewhat of a politician, and not always discreet, he is energetic, full of zeal, has pluck, and knows localities. If Pope is put in command it will deeply mortify and exasperate Paine, who is burning for a brigade in the field. Six mortar boats are in the Cumberland, the others, as got ready, being retained here. The Navy has not yet received a man, and call upon us for everything. I want an engineer, as I have no time myself to give attention to details. If Colonel McPherson is sick, perhaps it will be best to send Thom, if you can spare him.

General Grant took everybody and thing with him, not leaving even a file of your orders, which I daily want for reference. Send one to me by Carpenter or any one coming down. There is some captured property floating about in steamers and I believe considerable tobacco. It could not be sold here; had I not therefore better send it to Saint Louis? I am completely fagged out, and being among the little hours of the morning, I must say good-night.

Yours, very truly,

G. W. CULLUM.

Cumberland Rolling Mills and Iron Foundry, which supplied all the plates for their gunboats and some of their shot and shells, was burned by the Saint Louis, and the proprietor is our prisoner. The foundry was 6 miles above Fort Donelson.

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NASHVILLE, *February 25, 1862.*

General C. F. SMITH,

*Commanding U. S. Forces, Clarksville:*

GENERAL: The landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my in-

tention, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this side at every hazard. If the enemy should assume the offensive, and I am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only 15,000 men. I have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all the available force under your command. So important do I consider the occasion that I think it necessary to give this communication all the force of orders, and I send four boats, the *Diana*, *Woodford*, *John Rain*, and *Autoerat*, to bring you up. In five or six days my force will probably be sufficient to relieve you.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

The steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night.

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
MARCH 1, 1862.

General McCLELLAN,

*Commanding, &c., Washington:*

Yours of yesterday and to-day received. I have two divisions, say 18,000 men, with thirty-six pieces of artillery. McCook's division will cross to-morrow. Wood will close upon him I think by the day after. I have sent the troops back to Clarksville. Johnston will not stand at Murfreesborough; in fact is preparing to get out of the way. I hope to be able to crowd him a little. Their plan seems to be to get the rear of the Tennessee, and in positions to concentrate either on Halleck or me. I will say more about this when my information is clearer, and until then I cannot well determine my movements. You are aware that, for reasons given some time ago, Carter's is the only column moving toward East Tennessee. I have not heard of his being beyond Cumberland Ford.

D. C. BUELL,  
*Brigadier-General.*



FORTIFICATIONS  
ON THE  
CUMBERLAND.

See Schoepf to Thomas, p. 536.



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


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